Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
- One that holds itself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods
for hire as a public employment and not as a casual occupation. (De Guzman
vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-47822, December 22, 1988)
Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services
to the general public, that is the general community or population, and
one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population.
The Civil Code does not provide that the transportation should be by
motor vehicle.
Undertakes to carry for all people indifferently and thus is liable for
refusal without sufficient reason (Lastimoso vs. Doliente, 3 SCRA ,
[1961]);
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 1
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
The transportation must be for hire. (First Philippine Industrial Corp. v.
CA, 300 SCRA 661, [1998)
On June 15, 1994, petitioner filed with the RTC of Batangas City a
complaint for tax refund with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents City of Batangas and Adoracion Arellano in her capacity as City
Treasurer. In its complaint, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that: (1) the imposition
and collection of the business tax on its gross receipts violates Sec. 133 of
the Local Government Code; (2) the authority of cities to impose and collect
a tax on the gross receipts of “contractors and independent contractors”
under Sec. 141(e) and 151 does not include the authority to collect such
taxes on transportation contractors for, as defined under Sec. 131(h), the term
“contractors” excludes transportation contactors; and (3) the City Treasurer
illegally and erroneously imposed and collected the said tax, thus meriting the
immediate refund of the tax paid.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 2
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
D. Cases:
1. DE GUZMAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS (168 SCRA 612)
Facts: Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles
and scrap materials in Pangasinan and brought these to Manila for resale. He
used two 6-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, he would load
his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to
Pangasinan. For that service, he charged freight lower than regular rates.
General Milk Co. contacted with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of milk. On
the way to Pangasinan, one of the trucks was hijacked by armed men who
took with them the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver and his
helper. Only 150 cartons of milk were delivered. The Milk Co. sued to claim
the value of the lost merchandise based on an alleged contract of carriage.
Cendena denied that he was a common carrier and contended that he could
not be liable for the loss it was due to force majeure. The trial court ruled that
he was a common carrier. The CA reversed.
Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, (4) of her holds were
presumably inspected by the charterer’s representative and found fit to take a
load of urea in bulk. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 3
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were
closed with heavy iron lids. Upon arrival of vessel at port, the petitioner
unloaded the cargo pursuant to the terms and conditions of the charter-party.
The hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge.
Issue: Whether or not the charter-party contract between the ship owner and
the charterer transforms a common carrier into a private carrier?
Held: A charter party may either her be time charter wherein the vessel is
leased to the charterer, wherein the ship is leased to the charterer for a fixed
period of time or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single
voyage. In both cases, the charter party provides for the hire of the vessel
only, either for a determinate time or for a single or consecutive voyage.
SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its
insurance contract. Respondent on the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC,
brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On December 20, 1995,
the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the
shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common
carrier but a private carrier, has no merit.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 4
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that
Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman
v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)
4. FABRE VS. CA (259 SCRA 426 G.R. NO. 111127, JULY 26, 1996)
Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda
minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for
school children which they operated in Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.
Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were
also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that
they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC of Makati
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 5
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
5. TATAD VS. GARCIA (241 SCRA 334, GR. NO. 114222. APRIL 6, 1995)
Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along Edsa.
EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation was awarded the contract
to build, lease and transfer the said light railway.
The said award was questioned by the petitioners on the basis that a
foreign corporation cannot own the EDSA LRT III, a public utility as it violates
the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public
utility constitute a public utility?
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, rail
stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise
is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not
themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility in not
their ownership but their use to serve the public.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 6
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Facts: The complained alleges that plaintiff is a stockholder in Yangco
Steamship
Issue: Whether the refusal of the owner and officer of a steam vessel, to
accept for carriage dynamite, powder or other explosives for carriage can be
held to be a lawful act?
Held: The traffic in dynamite gun powder and other explosive is vitally
essential to the material and general welfare of the inhabitants of this islands
and it these products are to continue in general use throughout the
Philippines they must be transported from water to port to port in various
island which make up the Archipelago.
In its answer, Loadstar denied any liability for the loss of the shipper’s
goods and claimed that the sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure.
The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of MIC., prompting loadstar to
elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals, which however, agreed with the
trial court and affirmed its decision in toto. On appeal, loadstar maintained
that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a Certificate of
Public Convenience, it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed
route, and there was only “one shipper, one consignee for a special crago”.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 7
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: Loadstar is a common carrier.
On June 15, 1994, petitioner filed with the RTC of Batangas City a
complaint for tax refund with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents City of Batangas and Adoracion Arellano in her capacity as City
Treasurer.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 8
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Facts: The Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America shipped jute bags
of Peruvian fishmeal through SS Crowborough, consigned to San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. The cargo, which was insured by Home Insurance Company,
arrived at the port of Manila and was discharged to the lighters of the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation. When the same was delivered to the consignee,
there were shortages amounting to P 12, 033.85, prompting the latter to pay
against Luzon Stevedoring Co.
Because the others denied liability, Home Insurance paid San Miguel
the insurance value loss. This cost was brought by the former to recover
indemnity from Luzon Stevedoring and the ship owner. Luzon Stevedoring
raised the defense that it deliver with due diligence in the same from the
carrier. Mexican Steamship Agencies denied liability on the ground that the
charter party referred to in the bills of lading, the charter, not the ship owner,
was responsible for any loss or damage of the cargo. Furthermore, it claimed
to have exercised due diligence in stowing the goods and as a mere
forwarding agent, it was not responsible for losses or damages to the cargo.
Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party to owner’s non-
liability was valid as to absolve the American Steamship from liability loss?
Held: The Civil Code provision on common carriers should not be applied
where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation
in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the
negligence of its agent is void only if the strict public policy governing
common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at
large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a
single party.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 9
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
for its project to operate a ferryboat service from Matnog, Sorsogon and Allen,
Samar that will provide service to company buses and freight trucks that have
to cross San Bernardo Strait. In a reply of April 29,1981 PANTRANCO was
informed by MARINA that it cannot give due course to the request.
Thus on October 23, 1981 the BOT rendered its decision holding that
the ferryboat service is part of its CPC to operate from Pasay to Samar/Leyte
by amending PANTRANCO's CPC so as to reflect the same.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 10
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
the two terminals, Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not
be considered as a continuation of the highway.
Thus the Court holds that the water transport service between Matnog
and Allen is not a ferryboat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping
service. Before private respondent may be issued a franchise or CPC for the
operation of the said service as a common carrier, it must comply with the
usual requirements of filing an application, payment of the fees, publication,
adducing evidence at a hearing and affording the oppositors the opportunity
to be heard, among others, as provided by law.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 11
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
▪ Civil Code – primary law
▪ Code of Commerce – all matters not regulated by the Civil
Code.
▪ Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) – suppletory to
the Civil Code.
B. Land Transportation
a. Common Carriers
▪ Civil Code (Arts.1732-1766) – primary law
▪ Code of Commerce – suppletory law
b. Private Carriers
Object merchandise
▪ Code of Commerce – primary law
▪ Civil Code – suppletory law
C. Air Transportation
1. Domestic Transportation
Civil Code
Code of Commerce
In National Development Co. vs. CA (164 SCRA 593). “The law of the
country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the
common carrier in case of loss, destruction or deterioration (Art. 1753, NCC)
XXX The liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in
all matters not regulated by the said Code, the rights and obligations of
common carriers shall be governed by the code of Commence and by special
laws (Art. 1766 NCC). Hence, the COGSA /a special law is merely
supppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code”. The “place of destinations”
whose law shall be deemed to be the governing law in so far as the liability of
common carrier is concerned refers to the place of “ultimate destination” not
an agreed stopping place. This is particularly true in so far as the warsaw
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 12
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
convention used the term to determine the country where the suit against the
international carrier should be filled. (Santos III vs. NorthWest Orient Airlines,
210 SCRA 256
Cases:
SAMAR MINING CO., INC. VS. NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD (132 SCRA 529)
Issue: Whether Nordeustscher Lloyd is liable for the loss of the goods as
common carrier?
Held: No. At the time of the loss of the goods, the character of possession of
Nordeutscher Lloyd shifted from common carrier to agent of Samar Mining
Co.
Article 1736 of the Civil Code relives the carrier of responsibility over
the shipment as soon as the carrier makes actual or constructive delivery of
the goods to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
Under the Civil Code provisions governing Agency, an agent can only
be held liable in cases where his acts are attended by fraud, negligence,
deceit or if there is a conflict of interest between him and the principal. Under
the same law an agent is likewise liable if he appoints a substitute when he
was not given the power to appoint one or otherwise appoints one that is
notoriously incompetent or insolvent. These facts were not proven in the
record.
Facts: Sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S Asiatica, a vessel operated
by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan for
transportation to Manila loaded 5,000 pieces of calorized pipes valued at
P256,039.00 which was consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co, Inc. and
7 cases of spare parts valued at P92, 361.75 consigned to Central Textile
Mills. Both sets of goods were inured against marine risk for their stated value
with respondent Development Insurance and Surety Corp.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 13
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
In the same vessel, 2 containers of garment fabrics were also loaded
which was consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corp worth $46,583. The said
cargoes were consigned to Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance. Another
cargo loaded to the vessel was the surveying instruments consigned to Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise and insured against respondent Dowa
Fire & Marine Insurance for $1,385.00.
On the way to Manila, M/S Asiatica caught fire and sank. This resulted
to the loss of the ship and its cargoes. The respective Insurers paid the
corresponding marine insurance values and were thus subrogated to the
rights of the insured.
The insurers filed a suit against the petitioner carrier for recovery of the
amounts paid to the insured. However, petitioner contends that it is not liable
on the ground that the loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous event.
Held: The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported
governs the liability of common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. The liability of petitioner is governed primarily by the Civil Code
however, in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the Code of
Commerce and Special Laws will govern with respect to the rights and
obligations of the carrier. Therefore COGSA is suppletory to the provisions of
the Civil Code.
G. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Case/s
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to reduce
and increase fare rated based on the circular order issued by the LTFRB?
Held: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized
existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority, “Potestas delegata non delegari protest” what has been
delegated further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a
negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate inandated
to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is a delicate and
sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound
discretion with the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate
acceptable to both public utility and the public.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 14
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
1. REGISTERED OWNER RULE
GELISAN VS. ALDAY (154 SCRA 388)
Facts: Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract where
the former hired the truck of Gelisan for the purpose of transporting goods at
the price of P18.00. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all
losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him.
Benito Alday, a trucking operator, had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the
Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in
Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered
the use of his truck with the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of
fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and he instructed his
checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made
two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was delivered to the
driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A
and B. Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer
bodega at Mandaluyong.
Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of
fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation so that, on
12 February 1962, he (Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto Espiritu and
Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI Manila
Held: The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered
owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise
from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of
the passengers therein. The claim of the petitioner that he is not able in view
of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto Espiritu
which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained
because it appears that the lease contract, adverted to, had not been
approved by the Public Service Commission. It is settled in our jurisprudence
that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another
without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the
public and third persons.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 15
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
In May 1980, private respondent bound himself to sell and deliver to
Bluestar Mahogony, Inc. 100,000 board feet of sawn lumber with the
understanding that the initial delivery would be made on 15 May 1980. To
effect its first delivery, private respondent’s resident manager in Maddela,
Dominador Cruz, contracted Virgilio Licuden, the driver of a cargo truck to
transport its sawn lumber to the consignee Blue Star in Valenzuela, Bulacan.
This cargo truck was registered in the name of petitioner Ma. Luis Benedicto,
the proprietor of Macoven Trucking, business enterprise engaged in hauling
freight, with the main office in B.F. Homes, Parañaque.
On 15 May 1980, Cruz in the presence and with the consent of driver
Licuden, supervised the loading of 7,690 board feet of sawn lumber with
invoice value of P16, 918.00 aboard the cargo truck. The cargo never
reached Blue Star.
Issue: Whether the registered owner is liable even though the vehicle have
been transferred to another person?
Held: Supreme Court held that the prevailing rule on common carrier makes
the registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of
the common carrier, even though the specific vehicle involve may already
have been transferred to another person. This doctrine rest upon the principle
that in dealing with the vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the
public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful
owner thereof.
2. KABIT SYSTEM
Case/s:
Facts: Petitioner Adolfo Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but he
had no certificate of public conveyance for the operation of the vehicle as a
public passenger jeep. Santos then transferred his jeep to the name of Vidad
so that it could be operated under the latter’s certificate of public
convenience. In other words, Santos became what is known as kabit
operator. Vidad executed a re-transfer document presumably to be registered
it and when it was decided that the passenger jeep of Santos was to be
withdrawn from kabit arrangement.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 16
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
On the accident date, Abraham Sibug was bumped by the said
passenger jeep.
Issue: Whether the Vidad is liable being the registered owner of the jeepney?
Held: As the jeep in question was registered in the name of Vidad, the
government or any person affected by the representation that said vehicle is
registered under the name of the particular person had the right to rely on his
declaration of his ownership and registration. And the registered owner or any
other person for that matter cannot be permitted to repudiate said declaration
with the objective of proving that the said registered vehicle is owned by
another person and not by the registered owner.
Santos, as the kabit, should not be allowed to defeat the levy in his
vehicle and to avoid his responsibility as a kabit owner for he had led the
public to believe that the vehicle belongs to Vidad. This is one way of curbing
the pernicious kabit system that facilitates the commissions of fraud against
the traveling public.
Criminal case was filed against Emeterio Martin, while a civil case was
filed by the heir of the victim against Lita Enterprises. In the decision of the
lower court Lita Enterprises was held liable for damages for the amount of
P25, 000.00 and P7, 000.00 for attorney’s fees.
Petitioner now prays that private respondent be held liable to pay the
amount they have given to the heir of Galvez.
Held: “Kabit system” is defined as, when a person who has been granted a
certificate of convenience allows another person who owns a motor vehicle to
operate under such franchise for a fee. This system is not penalized as a
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 17
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
criminal offense but is recognized as one that is against public policy;
therefore it is void and inexistent.
It is fundamental that the court will not aid either of the party to enforce
an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Upon this
premise, it was flagrant error on the part of both trial and appellate courts to
have accorded the parties relief from their predicament. Specifically Article
1412 states that:
“If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: “when the
fault, is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he
has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s
undertaking.”
Facts: Pedro Nale bought from Teja Marketing a motorcycle with complete
accessories and a sidecar. A chattel mortgage was constituted as a security
for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. The records of the
Land Transportation Commission show that the motorcycle sold to the
defendant was first mortgaged to the Teja Marketing by Angel Jaucian though
the Teja Marketing and Angel Jaucian are one and the same, because it was
made to appear that way only as the defendant had no franchise of his own
and he attached the unit to the plaintiff's MCH Line. The agreement also of
the parties here was for the plaintiff to undertake the yearly registration of the
motorcycle with the Land Transportation Commission. The plaintiff, however
failed to register the motorcycle on that year on the ground that the defendant
failed to comply with some requirements such as the payment of the
insurance premiums and the bringing of the motorcycle to the LTC for
stenciling, the plaintiff said that the defendant was hiding the motorcycle from
him. Lastly, the plaintiff also explained that though the ownership of the
motorcycle was already transferred to the defendant, the vehicle was still
mortgaged with the consent of the defendant to the Rural Bank of Camaligan
for the reason that all motorcycle purchased from the plaintiff on credit was
rediscounted with the bank.
Teja Marketing made demands for the payment of the motorcycle but
just the same Nale failed to comply, thus forcing Teja Marketing to consult a
lawyer and file an action for damage before the City Court of Naga in the
amount of P546.21 for attorney's fees and P100.00 for expenses of litigation.
Teja Marketing also claimed that as of 20 February 1978, the total account of
Nale was already P2, 731, 05 as shown in a statement of account; includes
not only the balance of P1, 700.00 but an additional 12% interest per annum
on the said balance from 26 January 1976 to 27 February 1978; a 2% service
charge; and P546.21 representing attorney's fees. On his part, Nale did not
dispute the sale and the outstanding balance of P1,700.00 still payable to
Teja Marketing; but contends that because of this failure of Teja Marketing to
comply with his obligation to register the motorcycle, Nale suffered damages
when he failed to claim any insurance indemnity which would amount to no
less than P15,000.00 for the more than 2 times that the motorcycle figured in
accidents aside from the loss of the daily income of P15.00 as boundary fee
beginning October 1976 when the motorcycle was impounded by the LTC for
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 18
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
not being registered. The City Court rendered judgment in favor of Teja
Marketing, dismissing the counterclaim, and ordered Nale to pay Teja
Marketing On appeal to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the
decision was affirmed in toto. Nale filed a petition for review with the
Intermediate Appellate Court. On 18 July 1983, the appellate court set aside
the decision under review on the basis of doctrine of "pari delicto," and
accordingly, dismissed the complaint of Teja Marketing, as well as the
counterclaim of Nale; without pronouncements as to costs. Hence, the
petition for review was filed by Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian.
Issue: Whether the defendant can recover damages against the plaintiff?
The "kabit system" has been identified as one of the root causes of the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation offices.
Although not out rightly penalized as a criminal offense, the kabit system is
invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void
and in existent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. It is a fundamental
principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract,
but will leave both where it finds then. Upon this premise it would be error to
accord the parties relief from their predicament.
3. BOUNDARY SYSTEM
Case/s:
Facts: Urbano and Emilia Magboo are the parents of Cesar Magboo, a child
of 8 years old, who lived with them and was under their custody until his
death on 24 October 1956 when he was killed in a motor vehicle accident, the
fatal vehicle being a passenger jeepney owned by Delfin Bernardo. At the
time of the accident, said passenger jeepney was driven by Conrado Roque.
The contract between Roque and Bernardo was that Roque was to pay to
Bernardo the sum of P8.00, which he paid to Bernardo, for privilege of driving
the jeepney, it being their agreement that whatever earnings Roque could
make out of the use of the jeepney in transporting passengers from one point
to another in the City of Manila would belong entirely to Roque. As a
consequence of the accident and as a result of the death of Cesar Magboo in
said accident, Roque was prosecuted for homicide thru reckless imprudence
before the CFI Manila. Roque was sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor,
with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. Pursuant to said judgment Roque served his sentence but he was
not able to pay the indemnity because he was insolvent. An action was filed
by the spouses Magboo against Bernardo is for enforcement of his subsidiary
liability. The trial court ordered Bernardo to pay the. Bernardo appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court on the
ground that only questions of law are involved.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 19
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: An employer-employee relationship exists between a jeepney owner
and a driver under a boundary system arrangement. The features which
characterize the boundary system - namely the fact that the driver does not
receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the amount of fares collected
by him over the amount he pays to the jeep-owner, and the gasoline
consumed by the jeep is for the amount of the driver - are not sufficient to
withdraw the relationship between them from that of employee and employer.
Consequently, the jeepney owner is subsidiary liable as employer in
accordance with Art.103, Revised Penal Code.
1. FABRE VS. CA 259 SCRA 426 (G.R. NO. 111127, JULY 26, 1996)
Facts: Petitioner and his wife were owners of a minibus. They used the bus
principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they
operated in Manila and was driven by Porfirio Cabil. His job was to take
school children to and from the school. Sometime during November private
respondent WWCF arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33
members of its ministry form Manila to La Union and back in consideration of
which private respondent shall pay petitioners the stipulated amount. On the
day of the trip, several members of the ministry came in late, hence, the
departure was delayed. On the may to La Union, the minibus caught an
accident causing damages and injury to several passengers particularly
Amyline Antonio. Apparently, the driver was unable to see a sharp curve
ahead of time for him to be able to avoid the mishap. A criminal complaint was
them filed against the driver, while defendant spouses were also made jointly
liable.
Held: Court ruled that defendant spouses were negligent in the exercise of
their duties as owners of the minibus for it was clearly established by
evidence that said vehicle was not properly check if it was fit for the long trip.
Moreover, defendants were also negligent in the selection and supervision of
their employee, particularly, the driver, who was only used to driving short
distances.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
traveled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who,
the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate
his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that
Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give
his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in
the plane after being threatened that he will be thrown out of the plane if he
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 20
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
does not oblige. The captain of the plane, when asked to intervene, refused
to do so.
Issue: Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of Air France, petitioner,
entitling Rafael Carrascoso, respondent for moral and exemplary damages as
against the petitioner?
The court held that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not
suffer from reversible error. CA decision affirmed.
Facts: At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked
"Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number
GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City.
Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck
passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio
Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and
removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700
meters away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the
stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away
behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The
trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number
PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national
highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus
was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and
Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus, about
three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the stalled truck,
which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to
swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus
rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus
and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and
suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought to the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 21
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical
Center where she died shortly thereafter.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the
following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII),
petitioner Tiu’s insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of
the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They
alleged that petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along the
national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and
normal speed. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted
manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway, and that no early
warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied the
brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite
his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the
passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo truck’s left rear.
HELD: The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their
passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755and 1756. It is
undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the
destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such
contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved.
This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the
express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely
and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any
injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to
the negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that
he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed
that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in
creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such
presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required
extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or that the
accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court,
petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of
petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner
Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.
B. EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Coverage
1. Vigilance over goods (Arts. 1734-1754)
2. Safety of passengers (Arts. 1755-1763)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 22
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Passenger - A person who has entered into a contract of carriage, express or
implied, with the carrier. They are entitled to extraordinary diligence from the
common carrier.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 23
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
negligence applies. Common carriers are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
them. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. To
overcome the presumption of negligence in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to
this rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instance when
the presumption of negligence does not attach. (Delsan v. Trans.
American Home Insurance, August 15, 2006)
B. Act of God
Requisites:
1. The common carrier must have exercised extraordinary diligence
before, during and after the time of the accident;
2. The event must be unforeseen or even if it can be foreseen, it cannot
be avoided;
3. There must have been no undue delay on the part of the common
carrier;
4. The proximate cause must not be committed by the common carrier.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 24
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
2. The common carrier must have exercised due diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss before, during or after the act causing the loss,
deterioration or destruction of the goods (Art. 1739, Civil Code)
The common carrier shall be liable even if the shipper or owner merely
contributed to the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the
proximate cause thereof being the negligence of the common carrier,
the latter shall be liable in damages, which, however, shall be equitably
reduced. (Art. 1741, Civil Code)
o The rule is that if the improper packing is known to the carrier or his
employee or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but he
nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception
notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for the
resulting damage. (A.F. Sanchez Brokerage Inc. vs. C.A., 447
SCRA 427, [2004])
Requisites:
▪ The common carrier must prove that the public authority has the power
to issue the order for the seizure or destruction of the goods.
▪ The common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss, destruction or deterioration of he goods at the time
of the accident.
o Said public authority must have the power to issue the order (Article
1743, Civil Code). Consequently, where the officer acts without legal
process, the common carrier will be held liable. (Ganzon v. CA 161,
SCRA 646 [1988])
Cases:
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 25
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Inc. (CARE) wherein it would acquire from the US government donations of
Non-Fat Dried Milk and other food products. In turn, the Philippines will
transport and distribute the donated to the intended beneficiaries of the
country. As a result, it entered into a contract of carriage of goods with the
herein respondent. The latter shipped 4,868 bags of non-fat dried milk from
Sept-Dec 1988. The consignee named in the bills was Abdurahman Jama,
petitioner’s branch supervisor in Zamboanga City. Upon reaching the port of
Zamboanga, respondent’s agent, Efren Ruste Shipping Agency unloaded the
said milks. Before each delivery, Rogelio Rizada and Ismael Zamora both
delivery checkers of Efren Ruste requested Abdurahman to surrender the
originals of the Bill of Lading. However, the petitioner alleged that they did not
receive anything and they filed a claim against the herein respondent. The
petitioner contended that the respondents failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
Held The surrender of the Bill of Lading is not a condition precedent for a
common carrier to be discharged of its contractual obligation. If the surrender
is not possible, acknowledgment of the delivery by signing the receipt
suffices. The herein respondent did not even bother to prevent the resignation
of abdurhaman Jama to be utilized as a witness.
Facts: On July 25, 1990 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the petitioner received
on board its vessel, the M/V Central Bohol, 376 pieces of Round Logs and
undertook to transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska Lumber
Co., Inc. The cargo is insured for P3, 000, 000.00 against total lost under
respondents MarineCargo Policy.
After loading the logs, the vessel starts its voyage. After few hours of
the trip, the ship tilts 10 degrees to its side, due to the shifting of the logs in
the hold. It continues to tilt causing the captain and the crew to abandon ship.
The ship sank.
Respondent alleged that the loss is due to the negligence and fault of
the captain. While petitioner contends that the happening is due to monsoons
which is unforeseen or casa fortuito.
Held: From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods
they transport, according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event
of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are
responsible; that is, unless they can prove that such loss, destruction or
deterioration was brought about -- among others -- by "flood, storm,
earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity." In all other cases
not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
The contention of the petitioner that the loss is due to casa fortuito
exempting them from liability is untenable. Petitioner failed to show that such
natural disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss.
Human agency must be entirely excluded from the cause of injury or loss. In
other words, the damaging effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 26
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
not have been caused, contributed to, or worsened by the presence of human
participation. The defense of fortuitous event or natural disaster cannot be
successfully made when the injury could have been avoided by human
precaution.
The monsoon is not the proximate cause of the sinking but is due to
the improper stowage of logs. The logs were not secured by cable wires,
causing the logs to shift and later on the sinking the ship. This shows that
they did not exercise extraordinary diligence, making them liable for such
loss.
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no
fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its
undertaking of taking the private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place,
mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that
exempts the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting
arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for
the delay of departure. When the vessel finally left the port, there was no
longer any force majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.
Facts: On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by
defendant Eastern Shipping Lines under a bill of lading. The shipment was
insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance Policy. Upon arrival of the shipment
in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto the custody of
defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said to
be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 27
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Issue: Whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods
can be a solidary or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the
arrastre operator and the customs broker?
Held: The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the
shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for
their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738,
Civil Code). When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged
condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that
diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it
liable (Art. 1735, Civil Code). There are, of course, exceptional cases when
such presumption of fault is not observed but these cases, enumerated in
Article 1734 of the Civil Code, are exclusive, not one of which can be applied
to this case.
Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters
(Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old)
boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao,
Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.
They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their
personal belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three tickets covering
the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No fare was
charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height which fare is
charged in accordance with plaintiff’s rules and regulations.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to
allow the passengers bound therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and
their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was
the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led
his companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about
four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus
in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his
daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran
was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his
bayong which he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently
to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 28
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled about 10 meters
from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the
defendant to recover from the latter damages.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus
involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was already
terminated?
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected
by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until the passenger has
had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was
not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed
her father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the
bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started
to run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that
this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and
killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent had
exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person” required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. The driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started
to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while
the latter was still unloading part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran
and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from
Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila. Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the
passengers therein disembarked through a gangplank connecting the vessel
to the pier. Viana, instead of disembarking through the gangplank,
disembarked through the third deck, which was at the same level with the
pier. An hour after the passengers disembarked, Pioneer stevedoring started
to operate in unloading the cargo from the ship. Viana then went back,
remembering some of his cargoes left at the vessel. At that time, while he was
pointing at the crew of the vessel to where his cargoes were loaded, the
crane hit him, pinning him between the crane and the side of the vessel. He
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 29
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
was brought to the hospital where he died 3 days after (May 15). The parents
of Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz and
Pioneer filed a motion for reconsideration, upon which the trial court issued an
order absolving Pioneer from liability but not Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed
the trial court ruling. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at the time of the
incident?
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily
terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see
after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported
has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with
one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When they were near the
door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child
stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by
an oncoming train, causing their instant death.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 30
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver,
Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for
Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted
Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the
decision.
Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in
the conclusion drawn from the findings.
GACAL VS. PAL (183 SCRA 189, G.R. NO. 55300 MARCH 16, 1990)
Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife and three others were passengers of
PAL plane at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that the flight,
were Commander Zapata with other members of Moro National Liberation
Front. They were armed with grenades and pistols. After take off, the
members of MNLF announced a hijacking and directed the pilot to fly directly
to Libya, later to Sabah. They were, however, forced to land in Zamboanga
airport for refueling, because the plane did not have enough fuel to make
direct flight to Sabah. When the plane began to taxi at the runaway of
Zamboanga airport, it was met by two armored cars of the military.
Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt from liability
under Art 1174 of the civil code, it is necessary that the following elements
must occur: (a) the cause of the breach of obligation must be independent of
human will; (b) the event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner; (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 31
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the petitioners
safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged buy
the MNLF without connection to the private respondent, hence, independent
of will of PAL or its passengers.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest degree
of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers
and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not however,
make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort,
committed by a stranger which causes an injury to a passenger does not
accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same
could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted
that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as
in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the
common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father
of the family.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 32
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Consolidated then filed an action for damages against petitioner with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of First Instance dismissed the
complaint stating that the proximate cause of the fall of the payloader which
caused its damage was the act or omission of Vicente Concepcion for
misrepresenting the weight of the payloader as 2.5 tons instead of its true
weight of 7.5 tons. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed the decision of
the Court of First Instance and ordered the plaintiff to pay Concepcion
damages. Hence this petition.
Held: No, Compania Maritima is liable for the damage to the payloader. The
General rule under Articles 1735 and 1752 of the Civil Code is that common
carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case the
goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or had deteriorated. To
overcome the presumption of liability for the loss destruction or deterioration
common carriers must prove that they have exercised extraordinary diligence
as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court further held that the weight in a bill of lading are
prima facie evidence of the amount received and the fact that the weighing
was done by another will not relieve the common carrier where it accepted
such weight and entered it in on the bill of lading. The common carrier can
protect themselves against mistakes in the bill of lading as to weight by
exercising extraordinary diligence before issuing such.
Facts: Bico and Servando loaded on board the FS-176 the following cargoes:
1.528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and general
merchandise. Upon the arrival of the vessel, the cargoes were discharged,
complete and in good order to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At
2:00 pm of the same day, a fire of unknown reasons razed the warehouse.
Before the fire, Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice. The
petitioners are now claiming for the value of the destroyed goods from the
common carrier.
The Trial Court ordered the respondent to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of their lost goods on the basis that the delivery of the shipment to the
warehouse is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736 of the New Civil
Code, since the loss occurred before actual or constructive delivery. The
petitioners argued that the stipulation in the bills of lading does not bind them
because they did not sign the same. The stipulation states that the carrier
shall not be responsible for loss unless such loss was due to the carrier’s
negligence. Neither shall it be liable for loss due to fortuitous events such as
dangers of the sea and war.
Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the destruction of
the goods
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 33
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: No. There is nothing on record to show that the carrier incurred in
delay in the performance of its obligation. Since the carrier even notified the
plaintiffs of the arrival of their shipments and had demanded that they be
withdrawn.
The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since the storage
of the goods was in the Customs warehouse and was undoubtedly made with
their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged and maintained
by the Government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant
since it has no control over the same.
Facts: Berde plants, Inc. delivered 632 units of artificial trees to C.F. Sharp
and Company, Inc., the General Sip Agent of DSR- Senator Lines, a foreign
shipping corporation, for transportation and delivery to the consignee, Al-Mohr
International Group, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Sharp issued an international
bill of landing for the cargo, with a stipulation that the port of discharge for the
cargo was at the Khor Fakkan port and the port of delivery was Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia.
On June 7, 1993, the vessel left Manila for Saudi Arabia with the cargo
on board. When the vessel arrived in Khor Fakkan Port, the cargo was
reloaded on board DSR-Senator Lines feeder vessel, however while in transit,
the vessel and all its cargo caught fire.
Held: Fire is not one of those enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil
Code to wit,
Art. 1734, Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following
causes only:
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 34
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
SARREAL VS. JAPAN AIRLINES (117 SCRA 832)
On or about June 23, 1980, he was in Los Angeles, USA with his
business representative Atty. Pol Tiglao, and Luis Espada, the boxing
manager of World Flyweight Boxing Champion Hilario Zapata. They were
negotiating a possible match between the latter and the winner of the "
Netrnoi Vorasing - Brigildo Cañada" main event fight which was scheduled on
July 4, 1980 in Manila. This agreement was to be confirmed by the petitioner
through overseas call in Manila on or before July 2, 1980.
The petitioner then flew from Los Angeles to Tokyo arriving thereat on
June 26, 1980.
At the Narita Airport Office, the petitioner inquired if there was a JAL
flight from Bangkok to Manila on July 2, 1980. He explained to a lady
employee of JAL that he had a very important business in Manila on July 2,
1980. He also told her that if he could not take a flight from Bangkok to Manila
on that date, he would not be going to Bangkok anymore.
The JAL lady employee looked into her scheduled book put a stamp on
the petitioner's ticket and told him not to worry because she has endorsed his
JAL ticket to Thai International leaving Bangkok on July 2, 1980 for Manila.
However, in the morning of July 2, 1980, when the petitioner was about
to board the said Thai International, he was not allowed to board the said
plane through it had available seats because he was told that his ticket was
not endorsable.
This led the petitioner to file an action for damages with the Regional
Trail Court (RTC ), Pasay City against private respondent JAL premised on
the breach of contract of carriage.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 35
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
The court finds no justification for the relief prayed for by the petitioner.
He has failed to show that the findings of the respondent court are not based
on substantial evidence or that it conclusions are contrary to law and
applicable jurisprudence.
Facts: MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila and bounded for Cebu. Its
officers were aware of the upcoming typhoon Klaring that is already building
up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals on their route,
they proceeded with their voyage. When they reached the island of Romblon,
the captain decided not to seek shelter since the weather was still good. They
continued their journey until the vessel reached the island of Tanguingui,
while passing through the island the weather suddenly changed and heavy
rains fell. Fearing that they might hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility, the
captain ordered to reverse course the vessel so that they could weather out
the typhoon by facing the strong winds and waves. Unfortunately, the vessel
struck a reef near Malapascua Island, it sustained a leak and eventually sunk.
The parents of the passengers who were lost due to that incident filed
an action against Filipinas Pioneer Lines for damages. The defendant
pleaded force majeure but the Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower stating
that the incident was a force majeure and absolved the defendants from
liability.
Issue: Whether of not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for damages and
presumed to be at fault for the death of its passenger?
Held: The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer Lines failed to observe
that extraordinary diligence required of them by law for the safety of the
passengers transported by them with due regard for all necessary
circumstance and unnecessarily exposed the vessel to tragic mishap. Despite
knowledge of the fact that there was a typhoon, they still proceeded with their
voyage relying only on the forecast that the typhoon would weaken upon
crossing the island of Samar. The defense of caso fortuito is untenable. To
constitute caso fortuito to exempt a person from liability it necessary that the
event must be independent from human will, the occurrence must render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, the
obligor must be free from any participation or aggravation to the injury of the
creditor. Filipina Pioneer Lines failed to overcome that presumption o fault or
negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries to passengers.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 36
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent has successfully proved that he
exercised extraordinary diligence.
Held: The court held that they failed to prove extraordinary diligence. After a
snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus, the driver didn’t
even bother to stop and look f anything had gone wrong with the bus. With
regard to the waiver, it must to be valid and effective, couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of the person to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. In this case, such
waiver is not clear and unequivocal. When petitioner signed the waiver, she
was reeling from the effects of the accident and while reading the paper, she
experienced dizziness but upon seeing other passengers sign the document,
she too signed which bothering to read to its entirety. There appears
substantial doubt whether the petitioner fully understood the joint affidavit.
Facts: Herein plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course
from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant
Berfol Camoro and registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing
the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the
front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound
on his right palm aside from the injuries he suffered on his left arm, right thigh,
and on his back.
Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the
City Court of Cebu City. Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire blow
out was beyond their control, taking into account that the tire that exploded
was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.
Held: No. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused
either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects
in the tire. Common carriers should teach drivers not to overload their
vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct
measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers
at all tines.
Facts: On January\y 28, 1954, Severina Garces and her one year old son,
Precillano Necesito boarded passenger auto truck bus of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan.
After the bus entered a wooden bridge, the front wheels swerved to the
right. The driver lost control, and after the wrecking the bridge wooden rails,
the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. The
mother, Severina was drowned and the son Precillano was injured.
Issue: Whether or nor the carrier is liable for manufacturing defect of the
steering knuckle?
Held: It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passenger’s safety. His
liability rest upon negligence, that his failure to exercise utmost degree of
diligence that the law requires.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 37
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
The passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the
selection and use of the equipment and the appliances in use by the carrier.
Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective
equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while carrier usually
has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the
safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for flaws of
his equipment if such cause were at all discoverable.
C. DEFENSE/S
Cases :
Facts: Sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S Asiatica, a vessel operated
by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan for
transportation to Manila loaded 5,000 pieces of calorized pipes valued at
P256,039.00 which was consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co, Inc. and
7 cases of spare parts valued at P92, 361.75 consigned to Central Textile
Mills. Both sets of goods were inured against marine risk for their stated value
with respondent Development Insurance and Surety Corp.
On the way to Manila, M/S Asiatica caught fire and sank. This resulted
to the loss of the ship and its cargoes. The respective Insurers paid the
corresponding marine insurance values and were thus subrogated to the
rights of the insured.
The insurers filed a suit against the petitioner carrier for recovery of the
amounts paid to the insured. However, petitioner contends that it is not liable
on the ground that the loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous event.
Issues:
1. Whether the Civil Code provisions on Common Carriers or the Carriage of
the Goods by Sea Act will govern the case at bar?
2. Whether or not the common carrier has the burden of proof to show its
compliance with the diligence required by law, which is extraordinary
diligence?
Held:
1. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. The liability of petitioner is governed primarily by the Civil Code
however, in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the Code of
Commerce and Special Laws will govern with respect to the rights and
obligations of the carrier. Therefore COGSA is suppletory to the provisions of
the Civil Code.
2. YES. The Common Carrier has the burden to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence required by law. The Court is of the opinion that fire
may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 38
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
almost arises invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does
not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by
other natural disaster or calamity. However, petitioner failed to discharge the
burden of proving that it had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by
law and therefore cannot escape liability for the loss of the cargo.
Held: Now the petitioner is changing his theory to caso fortuito. Such a
change of theory on appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case, the
intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that
would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The
petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea
the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance
of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to
completely overpower the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere
difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. We
agree with the private respondent that the scraps could have been properly
unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO compound, so that after the dispute
with the local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be
delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage.
A. IN CASE OF GOODS
START: From the time that the goods are delivered to the common carrier.
(Article 1736, Civil Code. Cia Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of America)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 39
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
The liability remains in full force and effect even when they are
temporarily unloaded or stored in transit unless the shipper or owner made
use of the right of stoppage in transitu. (Article 1737, Civil Code)
Requisites:
1. Unpaid seller (Article 1525, Civil Code);
2. Goods must be in transit (Article 1531, Civil Code);
3. The seller must either actually take possession of the goods sold or
give notice of his claim to the carrier or other person in possession
(Article 1532 [1], Civil Code);
4. The seller must surrender the negotiable document of title, if any,
issued by the carrier or bailee (Article 1532[2], Civil Code);
5. The seller must bear the expenses of delivery of the goods after the
exercise of the right (Article 1532[2], Civil Code); and
6. The buyer is in a state of insolvency or becomes insolvent.
B. IN CASE OF PASSENGERS
START: The carrier is bound to exercise utmost diligence with respect to
passengers the moment the person who purchases the ticket (or a token)
from the carrier presents himself at the proper place and in a proper manner
to be transported. Such person must have bona fide intention to use the
facilities of the carrier, possess sufficient fare with which to pay for his
passage, and present himself to the carrier for the transportation in the
manner provided. (Vda. De Nueca v. Manila Railroad Company, CA, G.R. No.
31731, January 30, 1968)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 40
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
negligent. As to the other baggage, the rules in Article 1998 and 2000 to 2003 of the Civil Code
concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable. (Art.1733-1735, Civil Code)
Case/s
QUISUMBING VS. CA
Facts: Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among the of ...
(PAL's) Fokker 'Friendship' PIC-536 plane in its flight of November 6, 1968
which left Mactan City at about 7:30 in the evening with Manila for its
destination.
After the plane had taken off, Florencio O. Villarin, a Senior NBI Agent
who was also a passenger of the said plane, noticed a certain 'Zaldy,' a
suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez, seated at the front seat near the door
leading to the cockpit of the plane. A check by Villarin with the passenger's
ticket in the possession of flight Stewardess Annie Bontigao, who was seated
at the last seat right row, revealed that 'Zaldy' had used the name 'Cardente,'
one of his aliases known to Villarin. Villarin also came to know from the
stewardess that 'Zaldy' had three companions on board the plane."
After receiving the note, which was about 15 minutes after take off, the
pilot of the plane, Capt. Luis Bonnevie, Jr., came out of the cockpit and sat
beside Villarin at the rear portion of the plane and explained that he could not
send the message because it would be heard by all ground aircraft stations.
Villarin, however, told the pilot of the danger of commission of violent acts on
board the plane by the notorious 'Zaldy' and his three companions.
While the pilot and Villarin were talking, 'Zaldy' and one of his
companions walked to the rear and stood behind them. Capt. Bonnevie then
stood up and went back to the cockpit. 'Zaldy' and his companions returned to
their seats, but after a few minutes they moved back to the rear throwing ugly
looks at Villarin who, sensing danger, stood up and went back to his original
seat across the aisle on the second to the last seat near the window. 'Zaldy
and his companion likewise went back to their respective seats in front.
Issue: Whether or not Pal is liable for damages against the passengers for
loss caused by the robbers on board?
Held: It is illusive to assume that had these precautions been taken, the
hijacking or the robbery would not have succeeded. The mandatory use of the
most sophisticated electronic detection devices and magnetometers, the
imposition of severe penalties, the development of screening procedures, the
compilation of hijacker behavioral profiles, the assignment of sky marshals,
and the weight of outraged world opinion may have minimized hijackings but
all these have proved ineffective against truly determined hijackers. World
experience shows that if a group of armed hijackers want to take over a plane
in flight, they can elude the latest combined government and airline industry
measures. And as our own experience in Zamboanga City illustrates, the use
of force to overcome hijackers, results in the death and injury of innocent
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 41
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
passengers and crew members. We are not in the least bit suggesting that
the Philippine Airlines should not do everything humanly possible to protect
passengers from hijackers' acts. We merely state that where the defendant
has faithfully complied with the requirements of government agencies and
adhered to the established procedures and precautions of the airline industry
at any particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in
hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or
misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative
cause.
Facts: On April 16, 1989, Mahtani is on his way to Bombay, India from
Manila. His trip was Manila-Hong Kong via PAL and then Hong Kong-India
via British Airways. Prior to his departure, he checked in two pieces of
luggage containing his clothing and other personal effects, confident that the
same would be transferred to his BA flight.
Held: American jurisprudence provides that an air carrier is not liable for the
loss of baggage in an amount in excess of the limits specified in the tariff
which was filed with the proper authorities, such tariff being binding on the
passenger regardless of the passenger’s lack of knowledge thereof or assent
thereto. This doctrine is recognized in this jurisdiction.
When they were in Germany, they went to the KLM office and obtained
a confirmation from Aer Lingus. At the airport in Barcelona, the Mendozas and
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 42
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
their companions checked in for their flight to Lourdes. However, although
their daughter and niece were allowed to take the flight, the spouses
Mendozas were off loaded on orders of the Aer Lingus manager, who
brusquely shoved them aside and shouted at them. So the spouses
Mendozas took a train ride to Lourdes instead.
Thus, they filed a complaint for damages against KLM for breach of
contract of carriage. The trial court decided in favor of the Mendozas. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, KLM brings this petition to the
Supreme Court. KLM cites Art 30 of the Warsaw Convention, which states:
the passenger or his representatives can take action only against the carrier
who performed the transportation during which the accident or delay
occurred. Also, KLM avers that the front cover of each ticket reads: that
liability of the carrier for damages shall be limited to occurrences on its own
line.
As the airline which issued the tickets, KLM was chargeable with the
duty and responsibility of specifically informing the spouses of the conditions
prescribed in their tickets or to ascertain that the spouses read them before
they accepted their passage tickets.
The court found, that the passage tickets provide that the carriage to
be performed therein by several successive carriers is to be regarded as a
“single operation”.
Held: The court said that when it comes to contracts of common carriage,
inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of
the passenger to be accommodated in class contracted for amounts to bad
faith and fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in
accordance with the 2220 of the Civil Code. But in the instant case, the
breach appears to the graver nature, since the preference given to the
Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 43
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
plaintiff’s rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may
not be discriminated against with impunity, as found by the court below what
worsened the situation of Ortigas was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping
him as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given first class
accommodation at Cairo, the next station, the proper arrangements therefore
having been made already, when in truth such was not the case. Although
molested and embarrassed to the point that he had to take nitroglycerine pills
to ward off a possible heart attack, Ortigas hardly had any choice, since his
luggage was already in the plane. To his disappointment, when the plane
reached Cairo, he was told by Lufthansa office there that no word at all had
been received from Rome and they had no space for him in first class. Worse,
similar false representations were made to him at Dharham and Calcutta. It
was only at Bangkok where for the first time. Ortigas was at last informed that
he could have a first class seat in the leg of the flight, from Bangkok to Hong
Kong. This Ortigas rejected, if only to make patent his displeasure and
indignation at being so inconsiderately treated in the earlier part of his
journey. In the light of all foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of
Ortigas to damages, both moral and exemplary. Precedents we have
consistently adhere to so dictate.
Facts: Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines a passenger ticket for air
transportation covering Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila. The said ticket was
exclusively endorsable to PAL.
Before Chiok his trip, the trips covered by the ticket were pre-
scheduled and confirmed by the former. When petitioner arrived in Taipei, he
went to CAL to confirm his Hong Kong- Manila trip on board PAL. The CAL
office attached a yellow sticker indicating the status was OK.
When Chiok reached Hong Kong, he then went to PAL office to confirm
his flight back to Manila. The PAL also confirmed the status of his ticket and
attached a ticket indicating a status OK. Chiok proceeded to Hong Kong
airport for his trip to Manila. However, upon reaching the PAL counter, he was
told that the flight to Manila was cancelled due to typhoon. He was informed
that all confirmed flight ticket holders of PAL were automatically booked for
the next flight the following day.
The next day, Chiok was not able to board the plane because his name
did not appear on the computer as passenger for the said flight to Manila.
In the instant case, PAL as the carrying agent of CAL, the latter cannot
evade liability to respondent, Chiok, even though it may have been only a
ticket issuer for Hong Kong- Manila sector.
BILL OF LADING
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 44
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
The written acknowledgment of the receipt of goods, and the
agreement to transport them to a specific place to a person named or to his
order. It is not indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage.
(Compania Maritima v. Insurance Co. of North America 12 SCRA 213 [1964])
Functions:
1. Best evidence of the existence of the contract of
carriage of cargo (Art. 353 Code of Commerce);
2. Commercial document whereby, if negotiable,
ownership may be transferred by negotiation; and
3. Receipt of cargo.
However, the carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to, or loss of,
goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by its own
negligence.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 45
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
“On-Board Bill of Lading” v. “Received for Shipment Bill of Lading”:
An “On Board Bill of Lading” is one in which it is stated that the goods
have been received on board the vessel which is to carry the goods. An on
board bill of lading is issued when the goods have been actually placed
aboard the ship with every reasonable expectation that the shipment is as
good as on its way. It is, therefore, understandable that a party to a maritime
contract would require an on board bill of lading because of its apparent
certainty of shipping as well as the seaworthiness of the vessel which is to
carry the goods. (Magellan Mfg.,etc. v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 116-
117[1991])
Instances when the carrier may validly refuse to accept the goods:
1. Goods sought to be transported are dangerous objects, or substances
including dynamite and other explosives;
2. Goods are unfit for transportation;
3. Acceptance would result in overloading;
4. Contrabands or illegal goods;
5. Goods are injurious to health;
6. Goods will be exposed to untoward danger like flood, capture by
enemies and the like;
7. Goods like livestock will be exposed to disease;
8. Strike;
9. Failure to tender goods on time.
TIME OF DELIVERY
Stipulated in Contract/Bill
No stipulation
of Lading
Carrier is bound to fulfill the 1. Within a reasonable time.
contract and is liable for any 2. Carrier is bound to forward them in
delay; no matter from what the 1st shipment of the same or similar
cause it may have arisen. goods which he may make to the point of
delivery. (Art. 358 Code of Commerce)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 46
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Effects of delay:
1. Merely suspends and generally does not terminate the contract of
carriage.
2. Carrier remains duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence.
3. Natural disaster shall not free the carrier from responsibility (Art.1740,
Civil Code)
4. If delay is without just cause, the contract limiting the common carrier’s
liability cannot be availed of in case of loss or deterioration of the goods
(Art.1747, Civil Code)
NOTICE OF DAMAGE
Requisites for Applicability:
1. Domestic/inter-island/coastwise transportation
2. Land/water/air transportation
3. Carriage of goods
4. Goods shipped are damaged (Art. 366, Code of Commerce)
Rules:
a. Patent damage: shipper must file a claim against the carrier immediately
upon delivery (it may be oral or written)
b. Latent damage: shipper should file a claim against the carrier within 24
hours from delivery.
o These rules do not apply to misdelivery of goods. (Roldan vs. Lim
Ponzo)
o The filing of notice of claim is a condition precedent for recovery.
Purpose of Notice: To inform the carrier that the shipment has been
damaged, and it is charged with liability therefore, and to give it an
opportunity to make an investigation and fix responsibility while the matter is
fresh.
Prescriptive Period
Not provided by Article 366. Thus, in such absence, Civil Code rules on
prescription apply.
If despite the notice of claim, the carrier refuses to pay, action must be
filed in court.
1. If no bill of lading was issued: within 6 years
2. If bill of lading was issued: within 10 years.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 47
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Exception: A combined carrier agreement where a carrier makes itself liable
assuming the obligations and acquiring as well the rights and causes of action
of those which preceded it.
The filing of claim under either (a) or (b) is a condition precedent for
recovery.
If the claim is filed, but the carrier refuses to pay, enforce carrier’s
liability in court by filing a case:
1. Within six (6) years, if no bill of lading has been issued; or
2. Within ten (1) years, if a bill of lading has been issued.
Written demand within twenty-four (24) hours is necessary only when the
package does not show exterior signs of damage but when there are exterior
signs of damage, a verbal claim made immediately is sufficient compliance
with law. (Mapaso Goldfields v. Compania Maritima [CA], 2 OG 307)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 48
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
is ten years because there is a violation of contract, and the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) does not apply to cases of misdelivery.
o The real and hypothecary nature of maritime law simply means that the
liability of the carrier in connection with losses related to maritime
contracts is confined to the vessel, which stands as the guaranty for their
settlement. (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corp. 217 SCRA 359)
PREFERENCE OF CREDITS
Mortgage of a vessel properly registered becomes preferred mortgage
lien which shall have priority over all claims against the vessel in an
extrajudicial foreclosure for:
1. Credit in favor of the public treasury;
2. Judicial costs of the proceedings;
3. Pilotage and tonnage charges and other sea and port charges;
4. Salaries of depositaries keepers of the vessel;
5. Captain and crews’ wages;
6. General average;
7. Salvage, including contract salvage;
8. Maritime liens arising prior in time to the recording of the preferred
mortgage;
9. Damages arising out of tort; and
10. Preferred mortgage registered prior in time.
MERCHANT VESSEL
Vessel engaged in maritime commerce, whether foreign or otherwise.
Constitutes property which may be acquired and transferred by any of the
means recognized by law. They shall continue to be considered as
personal property. (Arts. 573, 585 Code of Commerce)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 49
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
3. Freightage; and
4. Insurance proceeds. (Chua v. IAC, 166 SCRA 183[1988])
o The limited liability doctrine applies not only to the goods but also in
all cases like death or injury to passengers. (Heirs of Amparo Delos
Santos vs. CA, 186 SCRA 649)
If the vessel is not entirely lost, the hypothecary nature will not apply,
unless the shipowner or the ship agent abandons the vessel.
When Applicable:
1. Civil liability for indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from
the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel
carried. (Art. 587, Code of Commerce)
2. Civil liability arising from collisions. (Art. 837, Code of Commerce)
3. Unpaid wages of the captain and the crew if the vessel and its cargo
are totally lost by reason of capture or shipwreck. (Art. 643, Code of
Commerce)
o This is not to say, however, that the limited liability rule is without
exceptions, namely: (1) where the injury or death to a passenger is due
either to the fault of the shipowner, or to the concurring negligence of the
shipowner and the captain. (Phil. Am. Gen. Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA, 273
SCRA 649,271 [1997]); (2) where the vessel is insured; and (3) in
workmen’s compensation claims. (Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA,
333 SCRA 71 [2000])
o Contrary to the theory that the limited liability rule has been rendered
obsolete by the advances in modern technology, which considerably
lessen the risks involved in maritime trade, this Court continues to apply
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 50
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
the said rule in appropriate cases. (Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA,
333 SCRA 71 [2000])
ABANDONMENT
Abandonment of the vessel is necessary to limit the liability of the
shipowner. The only instance were abandonment is dispensed with is when
the vessel is entirely lost (Luzon Stevedoring vs. CA 156 SCRA 169[1987]).
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 51
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Shipowner (proprietario) - Person who has possession, control and
management of the vessel and the consequent right to direct her navigation
and receive freight earned and paid, while his possession continues.
Not a mere agent under civil law; he is solidarily liable with the ship owner.
Duty of Ship Agent to Discharge the Captain and Members of the Crew
If the seamen contract is not for a definite period or voyage, he may
discharge them at his discretion. (Art. 603, Code of Commerce)
If for a definite period, he may not discharge them until after the
fulfillment of their contracts, except on the following grounds:
- Insubordination in serious matters;
- Robbery;
- Theft;
- Habitual drunkenness;
- Damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo through malice or
manifest or proven negligence. (Art. 605, Code of Commerce)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 52
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
2. Legal capacity to contract;
3. Must have passed the required physical and mental examinations required
for licensing him as such. (Art. 609, Code of Commerce)
Duties of Captains:
1. Bring on board the proper certificate and documents and a copy of the
Code of Commerce;
2. Keep a Log Book, Accounting Book and Freight Book;
3. Examine the ship before the voyage;
4. Stay on board during the loading and unloading of the cargo;
5. Be on deck while leaving or entering the port;
6. Protest arrivals under stress and in case of shipwreck;
7. Follow instructions of and render an accounting to the ship agent;
8. Leave the vessel last in case of wreck;
9. Hold in custody properties left by deceased passengers and crew
members;
10. Comply with the requirements of customs, health, etc. at the port of arrival;
11. Observe rules to avoid collision;
12. Demand a pilot while entering or leaving a port. (Art. 612, Code of
Commerce)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 53
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
3. If the vessel should change owner or captain. (Art. 647, Code of
Commerce)
Sailing Mate/First Mate: Second chief of the vessel who takes the place of
the captain in case of absence, sickness, or death and shall assume all of his
duties, powers and responsibilities. (Art. 627, Code of Commerce)
Crew: The aggregate of seamen who man a ship, or the ship’s company.
Hired by the ship agent, where he is present and in his absence, the
captain hires them, preferring Filipinos, and in their absence, he may take
in foreigners, but not exceeding 1/5 of the crew. (Art. 634, Code of
Commerce)
SUPERCARGOES
Persons who discharge administrative duties assigned to them by ship
agent or shippers, keeping an account and record of transaction as required
in the accounting book of the captain. (Art. 649, Code of Commerce)
PILOT
A person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of
ports, or in certain waters.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 54
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
channel, or from a port.
Master pro hac vice (for the time being) in the command and
navigation of the ship.
Liability of Pilot
General Rule: On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot is
responsible for damage to a vessel or to life or property due to his negligence.
Exceptions:
1. Accident caused by force majeure or natural calamity provided the pilot
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damages.
2. Countermand or overrule by the master of the vessel in which case the
registered owner of the vessel is liable. (Sec.11, Art.III Philippine Ports
Authority Administrative Order 03-85)
DESERTION
An act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel before
the expiration of his term of duty without leave and without intention to return.
(Singa Ship Management Phils. v. NLRC 276 SCRA 201[1997])
CAUSES OF REVOCATION OF VOYAGE
1. War or interdiction of commerce;
2. Blockade;
3. Prohibition to receive cargo at destination;
4. Embargo;
5. Inability of the vessel to navigate. (Art. 640, Code of Commerce)
Terms:
1. Interdiction of Commerce – A governmental prohibition of commercial
intercourse intended to bring about an entire cessation for the time being
of all trade whatever.
2. Blockade – A sort of circumvallation of a place by which all foreign
connection and correspondence is, as far as human power can effect it, to
be cut off.
3. Embargo – A proclamation or order of a state, usually issued in time of
war or threatened hostilities, prohibiting the departure of ships or goods
from some or all the ports of such state until further order.
Vessels
LOPEZ VS. DURUELO 52 PHIL 229
Issue: Whether the motorboat Jison is a vessel provided for by Article 835 of
the Code of Commerce?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 55
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: The word vessel as used in the third section of tile IV, Book III of the
Code of Commerce, dealing with collisions, does not include all ships, craft or
floating structures of any kind without limitation. The said section does not
apply to minor craft engaged in a river and bay traffic.Therefore, a passenger
on boat like the Jison, is not required to make protest as a condition
precedent to his right of action for the injury suffered by him in the collision
described in the complaint.Article 835 of the Code of Commerce does not
apply.
Facts: The counsel of plaintiff brought a suit alleging that his clients were the
owners of the pilot boat named Valentine, which has been in bad condition
and on the date of the complaint, was stranded in the place called Tingly, of
the municipality of Battings. The defendant Rivera took charge or took
possession of the said boat without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff
and refused to deliver it to them, under the claim that he was the owner
thereof. The refusal on the part of the defendant has caused the plaintiff
damages because they were unable to derive profit from the voyages for
which the said pilot boat was customarily used. The defendant, on the other
hand, alleged that they purchased the subject pilot boat. The plaintiff alleged
that the sale on behalf of the defendant Rivera was prior to that made at
public auction to Rubio, but the registration of this latter sale was prior to the
sale made to the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not, the plaintiff still has the better right over the subject
vessel?
Issue: Whether or not in order to claim limited liability under Article 837 of the
Code of Commerce, it is necessary that the owner abandon the vessel
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 56
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: Yes, abandonment is necessary to claim the limited liability wherein it
shall be limited to the value of the vessel with all the appurtenances and
freightage earned in the voyage. However, if the injury was due to the ship
owner’s fault, the ship owner may not avail of his right to avail of limited
liability by abandoning the vessel.
The real nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent is embodied in
the Code of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and 837 are intended to limit the
liability of the ship owner, provided that the owner or agent abandons the
vessel. Although Article 837 does not specifically provide that in case of
collision there should be abandonment, to enjoy such limited liability, said
article is a mere amplification of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 which
makes it a mere superfluity.
The exception to this rule in Article 837 is when the vessel is totally lost
in which case there is no vessel to abandon, thus abandonment is not
required. Because of such loss, the liability of the owner or agent is
extinguished. However, they are still personally liable for claims under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and for repairs on the vessel prior to its loss.
In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain, the liability of the owner
and agent is subsidiary. In such cases, the owner or agent may avail of
Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. But if the injury is caused by the
owner’s fault as where he engages the services of an inexperienced captain
or engineer, he cannot avail of the provisions of Article 837 by abandoning the
vessel. He is personally liable for such damages.
In this case, the Court held that the petitioner is a t fault and since he
did not abandon the vessel, he cannot invoke the benefit of Article 837 to limit
his liability to the value of the vessel, all appurtenances and freightage earned
during the voyage.
Facts: On the afternoon of May 26, 1927, the steamer SS Negros left the port
of Romblon on its return trip to Manila. Typhoon signal no. 2 was then up and
in fact, the passengers duly advised the captain before sailing. The boat was
overloaded. After 2 hours of sailing, the boat encountered strong winds and
rough seas between the islands of Banton and Simara. While in the act of
maneuvering, the vessel was caught sidewise by a big wave which caused it
to capsize and sink. Many of the passengers died on the mishap. Civil actions
were instituted in the CFI of Capiz, the petitioner sought to abandon the
vessel to the plaintiffs in three cases.
Issue: Whether the shipowner or agent is liable for damages for the
consequent death of its passengers notwithstanding the total loss of the
vessel?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 57
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
MANILA STEAMSHIP CO. INC. VS. INSA ABDULHAMAN (100 PHIL 32)
Facts: Insa Abdulhaman together with his wife and five children boarded M/L
Consuelo V in Zamboanga City. The said ship was bound for Siokon under
the command of Faustino Macrohon. On that same night, M/S Bowline Knot
was navigating from Marijoboc towards Zamboanga.
Around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening of May 4, 1948, while some of the
passengers of the M/L Consuelo V were then sleeping and some lying down
awake, a shocking collision suddenly occurred. The ship that collided was
later on identified as the M/V Bowline Knot. M/L Consuelo V capsized that
resulted to the death of 9 passengers and the loss of the cargoes on board.
The Court held the owners of both vessels solidarily liable to plaintiff
for damages caused to the latter under Article 827 of the Code of Commerce
but exempted defendant Lim Hong To from liability due to the sinking and total
loss of his vessel. While Manila steamship, owner of the Bowline Knot was
ordered to pay all of plaintiff’s damages.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Manila Steamship Co. is exempt from any
liability under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?
Held: NO. Petitioner is not exempted from liabilities. While it is true that
plaintiff’s action against petitioner is based on a tort or quasi delict, the tort in
question is not a civil tort under the Civil Code but a maritime tort resulting in
a collision at sea, governed by Articles 826-939 of the Code of Commerce.
Under Art. 827 of the Code of Commerce, in case of collision between two
vessels imputable to both of them, each vessel shall suffer her own damage
and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their
cargoes. The shipowner is directly and primarily responsible in tort resulting in
a collision at sea, and it may not escape liability on the ground that exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the vessel’s officers and
crew.
FACTS: The litigation involves a claim for damages for the loss at sea of
petitioners’ respective children after the shipwreck of MV Pioneer Cebu due to
typhoon “Klaring” in May of 1966. When the inter-island vessel MV Pioneer
Cebu left the Port of Manila in the early morning of May 15, 1966 bound for
Cebu, it had on board the spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo
and a four-year old boy, Mario Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV
Pioneer Cebu encountered typhoon Klaring and struck a reef on the southern
part of Malapascua Island, located somewhere north of island of Cebu and
subsequently sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from
since then.
Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for damages before
the Court Instance of Manila. Respondent defended on the plea of force
majeure, and extinction of its liability by the actual loss of the vessel. After
proper proceedings, the trial court awarded damages. On appeal, respondent
Court reversed judgment and absolved private respondent from any liability.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 58
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: With respect for the private respondent’s submission that the total loss
of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce as construed in Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330 (1941), suffice it
to state that even in the cited case, it was held that the liability of the
shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon,
Despite the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the
damages that the shipowner’s agent may be held liable for by reason of the
death of its passengers. Judgment of the CFI reinstated.
Facts: The M/S San Diego II and the M/S Bartolome, while engaged in
fishing operations around Mindoro Island on Oct. 1, 1941 were caught by a
typhoon as a consequence of which they were sunk and totally lost. Amado
Nuñez, Victoriano Salvacion and Francisco Oching while acting in their
capacities perished in the shipwreck.
Counsel for the appellant cite article 587 of the Code of Commerce
which provides that if the vessel together with all her tackle and freight money
earned during the voyage are abandoned, the agent's liability to third persons
for tortious acts of the captain in the care of the goods which the ship carried
is extinguished; article 837 of the same code which provides that in cases of
collision, the ship owners' liability is limited to the value of the vessel with all
her equipment and freight earned during the voyage (Philippine Shipping
company vs. Garcia, 6 Phil., 281), and article 643 of the same Code which
provides that if the vessel and freight are totally lost, the agent's liability for
wages of the crew is extinguished. From these premises counsel draw the
conclusion that appellant's liability, as owner of the two motor ships lost or
sunk as a result of the typhoon that lashed the island of Mindoro on October
1, 1941, was extinguished.
Issue: Whether the liability of the shipowner is extinguished by the total loss
of the ship?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 59
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Doctrine of Limited Liability, Art. 587
ABOITIZ SHIPPING VS. GENERAL ACCIDENT FIRE AND LIFE (GR NO.
100446 JANUARY 21, 1993)
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of limited liability is applicable to the case?
Held: The real an hypothecary nature of maritime law simple means that the
liability of the carrier in connection with losses related to maritime contracts is
confined to the vessel, which is hypothecated for such obligations or which
stands as the guaranty for their settlement. It has its origin by reason of the
conditions and risks attending maritime trade in its earliest years when such
trade was replete with innumerable and unknown hazards since vessels had
to go through largely uncharted waters to ply their trade. Thus, the liability of
the vessel owner and agent arising form the operation of such vessel were
confined to the vessel itself, its equipment, freight and insurance, if any, which
limitation served to induce capitalist into effectively wagering their resources
against consideration of the large attainable in the trade.
Facts: On or about June 19, 1998, Cheng Hwa Pulp Corp. shipped 5,000
bales of bleached kraft pulp from Haulien, Taiwan on board “SS Kaunlaran”
(owned by National Marine Corporation). The shipment was consigned to
Mayleen Paper, Inc. which insured the same with American Home Assurance
Co. On June 22, 1998, the shipment arrived in manila and was discharged
onto the custody of the Marina Port Services, Inc. However, upon delivery to
Mayleen Paper Inc., it was found that 122 bales had either been damaged or
lost with the value of P61, 263.41.
Mayleen Paper Inc, duly demanded indemnification from NMC but was
not heeded. Mayleen then sought recovery from American Home Assurance,
the insurer, which was adjusted to P31, 506.75. As subrogee, American Home
then filed a suit against NMC for the recovery of the said amount. NMC filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no cause of action based on
Art 848 of the Code of Commerce which provides “that claims for averages
shall not be admitted if they do not exceed 5% of the interest which the
claimant may have in the vessel or in the cargo if it be gross average and 1%
of the goods damaged if particular average, deducting in both cases the
expenses of appraisal, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. NMC
contended that based on the allegations of the complaint, the loss sustained
in the case was P35, 506.75 which is only .18% of P17.420.000.00, the total
value of the cargo.
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. American
Home then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which later
dismissed as constituting plain errors of law. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the law on averages applies when there is negligence?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 60
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: NO. Common carriers cannot limit their liability for injury or loss of
goods where such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence. Otherwise
stated, the law on averages under the Code of Commerce cannot be applied
in determining liability where there is negligence. It is reasonable to conclude
that the issue of negligence must first be addressed before the proper
provisions of the Code of Commerce on the extent of liability may be applied.
After the fire was extinguished, the cargoes which were saved were
loaded to another vessel for delivery for their original of port of destination.
ESLI charged the consignees several amounts corresponding to additional
freight and salvage charges. The charges were all paid by Philippine Home
Assurance Corporation (PHAC) under protest for and in behalf of the
consignees. PHAC, as subrogee of the consignees, thereafter filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, against ESLI
to recover the sum paid under protest on the ground that the same were
actually damages directly brought about by the fault, negligence, illegal act
and/or breach of contract of ESLI.
The trial court dismissed the PHAC’s complaint and ruled in favor of
ESLI. The court said that the Supreme Court has ruled in Erlanger and
Galinger vs. Swedish East Asiatic Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 178, that three elements
are (1) a marine peril (2) service voluntary rendered when not required as an
existing duty or from a special contract and (3) success in whole or in part, or
that the service rendered contributed to such success. The court said that the
above elements are all present in the instant case. Salvage charges may thus
be assessed on the cargoes saved from the vessel. As provided for in Section
13 of the Salvage Law, “The expenses of salvage, as well as the reward for
salvage or assistance shall be a charge on the things salvaged or their value.”
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Macondray Co., 37 Phil. 583. It was also held that
“When a ship and its cargo are saved together, the salvage allowance should
be charged against the ship and the cargo in the proportion of their respective
values, the same as in the case of general average…” Thus, the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 61
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
“compensation to be paid by the owner of the cargo is in proportion to the
value of the vessel and the value of the cargo saved.”
The Court reversed and set aside the judgment of the respondent court
and ordered respondent Eastern Shipping Lines. Inc. to return to petitioner
Philippine Home Assurance Corporation the amount it paid under protest in
behalf of the consignees.
Requisites:
1. Valid object of salvage; valid object of salvage; that the vessel is
shipwrecked beyond the control of the crew or shall have been
abandoned;
2. Object must have been exposed to marine peril (not perils of the ship);
3. Services rendered voluntarily (neither an existing duty nor out of a pre-
existing contract);
4. Services are successful, total or partial.
Subjects of Salvage:
1. Ship itself;
2. Jetsam – goods which are cast into the sea, and there sink and remain
under water;
3. Floatsam or Flotsam – goods which float upon the sea when cast
overboard;
4. Ligan or Lagan – goods cast into the sea tied to a buoy, so that they may
be found again by the owners (Diaz, Notes on Transportation Law, p.173).
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 62
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Persons Who Have No Right to a Reward for Salvage:
1. Crew of the vessel saved;
2. Person who commenced Salvage in spite of opposition of the Captain
or his representative;
3. In accordance with Sec. 3 of the Salvage Law, a person who fails to
deliver a salvaged vessel or cargo to the Collector of Customs.
DERELICT
A ship or her cargo which is abandoned and deserted at sea by those who
are in charge of it, without any hope of recovering it, or without any intention
of returning to it.
CONTRACT OF TOWAGE
A contract whereby one vessel, usually motorized, pulls another, whether
loaded or not with merchandise, from one place to another, for a
compensation. It is a contract for services rather than a contract of carriage.
Facts: Honorio Barrios was the captain and master of the MV Henry I
operated by William Lines, Inc. which plied the route from Cebu to Davao
City. On its voyage on May 1, 1958 the MV Henry I intercepted an SOS
signal from the MV Don Alfredo owned and operated by Go Thong & Co.
Responding to the SOS, Henry I approached the Don Alfredo and found out
that the Don Alfredo was suffering from engine failure. After agreeing to
assist the disabled ship, the crew of Henry I attached tow lines and
proceeded to tow the Don Alfredo heading towards the port of Dumaguete
City. The following morning, they encountered a sister ship of Don Alfredo,
the MV Lux. Upon the request of the captain of the Don Alfredo, the crew of
the Henry I released the towlines and continued on their voyage.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 63
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: No. Not all the requisites were present for the rescue to be considered
as salvage under the law.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 64
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Contents of Charter Party Agreement
Besides the condition freely stipulated, it shall include the following:
1. Kind, name and tonnage of the vessel;
2. Her flag and port of registry;
3. Name, surname and domicile of the captain;
4. Name, surname and domicile of the ship agent, and if the latter
should make the carter party;
5. Name, surname and domicile of the charterer, and if he states
that he is acting by commission, that of the person for whose account he
makes the contract;
6. Port of loading and unloading;
7. Capacity, the number or tons or weight, or measure which they
respectively bind themselves to load and transport, or whether it is the
total cargo;
8. Freightage to be paid;
9. Amount of primage to be paid by the captain;
10. Days agreed upon for loading and unloading;
11. Lay Days and extra lay days to be allowed and the rate of
demurrage.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 65
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
A. Of the Owner or Ship Agent:
1. If the vessel is chartered wholly, not to accept cargo from others;
2. To observe represented capacity;
3. To unload cargo clandestinely placed;
4. To substitute another vessel if load is less than 3/5 of capacity;
5. To leave the port if the charterer does not bring the cargo within
the lay days and extra lay days allowed;
6. To place in a vessel in a condition navigate; and
7. To bring cargo to nearest neutral port in case of war or
blockade. (Art.669-678, Code of Commerce)
B. Of the Charterer:
1. To pay the agreed charter price;
2. To pay freightage on unboarded cargo;
3. To pay losses to others for loading uncontracted cargo or illicit
cargo;
4. To wait if the vessel needs repair;
5. To pay expenses for deviation. (Art. 679-687, Code of
Commerce)
B. At Shipowner’s Request:
1. If the extra lay days terminate without the cargo being placed
alongside the vessel;
2. Sale by the owner of the vessel before loading the charterer.
C. Fortuitous causes:
1. War;
2. Blockade;
3. Prohibition to receive cargo;
4. Embargo; and
5. Inability of the vessel to navigate.
LAY DAYS: Days allowed to charter parties for loading and unloading the
cargo.
EXTRA LAY DAYS: Days which follow after the lay days have elapsed.
BILL OF LADING
Written acknowledgment of receipt of goods and agreement to transport
them to a specific place to a person named or to his order. (Compania
Maritima v. Insurance Comp. of North America, 12 SCRA 213)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 66
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
The consignee and the shipper who accepts a bill of lading even
without signing are bound by the terms and conditions thereof. (Keng
Hua Paper Products v. CA 286 SCRA 257[1998])
Acceptance of the consignee is implied if he claims reimbursement for
missing goods and files a case based on the bill of lading. (Belgian
Overseas Chartering v. Phil. First Insurance, 383 SCRA 23 [2002])
TRANSSHIPMENT OF GOODS
The act of taking cargo out of one ship and loading it in another, or the
transfer of goods from the vessel stipulated in the contract of affreightment to
another vessel before the place of destination named in the contract has been
reached, or the transfer for further transportation from one ship or
conveyance to another.
LOAN ON BOTTOMRY
Loan made by shipowner or ship agent guaranteed by the vessel itself and
repayable upon arrival of vessel at destination.
LOAN ON RESPONDENTIA
Loan taken on security of cargo laden on a vessel and repayable upon
safe arrival of cargo at destination.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 67
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Who may Contract
1. Bottomry: the owner; if owner is absent – captain.
2. Respondentia: only the owner of he cargo.
The parties to a loan, whether ordinary or maritime, may agree on any rate
of interest (CB Circular 905); provided the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code)
A. AVERAGE
An extraordinary or accidental expense incurred during the voyage in
order to preserve the cargo, vessel or both, and all damages or
deterioration suffered by the vessel from departure to the port of
destination, and to the cargo from the port of loading to the port of
consignment. (Art. 806, Code of Commerce)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 68
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
CLASSES OF AVERAGES:
1. Gross or General Average
2. Particular or Simple Average
Where both vessel and cargo are saved, it is general average; where
only the vessel or only the cargo is saved, it is particular average.
Jettisoned goods are not res nullius nor deemed “abandoned” within
the meaning of civil law so as to be the object of occupation by
salvage.
In order that the jettisoned goods may be included in the gross or
general average, the existence of the cargo on board should be proven
by means of the bill of lading. (Art. 816, Code of Commerce)
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 69
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Under the York-Antwerp Rules, deck cargo is permitted in Coastwise
Shipping but prohibited in Overseas Shipping.
1. If deck cargo is located with the consent of the shipper on overseas
trade, it must always contribute to general average, but should the
same be jettisoned, it would not be entitled to reimbursement
because there is a violation of the York-Antwerp Rules.
2. If the deck cargo is located with the consent of the shipper on
coastwise shipping, it must always contribute to general average
and if jettisoned would be entitled to reimbursement.
Domestic International
Deck cargo is allowed Deck cargo is not allowed
With shipper’s consent
General average Particular average
Without shipper’s consent
Captain is liable Captain is liable
In such arrival the captain must file a protest which is merely a disclaimer.
▪ It is the duty of the captain to continue the voyage without delay after the
cause of the arrival under stress has ceased failing in such duty renders
him liable. However, in case the cause has been risk of enemies, there
must first be an assembly before departure. (Art. 825, Code of
Commerce)
C. COLLISION
The impact of two moving vessels.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 70
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
c. 3rd zone – time when collision has become a practicable certainty to
the point of actual impact.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 71
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Error in Extremis
Sudden movement made by a faultless vessel during the third zone of
collision with another vessel which is at fault during the 2nd zone. Even if
such sudden movement is wrong, no responsibility will fall on said
faultless vessel. (Urrutia and Co. v. Baco River Plantation Co., 26 Phil.
632)
Rules on Liability in Collision and Allision
Consequential Damages Covered:
1. Damages caused to vessel
2. Damages caused to the passenger
3. Damages caused to the cargo
Rule:
1. One vessel at fault
Vessel at fault is liable for damage caused to the vessel,
passenger, and cargoes of both vessels. (Art. 826, CoC)
2. Both Vessels At Fault
Each vessel must bear its own loss, but as to the other damages,
the passenger and cargoes, they shall be both solidarily liable. (Art.
827, CoC)
3. Vessel at fault not known
Each vessel must bear its own loss, but both shall be solidarily
liable for losses and damages on the cargoes. (Art. 828, CoC)
MARITIME PROTEST
It is a written statement made under oath by the captain of a vessel after
the occurrence of an accident or disaster in which the vessel or cargo is lost
or damaged, with respect to the circumstances attending such occurrence, for
the purpose of recovering losses and damages.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 72
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Excuses for not filing protest: 1) where the interested person is not on
board the vessel; and 2) on collision time, need not be protested. (Art.
836, Code of Commerce)
D. SHIPWRECK
It is the loss of the vessel at sea as a consequence of its grounding, or
running against an object in sea or on the coast. It occurs when the vessel
sustains injuries due to a marine peril rendering her incapable of
navigation.
If the wreck was due to malice, negligence or lack of skill of the captain, or
because the vessel put to sea was insufficiently repaired and equipped;
the owner of the vessel may demand indemnity from said captain. (Art.
841, Code of Commerce)
Facts: Petitioner Litonjua is the duly appointed local crewing Managing Office
of the Fairwind Shipping Corporation ('Fairwind). The M/V Dufton Bay is an
ocean-going vessel of foreign registry owned by the R.D. Mullion Ship
Broking Agency Ltd. ("Mullion"). On 11 September 1976, while the Dufton Bay
was in the port of Cebu and while under charter by Fairwind, the vessel's
master contracted the services of, among others, private respondent Gregorio
Candongo to serve as Third Engineer for a period of twelve (12) months with
a monthly wage of US$500.00. This agreement was executed before the
Cebu Area Manning Unit of the NSB. Thereafter, private respondent boarded
the vessel. On 28 December 1976, before expiration of his contract, private
respondent was required to disembark at Port Kelang, Malaysia, and was
returned to the Philippines on 5 January 1977. The cause of the discharge
was described in his Seaman's Book as 'by owner's arrange".
Shortly after returning to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint
before public respondent NSB, which complaint was docketed as NSB-1331-
77, for violation of contract, against Mullion as the shipping company and
petitioner Litonjua as agent of the shipowner and of the charterer of the
vessel.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 73
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Issues: Whether or no the admiralty law as embodied in the Philippine Code
of Commerce fastens liability for payment of the crew's wages upon the ship
owner, and not the charterer.
Held: The first basis is the charter party which existed between Mullion, the
shipowner, and Fairwind, the charterer. In modern maritime law and usage,
there are three (3) distinguishable types of charter parties: (a) the "bareboat"
or "demise" charter; (b) the "time" charter; and (c) the "voyage" or "trip"
charter. A bareboat or demise charter is a demise of a vessel, much as a
lease of an unfurnished house is a demise of real property. The shipowner
turns over possession of his vessel to the charterer, who then undertakes to
provide a crew and victuals and supplies and fuel for her during the term of
the charter. The shipowner is not normally required by the terms of a demise
charter to provide a crew, and so the charterer gets the "bare boat", i.e.,
without a crew. Sometimes, of course, the demise charter might provide that
the shipowner is to furnish a master and crew to man the vessel under the
charterer's direction, such that the master and crew provided by the
shipowner become the agents and servants or employees of the charterer,
and the charterer (and not the owner) through the agency of the master, has
possession and control of the vessel during the charter period. A time charter,
upon the other hand, like a demise charter, is a contract for the use of a
vessel for a specified period of time or for the duration of one or more
specified voyages. In this case, however, the owner of a time-chartered
vessel (unlike the owner of a vessel under a demise or bare-boat charter),
retains possession and control through the master and crew who remain his
employees. What the time charterer acquires is the right to utilize the carrying
capacity and facilities of the vessel and to designate her destinations during
the term of the charter. A voyage charter, or trip charter, is simply a contract of
affreightment, that is, a contract for the carriage of goods, from one or more
ports of loading to one or more ports of unloading, on one or on a series of
voyages. In a voyage charter, master and crew remain in the employ of the
owner of the vessel.
Facts: On January 16, 1984, plaintiff entered into an agreement with Seven
Brothers Shipping corporation whereby the latter undertook to load on board
its vessel M/V Seven Ambassadors 940 Lauan round logs for shipment from
Isabela to Manila. On January 20, plaintiff insured the cargo with South Sea
Surety and Insurance for two million pesos. However on January 25, 1984,
the M/V Seven Ambassador sank, resulting in the loss of petitioners’ logs.
Pursuant to the loss, petitioner filed a claim with South Sea Surety and
Insurance for the insured amount of the logs, but the latter refused, denying
liability under the policy. Petitioner likewise filed a formal claim against Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs, but the latter
likewise denied their claim.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, holding South Sea and Seven
Brothers liable for the loss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part
the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the liability of
South Sea Surety and Assurance but exonerated Seven Brothers, stating that
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 74
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
the latter is a private carrier therefore the provisions on common carriers is
not applicable to their contract. Hence the present appeal.
Held: The decision of the Court of appeals is correct. The contract between
petitioner and Seven Brothers is one of Private Carriage hence the provisions
on common carriage do not apply. In a contract of private carriage parties are
free to stipulate that the responsibility for the cargo rests solely in the
charterer, such stipulations are valid because they are freely entered into by
the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public
order or public policy.
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no
fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its
undertaking of taking the private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place,
mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that
exempts the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting
arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for
the delay of departure. When the vessel finally left the port, there was no
longer any force majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.
Facts: Plaintiff (herein private respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo) bought a ticket
from herein petitioner for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand Vessel to Cagayan
de Oro from Cebu City. Arroyo boarded the vessel in the evening of
November 12, 1991 at around 5:30. At that instance, plaintiff noticed that
some repair works were being undertaken on the evening of the vessel. The
vessel departed at around 11:00 in the evening with only one engine running.
After an hour of slow voyage, vessel stopped near Kawit Island and
dropped its anchor threat. After an hour of stillness, some passenger
demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they were no
longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The captain
acceded to their request and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu City. At
Cebu City, the plaintiff together with the other passengers who requested to
be brought back to Cebu City was allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the
vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Plaintiff, the next day boarded the
M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a vessel of
the defendant.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 75
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place pf
destination on November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against the defendant.
Held: Undoubtedly, there was, between the petitioner and private respondent
a contract of carriage. Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was
bound to observed extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private
respondent. That meant that the petitioner was pursuant to the Article 1755 off
the said Code, bound to carry the private respondent safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case, the Supreme
Court is in full accord with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed or
discharged this obligation.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act. No. 65; Public Act
No. 521, 74th US Congress)
The Civil Code and the Code of Commerce is suppletory to COGSA in the
carriage of goods from foreign ports to the Philippines.
The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods. (Art 1753, NCC)
The Civil Code is the primary law on goods that are being shipped from a
foreign port to the Philippines. However, COGSA remains to be a
suppletory law for international shipping.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 76
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Amount of Carrier’s Liability
Under the Sec. 4(5), the liability limit is set at $500 per package or
customary freight unit unless the nature and value of such goods is
declared by the shipper. This is deemed incorporated in the bill of lading
even if not mentioned in it. (Eastern Shipping vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 463)
Notice of Damage
a. Patent Damage: shipper should file a claim with the carrier immediately
upon delivery
b. Latent Damage: shipper should file a claim with the carrier within three
days from delivery.
The filing of a notice of claim is not a condition precedent.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
1. Coastwise or within the Philippines
When to file a claim with carrier – condition precedent – if goods arrived
in damaged condition, claim must be filed by the shipper within the
following period otherwise recovery is barred:
a. Immediately – if damage is apparent; or
b. Within 24 hours from delivery – if damage is not apparent.
Under the COGSA, suits for loss or damage to the cargo should be
brought within one year after:
1. Delivery of the goods; or
2. The date when goods should have been delivered.
The one-year period shall run from delivery of the last package and is not
suspended by extrajudicial demand. Reasons:
1. Matters affecting transportation of goods by sea should be decided at
the shortest time possible.
2. The Civil Code does not apply to a special law like COGSA.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 77
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
goods had perished, gave out of commerce, or disappeared in such a way
that their existence is unknown or cannot be recovered. It starts from
delivery to the arrastre operator, not consignee. A stipulation reducing the
one year period is null and void but a written agreement to suspend it is
valid.
The rule applies in cases of collision, but it starts not from the date of
collision, but when the goods should have been delivered had the cargoes
been saved.
This one year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the
consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of
lading. (Filipino Merchants Insurance Co., Inc. v. Alejandro, 145 SCRA
42)
In Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. CA (315 SCRA 339), the SC ruled that a
claim is not barred by prescription as long as the one year period has not
lapsed. (Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. v. Philippine
First Insurance Co., Inc. 383 SCRA 23 [2002])
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 78
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Facts: Yau Yue Commercial Bank of Hongkong agreed to sell 140 packages
of galvanized steel durzinc sheets to Herminio Teves for $32,458.26. Said
agreement was subject to the following terms: the purchase price should be
covered by a bank draft which should be paid by Teves in exchange for the
delivery to him of the bill of lading to be deposited with honking and Shanghai
Bank of Manila; that Teves would present said bill of lading to carrier’s agent,
American Steamship Agencies which would then issue the “permit to deliver
imported articles” to be presented to the Bureau of customs to obtain the
release of the articles.
Yau Yue shipped the articles aboard S.S. Tensai Maru owned by
Nissho Shipping Co., of which the American Shipping is the agent in the
Philippines.
Held: The provision of the law speaks of “loss or damage”. But there was no
damage caused to the goods which were delivered intact to Herminio Teves.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 79
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
(145 SCRA 42)
Facts: Plaintiff Choa Tiek Seng filed a complaint against the petitioner before
the then Court of First Instance of Manila for recovery of a sum of money
under the marine insurance policy on cargo. Mr. Choa alleged that the goods
he insured with the petitioner sustained loss and damage in the amount of
P35, 987.26. The said goods were delivered to the arrastre operator E.
Razon, Inc., on December 17, 1976 and on the same date were received by
the consignee-plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the one-year period within which to file a suit against
the carrier and the ship, in case of damage or loss as provided for in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies to the insurer of the goods.
Held: The coverage of the Act includes the insurer of the goods. Otherwise,
what the Act intends to prohibit after the lapse of the one-year prescriptive
period can be done indirectly by the shipper or owner of the goods by simply
filing a claim against the insurer even after the lapse of one year. This would
be the result if we follow the petitioner's argument that the insurer can, at any
time, proceed against the carrier and the ship since it is not bound by the
time-bar provision. In this situation, the one-year limitation will be practically
useless. This could not have been the intention of the law which has also for
its purpose the protection of the carrier and the ship from fraudulent claims by
having "matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as
short a time as possible" and by avoiding incidents which would
"unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of
questions affecting the transportation."
In the case at bar, the petitioner's action has prescribed under the
provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Hence, whether it files a
third-party complaint or chooses to maintain an independent action against
herein respondents is of no moment.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 80
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
the said items to Hong Kong. Prior to shipment the items were insured
against all risks with respondent South Sea Surety and Insurance Co. and
Charter Insurance Corp for $212,772.09 with South Sea and $149,470 with
Charter.
Respondents paid part of the petitioner’s demand but declined the rest
claiming that the insurance surveyor’s report allegedly showed that the
damage was a factory defect and hence not covered by the insurance
policies. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner finding the damage not
caused by manufacturing defects. It also noted that the insurance contract
insured against “all risks” or all causes of conceivable loss or damage save
those caused by fraud or intentional misconduct. At the court of appeals the
CA found the “all risks” provision covered the damage endured but set aside
the decision because the complaint had been bared by prescription. Sec 3(6)
of the COGSA specifically bared it because it had been more than 1 year
since the damage had been done before the demand was made.
Ratio: Sec 3(6) of the COGSA covers only the liability of the carrier
which is extinguished if no suit is brought within a period of one year.
However, the liability of the insurer is not extinguished because the COGSA
governs the relationship between carrier and shipper, and consignee and
insurer. It defines a contract of carriage. The relationship at bar is properly
governed by the Insurance code. Thus the CA’s finding of prescription as per
the COGSA is overturned.
Facts: A PAL ticket, on the reverse side, stated in fine print that if the value of
baggage is not stated, and the baggage is lost, the maximum liability of PAL is
P100.00 if value in excess of P100.00 is stated, PAL will charge extra
because PAL is being held liable for an amount exceeding P100.00.
Shewaram, a Hindu from Davao, boarded a PAL plane for Manila. Among his
baggage was a camera with P800.00 and it was lost. PAL offered to pay
P100.00. Shewaram wanted full payment of P800.00.
Issue: Whether the limited liability rule shall apply in the case at bar?
Held: The limited liability rule shall not apply. Since this is a stipulation on
qualified liability, which operates to reduce the liability of the carrier, the
carrier and the shipper must agree thereupon. Otherwise, the carrier will be
liable for full. PAL is fully liable (for full) because Shewaran did not agree to
the stipulation on the ticket, as manifested by the fact that Shewaram did not
sign the ticket. Ticket should have been signed.
Facts: On august 26, 1967, Ong Yiu was a fare paying passenger of
respondent PAL from Mactan, Cebu to Butuan City wherein he was scheduled
to attend a trial. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggae, blue
maleta for which he was issued a claim ticket. Upon arrival at Butuan City,
petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. PAL Butuan sent a
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 81
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
message to PAL Cebu which in turn sent a message to PAL Manila that same
afternoon. PAL Manila advised PAL Cebu that the luggage has been
overcarried to Manila and that it would be forwarded to PAL Cebu that same
day. PAL Cebu then advised PAL Butuan that the luggage will be forwarded
the following day, on scheduled morning flight. This message was not
received by PAL Butuan as all the personnel had already gone for the day.
Meanwhile, Ong Yiu was worried about the missing luggage because it
contained vital documents needed for the trial the next day so he wired PAL
Cebu demanding delivery of his luggage before noon that next day or he
would hold PAL liable for damages based on gross negligence. Early
morning, petitioner went to the Butuan Airport to inquire about the luggage but
did not wait for the arrival of the morning flight at 10:00am. which carried his
luggage. A certain Dagorro, a driver of a colorum car, who also used to drive
the petitioner volunteered to take the luggage to the petitioner. He revelaed
that the documents were lost. Ong Yiu demanded from PAL Cebu actual and
compensatory damages as an incident of breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not PAL is guilty of only simple negligence and not gross
negligence?
Whether the doctrine of limited liability doctrine applies in the instant
case?
Held: PAL had not acted in bad faith. It exercised due diligence in looking for
petitioner’s luggage which had been miscarried. Had petitioner waited or
caused someone to wait at the airport for the arrival of the morning flight
which carried his luggage, he would have been able to retrieve his luggage
sooner. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or fraud, the petitioner is
not entitled to moral damages. Neither is he entitled to exemplary damages
absent any proof that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless
manner.
The limited liability applies in this case. On the presumed negligence of
PAL, its liability for the loss however, is limited on the stipulation written on the
back of the plane
Ticket which is P100 per baggage. The petitioner not having declared a
greater value and not having called the attention of PAL on its true value and
paid the tariff therefore. The stipulation is printed in reasonably and fairly big
letters and is easily readable. Moreso, petitioner had been a frequent
passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and back and he being a lawyer
and a businessman, must be fully aware of these conditions.
PUBLIC SERVICE
- Includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or
control in the Philippines for hire or compensation, with general or limited
clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general
business purposes, any common carrier or public utility, ice plants, power and
water supplies, communication and similar public services. (Sec. 13b, CA
146)
The Public Service Commission created under the Public Service Law has
already been abolished under P.D. No. 1 and other issuances. It has been
replaced by the following government agencies: LTO; LTFRB; ATO; BOE;
NTC; NEA; ERB; NWRC; CAB; and Marina.
Three-Fold Purpose:
1. To protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor,
inefficient service;
2. To protect and secure investments in public services;
3. To prevent ruinous competition.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 82
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
AUTHORITY TO OPERATE PUBLIC SERVICES
General Rule: No public service shall operate without having been issued a
certificate of public convenience or a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
Exceptions:
1. Warehouses;
2. Animal drawn vehicles and bancas moved by oar or sail;
3. Airships, except for the fixing of maximum rates for fare and freight;
4. Radio companies, except for rates fixing;
5. Public services owned or operated by the government, except as to rates
fixing;
6. Ice plants; and
7. Public markets.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
- Privately owned and operated business whose services are essential to the
general public.
A foreigner can own a public utility. The right to operate a public utility
may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the
facilities thereof. One can own facilities without operating them as
utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning
the facilities used to serve the public.
FRANCHISE
Is a special privilege and its terms and conditions are specifically
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 83
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
prescribed by Congress. Thus, the manner of granting the franchise, to whom
it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the character and
quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public
in exercising the franchise are defined in clear and unequivocal language by
the legislature. These conditionalities are made more stringent when the
franchise involves the operation of a game played for bets, such as jai-alai,
which is conceded as a menace to morality. Franchises are granted in accord
with this universal principle. (Del Mar v. PAGCOR 358 SCRA 775)
Under section 16 (n) of Public Service Act, the power of the Commission to
suspend or revoke any certificate may only be exercised whenever the holder
thereof has violated or willfully and contumaciously refused to comply with
any order, rule or regulation of the Commission or any provision of the Act.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 84
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
in which case, a suspension not more than 30 days may be ordered, prior
to the hearing.
The policy is not to issue a certificate to a second operator to cover the same
field and in competition with a first operator who is rendering sufficient,
adequate and satisfactory service. The prior operator must first be given an
opportunity to improve its service, if inadequate or deficient.
The granting of preference to an old operator applies only when said operator
has made as offer to meet the increase in traffic or demand for service and
not when another operator, even a new one, has made the offer to serve the
new line or increase the service on said line. The rule of preference protects
only those who are vigilant, in meeting the needs of the traveling public.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 85
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
certificate to operate a public utility in the same community over which no
person has as yet granted any certificate. If it turns out, after the hearing, that
the circumstances between the two applicants are more or less equal, then
the applicant who applied ahead of the other, will be granted the certificate.
A registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third
persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and
employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies
even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service,
(Equitable Leasing Corp vs. Suyom, 388 SCRA 445 [2002]], or otherwise
stated, to privately-owned vehicles.
RATE-FIXING POWER
The rate to be fixed must be just, founded upon conditions which are fair and
reasonable to both the owner and the public.
The policy, which prohibits the “Kabit System”, may also be applied to vessels
and aircrafts that are covered by certificates of public convenience and
necessity. Persons who do not have such certificates cannot circumvent the
law by using the certificate of another. (Sec. 23, Public Service Act)
BOUNDARY SYSTEM
Features:
The driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of
the receipt of the fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the
jeep owner.
The gasoline consumed by the jeep is for the account of the driver.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 86
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
These two features are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between the
owner and the driver from that of employer and employee. The jeepney owner
is subsidiarily liable as employer in accordance with Art.103 of RPC (Magboo
vs. Bernardo, 7 SCRA 952)
Facts: The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the
constitutionality and validity of a memorandum which, among others,
authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the LTFRB,
and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of notice and hearing and the delegation
of authority in the increase or decrease of transportation fares to provincial
bus and jeepney operators is illegal?
Held: Under Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the
legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today,
is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order 202.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the bus operators to set fares
over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid, as it is
tantamount to undue delegation of legislative authority. Under the maxim
potestas delegate non delegari potest – “what has been delegated cannot be
delegated.”
Issue: Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity or TOP even though the prospective operator does not have a
legislative franchise?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 87
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: Yes, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do so under
Republic Act 776 and a legislative franchise is not necessary before it may do
so, since Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of
domestic air transport services to the CAB, an administrative agency. The
delegation of such authority is not without limits since Congress had set
specific standard and limitations on how such authority should be exercised.
Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will
meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing
facilities do not adequately afford.
TATAD VS. GARCIA (243 SCRA 436, GR. NO. 114222. APRIL 6, 1995)
Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along Edsa.
EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation was awarded the contract
to build, lease and transfer the said light railway.
The said award was questioned by the petitioners on the basis that a foreign
corporation cannot own the EDSA LRT III, a public utility as it violates the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public
utility constitute a public utility?
Facts: On April 20, 1987, the PPA ( Philippine Ports Authority ) Board
adopted its Resolution No. 850 directing PPA management to prepare the
Invitation to Bid and all relevant documents and technical requirements
necessary for the public bidding of the development, management and
operation for the MICT ( leasing as well as to implement this project.
Respondent Secretary Reyes created a 7 man “Special MICT Bidding
Committee” charged with all bid proposals.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 88
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
President of the Philippines approved the proposed MICT Contract with
specific directives on the part of the PPA and the contractor ICTSI.
Issue: Whether or not the MICT needs a legislative franchise from Congress
to legally operate as a public utility?
Held: NO. EO No. 30 dated July16, 1986 provides for the immediate recall of
the franchise granted to the Manila International Port Terminals Inc., and
authorize the PPA to take over, manage and operate the Manila International
Port Complex at North Harbor, Manila and undertake the provision of cargo
handling and port related services thereat, in accordance with PD 857 and
other applicable laws and regulations.
Sec. 6 of PD 857 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the PPA
provides as one of the corporate duties of the PPA is to provide services
( whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise ) within the Port Districts and
the approaches thereof including but not limited to…
As stated above, PPA has been tasked under EO No. 30, with the
management and operation of the Manila International Port Complex in
accordance with PD 857 and other applicable laws and regulations.
However, PD 857 itself authorizes the PPA to perform the service by itself, by
contracting it out, or through other means. Reading EO No. 30 and PD 857
together, the inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker has empowered the
PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to
authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other
means at its option. The latter power having been delegated to the PPA, a
franchise from Congress to authorize an entity other than the PPA to operate
and manage the MICP becomes unnecessary.
Therefore, PPA’s act of privatizing the MICT and awarding the Contract
to ICTSI are wholly within its jurisdiction under its Charter which empowers
the PPA to “supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate and
provide such facilities necessary in the ports vested”.
Fact: Tomas Litimco filed a petition with the Public Service Commission
praying for the authority to operate a bus service between Manila and Malolos
via Sta. Isabel using 10 buses. Several operators filed their opposition
however none of them submitted their evidence to support their opposition.
The petition was then submitted for decision.
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that since there was no doubt that Litimco
was the first to apply for the service in the territory in question and its financial
capability was proven, its application should be granted. The Court pointed
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 89
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
out that if an applicant is qualified financially, and is able to undertake the
service, he should be given the preference as a matter of fairness and justice.
The priority in the filing of the application for a certificate of public
convenience is, other conditions being equal, an important factor in
determining the rights of the public service companies. It is only in cases
when the incapacity or incapability of the first applicant is established may the
other applicants be considered.
Facts: Herein respondent filed, on September 19, 1961, with the Public
Service Commission an application, praying for the grant of a certificate of
public convenience to operate, under PUB denomination, ten buses between
Norzagaray (Bulacan) and Piers (Manila).
1. "The finding of the Public Service Commission that there was a public need
for the operation by respondent of ten buses on the line Norzagaray
(Bulacan) - Piers (Manila) is not supported by the evidence;
2. "The Public Service Commission erred when it did not recognize the fact
that petitioner-appellant was rendering sufficient and adequate service on the
line in question; and
In support of his first two contentions petitioner argues that the 500
passengers found by the Commission as commuting daily from Norzagaray to
Manila could easily be accommodated in the buses of existing operators; that
the existing operators were authorized to operate 31 buses which made
around 100 round trips a day; that since a bus could accommodate about 50
passengers, the existing authorized services could easily accommodate not
only the 500 but even 5000 passengers a day. Petitioner also asserted that
the Commission failed to consider that 200 of the 500 commuters worked in
the Republic Cement Factory located at Norzagaray and so there were really
only 300 commuters daily traveling on the Norzagaray - Manila line. Petitioner
further claimed that the new terminal proposed in the application was not
based on actual need, because there were no importing firms, or business
establishments, or manufacturing concerns, in Norzagaray, whose employees
had to make trips to the piers at the south harbor in Manila. On the question
of public necessity, petitioner pointed out that the evidence presented by the
respondent consisted only of the testimony of two witnesses who did not
make any formal or systematic study of the movement and frequency of
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 90
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
public utility buses, so that their testimonies were based only on casual
observations. On the other hand, as petitioner pointed out, the oppositors
presented five witnesses, two of whom made meticulous, systematic and
daily observations on the line applied for.
Petitioner likewise asserted that public necessity did not require the
operation of the ten buses applied for by the respondent because of the fact
that on December 20, 1961, the Public Service Commission granted to herein
petitioner, in Case No. 61-5807, authority to operate only 10 buses on the line
Norzagaray - Manila, even if he had applied for 20 buses; and that out of the
many applications to operate buses from Paradise Farms (Bulacan) to
Manila, only 10 buses were authorized.
Issue: Whether or not preference over common carrier’s interest will prevail
over public convenience?
"It is the convenience of the public that must be taken into account,
other things being equal, and that convenience would be effectuated by
passengers who take buses at points in one part of a line being able to
proceed beyond those points without having to change buses and to wait the
arrival of buses of a competitive operator. We can perceive how under such
conditions one public utility could gain business at the expense of a rival."
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas, 91
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang