CASE DIGESTS

1. Buklod Ñg Saulog Transit v. Casalla, et. al (G.R. No. L-8049. May 09, 1956)

Facts:

Respondents, 65 in number and the employees of the Saulog Transit Inc., filed
in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for a certification election for the
purpose of determining the sole bargaining representative of the employees in the
said company. Among its allegations is that there were two labor organizations
which represented the employees, to wit: herein petitioner, and the Saulog Transit
Employees Union (PFL).

The president of Buklod filed its answer stating that there is an existing CBA
between them and the company. After hearing, the respondent Court rendered
judgment directing that a certification election be held among the employees of
Saulog Transit Inc.

From the evidence on record, intervenor maintains that the employees can
only lay claim to forty-two (42) on their side and, therefore, this number no longer
constitute ten (10%) per cent of all the employees in the company minus the
supervisory personnel. However, the Court took note of the retractions made by the
employees and it shall not therefore destroy the desire of all signatories
constituting, at least 10% of the employees in the appropriate unit desiring
certification election.

It was also found by the Court that the CBA does not touch in substantial terms
the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment
of all the employees in the company, but seeks to establish only a grievance
procedure.

Issues:

1. WON the respondent Court does not acquire jurisdiction over the petition filed
because of the diminution in number by retraction or withdrawal of any of the
employees, is violative of the 10% rule.

2. WON the CBA between the Buklod and the Saulog Transit which is incomplete,
will constitute a bar to certification election.

Ruling:
1. The petition filed by 65 laborers of the Saulog was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of Industrial Relations, for their number was more
than 10%. Under Section 12, RA No. 875 speaks of the 10% at thetime of the
filing of the petition. Retractions and withdrawals, therefore, after the petition is
filed cannot affect the number of the Petitioners at the time the petition is filed.

2. No. The agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification election, and
even if there is a supplemental agreement, it having been entered into after filing
of the petition for a certification election, the same cannot and does not bar a
certification election.

The contention that as Section 13 of RA No. 875, does not require that the
agreement be in writing unless either party request that it be reduce in writing,
thereby insinuating that there had been a verbal understanding before the
written agreement was entered into, has no bearing and effect in a case where
there is a written agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations found
incomplete.

2. Associated Trade Unions-ATU v. Noriel (G.R. No. L-48367. January 16, 1979)

Facts:

The Federation of Free Workers filed a petition for certification election

amon the regular rank-and-file employees of the Synthetic Marketing and Industrial
Corporation. The petition alleges that they constitute as the majority of the rank-
and-file employees bargaining unit and that there has been no certification election
in the company for the last 12 months preceding the filing of the said petition,
despite the fact that there exist another union in the establishment, the ATU-
KILUSAN.

Both the Company and the ATU opposed the petition on the ground that is it
contract-barred by virtue of the existence of a duly registered CBA with the Bureau
of Labor Relations. On the other hand, the Federation assailed the validity of the said
CBA on the ground that the same had been executed 5 months prior to its expiration
and was not ratified by its members.

Issue: WON the contract-bar rule is applicable in the case at bar.

Ruling:

No. The said CBA was certified after the petition for certification election was
filed by the Federation, and its certification was conditioned upon the fact that there
was no pending petition with the BLR. Likewise, the CBA was not yet in existence
when the instant petition was filed. Clearly, the management and the ATU
proceeded with such indecent haste in renewing their CBA in their obvious desire to
frustrate the will of the rank-and-file employees in selecting their collective
bargaining representative.

Therefore, the contract-bar rule does not apply to the case at bar since the
renewal thereof is way ahead of the 60-day freedom period (as it was renewed 28
days before the old CBA was to expire).

3. GOP-CCP, et.al v. Court of Industrial Relations (G.R. No. L-33015. Sept. 10,
1979) [consolidated case]

Facts: (L-33015)

On April 20, 1964, the union and the two above-mentioned corporations
entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBA) which could be effective for 3
years. By means of a supplementary agreement, the 3-year term was extended to
July 31, 1968. The agreements contained arbitration clauses which outlined the
grievance procedure for processing disputes regarding the terms of employment.
They also include no-strike and no-lockout provisions.

On October 26, 1967, two CIR prosecutors filed in behalf of the union and 3
dismissed employees a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) against the 2 firms
and their 3 officers. It was alleged that the 2 firms failed to comply with their
commitment to readjust the pay scales of the union members and that the 3
employees were dismissed because of their union membership and activities. The
case was docketed as Case No. 4875-ULP.

Without any notice, the union staged a strike and established picket lines at
the plants of the 2 firms so as to implement their protest against ULP complained
of.

By way of retaliation, a countercharge for ULP was filed by another CIR

prosecutor in behalf of the 2 corporations against the union for having staged a
strike in violation of the “no strike, no lockout” provisions and the grievance
procedure outlined in the CBA. That case was assigned to Judge Tabigne. The case
was docketed as Case No. 4881-ULP.

The union sought the consolidation of the 2 cases due to identity of parties
and close interweaving of issues but Judge Tabigne denied the consolidation.
 The union received a letter from the counsel of the 2 corporations,
manifesting a desire for the formalization of a “return to work” agreement and
requesting that the union should finalize its demands for the renewal of the CBA so
that the negotiations might be started. The union signified its unqualified
acceptance of that offer. It lifted its picket lines. The strikers held themselves in
readiness to work immediately.

However, the 2 corporations allegedly refused to readmit the strikers with

the exception of 4 of them. As a result, the union amended its complaint in Case No.
4875-ULP so as to charge such refusal as an additional ULP. Believing that the
amendment of the complaint in Case No. 4873-ULP constituted a prejudicial
question in Case No. 4881-ULO, the union moved for a suspension of the latter case.
Judge Tabigne denied such motion and was affirmed by the CIR en banc.

After the 2 firms had presented their evidence in Case No. 4881-ULP the
union was required to present its evidence but failed to do so. Hence, Judge Tabigne
considered the case submitted for decision without the union’s evidence. That
order was affirmed by the CIR en banc. The union appealed but it later withdrew
such appeal.

Judge Tabigne found (1) that when the strike was declared, there was no
grievance pending between the union and the 2 employers and that, if there was
such a grievance, the union did not avail itself of the procedure delineated in the
CBA; (2) that there was no notice of the intention to go on strike and no such notice
was filed with the Department of Labor; (3) that the strike was characterized by
coercion, intimidation and threats; and (4) that by means of picketing, the strikers
prevented the nonstriking employees from working.

The union contended in its appeal in Case No. 4881-ULP that they were
denied due process of law because the case was decided solely on the basis of
complainant’s evidence.

Issues:

1. WON the union was deprived of their right to due process;

2. WON CIR erred in deciding the ULP case filed by the employers without awaiting
the outcome of the prior ULP case filed by the union;
3. WON CIR gravely abuse its discretion when it denied the consolidation of the 2
ULP cases;
4. WON there is a total lack of evidence proving the commission of coercion,
intimidation and threats by the strikers like Trinidad and Valenzuela;
5. WON CIR erred in not granting their motion to reopen the case 3 months after
the case was submitted for decision;
6. WON the strike was lawful.
Ruling:

1. NO. The union was given the opportunity to present its evidence but they
refused to do so. Their pretext was that a prejudicial question was involved in
the ULP case filed by them.

2. NO. The first ULP case was submitted for decision in the CIR in 1974 and was
decided by a Labor Arbiter in 1975 and later passed upon by the NLRC and the
Secretary of Labor and eventually decided by the Office of the President on
November 18, 1977.

On the other hand, the instant case was decided by the CIR in 1970. Had it been
made to await the outcome of Case No. 4876-ULP, it might still ne undecided up
to this time. The wheels of justice grind slowly. Delay is the bane of litigation.

3. NO. The facts, circumstances and remedies or reliefs prayed for in 2 ULP cases
are at variance and entirely different.

4. NO. Trinidad was the union president. The acts were committed in the presence
of the other union members. They did not try to restrain the commission of those
acts. Their presence and inaction were tantamount to assent to the commission
of those acts.

5. NO. It will be recalled that Judge Tabigne considered the case submitted for
decision without petitioners’ evidence. In his decision he stated that the motion
for reopening was devoid of merit because the petitioners had been accorded
sufficient opportunity to present their evidence and, therefore, the petitioners
had not been denied due process.

Petitioners invoked Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, regarding “limit of

effectiveness of award”, to support their contention that the denial of their
motion to reopen was erroneous.

It is to be noted that under Section 17, it is not mandatory or ministerial for the
CIR to reopen any question involved in its award, order or decision. The
reopening is discretionary with the CIR.

6. NO. For a strike to be lawful, it must be preceded by the requisite notice of

intention to strike. It should have lawful purpose and it should be executed
through lawful means.
 In this case, the strike was not preceded by any notice. It was not peacefully
conducted. It was in contravention of the “no strike, no lockout” stipulations of
the CBA. The CIR correctly concluded that it was an illegal strike.

WHEREFORE, Judge Tabigne’s decision and the CIR’s resolution in Case

No. 4881-ULP should be AFFIRMED.

4. Firestone Tire & Rubber (FEU) v. Estrella (G.R. No. L-45513-14, Jan. 06,
1978)

Facts:

The NLRC certified a 3-year CBA between respondents ALU and FTRCP. Said
CBA was to be effective from February 1, 973 to January 31, 1976. In 1974, a
supplemental agreement was made extending the life of the CBA for 1 year. The ex-
tension was not ratified by the covered employees nor submitted to the
Department of Labor for certification.

Prior to the original expiry date of the agreement, 276 employees, by way of
letter to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, requested for the issuance of
a certificate of registration in favor of petitioner FEU. Such registration was then
granted and issued to FEU.

10 days after the original expiry date of the CBA, FEU filed a petition with the
Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election. ALU filed a petition for
cancellation alleging that at the time of FEU’s registration, ALU was the recognized
and certified collective bargaining agent in the unit and that FEU had not submitted
the required sworn statement that there is no recognized collective bargaining
agent therein.

ALU prayed for the dismissal of RO4-MED-143-76 on the grounds that it has
pending petition for cancellation of FEU’s registration certificate and that there is
an existing CBA, due to expire on January 31, 1977, which constitutes a valid bar to
the holding of a certification election. FTRCP likewise opposed on the ground that
the petition therefore was filed late considering that it was filed 10 days after the
expiry date of the CBA.

Med-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition for certification election.

ALU and FTRCP filed separate appeals from such order before the Bureau of Labor
Relations. Such order was affirmed by Director Noriel and Motions for
Reconsideration were filed by ALU and FTRCP.
 In 1977, respondent Estrella reversed the order of the Med-Arbiter. It ruled
that according to Section 4, Rule II, Book V of Rules of Implementing the Labor
Code, no union may be registered when there is in the bargaining unit a recognized
or certified collective bargaining agent. The Acting Director found that there was in
fact a bargaining agent in the unit (ALU) and that there was a CBA which was yet to
expire on January 31, 1997. Hence, this instant petition for review by way of
certiorari.

FEU contented that the issue of WON there was an existing CBA to validly
bar the holding of a certification election should have been resolved by respondent
Estrella in BLR Case No. A-070-76 as it was already intertwined with the issue of
petitioner’s legal personality as assailed in BLR Case No 2016-76. According to
petitioner, if the petition for certification election is not barred by the CBA in
question, then the registration certificate, acquired as it is within the 60-day
freedom period of such CBA must be likewise not bared or denied as premature.
Petitioner further alleges that there being no pronouncement on the applicability of
the “contract bar” rule in this case, the cancellation is devoid of legal basis.

Further, it is petitioner’s stand that the expiry date of January 1, 1997 was
unauthorized because the extension of the contract was not certified by the
Department of Labor.

In the meantime, due to the fact that the CBA had already expired ALU
demanded the FTRCP negotiate with it for a new CBA. The latter seek an advice
from the Department of Labor for proper course of action. In response, the latter
answered that there is is no legal impediment for the company to negotiate a new
CBA with the Associated Labor Unions. Accordingly, a new CBA was entered into on
April 1, 1977.

Issue: WON the existence of a certified or recognized collective bargaining agent

bars the formation of a new labor organization.

Ruling:

NO. A contract does not operate as a bar to representation proceedings

where it is shown that because of a schism in the union the contract can no longer
serve to promote industrial stability for the direction of the election is in the
interest of industrial stability, as well as in the interest of the employees’ right in
the selection of their bargaining representatives.

Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to
select representatives can be justified only where stability is deemed paramount.
Excepted from the contract bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not
foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the
representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be
subordinated to the employees’ freedom of choice because it does not establish
the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law.

In the case at bar, it is doubtful if any contract that may have been entered
into between ALU and FTRCP will foster in the bargaining unit, in view of the fact
that substantial number of the employees therein have resigned from ALU and
joined FEU. At any rate, this is a matter that must be finally determined by means
of a certification election.

Similarly, in Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) vs. Bureau of Labor

Relations, et. al., it was held that once the fact of disaffiliation has been
demonstrated beyond doubt, a certification election is the most expeditious way of
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
representative.

It appearing that the extension of the life of the CBA was not certified, it
cannot, therefore, also bar the certification election. Only a certified CBA would
serve as a bar to such election.

Corollary, therefore, petitioner’s application for registration was not

premature, as it need not waited for the expiration of the one-year extension, the
agreement having expired on January 31, 1976.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The resolutions

are hereby REVERSED.