TANTUICO, JR. VS.
REPUBLIC acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust
G.R. No. 89114 December 2, 1991
FACTS: Kenny Tantuico, Jr. filed this
petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, the petitioner seeks to
annul and set aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, denying his motion for a
bill of particulars as well as its resolution,
dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion
for reconsideration; to compel the
respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill
of particulars, or that said respondent be
ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant
in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to
submit the said bill of particulars; and to
enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding against petitioner until
the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming
that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the
aforesaid resolutions and that there is no
appeal,nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy for him in the ordinary course of
law other than the present petition.
As prayed for, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary restraining order “effective
immediately and continuing until further
orders, ordering the respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
further proceeding in Civil Case No. 0035
(PCGG 35), entitled “Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez, et al.” pending before it.
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was
included as defendant in Civil Case No.
0035 on the theory that:
(1) he acted in unlawful concert with the
principal defendants in the
misappropriation and theft of public funds,
plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other
and brazen abuse of power;
(2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent,
by allowing himself to be incorporator,
director, board member and/or stockholder
of corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by the principal defendants;
(3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in
flagrant breach of public trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with
gross and scandalous abuse of right and
power and in brazen violation of the
Constitution andlaws of the Philippines,
embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth;
(4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage
of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and with grave
failure to perform his constitutional duties
as such Chairman, acting in concert with
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the
withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds; and
(5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or
agent by allowing himself to be used as
instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to
plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or
member of corporations beneficially held
and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin
(Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent
recovery of assets illegally obtained.
After his motion for production and
inspection of documents was denied by
respondent court, petitioner filed a Motion
for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia
that he is sued for acts allegedly committed
by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private
individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a
complaint couched in too general terms and
shornof particulars that would inform him
of the factual and legal basis thereof, and
that to enable him to understand and know
with certainty the particular acts allegedly
committed by him and which he is now
charged with culpability, it is necessary that
plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought
therein.
On the contrary, those particulars are
material facts that should be clearly and
definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may, in fairness, be
informed of the claims made against him to
the end that he may be prepared to meet the
issues at the trial. Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic,
204 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 89114 December 2,
1991.

In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and Note.—The proper office of a bill of
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of particulars is to inform the opposite party
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or and the court of the precise nature and
restraining order, the petitioner seeks to character ofthe cause of action. (Tan vs.
annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 34.)
Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989,
denying his motion for a bill of particulars
as well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989,
which denied his motion for
reconsideration; to compel the respondent
PCGG to prepare and file a bill of
particulars, or that said respondent be
ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant
in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to
submit the said bill of particulars; and to
enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding against petitioner until
the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming
that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the
aforesaid resolutions and that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy for him in the ordinary course of
law other than the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the particulars

prayed by the petitioner is evidentiary.

HELD: No. The particulars are not

evidentiary in nature. The Court held that
the particulars prayed for, such as, names of
persons, names of corporations, dates,
amounts involved, a specification of
property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would
support the conclusions and inferences in
the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR.
represented by their co-heirs and
Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS
and NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE vs.
JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO
G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D.
FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all
minors represented herein by their parents
SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA
D. FAVIS
G.R. No. 185922 January 15, 201
A petition for review assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals dismissing
petitioners’ complaint for annulment of the
Deed of Donation for failure to exert earnest
efforts towards a compromise.
FACTS: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis)
was married to Capitolina Aguilar
(Capitolina) with whom he had seven
children. When Capitolina died in March
1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez
(Juana), his common-law wife with whom
he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis
(Mariano), he executed an affidavit
acknowledging Mariano as one of his
legitimate children. Mariano is married to
Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he
has four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On
October 16, 1994, prior his death, he
allegedly executed a Deed of Donation
transferring and conveying properties in
favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming the said donation prejudiced their
legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina,
petitioners herein, filed an action for
annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, liquidation and
partition of property before the RTC against
Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their
grandchildren as respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The
trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of
92 and plagued with illnesses, could not
have had full control of his mental capacities
to execute a valid Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal
of the petitioners nullification case. The CA
motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for failure of petitioners to make
an averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, as mandated
by Article 151 of the Family Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely and
seriously erred in dismissing the complaint
for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise.
HELD: YES. CA committed egregious error
in dismissing the complaint. A failure to
allege earnest but failed efforts at a
compromise in a complaint among members
of the same family, is not a jurisdictional
defect but merely a defect in the statement
of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before
the trial court ran the full course. The
complaint of petitioners was answered by
respondents without a prior motion to
dismiss having been filed. The decision in
favor of the petitioners was appealed by
respondents on the basis of the alleged error
in the ruling on the merits, no mention
having been made about any defect in the
statement of a cause of action. In other
words, no motion to dismiss the complaint
based on the failure to comply with a
condition precedent was filed in the trial
court; neither was such failure assigned as
error in the appeal that respondent brought
before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the
non-jurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent. If the
respondents as parties-defendants could
not, and did not, after filing their answer to
petitioners complaint, invoke the objection
of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the
appellate court unquestionably did not have
any authority or basis to motu propio order
the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
The correctness of the finding was not
touched by the Court of Appeals. The
respondents opted to rely only on what the
appellate court considered, erroneously
though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial
court's factual finding, therefore, stands
unreversed; and respondents did not
provide us with any argument to have it
reversed.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is

reversed and set aside and the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

Petition for review is GRANTED.

PEDRO GAYON V. SILVESTRE GAYON heir, interested, and her motion was
necessary so that other successors in interest
G.R. NO. L-28394, NOVEMBER 26, 1970 instead of deceased could be made parties to
PONENTE: CHIEF JUSTICE the case. If heirs included as defendants,
CONCEPCION they cannot be sued as representatives of
decedent, but rather as owners an aliquot
Facts:
interest in the property in question, even if
Appeal by plaintiff from CFI Iloilo dismissal
the precise extent of their interest may still
of his case. On July 31, 1967, Pedro
be undetermined and they have derived it
complained against defendant spouses
from the decent. Hence, they may be sued
Silvestre and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging
without a previous declaration of heirship,
that on October 1, 1952, spouses sold to
provided there is no pending special
Pedro Gelera, for P500.00, a parcel of
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
unregistered land in Guimbal, Iloilo,
the decedent. Concerning FC151
including improvements thereon, subject to
(compromise efforts) applies to suits "filed
redemption within 5years or not later 1957;
or maintained between members of the
that said right not exercised by them, or any
same family." This phrase, "members of the
of their heirs or successors, despite period
same family," should, however, be
expiration; that Gelera sold the land on
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same
March 21, 1961, to Pedro. Pedro had, since
Code, pursuant to which: (1) Between
1961, introduced thereon improvements;
husband and wife; (2) Between parent and
that he had fully paid taxes on said property
child; (3) Among other ascendants and their
up to 1967; NCC1606 and 1616 require a
descendants; (4) Among brothers and
judicial decree for the consolidation of the
sisters. Genoveva is plaintiff’s sister-in-law,
title in and to a land acquired through a
not part of enumeration, so failure to seek
conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying
compromise before filing of complaint does
that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for
not bar. Remanded to lower court of
the consolidation of ownership in and to the
administrator as defendant, or heirs if in
aforementioned property. Genoveva said
absence.
her husband died on January 6, 1954, long
before the institution of the case, that the
deed where they sold property to Gelera
was fake, her signature forged, and they
never executed such document, and that
complaint is malicious and embarrassed her
and her children, for they had to employ
counsel. And that being brother of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not
exert efforts for the amicable settlement of
the case" before filing his complaint. She
prayed, therefore, that the same be
dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to
pay damages. On September 19, 1967,
dismissed for Silvestre was dead (absolute
owner, wife nothing to do with it).

Issue:
Whether or not such dismissal was valid.

Held:
No. Wife has something to do with
property, being widow, she is a compulsory
HONTIVEROS VS. RTC of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers
GR NO. 125465, JUNE 29, 1999 to the Hontiveros family for purposes of
Article 151.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria
Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners
of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they
were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration
case. In the reply, private respondents
denied that they were married and alleged
that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora
was single. They also denied depriving
petitioners of possession of and income
from the land. On the contrary, according to
the private respondents, the possession of
the property in question had already been
transferred to petitioners by virtue of the
writ of possession. Trial court denied
petitioner’s motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were
made, it was not verified as provided in
Article 151.

ISSUE:

WON the court can validly dismissed the

complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article
151.

HELD:

SC held that the inclusion of private

respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the
case out of the scope of Article 151. Under
this provision, the phrase “members of the
same family” refers to the husband and
wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters
whether full or half-blood. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effects in this
jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses
REMEDIO V. FLORES vs. HON. JUDGE
HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS,
IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO
CALION G.R. No. L-66620
September 24, 1986 FERIA, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Cause of Action;
Joinder
SUMMARY:
• Flores has 2 causes of actions: 1st
against Binongcal for refusing to pay
amount representing cost of truck tires
purchased on credit from Flores from Aug-
Oct 1981 and 2nd against Calion for refusing
to pay amount representing cost of truck
tires from 1981-1982. RTC dismisses case for
lack of jurisdiction. The SC ruled that Flores
is partially correct, but still in favor of
respondent judge. The application of the
totality rule under Section 33(l) of BP 129
and Sec 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissive joinder
of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3: the total
of claims shall furnish the jurisdictional test
and that they arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and
there is a common question of law or fact.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
RTC Baguio City and Benguet Province
dismissed petition -> Petition for review SC
Rule 45
FACTS:
• Flores appealed by certiorari from
the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps of the
RTC of Baguio City and Benguet Province
which dismissed his complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Flores did not attach to his
petition a copy of his complaint in the
erroneous belief that the entire original
record of the case shall be transmitted to this
Court pursuant to Sec 39 of BP129. This
provision applies only to ordinary appeals
from the RTC to the CA.
• However, the order appealed from
states that the 1st cause of action alleged in
the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal
for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from Flores on various
occasions from Aug to Oct 1981; and the 2nd
cause of action was against respondent
Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to
pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased on
credit from petitioner on several occasions
from Mar 1981-Jan 1982.
• Counsel for Binongcal filed a
Motion to Dismiss. At the MTD hearing,
counsel for respondent Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion
to Dismiss. RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
• Lower court has jurisdiction over
the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Sec 33(l) of BP129 and Sec 11
of the Interim Rules.
• Flores compares the provisions with
the pertinent portion of the former rule
under Sec 88 Judiciary Act of 1948: ... Where
there are several claims or causes of action
between the same parties embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the demand in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims
or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or due
to different parties, each separate claim shall
furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
• With the deletion of the proviso in
the former rule, the totality rule was
reduced to clarity and brevity and the
jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims
in all, not in each, of the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different
transactions.
• Sec 11 Interim Rules: In actions
where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the test
of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of
all the money demands, exclusive only of
interest and costs, irrespective of whether or
not the separate claims are owned by or due
to different parties. If any demand is for
damages in a civil action, the amount
thereof must be specifically alleged.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
• 12/15/83, counsel for respondent
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only
P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129
RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is
more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said
motion that although another person,
Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to
petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from
that of the other respondent.
ISSUES: WON the RTC correctly dismissed
Flores’ petition for lack of jurisdiction - YES
HELD:
• Flores’ argument is partly correct.
There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff
sues a defendant on two or more separate
causes of action. In such cases, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions. If the
total demand exceeds twenty thousand
pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes
of action are separate and independent, their
joinder in one complaint is permissive and
not mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is twenty
thousand pesos or less may be the subject of
a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
• However, there is a difference
between the former and present rules in
cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a
defendant join in a single complaint.
• Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the
Peace Under the former rule, "where the
claims or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or due
to different parties, each separate claim shall
furnish the jurisdictional test". As worded,
the former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.
However, it was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties defendant.
• The application of the totality rule
under Sec 33(l) of BP 129 and Sec 11 Interim
Rules is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6
of Rule 3: the total of claims shall furnish the
jurisdictional test and that they arose out of
the same transaction or series of transactions
and there is a common question of law or
fact.
• After a careful scrutiny of the
complaint, it appears that there is a
misjoinder of parties for the reason that the
claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither
of which falls within its jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. joinder of parties requires that: (1) the right
vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY to relief arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions; (2) there is a question
453 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 140746, March 16,
of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
2005
defendants; and (3) such joinder is not
RULE 3 - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS otherwise proscribed by the provisions of
SECTION 6 – PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
PARTIES
In this case, there is a single transaction
common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus
FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the
hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is
passenger jeepney owned by Martina. While
also a common question of fact, that is,
driving, a Pantranco passenger bus was
whether petitioners are negligent. There
trailing behind. The Pantranco bus overtook
being a single transaction common to both
the jeepney, in so doing, the Pantranco bus
respondents, consequently, they have the
hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped
same cause of action against petitioners.
away.
To determine identity of cause of action, it
Crispin reported the incident to the police
must be ascertained whether the same
station and respondent Standard Insurance
evidence which is necessary to sustain the
Company, insurer of the jeepney. The total
second cause of action would have been
cost of the repair was not paid in full by
sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first.
Standard, so Martina shouldered the
balance. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of
suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and
Thereafter, Standard and Martina orderly administration of justice.
demanded reimbursement from petitioner
Pantranco and its driver but they refused.
This prompted respondents to file with the
RTC a complaint for sum of money.

In their answer, both petitioners specifically

denied the allegations in the complaint and
averred that there was a misjoinder of
parties. Petitioners insist that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the case since the
cause of action of each respondent did not
arise from the same transaction and that
there are no common questions of law and
fact common to both parties.

For their part, respondents contend that

their individual claims arose out of the same
vehicular accident and involve a common
question of fact and law.

ISSUE: Whether there was misjoinder of

parties.

HELD: NO. There was no misjoinder of

parties in the case at bar. Pursuant to Rule 3,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court, permissive
SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA
DECENA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
PEDRO and VALERIA
PIQUERO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Sps.Danilo and Cristina Decena
were the owners of a parcel of land, with a
house constructed thereon, located in
Parañaque.
On September 7, 1997, petitioners and the
respondents Sps.Pedro and Valeria Piquero,
executed a MOAin which petitionerssold
the property to the respondents for
P940,250payable in six (6)
installments via postdated checks.
It appears in the MOA that petitioners
obliged themselves to transfer the property
to the respondents upon the execution of the
MOA with the condition that if two of the
postdated checks would be dishonored by
the drawee bank, the respondents would be
obliged to reconvey the property to the
petitioners.
On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then
residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a
Complaintagainst the respondents with the
RTC of Malolosfor the annulment of the
sale/MOA, recovery of possession and
damages alleging that they did not transfer
the property to and in the names of the
respondents as vendees because the first
two checks drawn and issued by them in
payment for the purchase price of the
property were dishonored by the drawee
bank, and were not replaced with cash
despite demands.They declared in their
complaint that the property subject of the
complaint valued at P6, 900,000.
Respondents filed a MD on the groundof
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over
the property subject matter of the action.
Respondents averred that the principal
action of the petitioners for the rescission of
the MOA, and the recovery of the
possession of the property is a real action
and not a personal one; hence, it should
have been brought in the RTC of Parañaque
City, where the property subject matter of
the action was located, and not in the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners
resided.
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that
their action for damages and attorney’s fees
is a personal action and not a real action;
hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan
where they reside. They averred that while
their second cause of action for the recovery
of the possession of the property is a real
action, the same may, nevertheless, be
joined with the rest of their causes of action
for damages, conformably with Section 5(c),
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
By way of reply, the respondents averred
that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
applies only when one or more of multiple
causes of action falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the
other or others are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue lies
therein.
On February 9, 2000, trial court denied the
motion for lack of merit. When the case was
re-raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC of
Malolos, respondentsfiled MR which the
court granted and then ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the
principal action of the petitioners was a real
action and should have been filed in the
RTC of Parañaque City where the property
subject matter of the complaint was located.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: W/N venue was properly laid by
petitioners in the RTC of Malolos.
HELD: NO.Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court invoked by the petitionersdoes not
apply.Under the said Rule, a party may, in
one pleading, assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he
may have against an opposing party subject
to the conditions therein enumerated, one of
which is Section 5(c) which reads:Joinder of
causes of action. --(c) Where the causes of action
are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided
one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; …
The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a
quo, had only one cause of action against
the respondents, namely, the breach of the
MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the
first two installments in payment of the
property as agreed upon, and turn over to
the petitioners the possession of the real
property, as well as the house constructed
thereon occupied by the respondents. The
claim for damages for reasonable
compensation for the respondents’ use and
occupation of the property, in the interim, as
well as moral and exemplary damages
suffered by the petitioners on account of the
breach of contract of the respondents are
merely incidental to the main cause of
action, and are not independent or separate
causes of action. The action of the
petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on
account of the respondents’ breach thereof
and the latter’s failure to return the premises
subject of the complaint to the petitioners,
and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a
real action. As such, the action should have
been filed in the proper court where the
property is located, namely, in Parañaque
City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court. Since the petitioners,
who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan,
filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue
was improperly laid; hence, the trial court
acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16
of the Rules of Court when it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint
PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS
VS. ELENA LIM, RAMON CALDERON
and TRI-ORO INTERNATIONAL
TRADING &MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 158138, April 12, 2005
FACTS:
On September 3, 1999, petitioner
filed a complaint against respondents fo0r
the collection of a deficiency amounting to
P4,014,297.23 exclusive of interest. Petitioner
alleged that respondents obtained a loan
from it and executed a continuing surety
agreement dated November 16, 1995 in
favor of petitioner for all loans, credits, etc.,
that were extended or may be extended in
the future to respondents. Petitioner granted
a renewal of said loan upon respondent’s
request, the most recent being on January
21, 1998 as evidenced by a promissory note
renewal BD-Variable No. 8298021001 on the
amount of P3,000,000.00. It was expressly
stipulated therein that the venue for any
legal action that may arise out of said
promissory note shall be Makati City “to the
exclusion of all other courts.” Respondent
allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon
maturity. Thus petitioner foreclosed the real
estate mortgage executed by the
respondents valued at P1,081,600.00 leaving
a deficiency balance of P4,014,297.23 as of
August 31, 1999.
Respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue,
invoking the stipulation contained in the last
paragraph of the promissory note with
respect to the restriction/exclusive venue.
The trial court denied said motion
asseverating that petitioners had separate
causes of action arising from the promissory
note and the continuing surety agreement.
Thus, under Rule 4, Section 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
venue was properly laid in Manila. The trial
court supported its order with cases where
venue was held to be permissive. A motion
for reconsideration of said order was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the
“complementary-contracts-construed
together” principle is applicable in the case
at bar.
RULING:
According to this principle, an
accessory contract must be read in its
entirety and together with the principal
agreement. This principle is used in
construing contractual stipulations in order
to arrive at their true meaning; certain
stipulations cannot be segregated and then
made to control. This no-segregation
principle is based on Article 1374 of the
Civil Code.
The aforementioned doctrine is
applicable to the present case. In capable of
standing by itself, the surety agreement can
be enforced only in conjunction with the
promissory note. The latter documents the
debt that is sought to be collected in the
action against the sureties.
The factual milieu of the present
case shows that the surety agreement was
entered into to facilitate existing and future
loan agreements. Petitioner approved the
loan covered by the promissory note, partly
because of the surety agreement that
assured the payment of the principal
obligation. The circumstances that relate to
the issuance of the promissory note and the
surety agreement are so intertwined that
neither one could be separated from the
other. It makes no sense to argue that the
parties to the surety agreement were not
bound by the stipulations in the promissory
note.
Notably, the promissory note was a
contract of adhesion that petitioner required
the principal debtor to execute as a
condition of the approval of the loan. It was
made in the form and language prepared by
the bank. By inserting the provision of that
Makati City would be the “venue for any
legal action that may arise out of the
promissory note,” petitioner also restricted
the venue of actions against the sureties.
The legal action against the sureties arose
not only from the security agreement but
also from the promissory note.
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., v. Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ALEXANDER M. CRUZ ground of improper venue. He invokes
529 SCRA 664 (2007) Article 27.5 of the agreement which
provides that exclusive jurisdiction is vested
Where there is a joinder of causes of action with the courts f Quezon City. The trial
between the same parties one of which does court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
not arise out of the contract where the
exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the ISSUE:
complain may be brought before other venues.
Whether or not a case based on
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. entered into a several causes of action is dismissible on the
franchise agreement with Alexander M. ground of improper venue where only one
Cruz granting the latter a five-year franchise of the causes of action arises from a contract
to adopt and use the ―Uniwide Family Store with exclusive venue stipulation
System‖ for the establishment and operation
of a ―Uniwide Family Store‖ in Marikina
HELD:
City.
In this case, UHI contended that nowhere in
The contract stipulated that Cruz will pay a
the agreement is there a mention of FPC and
monthly service fee of P50,000.00 or three
USWCI, and neither are the two parties
percent of gross monthly purchases,
thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to the
whichever is higher to UHI, payable within
stipulation on ―exclusive venue.‖ The Court
five days after the end of each month
found merit in this contention.
without need of formal billing
or demand from UHI. In case of any delay
The Supreme Court cited Section 2, Rule 4 of
in the payment of the monthly service fee,
the Rules of Court which provides that all
Cruz would, under Article 10.3 of the
other actions may be commenced and tried
agreement, be liable to pay an interest
where the plaintiff or any of the principal
charge of three percent per month. Cruz
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
thereafter purchased goods from
any of the principal defendants resides, or in
UHI’s affiliatedcompanies First Paragon
the case of a nonresident defendant, where
Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales
he may be found, at the election of the
Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
plaintiff.
FPC and USWCI subsequently executed
The forging of a written agreement on an
Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI
exclusive venueof an action does not,
assigning all their rights and interests over
however, exclude parties from bringing a
Cruz‘s accounts payable to them. Cruz had
case to other venues.
outstanding obligations with UHI, FPC and
USWCI in the amount of P1, 358, 531.89.00.
UHI sent a letter demanding for the Where there is a joinder of causes of action
payment of such amount but it was not between the same parties one of which does
settled. not arise out of the contract where the
exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the
complaint, as in the one at bar, may
Thus, UHI filed a complaint for collection of
be brought before other venues provided
sum of money before the Regional Trial
that such other cause of action falls within
Court of Parañaque against Cruz praying
the jurisdiction of the court and
for payment of service fee, accounts payable
the venue lies therein.
to FPC and USWCI and attorney‘s fees and
litigation expenses.
It bears emphasis that the causes of action
on the assigned accounts are not based on
a breach of the agreement between UHI and
Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct
and independent contracts-deeds of
assignment in which UHI is the assignee of
Cruz‘s obligations to the assignors FPC and
USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the
deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to
the exclusive venue stipulation embodied in
the agreement.
SPS. PEREZ vs HERMANO
G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005
Facts:
The civil case filed by the petitioners before
the trial court against the respondents for
“Enforcement of Contract and Damages
with Prayer for TRO (Branch 224)
presented three (3) causes of action: first,
enforcement of contract to sell entered into
between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc.;
second, for the annulment or rescission of
two contracts of mortgage entered into
between petitioners and respondent
Hermano; and third, for damages against all
defendants.
First cause of action: Sometime in 1997,
petitioners entered into a Contract of Sell
with Zescon through Sales-Contreras, for
the purchase of 5 parcels of land in the total
amount of P19,104,000.00. as part of their
agreement, a portion of the purchase price
would be paid to them as downpayment,
another portion to be given to them as cash
advance upon the execution of the contract
and another portion to be used by the buyer,
Zescon, to pay for loans earlier contracted
by petitioners which loans were secured by
mortgages.
Second cause of action: In a tricky
machination and simultaneous with the
execution of the aforesaid Contract of Sell,
they were made to sign other documents,
two of which were Mortgage deeds over the
same 5 properties in favor of respondent
Hermano, whom they had never met. It was
allegedly explained to
them by Sales-Contreras that the mortgage
contracts would merely serve to facilitate
the payment of the price as agreed upon in
their Contract to Sell. They claim that it was
never their intention to mortgage their
property to Hermano, more so that they
have never received a single centavo from
the latter.
As to third cause of action, they prayed for
damages
against all defendants. In his Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent
Hermano denied petitioner’s allegations. He
then filed a civil case for Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
(Branch 216) against petitioner Aviso. He
also filed a ”Motion with Leave to Dismiss
the Complaint Against Him or Ordered
Severed for Separate Trial” before Branch
224, arguing that there was a misjoinder of
causes of action under Rule 2, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court.
The trial court (Branch 224) granted the said
motion over
the opposition of the petitioners, holding
that respondent Hermano should be
dropped as one of the defendants in this
case and whatever claims petitioner may
have against Hermano, they can set it up by
way of an answer to said judicial
foreclosure. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was also dismissed.
They filed a petition for certiorari to the CA
under Rule 65, however it was dismissed on
mere technicality, the petition having been
filed out of time. Hence, this petition after
the denial of their motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not there was mis-joinder of
causes of action.
Held:
NONE. The statutory intent behind the
provisions on joinder of causes of action is
to encourage joinder of actions which could
reasonably be said to involve kindred rights
and wrongs, although the courts have not
succeeded in giving a standard definition of
the terms used or in developing a rule of
universal application.
The dominant idea is to permit joinder of
causes of action, legal or equitable, where
there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join
as many separate claims as he may have,
there should nevertheless be some unity in
the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject
always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.
Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of

action, with the proviso subjecting it to the
correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual
unity in the problems presented, effectively
disallows unlimited joinder.

In herein case, petitioners have adequately

alleged in their complaint that after they had
already agreed to enter into a contract to sell
with Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-
Contreras, the latter also gave them other
documents to sign, to wit: A Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties but
for a lower consideration, two mortgage
deeds over the same properties in favor of
respondent Hermano with accompanying
notes and acknowledgment receipts for Ten
Million pesos (P10,000,000) each. Petitioners
claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-
Contreras, misled them to mortgage their
properties which they had already agreed to
sell to the latter.
 LILIA B. ADA, et.al. Petitioners,
vs. FLORANTE BAYLON, Respondent.
FACTS:
Rita Baylon, was alleged to have been used
the income ofbthe estate produced by
parcels of land co-owned by petitioners.
They claimed that Rita took possession of
the said parcels of land and appropriated for
herself the income from the same hence, this
prompted petitioners to file a Complaint for
partition, accounting and damages against
the former. During the pendency of the case,
Rita, through a Deed of Donation, donated a
lot in favor of Florante Baylon. Petitioners
filed again a petition that the said donation
be rescinded in accordance with Article
1381(4) of the Civil Code.
Read full Article here.
Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the
contracting parties and even to third persons, to
secure the reparation of damages caused to them
by a contract, even if it should be valid, by means
of the restoration of things to their condition at
the moment prior to the celebration of said
contract. It is a remedy to make ineffective a
contract, validly entered into and therefore
obligatory under normal conditions, by reason of
external causes resulting in a pecuniary
prejudice to one of the contracting parties or
their creditors.
Contracts which are rescissible are valid
contracts having all the essential requisites of a
contract, but by reason of injury or damage
caused to either of the parties therein or to third
persons are considered defective and, thus, may
be rescinded.

ISSUE:

Whether the deed of donation to Florante

Baylon is subject for rescission.

HELD:

The kinds of rescissible contracts, according

to the reason for their susceptibility to
rescission, are the following:

1. those which are rescissible because of

lesion or prejudice;
2. those which are rescissible on account of
fraud or bad faith;
3. those which, by special provisions of law,
are susceptible to rescission.
In the case at bar, the lower court aptly
ordered the rescission of the donation in
favor of Florante. It is undisputed that, at
the time they were gratuitously conveyed by
Rita, the subject lot are among the properties
that were the subject of the partition case
then pending with the RTC. Rita’s failure to
inform and seek the approval of the
petitioners or the RTC regarding the
conveyance gave the petitioners the right to
have the said donation rescinded pursuant
to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.
MAGALLANES vs PALMER 94 1994
9 18
Prudenti P19,880.0
CARPIO, J.: 001582 January19 January
al Bank 0
The Case 94 1994
15 17
Prudenti P45,440.0
This is a petition for review that seeks to set 001585 January January
al Bank 0
aside the Decision[1] dated 17 September 1994 1994
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- P148,800.
Total
G.R. SP No. 111314 and the 20
Resolution[2]dated 14 January 2013 which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration However, Magallanes' checks were
dated 25 September 2012. dishonored upon presentment to the bank.

Sometime in 1995, Andrews and another

The Facts corporation, Palmer Asia, Inc. (Palmer),
entered into an agreement whereby all the
Andrews International Product, Inc. business of Andrews was going to be
(Andrews) is a domestic corporation that handled by Palmer. As explained by Palmer:
manufactures and sells fire extinguishers.
Gerve Magallanes (Magallanes) was
employed by Andrews as a Sales Agent.[3] a change of name was in order to appeal to a
bigger and more sophisticated market.
Magallanes negotiated with three (3) Hence, Palmer Asia was born. Being a
prospective buyers of Andrews fire family corporation and since the change of
extinguishers: Cecile Arboleda, Jose Cruz, name was more of a marketing strategy, all
and Proceso Jarobilla, who all issued checks legal niceties were dispensed with. Andrews
payable to Andrews. These checks, x x x thus ceased to be active in the
however, bounced.[4] business.[5]

Angel Palmiery (Palmiery), the President of Thus, Andrews remained to be existing, but
Andrews, returned the bum checks to not operational. It was neither dissolved nor
Magallanes. Desirous of obtaining his liquidated. There was no transfer of assets
accrued commissions, and upon the advice and liabilities in the legal sense. Palmer
of Palmiery, Magallanes signed Sales simply took over the business of Andrews.[6]
Invoices covering the fire extinguishers that
were intended to be sold to the prospective According to Magallanes, Andrews
buyers, and he also issued five (5) checks demanded payment of the value of the
covering the purchase price of the items: checks. Since the demands were unheeded,
Magallanes was charged with several counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
Check Date (B.P. 22) under several informations all
Date of dated 28 March 1997. The cases were
Bank numb deposit Amount
check docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 211340-44 in
er ed
Citytrust 25 Branch 62 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
28 July P17,740.0 Makati City (MeTC Branch 62). Palmiery
Banking 000721 January
1993 0 was authorized to file suit on behalf of
Corp. 1994
Citytrust 2 25 Andrews.[7] Upon being arraigned on 13
P16,440.0 November 1997, Magallanes pled not
Banking 000743 Septembe January
0 guilty.[8]
Corp. r 1993 1994
Prudenti 7 7 P49,230.0
001579 On 16 March 1998, Escudero Marasigan Sta.
al Bank January19 January 0
Ana & E.H. Villareal (EMSAVILL), the
counsel of Andrews, entered its appearance
as counsel for Palmer in Criminal Case Nos.
217336-44 entitled Palmer Asia, Inc. v. Gerve
Magallanes, filed before Branch 67 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City
(MeTC Branch 67). The docket numbers as
stated in the Entry of Appearance differ
from the docket numbers of the cases filed
by Andrews. Also, the Entry of Appearance
was filed before Branch 67 of the MeTC and
not Branch 62, where the cases were
previously filed. Furthermore, there was no
mention of the relationship between
Andrews and Palmer. Lastly, there was no
registry receipt or stamp or signature or any
other mark which could indicate that
Magallanes was furnished a copy of the
document.[9]
On 10 August 2003, Palmiery appeared
before the MeTC Branch 62 and explained
that Andrews transferred its assets, and
relinquished control of its operations to
Palmer. Thus, on 16 September 2004,
Magallanes filed an Omnibus Motion to
Disqualify Private Prosecutor and to Strike
Out Testimony of Angel Palmiery (Omnibus
Motion). According to Magallanes, since the
assets and credits of Andrews were
transferred to Palmer, the real party in
interest in this case is Palmer and not
Andrews. Therefore, the criminal case
should have been instituted by Palmer.
Magallanes also asserted that:
[i]ndeed the private prosecutor was hired by
Palmer x x x solely for its own account and
not by Andrews x x x for otherwise how can
the Private Prosecutor explain the alleged
direct payment of Palmer x x x of its
attorney's fees in the present case. The
problem however is that Palmer x x x has no
right to participate in the present case -- as
the recitals of the information refer to
Andrews x x x. Hence, the private
prosecutor should be thereupon disqualified
x x x.[10]
Thus, Palmer filed its Opposition to
Magallanes' motion, claiming that:
3.01.4 As a marketing strategy, Andrews
International's business thus operated under
the banner of Palmer Asia. Palmer Asia had
exactly the same officers, occupied the same
business office, retained all its employees
and agents, had the same customers and
sold the same products.
x x x x
3.01.6 Seen another way, Palmer Asia can be
seen as in effect, for purposes of this
litigation, an agent of Andrews
International. x x x [A]n agency can be
constituted in any form, even by sheer
implication derived from the conduct of the
parties.[11]
In its Joint Order dated 8 March 2005, the
MeTC Branch 62 denied the motion filed by
Magallanes for lack of merit.[12] It also
acquitted Magallanes, but held him civilly
liable. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision[13] dated 10 December 2008 reads:
Wherefore, foregoing considered, the
accused Gerve Magallanes is acquitted of
the offense charged for lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases No.
211340, 211341, 211341, 211342, 211343 and
211344. He is ordered to pay the private
complainant, the corresponding face value
of the checks subject of the Criminal Cases
No. 211340, 211341, 211342, 211343 and
211344, by way of civil liability, with 12%
interest per annum counted from June 10,
1994, until the amount shall have been paid;
attorney's fees at 10% of the total face value
of the subject checks; and to pay the costs.
In case of execution of civil liability, the
Clerk of Court is directed to determine and
enforce collection of any unpaid docket or
other lawful fees in accordance with Rule
111, Sec. 1-b in relation to Rule 141.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Magallanes filed a Partial Appeal before
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (RTC Branch 61). According to
Magallanes, the checks were not issued for
valuable consideration since the Sales
Invoices, as well as the transactions reflected
in the invoices were simulated and fictitious.
He also claimed that as a Sales Agent, he is
not liable for the bum checks issued by the
prospective buyers of Andrews.[15]Andrews,
as the private complainant mentioned in the
Joint Decision of MeTC Branch 62, did not
file any appeal.
When the parties were required by the RTC
Branch 61 to submit their respective
memoranda, the memorandum for the
complainant was filed by Palmer, and not
Andrews. The memorandum was prepared
by EMSAVILL[16] and received by
Magallanes on 9 March 2009.[17]
The RTC Branch 61, in its Decision[18] dated
25 May 2009, held that Magallanes was not
civilly liable for the value of the checks
because "the x x x complaining juridical
entity has not fully established the existence
of a debt by Mr. Magallanes in its
favor."[19] Thus, Palmer filed a motion for
reconsideration on 15 June 2009,[20] which
was denied by the RTC in its Resolution
dated 14 October 2009.[21] Andrews did not
file a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, Palmer filed a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure before the CA. It alleged that the
RTC erred in reversing the decision of the
MeTC Branch 62 and absolving Magallanes
from civil liability. Andrews did not file a
petition for review with the CA.
Magallanes then filed his Comments to
Petition for Review (ad cautelam) with
Motion to Dismiss Due to Finality of
Judgment, wherein he alleged that:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City dated 25 May 2003 has already
attained finality there being no appeal
interposed by Andrews International
Products, Inc.
Petitioner Palmer Asia, Inc. is not, can not
and has never been a party plaintiff litigant
in the civil aspect of Criminal Case Nos.
211340, 211341, 211342, 211343, 21134[4]
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 62 for alleged violation of
Batas [Pambansa] Bilang 22 and in the
appealed Criminal Cases 09-031 to 035
[before the] Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 61.[22]
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled against Magallanes. It held
that Magallanes issued the checks for a
consideration because he derived pecuniary
benefit from it (collection of accrued
commissions). According to the court a quo:
The Supreme Court [has] held that upon
issuance of a check, in the absence of
evidence to the contray, it is presumed that
the same was issued for valuable
consideration which may consist either in
some right, interest, profit or benefit
accruing to the party who makes the
contract, or some forebearance, detriment,
loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor,
or service given, suffered or undertaken by
the other side. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, it is presumed that every
party to an instrument acquires the same for
a consideration or for value. In the instant
case, respondent failed to present
convincing evidence to overthrow the
presumption and prove that the checks were
indeed issued without valuable
consideration. In fact, respondent
categorically admitted that he issued the
subject bum checks in order for him to
collect his pending commissions with
petitioner.[23]
Aggrieved, Magallanes then filed the instant
petition before this Court.
Issues
The petition alleges that the CA erred in not
dismissing Palmer's petition for review
under Rule 42 based on lack of jurisdiction
and finality of judgment of the RTC's Joint
Decision[24] and in ruling that Magallanes
failed to rebut the presumption of
consideration in the issuance of the
checks.[25]
The Ruling of this Court
We grant the petition. The RTC Decision
absolving Magallanes from civil liability has
attained finality, since no appeal was
interposed by the private complainant,
Andrews. While Palmer filed a petition for
review before the CA, it is not the real party
in interest; it was never a party to the
proceedings at the trial court.
Under our procedural rules, "a case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue
upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure
to state a cause of action."[26] In the instant
case, Magallanes filed a motion to dismiss in
accordance with the Rules of Court, wherein
he claimed that:
x x x the obvious and only real party in
interest in the filing and prosecution of the
civil aspect impliedly instituted with x x x
the filing of the foregoing Criminal Cases for
B.P. 22 is Andrews International Products,
Inc.
The alleged bounced checks issued by x x x
Magallanes were issued payable in the name
of Andrews International Products, Inc. The
[n]arration of [facts] in the several
Informations for violation of B.P. 22 filed
against Magallanes solely mentioned the
name of Andrews International Products,
Inc.[27]
The real party in this case is Andrews, not
Palmer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.
In Goco v. Court of Appeals,[28] we explained
that:
This provision has two requirements: 1) to
institute an action, the plaintiff must be the
real party in interest; and 2) the action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest. Interest within the meaning of
the Rules of Court means material interest
or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an
action.
Parties who are not the real parties in
interest may be included in a suit in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and
shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law
or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the
principal.
The CA erred in stating that Palmer and
Andrews are the same entity.[29] These are
two separate and distinct entities claiming
civil liability against Magallanes. Andrews
was the payee of the bum checks, and the
former employer of Magallanes. It filed the
complaint for B.P. 22 before MeTC Branch
62. Thus when the MeTC Branch 62 ordered
Magallanes to "pay the private complainant
the corresponding face value of the checks x
x x",[30] it was referring to Andrews, not
Palmer.
Palmer, on the other hand, was first
mentioned in an Entry of Appearance filed
by its counsel EMSAVILL (also the counsel
of Andrews) before MeTC Branch 67 in
connection with Palmer Asia, Inc. v. Gerve
Magallanes. Palmer also filed the
Memorandum required by the RTC.
Although Andrews relinquished control of
its business to Palmer, it was never
dissolved and thus remained existing. This
was stated in Palmer's Comment and
Opposition.[31]Quoting the Order dated 8
March 2005 of the MeTC Branch 62 denying
Magallanes' Omnibus Motion, Palmer
explained that:
Under the Corporation Code, specifically
Sections 117, 118 120 and 121, a corporation
can only be dissolved in two ways,
voluntary and involuntary. In the case of
Andrews International, no document was
presented that majority of its Board of
Directors passed a [r]esolution terminationg
its corporate life. No complaint was also
filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to involuntarily terminate the
same, thus, for all intents and purposes, it is
still existing although not
operational.[32] (Emphasis in the original)
Given the foregoing facts, it is clear that the
real party in interest here is Andrews.
Following the Rules of Court, the action
should be in the name of Andrews. As
previously mentioned, Andrews instituted
the action before the MeTC Branch 62 but it
was Palmer which filed a petition for review
before the CA. In fact, the case at the CA
was entitled Palmer Asia, Inc. v. Gerve
Magallanes.
In NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,[33] NM
Rothschild changed its name to Investec
Australia Limited, in accordance with
Australian law, pending resolution of its
petition before this Court. Thus, when we
required the parties to file memoranda, NM
Rothschild referred to itself as Investec
Australia Limited (formerly "NM Rothschild
& Sons [Australia] Limited"). Lepanto
sought the dismissal of the case because the
petition was not filed by the real party in
interest. We held that:
[The] submissions of petitioner on the
change of its corporate name [are]
satisfactory and [we] resolve not to dismiss
the present Petition for Review on the
ground of not being prosecuted under the
name of the real party in interest. While we
stand by our pronouncement in Philips
Export on the importance of the corporate
name to the very existence of corporations
and the significance thereof in the
corporation's right to sue, we shall not go so
far as to dismiss a case filed by the proper
party using its former name when adequate
identification is presented. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. There is no doubt in our minds that the
party who filed the present Petition, having
presented sufficient evidence of its identity
and being represented by the same counsel
as that of the defendant in the case sought to
be dismissed, is the entity that will be
benefited if this Court grants the dismissal
prayed for.[34]
This case is different, however, because it
involves two separate and distinct entities.
The corporation that initiated the complaint
for B.P. 22 is different from the corporation
that filed the memorandum at the RTC and
the petition for review before the CA. It
appears that Palmer is suing Magallanes in
its own right, not as agent of Andrews, the
real party in interest.
Even assuming arguendo that Palmer is
correct in asserting that it is the agent of
Andrews, the latter should have been
included in the title of the case, in
accordance with procedural rules.
Admittedly, in his Omnibus Motion filed
before the MeTC Branch 62, Magallanes
concluded differently saying that the real
party in interest is Palmer and not Andrews.
This conclusion was based on Palmiery's
testimony dated 10 August 2003 that
Andrews transferred all its "assets and
credits" to Palmer.[35]
Procedural rules forbid parties to change the
theory of the case on appeal. In Bote v.
Spouses Veloso,[36] we defined the theory of
the case as:
[a] comprehensive and orderly mental
arrangement of principle and facts,
conceived and constructed for the purpose
of securing a judgment or decree of a court
in favor of a litigant; the particular line of
reasoning of either party to a suit, the
purpose being to bring together certain facts
of the case in a logical sequence and to
correlate them in a way that produces in the
decision maker's mind a definite result or
conclusion favored by the advocate.
The rationale for this rule was discussed in
the earlier case of Goyanko, Jr. v. United
Coconut Planters Bank:[37]
[Changing the theory of the case] violates
basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. Our rulings are clear - "a party who
deliberately adopts a certain theory upon
which the case was decided by the lower
court will not be permitted to change [it] on
appeal"; otherwise, the lower courts will
effectively be deprived of the opportunity to
decide the merits of the case fairly. Besides,
courts of justice are devoid of jurisdiction to
resolve a question not in issue.
However, the change in Magallanes' posture
was due to the confusing testimony of
Palmiery. We quote below portions of
Palmiery's testimony dated 16 September
2004, the same date the Omnibus Motion
was filed:
Atty. Bermudez: Mr. Palmiery, the last
hearing you undertook to bring before this
Court the Deed of Assignment and
Liabilities of Andrews to Palmer Asia, do
you have it with you now?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Why?
A: There is no assignment.
Q: There was no assignment?
A: Yes, because it was mentioned by our
lawyer a while ago it was not a legal
transfer, it was a marketing transfer because
the owners, the office, the line of business
are exactly the same.[38] (Emphasis supplied)
EMSAVILL, counsel for Palmer and
Andrews, even clarified in their Opposition
to Magallanes' Omnibus Motion that:
x x x [A]ccused loses sight of the fact that
Mr. Palmiery is an ordinary layman, not
versed with the technicalities of the law.
Expectedly, ordinary laymen, such as Mr.
Palmiery, do not fully appeciate and
understand the legal implications of x x x
technical and legal term[s] such as "transfer
of assets and liabilities."[39]
Thus, since Magallanes timely filed a motion
to dismiss based on valid grounds, we rule
that the CA erred in denying the said
motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
17 September 2012 and the Resolution dated
14 January 2013 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Makati Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND
ONGSIAKO LAW
OFFICES, Petitioners, v. HON. NORMA
CHIONLO-SIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 56 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, AND THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF DECEASED SUSANO
RODRIGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY THE
SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATRIX, Respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
We resolve the core issue of whether a law
firm acting as counsel for one of the parties
in the intestate proceedings a quo can file a
petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals to protect its own interests.
I all proceedings and incidents in the
Petitioner Siguion Reyna Montecillo &
Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) acted as
counsel for Remedios N. Rodriguez
(Remedios) when she commenced an action
for the intestate settlement of the estate of
her deceased husband Susano J. Rodriguez
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lucena City. Her action was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 4440.1 During the pendency of the
intestate proceedings, Remedios asked for
the payment of widow's allowance. This,
however, was denied by the RTC in an
Order dated August 8, 1983.2 On review, the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated a
decision reversing the RTC's Order and
granted Remedios a monthly widow's
allowance of P3,000.00 effective August
1982.3
On February 29, 1988, while the case was
pending before the CA, Remedios executed
a Deed of Sale of Inheritance (Deed of Sale)
wherein she agreed to sell all her rights,
interests and participation in the estate of
Susano J. Rodriguez to a certain Remigio M.
Gerardo (Gerardo) in consideration of
P200,000.00.4
As a condition subsequent to the sale,
Remedios, on March 1, 1988, executed a
special power of attorney5 (SPA) authorizing
Gerardo to, among others, "receive from any
person, entity, government agency or
instrumentality, or from any court, any
property, real or personal, cash, checks or
other commercial documents which may be
due to me or payable to me by virtue of any
contract, inheritance or any other legal
means," and to "receive said property... in
his own name and for his own account and
to deposit the same at his sole discretion for
his own account, and dispose of [the] same
without any limitation."6 Gerardo later on
executed a document titled as "Substitution
of Attorney-in-Fact,"7 where he designated
SRMO as substitute attorney pursuant to the
power of substitution granted to him in the
earlier SPA. Gerardo subsequently executed
his own SPA authorizing SRMO "[t]o
appear... and represent [Gerardo] in any and
aforementioned case."8
After the CA's decision regarding the
widow's allowance became final and
executory, SRMO, on April 24, 1991,
accordingly filed a motion with the RTC for
the payment of the allowance then
amounting to a total of P315,000.00.9 A few
months after, the Estate of Deceased Susano
J. Rodriguez (Estate) remitted to SRMO three
(3) checks totaling this amount.10
A Partial Project of Partition of the Estate
dated January 10, 199711 was approved by
the RTC on January 20, 1997.12 Sometime in
2002, Remedios filed an "Urgent Omnibus
Motion and Notice of Termination of the
Services of Petitioner's Counsel of
Record."13 Therein, Remedios questioned the
RTC's Order approving the partition and
denied the execution of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Gerardo. She also demanded that
SRMO return the amount it received from
the partition.14 Before the motion could be
resolved, however, Remedios filed a Notice
of Withdrawal of the same motion.15
The withdrawal of the motion
notwithstanding, the RTC, in an Order
dated August 21, 2003, motu proprio directed
SRMO to reimburse the Estate the amount
of P315,000.00 representing the widow's
allowance it received in 1991.16
In its Explanation with Motion to Excuse
Reimbursement,17 SRMO moved to be
excused from reimbursing the Estate.
According to SRMO, when it sought the
payment of the widow's allowance, it was
merely seeking the enforcement of a
judgment credit in favor of its client,
Remedios, who had, in turn, sold her
interests to Gerardo, also represented by
SRMO.18
In its Order dated December 22, 2003, the
RTC denied SRMO's motion.19 It disagreed
with SRMO's position because (1) "the sale
of inheritance was never made known" to
the RTC and that (2) the sale cannot
comprehend a widow's allowance because
such allowance is "personal in nature."20
Aggrieved by the RTC's orders, SRMO
elevated the case to the CA through a
petition for certiorari.21SRMO argued that it
merely acted as representative of Gerardo,
Remedios' successor-in-interest, when it
received the sum corresponding to the
widow's allowance.22 Without going into the
merits of the case, however, the CA denied
SRMO's petition on the ground that the
latter was not a party in the case before the
lower court and therefore had no standing
to question the assailed order.23 The CA
later denied SRMO's motion for
reconsideration.24
SRMO is now before this Court contending
that while it was not a party in the intestate
proceedings, it is nevertheless an "aggrieved
party" which can file a petition for certiorari.
It claims that the RTC's order of
reimbursement violated SRMO's right to
due process. SRMO further argues that the
RTC erred in ordering it to reimburse the
widow's allowance since SRMO received
said allowance only in favor of Gerardo as
buyer of Remedios' interests pursuant to the
Deed of Sale.
In its Comment, the Estate maintains that
SRMO has no standing to file the petition
for certiorari as it is not "the real party in
interest who stands to lose or gain from the
verdict [that] the Court may hand in the case
at bar."25 Having only acted in the
proceedings below as counsel for Remedios
and, upon transfer of interest, for Gerardo,
SRMO had no personality independent of its
client.26 Recognizing that SRMO received
the amount not for its own benefit but only
in representation of its client, the Estate
claims that SRMO is only being made to
return the amount it received for and in
behalf of its client; it is not being made to
pay out of its own pocket. 27 The Estate also
asserts that since Remedios already sold her
share in the estate to Gerardo on February
29, 1988, she was no longer entitled to any
widow's allowance from that time
on.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides in
full:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The "aggrieved party" referred to in the
above-quoted provision is one who was a
party to the original proceedings that gave
rise to the original action for certiorari under
Rule 65. In Tang v. Court of Appeals,29 we
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that
the special civil action of certiorari may be
availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the
orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term
"person aggrieved" is not to be eonstrued
to mean that any person who feels injured
by the lower court's order or decision can
question the said court's disposition
via certiorari. To sanction a contrary
interpretation would open the floodgates to
numerous and endless litigations which
would undeniably lead to the clogging of
court dockets and, more importantly, the
harassment of the party who prevailed in
the lower court.
In a situation wherein the order or decision
being questioned underwent adversarial
proceedings before a trial court, the
"person aggrieved" referred to under
Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the
special civil action of certioraripertains to
one who was a party in the proceedings
before the lower court. The correctness of
this interpretation can be gleaned from the
fact that a special civil action
for certiorari may be dismissed motu
proprio if the party elevating the case failed
to file a motion for reconsideration of the
questioned order or decision before the
lower court. Obviously, only one who was a
party in the case before the lower court can
file a motion for reconsideration since
a stranger to the litigation would not have
the legal standing to interfere in the orders
or decisions of the said court. In relation to
this, if a non-party in the proceedings before
the lower court has no standing to file a
motion for reconsideration, logic would lead
us to the conclusion that he would likewise
have no standing to question the said order
or decision before the appellate court
via certiorari.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(Emphasis supplied.)
The general rule, therefore, is that a
person not a party to the proceedings in the
trial court cannot maintain an action
for certiorari in the CA or the Supreme Court
to have the order or decision of the trial
court reviewed. Under normal
circumstances, the CA would have been
correct in dismissing a petition
for certiorari filed by a non-party. The
peculiar facts of this case, however, call for a
less stringent application of the rule.
The facts show that SRMO became
involved in its own capacity only when the
RTC ordered it to return the money that it
received on behalf of its client. The order of
reimbursement was directed to SRMO in its
personal capacity—not in its capacity as
counsel for either Remedios or Gerardo. We
find this directive unusual because the order
for reimbursement would typically have
been addressed to the parties of the case; the
counsel's role and duty would be to ensure
that his client complies with the court's
order. The underlying premise of the RTC's
order of reimbursement is that, logically,
SRMO kept or appropriated the money. But
the premise itself is untenable because
SRMO never claimed the amount for its own
account. In fact, it is uncontroverted that
SRMO only facilitated the transfer of the
amount to Gerardo.31
Under the law of agency, an agent is not
personally liable for the obligations of the
principal unless he performs acts outside the
scope of his authority or he expressly binds
himself to be personally liable.32Otherwise,
the principal is solely liable. Here, there was
no showing that SRMO bound itself
personally for Gerardo's obligations. SRMO
also acted within the bounds of the
authority issued by Gerardo, as the
transferee pendente lite of the widow's
interest, to receive the payment.33
It appears that the RTC's primary
justification for ordering SRMO to return the
money from its own pocket is due to the
latter's failure to formally report the transfer
of interest from Remedios to
Gerardo.34 While it certainly would have
been prudent for SRMO to notify the RTC,
the Rules of Court do not require counsels of
parties to report any transfer of interest. The
Rules do not even mandate the substitution
of parties in case of a transfer of interest.
Rule 3, Section 19 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section. 19. Transfer of interest. — In case of
any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party,
unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to
be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party.cralawlawlibrary
Otherwise stated, unless the court upon
motion directs the transferee pendente lite to
be substituted, the action is simply
continued in the name of the original party.
For all intents and purposes, the Rules
already consider Gerardo joined or
substituted in the proceeding a quo,
commencing at the exact moment when the
transfer of interest was perfected between
original party-transferor, Remedios, and the
transferee pendente lite, Gerardo.35
Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC
was unjustified in ordering SRMO, in its
own capacity, to return the money to the
Estate despite the fact, as certified to by
Gerardo's heirs, that SRMO had already
accounted for all monies or funds it had
received on its client's behalf to Gerardo.36 If
the RTC was convinced that the Estate had a
right to reimbursement, it should have
ordered the party who ultimately benefited
from any unwarranted payment—not his
lawyer—to return the money.
While the general rule laid down
in Tang (which limits the availability of the
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 only to
parties in the proceedings before the lower
court) must be strictly adhered to, it is not
without exception. In Republic v. Eugenio,
Jr.,37 we allowed the wife of a respondent in
two cases filed by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) to challenge
via certiorari the inquiry orders issued by the
respective regional trial courts. There, we
found that the wife had adequately
demonstrated her joint ownership of the
accounts subject of the inquiry orders. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that she was not
named as a respondent in the cases filed by
the AMLC or identified as a subject of the
inquiry orders, we ruled that her joint
ownership of the accounts clothed her with
standing to assail, via certiorari, the inquiry
orders authorizing the examination of said
accounts in violation of her statutory right to
maintain said accounts' secrecy.38
Considering that the RTC's order of
reimbursement is specifically addressed to
SRMO and the established fact that SRMO
only received the subject money in its
capacity as counsel/agent of Gerardo, there
is then more reason to apply the exception
here. Unlike Tang, which involved
neighboring lot owners as petitioners,
SRMO's interest can hardly be considered as
merely incidental. That SRMO is being
required to reimburse from its own
coffers money already transmitted to its
client is sufficient to give
SRMO direct interest to challenge the RTC's
order. Neither can SRMO be considered a
total stranger to the proceedings. We have
stated in one case that "a counsel becomes
the eyes and ears in the prosecution or
defense of his or her client's case."39 This
highly fiduciary relationship between
counsel and client makes the party/non-
party delineation prescribed
by Tang inadequate in resolving the present
controversy.
As a corollary, we have, in a number of
instances, ruled that technical rules of
procedures should be used to promote, not
frustrate, the cause of justice. Rules of
procedure are tools designed not to thwart
but to facilitate the attainment of justice;
thus, their strict and rigid application may,
for good and deserving reasons, have to
give way to, and be subordinated by, the
need to aptly dispense substantial justice in
the normal cause.40 In this case, ordering
SRMO to reimburse the widow's allowance
from its own pocket would result in the
unjust enrichment of Gerardo, since the
latter would retain the money at the expense
of his own counsel. To avoid such injustice,
a petition for certiorari is an adequate
remedy available to SRMO to meet the
situation presented.
Another important consideration for
allowing SRMO to file a petition
lor certiorari is the rule on real party in
interest, which is applicable to private
litigation.41 A real party in interest is one
"who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit."42 In Ortigas
& Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,43 we
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
..."Interest" within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential
interest.44ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarycrala
wlawlibrary
Simply put, a real party in interest is the
person who will suffer (or has suffered) the
wrong. In this case, it is SRMO who stands
to be injured by the RTC's order of
reimbursement considering that it is being
made to return money received on behalf of,
and already accounted to, its client.
III
Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court45 provides for the allowance granted
to the widow and family of the deceased
person during the settlement of the estate.
This allowance is rooted on the right and
duty to support under the Civil Code. The
right to support is a purely personal right
essential to the life of the recipient, so that it
cannot be subject to attachment or
execution.46 Neither can it be renounced or
transmitted to a third person.47 Being
intransmissible, support cannot be the object
of contracts.48Nonetheless, it has also been
held that support in arrears is a different
thing altogether. It may be compensated,
renounced and transmitted by onerous or
gratuitous title.49
The Estate contends that since Remedios
already sold her Estate to Gerardo on
February 29, 1988, she was no longer
entitled to any widow's allowance from that
point on.50 SRMO, on the other hand,
maintains that the right of Remedios to
receive widow's allowance remains from
1988 up to 1991 because she remained a
nominal party in the case, and that this
formed part of the interests sold to
Gerardo.51
However, neither of the parties to the Deed
of Sale is impleaded in the present petition;
hence, this particular issue cannot be fully
resolved. Following the principle of
relativity of contracts,52 the Deed of Sale is
binding only between Remedios and
Gerardo, and they alone acquired rights and
assumed obligations thereunder. Any ruling
that affects the enforceability of the Deed of
Sale will therefore have an effect on their
rights as seller and buyer, respectively. Both
are, therefore, indispensable parties insofar
as the issue of enforceability of the Deed of
Sale is concerned.53 The failure to implead
them is fatal to the Estate's challenge on this
front.cralaw-red
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The September 24, 2007 Decision and
December 28, 2007 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83082 are SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated August 21, 2003
and December 22, 2003 issued by Branch 56
of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City in
Sp. Proc. No. 4440 are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ALTRES VS. EMPLEO Mayor Quijano appealed to CSC but later
dismissed due to lacks a requirement
NORBERTO ALTRES, ET AL., petitioners, prescribed by the civil service law, rules and
vs. regulations, it would disapprove it without
CAMILO G. EMPLEO, ET delving into the reasons why the
AL., respondents. requirement was not complied with.

G.R. No. 180986 RTC:

December 10, 2008  RTC denied petitioners’ petition for
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.: mandamus.
 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and is subsequently
NATURE OF CASE denied as well.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the SC:

decision and order of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Br. 3.
FACTS
Iligan Mayor Quijanoadvised CSC of its
variou career positions in the city
government, of which the latter proceeded
its publication. Petitioners and other
applicants submitted their applications for
the different positions where they felt
qualified.
Toward the end of his term, MayorQuijano
issued appointments to petitioners.
In the meantime, the
SangguniangPanglungsod issued requesting
a suspension of action on the processing of
appointments to all vacant positions until
the enactment of a new budget and another
resolution holding transmission of all
appointments.
Respondent city accountant Empleo did not
issue a certification as to availability of
funds for the payment of salaries and wages
of petitioners, as required in the LGU
appointment.
The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte
and Iligan City disapproved the
appointments issued to petitioners
invariably due to lack of certification of
availability of funds.
 The Court, without giving due
course to the petition, required
respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice,
and at the same time required
petitioners to comply, within the
same period, with the relevant
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
 Petitioners filed a Compliance
Report as required.
 Respondents duly filed their
Comment,alleging technical flaws in
petitioners’ petition, to which
Comment petitioners filed their
Replyin compliance with the
Court’s Resolution
 Respondents assail as defective the
verification and certification against
forum shopping attached to the
petition as it bears the signature of
only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and
no competent evidence of identity
was presented by the signing
petitioners. They thus move for the
dismissal of the petition
 Petitioners, on the other hand, argue
that they have a justifiable cause for
their inability to obtain the
signatures of the other petitioners as
they could no longer be contacted or
are no longer interested in pursuing
the case.

ISSUE/s of the CASE


Whether or not there is a defect in the
verifcation and certification against forum
shopping.
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: GRANTED
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE
CASE
No. Court held that in the present case, the
signing of the verification by only 11 out of
the 59 petitioners already sufficiently
assures the Court that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation; that the pleading is filed in
good faith;A and that the signatories are
unquestionably real parties-in-interest who
undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the petition.
Under justifiable circumstances, we have
already allowed the relaxation of the
requirements of verification and certification
so that the ends of justice may be better
served. Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith; while the purpose of the
aforesaid certification is to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum shopping.
On the requirement of a certification of non-
forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that
all the petitioners must sign the certification
of non-forum shopping. The reason for this
is that the persons who have signed the
certification cannot be presumed to have the
personal knowledge of the other non-
signing petitioners with respect to the filing
or non-filing of any action or claim the same
as or similar to the current petition. The
rule, however, admits of an exception and
that is when the petitioners show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must be able to
convince the court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice.
Distinction between non-com-pliance with
the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum
shopping. —
1) A distinction must be made between non-
compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and
non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against
forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum
shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of “substantial compliance” or
presence of “special circumstances or
compelling reasons.”
5) The certification against forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to
the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one
of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum

shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

SUPREME COURT RULING

WHEREFORE, the Court declares that it is

Section 474(b)(4), not Section 344, of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which
applies to the requirement of certification of
availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii),
Rule V of Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of
1998.

SO ORDERED.
VDA. DE FORMOSO VS. PNB
G.R. No. 154704
Facts: Nellie Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and
her five children executed a special power of
attorney in favor of Malcaba, authorizing
him, among others, to secure all papers and
documents pertaining to loan with real
estate mortgage originally secured by Nellie
and her late husband from PNB.
After buying the mortgage real properties
from the Formosos, Malcaba and his lawyer
went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation
including the interests in the amount of
P2,461,024.7. PNB allegedly refused to
acceptMalcaba’s tender of payment and to
release the mortgage.
RTC: A Complaint for Specific Performance
against PNB before RTC was filed by
Formosos praying that PNB be ordered to
accept the money as full settlement of their
loan obligation. RTC rendered its decision in
favor of the Formosos but the prayer for
exemplary or corrective damages, attorney’s
fees, and annual interest and daily interest
were denied for lack of evidence. PNB filed
a MR but was denied for failure to comply
RULE 15, Section 6 of Rules of Civil
Procedure and thereafter filed a Notice of
Appeal which was also dismissed for being
filed out of time. The Formosos filed their
Petition for Relief from judgment
questioning RTC’s decision that there was
no testimonial evidence presented to
warrant the award for moral and exemplary
damagesand reasoned out that they could
not then file a Motion for Reconsideration
because they could not get hold of a copy of
the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was
later denied by RTC for lack of merit. An
Omnibus Order was issued by RTC denying
the Formosos’ reconsideration.
CA: The CA, acting upon the petition for
certiorari filed by the Formosos, denied the
petition on the ground that the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping
was signed by only one (Macalba) of the
many petitioners. The MR was also denied.
Issue: WON the rule on Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping be
liberally construed.
Contention of the Petitioners:
Questions of law are raised in a
petition for certiorari and no factual
issues that require personal
knowledge of the petitioners; and
Contention of PNB:
It is mandatory that all of the
petitioners should sign the
certification against forum
shopping. Malcaba’s signature alone
is insufficient
Held: No. Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules
states that a pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
In Docena vs Lapesura, the SC ruled thatthe
certificate of non-forum shopping should be
signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a
case, and that the signing by only one of
them is insufficient. The attestation on non-
forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party executing the same,
and the lone signing petitioner cannot be
presumed to have personal knowledge of
the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners
of any action or claim the same as similar to
the current petition.
It is clear that among the 7
petitioners (Nellie and 5 children and
Malcaba) only Malcaba signed the
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in the subject petition. There was
no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his
co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no
special power of attorney shown by the
Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their
attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for
review on certiorari. Neither could the
petitioners give at least a reasonable
explanation as to why only he signed the
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. While the Rules of Court may be
relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons
to relieve a litigant from an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedures,
nevertheless they must be faithfully
followed.

In other cases, however, the SC

applied the rule in liberality and leniency
where those who did not sign were relatives
of the lone signatory. Since Malcaba is not a
relative of the Formosos, the Court is not
persuaded to relax the requirement of strict
compliance with the rule regarding the
certification against forum shopping.

It was also correctly argued by PNB

that the substantive issue of whether or not
the petitioners are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages as well as as attorneys
fees is a factual issue which is beyond the
province of a petition for review on
certiorari.

Petition: Denied
BA Savings Bank vs. Sia Case Digest
BA Savings Bank vs. Sia
[GR 131214, 27 July 2000]
Facts: On 6 August 1997, the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution denying due
course to a Petition for Certiorari filed by
BA Savings Bank, on the ground that "the
Certification on anti-forum shopping
incorporated in the petition was signed not
by the duly authorized representative of the
petitioner, as required under Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91, but by its counsel, in
contravention of said circular." A Motion for
Reconsideration was subsequently filed by
BA Savings Bank, attached to which was a
BA Savings Bank Corporate Secretary's
Certificate, dated 14 August 1997. The
Certificate that BA Savings Bank's Board of
Directors approved a Resolution on 21 May
1996, authorizing the bank's lawyers to
represent it in any action or proceeding
before any court, tribunal or agency; and to
sign, execute and deliver the Certificate of
Non-forum Shopping, among others.
On 24 October 1997, the Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that Supreme Court
Revised Circular 28-91 "requires that it is the
petitioner, not the counsel, who must certify
under oath to all of the facts and
undertakings required therein." The bank
appealed.
Issue: Whether the certificate of non-forum
shopping can be signed by the corporate
counsel, not necessarily by the corporate
officers alone.
Held: A corporation has no powers except
those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are
implied by or are incidental to its existence.
In turn, a corporation exercises said powers
through its board of directors and/or its
duly authorized officers and agents.
Physical acts, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons
duly authorized for the purpose by
corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the
board of directors. "All acts within the
powers of a corporation may be performed
by agents of its selection; and, except so far
as limitations or restrictions which may be
imposed by special charter, by-law, or
statutory provisions, the same general
principles of law which govern the relation
of agency for a natural person govern the
officer or agent of a corporation, of whatever
status or rank, in respect to his power to act
for the corporation; and agents once
appointed, or members acting in their stead,
are subject to the same rules, liabilities and
incapacities as are agents of individuals and
private persons." Herein, the corporation's
board of directors issued a Resolution
specifically authorizing its lawyers "to act as
their agents in any action or proceeding
before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency[;]
and to sign, execute and deliver in
connection therewith the necessary
pleadings, motions, verification, affidavit of
merit, certificate of non-forum shopping and
other instruments necessary for such action
and proceeding." The Resolution was
sufficient to vest such persons with the
authority to bind the corporation and was
specific enough as to the acts they were
empowered to do. In the case of natural
persons, Circular 28-91 requires the parties
themselves to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping. However, such
requirement cannot be imposed on artificial
persons, like corporations, for the simple
reason that they cannot personally do the
task themselves. As already stated,
corporations act only through their officers
and duly authorized agents. In fact, physical
actions, like the signing and the delivery of
documents, may be performed, on behalf of
the corporate entity, only by specifically
authorized individuals. It is noteworthy that
the Circular does not require corporate
officers to sign the certificate. More
important, there is no prohibition on against
authorizing agents to do so. In fact, not only
was BA Savings Bank authorized to name
an agent to sign the certificate; it also
exercised its appointing authority
reasonably well. For who else knows of the
circumstances required in the Certificate but
its own retained counsel. Its regular officers,
like its board chairman and president, may
not even know the details required therein.
Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the
Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the
evils of forum shopping. We see no
circumvention of this rationale if the
certificate was signed by the corporation's
specifically authorized counsel, who had
personal knowledge of the matters required
in the Circular.
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG necessary. In Philippine Airlines v. Flight
CORPORATION vs. CIR G.R. No. 151413 Attendants and Stewards Association of the
February 13, 2008 Philippines , SC ruled that only individuals
vested with authority by a valid board
FACTS: Petitioner, a corporation duly
resolution may sign the certificate of non-
organized and existing under Philippine
forum shopping on behalf of a corporation.
laws, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine
The action can be dismissed if the
and other pharmaceutical products.
certification was submitted unaccompanied
Sometime in 1995, it granted 20% sales
by proof of the signatory’s authority. SC
discounts to qualified senior citizens on
believes that appending the board
purchases of medicine pursuant to RA No.
resolution to the complaint or petition is the
7432 and its implementing rules and
better procedure to obviate any question on
regulations. In compliance with Revenue
the authority of the signatory to the
Regulation No. 2-94, petitioner treated the
verification and certification. The required
20% sales discounts granted to qualified
submission of the board resolution is
senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from
grounded on the basic precept that
the gross sales in order to arrive at the net
corporate powers are exercised by the board
sales, instead of treating them as tax credit
of directors, and not solely by an officer of
as provided by Section 4 of RA 7432. On
the corporation. Hence, the power to sue
December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed
and be sued in any court or quasi-judicial
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a
tribunal is necessarily lodged with the said
claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full
board. In the case at bar, the petitioner
amount of the 20% sales discount it granted
substantially complied with Secs. 4 and 5,
to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly
Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
totaling to PhP 123,083 in accordance with
Procedure. First, the requisite board
Sec. 4 of RA 7432. The BIR’s inaction on
resolution has been submitted albeit
petitioner’s claim for refund/tax credit
belatedly by petitioner. Second, the ruling in
compelled petitioner to file a petition for
Lepanto with the rationale that the President
review before the CTA. On April 26, 2000,
of petitioner is in a position to verify the
the CTA rendered a Decision dismissing the
truthfulness and correctness of the
petition for review for lack of merit.
allegations in the petition. Third, the
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter
President of petitioner has signed the
before the CA. On August 31, 2000, the CA
complaint before the CTA at the inception of
issued the assailed Resolution dismissing
this judicial claim for refund or tax credit.
the petition on procedural grounds. The CA
held that the person who signed the
verification and certification of absence of
forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J.
Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to
adduce proof that he was duly authorized
by the board of directors to do so. Hence,
this petition. ISSUE: WON petitioner’s
president can sign the subject verification
and certification sans the approval of its
Board of Directors. RULING: With respect
to a juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on
verification and Sec. 5, Rule 7 on
certification against forum shopping are
silent as to who the authorized signatory
should be. Said rules do not indicate if the
submission of a board resolution
authorizing the officer or representative is
MC ENGINEERING, INC., and HANIL
DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
LTD., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ARISTOTLE
BALDAMECA, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
December 27, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56298
and its subsequent Resolution[2] dated
March 3, 2000 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration thereto. The December
27, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioners Petition for
Certiorari[3] dated December 17, 1999 for
failure to comply with the requirements
regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping and explanation of service by
registered mail.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Hanil Development Co., Ltd.
(hereinafter Hanil) is the overseas employer
of all contract workers deployed by
petitioner MC Engineering, Inc. (hereinafter
MCEI) under a Service Contract
Agreement between the two
petitioners. Contract workers deployed by
MCEI for Hanil for overseas work enter into
an employment contract with MCEI in
accordance with the terms and conditions
set forth by Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (hereinafter
POEA) Regulations and the Service Contract
Agreement between MCEI and Hanil[4].
On 18 September 1992, private
respondent Aristotle Baldameca entered into
an Employment Agreement[5] with MCEI for
deployment as a plumber in Tabuk, Saudi
Arabia. He commenced working for
petitioner Hanil in Saudi Arabia on
September 21, 1992. The contract was for a
term of twelve (12) months.
For some reason, private respondent
was not able to finish the full term of his
contract and he was repatriated back to
Manila on January 19, 1993. On October 19,
1993, private respondent filed a complaint
with the POEA against petitioners for illegal
dismissal. In his complaint, private
respondent prayed for the payment of his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment agreement and the
reimbursement of his airfare[6].
In March of 1996, the case was referred
to the National Labor Relations Commission
(hereinafter NLRC) Arbitration Division as
by then it was this agency which had
jurisdiction over private respondents
complaint by virtue of Republic Act 8042,
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995. After the submission of position
of papers, the labor arbiter assigned to the
case rendered a decision[7] dated April 27,
1998 in favor of private respondent. In this
decision, the labor arbiter held petitioners
MCEI and Hanil jointly and severally liable
to private respondent in the amount of
US$2,500.00 and 10% of the cash award as
and by way of attorneys fees.
The decision of the labor arbiter was
appealed to the NLRC by petitioners on
June 15, 1998. However, this appeal was
dismissed by the NLRC in a
Resolution[8] dated February 26, 1999. The
motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was likewise denied by the
NLRC in its Order[9] dated September 28,
1999.
On December 17, 1999, petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the above Resolution
and Order of the NLRC. However, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by
petitioners in a Resolution[10] dated
December 27, 1999. The full text of the
resolution is as follows:
The instant Petition for Certiorari is fatally
defective for two (2) reasons: (1) there is no
certification against forum shopping by co-
petitioner Hamil Development Co., Ltd.;
and (2) there is no written explanation why
the service of the pleading was not done
personally (Section 3, Rule 46 and Section
11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
Certiorari, having failed to comply with the
requirement of the Rules, as aforesaid, is
DISMISSED outright.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from this December 27,
1999 Resolution but this was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution[11] dated
March 3, 2000.
Hence, the recourse by petitioners to
this Court where they raise, among other
issues, the propriety of the dismissal of their
petition for certiorari by the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of non-compliance
with the requirements of non-forum
shopping and lack of explanation of service
by registered mail.
With respect to the first ground for the
dismissal of the petition by the appellate
court, the requirement regarding the need
for a certification of non-forum shopping in
original cases filed before the Court of
Appeals and the corresponding sanction for
non-compliance thereto is found in Section
3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Said section, in pertinent part,
provides as follows:
Rule 46, Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition;
effect of non-compliance with requirements.
XXX
The petitioner shall also submit together
with the petition a sworn certification that
he has not theretofore commenced any other
involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the
same; and if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five (5) days therefrom.
XXX
The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
In the case at bar, the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioners before the
Court of Appeals contains a certification
against forum shopping[12]. However, the
said certification was signed only by the
corporate secretary of petitioner MCEI. No
representative of petitioner Hanil signed the
said certification. As such, the issue to be
resolved is whether or not a certification
signed by one but not all of the parties in a
petition constitutes substantial compliance
with the requirements regarding the
certification of non-forum shopping.
The rule quoted above requires that in
all cases filed in the Court of Appeals, as
with all initiatory pleadings before any
tribunal, a certification of non-forum
shopping signed by the petitioner must be
filed together with the petition. The failure
of a petitioner to comply with this
requirement constitutes sufficient ground
for the dismissal of his petition. Thus, the
Court has previously held that a certification
not attached to the complaint or petition or
one belatedly filed[13] or one signed by
counsel and not the party
himself[14] constitutes a violation of the
requirement which can result in the
dismissal of the complaint or petition.
However, with respect to the contents
of the certification, the rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of. This is
because the requirement of strict compliance
with the provisions regarding the
certification of non-forum shopping merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely
disregarded.[15] It does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions
under justifiable circumstances.[16]
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
should have taken into consideration the
fact that petitioner Hanil is being sued by
private respondent in its capacity as the
foreign principal of petitioner MCEI. It was
petitioner MCEI, as the local private
employment agency, who entered into
contracts with potential overseas workers on
behalf of petitioner Hanil.
It must be borne in mind that local
private employment agencies, before they
can commence recruiting workers for their
foreign principal, must submit with the
POEA a formal appointment or agency
contract executed by the foreign based
employer empowering the local agent to sue
and be sued jointly and solidarily with the
principal or foreign-based employer for any
of the violations of the recruitment
agreement and contract of
employment.[17] Considering that the local
private employment agency may sue on
behalf of its foreign principal on the basis of
its contractual undertakings submitted to
the POEA, there is no reason why the said
agency cannot likewise sign or execute a
certification of non-forum shopping for its
own purposes and/or on behalf of its
foreign principal.
It must likewise be stressed that the
rationale behind the requirement that the
petitioners or parties to the action
themselves must execute the certification of
non-forum shopping is that the said
petitioners or parties are in the best position
to know of the matters required by the Rules
of Court in the said certification.[18] Such
requirement is not circumvented and is
substantially complied with when, as in this
case, the local private employment agency
signs the said certification alone. It is the
local private employment agency, in this
case petitioner MCEI, who is in the best
position to know of the matters required in a
certification of non-forum shopping.
Concerning the second ground for the
appellate courts decision, Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.
Whenever practicable, the service and filing
of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other
modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was
not done personally. A violation of this rule
may be cause to consider the paper as not
filed.
Pursuant to this section, service and
filing of pleadings and other papers must,
whenever practicable, be done personally. If
they are made through other modes, the
party concerned must provide a written
explanation as to why the service or filing
was not done personally. To underscore the
mandatory nature of this rule requiring
personal service whenever practicable,
Section 11 of Rule 13 gives the court the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as
not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal
service was not done in the first place.[19]
In the instant case, it is not disputed
that petitioners Petition for Certiorari filed
in the Court of Appeals did not contain an
explanation why resort was made to other
modes of service of the petition to the
parties concerned. In the exercise of its
discretion granted under Section 11 of Rule
13, the Court of Appeals considered the
same as not having been filed and dismissed
the petition outright.
Petitioners, in this petition for review
on certiorari, do not give a reason why their
petition before the Appellate Court was not
accompanied by an explanation why they
resorted to other modes of service as
required by the rules. Instead, they argue
that there has been substantial compliance
with the requirements of the rule as the
petition contains the required affidavit of
service that shows that the petition has
indeed been served on the parties
concerned. Moreover, petitioners claim that
their failure to indicate an explanation was a
purely technical error which does not call
for an outright dismissal of the
petition.Citing the oft-quoted doctrine laid
down in Alonso vs. Villamor[20], they argue
that technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance, should deserve scant
consideration from the courts[21].
We are not persuaded.
In the case at bar, there was no
substantial compliance made by petitioners
of the requirement in Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The utter
disregard of the rules made by petitioners
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on
the policy of liberal construction and
substantial compliance.[22]
The fact that an affidavit of service
accompanied their petition does not amount
to a substantial compliance with the
requirement of an explanation why other
modes of service other than personal service
were resorted to. An affidavit of service,
under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, is required merely as
proof that service has been made to the
other parties in a case. Thus, it is a
requirement totally different from the
requirement that an explanation be made if
personal service of pleadings was not
resorted to. In fact, a cursory reading of the
affidavit of service[23] attached by petitioners
in their petition before the Court of Appeals
shows that it merely states that a certain
Rogelio Mindol served copies of the
pleading to the counsel of private
respondent, the NLRC, and the Solicitor-
General by registered mail. There is not
even a hint of an explanation why such
mode of service was resorted to.
With respect to petitioners reliance on
the much-abused doctrine laid down in the
case of Alonso vs. Villamor and other
analogous cases, we adhere to our
pronouncement in the case of Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[24].
To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike
out pleadings for violation of Section 11 of
Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved
under Section 6 of Rule 1[25] or Alonso vs.
Villamor and other analogous cases, then
Section 11 would become meaningless and
its sound purpose negated.
We are aware that in the cited case, the
violation of Section 11, Rule 13 committed
by the party therein was eventually
condoned and the pleading was allowed to
remain in the records. However, such action
by the Court was premised on the fact that
counsel therein may not have been fully
aware of the requirements and ramifications
of the said provision as the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure had only been in effect for a
few months. Such circumstance does not
obtain in the case at bar considering that it
has been years since the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover,
our decision in the Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. case contained a directive that, for the
guidance of the bench and the bar, strictest
compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is
mandated one month from the
promulgation of the said decision.
Petitioners thus have no excuse for their
non-compliance with the requirements
embodied therein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated December 27, 1999 and March 03,
2000 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LDP MARKETING, INC., et al. v.
ERLINDA DYOLDE MONTER
A complaint for illegal dismissal
was filed by Erlinda Dyolde Monter against
LDP Marketing, Inc. (LDP) and LDP’s Vice-
President-co-petitioner Ma. Lourdes Dela
Peña. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
ruled in favor of Monter. LDP filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
wherein the Verification/Certification of
non-forum shopping was accomplished by
Dela Peña.
The Court of Appeals, citing Digital
Microwave Corp. v. CA, dismissed LDP’s
petition for “failing to attach to the petition
a copy of the company board resolution
authorizing said Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña to
sign the said Verification/Certification of
non-forum shopping for and in behalf of
LDP.”
LDP filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to which they attached a Secretary’s
Certificate quoting a Resolution adopted by
the Board of Directors of LDP during a
special meeting giving authority to Dela
Peña to represent the corporation in this
case. The CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari
should be granted despite the belated filing
of a mandatory written authorization to sign
the verification/certification against forum
shopping
HELD:
In the more recent case of Shipside
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals cited by
LDP, the therein petitioner Shipside
Incorporated filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals
which, however, dismissed it, citing absence
of proof that the one who signed the
Verification and Certification of non-forum
shopping, its Manager Lorenzo Balbin, Jr.,
was authorized to institute the petition for
and in behalf of the petitioner. Shipside
Incorporated filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to which it attached a
certificate issued by its board secretary
stating that ten days before the filing of the
petition, its board of directors authorized
Balbin to file it. The Court of Appeals just
the same denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Court has consistently held that the
requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is simply a condition affecting
the form of the pleading, non-compliance
with which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that
the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The lack of certification against forum
shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the
petition. In certain exceptional
circumstances, however, the Court has
allowed the belated filing of the certification.
In the case at bar, the merits of LDP’s case
should be considered special circumstances
or compelling reasons that justify tempering
the requirement in regard to the certificate
of non-forum shopping.
SOUTH COTABATO
COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
and GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN vs. HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, et. al.,
G.R. No. 173326, December 15, 2010
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
x x x.
Anent the first procedural issue, the Court
had summarized the jurisprudential
principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley
Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.[15] In said case, we held
that a President of a corporation, among
other enumerated corporate officers and
employees, can sign the verification and
certification against of non-forum shopping
in behalf of the said corporation without the
benefit of a board resolution. We quote the
pertinent portion of the decision here:
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in
relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code,
clearly enunciates that all corporate powers
are exercised, all business conducted, and all
properties controlled by the board of
directors. A corporation has a separate and
distinct personality from its directors and
officers and can only exercise its corporate
powers through the board of directors.
Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate
officer cannot solely exercise any corporate
power pertaining to the corporation without
authority from the board of directors. This
has been our constant holding in cases
instituted by a corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have
recognized the authority of some corporate
officers to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping. In
Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. CA, we recognized the
authority of a general manager or acting
general manager to sign the verification and
certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer
v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a
verification signed by an “employment
specialist” who had not even presented any
proof of her authority to represent the
company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA,
we ruled that a personnel officer who signed
the petition but did not attach the authority
from the company is authorized to sign the
verification and non-forum shopping
certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company v. WMC Resources
International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled
that the Chairperson of the Board and
President of the Company can sign the
verification and certificate against non-
forum shopping even without the
submission of the board’s authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following
officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the
General Manager or Acting General
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a
complete listing of authorized signatories to
the verification and certification required by
the rules, the determination of the
sufficiency of the authority was done on a
case to case basis. The rationale applied in
the foregoing cases is to justify the authority
of corporate officers or representatives of
the corporation to sign the verification or
certificate against forum shopping, being “in
a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the
petition.”[16] (Emphases supplied.)
It must be stressed, however, that the
Cagayan ruling qualified that the better
procedure is still to append a board
resolution to the complaint or petition to
obviate questions regarding the authority of
the signatory of the verification and
certification.[17]
Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this
case, it bears reiterating that the requirement
of the certification of non-forum shopping is
rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.
However, the Court has relaxed, under
justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring
the submission of such certification
considering that, although it is obligatory, it
is not jurisdictional. Not being jurisdictional,
it can be relaxed under the rule of
substantial compliance.[18]
In the case at bar, the Court holds that there
has been substantial compliance with
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure on the petitioners’
part in consonance with our ruling in the
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v.
WMC Resources International PTY LTD.[19]
that we laid down in 2003 with the rationale
that the President of petitioner-corporation
is in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition.
Petitioner Benzonan clearly satisfies the
aforementioned jurisprudential requirement
because he is the President of petitioner
South Cotabato Communications
Corporation. Moreover, he is also named as
co-respondent of petitioner-corporation in
the labor case which is the subject matter of
the special civil action for certiorari filed in
the Court of Appeals.
the records, pleadings, and other evidence
available before us to properly resolve those
questions, we are constrained to refrain
from passing upon them
After all, the Court has stressed that its
jurisdiction in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing only errors of
law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact
complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record, or the assailed judgment
is based on the misapprehension of facts.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for proper disposition of
CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN.

Clearly, it was error on the part of the Court

of Appeals to dismiss petitioners’ special
civil action for certiorari despite substantial
compliance with the rules on procedure. For
unduly upholding technicalities at the
expense of a just resolution of the case,
normal procedure dictates that the Court of
Appeals should be tasked with properly
disposing the petition, a second time
around, on the merits.

The Court is mindful of previous rulings

which instructs us that when there is
enough basis on which a proper evaluation
of the merits can be made, we may dispense
with the time-consuming procedure in order
to prevent further delays in the disposition
of the case.[20] However, based on the
nature of the two remaining issues
propounded before the Court which involve
factual issues and given the inadequacy of
Title: Swedish Match v The Treasurer of
the City of Manila
GR No. 181277
Date: July 3, 2013
Ponente: Sereno, CJ.
Parties:
petitioner: Swedish Match Philippines, Inc.
respondent: The Treasurer of the City of
Manila
Facts:
This is a Petition for Refund of Taxes with
the RTC of Manila in accordance with
Section 196 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991. The petitioner says that it
had been religiously paying its taxes based
on Section 14 of Ordinance No. 7794 or the
Manila Revenue Code (as amended by
Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011). However, it
was still taxed based on Section 21 of the
same code. RTC denied the petition because
of the failure of the petitioner to plead the
latter’s capacity to sue and to state the
authority of Ms. Beleno, who had executed
the Verification and Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping. It also denied it on the
ground that Section 14 and 21 pertained to
taxes of a different nature and, thus the
elements of double taxation were wanting in
this case. CTA affirmed the decision.
Petitioner points out that Section 21 is not in
itself invalid, but the enforcement of this
provision would constitute double taxation
if business taxes have already been paid
under Section 14 of the same revenue code.
Petitioner further argues that since
Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 have already
been declared null and void in Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, all
taxes collected and paid on the basis of these
ordinances should be refunded.
The respondent also argues that Sections 14
and 21 pertain to two different objects of tax;
thus, they are not of the same kind and
character so as to constitute double taxation.
“Section 14 is a tax on manufacturers,
assemblers and other processors, while
Section 21 applies to business subject to
excise, value-added, or percentage tax.
Respondent posits that under Section 21,
petitioner is merely a withholding tax agent
of the City of Manila.”
Issue:
WON the imposition of tax under Section 21
of the Manila Revenue Code constitutes
double taxation in view of the tax collected
and paid under Section 14 of the same code-
YES
Ratio:
The Court used the holding in The City of
Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. to
justify that taxation under Sections 14 and
21 would result to double taxation. Here, it
was elaborated that “Section 143(a) of the
LGC: said municipality or city may no
longer subject the same manufacturers, etc,
to a business tax under Section 143(h) of the
same Code. SECTION 143(h) may be
imposed only on businesses that are subject
to excise tax, VAT or percentage tax under
the NIRC, and that are ‘not otherwise
specified in preceding paragraphs.” In the
same way, businesses such as respondent’s,
already subject to a local business Tax under
Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794
[which is based on Section 143(a) of the
LGC], can no longer be made liable for local
business tax under Section 21 of the same
Tax Ordinance [which is based on Section
143(h) of the LGC.]”
Thus, since petitioner has already been
paying under Section 14, it should not be
subjected to the payment of taxes under
Section 21. Further, the Court agreed with
petitioner that Ordinance Nos. 7988 and
8011 cannot be the basis for the collection of
business taxes because Coca-Cola already
ruled that these ordinances were null and
void.
Hence, payments made under Section 21
must be refunded in favor of petitioner.
Petition is GRANTED.
AGAPITO CRUZ FIEL, AVELINO
QUIMSON REYES and ROY CONALES
BONBON, petitioners, vs. KRIS
SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari which seeks the nullification of
the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
16 April 2002, as well as its reiterative
resolution of 29 October 2002, dismissing
the case brought to it by petitioners for non-
compliance with the requirements of Section
5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioners were employed by private
respondent Kris Security Systems, Inc., as
security guards and were assigned posts at
Dunkin Donut, lmus Central Kitchen
Department, in lmus, Cavite. On different
dates in October 1998, private respondent
terminated the services of petitioners. On 13
October 1998, petitioners filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal before the Regional
Arbitrating Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Private
respondent contended that it did not
dismiss petitioners but that they were
pulled out from their assignments due to the
request of the client.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his
decision on 30 June 2000; he concluded:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that herein complainants have
indeed been constructively dismissed from
their employment. Accordingly, respondent
Kris Security Systems, Inc. is hereby
directed to reinstate said complainants to
their former position(s) without loss of
seniority rights and to pay them their full
backwages as follows:
Full
Backwa
ges
1) Agapito C. Fiel P139,799.66
2) Avelino Q. Reyes P139,799.66
3) Roy C.Bonbon P137,583.16
4) Diomedes Uray P139,128.00
The other monetary claims are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.[1]
Private respondent appealed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC
which, on 08 August 2001, set aside the
questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter, it
held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated
30 June 2000 is SET ASIDE. The complaints
for illegal dismissal are dismissed for being
without merit.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC in its resolution of 28
November 2001.
Petitioners forthwith filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals. In a resolution, dated 16 April
2002, the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground that it violated
Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure because only three of the four
petitioners signed the mandatory
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of 29 October 2002.
The instant petition raises the issue of:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted
correctly and in the interest of substantial
justice when it dismissed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court on the mere technicality that said
petition was signed, certified and verified by
only three (3) out of four (4) named
petitioners (all of whom claim to have been
illegally dismissed by their employer)
considering the following circumstances:
(a) The ruling in the case of Loquias, et al.
vs. Office of the Ombudsman (338 SCRA 62)
where only 1 out of 5 petitioners signed the
certification of their petition is not properly
applicable to the present case where 3 out of
4 petitioners signed the verification of their
petition.
(b) The later ruling in DAR vs. Alonzo-
Legasto (339 SCRA 306), (where the petition
was signed by only one of each of the four
(4) couples) that the requirement of a
certification of non-forum shopping should
not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert the goal of
achieving substantial justice supplanted or
modified the earlier strict ruling in Loquias
vs. Office of the Ombudsman (338 SCRA
62).
(c) In St. Michael Academy vs. NLRC (292
SCRA 478) it was ruled that technical rules
of pleading are not enforced strictly in labor
cases especially where they will defeat the
substantive rights of employees and in De
Ysasi Ill vs. NLRC (231 SCRA 173), it was
declared that courts must heed the
underlying policy in the labor code relaxing
the application of technical rules of
procedure in labor cases.
(d) The three (3) petitioners who signed the
petition filed with the Court of Appeals are
differently situated from the fourth (4th)
named petitioner who failed and omitted to
sign the petition; consequently, such failure
and omission by the fourth (4th) petitioner
should not prejudice the three (3) other
petitioners who are without fault.
(e) The failure or omission to delete from the
petition filed with the Court of Appeals the
name of Diomedes Uray (the 4th named
petitioner who failed or omitted to sign the
petition) was an excusable oversight or
lapse by petitioners attorneys pro bono.
(f) Giving due course to the petition only
insofar as the three (3) petitioners who
signed the petition are concerned but
dismissing the petition only insofar as the
fourth (4th) petitioner who failed or omitted
to sign the petition is concerned would be a
fair, reasonable and equitable disposition of
the petition filed with the Court of Appeals.
(g) An outright dismissal of the petition on a
procedural or technical omission (not
attributable to the three (3) petitioners who
signed the petition filed with the Court of
Appeals) would deprive petitioners of their
right to be heard on the merits of their
petition which calls for the rectification of
acts of grave abuse of discretion by the
NLRC.[3]
In its brief comment, dated 09 January 2003,
respondent company prays for the denial of
the petition and an affirmance of the action
taken by the Court of Appeals.
The Court grants the petition.
The greater interest of justice would be
served if the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners before the Court of Appeals is
adjudicated on its merits with respect to the
three petitioners who have signed the
verification and certification on non-forum
shopping, namely, Agapito C. Piel, Avelino
Q. Reyes and Roy C. Bonbon, than to make
them all pay for the failure of their co-
petitioner Diomedes Uray to observe his
own compliance with the rules. The three
petitioners who have faithfully observed the
rules mandated in Section 5, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, by signing
the requisite verification and certification on
non-forum shopping, should not be unduly
prejudiced by the fault of their co-petitioner
who apparently has lost interest in pursuing
his case.
Once again, we must stress that the
technical rules of procedure should be used
to promote, not frustrate, the cause of
justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable aim, the just resolution
of cases on their merits, however, cannot be
sacrificed merely in order to achieve that
objective.[4] Rules of procedure are tools
designed not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; thus, their strict and
rigid application may, for good and
deserving reasons, have to give way to, and
be subordinated by, the need to aptly
dispense substantial justice in the normal
course.[5]
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated 16 April 2002 and
29 October 2002, are SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits of the petition
before it.
SO ORDERED.
ALLEN
LEROY HAMILTON, petitioner, vs.
DAVID LEVY and FE
QUITANGON, respondents.
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres and Ibarra for
petitioners.
Oscar L. Karaan for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The case commenced with the filing by
petitioner of a complaint for sum of money
and damages, with prayer for preliminary
attachment against respondents and one
Pablo de Borja with the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles, Pampanga. The trial court
issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. On the strength of
said Writ, the court sheriff levied on a
Cherokee 180 Piper aircraft, allegedly
owned by respondent David Levy. Ramon
Araneta filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim asserting ownership of the levied
aircraft by virtue of a sale from W.E.L.
Phils., Inc., represented by respondent Levy,
on June 19, 1997. Meanwhile, petitioner filed
a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default
for failure to file any responsive pleading
within the reglementary period. This was
granted by the trial court and petitioner
proceeded with the presentation of
evidence ex parte. Prior to the presentation of
evidence, however, respondents' counsel
filed a Special Appearance to Question the
Jurisdiction of the trial court. When no
action was made on the Special Appearance,
respondents filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the trial
court a motion for leave to sell the attached
property pending entry of judgment,
alleging that the levied aircraft was
deteriorating, depreciating and
accumulating rust in the hanger.
Respondents filed a Supplemental
Manifestation informing the trial court of a
pending case for replevin/annulment of the
writ of preliminary attachment filed by
Ramon Araneta before the Regional Trial
Court, Olongapo City, Branch 72. The Court
of Appeals issued the assailed Decision
granting the Petition and ordering the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8696 without
prejudice, on its finding that summons was
not validly served upon respondents, hence,
the trial court never assumed jurisdiction
over their persons. The Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The
filing of a supplemental motion cannot be
considered as voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court in the case at
bar. The records show that respondents filed
the Supplemental Motion on August 7, 1998,
almost a month after they filed the petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. It
was preceded by a "Special Appearance to
Question the Jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court," dated March 26, 1998, and by a
Manifestation, dated August 5, 1998,
informing the trial court of the pendency of
the petition for certiorari assailing the court's
jurisdiction over their persons. In other
words, when the Supplemental Motion was
filed, it was made clear that respondents
were questioning and continuing to
question the jurisdiction of the trial court. At
any rate, the Supplemental Manifestation
did not seek any direct affirmative relief
from the trial court.
Summons was not properly served on
respondents. The Sheriff's return showed
that there was no reason why personal
service could not be effected. The petition
was denied.
Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile
GR No. 148635 April 1, 2003
Puno, J.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
Doctrine: The execution by one of the
petitioners of the certificate of non-forum
shopping constitutes substantial compliance
with the Rules where all the petitioners,
being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, share a common
interest.
Facts:
 Bernardo Cavile – contracted 3
marriages and acquired 6 parcels of land
now being disputed
1. Ines Dumat-ol – 1 child
(Simplicia)
2. Orfia Colalho – 2 children
(Fortunato and Vevencia)
3. Tranquilina Galon – 3
children (Castor, Susana and Benedicta)
 Oct 1977 – descendants of his 1st and
2nd marriage (herein respondents) filed a
complaint for partition against the
descendants of his 3rd marriage (herein
petitioners).
Allegation:
- They are co-owners
of the properties in question having
inherited them from Bernardo
- Upon the death of
Bernardo, his son by 3rd marriage (Castor)
took possession of the properties as
administrator for and in behalf of his co-
owners
- When Castor died,
his children took possession of the land but
no longer as administrators. They claimed
the properties and their fruits as their own
and repeatedly refused respondents’
demand for partition.
 Among the evidence proferred was
a notarized Deed of Partition executed by
the heirs of Bernardo Cavile in 1937.
 Trial court – dismissed the petition
for partition.
 Upon appeal, CA reversed the
decision saying the trial court erred in
admitting the Deed of Partition as evidence
without proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
 Hence, this petition.
 The respondents pray for the denial
of the petition on two grounds: it violates
the rule on the certification against forum
shopping; and the CA did not commit any
error in its assailed decision.
 The respondents harp on the fact
that only one of the 22 petitioners, Thomas
George Cavile, Sr. executed and signed the
certification against forum shopping when
the Rules require that said certification must
be signed by all the petitioners.
Issue:
Was the certification against forum
shopping signed by only one of the
petitioners sufficient to meet the Rules? Yes
Ruling:
 The rule is that the certificate of
non-forum shopping must be signed by all
the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the
signing by only one of them is insufficient.
 However, the rules on forum
shopping, which were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own and
legitimate objective.
 The rule of substantial compliance
may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification.
 The requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding
the certification of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
 The execution by Thomas George
Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other
petitioners of the certificate of non-forum
shopping constitutes substantial compliance
with the Rules.
 All the petitioners, being relatives
and co-owners of the properties in dispute,
share a common interest, and share a
common defense in the complaint for
partition. When they filed the petition, they
filed it as a collective, raising only one
argument to defend their rights over the
properties in question.
 There is sufficient basis for Thomas
George Cavile to speak for and in behalf of
his co-petitioners.
 The trial court was correct in
dismissing the complaint for partition, it
appearing that the lawful heirs of Bernardo
Cavile have already divided the properties
among themselves, as evidenced by the
Deed of Partition.
 The document (Deed of Partition)
speaks for itself. It was acknowledged
before the Notary Public and recorded in his
notarial book. Documents acknowledged
before notaries public are public documents
which are admissible in evidence without
necessity of preliminary proof as to their
authenticity and due execution. They enjoy
the presumption of regularity. It is a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
 The respondents failed to overcome
the presumption of regularity.
 The properties left by Bernardo
Cavile have already been partitioned among
his heirs.
POLYTRADE v BLANCO

G.R. No. L-27033

October 31, 1969

FACTS

POLYTRADE filed a case against BLANCO

in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
BLANCO moved to dismiss the case upon
the ground of improper venue invoking
Section 3, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which
states that “venue may be stipulated by
written agreement.” According to BLANCO,
they agreed “tosue and be sued in the
Courts ofManila." BLANCO says that
because of such covenanthe can only be
sued in the courts of Manila.

ISSUE

Whether or not venue was properly laid.

HELD

Venue here was properly laid.

An accurate reading of the stipulation,

"Theparties agree to sue and be sued in the
Courts of Manila," does not preclude
thefiling of suits in the residence of plaintiff
or defendant. The plain meaning is that
theparties merely consented to be sued in
Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words
whichwould indicate that Manila and
Manila alone is the venue are totally
absenttherefrom.