306 “HISTORICAL, SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES based on natural selection, yielding the survival values” 6826). “If survival is the underlying motive, then men A organize for power"; the demand is for social efficiency and for the subordination of the individual to the social organization ( 683). But if happiness is the basic motive, then “the rights of individuals become basic because satisfactions have theit seat in the bodies of individual men” (p. 684). “Both ideals are rela- tively rigid and dogmatic and unadaptable,” and cach is appro- priate to only 2 particular sort of situation (ibid.). __{An “obvious solution” for this conflict of ideals would be an “didjustable social structure”—what Pepper calls “the intelligent society.” The aim of such a society would be to “maximize happiness, subject to the legislation of human sutvival values over affective values” (p. 685). In any case, however, the basic imperative would be: “Follow the dynamics of values wherever they may lead. For it is only the dynamics of values that can guide 2 man to the natural norms and show him the lines of legislation running through them” (p. 699). BIBLIOGRAPHY. Pepper, Stephen C., “The Bquivocation of Value,” University of California Publications in Philosophy, 1V (1923), pp. 107-132, A Digest of Purposive Values, Berkeley, 1947, + The Sources of Value, Berkeley, 1958, Duncan, Bluer Wl, ‘'Stephen C Pepper. A Bibliography.” jesthetics and Art Criticism, XXVIIL (1970), pp, 287-93, Journal of CHAPTER XUIT EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH [As interest in language analysis generally increased. in philo- sophical circles, it was inevitable that attempts should be made to deal with value problems also linguistically. Everett W. Hall presented the rationale for that approach most effectively in 2 study in the history of ideas published in 1956 under the title Modern Science and Human Values. “Medieval physics,” so Hall pointed out, “was a study of values, of goal behavior on nature’s part” (p. 4). Modern posi- tivists, however, “assume 2 basic distinction between facts and values,” regarding the former to be “genuine constituents of the world, the latter not” (p. 5). They hold that value words do not refer to anything. It is Hall's contention that the positivists are right in “deny- ing that values can be investigated by the method of modern science.” He asserts, however, that “there are values and that, by a different method, they can be known’ (ibid.). In fact, he points out, “there are two ways in which values are closely related to fact”: On the one hand, “‘there are facts about people's beliefs in and actions guided by values”; and, on the other hand, ‘values always bear within themselves 2 kind of reference to possible facts”; they inherently “aim at facts” but are not themselves facts (p. 6). Recognition of this situation has marked “a major revolution in men’s attitudes toward facts and values and the methods of investigating or assaying them” (p. D, I ‘The Medieval Church found in Aristotelian physics a view of the world that agreed well with its Christian theology; for, “being teleological and dominated by value concepts,” Aristote- 307Hate 308 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES lian physics “could easily be made to fit a religious outlook that ascribed the creation of the physical world and its general ‘overseeing to a good God” (p. 19). Moreover, that view “carried the weight of the authority of common sense" (p. 37) In a sense, the break with that Medieval point of view started with the Copernican Revolution. Copernicus’s own conception of the universe was, however, still value-charged (p. 47). And even Kepler was “animated by @ profound faith in the mathe- matical perfection of [the celestial] motions” (p. 62), and was thus valicoriented in his thinking ~But with the Renaissance the picture changed. A new experi- mental attitude replaced the Age of Faith. Leonardo da Vinci and William Gilbert were its first outstanding representatives. It came into its own with Galileo, who combined the experimental attitude with a mathematical interpretation of the facts of observation and thus developed “a whole new approach to nature” (p. 93). The cumulation of this development was New- ton’'s conception of nature asa vast machine. Although Newton's own thinking was still inspired by the faith, common to Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo, that nature is perfect, his conception of nature led in the late seventeenth and carly eighteenth centuries, to a view of the world— exemplified by Deism—that took all purpose and value out of the world and “put them elsewhere” (p. 109). Charles Darwin introduced the new orientation into biology (p. 221), refusing to ascribe design to nature (p. 227). He showed that “such obviously teleological concepts as ‘the pres- ervation of the species’, ‘adaptation to the environment’ and ‘organic function” could be used without a commitment to “any Atistotelian notion of an immanent purpose or a Nature- docs-everything-for-the-best” (p, 231). That is to say, “Darwin challenged the appeal to final causes in the last great citadel of its strengeh—that of life itscif” (p. 236) Einstein's theories of relativity “marked a further break with the commonsensical standpoint so admirably systematized in the Aristotelian physics of the Middle Ages” (p. 254). And modern scientific economics was no longer interested in the Pleasures and pains of the consumer, but only in exchange EVERETT W, HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC AFPROAGH 309 values and their laws-laws that could be “stated in terms of quantities of goods supplied and demanded" (p. 263). ‘And thus, from our twenticth-century point of view, “the iences are value free” (p. 283). : development in the sciences (pp. 276-455). “For the first time a. naturalism has arisen which takes seriously and works ou consistently the difference between the normative and the fac tual,” Its “shocking feature” is that it denies the normative element entirely: “There is no normative aspect of things; normative questions and their normative answers are meaning: tess” (p. 485). Ayer and Carnap represent well this point o view~Ayer holding that moral statements merely express the feelings of the person making them or sere to arouse felings in others; Carnap regarding all of them as disguised commands which are but ‘stimuli to action, like a love-eall or a groan” (p. Phe result of such views is «skepticism which “ress is ease on a profound distinction which the whole movement of mods fem thought has served to establish—that berween fact an value,” and which contends that, since the methods used in establishing facts are not relevant when we are dealing with values, any supposition that there are values in the world is “just nonsense” 9p. 461). Noxstentaists, ov the other hand, deny tha “ere is say Wécpendent standard to which the values we create by our decisions must conform if they arc to be valid” (p. 462). “We ate condemned to the profound and awful freedom of creating uihat is good and evil by our unfounded choiee”(p, 463), “Its only through his free acts, springing from his arbitrary deci sions,” that man forms his own nature. Apart from his free choice he has no nature that could in any sense serve as @ criterion of the appropriateness of his choices (p. 464) ‘As Hall sees it, we find ourselves in a serious predicament. “With the clear distinction of value from fact, we have lost the comfortable assurance that the nature of our universe or of ourselves, if properly grasped, will show us the right goals to seek and rules to obey” (p. 469). What is urgently needed is a310 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES new method of investigation~“a strietly empirical procedure of ascertaining values which nevertheless avoids confusing them with Ei (p. 472), Unless we succeed in developing such a procedure, we will be “forced down the path to complete valu skepticism” (p. 475). f shail u Hall himself saw the possibility of the necessary new ap- proach in language analysis. He dealt with it first in the very dlosely argued study Whar is Value? (1952). In that book, Hall's first aim is to “overthrow decisively” the traditional view that value is some sort of property (p. vii), and then to suggest at Icast an interpretation which makes value, not 2 property, but “something having a status more like that of fact” (p. ix), without yer identifying it with fact Basic to his argument is the assumption that “in some sense there are values” (p. 1); and that there is “at least one value-term which is indefinable”—traditionally referred to as intrinsic value This assumption, however, is meant to involve no commitment to “the position that value is a quality, or that there is a value-quality” (p. 3) Hall’s argument proceeds in the form of answers to specific questions (raised in the chapter headings): “Is value a first-order property?” “Is value a second-order property?” “Is value a property of states of affairs?” The discussions are essentially ital evaluations of the views of G. E, Moore, C.D. Broad A. wing, Ross, Bradley, C. 1. Lewi richard, and oth CEng, ley, C. 1 Lewis, H. A. Prichard, and others What Hall believes he has shown is that “in each of these interpretations the position, if not definitely untenable, is at best highly implausible” (p. 63). Three basic facts, however, stand out: “(1) Value does not seem to be something directly experienceable in its own right, like yellow or before and after. It seems rather a way in which other things can be experienced, Thus it would not seem to be a property. (2) Value includes in its nature but without asserting it a reference to some fact, the fact which, were it to exist, would be good or bad as the case SEE eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH $11 may be. This would be anomalous, to say the least, if value were 2 property. (3) Value in some sense obtains quite independently of the existence of the fact a reference to which is involved in its nature. Thus value cannot be a property of that fact, for if it were it could not obtain in the absence of it” (p. 63). 1 With Chapter V, Hall’s orientation changes. Even the chapter headings reveal this fact: “Is value the referent of a semantical predicate?” “What is the proper syntax of value-sentences?” “What is the significance of linguistic analysis for value~ theory?” Since the discussions in these three chapters are, in effect, introductory to Hall's own position, we must consider them in some detail, The first question Hall states more fully in this way: “Is it more illuminating to treat value as the referent of a semantical predicate similar to ‘designates’ or ‘is true’ than to treat it asa property designated by a zero-level predicate similar to ‘yellow’ or ‘above’?” (p. 66). Using R. B. Perry’s view that value is “any object of any interest" a5 a springboard, Hall argues that it may be possible to define value as the object (or, in the semantical sense, the designatum) of an “interest-sentence” or value-sentence, parallel to a definition of fact as the object of a cognitive or descriptive sentence. At least, Hall holds, we may have a lead here which is worth exploration (p. 74). Further analysis shows, however, that unless some restrictions or requirements are imposed upon value-expressions before any one value-expression can be “al lowed to designate or to be true,” the definition of value as the designatum of an interest-sentence entails serious difficulties (p. 80). For one thing, it leads to “an objectionable type of relativism” which “would make ordinary speech almost wholly ambiguous in its use of ‘good’ and other value terms. For everyday language almost never specifies the interest involved” (pp. 76-77). Would we fare better if we made “fittingness,” “appropriate- ness,” or “suitability” the fundamental value-concept? Hall312 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES discusses this question in connection with A. C. Ewing's con- ception of “fittingness,” but finds that there is here a great deal of ambiguity. Ewing himself comes close to recognizing this; for he speaks sometimes of the rightness of an action as a matter of, “the appropriateness of the act to the situation,” and he speaks at other times of the goodness of an action as “the fittingness of moral admiration towards the act”; and “the fittingness that constitutes goodness may depend upon the different fittingness which constitutes rightness” (p. 82) But even when it is argued that the semantical dimension is “used simply as a device to pick out those particulars or facts between which the relation of fittingness is taken co hold,” an ambiguity remains. Thus, “when it is said that pity is the appropriate emotion towards those who suffer,” it may be ‘meant that the appropriateness holds between the emotion and certain people “picked out as objects of that emotion, when it so happens that those people suffer.” Or it may be meant that appropriateness holds between the emotion (which, in our example, is pity toward those who suffer) and certain people as the objects of that emotion (p. 83). But if the directedness of the emotion is only a device for picking out certain objects, we might as well use a different device, such as a proper name. Surely, however, “the directedness of an attitude toward an object is more integral to the fittingness here under discussion” than is this, What must be meant, in other words, is that “what is appropriate is that an attitude of such and such sort be directed in such and such a direction and conversely.” But this would entail that “only attitudes (emotions, acts) exemplify this sort of yaluc”—not in relation to some object or effect, but “simply internally, as a feature of their own structure.” It would then be “impossible to assert meaningfully that [such and such] an attitude ought to occur” (p. 84). The “ought” would have no relation to any fact or objective situation. But it is the object toward which an attitude is taken that determines the fittingness or unfittingness of the attitude; just as it is the objective which determines whether a cognitive judgment is true or false. And if this is so, then “* ‘good’ may be defined as, ‘object of a fitting pro attitude’ in a fashion analogous to the EVERETT W, HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 313 definition of ‘fact’ as ‘object of a true, affirmative, descriptive proposition’, and similarly that ‘bad’ may be defined as ‘object of a fitting anti attitude’ in a fashion similar to a definition of ‘nomfact’ as ‘object of a true, negative, descriptive proposi- tion’ ” (p. 91) However, as Hall demonstrates in his critical analysis of Brentano’s position (pp. 94-109), this interpretation “raises many scrious issues”; and everyday usage demands, further~ more, “that we treat value-sentences as being directly about the extralinguistic world as are existential or descriptive sentences” (p. 109). And when we accept this fact, then “we can set up legitimacy-conditions strictly analogous to truth-conditions. Similar to ‘ ‘There is A’ if and only if there is A’ there would be ta is good’ is legitimate if and only if A is good’ " (p. 112). The problem is “to have value in the world, not merely in our Ianguage,” and “to have it there in some other role than that of a property.” That is to say, ‘value is to be somehow coordinate with fact, and thus to have a status similar to fact” (p. 113), Vv ‘The problem as stated leads Hall to ask, “What is the proper syntax of value-sentences?” ee ‘A first answer to this question was suggested by Carnap: “All valuative sentences are simply disguised imperatives.” For Car- nap this meant that they are not really sentences at all and should therefore be ignored by philosophers (p. 114). Hall suggests the alternative (which was not discussed by Carnap) that imperatives are statements having “a distinctive syntax (formation and transformation cules, in Carnap’s termi- ology) marking them off from declarative sentences.” This ‘means, not that imperatives are meaningless, but that, for them, the criterion of meaning is different from that of declaratives Since “one of the most developed systems of imperatives is to be found in the language of the law” (p. 115), Hall now turns to an analysis of Hans Kelsen’s theory of law; or it was Kelsen who recognized and insisted upon the fact that “we have in legal norms a syntactically different sort of sentence from any314 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES scientific law": “A descriptive fic., a scientific] law says, If A is, B is; a legal law says, If Ais, B ought to be” (ibid.). Valuative sentences or norms (as Kelsen calls them) thus differ from descriptive sentences in their conditions of validation or verifi- cation. In the case of descriptive sentences, verification ulti- mately turns on observation of fact. “Norms, however, are validated by higher norms, ultimately by a highest, the basic norm” (p. 116). More specifically, “in static systems of norms (morality), the validation is through the content of the norms. The relationship, “pparently is simply that of subsumption. The lower norm falls under or is included in the higher. Thus ‘You ought not to lie’ is validated by ‘No one ought to lie’. In dynamic systems of norms (legal law) the validation is by means of authorization. The higher norm delegates norm-creating power to some authority. ‘The lower norm is validated by the fact that it was created, in the prescribed manner, by the authority set up by the higher norm. Thus, ‘No one ought to drive more than thirty-five miles per hour on this designated stretch of highway’ is validated by reference to the way it was created, to the delegation of authority to the individual or individuals issuing it.” It is evi dent from these facts that “2 dynamic or legal system of norms is a system of [“emasculated and depsychologized”| impera- tives” bid.) In the legal system “a law that is not valid may be either invalid (as involving a command that in content oversteps the limits set down by some higher law in the system) or it may be non-valid (as being issued by some individual without legal authority in the system)"; and here, Hall maintains, “we have a lead that may prove valuable in exploring the differences of imperatives from declaratives” (p. 119). Now the question is how to express imperatives properly for the purpose of logical analysis. If Kelsen’s interpretation is accepted, then “a legal norm is not properly expressed by a simple imperative, ‘p!’, but only by a hypothetical one, ‘If @ issues ‘pl’ then p!'," where “ ‘a issues ‘pl’ ’ gives a fuctual condition (in the system of positive law involved) under which “pl” obtains. The validity of ‘p!” is not the truth of ‘a issues ‘p!” EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACIL 515, but is contingent upon it” (p. 123). However, the whole hypo- thetical statement—ice,, “If a issues ‘p!”, then p!””—is clearly an imperative, “It has the force . . . of its consequent, save that it makes this contingent on a fact”—the fact, namely, that a issues ‘pl” (p. 124). But this obviously means that the legal norm is not the basic type of an imperative, ‘That basic type, Hall holds, does not mention the linguistic expression ‘p!” at all. He calls ita thing-imperative, And to every thing imperative—such as ‘Donald, wear your rubbers!’—there is a corresponding declarative—such as ‘Donald is wearing his rubbers’. But since to every affirmative declarative there is also 1 possible negative declarative~such as ‘Donald is not wearing his rubbers’—there must also be a corresponding imperative “whose what is the negative of the what of the former”—thus, ‘Donald, don't wear your rubbers’ (p. 125). We must note, however, that there is still another way in which the first imperative may be negated—thus, ‘Donald, you don’t have to wear your rubbers!’. That is to say, “any declara- tive that corresponds to an imperative should be taken as really corresponding to a pair of imperatives, each having the same what, but one affirmatively commanding it the other nega- tively” (p. 126). Or, to put it in terms of the imperatives: thing-imperatives have two sorts of negatives: ““An imperative may negate another in what it is that is commanded or in the quality of the command itself” (ibid). And this fact clearly shows that a logic of imperatives must be different from any logic proper to declaratives (p. 130). ‘After an examination of various suggestions for a logic of imperatives and finding 0 solution of the problems involved (pp. 131-151), Hall himself proposes (without following up his proposal) that “there be carried out 2 functional analysis of imperatives whereby these will contain the same names as declaratives but have a structure different from, and yet analo- gous to, theirs” (p. 151). With the achievement of such a “combined logic of declaratives and imperatives” a syntactical clarification of everyday language revelatory of the status of value in its relation to fact might then be possible (p. 153). However, Hall realizes that there are still two serious defi-316 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES icncies in such a program. One is that imperatives are too specific and too restricted to serve as representative of all valuesentences, The other is a defect in the interpretation of imperatives themselves; for as here interpreted, what is com- manded in an imperative is the very fact which the corre sponding declarative already asserts. Hall, therefore, finds him- self ‘“in the unpleasant position of having to face the possibility that in no clarified language can something vital to the status of value be said or even shown” (p. 154), v A further question arises: “Are value-sentences properly ren- dered as normnatives?” By normatives Hall here means “sen- tences which state that some fact ought to be (or ought to have been)” (p. 155). It seems obvious thet “not all normatives can be treated as lisguised imperatives”; for, surely, “there is properly no impera- tive in the past tense, but there are normatives in this tense” (p. 156). Also, “most imperatives are in the second person.” One does not usually command oneself. Normative sentences, how- ever, “occur quite indifferently in all persons” and “no harm to their intention would be done if they were all translated into the appropriate third person” (p. 157) But if normatives cannot be interpreted as imperatives, is it perhaps possible to treat imperatives as a subset of normatives? And Hall indeed proposes that “imperatives be treated as a complicated sort of normative” (p. 161). Such an interpreta: tion, he believes, means an advance in our understanding of values, for “the generic structure of a normative is more obvi ously analogous than is that of an imperative to the generic structure of a declarative’': “‘Exemplifies’ and ‘ought to exem- plify’ in such sentences as ‘John exemplifies-tact’ and ‘John ought to exemplify tact’ indicate prima facie very analogous sentence-structure” (ibid.). But are there not perhaps value-sentences which are not even normative in form but are obviously declarative? The following is an example of what Hall has in mind: ‘John may not be EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 317, intelligent but he certainly is good’. “This kind of sentence may be roughly characterized as one in which a value-term occurs as predicate.” Hall calls them “value-predicating sentences.” “They are not normative in form’ (p. 162). Analysis then shows that “normative sentenecs cannot be reduced to value-predicating and causal sentences because some of them at least say something that no set composed wholly of sentences of the latter sorts can say. They say that some- thing...is obligatory.” ‘They assert 2 “value-rcquiredness”” which is “not asserted in the ordinary value-predicative sen- tence” (p. 171). That is to say, “in the declarative the predicate designates a property asserted to be exemplified by that which is named by the subject. In the normative the predicate desig- nates a property which it is asserted ought to be exemplified by thar which is named by the subject” (p. 174). It follows from this difference in the two sorts of sentences that normatives cannot properly be rendered as value-predica- tive sentences. But Hall now tries ‘to make plausible the posi- tion that value-predicative sentences can properly be rendered as normatives”; that they are “incomplete normatives” (p. 177) What this means is that value-predicative sentences in ordinary speech are to be taken as asserting “either that some particular or particulars ought to exemplify some unspecified property or that some property ought to be exemplified by some unspec~ ified particular or particulars or perhaps by all particulars” (p. 180). Thus, ‘2 is aesthetically good’ is to be “treated as an incomplete and disguised form of the normative, ‘There is a property X such that it were aesthetically good (or fitting) that a exemplify X° (together perhaps with ‘and a does exemplify XY” (pp. 1838), A further question now is, “Can all legitimate value-sentences be derived from one or a few having the character of standards of value (plus certain declarative premises)?,” a standard of value, as here intended, being a generalized value-sentence, An instance of a standard of value would thus be the sentence “Everything whose occurrence is regularly related, by 2 law, with subsequent occurrence of pleasure is good” (p. 186). In normative form this would mean: “For any X, if any exemplifi-318 HISTORICAT, SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES cation of X is related by a law to a subsequent exemplification of pleasure, then it were good that X be exemplified” (pp. 1861). It is clear, however, that even if all genuine valve-sentences could be reduced to normatives, it would still be true that normatives differ syntactically from declaratives. As Hall pro- ceeds to show, “for every contradictory pair of descriptive declaratives there is a set of four normatives having the same content, two being normatively affirmative, two normatively negative” (p. 188). And if a normative sentence can be negated in two different and mutually irreducible ways, it can also be legitimate in two different and mutually irreducible ways. It follows that “the same sentence cannot be both true and legitimare (or more generally, cannot have both a truti-value and a legitimacy-valuc)” (p. 190)-which is another way of saying that while descriptive sentences are two-valued, norma- tive sentences are three-valued. Between the positive and the negative values there is always a point of indifference. vI Underlying Hall’s discussion throughout has been the assump- tion that “‘an analysis of our valuational language can furnish reliable insights into or at least clues 2s to the status of value in the world.’” But if this assumption is challenged, Hall confesses, “there is not much fhe] can do by way of a justification” (p. 191). Moreover, underlying Hall’s discussions also is the assumption that “all that is significantly sayable in everyday language is to be sayable in an ideal language” (p. 197). The ultimate test, however, is “not the ideal language but everyday language” (p. 196). In other words: “Everyday language furnishes the talk about the world. The ideal language purifies this of misleading grammatical analogies. In doing so, however, it finds itself confined to empirical statements; it cannot formulate philo- sophical questions or answers. Everyday language then returns and, with its improper forms, speaks of the categorial aspects of the world by means of talking about the forms of the ideal Bic | EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 319 language” (p. 202). And now we must recognize the fact that “the ideal languages so far proposed have not contained value- sentences” (p. 221), Yet, there is value in the world (p, 225); and value is “that which makes a legitimate value-sentence legitimate” (p. 226). The preceding analyses, however, have shown that we cannot formulate in an ideal language an answer to the question, What is value? The relation a value bears to its corresponding fact cannot be stated in an ideal language; it can only be experienced (p. 246). Is our everyday language more sensitive to the problem of value experience? In Our Knowledge of Fact and Value (1961) Hall puts this question to a test, vir Hall's starting-point is now what he himself calls “common- sense realism” (p. 3). It is the assumption that “there are categories to which we are all more or less committed and that, these are discernible in everyday speech”; that every language is intentional in the sense of pointing to matters that arc extra-lin- guistic; and “it uses both descriptive and evaluative devices in speaking about them (pp. 9f). Although all our knowledge is based upon particular experiences, it transcends these experi- ences by generalizing them, i.e., by formulating “laws in s ence, moral rules in normative ethics, and critical canons in art” (p. 11). And Hall’s task now is “to make an empirical analysis of our knowledge of fact and value, but one that, by contrast with British empiricism, will remain true to the intentionalism of everyday thought and language” (p. 23). ‘As to Hall’s interpretation of our knowledge of fact, we shall be brief here: Suffice it to say that, as he sees it, the final basis of that knowledge is “our natural language of sensory percep- tion” (p. 30)—of perceptions, that is, which we experience as “properties of things or events” (p. 34). The major defect of our perceptions is that “they contain no mechanisms of generalization.” “It is in furnishing these that conventional language makes its greatest contribution to our Knowledge of fact” (p. 45). And “ordinary language is as intentional about matters of value as it is about matrers of aoe ccctccececeneeeerrey520 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES fact.” The emotivists are wrong when they make a sharp distinc tion between emotive and cognitive verbs, for, “if we trust ordinary speech, emotions are as assertive as any experience and as objectively oriented” (p. 119). “The whole division between, emotive and cognitive terms has been foisted onto everyday language by outsiders trying to save what they can of a philo- sophical commitment” (pp. 1191). In actual usage, “cognitive and emotive verbs and adjectives in English shade into one another so subtly and pervasively that it appears clearly improp- cer to set up separate classes of terms descriptive of experience based on this distinction” (p. 123). Experience is throughout both emotional and intentional. “To occur at all, ... a cogni- tion, whether perceptual ot ratiocinative, must be infused with fecling of some kind and in some degree, To have the character- istic pattern of an emotion, a fecling needs to be directed, to have an object” (ibid.). Correspondingly, we encounter in everyday language sen- tences in good grammatical form which are “unquestionably emotional but not descriptive of emotions,” Thus, there are (1) declarative sentences. whose emotional expressiveness stems largely from the fact that they are uttered at all: “"There’s a hair in the soup you served us.”—There are (2) admittedly declara- tive sentences which may well be classified as non-descriptive: “He is a lovable old rascal.”—There are (3) declarative but probably nondescriptive emotional sentences: “he is 2 god- damned liar." ~There are (4) many emotionally expressive sen- tences that are not declarative in form: “May God bless you.”” Some of these sentences may have the form af commands: “Go jump in the lake.”—And there are (5) emotional expressions which, though linguistic, are not sentences in the grammatical sense at all: “Hell!” (pp. 133-34), “AIL of these utterances precisely in their emotional expres- siveness have objects, namely, the very objects of the feelings they express” (p. 135). They say something about their objects, (p. 136). However, while “sentences of any grammatical form can function as expressions of feelings, .. . only declarative sen- tences can properly translate perceptions” (p. 138). There is CO EVERETT W. HALJ. AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 521 thus a functional difference between emotional and purely descriptive statements. vul ‘The emotions which find expression in the various forms of sentences are themselves intentional in character; and the sen- tences. expressing them “make a kind of claim”; they say something, As Hall sees it, “this something is a value sort of thing,” It is upon emotions, therefore, that Hall intends to base hig understanding of values~just as he uses perceptions as the foundation of our knowledge of facts (p. 141). But whereas in the case of an analysis of facts he speaks (as we all do) of the truth or falsity of the statements pertaining to facts, in the case of an analysis of value statements he now speaks of their being legitimate or illegitimate Perceptions, Hall had argued, are actually a “natural lan guage.” He now proposes to treat emotions also as ‘sentences in the natural language of our immediate experience” ¢p. 150). “All emotions are directed toward facts without, so far as they are evaluative of them, declaring them” (p. 151. Italics in the original.). That is to say, emotions have an evaluative function ‘They favor or disfavor something. And expressions of emotions “translate into conventional speech the flavor of the emotions as directed towards the fact which [the factual content of the expressions} does or could declare” (ibid. : It is true, of course, that our “favoring and disfavoring evaluations of actual or possible facts are taken to be more personal (and thus more suspect) than our perceptual affirma- tions of fact” (p. 155). But this does not affect their objective references as such : ‘The term “emotion” is here used in a broad sense, including all volitions: "States of will, resolve, decision, purpose”—all of which have “the same general pattern” as the emotions (P. Against this background of preliminary considerations Hall next discusses emotions as evaluations.SEE eC ee eee ae 322 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES 1x Bis first step is to show that “value judgments are perhaps most clearly formulated in two varieties”: ‘‘value-predicative”” and “normative”~a distinction which he had first made in What is Value? And in conformity with that carlier interpretation he again maintains that “the normative sentence reveals more ex- plicitly and less misleadingly what is involved in our ordinary value-claims than does the value-predicative” (p. 166). Although value-predicates seem to include a reference to fact, they always come paired—good-bad, right-wrong, virtue-vice— whereas descriptive predicates do not, and the law of the excluded middle does not hold for value-predication as it does for factual descriptions (p. 167). Valuc-predicative sentences, however, do not allow us to say “just the value-thing, without any tacit factual affirmation or denial” (p. 169). Normatives, on the other hand, make this possible. They show how in daily life we do assert the value of some fact without asserting the fact. ‘The difference is readily seen when we compare any value-predi- cative sentence—say, ‘Muriel is honest’—with 2 corresponding normative—Muriel ought to be honest’ (whether she is or not). But whatever its form, evaluative speech requires that there be something in our experience which, as fact of experience, is not reducible to convention; and this something, Hall points out, is our emotions. It is they which, as elements in direct experience, “make the basic value-claim.”” Emotions may be for or against an object. “Love, delight, hope, pleasure, joy are in favor of their objects. Hate, anger, ust, fear, regret, sorrow, displeasure are opposed to theirs” (p. 173). It is this favorable or unfavorable attitude towards objects that constitutes the evaluative dimension of the emo- tions; and “evaluative sentences in conventional language re- ceive whatever probability they have from their truthfulness to emotions” (p. 174). However, “the mere fact that our immedi- ate [emotional] experience makes value-claims is not by itself sufficient to justify those claims” (p. 177). We can always ask, Is the occurrence of a certain emotion proper under the given circumstances? Ought it to have occurred? And “this is basically EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 323 4 normative or value-question in its own right.” It differs from a question of the validity or correctness of an emotion with respect to its object—which is a question about the evaluation of the object. “Is the object hateful or lovable as the emotion takes it to be; is it worthy of being an object of the emotion in question?” The value that is here our concern is not that of the emotion as such but of “the object towards which one fecls the emotion” (p. 178). What Hall is thus interested in are the emotions “as forms of evaluation,” their “legitimacy” (i.c., the correctness of their evaluation) and their “justification” (.e., the evidence for their legitimacy) (p. 179); and he hopes to develop “a theory of legitimacy analogous to our correspondence theory of truth” {p. 183). However, “for legitimacy we do not have a tradition in logic which we can follow” (pp. 185; 188); and if we had one, it could give us only degrees of probability. “We have no certainty concerning the legitimacy of any value-claim” (p, 189). x Since feelings evaluate (actual or possible) facts, it is essential for the legitimacy of any value-claim that we be “clear about the facts evaluated, about the objects of the feclings,” for “our emotions may be literally mistaken about their objects” (p. 191). Also, we must distinguish between disagreement about the facts and difference in the evaluation of them, When our feelings for value disagree, some may be more teliable than others, and a coherent value pattern may enable us to put individual value judgments to the test. The situation is this: “Each actually occurring emotion [has] a small but positive inherent probability of being legitimate. ‘This is increased or decreased as we find that it does or does not fit into certain patterns of coherence with other feelings about the same object . . . in some respect” (pp. 193; 197). When we examine the actual coherence patterns that control our everyday thinking, we discover various principles which determine the reliability of a value experience, Hall specifically mentions six.a 324 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES 1. “The principle of quantitative corroboration: the larger the number of feelings evaluatively agreeing with a given one, the greater the probable legitimacy of that one” (p. 197) 2. “There is corroboration through variety in non-evaluative constituents of emotions: agreeing emotions add more to one another's probability if their perceptual constituents other than in the respect evaluated show greater variety.” This includes “agreement between different people as contrasted with the agreement in emotional responses of the same person on differ- ent occasions” (p. 198). 3. “There is the principle of maximum perceptual discrim- ination in the respect evaluated.” That is to say, “of two disagreeing evaluations, that one is most probably legitimate which embraces the greatest perceptual discrimination of prop- erties in the respect evaluated” (p. 199). 4. “There is the criterion of emotional sensitivity.” “Roughly stated, of two disagreeing valuations, that one is more trustworthy which is experienced by the person who ordinarily is more sensitive emotionally or which occurs under conditions which are commonly associated with greater sensitivity” (p. 200). 5. “There is the relevance of the emotion to the respect being evaluated. 1t may be entirely irrelevant, in which case it has no justificatory weight. But it may have a partial relevance less than that, for example, of some other emotion” (p. 201). ‘This may well be the case when we deal with objects of aesthetic appreciation and of moral judgment, for such objects are “very complicated entities, and our feelings about them differ in being directed to partially different aspects of them... The qualitative wealth of our feelings about osten- sibly the same thing (thus] has some epistemic significance” (p. 202). 6. And there is “the postulate of regularity.” Although we must here avoid rigorism in application, “we can take those evaluations to be more reliable which fit with more value-laws as determined by other appraisals of similar objects in the respect or respects involved” (p. 202). In the application of the six principles conflicts may occur; eo eee ae EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 325 and there is no general principle for eliminating the conflicts by ranking the principles. “As with the parallel clashes of criteria of perceptual reliability, we must finally either suspend judg ment or determine the matter by decision” (pp. 202f). If this sounds “weak and vague’’—well, itis; “but it is the predicament wwe are actually in” (p. 203), XI Hall's approach to and his discussion of value problems provide an excellent background for the symposium on value published in 1957 under the title The Language of Value. The editor, Ray Lepley, whose own value-theoretical position has already been presented (Chapter XI), and whose carlier Value ‘A Cooperative Inquiry contained a number of suggestive essays, now formulated the issues as follows: 1. “What different functions are performed by signs?” 2. “If there is justification for distinguishing valuative signs, sentences, problem solvings, or judgments (valuations, evalua- tions), on the one hand, from factual signs, sentences, or judg- ments (cognitions, descriptions), on the other hand, are the modes of sign responses (possibly the interpretants) different in the valuative as compared with those in the factual?” 3. “Are emotive elements always present in valuative terms, sentences, judgments, but not in factual terms, sentences, or judgments?” 4. “Under what, if any, conditions is it possible to use ‘factual’ and ‘valuative’ signs or sentences inzerchangeably or to translate the one into the other?” (p. 4) Each contributor to the symposium was “urged to address himself to the linguistic (‘semantic’) issue or issues which he felt to be particularly important for value theory at the present time.” Lepley must confess, however, that few of the essays presented in the symposium discuss directly the questions as, formulated above. “Some of the Essays are devoted mainly co description and analysis of instances in which valuings and valuations occur, with particular attention to the language or sign phenomena involved. Others consider more general prob-326 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES Jems as to the nature and functions of the signs which occur in value situations, the bases of the distinction between factual and valuative terms and sentences, and the place of emotive, cognitive, and other elements within total human adjustments or problem-solving courses. A few seck .. . to discover how the language of value theory differs from other types of language +++ 0F to determine systematically the type of logical relations of of normative justifications involved in various kinds of value sentences or situations” (p. 5). But not one of the contributors referred to Hall's work; and Lepley himself does so only twice in passing, both times in a footnote mentioning What is Value? without comment or specific reference. In general it is fair to say that to anyone familiar with the immense amount of work that has been done in the field of value theory over the last eighty or ninety years, the essays of this symposium are signally uninspired and unilluminating ‘There are, of course, two or three exceptions. Robert S. Hart- man's essay, “Value Propositions,” is one of them. Hartman at least introduces a new point of view. But since an entire chapter (Chapter XIV) will be devoted to Hartman's theory, no com- ment is required at this time. Stephen C. Pepper's thesis—stated in his essay “Evaluation and Discourse”—that “‘the facts them- selves will furnish the norms for responsible evaluations” (p. 88) and that “the appeal to usage as a final criterion... is either inadequate or arbitrary” (p. 85), also deserves to be noted but reflects only his general theory of the sources of value as presented in Chapter XII In his essay, “Empirical Verifiability Theory of Factual Meaning and Axiological Truth” (pp. 94-105), E. Maynard Adams discusses the new emphasis on the role of reason in value decisions. It is a topic worth closer examination, Logical empiricists, emphasizing the emotive aspects of value sentences, claim that such sentences are cognitively meaningless and therefore without truth-value. Value statements, they hold, are “merely expressions of feelings or sentiments of the speaker or evocative of similar feelings or attitudes in the hearer or reader.” But this new emphasis indicates “a shift from the analysis of value language to a consideration of practical deci- EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH $27 sions” (p. 94). “The shift is from rationality in the form of warranted assertability of a statement to rationality in the form of warranted practical decision” (p. 95)~a shift which clearly reflects the influence of a pragmatism upon value problems. ‘Adams finds, however, that even this new version of logical ‘empiricism assumes that there is and can be only factual (or tific) knowledge about the object world, and that all em- pirically verifiable statements are scientific. The result of this assumption is that value sentences are still excluded from “the domain of truth-values.” ‘The argument in defense of this position Adams summarizes as follows “1, The cognitive meaning of a sentence in statement form consists of a conceptual representation of its truth conditions, which constitutes a proposition, 2. Only propositions may significantly function directly as subjects of truth-value predicates. 3. All propositions are either analytic or synthetic. 4. Analytic propositions are the only proper subjects of formal truth-value predicates. 5. Synthetic propositions are the only proper subjects of factual truth-value predicates. 6. All synthetic propositions are empirically verifiable since they are conceptual representations of experi- enciable conditions which obtain if they are true and which do not obtain if they are false. 7. Allempirically verifiable statements are scientific. 8. From Theses 6 and 7 it follows that all synthetic propositions are scientific. 9. From Theses 5 and 8 it follows that only scientific propositions are proper subjects of factual truth-value predicates and thus the monistic theory that all factual ‘ruth is scientific. 10. All scientific sentences in statement form are descrip- tive 11, Value sentences in statement form are not descriptive. 12. From Theses 10 and 11 it follows that value sentences in statement form are not scientific statements.328 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES 13. From Theses 9 and 12 it follows that there is no factual axiological truth” (pp. 96~7). Adams accepts Theses 1 through 6, and rejects Theses 9 and 13. Since Thesis 9 follows from Theses 5 and 8, and since Thesis 8 follows from Theses 6 and 7, the crux of the argument for Adams is Thesis 7—the Thesis that “all empirically verifiable statements are scientific. ‘Adams agrees with logical empiricism in holding that “all meaningful factual sentences in statement form are necessarily empirically verifiable.” But, he maintains, “this does not estab- lish empirical verifiability as a sufficient condition for a state- ment’s being scientific.” It leaves open “‘the possibility of there being nonscientific statements which are empirically verifiable” (p. 98). ‘Since the ultigate goal of scientific inquiry is an answer to the question why something is as ic is and not otherwise, the cognitive goal of science is not simply to obtain empirically verified factual staremients, but empirically verified descriptive- explanatory statements. Since no single statement in isolation can be explanatory, explanation involves a relation between or among statements, That is to say, ‘“descriptive-explanatory knowledge consists of empirically verified descriptive state- ‘ments arranged in a logical order such that some, descriptive of certain states of affairs, are explanatory of others which are descriptive of other states of affairs” (pp. 989). But in the light of these facts, Thesis 7— ‘Scientific’ scare- ment means an empirically verifiable statement”-must be mod ified to read: “ ‘Scientific’ statement means an empirically verifiable statement formulated out of concepts from the de- scriptive-explanatory conceptual scheme and used in the de- scriptive-explatory context” (p. 100). This means, however, the rejection of Thesis 7 as analytically true and thus leaves open the possibility of its being false. And since no one has shown Thesis 7 to be factually true, it must be regarded as not established. But if Thesis 7 has not been established, then neither has 8, EVERETT W. HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 329) which depends upon it, nor 9, which depends upon 8. But “if ‘Thesis 9 has not been cstablished, Thesis 13, the thesis that there is no factual axiological truth, remains unestablished, since Thesis 9 is a premise of Thesis 13” (ibid.). ‘Adams continues his argument by accepting Thesis 12—the thesis that “value sentences in statement form are not scientific statements”—and he maintains that ‘value sentences of the type ‘X is good’ or ‘X is right’ are descriptive, but not descriptive- explanatory.” They are thus both “descriptive and nonscientif- ic” (p. 101), However, just as problems of his environment force man into making descriptive-explanatory inquiry, so his attempts to make “reflective intrapersonal and interpersonal adjustments among conflicting interests” force upon him a “search for descriptive- justificatory knowledge”—an inquiry that is “just as much a bona fide type of cognitive inquiry as is the descriptive-cxplan- atory.” “Reflective living requires justifications of acts” (ibid.).. “All justifications are of acts of persons or social institutions and they are all of the means-end type” (p. 103). Thus, an act is economically justified if itis showa to contribute as much ‘or more to the satisfaction of economic interests” than any of its alternatives, But what would it mean to say that an act is ethically justified? To be sure, there are several ethical inter- estssuch as honesty, truthfulness, benevolence, justice~but, Adams points out, “there is one ethical interest that is domi- nant over all others and may be referred to as the ethical interest, namely, good will, an interest which has for its object ‘the maximum net satisfaction of all relevant interests in any given situation” (ibid.). ‘That this goal ought to be achieved is, in Adams’ view, ‘‘an analytic statement and thus true by virtue of its meaning alone” (p. 104). Adams’ conclusion: “Axiological knowledge, empirically veri- fied (or confirmed) statements formulated out of concepts from the axiological conveptual scheme, is no more of a mystery nor mystical than scientific knowledge. Both are completely com- patible with each other and with the empirical verifiability theory of factual meaning. Both are twin products, as well as330 HISTORICAL SPECTRUM OF VALUE THEORIES necessities, of reflective living” (p. 105). Their difference lies in the fact that one is justificatory and the other explanatory; it does not lie in the descriptive dimension (p. 295). x In a chapter devoted to the linguistic approach to value problems one must refer, finally, to Karl Aschenbrenner’s pre- sentation “for explicit view" of the vast number of appraisive terms in the English language: “The vocabulary by means of “which we say we commend, judge, appraise, or evaluate subjects, and object matters in our experience” (The Concepts of Value, vii). In Part 1 (pp. 35-122), Aschenbrenner surveys the entire range of the acts of valuation for which common language supplies specific designations, In Part I (pp. 123-339), he presents all the terms cmployed in the appraisal of man, He arranges them under such subheadings as “Intellectual Charac terization,” “Behavioral Characterization,” “Dialectic Charac- terization” (including “emotive tone” and temperament), “Sex-Related Characterization,” “Social Characterization,” “Economic Characterization,” etc, Part III (pp. 343-388) con- tains the complete vocabulary of “ultimate” and “general” appraisals~“‘the vocabulary good-excellent-valuable (and their negations).” An Index of the entire appraisive vocabulary (pp. 425-458) ranges from “abandon” to zest.” It is Aschenbrenner’s contention, and he is right about this, that “there are no appraisings until we have found words for them” (p, 388). But if his collection of terms truly reflects the whole spectrum of actual and/or possible appraisings, then the varieties and shadings of our appraisive acts are certainly poten- tially infinite, And such is in all probability the case. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aschenbrenner, Karl, The Concepts of Value: Foundations of Value The- ory, (Foundations of Language Supplementary Series, Vol. 12), Dordrecht-Holland, 1971, Hall, Everert W., What is Value?, New York, 1952, EVERETY W, HALL AND THE LINGUISTIC APPROACH 331 ———, Modern Science and Human Values, Princeton, 1956. | Our Knowledge of Fact and Value, Chapel Hill, 1961, ‘There ‘aze ten essays on Hall's philosophy in a special issue of The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1966. Papers by John P, Dreher, Henry D. Aiken, and E./M, Adams are especially relevant, Lepley, Rey, editor, The Language of Value, New York, 1957.