Curtis E. LeMay and Lauris Norstad Correspondence

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tor General Curt.la I. Lelllq, U. S. J:nsy

ComaDdiDg General, Ul Bomber Comand
~ 234, c/o Poetaster
San Francisco, California
DMr Curt i
17 April 1945
I aeea to be back in the public relationa buiness again, t.bia t.t.
ewer a statement attributed to you by Associated Press and CBS on April 151 r
The destruction ot Japan's industt7 by air blows alone 1a poaslble.
Personally- I have no quarrel with that thesis, and the 1tatnnt. aa
well received by- both press aDd radio. But there is a War Departnt polic7,
steaming trom last y-ear's orgy of predictions that the war would eDd before
Christll8.8, which prohibita alJ1' predietions or speculationa of a.nr kiDd b7 .
General Officers . There never is acy quarrel over a stateJUnt of acco.pliah-
nt; but what may or could happen is r eceived with a Tery jaundiced qe.
This attitude st ems !rorc such a high level t hat departures from it auto.\-
ically bring repercussions. In this case it has been suggested that the War
Department my in future publicly repudiate any predictiona b7 otticera, which
would of course be exceedingly embarassing
The situation is acute now that the denouement in Europe has becun, aDd
a particularly strong chec;.rein is exerted right now lest someone be i.Daplred
to predict the end of the war agai n, or be the innocent cause of soM contro-
versy over the congressional plan for consolidation of the ailitar,y aDd a a ~
eatablishmente.
When a press statement is issued here, it is hedged, eheeked, screened
Ud kibitsed by enryo11e familiar with the day-to-day shifts in high leYel
attitude, and even then our fingers are crossed at the time of releaae. There-
tore, I think that it we all keep entirely clear of predictions ot &Jrf utare
for some time to come, our cause will be beat served.
We are anxiously waiting word of the results of your last attack OD
southwest Toqo and the lawaaaki area. We are optillistic e11ough to hope t.hat.
t.he effect of the other two operationa will be duplicated.
Giye rq regards to Augie, BUl, llont7 aDd the rest.
Sincenly
LlURIS IORSTD
Bripdler O.aeral' u. a. lnT
IN REPLY REFER TO:
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tADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORC! {
WASHINGTON
16 October 1945
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Major General Curtis E. LeHay
J; ~ CG, 21st Bomber Command
i fi APO 234, c/o Post master
; / San Francisco, California
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Dear Curt :
Mr . J . Parnell Thomas , Congressman from New Jersey,
and a member of the House Military Affairs Committee has asked
that we obtain an ori ginal signature on the attached letter if
possible . This is an exact c opy of a mimeographed letter which
indicates that t he or iginal was signed by you on the 1st of
August 1945 . Mr. Thomas has a son in t he 55th Reconnaissance
Squadron, so I feel that his request is a legitimate one. In-
cidentally, he i s a very firm supporter of the Air Forces.
I would appr eciate the ret urn of the attached let ter
at your earliest convenience .
J .'PARNEL.L. THOMAS
7TH OlltTftiCT N , .J,

' of tbt Wnittb
of
COMMITTEES:
MIUTARY
aS'bington, a. :.
September 12 , 1945
Major General Curtis E. Le
Commanding General ,
Headquarters 20th Air Force,
APO 234 , c/o Postmaster
San California .
Dear General Le May:
It was the good fortune of my son, Sergeant J . Parnell
Thoma s , Jr ., to receive , through Lt . Col . Chavasse , a commendation
f r om you. This was dated August 1, 1945 and given to the Commanding
Officer , 55th Reconnaisance Squadron, Long Range , Wea., APO 234 .
Knowing that I would be interested in my son mailed
it to me , and the thought has occurred that I would like to have this
framed to be placed in my den, but that it would be much better if I
could receive one personally signed by you.
Thanking you in anticipation of whatever you may do on
this regRrd, and with best personal regards , I am
Sincerely,
1
. .
HEADQUARTERS, lWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINCiTON 2.11, D . C.
Major General Curtis E. LeMay, U. S. Ar.my
Commanding General , XXI Bomber Command
APO 234, c/o Postmaster
San Fr ancisco, California
Dear Curt:
18 April 1945
Your radiogram AIPLN 1116 of 18th of included among the informa-
tion addr essees COMGENPOA, and CINCPOA. Addressed as it was, it
had further distribution throughout the Department sections . Since
this is strictly internal Twentieth Air Force business at t his time, the
wide dissemination of this message creates nothing but confusion here.
I had hoped to send on a visit to you before t his to discuss
personnel and administr ative questions , but he had to go to USSTAF in order
to line up some key personnel . I believe t he question of routing of r adio-
grams and the general rules for t he use of radio and telecon transmission
could be clarified to advantage of all concerned, and I consequently propose
to have him go into the subject with a view to visiting you in the near future
and passing on our gener al ideas. It is astounding what one message mis-
directed can sometimes cause in the way of confusion.
'.e got your report of t he photography for the 15th/16th April operation
against Tokyo. Although \\ e are not attempting here to work out any aetails
until photoeraphs come in, a quick glance at the map certainly gives the
linpression that something over half of Tokyo is now gone. The three
incendiary operations have certainly been among the most effective in the
entir e history of bombing . Keep up the good work.
received today the Koriyama pictures and have been most impressed
with the r esults achieved. From the complete destruction of some of those
buildings , there must have been some terrific explosions involved. I hao
no idea that even a matchbox could disintegrate to that extent .
As I stated in a telecon a couple of days ago, I think the Twentieth
Air Force channels in the Pacific Oceru1 Areas will shortly be str aightened
out . Present thought is that pending the movement of Headquarters Twentieth
Air iorce to t hat area, you shall be designated as Acting Deputy Commander,
Twentieth Force, for the Marianas . This will permit you to function
somewhat similarly to the manner in which you worked in India and should be
most satisfactory. The responsibilitibs for logistic support will probably
have to be carried by AAFPOA at leastcfor the t line being. That is a matter
lassification cancelled by
DOD
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being worked out now. The administrative planning for the deployment
and support of the XX Bomber Command in the Ryu.kyus would also be a specific
charge on AAFPOA. This is very much in the formative stage now so please
don 't discuss it . The form whi ch t his clarification may take has not been
decided topside yet and the above is merely my forecast .
Joe Preston is leaving her e tomorrow to gp out and take over the j ~ b
of Director of Training of the Lead Crew School . We are still hoping to
get it started by May the lst and to keep the first class on schedule.
l have done everything possible to focus the interest of all concerned on
this first class so that we may learn while doing and thus permit the second
gr oup to operate at full scale
.. e will send you either by telecon or letter in the next few days some
information on personnel available in the U. K. and in the Mediterranean.
The war has progressed to a point there which has caused the powers that be
to give us what amounts to almost a clear go ahead to select anyone we chose
outside of the very top layer.
My best to everyone .
Sincerely
A
Brigadier General,
Chief of Staff
HUDQUART'I':RS YXI BOWER CO !M/.ND
Offi ce of t he Commanni ng General
234, c/o Postm:st er
San Fro.ncisco, Cal ifornia
.
Classification cancellea
18 hprtl 19L5
DOD DIRECTIVE N y
o. 9_,_ e:t'.feoti ve .28 Nov. 58
Brigadier General Lauria Norstad,
Hecdquarters, Twenti et h Air Force,
Pentar on Building,
Washinrton 2?, t . c.
Dear Larry,
I aa sending a teletype on our personnel s ituation. In addition
to t hose mentionec, I need a new staff photorraphic officer an1 a new
co nnder for the photo squadr on. Bot h ar e exper ienced , but
opi nion, l ack t he necessary drive t o keep pace wit h our oper otiona.
This will t ake car P of imaedi a te needs . MontgomAry i s st ill doinf
alri ht, as you can see by t he r esults of our recent mi ssions . Bill
Jrvine continues to do a good job. All our supply difficulties lie
outside of his inf luence .
I have kept close contact with since t he str rt of t he
Okinawa campairn. They have askec us t o keep t he Kyushu air"iel ds
neutralized f or the next days. I di slike bei ng. pulled off our
aain j oh now t hat we are to r et r esults I r Acopnize
t he necessit y of complet i ng t he Okinawa jot as soon as possihle .
I you noted, t he l irht over Tok)o
our l ast daylir;ht attack. }. ppar entl y t he Japs ha ve "'Ver y- I
t hing t hey have t o t hi s i s true, I roinr t o rnle 8" .
t he f irhters from close escort l et t hem J5po cl cr r
t heir kennels , i f necessary, to shoot t hem c: own . I ,;j on
1
t t .el teve t be
Japs wi ll have much l eft at t he end of Oki na e j ol enn I
be rel eased this airdrome job bef ore t oo long, I hope to r et
rest of t he enpi ne i ndustry t his month. I hovn hopes t hr t ' l5
will do for t he Japs what February ' 43 di d for t he Germans.
Our nir ht attacks proved ineffective bee us e we l ecke0 t he
tools. Upon the arrival of the r eflex optic sights an1 Pritish
marker bombs , I believe we oan t ake out f actories at niuht fro around
seven t housand feet or underneath the clouds. This will te an a 'van-
taPe during per iods of bad weat her teoause t he night weat her over Japan
eeeas to be better than it is in the day tiae.
I

We are still experimentinp with the reek attacks . I t hink wP can
use it on s ome t argets when t he weat her i s not f or
el s e . The crews are el at ed over our r ecent eucoeaRos and will t aY.i t o
Japan if necessary to destroy the t ar pet s .
The l ast t wo i ncendi ary attacks wer A vary rue t o
and haze over t ar Pet ar ea , the photor,Taphy .e not rooc
to accurat el y assess to pr ior i ty i n t he nurnt out
many them been heavi l y r n' t hr t
still stann can be off ry H.F. bomts,
Our main difficult y out her e now i s supply . I you
nr i nr some supply people with you on your next vi si t.
Sincer el y,
CURTIS F. LeMAY,
Maj or Gener al, u. S. A.,
Commandinr .
HEADQGARTEHS XXI BOII.I:JER OOJII(AMI)
Office of the Commanding General
!PO 234; o/o Poetmaeter
San Francisco, Cal ifornia
3 March 1945
General Laurie Norstad,
Headquarters , Twentieth Air Force,
Pentagon Building,
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Larry,
I have just received your l etter on requisitioning procedure. I
have already taken some drastic action to stop all act ivities of t he Com-
mand t hat have been going on outsi de normal channels. Shortly after my
arrival here, I found we had dam near half of t he Command back in t he
States on some project or other and t his Headquarters bad onl y a vague ,
i dea of what t hey were trying to accopliah. I think I have t he situation
cleaned up now eo that we will not be furt her on t he sur ject
.
We have been having a hell of a time wit h the weat her l atel y.
have been ready for a strike for t he l ast t hree days but t he weather has
been solid to 29,000 from 29 degrees l atitude north to Japan, which aakes
it impossible to get format ion through. It lools l i ke this situation
will exist from now on. If we put our f ormations on top of it going in,
the b011b load drops to practically nothing. To try and beat these weather
conditione, I am going to try to a formation Japan itsel f .
{
I think we can get away with it a few times
'
Another out is to t ry asome night boJObing. I don't believe it i s an
effi cient method of operation but th.is is another case or a few boabs on
the t arget better t han no bo11be at all. In any c: se, cannot keep
the force on the ground waiting for good weather which doesn't eyist over
Jape.n at thi s ti11e of the year. I am working .on several very radical aeth-
ods of employment or the 'foroe. As aoon as I have run a few t ests, I'll
submit the plans to you for comment.
As you know, I have' slower! down our oombat effort to get some training
time for t he outfit. I believe that t his will pay us dividends in t he
near future. Within three weeks, I hope to have the groups in shape to atep
up the tempo of our att ack.
This probabl y will not reach you before your vi sit out here, but 1D
case it does, let me urge the necessity tor a visit fro you as aoOD
ae possible.
Sincerely,

HEADQUARTr RS :XXI BOMBER COIOIAMD
Office of the Commandtng General
APO o/o Postmast er
San Franci sco, California
31 1945
28 Bov.
J)Ql) J)IUCtiVE lio v '
Brigadi er General Norstrd,
He dqucrters, Twentieth Air Force,
25, D. C.
Dear Larry,
Maybe the ahefd looks vorse t han t he
but after t en <1 ays t his jol looks m1ch t "'urher t han t he oae I
j ust l eft . To start tne t ale of r oe the steff here is procticr l l y
worthles.s . They haven't hr d tht"i r s ect i on he rl e l onr enouph t o r et
organized. There h a been no weeding out so we hive a lot of mis-
rtt personnel. The is o l y so everyone i s
eitting around waiti ng for an of fice bef or e going to or k. No one
i n t he combet unit e cn remember a sinr l e instance here the staff
h a t hem. They cturll y believe ouposite to be true;
effort s h ve been hin eleci ly l blunAer ing st aff . '71th this
situ.etion exi sti ng, t hP.re a been e. t ennency ri. r.ht own t o inr' ivi-
dusls in the combrt ere s t o froa hi rher auth-
ority. My first j ot i s t o get t hi s st eff functioni ng -- a j ob t hnt
should been compl et ed in t he st r tes . I ' m th t this is
going t o re cons i (l erA l,l e WE>eding out cnc I pr ob bl y ill br ve
t o nsk for r enl 1 cemE>nt personnel. I ' l l t ry nr along ly re-
shuffling whnt I h ve. If isn't ooseible, I ' , l on you
ror '1elp.
If spce i s avPi l srle, I Tecommenrl t '1ot t'1e entire
at rr of t he Uth CO?f2e over ht:'re to help ret this pl tCe ;-oiDF" and
t he move to their "le" ;;raa f r om bare . The I t hink, ould
p;et us f Oing a month or so s ooner ;;. nCI i t ke-'p thea froa eoi.Df'
to SAed aiting i n Inf
1
ia. At le> st the t rrpet sect i on of A- 2 nn
the Tooo vre musts.
Rosy ' s outfit ia i n shrpe. I t he impression f r oa
on _, o .. '1Ay t hink .. he ol too an t he opposition too
he vy to crash thr o lP,h r nd get t he bombs on t he t arret. I a uetti nF"
them st arted on a propPr t raini nf' st eoR to r ive
t hem t he help t hey I hope ill re rl l e to ull the outfit
out or the hole, but I h1ve no a, sure nee t hr t he vwill. Two
. .
manners would help consir
1
f't' " l y if you con f inn t hea.
bett r st art up A Rosy i n esse we
.,
General Hnrmon i e 0ue here today ann I hDve a 11at of
troubles to present to hia, mai nly of constructiOD pr1-
and getti ng t he r eoot going. Froa 1 convers t i on I wi t h
Ball yest erday, I
1
a not to hope:f'ul of v. satisfo. ctory ao1utioa at
this end of some of the pr oblems . I ' l l keep you roster on Lhe r r o-
gress 1 male.
Due to the many d Lstre.ctiona 1 y the r 8 5ftS "lOt he : ne
our efficiencr i s r oing to i ncrease sl owl y. However, : a soon
as t he t -aininr :rogram I aa ;>l ee ine i n effect, t ... k As hold, I ' sure
we wil l utting mor e bombs on the
I received a. let t er f:roa Helen yest erday , sayinp the r oxes t.r-
:rived appreciMte your efforts :n t aki ng of the
home front .
I would appr ecirte your
starr over here.
Stncr rely,
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. HEADQUARTERS, TWENTIETH AIR
WASHINGTON 2.5, D. C.
SUBJECT: Requisitioning Procedure
TO: Commanding General
XXI Bomber Command
APO No. 234, c/o Postmaster
22 February 1945
,
1. Under directives heretofore issued it has been
establisned tnat requisitions will be presented by your Command
to the Guam Air Depot.
2. Use of cable or telecon for assistance in follow-up or in
expediting the filling of extremely essential requisitions bas been
authorized. (Copies of sucn telecons should be furnished to the
Guam Air for their information.)
----:;:;:;;- ( it0$!
1
s@fl zil*t tr. n .--
3. In spi1ie of the foregoing, instances have arisen where
individuals under your Command have communicated in writing and by
personal visit with staff agencies in Washington and with Headquarters
Air Technical Serviqe Command at Dayton, Ohio, not through Twentieth
Air Force cnannels, furnishing requisitions which have not been
presented to the Guam Air Depot, and in some cases which have not
clearly authorized by your Headquarters.
4. It is therefore directed:
a . Regular requisitioning channels only will be used.
b. That the foregoing improper practices referred to in
paragraph J above will be stopped. .
By command of General ARNOLD:
LAURIS NORSTAD
Brigadier General , U. S. Artey'
Chief of Staff
!XI BOMBER C01AND
Office of t he Commanding Gener al
San Franci sco, California
Brigadier General Laurie Norstad,
Chief of Start, Twentieth Air r orce,
Pentagon Building,
25, n. c.
Dear General Nor stada
31 March 1945
I received t he autographed photographs that you 10 thouehtfully
sent and both Lelay and General Iissner were protuse in t heir
thanks.
I have made arrangements with our photo l ab to t ake s ome pictures
ot General LeMay and General As soon as thPse are
I will send autographed print s of both t he Gener al s to you.
Very sincerel y yours ,
THFODORE E. BECKF!Eifft,
Captain, Air Corpe,
Ai de t o Jaj. Gener al LeMay.

HEADQUARTERS, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
WASHINQTON 21, D. C.
Captain Theodore E. Beckemeier, A. C.
Aide- de- camp to General LeMay
Headquarters XXI Bomber Command
Dear Beckemeier:
24 March 1945
Inclosed are the pictures you requested for
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Gener al LeMay and General Kissner.
2 Incls.
Sincerely
~
LAURIS NORSTAD ~
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff
Captain Theodore E. Beckemeier, A.
Aide-de-cap to General LeYay
Headquarters III Bomber Command
~ 234, c/o Postmaster ~ ~
Dear Beckemeiera
~
LlURIS N<msUD
Brigadier General,
Chier or Starr
... HEADQUARTERS, lWENTIETH
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING CIEINEFt.a...
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
(Ini tials)
SUBJECT:
Classification
1945
DOD DIBECXIVE No. D200.9, effeotive
Assignment of Colonel E; E. Kirkpatrick, 0- 17660
T 0: Commanding General, XXI B omber Command
1. Colonel E. E. Kirkpatrick, 0- 17660, Corps of Engineers , has
been accepted by this Headquarters as liaison officer in connection
with the establishment and the activities of the 509th Provisional
Group. He will be attached to the XXI Bomber Command.
28 Nov. 54
2. It is desired that Colonel Kirkpatrick be given every assist-
ance i n carrying out his important work. He has been advised that
insofar as possible, all contact with other agencies concerned will
be through your Headquart ers . This procedur e should not , however ,
be permitted to interfere with the expeditious discharge of his
duties .
3. Colonel Kirkpatrick is authorized to transmit messages by
telecon to t his Headquart ers or through this Headquart ers to the
agency which he represents .
By command of General ARNOLD :
Brigadier General ,
Chief of Staff
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HEADQUARTERS, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
WASHING T O N 2.5, 0. C.
o ~ _
19 February 1945
Maj or General Curtis E. LeMay
Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command
APO 234 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Califor nia
Dear Curt,
The bearer of t his letter is Mr. Edward c. Wells
of Boeing Aircraft Company. He has accompanied the specially
instrumented B-29 which is t o be test flown in your Command.
Other specialist personnel with him are Mr . A. Elliot Merrill
(Pilot) and Mr. John D. Alexander, both wit h Boeing and Mr.
Maurice A. Hull of Wright Aeronautical. See my telecon G-16-5
of 16 February.
It is desired that Mr . Wells be gi ven the broadest
l atitude in flying this plane in order to carry out this mission.
It is also desired that he be given permission to fly on missions,
if necessary, including combat type, at your discretion.
The above is in accord with discussions between General
Echols and the writer.
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Chief of Staff
Uajor General Curtis E. LeMay
Commanding GenerPl , XXI Bomber Command
A. P.O. 234, c/o Postmaster
Dear Curt:
The memorandum inclosed with your letter of 8 February is an in-
teresting study. I agree with you as to the seriousness of the whole
question of combat tours . It is one which must be solved.
My telecon of 14 February should allay your apprehension of crew
shortage. I agree with your plan of using experienced combat personnel
t o raise experience level of your staff.
Establi shment of
11
nor!J'I.al combat tours" has been a matter of lone-
continued thought on my part . First of all, there are many variables:
airplane types, mission types, attrition, replacement flow, --to name
several broad aspects . Psycholoeically, it would seem f rom past ex-
perience, wise to set a goal towards which to strive. On the other
hand, if circumstances make it imperative to raise that goal , ther e is
a bl ow both to morale and to f aith in the integrity of the leader . It
was the consideration of these factors that prompted my various mes-
sages which left the question open to you, rather than stating a rieid
policy. I do feel that t he announcement of the expected number of
combat hours--with a well spread minimum and maximum, offers the most
satisfactory solution. Such a. roal reduces the nsweatinP' out" of the
few missions, which in heavy_ bombardment units has been a serious
cause of aborts when the tour has been expressed as a definite number .
It permits the commander to reward his most effective crews by earlier
rotation; it allows for possible delays in replacements; it hel ps to
keep constant the experience level . And finally, although tbere is a
a goal at which to shoot , it is sufficiently broad to nreclude the
OT chance. All past experienqe leads to the conclusion that
the announcement of a minimum- maximum number of is the best solu-
tion to the problem.
It is my that it would be unwise to accept as standard
the nresent rate of attrition or to base future upon
,

I
this rate which is, as yet, of doubtful representative value. I
believe, and without question,. that t he present training
will produce the supply of crews you need. If in the future , this
position bec9rnes you may be sure that cor rective steps
will be pushed with vigor.
I hope within the next few days to send you a well qualified,
young and ener getic Major , A.G. D.
Sincerely,
U. S.A.
\

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. '. . . . ., ... ., . .:. ..
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HEADQUARTFRS XXI BOMBFR COMMAND
Office of the Commanding General
APO 234, o/o Postmaster
San francisco, Cal ifornia
'
10 February 1945
Bri gadier General Lauria Norstad,
Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force,
Pentagon Building,
Waahington 25, D. c.
Dear Larry,
In anftwer t o your lett er on airpl ane commanders, here ar e a few
coaments on the subject.
From the very start of our expansi on the t r aining people hsve
sent us excellent pilots who could .eke these airplanes sit up and
do tricks but very rar ely was he an airplane commander. This is sa.e-
thing we had to teach t hem aft er they got into combat.
Whil e I had a group, I used to give combat cr ew commander s aa
much personal attention as I could by short lectures froa time to tiBe
and frequent i nspections of cr ews at their ships various phases
of their activity. I oould predict, wit h a degree of accuracy
t hat scared me at times, thoae crews that would be shot down in coabat.
I can no longer do that, of course, but I aa doing other thinps
which will tend to improve the quality of the airplane COIUIB.ndera. For
instance, lead crews receive quite a bit of training along t hi s line by
speci al briefing; time in t he air, etc. All staff sections
and commanders tend to per sonall y impr ove t hei r techni que , Pnd since he
waa a good airplane cOII!Dallder to st art v ith, he winds up as an excel-
lent one. The other erewa know this and tend to copy his methods and
pr ocedure.
In combat cr ew manual we have a section devoted t o the air-
plane At the present time, t he whole manual i s poorly writ-
ten and incoapl ete. At the time it was published, I fel t that we had
to make a ftart somewher e so we put it out in a hurry, intendinF to aa-
,
plit)- and rewrite it l at er. This ie in the mill now and the airplane
co-.andera eection will be greatly u plitied. It ia .:r 1ntent10D to
uae thia .ual as a text book tor ground school inatruet10D. Once we
1et it intb final form and the elassea going, you can expect an increase
in effioiebby or not only airplane commander but the entire crew.
All shortooaings ot pilote aa airplane ha been
.
)
passed on to the training command many t 1mes. two occasions I have
discussed the problem personally withGeneral Youat and I'm sur e that
Bob Williams i s familiar the problem. However, I have yet t o see
auch impr ovement in their pr oduct in thts respect. Leadership is ane
of the !ntangi bles tied up with a kaft
1
s and character that
he either has or not, but if there is a spark there we should be abl e
to tan it into a sizeable flaae. I think much could be, .done in t he
training aOIIIDaDd and the training Air Forces to iapress t he airplane
commanders with their command responsibilittes. Certainly ore can be
done than is being done nt the present tiae.
. If you run ac,.oaa that can be used i n 1IY coabat crew manua.l,
I would appreciate it.
Regards,
. --- ..- __ -
I,
I
HF.ATIQITAPT
14
RS YXI BQ'fi31c'P ND
Office of the General
APO 2?4, o/o
San C lifornin
Fcbrucry 1945
Ae indicaten tn my letter of 31 1945, weeding out of
misfit i e now underr.ay. y telecon FN 1 Feb-
ruary 19L5 , rP-fP.rer.ce Colonel Bill Bl nnchrrd,
Officer of the I.Oth Bomb Group, ls step tn this direction. I
intend using as A- 3 of Commend and f eel since
he will ooma over with the 5Sth I ' m j uotified in
asking for him now. His formor as Steff of t he
58th "'ing under Blondy Saunrlers and his oomca.t as a Group
is j nnt hct r e need here to s o rk plur our .A- 3 9ectioo.
He ' s e good nan the job nr I neen him rirht -- hope you've
, alre<>dy been Atle to sell Rnmey on the 18es .
My bic ia the l r ck of peson 1el in
'" he A i jut.- nt General C:ectiQn. I naed an "ol d timertr 'kno s all
t he rulea e.nc Ot' O organi7e the po.por v ork ith orkPbla system.
I ' d l i ke t o hE: vo Oolol"\ al Leo I. Uar'nan, Ao j utant Gent":l ral "or Pomey,
l ut I don ' t wnnt For(.r t o feel that I ' m t ryinp to bl eed him r. ry.
Would appreci1te your
lfeU, tarry, thc t
1
t.> &bout nll for now
comments .
Classification cancelled by - 28 N 58
.DQI) J)IBiCTIU Bo. 5200.9, efi'eotive ov.
CURTIS F'.
Major n.s .A.,
Co.und iDA; .

..,..- ;"1--:.."' .., _ _.,.,., - ,... -
. . .....
. .....
HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMUAND
' ottice ot the Command1ns General
APO 234, o/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.
a
.. As you undoubtedly realize. the re.eponsib111t1es ot the
atatf photo officer ot this command are heavy. To discharge
properly these responsibilities, he auat be a moat capable and
aggressive organizer and planner in $ddit1on to possessing a
sound technical knowledge in t he field of aerial pqotograpby.
Colonel Shephard has the technical knowledge required but
lacks the ess ential ability to plan and organie Since Joining
this comand, he has devoted his entire effort to his Job, and
in doing so has earned our reapeot. HoweYer, I am confident
that he should be given an aasign.ent to which he 1 better
suited.
I am therefore requesting that you diseuse this utter with
Colonel MCCoy of OC&R and have Colonel Shephard reassigned. As
tor his replacement, I believe that Lt. Colonel Nadeau, who ia
aow functioning aa aaa1atant to Colonel Shephard, can handle the
Job.
Before leaving, Qeneral Hansell and I d1aouaaed aatter.
HI 1a of the eame opini on concerning reassignment ot Colonel
Shephard. In Y1ew of extensive and 1aportant photographic
requ1reenta now existing and in it 18 reoommended
\hat colonel Mccoy give t -hia matter hie iiiiHdiate attention.
CURTIS I LaMAY
llaJ oaneral, USA
CODUII&Dding
Deputy Comnmnder
(POA)
'.PO
Recon:'audation .is- t!'e.Ci e "ureuent to t he of
200- l presently Fil d be deFignated
"Ca s t l e Fiel d" i n 'honor o.r di er J' . Ceai; l e ehe was
killed in on 24 1944. .., '
. .
.
2. C stl e of the of nevy tR
the Air to the or ite
hir,Kly aucc.ess!1ll fiomhtng ' t--cchn.i que. His' effort s -;>l r:1yarl an rol e
in the strut "lgic boaher--lnent whi ch wa s u c'7lnducive f nc t or in
the ultim te o!' the Europetm f' ar . He die& h e roica .y hile l e dinr
h11- ing inta cctlou '*'beo. he valiav.'t,ly ch.ole t o stand ty eont!"ol.l
. . ....
bf his to effect t hn .... of 'li s creu r thr!r t "lan
'\ellpt to as.ve hiE! o-m life. His r.- , - s k111, "Sa !": cicus ju'1ZJ!tent uti
brtll 'fl'f re i n accorii wi th t he !li r hcet t.r &ditioo of t he Air

J. General ty the t ir
to wh.ieh the use of
Sll.d .skill iu an impo:rt .. l)t 'poeh.ion 1n VLR Jll"Qgrlt nc op reti nfl of this
eo.rmnr'l . of tird ... cme by his w. ae ill ?<"rp
ht a ... e'lory, .... OT ".li7e d " Cl:S e nd 1-:'tlY b.orre to hoae
Qf. &CCO;ft \ l i aht:l("Ut tho tre. df or Av: eri cr .Cl
"-'-'-'......-:.: -.
0 I
Via I

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
11EADQUARTBRS OF TBE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
( a ) ~ ltr. llUA 600.05 clatedlD ltq l94S
... 1.1\ taa.do.
(b) P..Ul n.a x . . ~ ltllrl.4 aw 26 JW 191.4.
( ) ~ Of nteftDOe (a) .
~ :W.. NIMITZ
. .. """

. .

WASHINGTON 211, 0 . C. \
I
B
,..
-
Major General Curtis E. LeMay, U. S. Army
APO 234, c/ o Postmaster
San Fr ancisco, California
Dear Curt :
17 April 1945
I seem to be back i n the public rel ations business again, this time
over a statement attributed to you by Associated Press and CBS on April 15:
"The destruction of Japan' s industry by air blows alone is poss i ble.
11
Personally I have no quar rel with that thesis, and the statement was
well r eceived by both press and r adio. But there is a War Depar tment policy,
stemming from last year ' s orgy of predictions t hat the war would end before
Christmas , which prohibits any predictions or s peculations of any kind by
General Officers . There never is any quarrel over a statement of accomplish-
ment; but what may or could happen is r eceived with a very jaundiced eye.
This attitude stems from such a high l evel that departures from it automat-
ically bring repercussions . I n this case it has been suggested t hat the War
Department may in future repudiate any predictions by officers , which
would of course be exceedingly embarassing.
The situation is acute now t hat the denouement in Europe has begun, and
a particularly s trong checkrein is exerted right now lest someone be inspired
to predict the end of t he war again, or be the innocent cause of some contro-
versy over t he congressional plan for consolidation of the military and naval
establishments .
When a press statement is issued here, it is hedged, checked, scr eened
and kibitzed by everyone familiar with the day- to- day shifts in high level
attitude, and even then our fingers are crossed at the t ime of rel ease. There-
fore , I thi nk t hat if we all keep entirely clear of predictions of any nature
for some time to come, our cause will be best served.
We are anxiously waiting word of the r esults of your last attack on
sout hwest Tokyo and the Kawasaki area. We are optimistic enough to hope that
the effect of the other two operations will be duplicated.
Give my r egards to Augie , Bill , Monty and the rest .
Sincer ely
,se
S. Army

.. . . ., ......... T-" - -... ..
' .. <i' '
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- - t

FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL - -/).
HEADQUA
Classification 3 April 1945
DOD DIRECTIVE cancelled by
No. 5200. 9, ef fective 28 D
.nov.
General Curtis E. LeMay, u. s. Army
Dear Curt :
I haven' t written to you earli er because I wanted to get underway
some of the projects we discussed on my visit . Most of the important ones
seem to be pretty well in hand and progress is being made on others. The
success of your operations during March was nothing short of wonderful. I
think you and your XXI Bomber Command have demonstrated courage , skill and
adaptability which will have a critical influence on the war against Japan.
Certainly your last month ' s operations have been the most impressive that
I have seen in the field of bombardment .
By the time this reaches you, you will probably have learned that
General Giles is taking over AAFPOA. He will undoubtedly have a DEPCOMAF 20
function as well , but whether this will be definitely restricted to admin-
istration, I don' t know. I have recommended this , but I think perhaps for
the time being a status quo will exist . Under the present system, as you
know, he would exercise any operational control or coordination functions
only in such individual cases as may be specifically designated by this Head-
quarters . You will find that General Giles is a most r easonable individual
and one who is fully appreciative of the aims and aspirations of the Twentieth
Air Force. I am sure that you will find him a man who will help you fight
your battles .
For planning purposes we have made the assumption that by late
summer the Headquarters of the Twentieth Air Force will be in the Pacific
area. This is for planning purposes only and is, of course, contingent upon
many things, but at the present time it seems reasonable. I have no idea
who the commander will be unless General Arnold continues to retain that
function. The possibility that someone will come over from Europe becomes
more and more remote as that war drags on and as the complications of post
war activities become more apparent . It may well be that this Headquarters
will simply be increased by the addition of some key officers with European
experience, but this is all conjecture at t his time.
In anticipation of a decreasing requirement for key personnel in
the U. K. and the Mediterranean, we are working up a slate of indivi duals of
this category for a ssignment to the Twentieth Air Force. General Arnold him-
self has paved the way with Spaatz and at his direct Colonel

Whitney from this Headquarters to report to Anderson in order to discuss
and establish our r equirements . Ten or twelve top people will be required
in t his Headquarters in anticipation of our possible move to the field.
Whitney is leaving here the 6th and will probably be over there
a week to ten days. In the meantime I wish you would send me a statement
of the jobs i n the XXI Bomber Command which should profitably be filled by
people from the European theater . You should also, where possible , list
your nominees for these positions . In order to save time, as much of this
as possible should be sent by telecon, but I realize there may be some d i f ~
ficulty in doing that so your whole picture should be recapitulated in a
letter to be sent by the most urgent means . If I can receive the letter
while Whitney is still in UK, we may be able to establish a claim to at
l east some of the individuals that you want .
More than ever I am convinced of. the importance of the bombs dropped
on Japan between now and, say, three months after the fall of Germany. This
period will certainly be Japan's hour of decision. We can afford to retrench
a little after t hat period if necessary since it appears now that should
there be no significant change by t hat time, we may have to settle down to
blasting for a considerable period.
Results of the incendiary attacks have been tremendous. The first
areas assigned were selected on the basis of a compromise between industrial
importance and susceptibility to fire. With a greater respect we now have
for our fire-making ability and the greater wei ght that we are able to lay
down, these new areas which have just been sent to you represent more nearly
the top industrial areas. They also appear to be most susceptible to fire
attack, but they do not repr esent any compromise. If we are successful in
destroyi ng these areas in a reasonable time, we can only guess what the effect
will be upon the Japanese. Certainly t heir war- making ability _will have been
seriously curtailed. Possibly they may lose their taste for more war. I
am convinced that the XXI Bomber Command, more than any other service or
weapon, is in a position to do something decisive.
As I told you by telecon, I was greatly i mpressed with the progress
you had made i n a two months ' period. Your establishment bore little resem-
blance to what I had seen in January. Another thing that i mpressed me tre-
mendously was the spirit and ability of Augie Kissner. I have always thought
highly of him, but on t his trip his quiet effectiveness was outstanding.
He is a gr eat asset to the Twentieth Air Force .
There are many other points that I plan to write to you about ,
but they will have to wait . I want to get t his l etter off so that you in
turn may get an answer back to me on personnel .
I
:..

As always you and your Command have t he r espect , admiration
and unqualified confidence of t his Headquarters . Keep up t he good work.
Sincerely
u. s. Army
,
..
Sf

,.
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"
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OFFICE OF THE COM
AIR FORCE
of
G. u., Air Force
FJi .t JJ45---------I!!!k.---
( . e) ( I niti-als)
._.. _____ _.........,......_..___.... ,._,. ._ .....
Cla 30 January 1945
hif1oat1on c
DOD anoelled by
No. 9
Major General Curtis E. LeMay
Commanding General, XXI Bomber
A.P. O. 234, c/o Postmaster
Command
' e.ft'eottve 28
58
Dear curt: - -
Before saying anything I should probably offer my apologies
for raising the subject on which you are an authority. With this
word of explanation, however, I do want to discuss briefly the ques-
tion of abortives.
As I see it, after having had some firsthand information in
the European Theater and after having discussed t he matter with
many wing and group commanders (you have had even more intimate
contact with the problem), it seems to me that the one individual
who influences the situation most is the airplane commander.
Headquarters , Twentieth Air Force, has a direct obligation to fur-
nish operating units with the best avail able equipment and with the
best available personnel . This we are trying to do although we
realize that there are times when it seems to you that it takes an
interminable period t o get some little necessity. I know damn well
that you are doing everything in your power to give the wings what
they need to do the job including the benefit of your judgment and
experience. Rosy O' Donnell, Jim Davies, and Tommy Power are work-
ing on this problem night and day to the exclusion of almost every-
thing else. The combined efforts of all of us add up to only part
of the solution. The rest of it I am convinced rests in the hands
of t he individual airplane commander. I am sure that you agree
with this.
I doubt if any of us have taken the trouble to tell the air-
plane commander what his job is or how important he, as an indivi-
dual, is to the war effort. The rest of us make plans, announce
policies, and issue orders. He is the man who does the work. The
battle of Japan has been going on at a f air rate for some months
now. The whole thing to date has involved only about 300 of tPese
airplane In terms of modern war, 300 of anything is
damn littl e. When you stop to realize the punch each B- 29 carries,
it is easier to understand why so few are able to carry on a major
battle.
I think the man who gets the airplane over the target and drops
his bombs where they will do the most good is the important man in
this machine. His leadership, his judgment, his courage , and his
skilr are reflected in t he bomb damage assessment photographs . I
think he is also the man who in the last analysis is responsible
f or keeping his airplane flying. He has a big job on the ground
as well as in t he air.
If we have .failed to impress these men with the importance of
their position and the corresponding r esponsibility that they carry,
we ought to correct t he at once. It would seem to me that
we ought to start in the training establishment and carry it right
through into t he groups wings and on i nto the theaters . You have
an opportunity to observe t 4e attitude of the people who are actually
. engaged in combat so I would appreciate your comments on this subject .
Sincerely,

. . , . . .. :' . '
..

XXI Boobor
Mejor V. o. ,Johns.on, JiC'' Steering Memhor
ajor R. Perdue, Jr., GSC
Captain John S. Hughes, AC
Hnrold K. Landry, SO
- '
1. You hnve been desd..gnated- a s n group t o i nveatiet.tc re ... ort en
e,ul5jeet of tht a l"tt er. You hav:e been eepeei w l y piokrd t o 1-nowl-
edge experience towr ro beet r eport po$eibl e in c0n1unctioa
with specitliste i n the t heet er .vnd in the. lll Command .
2. are tb .t of YXl
' re to t:n1.1ly>ei e. by the enemy. 1t i s that
certain code be read. Informrtion aa to t he P.7.tent t o
the enemy aftY he vttining from t ha ae our ef!s , o: s ..-ell oth"''
aou.rcfte, is 11pt ve. E;lth6ugh have come in from t he "'ield
ll'b.teh indic"te t hat the onerey warnine net he- s s ome pr..-. vi , us knolfle'r;e of
an operr;t t on pr ior t o a.otucl eightine of the plr .ea ovfr :s pott i r s
1-.n t he renye of th-t;ir n ... dar
3. Preliminer y Antilys!s of "the at this r-
t f' r8 ineicQt ee that r ,:Stiudy o! the COI:!U'ftuntc tiona or m Ccar:ur.nid nnd
rel ated i nf"or mt:>tion is to det<:rMine. f & st.-r'to-
typed pettE'ms "' n rl v-olunes, in codes Cll
inf or motion, prepnrat or ) instructions, eto. , and unn&ceest ry
fixed eharacbP.risttcs of tranemitt i ne which subject to
inJ. Upon of these etuni. es oertein c ct ion 119Y l p ia-
dieAted or, i n the absence of evi r ent we,r lcles$ea, prectuti .,ns recoMen' .,a
that f!\.ay be in c.rldition t o nCiw in uae.
4. You i l l rePort upon Rrr ivr- 1 to the rx: r
Command , r nd :. O')Uai.nt him with the purno:cr e of the You wil l Op4'r Ate
mder hie gtmeral supervision s o tta to of ass istance t o the Cc:.-
mand in th, successful completion or thB mieaton. Val uRl le aaat!'tattce and
advice fro of f i cers at Headf! utrters, AAFPO,A
1
1'\ay be ohta i nad.
1st Ind.
H!ADOUf. RTr..RS, XXI BOMBFF COM'lAND, of t,he Gen'"'ral ,
c/o Post.aater, San Franci eoo, California, l O 1915.
Comanding General, 313th Bombard!uent Wing, APO 247, o/ o
San rra.nci r oc , Ce.litornla.
is copy of letter oricri netod by General
r
2. It ie impr&tiTe tbot study be speedil y copcluded
measures can be initinted ir:Diledi ately.
3. It ie my deat re ell and of your rPrpeo-
tiTe which are by gr cup ot off1orrs be
ao thnt their million ean be expeditftd.
r .. 'i . J m
' ,.. ... . ' ..
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..
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u
H
D . C. I e.\ o- ry of
C.G., Tweotiet.. :;. -e
w 8 - {[c! ____ _
---------
J)
(Date) ( .. v ... alw)
.._ ________ _
8 May 1945
Classification oancQlled bT
General Curtis E. LeMay
Hdqrs ., Y.YI Bomber Command
A.P.O. 234, c/o Postmaster
DOD DIBECTIVB No. etteet1A Zl ....
Dear General:
At Larry' s su restion I am sendinP" you copies of two
written by Group CaPtain Cheshire on a subject which is of
able to all of us. The views expressed in these papers are
Cheshire ' s own and are not official doctrine of the RAF. They are,
however, statements of gener al principles, which while not ori ginal
with the author , are very clearly expressed.
I know that your people have been ?iving a lot of thoUfht to
these same problems . There has been a lot of discussion here along
these lines. Some action has been started. As you know, we have
arranged to ship you by air some British target marker bombs . ''le
have also started action for the immediate redeployment of an \- 26
?roup from Europe which is to be trained for the purpose of marking
tarfets . Efforts are also being made to determine the specifica-
tions and requirements for a command airplane. All of the action
taken so far, however, is insufficient to meet your immediate re-
quirements . It may well be that study that has already taken place
in the XXI Bomber Command will have revealed some things which can
be done immediately. It may be,. for example, that without wai tin("
for P.eadouarters , Army Air Forces, to carry out a long ranpe pr o-
pram of testing and traininr , we could provide you with some of
the thinrs you need now to build up a scoutine marking
force that will be adequate.
One of the things which we here, more or less as snectators,
have learned from your operations is that your operations are apt to
be extremely varied and flexible . It is impossible for the neonle
here to anticipate your requirements nearly as fast as your own peo-
ple can foresee them. For trat reason it wouln Pelp us a lot to
Ynow what your people are so that we can keep Headquarters,
J.rmy Air Forces , on the beam.
The two re advocates in these papers may
or may not fit into your methods of operation. I think he is
essentially sound in advocatinv the marking of targets but only
if we can provide a type of aircraft and a type of marker that
can do the job efficiently. It is also unfortunately true that
as yet no radar target marker has been developed. As for a com-
mand plane, that seems to be mostly a matter of improved communi-
cations . It seems to me that the use of an advanced C.P. in an
airplane suitably equipped with adequate communications to r e-
ceive weather and intellivence reports from both long range and
close- in scouting planes, and from all elements of the force,
would permit a wide variety of tactical control, such as planned
penetration of fronts, choice of targets based on last- minute
weather , effective disposition of fighter units, and command de-
cisions to meet any emergency situation. Such a plane need not be
heavily armored or closely guarded for it should be able to per-
form its function without cominu closer than 80- 100 miles to the
target .
The above are some of the thouuhts we have had on the sub-
ject. They are merely preliminary, and are not really sufficient
to serve as a guide to necessary action. Your opinions and de-
sires will , however, serve as a basis for immediate action along
any line you recommend. It is my hope that Larry will r elease me
soon--to come to you in any capacity whatever. Until the air
clears, I cannot make any plans, but I would like, during the
time I have to wait, to initiate and follow up on any action you
desire along these or any other lines .
As Larry indicated to you, there has been a re- appraisal of
the entire B- 29 program in an effort to ret all of its various
aspects in phase. This was largely initiated by your demonstrated
ability to ret far more out of the B- 29 airplane than had been
planned and also by your request for additional crews and person-
nel . The study has been and approved and reveals that
the sinule most limiting factor in the B- 29 provram from now until
the first of the year will be the availability of combat crews .
are in the process of preparing for you a summary of this plan
with all its details so that you may have the information upon
which to revise your pl ans for future operations . This summary
should be sent to you within a very few days and I will not
attempt to go into the details of it. I t does not eive you all
you asked for . I would like to explain, however , that it does
you all the combat crews that will be avail able except for
the minimum that will be required to man the 316th and the
first odditional wing for ICEBFRG. By the time later uni ts are
deployed, the shortages of crews will have been overcome.
This pl an also will provide as early as the bodi es become
-
available, an augmentation to your gr ound personnel in the form
of an additional squadron for each of your groups . The plan also
reduces U.F. aircraft per squadron from 10 to 8 and provides for
two crews per U. E. l7ith the additional squadron it will result
in approximately a 25% increase in your ground personnel for an
increase of aircraft from 30 to 32. I wanted to mention this
plan to you because I was afraid that at first glance it may be
very disappointing. It is true, however , that you will ret the
additional personnel as soon as nossible and you will get all of
the combat crews that can be produced. It is also hoped that we
may discover ways and means of cutting corners so as to make
even more crews available. Dr. Sallagar and Bill Fisher are
collaborating in this effort.
Please give my very best regards to Aue-gie, to Monty, to
Rosy, and to Jim, and Tommy Powers . Any ideas that they have
which may give us guidance will be very useful . I am looking
forward to seeing you soon.
I ncls
Yours sincerely,
Colonel, Air Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Operations
1r For"' ,
liN - - - - ------------------
(D te) ( n
==-----
Cl4ae
lJ}!!,oatt
OlJ
Jor General Curtis E. Le.lla7 Jlo. ;;,llea ,_
Bdqrs . , XII Boaber C0111Band Oo.g ".r
A.P.O. 234, c/o Poatmaater '
San hancisco, California l'8
61
Dear General:
At Larry's suggestion I am sending you copies of two papers
written b7 Group Captain Cheshire on a subject which ia ot conlider-
able interest to all of us. The views expressed in these papers are
Cheshire's own and are not official doctrine of the RAP. The7 are,
however, statements of general principles , which while not origial
with the author, are very clearly expressed.
I know that your people have been giviDg a lot of thought to
these same probleu. There baa been a lot of diacuasion here aloDg
these linea. Some action baa been atarted. As you lmCM, we haYe
arranged to ship you by air soae British target marker bollba. We
have alao started action for the t.aediate redeploJMnt of an .1- 26
group troa Europe which 1a to be trained for the purpose of arkiDC
targeta. !fforts are also being -.de to deteraine the specitica-
tiou and requirements tor a co-Nnd airplane. .ll.l of the actioa
taken so tar, however, is inslif'ficient to ... t 70ur 1aed1ate re-
quireents. It -r well be that atudy that baa alread7 taken place
iD the III BOIIber Colll!l8nd will have rev-.l.ed aoae th1 np which can
be done imaediatel.7. It --r be, f or exaaple, tbat without itiDc
tor Headquarters, J.rTr .Air Forces, to carey out a long p.uge pro-
craa ot teatic aDd we could provide you with SOM ot
the things 7ou need now to build up a scouting or target arkiac
force that wUl be adequate.
One ot the thinga which we here, more or leas aa apeetatora,
baYe learned troll your operations is tbat JOur operatiODS are apt to
be a:tre.eq varied and fiexible. It !a illpoesible tor the people
here to anticipate your require .. nta Dearly- as tut aa 70ur OWD peo-
ple laD foresee th-. lor that reaaon it would help u a lot to
what 7our people are thinking ao that we can keep Bdqrters,
l.rrq Air Fore .. , OD the beua.
The two things which Cheshire advocates in these papers
or may not tit into your methods of operation. I think be ill
essentially aoUDd in advocating the aarking or targets but onl7
1:t we can provide a type or aircraft and a t1'J)e or arker t.bat
can do the job ef!icient11. It is &lao untortunatel7 true that
aa 7et no radar target marker baa been developed. AI tor a ccm-
Dd plane, that aeeu to be mostly a tter or ia,Proved cc.nnl-
caUona. It seema to me that the uae of an adftDced C.P. in an
airplane auitabq equipped with adequate cOIIIIWlieatiotll to re-
ceiTe weather and intelligence reports trom both long range aDd
close-in scouting planes, and troa all elements of the force,
would pend t a wide variety of tactical control, such as plalmed
penetration of fronts, choice or targets based on laat-mimrte
weather, effective disposition or tighter units, and aa.mand de-
cisiou to meet &IJ1' eaergency situation. Such a plane need not be
hvil)" armored or closely' guarded tor it should be able to per-
fora i te function without coaing closer than So-100 milea to the
target.
The above are some or the thought. we haTe bad on the aub-
j eet. They are merely preliminaey, and are not reall7 auf'ticient
to serve as a guide to necessa17 action. Your opiniou and de-
aires will, howeTer, serve u a buil for t..aedi ate action along
&IV' line you reeoaaend. It ia rq hope t.hat LaJT7 will releue
aoon--to coae to you in an,. capacity wbatenr. UntU the air
clears , I cannot make any plans, but I would lille, duriDc the
U.. I haTe to wait, to initiate and follow up on aD7 action J'OU
desire along or any other linea.
,. larr7 iDdicated to you, there baa been a re-appraiaal or
the entiee B-29 program in an effort to get all of ita Tarioua
aspecta in phase. This was largel7 initiated by your dnonatrated
ability to get tar more out or the B-29 airplane than had been
planned and aho b)r your request for additional crews aDd penon-
net. The study baa been completed and approTed and meal that
the single 110at limiting !actor in the B-29 prograa trma DOW until
the first or the ;rear will be the aT&ilability or c011bat cren.
We an in the process of preparing ror you a ot thia plan
with all ita details ao that you may have the intonation upon
which to reri.ae your plana tor future operatioD8. This au 117
should be sent to you within a very !flff dqa and I will not.
attempt to go into the details or it. It does not give you all
you asked tor. I would like to explain, howner, t.bat it doe.
giTe you all the co.bat crewe that will be aTailable except tor
the miniiiWa that will be required to an the )16th WiDg and the
first additional wiDg tor ICEBERG. By the tille later unita are
depl07ed, the shortages of crews will baTe largely been OYeroc.e.
This plan also will provide as early as the Dodiea becoae
.
...

I
anilable, an augmentation grotmd personnel in the form
o! an additional squadron each of' your groupe. The plan alao
reduces U.E. aircraft per squadron trom 10 to 8 and prOTidea tor
two crews per U.E. With the additional squadron it wUl result
in approrlmately a 25% increase in your ground personnel tor an
inereaae or aircraft from 30 to 32. I wanted to mention this
plan to you because I was afraid that at tint glance it u.y be
very disappointing. It iJI true, howenr, that you will get the
additional personnel as soon aa possible and you will get all ot
the combat crews that can be produced. It 1a also hoped that "
may discover ways and means ot euttiDg corners ao aa to make
even aore eren available. Dr. Sallagar and BUl Fisher are
collaborating in this effort.
Please give WJ7 very best regards to J.uggie, to Monty, to
Roay, and to Jill, and TolllaJ' Powers. J.Jrr ideas that they haYe
which 7 give ua guidance will be very uaetul.. I .. lootini
forward to seeing ;you soon
...
Inca
Yours aincerelJ,
CECIL I. CCIIBS
Col011el, Air lor,.
Deput7 Chiet ot S tatt,
Operaticma
I
Introduction
f heavy bombers when employed
The following paper opportunity. Its purpose
against fixed land targets as which have not as yet been uni versa.l.l
is to establish two basic es
recognized.
. i t ailll his bomb and not to
(1) The function of the bomba.llller s o
identify his target.
vi
tal t a Bomber Force as it is
(
2
) J\. cllain of command is equally
0
to a land or naval. formation.
PARI' I .
The Function of the Bombaimer is to Aim his Bomb
and Net to Ideritit'y his Target
1 . The Argument
From the beginning of creation man has been
et by means of a mis sile launched through the u ou
this science the problem has been twofol d; first provide
energy for the missile and secondly to find some means of achie-nng accuracy o
aim Air bombardment is nothing but another means of launching a pr ojectile
an objective the aeroplane being the platform which gives the missile
: t i ve energy. In tlus case the motive energy is new, . but the problem of achieving
accura.cyof aim that is to scry the ballistic problem, J.S fundamentally the same.
In sol ving the' problem of air bombardment, therefore, the Air Force is with
the same basic problem that faced the artilleryman from the dey that the
gun was fired.
No matter what mechanical method of launching a projectile is used, the
pr oblem of achieving accurac.y resolves itself into two parts; first to calculate
the position of the target relative to the source of the missile; second to feed
the resultant technical data into the launching platform in order that the plat-
form may be correctly aimed and to give the missile moti ve ener gy. These two t asks
are entirely separate in character, each one requiring specialized knowledge and
specialized equipnent, and are clearly recognized as such by the A:rary and NJL'IY'
The man who feeds the technical. data. into the gun, that is to Sfff the gunla;yer,
is relieved of all responsibility for calculating the necessary data and is re-
quired merely to set up and operate his gun in accordance with the informati on
which he receives. His sole duty is to feed this information into the gun accurately
and efficiently and hi.s ability to do this depervis upon his receiving preci se
instructions .
For this purpose both the Army and the Navy have created a canplex and
efficient organization manned by highly trained and specialized personnel whose sole
function is to supply the necessary data to the guncrews under their contr ol. This
organization is created, trained and equipped so -asto enjoy complete tactical free-
dom in order that it ma;y be able to use every mearts at its disposal, whether l aiXi
or airborne, to fulfill its function. In other words , the system of artillery fire
is based on the principle that the gunlayer and his crew are responsible for giving
\
the shell motive energy, while the responsibility for accuracy of aim rests with a
separate organization which possess both tactical freedom and specialized equipment
neither of which can be made available to the gunleyer . This division of responsibility
i s the cause of the accuracy of artillery.
The bombaim.er is the counterpart of the gunl.c\Yer . It is his f unction to
manipulate his sight in such a way that the bomb will be correctly aimed. In order
to do this he is required to execute the following operations: -
(1) To feed various and U&ta 1nto the sight

hr nize graticule in the head with the aiming
(n) To at least 10 miles short of the target and sane-
point . A bombing This synchronization therefore nust be effected at a
times considerablY more.
great optical range.
(III) To guide the aircraft so that the graticule synchronized
with the aiming point throughout the run, at the same time executwg a delicate
drift and ground speed calculation.
This oper ation is clearly one which requires a high degree of skill and concentra-
tion and cannot be effeciently accanplished simultaneouslY with arr:r other mental
process. Its successful execution depends first on having the right point
and graticule. If the aiming point is vague or blurred in outline,
synchronization is not possible and an initial sighting error is inevitable.
This error is in addition to and separate fran the gross error which will occur
if the banbaimer selects the wrong aiming point or fails to identify it at all
The task of identifying a feature on the ground at a range of some 10 miles or
more, which the banbaimer is canpelled to do, is probably the most difficult of
all tasks which an airman can be called upon to execute. It is an entirely separate
art or science from that of operating a bombsight and involves an essentially
different mental process. To require the bomba:ilner to do this s:ilnultaneously with
the manipulation of his bombsight under circumstances which allow him no time to
pause or hesitate, is exactly the same as to require the guncrews of an artillery-
battery to find the target themselves, work out their own calculations, and operate
the gun.
In this one fact, the fact that the banba:ilner is responsible for target
i dentification in addition to the manipulation of his bombsight, lies the principal
and fundamental cause of all banbs which have failed to hit their objective during
this war . It is not only responsible for all the gros s errors and most of the
minor banbing errors of this war, but means that a Bomber For ce is limited to targets
which are capable of being identified either visually or through the medium of radar,
at a slant range of same 10 miles or more; and this is hardly a limitation which
can be readily accepted.
The criterion of a successful Bomber Force is whether or not it can achieve
under similar climatic conditions, the same accuracy in action as it does on the '
subject to an allovrance for battle stress. This is the only criterion by
which it is possible to determine the efficiency of a Bomber Force, or indeed or anv
of and should be the standard by which all organizations are judgef:
nofAir f orce organization, either Allied or Enemy, can claim even an approxi-
ma on o sustained battle accuracy to range accuracy, we are faced with the fact
the world has not yet seen a successful Heavy Banber Force. All Bomber Forces
whereas they do not in battle. The oncy
stthructied so as to. provide the :: is tchon-
o er s not . is the only diff , e e
accounts for all battle errors So between the two, and it is this that
nothing is done to canpensate for it as fact is not clearly recognized and
in bombing accuracy , ere Wl. never by aey substantial improvEIIlent
t Once this basic principle is accepted it remains to apply it in practi ce
say to create, train and equip an organization which is capable at all '
under all conditions of converting the target into an aiming point which
the bambaimer ' s requirements . The only aiming point which fulfills t hes e
is a single, clearly visible mark or source o light small enough t o
syn7hronization with the gr aticule, and of confusion
th <7'1, ..
1
.,..... gro . . less than this is a makeshift; it equivalates to gi ving
e vague or settings . Thus, for example, it is usel ess to cover
an area with markers and wstruct the bombaimer to choose the est:ilnated centre as his
point of aim.
These requirements
__._....,..,,., .. ,, .. requirements good r egardless of whether bombing is carried
by or by night, whether it is visual or through the medium of radar.
Bombing through the medium of radar means that the bombsight is synchronized not
,vith the ground itself but with a presentation of the ground on a radar scope. No
matter what advances may be made in scope definition, the problem r emains the same.
The bombaimer is still faced with the problem of identification and with the
difficulties of attacking a target which is not capable of accurate s,ynchronization.
Until such time as a r adar set is designed which automatically select s the target
for him and there is no evidence that such a set is forthcoming, he sti ll requires
an adequate point of aim. In this case he requires not a mark on the ground but a
mark on his radar scope; that is to say some device dropped on the ground which
simulates the ideal, and of course the correct, aiming point through the medium of
radar . In the future, and possibly the not so far distant future, this device
dropped on the ground by the Pathfinder aircraft will relieve the bombaimer of
all responsibility, not only f or identification, but also for actually aiming the
bomb, because it vrill be capabile of attracting the bomb down onto itself. 'lhen
t his state of development is reached, as surely it will, the principl e which this
paper has set out to establish will have achieved its culmination. The bombaimer
mil emerge in his true and proper r ole, that is as the agent through whom t he
missile is given motive energy, while the responsibility for the gui dance of the
missile will rest With the specialists, that is the organization which dropped
the device on the target.
The introduction of the Pathfinder Force in Bomber Command vras the fir st
step in recognizing the necessity of an organization to simulate the aiming point
for the bambaimer, and undoubtedly has been the cause of many bombs hitting their
objective which otherwise would have fallen in open country. The Pathfinder Force,
however, by the very nature of its method of operation, failed to recognize the
principle which i t had set out to establish for others. That is to say, it set
out to succeed where the rest of the world had failed without any basic difference
in technique or equipment, but solely on the theory that the distinction between
success and failure hinges on the state of training of the crews. In point of fact
the distinction between success and failure hinges on the tactical freedom of the
aircraft and its equipment . Target identification, whether it be achieved visually
or by means of radar or by a combination of both, presents no difficulty to a
trained crew equipped with a suitable t ype of aircraft. Thus for exampl e a dive
bomber pilot, whether he be experienced or not, can without the least difficulty
identify and hit a target which the most experienced and specialized Heav.r Bomber
crew would not even consider attacking, for the simple reason that the dive bomber
is not required to carry a heavy load and therefore enjoys tactical freedom. A
Pathfinder Force which is committed to a heavy bomber with all the attendant
tactical is not capable of achieving success, and it is for this reason
that the athfinder Force of Bomber Command was not entirely successful. To succeed
the Pathfinder F?rce must be organized, trained and equipped for the sole function
of marking the aiming point . In short it must be essentially a specialist organization.
I .
II.
III.
IV.
v.
2. Recommendations
That all future bombing policy be based on the principle that the bambaimer
shall never be responsible for target identification.
That target identification be the responsibility of a specialist organi zati on
equipped and trained so as to possess adequate tacti cal freedom.
That target identification be defined as "the provision of a singl e cle 1y
or source of light, small enough to be capabXte of accurat:r
sync o zation with the graticule and incapable of conflls'ion with its backgroundn .
That in the field of Radar all t P. hn1 al <
equipment capable of cHad though be directed t.o...,JJards producing
a ar scope the requirements of III above.
That steps be taken to produce Radar k
themselves. mar era capable of guiding banbs down onto
PARt II
- - - V-- ____ , --- -
A Chain of Command is Equally Vi tal to a Banber
Force it is to a Land or Naval Formation
1. The Argument
I
The success of an aerial attack depends Qn a number of factors which are
not predictable prior to the launching of the attack. The most important
of thes'e are weather, enellzy' reaction and the ability of the force to adapt itself to
the tactical situation. These factors are not peculiar to aerial attacks, are abl
fundamental to all forms of warfare . In all military engagements the enenzy- s cap f e
of taking a:oy one of several countermeasures against an attacking force . To o
these countermeasures there is a different answer . If the answer is
the countermeasure is likely to succeed. The outcane of all battles will er
normal conditions depen'Cl on the ability of the respective. Force to achieve
tactical superiority. In order to achieve tactical super1.ority J.S first necessary
to assess the tactical situation and to do this requires a reportJ.ng system and a
chain of command. Thus, a chain of command is a basic requirement of all land and
naval formations and is clearly recognized as such.
As things stand toda;y" , a heavy bomber formation has noi chain of
and no reporting system. Such air to air and air to ground canmunications as enst
are adequate only for the purpose of aircraft safety and in the case of the U. S. A. A. F.
daylight formations, as an assist ance to the leader in keeping his units together .
The force, after it is briefed, i t committed to its predetermined plan of attack
and is canpelled to implement that plan even though! through some unforeseen devel op-
ment, it should be faced with total annihilation. The implicati ons of this stat e of
affairs are twofold -
(1) The force requires full and detailed briefing of its target and the
method lywbich the attack is to be carried out .
(2) The force is compl etely lacking in tectical mobility.
These two implications impose a serious limitation on the striking power
of the force. They are due not to the fact tha"\; no sources of information fran
which the tactical situation may be assessed exist, but to the fact that these
sources are not accessible. As soon as the engagement is over, lf.nformation fran
the various relevant sources; that is to say, from crew reports, intercepts of
enemy broadcasts and the early warning network, is collated and a report issued
showing what happened, what went wrong and what should have been done. All these
sources of information are available at the time of the action and would thus be
capable of enabling contemporary assessment of the tactical situation to be made,
if only there . existed a chain of connnand and a reporting system.
Let us suppose for the purpose of this argument that there exists a banber
force organized on the basis of the principle established in Part I of this paper;
tt:tat is to sey, a force designed to attack an artificial and not the actual aiming
point and which theref ore requires no prior breifing as to the identity of its
Let us also suppose that this force possesses a signals organization and a
chaJ.n of command comparable to that possessed by an army or naval force that is
broken down into units, groups and divisions of appropriate sizes which
extends a reporting s.ystem from the smallest unit up to Command H.Q. that each unit
group and division has a forward command post established in a suitable aircraft '
the force is commanded by a Force COOIIllander, who together With his staff,
SJ.tuated either in a H. Q. aeroplane or on the ground, in such a way as to be abl e
to follow the course of the battle and to issue such orders as may be necessary.
Finally that the Force Commander has access not only to all internal battle reports,
but also to external reports, such as Y service, early warning networks other forces
airborne at the time, land and naval forces , etc. '
The existence
...... -- V6- - -- - - , - '-' - .
The exi stence on t hese lines would eliminate the
crucial weakness of t he present-day heavy bomber formation - that
its of attack i s based on the est imated and not the a ctual tactical
situation and t hat no matter what happens ita method of attack cannot
be altered. It would be highly mobile and flexi ble, capable of making
use of t he el ement of surprise and of meeting the enemy's countermeasures
blow for blow. It would not requi re elaborate briefing and in fact
not even know target until long after takeoff. The Force Commander
would be able to swi tch the attack anywhere within the airborne range of
his units at any time, even aft er commencement of bombi ng. Thus he could
turn back f rom a routine strategic attack to give close suuport in answer
to an emergency call from land or naval force s . He would be in a uosi-
tion to switch a group or part of a group t o attack a target of
opportuni ty or to meet a changing tactical situation. More t Pan t hds ,
control t he bombing itself either by re-orienting t he poi nt of
aif or by wholesale cancel lation, and could thus eliminate t he possibil-
ity of a serious error .
In conclusion I give two examples from the European war which
illustrate t he potentialities of a chain of command lrewn from 617 squadroni
617 was a Special Duties Squadron engaged on the high level bombing of
small t argets with large caliber bombs. Its structure, training and
ment were built entirely around t he two principles discussed in t his paper.
(I) In February, 1944 t he Squadron was executing an unprotected
night attack on a r ocket site in Nort hern France under conditions whi ch
neces sitated remaining over t he target some considerable time. After
one hour and ten minutes, the leader was informed that a force of aome
30 to 35 enemy fighters were approaching from t he South, which meant
superiority in t heir favour of three to one. On receipt of this i nfor-
mation, the leader ordered the Squadron to engage maximum power, lose
height and turn for home, with the result t hat the fighters just failed to
make contact. Had it not been for this, t he Squadron would have been
caught over a brightly illuminated area and would undoubtedly have suffered
casualties.
(II) In April , 1944 t he Squadron was carrying out a night attack
against an engine workshop outside Lyons. There were t hree stages t o the
attack: illumination of t he target by flares, marking of t he aiming point
and finally bombi ng of t he marker. The flare force dropped thei r flares
Uorth of the target. On being told t o drop 2f mUes f urther South, they
dropped 5 mi les South. On being finally and successfully re-orientaCed,
the flares f ailed to i gnite givi ng inadequate illumination. At t his stage
t here were only some six flares left. After a seri es of manoeuvres ordered
by t he Leader, t he situation was retrieved and a marker dropped on top
of t he target. This marker penetrated the roof and although clearly
visible to t he l ow f l ying marking ai r craft, was not visible to t he bombing
force. The bombing f orce informed the 1 ader and the leader ordered
anot her ne rker to be dro-cped, with t he r esult t hat t he attack was success-
fully comnl eted.
It i s stressed that these are not isolated examples, but are
represent ative of t he trend of the Heavy Bomber offensi ve in Europe.
2. Recommendations
( 1) the structure and equipment of all H. B. formations
be changed so a s t o create an ef f ective chain of command during t he whole
period t hat t he Force is airborne.
(II) That all formations, regardless of t heir size or function
be controlled by a Command or aircraft whose sole function is to
exercise control down through the lower echelons , this aircraft bei ng
either in the form of a supreme commander or acting under orders from
a higher and l and based formation.
(I II)
continuous battl
25 April 1945
and equipped to r eceive
- Group Captain
Claee1t1oat1on oanoelled by
OBJECTIVF.IOD DIREC1'IVE No
5200
a
" effective 28 lrov. mr:
(1) To make the utmost use of the tactical situation; that is to say,
to ensure that the attack j_s directed against the most suitable
target by the most suitable method ,
(2) To provide adequate marking4 for the Main Force .
l
(3) To ensure tha t t he success of the operatj.on will not be jeopard ...
ized by any unforeseen
Timing
The success of any attack hinges on accurate timing ,
This has the following three as pects :-
(1) That the marking be completed on time .
(2) That the attack by the Main Force is punctual .,
(617 worked to an outside limi t of 45 seconds J
(3) That the duration of the attack be not unduly long.
Under no conditions should a marlcing force be re-
quired to maintain continuous marking for more than 30
minutes .
Where long distances and the possibility of anver se
are involved, it is not normally possible to f Uarantee
the precise arrival of the Force on a pr edetermined zero
hour . It i s necessary therefore to make arrangements to
provide anains t this by all ava ilable means ; i . e . ,
(1) To alter zero hour and the phases of the attack as and
when necessary.
(2) To provide arti ficial marshalling points beyond which
the Force must not proceed before a stipulated tima
Cm1POSITION OF THE FORCE
(1) The Force Commander , together ""i:th his staff and such subordinate
as ar e appropriate to the size of the Force #
(2 )
The Mar king Force ,
(3) The Flare Force .
(4)
The Reconnaissance Force .
( 5) The Main Force .
SEQUENCE OF THE ATTACK
The following stages are those which normally take pl ace
after a force is airborne and when the Force Commander has had the
opportunity of the tactical situation. In many instances,
however, the attack will proceed according to the plan as given at
briefing, which will render some of these stages superfluous .
The Force Commander will -
(1) Decide the most suitqble target or sequence of targets in the
light _ _q,:t;. cond iti nns. __ _s._i ze _and
ur wHve s or a ttack.
Thus if more than one t ar ge t is atta cked or there is more than
one wave t o any one t arget , i t will be necessary to decide the com-
pos ition of the r espective for ces or waves in the l ight of the order
of pr iority of the t ar gets, the estimated spacing of the force at
t he t arget and the probable chances of succes s of t he ' r espective
waves .
( 4) Alloca t e r espective zero hour s and timing sequence of all uni t s ,
This can only be done after knowing prevailing winds , number
of a t tack waves , s pacing of the forc e , time l i kely to be r equired far
target marking and sta t e of enemy def ences over the target .
Order such unforeseen naviea tional aids as be in the
f or m of r oute mar kers , mars halling points , etc .
The purpose of thes e a i ds is principally to ensure
timing of attack. They may also be us ed as a navigational
in cas e weather cor.di tions have caused units of the force to straggle
or bec ome lost ..
(6) Order and control flare dropping and subsequent target marking.
(7) Assess the accuracy and adequacy of the marking
(6) and (7 ) ar e compl icat ed oper a t i ons which ar e dealt with
in det ail in Appendix "A" .
(8) Order the main force to commence bombing, with s uch
as may become necessary.
(9) Control the bombi ng against the pos sibility of error of aim,
extinction of rnarker s., unfor es een enemy r eaction, etc ,.
(10) Throughout the oper a tion ma inta in a watching brief against
unforeseen devel opments .
FUNCTIONS OF THE VARIOUS UNI TS OF THE FORCE
force Commander
Function: To deploy hi s forc e to the utmos t advantage
agains t t he exis ting t actical s i t uation. This may be br oken
dovn1 into f our parts -
(1) To ensure tha t every unit of the Force is di r ected
aga inst the most s uitable t ar eet by t he most s ui t able
(2) To ensur e tha t each uni t of the Force i s provided wi th
an marker r
(3) To ensure tha t every phas e of the oper a t i on is accura t e-
ly timed .
(4) To guar d agains t the success of the oper a tion being
j eopardized by s ome unfor es een development ,
I n or der to do this , therefor e , the Force
must be in a pos ition -
(1) To r eceive early weather r cconna j.ssancc .
(2 ) To r eceive cont i nuous and full comba t r eports from his
crews .
(3) To have under his control subordina t e commanders res-
ponsible f or the det ailed execution of the r espective
phases of the attack.
( 11) m_
Function: To provide adequate tar get marking for the Main
Force in accordance with orders r eceived from the Force
Commander . Thus it must be able -
(1) To mark accur ately in all conditions of visibility.
(2) To mark any target that the Force Commander may order
even at the shortest notice .
(3) To achieve exact timing .
The Flare Force
Function: To provide adequate t arget illumination for the
Mar king Force in with orders r eceived from the
Force Thus it must be able -
(1) To provide accurate fl ar e illumina tion in all condi-
tions of visibility.
(2) To illuminate any t arget ordered by the Force Commander
even at very short .notice .
(3) To exact timing .
The Reconnaissance Force
Function: To supply the Force Commander with advance wea ther
r eports and such other informa tion as may be r equir ed .
The Ma in Force
Function: To arrive at its allotted t ar get or targets in
the manner and a t the time ordered by the Force Commander;
ther eafter to bomb the marker according to instructions .
3rd May, 1945,.
/)I /JI
tL.
G,L. CHESHIRE ,
Group Captain.
Marking Leader
Flar e ' Lender
Flar e 1
Flar e 2
Flar e 3
Marker 1
Marker 2
Marlcer 3
etc .
etc.
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
1. Timing
The operation should not bG cnrried out on a pr edetermined
zero hour but on a zer o hour order ed by the Force Commander who
is in a position to lcnow when his entir e forc e is r eady to s trike.
On r eceipt of the order to commence mnr king the Marker Leader
will ensure that his own forc e is in position and order the
Flar e Force Leader to illuminate .
2. l;ll!Jmina tion
I diosyncrasies of Flares
(a) Flares must be properly spaced in order to provide
adequate illumination . If ther e i s too high a density,
s evere da zzle will r esult and vice versa .
(b) Flar es dr ift in the wind and burn only for .a short
period - approximately three minutes .
(c) Flar es ar e usually dropped by means of r adar
This involves a mor e or l ess planned approach to the t ar get .
It is ther efor e difficult for a Flar e For ce to drop flar es
accurat ely immediately on r eceipt of orders. Tha best way
of overcoming t his diffi culty is to detnil an a ircraft to
drop a point in the shape of a ground marker. This
da tum point can then s er ve as a point of aim for all flare
dropping a ircraft . When existing flares need to be r e-
inforced or it is necessary to r eorientate the illuminated
area , a marker of this sort is of invaluable assistance .
ot Operations
'
(a ) Dropping of da tum point marker .
(b) Illumina tion around the marker according to a pre-
conceived t echnique and pattern.
(c) Reconna issance of the illuminated ar ea by the Marking
Force to identify the t arget .
(d) The Marking Leader, on compl etion of r econna issance,
orders the Marking Force to commence marking and det ails
the Flar e Leader to maintain illumination until marking
is complet ed .
Should the t ar get either not bo vlithin the illumina t ed
ar ea or be inadequat ely illllminated , the Marking Leader
will order further illumination as appropriat e .
Throughout thes e four stages it is the r esponsibility
of the Fl ar e Leader to ensur e tha t the correct density of
flares is dropped, that adequat e illumination is maintained
until marking is compl et ed and tha t his forc e carries out
r eo uests that the Marking Lender may make . In all
. . . . . . . - . . . . . . .. .... . . - .. -. ------'
(c) When the mar%er ighi tes , the entire forc e will assess for
a ccuracy and notify the Leader ,
(d) Leader, according to thii assessment , will either or der
the 1n1ti al marker to be r einforced or will cnncel it and r e-
peat the marking procedur e .
Cancellation is effected by dropping a differ ent
marker on the marker to be cancelled und by i s suing verbal
instructions .
(e ) As soon as the considers mnr king to be adequate , he
will inform the F'orce Commander and the Force Commander will
order bombing to s t art with such compl 0mento. ry orders as may
be necessary.
The Flnr c and Marker Force wil l thon stand by for further

METHOD OF HARKING
The me thod varies according to conditions of visibility and
enemy
(1) Goog Conditions
The marker is dropped from lovr l evel using glide bombing
t echniaue . The point a t issue is that the cir crnft must pl ace
itself in a position where it can most easily identify the
t arget (i. e . mor e or l ess directly overhead) and cnrry out
its mar king r un from that .post t ton w'-thout tlt atiy- ..
time losing sight of the aiming point . Glide or dive bombing,
ther ofor e , is the ideal method of attack.
(2) PoQr Conditions
Wher e visibility is too poor to en<t bl e the aiming point to be
identified visually, marking must be cnrried out by means of
r adar .
This is a compl et e story in itself and I have no
at thi s stage .
(3) Strong Defences
It is conceivabl e , though unlikely, that the strength of the
def ences of a t arget may mnke a glide bombing
approach undesirable . In this event the Force must r esort to
a l ow l evel approach or any other appropria t e tactical me thod.
ConcJ,usiop
1. The crews mus t -
Achi eve a high degr ee of navigational accura cy.
(b) Be proficient in map r eading end visual identification
of gr ound f eatur es .
(c) Be tra ined in glide and dive bombing and nll forms of
low l evel flying .
(d) Be mentally al ert .
(e) Enclude a highly t r ained r ad1r Navigator/Bombaimer
. . . - . . . .. .. - -
3 -
(d).Carry a minimum of 2 X 250 lb. bombs.
(e) Have reasonable range.
TO
.
.
INFO:
FROM:
SUBJ:
CINCPAC
ClliCAFPAC
COIIAF 20
BOMCOY XXI
DEPCOMAF 20
DRAFT
xY
G,/
(TO SHEIDAAN AND CHAMBERLAIN {).A 11 July 1945
FROM KUTER) \....-'
AIR COORDINATION
Strategic Air's preliminary view on overall air coordination is
!i
li

=a
124
0 ()
.

"'' forwarded herewith for consideration in connection with the conference ii
expected to be held in Manila on this subject on or after 15.
The scheme of coordination by the allocation of areas of primar,y
interest which was transmitted by memorandum for Admiral Sherman,

0

.....
:
N
CD
gr
ccf
dated 14 June 1945, by Major General S. J. Chamberlain, Assistant Chief i
of Staff, G-3, has been considered in this Headquarters and the following
co!W!lents are offered. The objectives sought by this scheme are strongly
indorsed. Strategic Air believes that waste effort through attacking
targets previously destrqyed by other forces and clashes between
forces are inevitable unless a workable system of coordination is devised.
It is belijved, however, that a workable can be set up which will
avoid the limitations or restrictions inherent in the plan which has been
proposed. It is felt that an;y such scheme must be based on the principal
of exploiting rather than. limiting the range and flexibility inherent in
each of the air forces and particularly in the B-29 airplane.
Strategic Air objects to the proposed allocations of areas because the areas
allocated to Strategic Air have been burned out by incendiar.y
attacks at this date.
Wit hin those areas there remain a limited number of top priority industrial
targets, the attack of which requires visual conditions. The tapansion
of specific areas is not deemed practicable since our t ~ p priority
targets are scattered throughout Japan proper. The assignment of specific
areas will force inactivitt on those air forces whose areas are covered
b.1 adverse weather. The assignment of specific times for attach would
similarly impose intolerable restrictions when weather is bad at the
assigned time . In brief, a ~ attempt to allocate either areas or times
imposes unacceptable limitations. Objection is also raised to the propo-
sition that Fleet Air should be the principal coordinating agency. It is
believed only reasonable that the weight of the sustained air offensive
being carried on b,y Strategic Air under Joint Chiefs of Staff directive
make it unacceptable to consider any other agency as a principal source
of coordination.
In the Strategic Air View, it i s believed that the broad subject
of coordination should be based upon the JCS directive to the 20th Air
Force and that the basic element of coordinating activit,y should be the
20th .Air P'orce longer range plan and current statement of intentions. As
an approach to solving the coordination problem, Strategic Air believes
the broad problem falls under two headings----the coordination of planning
and the coordination of the actual execution of operations. It is believed
that weather conditions over Japan alone may force coordinated plannine as
it is not improbable that weather would leave o n ~ one limited area open
for the operation of all air forces. When such is the case today within
the Strategic forces, extensive and detailed pre-planning is mandator, to
avoid collision and confusion within a limited target area. Examples ot
the detailed planning necessary are selection of the routes in, withdrawal,
altitudes, initial points, assembly areas and the time schedule. Surel,y
when several Air Forces are faced with such conditions , detailed pre-planning
will be essential for efficient operation of any of the forces . To effect
the desirable coordination in planning, it is suggested that authoritative
planners from both Fleet Air and FEAF be stationed with Headquarters
Strategic Air Forces and be empowered to agree to detailed coordinated plans
for the employment of all forces against specific targets or within
limited areas.
The second phase in overall coordination is the coordination of the
execution of air missions. The basic means for effecting such coordination
should be the Strategic Air statement of current intention. This Headquar-
tars is prepared to inform Headquarters, FEAF and Headquarters, Fleet Air
of the strategic intentions for a period of approximately 7 days. It
must be appreciated that these intentions will vary widely with weather
and with changes in the situation. These intentions and the continuing
changes therein should be kept before FEAF and Fleet Air by Strategic Air
operational liaison officers . When FEAF or Fleet Air find that Strategic
Air intends to attack objectives which FEAF or Fleet Air would elect to
.
atta<?k, this Headquarters would normally be most happy to delete such an
operation from its intention, thus avoiding waste effort and permitting
Strategic Air to select additional objectives. It is believed further that
effective and adequate coordination can be effected through the provision
of well informed operational liaison personnel to be interchanged between
Fleet Air, FEAF, and Strategic Air.
This Headquarters i s prepared to assign one senior and two junior
operational officers to each or this Rather rapid
r otation of these individuals will be desirable in order that they remain

..... - -

. . . ..
current on strategic capabilities and limitations and particularly tactics
8Dd techniques .
With regard to the coordinated control and command of air units
related to OLYMPIC, it is the intention of this Headquarters to
cooperate in air planning and to establish an Advanced Headquarters with
executive authority. This Advanced Headquarters will be set
up to the commander of the Amphibious Assault until overall
co-maud moves ashore and then to transfer to the headquarters of the com-
aander ashore. We have in mind a period of about 10 days during which
tactical command of all strategic components will reside in this advanced
echelon to insure the proper tactical employment of the strategi c elements
and complete, quick and positive cooperation with the amphibious and land
actions involved.
In conclusion, it is reiterated that the foregoing material i s for
preliminary considerati on and to provide an indicati on of the views and
proposals which will be advanced by the Strategic Air r epresentati ve at
the forthcoming conference.
,:._

... ,.

...
- 4 -

' f.. ""

.

'
BASIC LIIT.fo2a Ltr tr CoiiOc, ni BaiiCoa, tile AIYJA 600.0, dt4 10
.,.., 45 to DapCoaAP 20, aubjeat: Raadl\& ot Airfield.

Ist IDd. UACS/WJ/-.
HEw. UJJrl'IBS TWDTIETH AIR PORe!, OniC! OF THK DIPUTJ' COJilAIDii, PACIFIC
OCJWI ARIAS, APO 231.. 2 June 194'
1. lecornaerid appro"al ot the raquaat oontalnad in bado eo-nd catioA.
2. !he designation ot Northwet Pield, Guam, u "Cutle Pialcl" 18
ucapt.ionall.T 1D Y.t ot the OQt,atandin& oontributicma of
04"11el'al Oaatle to boabin& taohniquea now beinc .-plo7e:&l the ,
.JapaneH Tbe 315th Wing .Ul be stationed at thle !be
naming af the t1eld in honor ot General cutle would be an illportant. rile
taotor aince a lara peroentage or the aol'llL4t cl"fta or thil Wing were
-ben ot the lilbth Air reroe.
3 Inclat Photostatic Magasine Articles.
BAR!I!! 1&. GIUS
Lieutenant General, tJ. s. An.,

. - ..
,. .
BRIGADIER GENERAL
FREDERICK WALKER CASTLE
BY R. E. GILLMOJ<
W
E who knew him have lost a dear friend.
Our Country has lost a great man. The
best tribute we can pay him is to follow
his example of unselfish idealism, accomplishment
nd courage. So that others may know how great his
example is, 1 write this brief 'story of his life.
Fred Castle was born in Manila in October, 1908,
where his father, Capt. (now Colonel) Benjamin F.
Castle, was stationed. He was born into a family
with illustrious military traditions and, therefore,
in his life it was planned that he would enter the U. S.
Military Academy at West Point.
He entered West Point in 1926. Because of the tra-
ditions of his family, his principal anxiety was that
he might fail and thus reflect discredit on those who
had gone before him. He did not fail. To the con-
trary, he stood near the top of his class in each of the
tour years and graduated with the designation of
"Distinguished Cadet" with the class of 1930. The
cadets who graduate with this. distinction are given a
l.hoice of any Corps of the Army. Fred Castle chose
the Corps of Engineers and was commissioned a sec-
ond lieutenant.
With characteristic penetration, he realized the im-
portance to the military man of developing a mental
discipline which would make him independent of in-
stinctive emotional reactions in time of danger. For
rhis reason he asked for training as a fighter pilot and
was transferred to the Air Corps in December 1931 ,
where he served until February, 1934.
Having satisfied himself that he would alwa}'S be
capable of serving his Country in time of war, he
resigned from the regular army, became a reserve
officer and took a position where he could gain ex-
perience in economics-a subject in which he had
always been intensely interested. This position was
with the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. The
next four years were spent not only in gaining prac-
tical experience as an economist but in attending
dasses at the New York University on subjects con-
cerned with finance, accounting and economics.
Fred Castle joined the Sperry Gyroscope Company
20
in September, 1938 a'S Assistant to the President.
During the years that followed, the demands on the
Company by tlie Armed Forces grew rapidly and it
was necessary to plan and carry out a great expansion
of organization, personnel and facilities. Because of
his unusual ability, Fred a responsibi lity
much greater than that indicated by his title: he be-
came, in effect, a General Manager.
He foresaw that to adequately serve the Armed
Forces it might become suddenly necessary for the:
Company to build a new plant. He therefore took
the initiative in having studies made with a view to
having plans ready for an ideal instrument manufa(-
turing plant and, as a part of this study, he himself
visited many plants all over the Country. Studies were
completed in 1939 and laid on the shelf pending neeJ
for them. Our Nassau Plant is, in all essentials, the
as the plant which was planned under his direc-
tion in 1938 and 1939.
In January, 1942, Lieut. Gen. Ira C. Eaker tele-
phoned me from Washington, asking me to meet him
near Mitchell Field. When we met he told me.
briefly, that he had been given the great
of organizing the American Air Forces in Great Brit-
ain and that he wanted Fred Castle to serve as A- L
the staff position having cognizance of all supply
problems, and Harris Hull as aide to the staff position
having cognizance of intelligence. I have no doubt
that the General had his choice of anyone in the
United States, in or out of the Army; he chose Fred
and Harris.
The work of General Eaker and his staff in organ-
Izing the Eighth Air Force will stand forever as an
accomplishment without parallel in all the previous
history of warfare. Fred's part in organizing the
bases, the supplies, the maintenance and the com-
munications was brilliant in every respect.
He was not content with staff duty, even though it
involved constant danger. He requested combat duty
and was told of the rule that no officer could be ap-
pnintt>rl to a combat until he had com
pleted five missions as a member of a combat crew.

..
H rcll1t:J th.u he ",1, ,t\\ .If<. ut tht rule ami thJt hL
h tll completed the mi!>siom as an observer 111 connec-
tum \\ tth hi!> duty as a staff officer. He therefore
..,t\Cn command of a group of B-17's and deliberately
l hose a group that had had very hard luck in the loss
of its wmmanding officers and therefore badly needed
... leadershtp which would bring back their morale.
He gave them that leadership immediately anJ wtthin
.1 fe" days led them on an outstandingly successful
mission. From then on he led mission after
n11Ssion. The story of his last mission is best told in
rhe words of the Associated Press dtspatch from Lon-
don d.tted January 18th.
.. A\ the lOmmander of a bomber wing, he was leading
tht Tlurd A1r Dtvision in an attack agaimt the German
into Belgium wJ1en a single Nazi plane
, woopc:d in for a head-on-attack, pumping cannon shelb
hrough the plexi-glass nose of the plane and wounding the
n.lvtgator.
six more Messerschmitb then lame 111 for the ktll, spray-
gunfire into the crippled Flying Fortress and setting two
lllt:ln(-, ,tfirc. An oxygen tank in the w.ust of the plane was
,tnd threatened to explode the heavy bomb
Jo.ld.
HO\\ C:H:r. General to order the bombs jet-
mooed became the plane w.l!> flying over Alltcd soldiers.
To cut down air speed, the of the Flying Fort
re'' wrre Jo,, creel and the new ordered to bad out with th<:
t N. mtc:r-lOm mbs.tge, is it,
Tht '"'omber huddereJ and lurched on its two n:ma1n1ng
but General managed to lcvtl out Jon!!
nough for the: ere\\ to parachute. General Ca tie apparently
"" determined to the to lea,e the plane and, th<:
loomeJ bomber to 1..200 feet, a wing fuel tank ex-
l' loded, sending the plunging down."
Surely rrue are the ''ords of the Btble: "Greater
lu\ e hath no man than this, that a man lay down his
Ide for his friends ...
General Castle's promotion "as excepttonally rapid
L' en for "ttr time. He was promoted from First Lieu-
tenant to Captain on February 1, 1942; to Major on
\larch 1, 1942; to Lieutenant Colonel on eptember
23, 1912; to Colonel on June 10, 1944; to Brigadier
Gener.tl on November 20, 194tf.
Fred's las"t flight "as his thirtieth combat mission.
He had not been ordered to fly these missions but
"ould always to lead when the toughest
' peratwns "ere undertaken. He received the Croix
de Guerre for directing the supply of arms by air to
hL French. M.t<:luis m Occupied France. He was
\\,J <It I lht Ru,,J,If1 Onkr o( Kututov For 1<.-.tdinJ! a

ol shu ttl<: bombtr'> I rom (,n.Jt l.Sttt.un h otr
ou r 0 \\ n Country Fred r<:cetv<:d ttght dewrattorh
the!le ar<: listed belo" "tth guotattons from the olh
cia) orders of the .u-d.
AIR Mt!OAL awarded 20 M.ty, 1911. For exttptiOnalh
mcritonous ad11e\ u11Cnt "h1 k part lllp.umg tn fiH 'ep.tr.th
bomber comb.tt 1111,\iom 0' cr <:n<.:m) Olrup1cd ( ontin(;nt.tl
Europe."
OAK Lt AI ( 1 u,,, ll ro AIR Mtt>Al ,1\\ardtJ ')
19 I). For txceptlon.tlly m<:ritonou' .lthi C\ Lmtnt '' hdt
p.trt1Ctp.1llng 111 fiH bombl r , omb.ll OH r
tn<.:my Otuprd Continenti\! I urope.
II Vf R S lAR ,1\\ .trdtJ I Y I., I or g.tllantr} 11
acllon, "hde ( omh.1t Lc.1Jc:r on .1 bombmg
s1on O\ U Germ.1n} .:? 8 Jul) , IY 1). ( olonel C.t\tk d1rccttd
Ht.l'}' Uomb.mJmtnt \X
1
1n_g from ht!> po"tion 1n the lc.tdm.:
airplane of tht formanon. Under his lc.tdcr,Jllr
.1 htghly mportant .mJ hea\11) Jlf<:nded md1tary objtctl\ (
w'" :.unessfully bombed. The courage, .,kdl ,tnd bni!J.Ut'
lc:.tdtr!>hlp di.,pl.ty(;d h) Colonel ( ,t.,tlc on tlw. <Xl.l\IOn n.:
flelh the highe.,t credit upon and the Armtd Foret
of the Un1ted tates."
Dtsl tNGtllSH rtl FtYINt. C ,1\\ .trJeJ I'\ <.:pte:mbtr, I') 1'
.. For ext raord 1 nMy .1d11evement. "lule mg .t'> C omnun,l
ing Otlicer of ,1 1:3 1- Group on .1 bombardment mi.,_.on
0' er Glrmany, L 7 19 1 ). In sptte of intcn .. c .Hltl
.mt r.1ft tire ,md extrtmdy hc.n} fight(;r oppO,IliOn, tit
form.llion m.tde tht deepest prnetration thus far mto GLr
m.m}. a of 'it.tl 1mportance '' 1th h1ghl) !>lll
ce.,,( ul rc:,ult' and tOnt1nuc:d on to base, in another thcatu
Dunng one of the weat<:l>t .ten.tl b.tttlc.-. oi the: "ar, !J,tmc
over two hours, approximately one hundred and fifty enemy
aircraft were destroyed. The courage, skill and determina-
tion displayed by Colonel Castle on thi s occasion reflect the
highest credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of the
United States."
OAK LEAF CLUSTER TO AIR MEDAL awarded 8 December,
1943. "For exceptionally meritorious while
participating in five separate bomber combat missi ons over
enemy occupied, Continental Europe."
OAK LBAF CLUSTER TO DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
awarded 16 February, 1944. "For extraordinary achieve-
ment while leading a Heavy Bombardment Division of Fly-
ing Fortresses on a mission Germany 16 December,
1943. Colonel Castle directed the attack from his position
in the leading aircraft. In spite of repeated assaults by hos-
tile fighters and extremely adverse weather conditions, he
maintained, a_ tightly-knit fo:mation and reached the assigned
target on schedule. Though subjected to heavy, accurate
mti-aircraft fire, Colonel Castle led his units directly over
:he objective and wrought great destruction on important
:nemy installations. The high degree of success attained is
attributable to the courage and superb leadership of <;:olonel
His actions on this occasion reflect highest credit
Jpon himself and the Armed Forces of the United States."
)AK LEAF CLUSTER TO DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS
twarded 27 April, 194-t. " For extraordinary achievement
while leading a Combat Wing of B-17 airplanes on a bom-
udment mission over Germany 25 February, 1944. In
.pite of adverse weather conditions over England, he skil-
,dly :tssembled hi s units in their proper positions in the

formation exJctly on schedule. Flying as Command Pilot
in the leading aircraft, Colonel Castle maneuvered the Wing
through determined enemy opposition to reach the assigned
target. Though subjected to intense and accurate anti-air-
craft fire, which damaged his plane he directed a bombing
run that wrought vast devastation on' an important enemy
installation. The courage, sound judgment and skilful lead-
ership displayed by Colonel Castle were largel y responsible;
for the high degree of success attained by the Wing."
OAK LEAF CLUsTER TO AIR MEDAL awarded 6 May, 194'1.
" For meritorious achievement .i n ' the destrudion of one
enemy airplane while serving as on a bombard-
ment mission over enemy occupied Continental Europe."
His was one of the first heavy bomber groups to
receive a Presidential Citation courage displayed
in pressing home a costly attack against a Messer-
$Chmitt aircraft plant at Brunswick, Germany, Ja.n-
uary 11, 1944, the day sixty of our bombers were lost
on the combined Schweinfurt-Brunswick raid.
The heroism and accomplishments of Frederick
Walker Castle will I !ve on as one of the great
of this war.
"Still seem.r it .rtrange. that tbou shouldst lite
foret'er?
/.r it les.r .rlrange. that tbou .rbouldst lit-e at all?
Tbis i.r tl (md th . lt 110 more.''t
tEdward Night Thoughts
ISJIHMIAN'S COMPASS CARE GETS RESULTS
I . I Blf LYNN CALLAIJV /
h N Dece1 5e. 8, 1922, one or/first large the original G)'l'o-Co;,tpamJ ha.1 beeu retired b_1
/
u scale erchant fleet installations of Sperry Is 'Jmian. An unmentionable number of the com-
Gyr -Compasses was initilted when Sperry asses._ has taken the ;Pfunge to the bottom ql the sea
stalled a compass Board the Isthmia as a result of enem action, and one was resold to the
5teamshi Company's S.S. Stee Sectfarer. By June , Sperry Company in the early days of the
1en the S.S. St eel 1\ ri11er received its e9uip- present war fo approximately its original sale price.
rnent 28 ships of the Is mian fleet carried perry Save for thes equipments, every single compass is in
Co passes which had ready proved inval_uable. Isthmian's gular service.
A spot check made m December, 1944, indicated The q lity and precision buvt into Sperry Marine
that the d been in actual ope ation about Gyro-C passes have to do with the endur-
72)o of the entir time since installati n. In the 22 ing r ord which is bein& compiled by the equip-
years of servic;, therefore, each of hese compasses owned by Isthmial)f' But since that quality and
has actually run approximately 15 years. Despite p ision are built intqlevery Sperry equipment, the
li11 s long record of consistent ofation not A .ringle utstanding of these p2rticular com-
' '

p.btw4ry, 194'
U . 5', A l R S E R Y l C E S
11
Brig. Gen. Frederick Walker Castle
B
RIG. GEN. FREDERICK WALKER CASTLE, son of Col. Ben-
jamin F. Castle ( Air Corps Reserve), was killed in action
on December 24 while leading the 3rd Air Division in an
attack against the German break-through into Belgium. As the
Bomber Wing which he was commanding was flying over
the Liege area, a Messenchmitt fighter swooped in for a heac!-
on attack on his Flyitlg Fortress, and six more fighters immedi-
ately attacked him. Two of General Castle's engines were set
on fire and the airplane was so badly damaged that he ordered
rhe crew to bail out. He remained in the airplane at the con-
rrols and managed ro keep it flying level long enouAh for the
:rew to parachute. Before he could jump, a wing fuel tank
exploded and the airplane plunged into a tight death spiral.
He went down with his ship, his colors llying.
The last few minutes of his life were typical of Gel)eral
::astle's coorage and leadership. Stationed in England si nce
february, 1942, he had long been famous as the Flying Colo
nel, news of his repeated exploits against the enem)' comi ng
ro his native land time after time. He was promoted to
Brigadier General on last November 20. He was never ordered
ro fly combat missions, but he had made twenty-nine, alw:t)'S
usigning himself to the toughest operations. He was on his
on the day before Christmas. On that day especially he:
would not order men to a task he would not himself perform.
The classic 30 at the end of a newspaper man's copy means
rhe end. If Castle had been a regular aircrew pilot, 30 missions
would have completed his tour. He completed the full sti nt of
a Fortress pilot, in addition ro having been a staff officer, .1
Group Commander, and a Wing Commander.
AS COMMANDING OFFICER of his Fortreu group, Gen
:raJ Castle led a combat wing ag:tinst an aircraft plant at
Jschersleben, deep in Germany, in September, t 943. Up to
that time this was the deepest penetration made by 8th Air
force heavy bombers. For his gallantry in that raid he was
awarded the Silver Star.
A dangerous mission was decided upon against a Messer
tchmitt aircraft plant located at Brunswick, and again he rook
parr in the attack, on January 11 , I 944. The mission resulted
in a combined Schweinfurc-Brunswick raid, sixty U. S. Army
Air Corps bombers were lost, and for courage displayed on that
day General Castle's group became one of the first to receive
a Presidential citation. The Americans were outnumbered
three to one by the Nazis, but they ignored orders to turn
back and drove on alone through savage enemy fighter resist-
ance to accomplish their mission.
On another occasion General Castle led a flight, last year,
of shuttle bombers from England to Russia, and his per-
formance was so notable that he was awarded the Russian
Order of Eutaxov, Third Degree.
His mother and father, relatives and friends, have the proud
realization that Fred Castle received, among other awards,
the French Croix de Guerre, presented in recognition of his
direction of the work of supplying the French Maquis in
Occupied France from the air; the Legion of Merit; the Dis-
tinguished Flying Cross with two Oak Leaf Clusters, and the
Air Medal with three Ousters, all before he had completed
bia 36th year. He was born at Manila, P. I., October 14, 1908.
THOSE OF US WHO SIT IN COMFORT AT HOME and read in
the daily press scories of our young men making mass bomb
ing missions day and night, have difficulty picturing what it
is like to sit in a bomber and Ay toward the enemy, through
Aak thick enough ro walk on, and dark ro shoot through at, a,o
enemy. the long distance back m base, and the fighters waiting
for them on the return trip.
On this very point. we have the bene/it of General Castle's
own explanation why it is so h.ml to convey to us at home just
what a typical bomber r.1iJ comprises- memally, physically,
emotionally. U. S. AIR SEitVICES had the pri,i lege of giving
to its readers in November, I 9'B an an ide, unsigned for
security reasons, wrirten by General C'lstle. We quote from it:
We are nearly at altitude now, and suddenly the COpilot points
ahead- there is the enem)' wast C French, Belgium. Dutch, or Ger-
man ). Several miles ahead ami thousands of feet below, some little
black d01s arc: wwards us- the first enemy fighters we arc
w meet that d:t)' The !ormation up, and all eyes rove the
sky continuousl y.
We arc nnw over the enemy utdst. Su.l.lenl)". over the ""i nter.
tom the top wrret warns enemy .urcralt :11 I 1 o"dock,'
.led.! ahead. Two little dots can lw seen over the nose.
lar,L:er The next instant our plane vabrates as the
nose guns start throwing stuff at them. Evadently the Hun pilon
'aw the tracers come pretty close, for they don't come in very
:.,sc, hut r<JII over and dive away. As they go, we notice the ball
rurrc:t J!Unner in our win)ol ship spitting some lead at them.
We are tive miles up, and the earth below is a quilt of tiny patch-
work. If we are raiding Bremen, we: see the River Ems in the dis-
tance, or if Paris is the rarger, ir is the Seine thar we see glistenini
Over the intercom we hear the bombardier say bombbay doon
openin,L:," and there is a roaring noise the big doors open down
ward, and wind rushes by them.
We settle .town co do some accurate Ryang, for we are on thC'
bcJmb run, and if we are ro hit our target ( a tiny thing, so many
miles down ) everything must go right. Some tiny cri nkly Rashes
appear on the patchwork below. We wait breathlessly, and surc-
enouJ.th, a cloud of brown puffs- with Rashes in thei r centers-
appears dead ahead. It looks very impersonal, like a movie, but
that hrm.on doud has death in it, and we hope the next cloud isn't
an)' duser.
But the next one dues come close, dod suddenly there is a
.. eruum-mp noise, and then a ratrling sound as some of thC'
shell pieces hit us. Our plane lurches. We sit tense, and wait for
that terrible tell-tale sputter from an engine, bur nothing happens,
ami we know that nothing vital has been hir. The waist gunnl'r
lalls rcassuringly on the intercom to say thar no one is wounded.
sombs away!"'-and we veer with the rest of the formation
sharply for home. As one bombardier put it, up until the rime our
bombs have gone, we have been working for the Govemment, but
now we are working for ourselves. There is still plenty of work to
do, for the lighters are realty beginning to bore in. Two-then-four-
then two come darting in. Ahead and below I see another bomber
group getting it worse than us.
Two bombers are falling back, smolei11g badly. OtU goes into
slow spiral J;, ,e. ll'ith three fighters spMrti11g death on iJs hliJ.
IIV e see three liute ll'hite blossoms optm as part of the crftll
jumps-we strai11 OMr eyes, but cats't see the rest. (His owo
obiruary-Ed.]
But we are too busy to wonder about them now-we are turn-
ing to avoid some more ftak. Finally, we are back over the
Channel. The fighters no longer attaclc, but follow to one side.
waiting to pick off a straggler. We pray ferveody that our m-
gines keep purring. The top gunner reports that he sees a hole
in the outer en&ine nacelle. We arurioUGly watch the oil
pressure gauge-if it starts going down, we arc io for Nil
trouble. Tail gunner reports "Ship in our hiab lqUadroo unoki
aod faW--. t.ck--duw fitbeen necki W. &am below ... We
----- -- -. - ....

12
u. .L AIR SERVICES
Pe!mtary, 194J
see the tail guns c our wing ships spurring. but it is too lace.
Taii gunner reports "The scraggier has exploded-no chutes
-
Another half hour of tight formation flying-the tighter we
are, the less the enemy fighters like it. The navigator calls back
that he sees England ahead. We all heave a sigh of relief, anJ
the formation, opens up-we know that it is unlikel y char any
.lighters will follow us this far. We keep a good lookout, however,
for the long-range fighters sometimes do come this far.
Safe home at last-the interrogation by the Intelligence Of-
ficers-grim faces-a favorite flight leader in the Group has been
lost. But losses are otherwise light-a total of four wounded in
two other planes. I go back with the Group commander to his
quarters to have a drink and calk it all over.
So in very few words, I have described a typical bomber raid.
But there is so much that I haven't been able to convey. The
whole thing is so immense. And how can one describe being five
miles in the air, in a great armada of airplanes? There are no
words that can tell about it. It is a thrilling experience, bur the
thing I like about it are the people involved. The days and weeks
I have spent with these men are worth remembering.
THE DAYS AND WEEKS GENERAL CASTLE HAS SPENT with
these men, he says. are worth remembering. The days and
weeks he has spent with them, by them will never be for-
gotten.
When General Castle first went to England in 1942, it was
to help Lieut. Gen. Ira C. Eaker and six other officers lay
the ground work for the 8th Air Force. He was made Chief
of Supply for the 8th Air Force Bomber Command and later
was cited for his organizing genius by General Eaker, then
Commanding General. It was upon his own request that Colo-
nel Castle was transferred from his relatively safe assignmem
to the role of G,roup Commander.
As a boy he followed in the family rradition ;1nd entered
the U. S. Military Academy, after winning his appointment
by competitive examination. He was graduated as a "distin-
guished Cadet,'' ro cmn la11drt. in 1930. The fol-
lowing year he was sent tO Kelly Field, Texas, where he re-
ceived flight training, and subsequently was assigned ro duty
with the 1st Pursuit Group, Selfridge Field, Mich. In 1934 he
resigned from the Army to become statistician and assistant ro
the sales manager of The Barrett Company ( Allied Chemical
::nd Dye Corporation). and later transferred to the Semet-
Solvay Company of the same corporation. In September, 1938.
he joined the Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc., in Brooklyn
as assistant to the president. Although he had been placed in
the War Department pool of officers whose civilian activities
were deemed of greater importance than military duty, he
requested active dury after Pearl Harbor and was assigned
to General Eaker's staff as G-4, on January 18, 1942.
ELSEWHERE IN THIS ISSUE we reprint from the l'V''ashitlg/Otl
Post for January 21, the letter written by General Castle ro
Archibald Macleish, when he was Librarian of Congress. He
is now Assistant Secretary of State. Dr. MacLeish wrore for
the Atlantic Motlthly an article entitled "The Word and rhe
Fact." We recommend ro our readers that they give serious
thought to the suggestions so originally and intelligently sub-
mitted by Castle. whose training and experience peculiarly
qualified him to advise the Nation concerning certain para-
mount problems it must face after the war. He deals with the
question: WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?
Dr. MacLeish, poet, was graduntcd from Ynlc in 1915, and
In 1939 was awarded by Yale the honorary degree of Doctor
ol lcctm. Harvard IDidc him ao LL.B. in 1919; Walevan
gave him an honorary Lin. D., 1938, Colby, 1928, University of
Pennsylvania, 1941. He was awarded the Pulitzer Poetry Prize,
Sl ,OOO, in 1932, for "Conquistador." A list of his published
verse and prose is roo long to reproduce here. Speaking of the
letter by General Castle, Dr. MacLeish said: "I look upon it as
being one of the finest documents ro come our of this w:u.''
Praise from Sir Hubert.
WE CLOSE THIS INADEQUATE TRIBUTE to the memory of
General Castle with a quotation from an edirorial in the Wash
it1gton Post. on January 20. It is interesting ro be told by the
publisher, Eugene Meyer, that it was written by Lieut. Col
Beirne Lay, Jr., AAF, author of I W atlled Wings. who served
with Castle on Eaker's original staff and was a fellow Group
Commander in General. LeMaY's Air Division. Colonel Lay
wrote:
"Castle must have known that the percentages were accu
mularing against him. Bur this was secondary in his mind
and heart to giving his last full measure of contribution to duty.
Castle's enormous capacity for work appalled his colleagues
when he was a staff officer. He flogged himself on beyond the
point of normal endurance. Arising from the same real devo-
tion ro duty was a sense of self-consecration that drove him
inro the cockpit before a scheduled mission whenever the
worst fighter opposition and the blackest flak loomed ahead.
"No man can say how far it is ro the rop of the sky. But rhosc
who have fought the enemy in the blue upper levels where the
vapor trails form, and where the mist between life and death
is thin, believe that men like Castle fly on at that higher
altitude from which none return to earth."
+
Jaffe
1
ReYiew of His Book
S
HOWING U USUAL RESTRAINT, we pointed our tn our
Decembe issue a w of the gla,ring inaccuracies in the
chapter pert mintgo e Wright br6thers. in Men of Scietlct
i11 Americ . by Bern, d Jaffe. We reprinr whar rhen wrote:
. Au xpert at Bting Wrong
riE HAVt; L 1-\RNED to be suspiciol'. l.>f "popularizations" ol
W science; this book (Men of Scienre iu Americ11. by Bernard
Jaffe. published by Simon & Schuster. N. Y. ) . by a teacher in a
Brooklyn hig school. must be the most woefully and inexcusably
inaccurate of II. I J
How bad all the twenq./chapters are we can only for
we stoppe after reading the one Jealifg with a subject that we
know a lit e about, the )Seginnings of aviation. This chapter is so
packed 'l':ith errors th1, it almost makes one gasp. It winds up
with the astounding add preposterous statement that the "theoreti
cal rese rch" of Pro/ssor S. P. Langley "paved the way for the
great air lleets of and tomorrow."
In heaven's name, just what scfemitic research by Langley con
tributed to successful human flifht ? Every well informed persoa
now knows, or sipuld kno"' rl)ar the Smithsonian Institution hu
publicly and formally acknowle(lged that the Langley airplane wu
never proved capable of llighr., No airplane that ever flew contained
or used whatsoever based on dara oriJinal with Langlt'f.
Langley's researches led him o propound the absurd Langley Law,
that the /11stet' the speed of a plane, the less would be the powt'f
required to s.israin it. Tod y the Langley Law is, of course, com
pletely discredited. Human /light first became possible in CODM-
quence of the wind-runnel and other researches by the WriJhc
brothers.
The chapter states, too, that the .Aerial Experiment Associari011
built a machine of their own design. As the courts loll& ago ceq.
niaed, aod aa the author mitht ..UJ haw leeroed, the Aerial ..
COL. FREDERICK W.
CASTlE RECEIVES FROM
MAJ. GEN. CURTIS E.
LEMAY THE SILVER STAR

..

General LeMay Then
Was Air Division Com-
mander, Eighth Air
Force. Citation Accom
panying Award Given In
Second Column Below
Among the Things We are Fighting For
BRIG. GEN. FREDERICK W. CASTLE
Tht) lcuer "J) wriuen by Gcner .tl C.ISde w
,\r<htbJid Matlt:t)h, insptred h) his .trude tn
the Atl.mlh l'l ontbl), entitled, "The Won! an . .!
rhc FJu.' Dr. MJcletsh \\.IS then of
( now Assist.uH bf Srarc.
I lool.. upon Gencr.&l Castle's let!er." SJtd
Dr Matlcish. ".t s bct ng one of 'the finest
I >lUffiCill' tO lOtne out of \\.IJ' ,"
T
HI' PSSFN(I! of what )'OU say is that
no one has ex pressed well or con-
uctely we arc fighring for. It is not
only ,\ macrer of bur the ver)'
phtlosophy of our barrie. If people do not
xprcss well wh.tt the) rhi nk :1bour the
".1r, tt ceruinly indil.ttes rhar the issues
1re snll confused in rhe minds of all of us.
Of course, most of us do know prert)
1
dearly rhat "e .tre "defending ourselves
. tg.tinsr bur chis is a negarive
objecrive char fail s to inspire those of us
who feel that rhert 1s somerhing more we
muse be lighting lor.
l feel char there Me rwo reasons why
rhe " Word" h.ts nor yet been found in
this w.u. Fir" rhc lighting men are roo
f.1r separated frnrn rhe writing men; sec-
ond, the objewves of our liberals have
become over wmplicared in our new in-
r:i\ illl.ltinn
-. .. .. . -=-- ...... .... - ..
Thi:, glob.d war is being fought so far
(rom home th.lt rhe very rc.1lity of the
fighting lurd ro undcrsmnd by rhc peo-
ple .IC home. Our press is well represenred
on the b.urlefroms, bur the reporting of
rrue f.tcts ro rhe people ar home is impos-
Sible with wriuen words, and so the b.urle
irself is nor even understood. In the sim-
pler of our Rcvolurion rhe
b.mlefields where freedom was fought for
were in our own b.tek yards. and the
bloody wounded t.trne home w be rcnded
by their morher\ or wi ,es. It was a con-
srructive war in the sense and
rhe objeuives could be easily expressed
by the rcrrns " liberty" .tnd "freedom."
The picture shO\\S Maj . Gen. Curtis E. Le-
May, then Air Division Commander, !lth Air
Force, giving 10 Colonel C.tStle the Silver Srar
wuh the tiralion :
"Por gallantr) in arlion tl'bile serting as
combat leader on a bombing mission 01 er Ger-
man), 28tb july, 1943 , Colonel Castle directed
a Heat') Bombing ll"ing /rom bis position in
tbe leading airplane of tbe formation. Under
his inspirinx leahrsbip ,, bigiJ/y important and
h6ati/y defended militar.1 obJect it e uas Sllr-
ceu/ull)' bombed. 1'be rourage, skill a111l bril-
liarn leadtrsbip dupla)ed b) Colonel Castle on
this occasion re{lerttbe IJigbest rredit11pon bim-
relf aml1be arm"tl fv' ' u/tlur UnitcJ -"'""'1."
NOWADAYS the soldiers' rhoughrs ctn
not e.tsi l)' be expressed because of thl
necessary lensorsh1p regularions due to
military and poli.tical consider.uions. It i'>
necessary .1nd right th;tr \\ e .tre not al
lowed ro wrire polirical lerrers, bll[ it r:er
t<linly does rend tO srifle the rurbull'llC.:L
of thought which would evolve 1nw .1
common undersranding of wh.H we Jrt
doing. In rhe Revolution our newsp.1per'
prinrcd vitriolic edirorials or letters "rit
ren by the soldiers rhem elves on all tht.
subjecrs which were at issue. These word:.
came from the very he.u of b.mle .1nJ
from the heared emotions generareJ in
battle. They were true words .md then:
could never be .tn) quesrion .1s co wh.tt
rhe fighring men themselves were
for. Now the fighting men h.tve to de
pend on interpreters and can never s.t)' tn
prim or in public whar rhey re.llly thin!..
.tbour rhe issues of rhe day, for fe.1r ol
overstepping the bounds sec for us.
Don'r misunderstand me. I do belte\e
char this is necessary under the circum
seances, but I hope rh.u as rhe war dr.1"'
ro a close the press will open ro aJI of u'
co say just whar we chink ;tnd believt'
Whar you will then hear from us m,t}
not initially be pleasant nor may ir even
be true. bur from the deep of
.111 rhe lighrinj.t men expressed in the"'
. ........... -.... ---- ----------------- --- ----
IIi I

26
words we will finally begin to see just
what we are after.
THE SECOND FACTOR-the lack of a
dearly defined liberal objective-is one
which will be resolved . to some ex rent
when freedom of speech is again restored.
However, many strong-minded men our-
side the service as well as in it must think
on this subject before we can find the
answer. In my own mind I feel even-
tually we will come co realize chat our
objective can be summed up in the word;
"industrial democracy." In all the discus-
sions of the modern problem, there is one
thought which I have never heard ex-
pressed I believe is cbe
inner kernel of che situation. This is che
face char our country is now made up not
unly of residential communities bur also
of many great industrial communities.
How to develop a free citizenship which
will recognize both faces is co my mind
the greatest problem of our age. John
Doe, living in a suburb of Detroit, Mich.,
is not only a member of the community
of say Grosse Isle, but also of Gener.1l
Motors. The expression of the industri:li
community membership is claimed by the
unions, but in my opinion they are still
way off the track in the objecrives they
seem to be seeking.
How can a modern industrial citizen-
ship be expressed in an mganizarion
whose only thought is rim of contiict! It
is true chat a great parr of the progress
in our modern industrial revolution has
been through the aggressi,e action of the
union movement. But now we must find
some way ro express a new philosophy
involving an approach to our ideals
through less violent means.
Perhaps Sidney Hillman's unions are
moving in the right direction, with a con-
cept of partnership between che unions
and management-ownership, but he idea
of partnership ro me somehow does not
adequately express what we must even-
tually achieve. There must be some rela-
tionship berween the community political
activity of the individual and his indus-
trial activity. Again do nor misunderstand
me-l am not talking about a kind of
"national socialism." To any liberal such
a thought is abhorrent. "National social-
ism" expresses irs inherent. dictatorial
ideals in words, some of which only
rhrou_gh demagoguery, express the demo-
cratic ideals for which we are fighri ng.
Too long in our modern industri al
revolution have we focuted our attention
..
U . .. A 1-!t S E R VICES
on 'Two chickens in every pot and two
cars in every garage." Obviously, work
and production are essential for all, and
must be an ever present and practical ob-
jective. It is unfortunate that this musr be
such a preoccupation, for it tends to ob-
scure the more important ideals which
should srand ou'r in all our chinking. Dur-
ing the Revolution work and production
were no problem-our agrarinn civiliza-
tion pnnided all the work and all the
needs that we desired.
Where is the modern Jefferson ro get
up and tell us in si111ple rerms what rhe
issues are today? Ic is understanding lead-
ers that we need-chen they will proviJe
rhe words. The great jurisrs have not
helpeJ us. I bow w Holmes and Brandeis
as genuine and greac-liberals, but the com-
mon man finds no answer ro his q:1::srions
in a learneJ opi nion on rhe righrs of cor-
porations to merge or nor to merge. The
great labor leaders have nor helped us,
for in their minds their onl)' job is still
w fight che bosses: The grear business
men have not helped us. for very few of
rhem have p.:r even thought about their
relationship w currenr history, except in
rerms of proJucrion. One or rwo of them,
like C E. Wilson anJ Willkie, have
roucheJ rhe problem, bur thar is all.
AnJ the politicians haven't helpeJ, pre-
cisely because the others h:nen 'r.
Gon:rnmtnt, Labor. Capital, Manage-
ment-four words roday fraught with
great implications in rhe two great demo<:-
racies, anJ yet Jefferson never even used
rhe htst three worJs.
YES, THE FIGHTI NG MAN KNOWS he is
lighting to prevent a small group of un-
principled men from raking over the
T hird A nni..-ersary of 8th Air Force
} T IS GRA.fii' YING TO REAU in a London dis-
patch that Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles
Portal sent on J anuary 28 to Lieut. Gen. James
H. Doolittle the following message on the thir<l
anniversary of rhe United Stares Hth Air Force:
Through three momentous years we have
watched rhe United States Eighth Air Force
grow until today it forms with the RAF Bomb-
er Command a great two-handed sword cutting
from the west at the German capacity to wage
war. Never has cooperation in the common
task herween two allies been more complete,
more harmonious and above all , more effective."
In its three-year history the Eighth has flown
more than 250,000 bomber sorties and 210,000
lighter sorties. Since it was activated at Sa-
vannah, Ga., in 1942 it has dropped more
than 518,000 tons of bombs and destroyed
about 13,000 German planes, while losi ng
.\,HJ7 and l ,:r48 fiahtcrs.

PehrH""J, 194J
world, and he knows that when he gets
home he wanes ro breathe a cleaner, freer
air than that he inhaled before he leh.
He would like to h,l \'e his leaders tell hi m
how that is going w be done. So ir Jot.'S
not reassure him to hear from home: norh-
ing but the sulky grumbl mgs and rant-
ings of John L Lewis . md nothing but
. boasting by General Morors . and Mr.
Kaiser. And he gets picrures of Mont
gomery WarJs presidem being c:jenld
!rom his otl_i_ce by armed soldiers.
A truce .. Ius been dechin.:d between
org;1nized labor and m:u1.1gc:ment for th\:
duration, anJ yer much of the: news is h11w
the truce is viohmd. What the hell, asb
rh:: fi ghting !Tlan. is going on! Nobody
<:\en tries ro explain m him. ;1nd the: light
i::g man looks glumly forw;!rd to rlu:
wlitn the .. truce:: is olliciall) off ( pr\:
sumably when the war is otlicially l>Vt:r 1
anJ Labor and Managc:menr can <lgai n
u:me to grips. whil<: (;o,Nnmc:nt tries 111
make rults and an as referee so the:: figlu
Joesnt get roo bloody.
I think we all sc:t: that one of the rhin,!.\S
we: arc: fighti ng for is rhis right w fight
oursc:lves. Bur we rt:membt:r wit h
a shiver that the: Nazis anJ f ;1scisrs nxl l
m power in Europe when Labor .tnd Capi-
u l (or Socialists and Rightists-or whar
<.:ver )'OU want to c.dl them > couldn r
learn to li ve together. Where are the lead-
ers to tell us what is happening and whar
is going to happen, anJ whar we should
do to avoid the vaguely seen hur mud1
feared dangers ahead?
Well, I :.tm nor pessimistic.
like this are boiling in thousanJs like Ill\:.
When we are done with the fighting W\:
shall be forthright in asking our questions
and demanding our answers. Imagination
and daring enterprise wrought the miracle:
of the twentieth century American indus-
trial revolution, and every man jack of us
is proud of it-every pilot who has tlown
one of our grear bombers, e\ery mechank
who has repaired one, every t01nk man
who has fought in Normandy or Saipan,
every engineer who has guided a giant
bulldozer on the airstrips rhere.
We are nor afraid. Americans have ere
:ued the new industrial revolution, and
Americans will solve the problems ir has
created. The issues may not be entire!)
dear now, but they will be later- perhap!l
nor unri l some time after the war-and
the n the Word will emerge. In the mean
rime we will enthusiastically and thor
oughly lick hell out of our enemies,
Nazis and the Japs.
I
Major Gell811"al Cart.is B. 1AIIa7, U. S. Arrq
CoMandin& Oeneral, m BaUer eon.nd
J.PO 234, c/o Postaaster
Dear Curt:
18 April 1945
Iou.r radiograa llPLI lll6 of l.8t.h of April included AIIOilg the intonu-
tion addruaees CQIGIIIPQl
1
CIBCSWPA and CIICPOA. Addressed as it was, it
had further diatribution tbrou&bout the War .Departact aecUona. Since
this 1e strict} int.em.al !weDUeth Air Force buains at thia t.iae, the
wide diasw1nation of thia .-asap createa DOthinc bat contwrion here.
I had boped to aend Whit.Ae7 on a dait to 70u before thia to diacuaa
pereonnel and edw1 nilitrati Ye queationa
1
bat he bad to 10 to tJSS!A.F in order
to line up scae ke7 peraoanel. I bell.ne the qaeaUon of rout.i.D& of
grau and the rules for the uae of radia and t.elecon tranui aaiOil
could be clarified to adYantaae of all conoemed, and I conaequentJ.)" propose
to ba.e h1a go into tbe aabject with a n to daitinl 1011 in the near future
and paaaing on our general ideaa. It t.. aatoundia& what one P Ilia-
directed can aoaeu... cause in the way of contuion.
I
We got your report of the pbotograph7 tor the 15th/16th April operation
against Toqo. Although we are t attptinc here to work out uq details
until photographs coae in, a quick glance at the aap certainl7 cl tbe
iapresaion that aoaeth1ng oTer halt ot Tolqo i.e now aone. !he three !olqo
incendiaey operations haYe certainl7 been UIOilg the aoat etfectiYe in the
entire histor7 of bollbing. leep up the good work.
We receiyed toda7 the lor!Tua pi.ctares and baw bee t iapreaHCl
with the results acbined. Fro& the co11plete destruct.i.on of aoM ot tboae
buildinga, there auat haYe been so.e terrific inYolYecl. I had
no idea that eYen a aatchbox could diat.ltegrate to that ext.eat.
As I stated in a telecoa a eoapld of dqa aao, I think t.be Twcti.U.
J.1r Force cbannels in the Pacific Ocean Areas will sbort.l.J' be atraipted
out. Preaeot. thought is tbat peDdi.na t.a. 110n.nt of Headquarters TwUet.b
Air Ioree to tbat area, 704 shall be deaianated aa Aoti.Dc Deplt7 CQrsact.r, ;)
Tw-.iet.h Air Force, tor the llariaaaa. Thia will pemit JOU to tmacUOD
acaRbat a1rUarl7 to tbe aaner in which ,ou worked in ladia and aboald be
.,at aatiafacto17. The reapooaibUitiea for lopaUc RppOrt will probabl7
t.Ye to b carried b7 AArPOA at least tor the tiae bein&. that ia a -tter

beiac we>rked out. now. The acta1n1atrat.ive plDiliftl .tor the deplo1Jl8nt.
and aupport. ot the IX Balber Cond ill the Jqulqua would alao be a apecitie
charge OD !AIPOA. 'th1a ia verr eh in the tol"'ll&ti ye atage now eo pleue
don't diacuaa it. the tom which thi.a claritication f4A7 take hu not be
decided t.opeide yet and the above ia aerel7 "a torecaat.
Joe Preston ia leaYirc here to.orrow to IP out and take OYer the Job
ot Director ot Training ot the Lead Crw School. We are at.ill bopinc to
f
et it atart.ed bJ lla7 the lat. and to keep the tirat. claaa on acbedllle.
have cbne ner)'thing poaaible to tocua the intereat. ot all coDDerned on
thia tirat claaa eo that we UJ learn while dOing and t.hua pel'llit the second
aroup to operate at tW.l. scale.
We will aend you either by telecoA or letter in the next tn daJ8 11011e
intomation on peraonnal available in the U.l. aad 1n the Kedit.erraneaa.
The war haa. proareaaed to a point there which baa cauaed the powers that be
to give ua wbat UIOunta to aaoat a clear p ahead to select &1110De W. choae
out.aide ot the Yel'7 top l&Jer.
IT beat to eveJ70De.
Sineereq
LAUBIS IJOBS!AD
Brigadier Oeneral
1
u. s. A.,.q
Chief ot Staft
.,
I
Twentietb Air Force
If __ </:_?_ _________
(Initials)
19 llarch 1945
SUBJECT1 Assignment of Colonel I; E. Kirkpatrick, 0-17660
T Oa Commanding General, XXI B omber ColBIDa.Dd
J.PO 234, c/o Postmaater
San Francia co, California
1. Colonel E. E. Kirkpatrick, o-17660, Corps ot Engineers , hU
been accept6d b,y thia Headquarters as liaison officer in connection
with the establishment and the activities of the 509th Provisional
Group. He wUl be attached to the XXI Bomber Command.
2. It is desired that Colonel Kirlqxitrick be given every assist-
ance in carrying out his important work. He has been advised t hat
insofar as possible, all contact with other agencies concerned will
be through your Headquarters. This procedure should not, how eYer,
be per.itted to interfere with the expeditious discharge ot his
duties.
3. Colonel Kirkpatrick is authorized to transmit messages b7
telecon to this Headquarters or t hrou8h this Headquarter s to the
agency which he represents.
By COlllDIZUld of General ARNOW:
LAURIS NC!tSTAD
Brigadier General, U. S. Ar117
Chief or Start
Cl&asification oartoellea
laD DIRECTIVE No. 5200.9, effective 29 Nov.
I

Air Foroe
JAN 1 91945 __________ -fl'!i ___ _
(Initials)
General Curtis E. LeMay
Commanding General, XX Bomber Command
A.P. O. 493, c/o Postmaster
' New York, New York
Dear Curt:
It was nice to see you again even though our visit was very
short. Since r eturning I have thought of many things which I should
have discussed with you but which were for gotten in the press of time .
I don' t suppose I would have r emembered them even if I had s t ayed
around 2 or 3 additional days .
One point which was discussed with Hansell, and I think also to
a limited extent with you, was the question of the size of force and
rate of effort. I stated that t here was no intention here to put so
much pressur e on either of the Bomber Commands that they were forced
to put out aircraft which were not consider ed up to the pighest main-
tenance standards. This is correct . We are surely inter ested in
s eeing t he largest practicable force operated at the highest reason-
able frequency since this naturally leads to the greatest amount of
destruction. The point I was trying to make was that sub- standard
aircraft or aircraft not up to t he desired maintenance level should
not be forced into operations at the risk of ditching them just for
the purpose of adding to the number of airplanes dispatched on any
one mission. What General Arnold wants is the greatest possible num-
ber of bombs dropped on our priority targets in any .given per iod of
time. I am sure that you fully appreciate this .
I n the preceding paragraph I do not mean to convey the idea
that the boss gets the same amount of pleasure out of a successful
mission invoiving 50 airplanes as he would get out of the same opera-
tion if 150 were participating. He knows as well as we do that re-
sults are normally directly proportionate to the size of the force
employed all things being equal. However, it is true that he r ealizes
the problems and is looking more and more to the damage r eports for
his evaluation of what a bomber outfit is accompli shing. I think you
will agr ee that this is the real answer. '

As you know, Erik Nelson and a carefully selected team is leav-
ing here about the 25th to work with you on the maintenance problem.
Some of these people are those who were with him when he was with the
XX Bomber Command last fall and should prove most helpful . Some of
these individuals were procured from their assignment with con-
siderable difficulty and I am therefore, that they be used
for the purpose originally intended: Erik' s l etter of instructions ,
a copy of which he will present to you, will cover this .
I believe that you wi ll agree with me that you will have what
will shortly become the biggest and best air striking for ce in the
world today. I don' t know of anyone better qualified to command than
you. There is no doubt in my mind but that you will fully justify
General Arnold ' s confidence in your judgment and ability.
I called Helen on my return, told her you were well , and gave
her your new A.P. O. She was also advised that there would pr obably
be a two- or three- week gap in your letters t o her because of your
change in assignment . She asked me to give you her love and t el l
you that she and your youngster were well.
Augie Kissner has been ordered back as you know, but has not
yet come through here. I will let you know when he arrives. I hope
you will agree that he ought to have 10 days or 2 weeks leave befor e
coming out to your I am still working on a Deputy Chief of
Staff for Administration f or you but have had no success to date.
We wi ll not let the matter drop.
,
My best wishes and warmest regards .
Sincerely,
u.s.A

001
.EADQUARTERS, TWENT:.rH
WASHINGTON 25, D . C .
SUBJECT: B- 29 Fer ry

t..,
TO:
-u.u .DIJiE "'o.n c
CTIVE a.ncelled b DC 1 9 1nA
0
s2o
0
3'
Commanding General 9, St':fect
XX Bomber Command
1
tre 28 ll"
. 1 r
Attent1on: Major Genera Lefuay v

1 . Letter your Head1uarters, s ubject as above , dated 29 September
has been referred to the Air Tr ansport Command for an investigation
of conditions referred to in the l etter and inclosur es thereto.
2. Action has been taken by the Air Transport Command which
should r emedy any unsatisfactor y conditions at Morrison Field and
should res ult in more expeditious handling of air planes and crews
through that station.
3.
enr oute
time t o
further
There has been continual i mprovement in ferrying condi tions
to your Command , with airplanes r equiring pr ogressively less
accomplish the t rip. Effor ts will continue wit h view to
improvement and furt her reduction in fer rying time .
By command of General ARNOLD:
LAURIS
Brigadier General , U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.
\ADQUARTERS, TWENTIETH AIR FO:i
OFFICE OF T HE COMMAND ING GENERAL.
WASHINGTON 25, 0. C.
11 December 1944
SUBJECT: Commendation of Officers of your Command
TO: Commanding General, XX Bomber Command
1. On his return from his visit to your Command, Colonel
Rosenblatt of this Headquarters reported that he was greatly im-
pressed with your Headquarters in general and particularly with the
work of Colonel Charles K. Deputy Chief of Staff for
Maintenance, Supply & Service, and Colonel Dwight 0. Monteith,
Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon. He stated that these officers
were extraordinarily able and efficient and the manner in which they
discharged their duties was over and above could be considered
normal performance.
2. It is a pleasure to forward these favorable comments .
It is the hope of this Headquarters that Colonel Rosenblatt ' s visit
was mutually advantageous.
rigadier General, U. S .A.
Chief of Staff
--

. . ........
. . ' ....,.-.
' - .

Qt'tiQe ot the General

Bricadier General Lauria Ber1-.&,
S.aclquarten tnntie'h Air Pone,
Wahin&ton 25, D. C.
8 December 194t
The eno le rep on waa prepared by my OOGine or. AI you oan
aee, clittera 1reatly troa tbe Theater ti.mate. General Braley,
Silrat'l en&ineer, &&reel With aine, 10 I dont know where luli;an '"
hi1 information upon whioh he baled hia

1 inola
IDol lieport on 41rt1el4a
C.. atJ"... c;,atton catlj 1 'I'
DOD DIRECtiVE No. effective 28 Nov. sa

HEADQUART
RCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL.
WASHINGTON %5, D. C .
Major General Curtis E. LeMay, U. S. Army
A. P. O. 493, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York
Dear Curt :
9 December 1944
Thanks for the charts you forwarded with your note of 29 November.
I have sent them on to Possum who wi ll be very interested in what you have
done. Keep it up .
I think I appr eciate how you feel about your operational losses.
It was for this reason that we sent you the message stating that we would
accept operations at gr eatly reduced strength in order to keep the unmodified
engines out of combat. I hope it was clear to you that we were sincere in
the statement that we would accept t his . I was r eluctant to make it stronger
because we do not want to interfere with your command prerogatives any more
than is necessary. I hope t hat long before this letter r eaches you, you have
at least taken them off your longest and toughest trips .
We r ecently s ent you a memor andum on public relations to serve as
a gui de to you and your people. I hope that you agr ee that this is a good
i dea because so far it appears to be working very effectively. By t hat I
mean that we have been able to focus the attention of the public on a few
important points. These points are quot ea and commented upon editorially
and are bound to have a good effect. This system is opposed to that which
formerly prevailed i n which we threw out a lot of news sometimes of a ques-
tionable quality which left little but confusi on in the minds of the public.
The way t his works in the over all picture is like this - General Arnold in
his occasional r eleases or public utterances gives out a few well chosen
points. The releases from this Headquarter s , from your Headquarters and from
Possum' s Headquarters all directly or indirectly join in on the same theme.
I f we are to put over t he B- 29 proj ect, it is firmly believed her e t hat we
must establish in the public mind the fact that the Twentieth Air Force is a
sound substantial organization which is making an important contribution to
the war i n the Pacific . I woul d appreciate very much getting your reaction
to thi s .
I f you. donJ t have cowl f l aps coming out of your ears wit hin the
next ten < it will no't be my fault . After getting your
t elecon th' mo:rnina.&..I tore t his damn place apart on this particular
-. tt i .
. l!
I t
. .
'

subject, only to find that the greatest trouble was the question of
which have. been established by CBI . With a 4 priority for a
small part of the shipment and the rest of it by boat, we would never
get the things there in time . I think your people were partially at
fault for not giving us a higher but at the same time
.I accept the responsibility here for the .:ifct that my people lli.dn ' t raise
hell about it at this end. -
I hope that our teleconference of yesterday morning on the subject
of the Chinese situation was of some help to you in your conferences with
Wedemeyer. I discussed t his at great length with OPD, and we wrote many
draft messages which we later tore up. It seemed to me that everything
that had a chance of getting out either to you or could do nothing
but cramp your style and further confuse the issue. I personally have a
hell of a lot of confidence in the ability of you and Wedemeyer to arrive
at a good sound solution. I don' t know how well acquainted you are with
Wedemeyer, but from my few contacts with him a couple of years back and
from the general tone of his messages back here, I am convinced that he
is a damn solid citizen and that he is capable of looking at things about
as objectively as anyone possibly can under the circumstances in which he
finds himself.
We have done everything we can to move up the date we can get
bases for the XX Bomber Command, but it looks now like is the earliest ,
but please don ' t take that as a firm date because it is still in the planning
and pushing stage.
I had a note f roin Helen the other day which served as a sort of
letter of transmittal for a bi g package she sent down . She and t he family
appear to he all well . I believe the package went out the same day it
arrived here, and you probabl y have it now.
This .must be all for now. I think you are still doing a swel l
job. Best of luck. Please give my regards to Upston, Horne, Herman and
Garcia.
Sincerely
U. S. Anny
!be enclosed report . prepared by vr. w. n. Shookle7
clearly showa the dividends paid by the amall amount or
t raining I have been able to accompl i sh to date. I have
sent a copJ direct to ~ e n e r a l Arnold, as I know he will
be i nteres ted.
our operational losses are still a headache;
passing us the new ah1ps and n:odif1cat1on kite eo
ohange tho shape or t hat curve.
N-
Ber 1a Al leo,iaaa of the oapab111t1 .. aDt
intentions of the J apa in China. I oan f ind ao fault wlth their
rea1on1ng nor refute any ot their arguments. Howner. in tbe
pa1t the Japa .oot al-.ya followed aound reaaoning and l .
have a hunoh they are ror lunming . Jua't to be aate. we
a.1.o formulat ing a plan tor gettinc our people ou.t or tne Chenctu
4rea.
I ua &lad wheel are tiDally bechming to mow t.Dd that n will
eventually get out ot Ohin&. I do not, honftr, follow in the reaaoniiJg beh1li4
thll ohoioe ot tbl Ltt7M area. It appeara w IDI that thia ia tar away troa
J&I*Jl, aDd -n wi:ll tiDally wiM up boabiDg target. aDd other miaoel-
l&Deoua objeotivea. I belieft ttat tile B-29 should clrop boabe on Japan
and el... If we a:re 1so go 1nw the PbilippiMa, S.r Ial&M would b8
be'tter, and tlwt beat ohoioe would be or1b.enl J'rom there we oould hiiJ
enrything aouth of tokyo. U I aa not .f'Uiliar with all taotora
the ohoioe, I aa in no poai tion 1lo "Orltise ., any great extant. .lbloat any
baae would be better than the ,.. have.. I would appreciate &117 more
-.tion you aay on 1he
I bope the Boaa wu pleaae4 1th the job we did on ronaoa. !ba tint
1lwo day were tine, b.lt the oloud.a onr 1arge' on the 1ilir4 day g&Ye ua a
11 title trouble. I teel tba t I - ak1ng heaa.&y, and tla t I will aoon baw
aa outtit that will produoe reaulta. I feel tbat I han taken all the
I oan to operaticmal lo ... a aDi I don't think we will loae aD7 .ore
ahipa beoauae ot "t'igational errora, poor planning, aDd other awpid a181atea.
.. .till han 'bbe All 11hree ahipa loa-. on "118 laat ._..
lliaaioua weN det1n1wly ohanil failure. I aa iJhat iJbl Dn oool1Dc
will be lp. '
I aaw !lcmdie today aDd be 1a king goOd progreaa. 111 1a oomple1;el7
rattoual baa the old tight. 1111 ia ati:ll a llight7 aiok II&D, aDd wlll be
o tiMJ blt I think the worat ia O"t'er. We plan to aeDrl hila hoM in a
CM about the aiddle of Joveaber. I Will giw )'9U the detaila la-.r.
<ll1 ul'bw alae ot the XX Beaber o,..m, I oan toraee no 41tt1
oulty in hmdling tiw lDI you know the in JDclaD4 are now
haDrlliDg tive ocab&t wiilga w11bout &ny trouble, and they law a aaller a-.tf
a !oliber C,.,.nd . I th1Dk we oan baD4le all you oan gin ua. Perteot
ocwnJD1oat1ona are 111oeaaary haDdJ. aD7 Air Pc:roe unit aD4 11bey ahoul4 be
ginn oouiderable 'thought, eapeoially it w in an area where there are
DO peraDBJl' w-.llationle
latlll . ._.Y,
._,., .._ral, u. a. '
Ott1oe of tbl Co.,..nd inc General
APO 493
Brigadier General laurie Norata4,
Chief of Statt, TWentieth Air loroe,
D. C
Dear larry,
16 November l94j
You aeem to be having a bell ot a tt. finding me a Deputy tor Oper-
atioaa. I think you ullderetand what I want and I know what k1ncl of op-
position you are running into 1n trying to till tne vaoanoy.
I th1nk we all agree that the oompoai tion and. aiae ot our poat 11&1'
Air Fol"Oe depends a great cteal on tbl B29 perfonanoe in the Paoitio.
With tbia in mind, I believe that only top notoh people who ban pr0ft4
theuelvea in oombat ahoulc1 be aicP-4 to tlw B-29 program. In the
put ban fallen down on the job intnia reap(tt. Tne people you have
reoo=-nded ao tar are good ottioera and have oreditably but
tbe;y are not tna beat in the bua ineaa by any ana
Tlw war in Jurope ie about onr. I ll admit there ia work lett to
4o, but it' juet a tter of baulin,g the neoeaaary load ot bombs to do
thl job. Moat ot the air fighting ia over. I think it ia about tll.
that 80118 top notch people were pired loose .from the Bighth. They will
never give them up ot their own tree will but will require preaaure
troa waahington.
Joe Preaton ia doing a creditable job aa Deputy for Operations now
an4 I think I oan hold out until you do tbe in U. K., however.
1 t means that I have to deYote oonaiderable t i to Opera tiona.
Our laat mission was not hing to brag aboutJ w were ctouble oroaaect
by the weather. About five minutes betore take-oft we reoeive4 intor-
tion on the position ot that hurrio&M ott the Philippine buli it waa
then too late to atop aome shipa taking ott. I deoided to get tbe out
tit 1n the air and try to nine tnea an Ht.nking by radio. unrortuDatelJ
we bad a oommunioationa breakdown due .aoatly to at::toapheriol. Tlw Dlt
rea.ulta were blind bombing at Omura and not enough on Banking to do JNOb
cooct. I gueaa you oant hit tbe jaolcpot with every niokel. We will try
to ,et baok 1n tne on the naxt one. Note alao tna1) one ot thl loa
waa ctue to ice. we oan expect more ot tbe l&mll .f'rom now an.
Roaenblatt baa been a big help to ua and hia viait nere will cto a
lot to open tbl ey.1 of tba 11 & 8 leotiOD aa tO our DM41 &D4 t:rouble8e
I cUctn t pull any. punon.a with hill ul be hu a tlrat nud k:nowlectr;e ot
all phaaes ot our act1v1t1ea in .... ltl te eupp I t'ee.l tna-c tbl MN

people on t 20th at&tt we oan giw tnia peraonal 1nc1octr1nation to
t bl better ott we will be. I auueat tr..t both you an4 General .&rnol4
apeD4 with him on hia return. Be oan gin you a good anawer
to any ot your queatioa..
Who hal tbl 22D4 nowt I thought you would oo up with Bob Willa-1
ror lt, bowenr, bl oerta1Dly ian't 11laplaoecl 1n 2c1 D. Who took
Boba cl1T111on 1D the E1gntht Row 1a ltnb ooming onT we laven't JIUoh
newa exoept that he waa aerioualy 1njW"e4.
I would uy late int"ort1Qn you ay have on our r e
4eplOJ.118nt. I hope we oan &t oloaer 1D than tbl laail apot you mentiaa.ed.
We Y Dave to get out ot ChiD& betore lq.. b a1tuat1on up there 1a
worae tfl&D it baa ever been ao we JNat think ot what w are going to 4o
it the worat lappeu. I aa to you 1D ano-cher atter our A-2
tiaw ot :tne aituaticm.
-
Dri

\ lmtlal"
I Uale .
Classification cancelled by
DOD DlBECXlVE D200.9, 2B
0 octol)(J'r 1l"f}f""L ;

1
'!1lo Gene_ til ,
octor, c: 1r - _o tar
(l)
'5)
up the aonoral, United. tatea
y F roes, ,b no- i:.''\irtna. !l"4 ia an tho supretxl
crnm nndor, southonot r!siSt OOtWtnncl, advised or
all plo.ns for n.daa1oua to bo flown 1'1--o... the
Th ntor c.nd t. G osults or o1"
Bombcr Oomuc.n .
ct 1or the Cor.amantitilg Unite Stntes
y : Chin - u a- !ndla 1n d ct1
and arrru ... ins for t l() nupport to b nd.ered
o X... mbor o t.U\ ru; quosted bj
t:' oc andinE a ner 1, :r.x BrJ oor co nrA. ..
to 'by Conansndtng nenortil, IDS,
ox<l opt in ense or our-port to bo
by ths co:snn ng onora , Fourteenth :A1r
aa l:eroinru::'ter tntod.-
no lea
Dr1Gad1er t}.enel'al t.t\\.\t-1c :r:orutt1, 2(}th A1r ,fasbin;ton.
D. c., 20 ootobe.r 1944.
(4)
(S)
(6)
(7)
(0)
(9)
i u.rniah aM rUt h chelone ma1n-
supply. nnd roclamat:on, nll
and serYiaea.
Arrange with oener#l,
.supply, 'USAP- C!-'I, and ... toatcr Signn.l
oftioor, for construction, a:gnal
0 )llntr\\!)t ion, llnd nlntonnnce or 'b&,e(!$ in
! nd1A
1
ground trnnsportnt1on of
nnd aupplicc, operation of o,
ho:spitali::ation nnd evacuation 3)orsonaol.
Arrarl8e w ... th aenora.l, :dl.a--
Oh!.na ing, Air Trntarc ...... Oo::Jrno.nd. { Qr
neoeaeary ntr
f or eYaouatlon or
ear.Y1oe,
CoOrdinate local tl1
0
ht operationa 1n I ndia
( 10) AM'&m:-:o ro:: local aeour 1tj and air am gx'Q\IDA
defenae of bamea 1b India.
( ll ) ror tnation or aisnal OOPWIIIS.
cat tons aa call lP. and :t'requeu1aa.
( 12) Arrange f or p:rov1s 1o:t of Sptc1al serY1ce
.S'.:tppl1oa.
'
comtttamil;lg General, Fourteeuth Air J. .. orae w1llc
(1 )
(3)
(4)
,_
.. -- .. .
' ' -,.!' .....
. .
.

nst-o ,
(5) .. locnl uocar1ty n- def na
otns .urOl.loo 1n Chinn, rr
ut.lerwe if l'Oqui. ad.
(G) f'i'lep tb 1r Advisor to. co
UtlAF- CBI :f .. actions in
h!s eap,ueildl1t on 1n oonnoet1on
.a:..illlo.nd."
1a Cnina - tho 1 olo ;ftd paper to
be pre tll'Od. ond poroona.ll del vorod it to enoral Cher.naul'
n e hra.v.lnl"!' the at d1d and I hope fawrnble reaulta,
althouC-"11 ! L\tlt1cipnte n" t crstnmnblo rol otc:nce to vort 1U17
!UC&n8 wrnioh aro no 1 sorv1ns llth Air r ox'Ce aot.1v1tlea. The onlJ
1: d:l.at nction nh1ch ho cou ng"""e to was to plnce '!i:oro ex-
pcrioneed ctr1oars .. n eoutniu"ld or ao oi' our Chengtl.l baaos to
re--1 ce i noxpor1oncad L1 ut nnnta now tboac
Tl !.s is n atep in tl o t direotlon, of
cour.tse , onnnot zolv roblem until provides
, 1.th the a equip!:U)nt oeeaso.ry t o e ble
them: to d chorgo tl e :f) ac r;u rldere 8.8 ;p on-
cr1bed in Ar.mr end ll' I will
and n::.io '" to end any w.ud.atanec iO'O ibl ;r1.tl t smol.l
e..e.tac 1..--t nto whlah oaeh Groul' ma1nta:.tna at; ..,.ts 1'orw
vtith our op&rations rom t a baaea cona.tnntl l.ll-
1ri ond froquenc7, thOo dotaonment arc oa.ins
leaa lcaa avnilnbl& to part o1pato in
Met1 nl o.ctl'\1tloa. onaoq'.'!Ontl ! mu.at contin.Ao t o prosa
Ohenn u.lt to prov!.do Ul.l btu!e suppo t at an Al"lF date. e2an

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GEI.II':FIAlluo
WAS HINGTO N 25, D. C.
tlaaa1fication cancelled by 7 October 1944
DOD DIRECTIVE No. 5200. 9, eff ect ive 28 Nov. 58
Commanding Gener al, XX Bomber Command
A. P. 0. 493, c/o Postmaster
New York Cit'y, New Yor k
Dear Curt :
Attached is a copy of a letter sent to the XXI
Bomber Command which, it i s believed, will be of great
i nterest to you.
Sincerel y
u. s. Army
1 Incl .
Major Oeoeral Curti 1. 1rt117
Oa. ndiQa General
1
Jl Bollber Cnnd
A. P. 0. 493
1
o/o Potmaster
1 .. York City
1
In York
.

HEADQUARTERS
Office of the u ... ..
WashiDSt on 25, D.
------------------------------
(Date) (Initials)
7 October 1944
Brigadier General H. s. Hansell, Jr.
c/o Comaandinc General, Advanc Echelon,
UI BOIIber CoiDmand 11M 1jy
A. P. o. 234, c/o Postmaster <nasstfioa.tfon
9
e;tteotive 2B Jgv, :1
San Francisco, Califomia J)(.W .oiBECfld o.. _ .....
Dear Poaswaz
At the time of your visit here ;you brought up seYeral it_.
requiring fUrther development that had shown up on one of your trial
combat missions. The Developm.nt Engineerinc people had alreaQ7 been
working on some ot these iteas and are stUl checking further into
them. However, I thought you might be intereated in knowing the cur-
rent status.
(1) Bombsight Trail You.,. reported that it appeared that.
bombing at speed8 Qf and .340 .Uea per hour at 30,000 teet.
exceeds trail angle or the bOIJibaight. The Deyelopment EnJineeriDa
people report that this is true and had already taken the t ollowin&
steps to correct theae conditiona, both by supply ot traU and diao
speed kits and modifying the )(-aeries bombsight in production Uneaz
Fift;r (SO) bombsights, It-series, with increased trail aDd diao
speed provisions will be supplied to the 7.3rd Bomb Wing within one week.
I
These were originally fabricated tor supply to th XI Bomber C,.aadJ
however, are now being made available to the 73rd Wing instead.
to be supplied to the combat theaters for all very heav7 bombardmen\
aircraft are being procured now and will be aupplied aa soon as &Tailable.
The Army Air Force production linea of K-seriea bombsight are, thia
mont.h, these increased trail and diac speed provisioaa
(fl'OJl Victor). lavy production linea are also being chqed; howeTer,
it is anticipated that these changes will not beoome evident until prob-
abl)" Novaaber.
These increased trail and diac apeed provisions aettina
in 400 mila of trail (no increase in cross trail) and perait deoreaaiD&
disc speeds so that bombing can be aocoapliabed as hich aa
4S
1
000 feet.
(2) turret Interrupters. The Encineering people here had no
knowledge of the electric eye t1Pe of interrupter that ,ou atated Coloael
Schatzel is workinc on. The Bagineering Division baa been directed to
r
"
..

contact Colonel Schatsel and to work cloaely with h1a to determine
the teasibilit7 ot adopting or modi!Jin& the photo-electric- tJPe ot
interrupter tor turther u.se in connection with B-29 CPC S7at.
At tbe present time no photo-electric type interrupters are
contplated. For out ot 1r1chroniam tire interruption, it ia preaentl7
conteaplated incorporatiD& a new special tJPe highly aensitiTe
into the S7St .. , which will &\ltoa&t.icall7 interNpt the pna While the
turret. are alning. Therefore while the turret alna in nitching fl'Qa
prialary to secondary control uad rlce Teraa, the pna will not fire.
This eqaipaent ia scheduled to 10 in production airplane in Deo-.ber
1944 and posaibl7 eooner U production ot the nn type rela7a can be
expedited.
'
( 3) Radar Finders . haTe all been bearing ru.110ra abOut.
ann radar ranae which would el1 mj nate the present necesait.7
tor ranging wben trackins the t.araet. The follow in& ia the eqaipaut.
bein& considered for installation with B-29 CF.I equ.ipaant. and the
atatuaa '
(a) d / APG-3a(AGLX tor tbe B-29 tail. pQaitioa) is beiac o--
aidered at the present time aa the eTentu.al standArd r adar tire control
tor the B-29 tail turret.
(b) AJJ/APG-l4s(ARO for the B-29 nose, aide, and upper ai&htiD&
stations) ia considered aa experiaental equipaent. o1'11.7.
(c) AI/APG-15: (AGSfor the B-29 tail position, non-coapatiq)
ia, at the present t.iae, conaidered u a substitute standard tor the
B-29 tail turret until Ai/AFG-3 becoaea available.
Statue of the aboYe installations ia aa tollowaa
(a) d/APG-3a The lir Technical Senice CO!MInd baa b..a
directea to assign 1-C priorit7 to the Ea.&ineerinc and neceaaaey work
inTolyed in accoa.pliahing a protot.JPe in8t.allatiCil. Deliverr ot t.be
first JM/APG-3 wtita troa Gen.eral Electric ia scheduled tor 5 BoTIIIber.
At the present t.iae no B-29 airplane is available tor accoaplishiD&
necesaar,r aoditication required to make proTiaiol18 tor the radar
ment, but. as aoon aa one ot tbe airplanes presently aaaigned to llr
Technical SerTice COIIIIIl&nd can be made ayailable, work on the prot.ot.7pe
installation will get wtderwa7. It ia anticipated \he installation aM
trials on this equipaent. will not be coapleted tor aeTeral aont.ha.
(b) AI/APG-14z An installation ot t.hia eqaipaent. in a B-29
DOH ia bei111 b7 M.I.T. bdiation Laborator7 peraonnel a\
Bedtord, llaaa.
,

"'"!il'" ..
.. # - ,f
, I

(c) AI/AP0-15& Air Technical SerYice Command baa assigned
a 1-A priority to the crash prograa recen\ly established inYolrlng
inst.al.lation ot AII/APG-15 in seven {7) B-29 airpl.aoea, and it ia under-
atood that installation 1n the tirat or these airplanes has been coaple\ecl.
Six of the B-29 installations are intended tor operational testa in
the Pacific Theater while the other installation will be used tor ex-
tensiYe tests by the Anu.mt r: t Laborator1, Aircraft. Radio Laboratoq,
and the A.Jw3 Air Forces Board.
There wlll be no quantity production of AI/ APG-3 until the last
quarter of 1945 No plans, whatsoeYer, haYe been ude tor quantity
production of A.R/ APG-14, but AJJ/ A.PB-15 will be in producUon in the
latter part ot 1944. At the present U.., DO ettectiYe production lille
installation dates tor ot this equipaent haYe been established.
There ia a possibility that AI/APG-15 will be installed in production
airplanes in early 1945 but diaposi tion on this will not be zade unt.il
the utility ot the baa been determined aa a result ot the
crash program outlined above .
l.i.Ma.
I will keep 10U posted on turt.her deYel.DJXMnt alona tn-
L.UJR.IS IOtiSTAD
Bri1ad1v General, u. s. tilq
Chief of Statt
I
.

l
. -
.. . - --. ,, '
,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERA L
WASHI N G T ON 25, D. C.
Classification cancelled by
J)QI) DIBEC1'IVE Bo .. 5200.9_._ effeot1ve 28 lov. 68
Dear Curt:
5 October 1944
Since I last wrote you several points have arisen on which we now
have some definite information which may be interesting to you. I am
passing it on for your information only, since you will see that some of
the subjects are not for general dissemination.
The point in which you are probably most interested is the suq-
ject of the ultimate movement of the XX Bomber Command. This is now
beginning to take shape. We recently presented to General Arnold a paper
which led to the conclusion that we should move the XX Bomber Command to
the Leyte ar ea as soon as this area was occupied and bases could be built.
This subject was subsequently presented to the Chief of Staff. I t was
well received by all concerned and messages have gone out to MacAr thur
which will lay the foundation for further action. I can' t give you any-
thing firm on this except that everyone is convinced that the XX Bomber
Command must move as soon as suitable bases can be provided. Whether
this will be January or June, or even later, we must wait until we have
some more tangible reactions .
The r eport of the committee on B- 29 weight reduction has been
approved except for the el imination of the 4- gun turret and the de- icer
installati ons and with the further exceptions that the items des ired re-
tained by you will not be removed. As far as the turret is concerned, you
will be authorized to remove two guns if you desire, but the decision to
change the type of turret will not be made at this time. More experience
may indicate the desirability of this at a later date at which time the
subject will be reopened.
We have given considerable the range and
load characteristics of the B- 29 as well as to improving the overall
effectiveness of this weapon. I have long felt that a balanced Air Force
must have some instrument precision elements as well as the accepted
visual precision units. The proportion of instrument to visual is some-
thing I don' t know, but we can probably depend upon experience to tell us.
In this line we are examining the possibility of installing in some of the
B- 29 units the latest radar developments and stripping the aircraft down
to give gr eatest possible load and range f actors. Judging from t he progress
to date, I am confident that we can car ry a full load of

.,

at l east 1600 miles and place the bombs witli far greater accuracy than
has been done to date by instrument means . The new "Eagle" equipment is
far superior to the Q-13 with which you are now equipped. I won't go
off the deep end on this subj ect for another two or three weeks when we
should have some conclusive findings from the tests in progress . In the
meantime, however, I would appr eciate your r eaction on this subject.
Regardless of what the f indings on the strip-down instrument air-
craft are, I am convinced that we can improve our radar bombing by re-
placing present radar equipment by the "Eagle." This new equipment is
a slightly heavier unit but offers less drag which in the long run
appears to balance out quite well. If our mock- up looks good we intend
to establish t his as a r equirement for all future B- 29
1
s.
Your low losses in the last two missions occasioned considerable
comment here, particularly by the press, who are a little inclined to
accept this as an indication that all our troubles are over. We are
deliberately playing this down, pl ainl y stating that these two cases were
exceptional and that losses must be expected in the future. I hope you
follow the same general lines in your to t he press in your area.
While we are speaking of public relations, it might be well to
reiterate the policy of t his Headquarters although Glass is thoroughly
familiar with it. We do not want a high- pressure B- 29 publicity program
and are making no effort to maintain constant publicity. Natural demands
of t he press keep the subject constantly before the public in newspapers,
in magazines and on the radio without any effort on our part except that
required to monitor the informat ion put out. When an operation has taken
place, we announce it as a fact and have f ound that the story steals the
headlines of t he papers for at least three days . When some particularly
significant event occurs or there is an angle which we desire to stress,
we point this out through the medium of the weekly Air Forces' press con-
ference and it is picked up with enthusiasm. You will have received by
this time t he script for a radio program which involves record making by
you and other members of your command. You will be asked to do this from
time to time in order to preserve a proper balance between what originates
in Washington and what originates in the Theater. By the time Possum gets
in operation I hope this proportion is about three parts in the field for
every one part in the continental Uni ted States. If you don't like the
script or have any suggestions as to subjects or treatment, please don't
hesitate to l et us know. Most of t his stuff is produced by the public
relations people here and although I monitor it, I have no pride of author-
ship in it.
P. D. Ent is being assi gned as Commander of the XXII Bomber Command .
Although he has only limited "bi g time" combat experience, he is a very
solid citizen and has done outstanding j ob organizing and running the
Second Air Force. I think he will the XXII Bomber Command the
stability that the Boss
.. - - ----

In connection with the preceding paragraph I had a discussion
with H. H. a few days ago with r eference to his commanders and I want to
assure you that he thinks of you in the most superlative terms . I realize
that this has been his attitude for some time, but it is also very evident
that the work that you have done with the XX Bomber Command has greatly
impressed him.
As you know, the B- 29 project will be greatly augmented by the
reconversion of present heavy groups. This brings up the question of
the optimum number of wings which shoul d be placed under one bomber com-
mand. I feel that four, giving a total of 16 groups, may be the answer
with a probability that five could be handled without losing effectiveness.
I realize that you are in a unique position in India in running both a
bomber command and what amounts to a transport command under very trying
but I would like an expression of your opinion on this subject .
For instance, when you are based in t he Philippine area, do you want to be
built up to 3, 4, or 5 wings?
When you ask for personnel by name we try to get them for you.
When they aren't actually forthcoming, it is because we have run into snags
which pretty definitely stop us. We are still working on Engler's replace-
ment but so far the names submitted as available have not been suitable.
I try to apply to the rule that if I wouldn't have them, you don't want
them either. Howard really ought to come home, so we will keep at it.
Please tell Jack Up. on that I sent on the letter for Mrs . Saunders
which was sent here by courier. We are all very happy to learn of Bien-
die's apparent improvement .
Possum starts moving today and you may expect to hear something
f r om his area about the middle of November if all goes well.
Give my r egards to your staff.
Sincerely,
U.S.A.
Dear Curt:
.

23 September 1944
Forrest Allen delivered your letter of 12 September. It was
very informative and I think will give me a better basis upon which to
help you than is attainable qy normal teleconference means. There is
a courier service running between your place and Washington. I
strongly suggest that you use it for personal letters to me on any
problems you don
1
t feel free about airing to the public. I will do
the same.
We were all very much distressed to bear about Blondie's acci-
dent. The doctors here estimate that he will be out of circulation for
at least six months so we are consequently faced with the problem of
finding a new commander for the XXII Bomber Command. You may think t his
is not too big a task realizing there are only three B-29 Com-
mands and a hell of alot of officers in the Air Forces, but with the
tremendous significance the boss attaches to these positions it is, I
assure you, a major problem. Right now most of the Air Staff are work-
ing hard at it.
We asked Rosy to carry the bad news to Blondie
1
s wife which he
did. His report was quite favorable. She apparently took it well and
we are now feeding her slightly edited versions of the truth. Please
assure Blondie that I will personally see that she has all the informa-
tion that we can give her and that we will avoid giving her any bad
news in too large doses. I hope the last report we received is not
overly optimistic and that he will pick up faster than was indicated.
Please give him my best regards.
Strictly between us, after my brief visit to India and China
in August, I was quite confident that you would find many things to make
you unhappy. I am, in fact, surprised that you are not unhappier than
you appear to be. The redeeming feature, however, was the tremendous
enthusiasm indicated in all echelons of the command. They all appeared
to think that the B-29 was the best airplane in the world, that they can
do the best job in the world, and the XX Bomber Command was without a
doubt the best organization in the Air Forces. With that spirit to
support you, I am confident that you will make the XX Bomber Command
everything that those kids want it to be.
[

~
~ ! ' < \ _<; .. ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ f \ ~ I hope you appreciate that my inquiry with reference to the
ossibility of your taking additional groups was for the record only.
The question of deployment was hot at that time, as it still is, and
I wanted your statement to controvert any pressure which might be
exerted to dump additional units on you. I think now that this has
been satisfactorily averted. The Pacific program, after a very dark
and gloomy start, has picked up considerably and together with a
slight adjustment which was necessary in the production program,
gives us a good chance of moving units to available bases from which
they have a reasonable chance of operating effectively.
I think everyone here from the boss down is impressed with
the necessity for getting the XX Bomber Command on new bases from which
they can operate effectively at the earliest possible date. This
figures in every discussion on deployment. Any delay will not be the
result of lack of effort on our part. You know why we must operate
from there as well as I do and also why we must do a good job under
the most trying conditions. I have complete confidence that you will
do the job as well as it is possible to do it. I am sure that General
Arnold feels exactly the same way about it.
We attempted to put the heat on the top side with reference to
increased hump tonnage but had it tossed back at us t o t ake up directly
with you. Apparently it is desired that you must reach a solid impasse
with the local authorities before the heat was put on here. In our
message we stated that your capabilities beginning the 1st of October
would be a minimum of 400-450 sorties per month if sufficient tonnage
could be pr ovided. I am most anxious to go to bat for the increased
supplies up to the limit of your operating capabilities and I hope you
keep us informed of what you can do.
Future plans may permit some operations of somewhat shorter
range than those we have done in the past. I hope this is true because
I know you are as anxious as the rest of us to carry a big load of bombs
in the B-29. I think the B-29 proj ect has a tremendous significance on
the future of the Air Forces so what we can do with it now is of the
greatest importance. We have been forced to work at such great range
that so far, of course, the weight of bombs carried has been of neces-
sity very unimpressive. I think we made an error initially by announc-
ing bomb tonnage dropped on each mission and I now propose to change
this policy if possible. If on one of t he shorter range operations
against an important strategic target , we can carry a load of up to 6
or 8 tons, we will announce that figure and in the future make no refer-
ence to weights carried. By so doing, I think we can kill the comments
that always arise after one of our long range missions .
I have taken up with the Air Engineer everything you have sent
in on the condition of the Chengtu bases and will continue to keep as
much pressure on this subject as possible. In this connection, I am
afraid that I have nothing very cheerful to pass on to you except the
fact that they are working on it.
J - ~

We share your concern about the defense of the advance bases
and managed to hurry up the delivery of aircraft to the 426th Squadron.
I hope it will soon be in place and giving you some peace of mind.
I have talked to Helen on the telephone a couple of times .
She sent a package which I believe is your Christmas present which we
forwarded on by ATC. I am afraid it will get there a little bit early.
I think Helen underst ands that she can call on me for any information
or any help that I can give her so don't worry about that. I will also
keep you advised of any emergencies that might arise in your family.
Charlie Horn's promotion was approved for submission to the
War Department. I can't at this time give you any indication of what
the chances are of its going through but it is at least on the list.
I am sorry about Howard Engler's being held up but there was nothing we
could do there. In the first place, he had not fully met the time re-
quirements in the job and in the second place he was due to return to
the U.S. I hope that it will meet a better fate in the near future.
A thousand other points occur to me which I would like to
discuss with you a little less formally than in a teleconference but
I will leave them for the next time since this has already developed
into quite a long letter.
You have our 100% support here, Curt. Best of luck to you.
Sincerely,
U.S .A.
I I
, .
rorreat Alan ia le&Ting tor WUhiDC'boD. ao I am coin& to uae lim to pt
1Dtomat1on bulc 1Jo you that ahoul.dD' t go over tile wine. bHD owr
here only ten 4&78 I haft .aot been able 1Jo but I haft .U
hurr1e4 Tialta to all ba botb 1D the Rear aDd Pozii11Ui4 .areu. Ql I
have been able to do ao tar 1a hit 'bM apot8.
I-.. very JIIIJOh 4laappo1n1iild 1il the outfit u a whole. After
lut.Dine; to all the atoriea at home about ever.vo bei.Dc robbecl by the
II Bomber OomnaDd ot all their uperieDOecl man. I upeotect a auper ou...._
tit. tally,. thOy are wry u a ocab&t It a trail *&t
ao. ot 'bhe people are a 11 ttle older &Dd haft JION aeri10e 1rMD 1lbe
Men& outtit. but almoat Without aoeptiOD they laCk experi-
ITel')'ODe 1a workillc like bell on the VODC ID o"-r worda.
are tindinc out how to tight tba - u our tiret ou1ftta 414 tbe
beg1nn1J;te ot the -.r. by tb8 trial U4 error Dilt1abod. I don't th1ik w
oan attord to operate our !-29' m that 11MDBr. We -.cl experieaoe tJICiil
the oaabat outnta. We ahouldn't b8 breaking peop,_. in., ocma'bat 18 B-19'
it' too expenain. I lr:Dow thu aOwida liD 'bhe ...- ol4 1 J.tt
the bea1J outtlt 1.Ji the wor14. it.Dd o- to the worat. I 4ont .._ 11tiat
at all. We all JaiOw that e'ftryoDe oonDIOted wi the &-29 baa p.rtor.M
a -.jor miraole in gettillg it aloug aa tar as it 11. bu1J w are 0Dl7
toolinc ouraelna it w think w have a t1rek1Ua I
aa &oi:oc to tey and pt outfit aeaaoDI4 u aoOD as poal'ble bj JIIID!id
:a1aa10D8 out ot Rear Area. 1b1a will alao glw ua Kdi111cmal iJitOJII&
tion Oil ot varioua siaecl tol"JJ& tiODa.
I tOtUid on m:r atrival that ao small UlOQD1: of achool baa liMn
4oDe in the paat, that no olaaMa wro being held DOll' DOr _.. any otrblr
training being aooompliahed. I am oorreotinc thu at <moe tan1Jtc with
& lead ONW training propoaa and tolloriJJc up with a oomple'be trainSJlll
progna for all peraozmel..
On baaea we baTe the aame old toey they aren t tin1abe4 aDd DeWI"
will be. are loa iDe 1lhe enciDMn to go up into Borth Buraa. !WO ot
the tield.e are par1Jioularly bad illolmioal f'aoilltiea. Bcwr.
tb8 in trouble 1a that the toi"'IVd t1elda ..,.. coillc pi .... Ull.
!tie wather UOWXl Ohe- u go1JIC to tin ua a little troUble. I
bilieft. !M weather people 111tll that ihere 1a a peraanent overoaat
up then tor about 1000 w 2500 teet abo't"e tbii JIOUD4 ito 12 or 15.000
-.t of it wiih ioe. 'Jb&t an ""l'Y 1D tbe CbltD&1Al Area is
a le._ 4GIIIl tibra ioiJit ooDditiou.. Whether w oan opera'be our 11ND8portla
or DO'b ia a pro'blea w auat aol" aDd u tor brix.gimc 100 B-29 tb&t
are out ot 1N"u tbat at I jt hawnt b auner tor
tbit OJ ,. ...
Oil the auppl7 ai cmtr ll\Dlp we aN soillg 116 get jut as
.uOh help troa the !beater U 11be7. ant told to CiW ua aD4 DO n Iicht
now the7. are opera'td.Dc UDder h ot 211 per moatb. ao
tlbe7 timate Whit w will k}il aDd supply tbe r'M" So DO '*r hoW
illioh p.a we haul w oan DBTer ezoeed 225 sorties Uiileaa w O&rz7 all tM
cu and trom the oalouV.. area too. I oollri.uoed 11'111 aot
pt arq tao111tiea rro:n the !bea'ber otber 1lbaD tboae,.. haft rae..
-. tao1li1dAta be1 ill or at Will 'bi
tor 'lbeater baaiz.aa &:nd not B-29' lhat I am tr,r1.Dc ..0 aay a. w
have DO buaineaa opera1lfi1i !-29' out ot: here l9DPr tb&i1 u abao-
luW.ly

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tor General Curt.la I. Lelllq, U. S. J:nsy

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