Gordon G. Gallup, Jr.

A Mirror for the Mind of Man, or Will the

James L. Boren Chimpanzee Create an Identity Crisis for
Gregg J. Gagliardi Homo sapiens ?
Larry B. Wallnau
Assumptions of human uniqueness abound in many of the social and
Department of Pocholoo, behavioral sciences. However, to the extent that many of these ideas
•~tate University of N e w York at about man can be operationalized, data exist which show that
Albany, Albany, New York 12222, chimpanzees, and perhaps other great apes, are capable of functioning
U.8.A. iv. strikingly hominoid ways. This literature is reviewed in light of
evidence which suggests that common distinctions and imagined
Received 8 June 1976 and barriers between human and animal behavior may be inappropriate.
accepted 5 July 1976
K~wor&: chimpanzees, tools, tool fabrications predatory behavior,
language, cross-modal perception, self-recognltion, consciousness.
I II I III III II _ -- -- I I II | I I __ __ IIII

I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h e existence of certain fundamental distinctions between human and non-human be-
havior continues to characterize much of the thinking in the behavioral sciences. Certain
recent developments have the potential to greatly alter these views, and may necessitate a
re-evaluation of ourselves in relation to other species.
Current research on chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) is providing data which challenge
many cherished notions of human uniqueness. In a recent review of biochemical and im-
munological research, King &: Wilson (I 975) conclude that humans and chimpanzees are
so alike genetically and biochemically that they are at least as similar to one another as
sibling species of other animals (e.g. dogs and wolves). They also note that the major
anatomical and behavioral differences between chimpanzees and humans seem para-
doxical in light of these data. While anatomical differences do exist, there is a growing
body of evidence that casts doubt on our behavioral uniqueness. Research on such
topics as tool use, tool fabrication, predatory behavior, language, cross-modal perception
and self-recognition in chimpanzees is reviewed in terms of some of these preconceptions.

2. T o o l s
One of the first candidates for a uniquely human trait was tool use. It has become fashion-
able to view our evolutionary history as one of descending from the trees and assuming the
role of primate predators. It is held that we changed from arboreal foragers to terrestrial
hunters. Tools, principally in the form of weapons, were assumed to be critical for making
the transition (Washburn & Lancaster, 1968)*.
Man's distinction as a tool user was short lived, however, as reports of tool use in a variety
of creatures such as birds and sea otters began to accumulate (Hall, 1963; van Lawick-
Goodall, 1970). Under pressure to refine our ideas, the next step was to declare man the
only animal to engage in tool fabrication (e.g. LeGros Clark, 1959). T h e n it became d e a r
that a number of different species also engage in tool manufacture. Free-ranging chimpan-
zees, for example, fabricate and use a variety of tools. These include implements for
extracting insects from their nests (termite fishing), and ingeniously contrived sponge-like
drinking tools used to remove water from hollow tree trunks during the dry season (van
* For the present purposes a tool can be defined as any inanimate
extension of the body used to accomplish some end.
Journal of Human Evolution (1977) 6p 303-313
 $04 o . O . OALLUP E T A£.

Lawick-Goodall, 1968, 1970). Beck (1975) distinguishes between at least four different
categories of tool fabrication by chimpanzees: (1) detachment of potential tools from the
substrate; e.g. breaking off a branch, (2) subtraction of elements from objects; e.g.
stripping offleaves and twigs from a branch, (3) combination ofobjects, e.g. joining sticks
together, and (4) reshaping objects for functional purposes.
The claim has also been made that premeditated tool fabrication is uniquely human
(Oaldey, 1959). But as evidence that it can be a consequence of planned, deliberate
action in other species, several investigators (e.g. Teleki, 1974) have seen chimpanzees
prepare collections of tools in advance of an intensive session of termite fishing. Moreover,
when a particularly good tool is struck upon its owner will often retain it for use on other
termite mounds.
Among chimpanzees, unlike many other tool-using species, tool use is not confined to
repetitive stereotyped acts, but is quite optional and flexible in meeting the demands of
different situations. Sticks, which are readily available at all sites, are a good case in point.
Chimpanzees have been seen using sticks of various sizes for such diverse purposes as
tooth picks for dental grooming (McGrew & Turin, 1973), touching, raking, scratching,
termite fishing, olfactory probes, agonistic displays (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968, 1970;
Teleki, 1974), and for purposes of hitting, clubbing and aimed throwing (e.g. Korflandt &
Kooij, 1963). On at least one occasion chimpanzees have been seen using sticks to extract
honey from beehives (Merfield & Miller, 1956), and van Lawick-Ooodall (1971) has seen
chimpanzees using large sticks as leverage to pry open metal boxes containing hidden
fruit.
Also unLike most tool-using animals, chimpanzees can learn to fabricate and use tools
by simply observing companions (Beck, 1974; Teleki, 1974). Among a group of Captive
chimpanzees, Menzel (1972) reported an intriguing instance of ladder invention with
sticks, and once this technique was perfected it rapidly diffused to other members of the
group and eventuated in active ladder-building collaboration among certain individuals.
As it stands, humans are left, for the time being, with the somewhat deflated distinction
of being the only species known to use tools to make tools.

3. Predatory Behavior
That humans kill animals and eat meat has served both as a basis for theorizing about
hominization and as a rationale for continued distinction between humans and other
primates. As it applies to meat eating, however, this distinction becomes blurred in Light
of evidence (reviewed by Jones, 1972) that varied forms of meat eating occur among 12
genera of prosimians, 11 genera of Old and New World monkeys, and all great apes (see
Teleki, 1975). Moreover, at least one of these omnivorous primates, the chimpanzee,
engages in cooperative hunting rather than mere opportunistic capture*.
Predatory behavior among chimpanzees is systematic and deliberate. The initiation of
a predatory episode is often marked byan unusual silence among the participants, whichis
notable in that otherwise chimpanzees almost always make noise when engaged in group
activities. Of greater significance is the observation (Teleki, 1973b) that a recognizably
distinct walking gait is adopted by the participants. Their diet includes such large prey as
baboons and other monkeys, bush pigs and bushbucks. Hunting among chimpanzees is
* Recent reports (e.g. Hausfater, 1976; Strum, 1975) suggeat that
systematic hunting patterns may also exist in baboons.
 CHIMPANZEE AND IDENTITY CRISIS ~t5

almost exclusively a male activity and meat is one of the few foods they are willing to share
with other members of the group. Male-oriented, co-operative hunting patterns which
terminate in sharing have been held to be a hominoid hallmark and an evolutionary pre-
cursor to the development of modern man.
It could still be argued, however, that the infrequent observance of predatory behavior
in most chimpanzee groups and the relatively small contribution of meat to the chimpan-
zee diet render such behavior fundamentally different from human hunting activities. In
fact, the major criticism leveled a t Teleki's (197.3) study of chimps at the Gombe National
Park centers around the theme that banana provisioning was an artificial situation which,
for a number of reasons, acted to increase the rate of chimpanzee predatory activities
(Gaulin & Kurland, 1976; Reynolds, 1975). However, as Teleki (1973b, 1975) and Strum
(1976) have noted, chimpanzee predatory behavior was observed both before the banana
provisioning began and after it was terminated at Combe. Further, additional evidence
shows that predatory behavior occurs in non-provisioned chimpanzee groups outside of
Gombe. Indeed, the degree of hunting organization, the complexity of communication
involved in the sharing of meat, and the apparent suspension of high social status during
the meat-consumption phase of predation argue strongly for a pattern of behavior that has
been developing for some time. Banana provisioning may have temporarily altered the
rate of predatory behavior on baboon prey, but in light of the preceding considerations
this appears to be a tangential issue at best. Moreover~ as Teleki (1975) has suggested,
differences in meat intake between human hunters and chimpanzees may be primarily the
result of greater technological sophistication on the part of human hunters. In any case,
such differences should not obscure the more fundamental similarities between human and
chimpanzee predatory behavior,
It is worth noting that the chimpanzee's capacity for innovative tool use also extends to
his predatory activities. The sponge-like drinking tools, consisting of partially chewed up
leaves, are alternatively used on occasion for purposes of extracting and consuming the
brains of their prey (Teleki, 1973b). It is also interesting to consider the methods of killing
employed by some, usuany physically handicapped, chimpanzees. Teleki (1973b) has
observed one such chimpanzee dashing the head of his prey repeatedly against tree trunks.
Given the chimpanzee capacity for innovation, it may be a short step indeed from hitting a
head against a tree to hitting a stick against a head.

4. Dotnlnance, Incest and Attrlbut[on

Reminiscent of man, dominance relations among chimpanzees can be based on subtle
psychological traits such as ingenuity and invention rather than or in addition to brute
strength and overt aggression, j a n e Goodal1's description (1971) of the subordinate male
who rapidly achieved dominant status by virtue of a clever invention is a typical example.
By banging two empty kerosene cans together to augment his intimidation display this
individual, in a matter of days, rose to dominance and achieved and maintained the
respect of all others including physically larger males.
While the issue of inhibition of genealogical mating among primates remains contro-
versial at best (e.g. Missakian, 1973), chimpanzees show what appears to be incest avoid-
ance. Despite frequent opportunities for such relatiom, Goodall has never observed an
instance of mother-son copulation after the offspring reach puberty. Whether father-
daughter relations occur is a moot point since chimpanzees are promiscuous, and status
 $06 o, o. OALLUP •r AL.

appears unrelated to preferential patterns of mating, thereby obscuring father-daughter

identities.
One final observation, by Ooodall (1968) deserves mention in this context. Suggestive
of their human-like intellect she notes that when two infant chimps are playing together,
if one is hurt as a consequence of the other being too rough, rather than, or in addition to,
reprimanding the aggressor, the mother of the victim sometimes attacks the offender's
mother. This might bc construed as an instance of what psychologists call attribution of
responsibility. Responsibility for the misbehavior would not appear to b e placed com-
pletely on the other infant, but on his mother as well. While this might seem to be a less
than parsimonious interpretation, chimpanzee mentality often defies the law of parsi-
mony. As noted by Menzel (1973), although mentalistic terms do not necessarily explain
what chimpanzees do, they nevertheless often yield accurate predictions and succinct
descriptions of such behavior.

5. L a n g u a g e
Language, defined as the use of otherwise arbitrary symbols for the purpose of communica-
tion, has always been a major holdout for human uniqueness. Several unsuccessful
attempts to teach chimpanzees human speech (reviewed by Kellogg, 1968) have bolstered
this position. But recent examination of the chimpanzee vocal apparatus (Liberman,
Crelin & Klatt, 1972) reveals that it may not be anatomically suited for producing all but
a few of the phonemes required for human speech. Unlike human infants, baby chimpan-
zees show tittle or no spontaneous babbling. However, infant chimps do seem to engage in
considerable gestural "babbling".
In 1966 all attempt was therefore made to teach a one-year old female chimpanzee,
Washoe, to use gestural signs (Gardner & Gardner, 1969). Using a form of the American
Sign Language (Ameslan), the Gardners attempted to rear Washoe in a linguistic environ-
ment of gestural signs in much the same way as human infants are reared in an environ-
ment of speech sounds*. Through the use of reinforcement and guidance techniques,
Washoe eventually learned the Ameslan equivalent of a variety of nouns, verbs, adverbs,
adjectives and prepositions. As her active vocabulary increased, her ability to acquire new
signs grew rapidly, and without prompting she began to generalize these signs to novel
contexts. After over a year of training, Washoe began to spontaneously combine signs into
meaningful phrases and simple sentences in a manner which showed a striking parallel to
language development in both deaf and speaking children (Gardner & Gardner, 1971).
Her vocabulary eventually grew to about 160 signs, including some of her own invention,
and, much !ike humans, her passive comprehension greatly exceeded her active vocabu-
lary.
In a more recent sequel to Project Washoe, two chimps, Moja and Pili, were reared from
birth by native speakers of Ameslan (Gardner & Gardner, 1975). Exposure to sign
language earlier in life, by more fluent models, resulted in both chimps showing evidence
* American Sign Language can be considered a h u m a n langlaage,
thereby partially circumventing the problem of having to show that the
system is a valid form of language. Certainly to claim that the system
must be vocal to qualify as language seems superficial and defensive,
at least in terms of more basic questions about the mental capacity for
symbolic communication. Although teaching gestural speech to an
ape was an innovative idea, it was not new. Yerkes suggested the
possibility of teachingsign language to chimpanzees in 1927.
 CHIMPANZEE A N D IDENTITY Cl~ISIS 307

of gestural communication as early as three months of age. By six months both chimps
had mastered a dozen or more signs. Washoe, who began her training at one year, with
novice models, acquired only two signs in a similar six-month period.
In a separate and unrelated case, Premack (1971) has taken a different approach to
assessing the linguistic capacity of a chimpanzee named Sarah. Sarah, unlike Washoe,
was reared under laboratory conditions and was taught with operant techniques to employ
plastic, geometric forms as referents for objects, events and/or transactions. She eventually
acquired a vocabulary of about 130 symbols and was able to form simple declarative
sentences, obey instructions conveyed in compound sentences, and even respond to con-
ditional relations and interrogatives. With the introduction of a symbol for "~tame of" it
finally became possible to use language to teach Sarah language (Premack ~& Premack,
1972). In addition, Sarah was able to abstract and symbolize objects in their absence
with language. When asked to describe the symbol for apple (a blue triangle) she de-
scribed it as round, red and edible. As evidence for the applicability and generality of
Sarah's language learning regime, a similar approach has proven useful for teaching
language skills to aphasic children (Glass, Gazzaniga & Premack, 1973).
Another chimpanzee named Lana, has been taught to communicate with a computer
(Rumbaugh, Gill &von Glaserfeld, 1973). A notable feature of this method is that it elimin-
ates the influence of subtle cues which might otherwise be unwittingly provided by human
companions, and thus precludes the problem of a "clever Hans effect". Lana converses
with the computer by pressing rectangular plastic displays containing geometric forms.
The computer has been programmed to accept certain combinations of responses, which
adhere to the grammar of an artificial language called Yerkish, and to reject those which
do not. Her performance suggests that she can both identify valid and invalid sentence
fragments presented to her by the computer, and supply valid endings to incomplete
sentences. Like Sarah, Lana can encode and decode simple declarative and interrogative
phrases, and, in addition, can use the universal abstract referent "this" when referring to
specific objects (Gill & Rumbaugh, 1974).
To date, over a dozen chimpanzees have been given language training using non-verbal
media. In many cases these animals not only communicate effectively, but appear sensi-
tive to word order or syntax. Fouts (1975) describes a typical instance of apparent syntax
comprehension with a chimp named Lucy. When Lucy wants to be tickled she signs
"tickle Lucy". If her human companion signs "tickle Lucy" she behaves as if she expects
to be fielded. But if her companion signs "Lucy tickle", she attempts to tickle her com-
panion. Simply changing the word order drastically alters the meaning of the message.
While the linguistic accomplishments of chimpanzees are indeed remarkable, some
linguists claim that chimpanzees are unable to use language in a reeonstitutive manner
(Bronowski & BeUugi, 1970). The reeonstitutive use of language refers to the ability to
break down complex messages into parts which can later be re-arranged to form other
messages; i.e. reconstitution implies creative use of language. However, recent evidence
shows that chimpanzees do in fact use language in this manner (Fouts, 1974), with many
instances of grammatically correct reconsdtutions having been noted. Washoe's descrip-
tion of a duck as a "water bird" and Lucy's innovative characterization of a radish as
"cry hurt food", or reference to Fours as "dirty Roger" suffice for purposes of illustration.
Attempts are now underway to see if chimpanzees can use language skills to communi-
cate with one another (Fouts, Mellgren & Lemon, 1973). Fouts (1974) has shown that
without prompting chimpanzees who have received trainingin Ameslan readily sign to one
 ~08 O . O . GALLUP E T .4L.

another in a variety of c o n t e x t s . In terms of intraspecific communication, Menzel (1973,

1975) reports some elegant research on the possible existence of "natural language"
among chimpanzees. His work shows that without any training or explicit human inter-
vention, chimpanzees are capable of conveying to one another in subtle ways "the
presence, direction, probable location, and the relative desirability and undesirability" of
a distant, hidden object that olfly one has seen. Moreover, it appears that a chimpanzee
with information about a highly desirable piece of food may actively attempt to deceive
other chimpanzees as to its location.
Eventually we may have to concede that, with some exceptions (Mounin, 1976; Smith,
1973), chimpanzees are capable of learning to use the functional properties oflanguage in
embarrassingly human ways. If we accept language or some special use of language (e.g.
reconstitution) as the defining characteristic of man, then in light of the chimpanzee
accomplishments we are forced, as Leakey said about tools, to either redefine language or
redefine man. Faced with this choice, it may be tempting to opt for the former. However,
in the light of evidence that the vocal apparatus of Neanderthal man may have been
incapable of producing many of the sounds currently part of everyday speech (Liberman,
Crelin & Klatt, 1972), and theoretical work on the gestural origin of language in man
(Hewes, 1973), adherents to an increasingly rationalized definition of languages are
placed in a peculiar predicament. The tendency to continuously redefine language in
light of the chimpanzee accomplishments, may occur at the expense of excluding Neander-
thal man as well as the chimpanzee. Scientists of all persuasions will no doubt continue to
debate the linguistic achievements of chimpanzees (e.g. Brunet, 1972; Lennenberg, 1971 ;
Mounin, 1976) and the vocal capabilities of Neanderthal man (Falk, 1975). Although the
controversy may eventually lead to a better understanding of what we mean by language,
predicated on our willingness to recognize the similarities between ourselves and chimpan-
zees, it may or may not have the same effect on our thinking about man.

6. Cross-modal Perception
One of the most interesting byproducts of language training with chimpanzees is that it
does not appear to provide them with radically new concepts, but rather merely gives
them a means of expressing what they already know (Premack & Premack, 1972). In fact,
there is increasing evidence that symbolic-like processes antedate language, or what
Menzel (1973) refers to as "the apparent evolutionary independence of representational
ability and verbal language".
Cross-modal perception is a good illustration of the fact that thinking-llke processes may
pre-date language. This refers to the ability to conceptually equate information between
different sensory modalities; such as recognizing that the visual, olfactory and tactile
representations of a piece of fruit all pertain to the same object. The ability to synthesize
and integrate modality specific information to achieve intcrmodal equivalence has long
been considered an exclusive property of man. Since the senses are somewhat structurally
and neurologically independent, the mediational processes underlying this capacity were
thought to presuppose language (Ettlinger, 1973). In support of the need for linguistic
underpinnings, until recently (e.g. Weiskranz & Cowey, 1975) attempts to demonstrate
cross-modal perception in monkeys met with repeated failures (Rtflingcr, 1967).
But, as evidence for the ability to equate heterogeneous input from several modalities in
great apes, the concept of stimulus equivalence can be acquired by linguistically naive
 CHIMPANZEE AND IDENTITY GR~IS 309

chimpanzees and orangutans (Davenport & Rogers, 1970; Davenport, Rogers & Russell,
1973). Thus, rather than being a consequence of Janguage, the perceptual integration of
intermodal information may be an important precondition for the develdpment and
elaboration of language (Geschwind, 1965; Hewes, 197S).

7. Self-recogn/tlon
O n e of the lastsubstantive psychological holdouts for h u m a n uniqueness is consciousness
or self-awareness*. Consciousness in this sense can be defined by an awareness of one's
own existence. The persistent idea that m a n m a y be cvolution's first instance of self-
awareness (e.g. Ardrey, 1961 ; Buss, 1973), has bccn reinforced by the pervasive feeling
among behavioral scientiststhat in animals consciousness is not amenable to objective
study. For example, Gardincr (1974) claims that "there is no way to interview animals to
discover the exact point on the evolutionary scale at which this phenomenon (conscious-
ness) emerges. Neither is there any way to determine when 'self'becomes an element
within the subjective mass. @ "
• •

A few years ago, however, a study was conducted with chimpanzees and mirrors which
reflectson this problem (Gallup, 1970). Upon seeing themselves in a mirror m a n y organ-
isrns react as if confronted with another unfamiliar animal. The chimpanzees were no
exception, but aRcr a few days of exposure this social orientation disappeared. They
gradually began to use the mirror to gain visual access to otherwise inaccessible parts of
their bodies, to inspect the inside of their mouths, to groom themselves, and to view and
manipulate their genitals.
To objectify these obscryations, the mirror was removed and each chimpanzee was
anesthetized. While unconscious, the upper half of an eyebrow ridge and the opposite car
was strategicallypainted with an odorless, non-irritating red dye. Later, as evidence for
self-recognition, when allowed to view their reflections they all tried repeatedly to touch
and inspect the painted spots with the aid of the mirror. These findings have now bccn
replicated with chimpanzees at least twice (Gallup, McClure, Hill & Bundy, 1971; Lcth-
mate & Diickcr, 1973), and extended by Lcthmatc & Diickcr to include orangutans.
However, so far all other primates, including spider monkeys, capuchins, several species of
macaques, mandrill and hamadryas baboons, and both species of gibbons have failed to
show any signs of self-recognition after prolonged exposure to minors (GaUup, 1970;
Lcthrnatc & Dfickcr, 1973). Curiously, monkeys sccm incapable ofrccognizing that their
o w n behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the mirror.
Since the identity of the observer and the mirror image arc one and the same, the
ability to correctly infer the identity of its reflection in a mirror would sccm to bc predi-
cated on an organism which has an already existentidentity of itsown. SVithout at least a
rudimentary sense of identity, self-recognition would bc impossible. Thus, tests of self-
* Religion might be construed as exclusively human. But superstitious
behaviors, in the sense of coincidentally reinforced responses which
lack an instrumental component, have been repeatedly demonstrated
in many animals (e.g. Herrnstein, 1966). Not unrelated to the issue of
religion is the question of death. While man may or may not be
unique in his ability to contaraplate his own death, such a capacity
would seem to presuppose, and be a logical extension of an awareness
of one's own existence. Teleki (1973a) describes group behaviors in
response to the death of a chimpanzee which could be viewed as sug-
gestive of some appreciation for death in a conspecific.
310 o . o . OALLUeET AL.

recognition represent one way ofoperationaUzing self-awareness (GaUup, 1975). Although

modified versions of this technique typically yield positive results with humans (Amster-
dam, 1972), profoundly retarded children and adults often fail the test of self-recognition
(Pechacek, Bell, Cleland, Baum & Boyle, 1973). So far only three species have been found
capable of self-recognition: chimpanzees, orangutans and man. No one has tried to teach
linguisti¢ skills to orangutans, but the orangutan appears deserving of more attention*.
Related to the chimp's apparent concept of self, there was an intriguing informal
experiment conducted in the 1950's on a home-reared chimpanzee named Vicki. Like all
early attempts, Vicki never acquired convincing patterns of speech. But one of the things
she learned was to sort stacks of snapshots into a human versus animal pile. One day un-
beknown to Vicki, her own photograph was placed in the middle of the pile. When she
came to her picture, without hesitation Vicki placed it onto the human stack (Hayes &
Nissen, 1971). Man may not be the only one capable of appreciating the similarities be-
tween men and chimpanzees.

8. Biological Overlap
To a reductionist, it shotdd come as no surprise that the biological similarities between
man and c~himpanzee are at least as striking as the behavioral ones. In terms of gross
anatomy and topography the chimpanzee brain closely resembles our own. Neuro-
anatomical analyses (e.g. Shantha & Manocha, 1969) show that the chimpanzee brain is
very much like a human brain in miniaturet. While the phrase is figuratively misleading,
it appears technically true that chimpanzees and men are literally "blood relatives".
Chimpanzees give isoagglutination reactions which are indistinguishable from human
blood (Chiarelli, 1973), and a sequence analysis of hemoglobin reveals an exactly identical
order of amino acid molecules (Wilson & Sarich, 1969).
Based on their review ofthe literature King & Wilson (1975) conclude that"the average
human polypeptide is more than 99 ~o identical to its chimpanzee counterpart", and that
the genetic distance between humans and chimps shows that we are at least as similar as
sibling species of other organisms. King & Wilson suggest that anatomical differences
between man and chimpanzee may be accounted for by small changes in mechanisms
which influence the expression of genes. In light of such data it is not quite as surprising
that Reemtsma el al. (1964) report a bilateral kidney transplant from a chimpanzee to a
human which maintained the recipient for nine months.

9. Conclusion
Chimpanzees are not human. It is equally clear that while we may share a common
ancestor, man did not evolve from chimpanzees (LeGros Clark, 1959). However, many
of the most cherished notions of human uniqueness have become increasingly suspect as a
consequence of what we now know about the mentality and physiology of Pan troglodytes.
* It is important to note that the value of language acquisition for
taxonomic purposes is as yet very unclear. We simply do not know the
phyletic limits of the capacity for symbolic communication. No one,
for instance, has reported a systematic attempt to teach sign language
to a Rhesus monkey.
I" Since cerebral asymmetry is generally associated with man's capacity
for language, it is interesting to note that chimpanzees, but not Rhesus
monkeys, show temporal lobe asymmetries which are similar to those
found in the human brain (Yeni-Komshian & Benson, 1976).
 CHIMPANZEE AND m E N ~ " CR~S 311

Psychologically and biologically,most of the differences between humans and chimpan-

zees are a matter of dcgrcc, not a matter of kind. The correspondence between our be-
havior and the chimpanzcc's supports Mason's (1976) contention that the "essentialterms
of our uniqueness have yet to bc defined" and that "time and time again wc have imposed
our own categories of experience on the (great) apes and havc found solid evidence of
correspondence". While no single chimpanzee achievement, inch:ding language, will
make a case for commonality or cvcn continuity, collcctivclythcy converge to imply that
perhaps somcday, in order to be logicallyconsistcnt,m a n m a y have to scriouslyconsider
the applicabilityof his political,ethical and moral philosophy to chimpanzees.
It is i~rcmaturc to try to answcr the qucstion posed by the titleof this papcr. But it is
important to note that the history of science can bc vicwcd as having brought about
gradual changes in man's conception of man. In the future,man's conception of m a n m a y
be grcatly altered by man's conception of the chimpanzee. Man's abilityto contemplate
his own existence has Icd him full circle,in the scnsc that hc has bcgun to question the
psychological as well as thc evolutionary basis of that cxistcncc in tcrms of whcthcr it
might bc sharcd by species other than his own.

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