Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REGALADO, J : p
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
Branch 10, finding accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. 1
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the
prosecution of criminal cases, recommends the acquittal of appellant for the
reasons stated in his Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief) filed
with the Court. We have reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary
evidence in this case and we find said recommendation to be well taken. cdrep
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-
accused, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, with allegedly having in their
custody and possession 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-
bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of
P200.00. 2
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against
them. At the trial, the prosecution and the defense presented several witnesses
after which the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and
Antonio Lonceras but convicting and penalizing herein appellant as hereinbefore
stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was
in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp
Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Moliñawe, CIC
Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M.
Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an
ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem
formed a team to conduct a buybust operation, which team was given P200.00 in
different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet
powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Moliñawe
gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look
for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas
alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia
where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a
while and when he returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on
introduced to him as Don, herein appellant. 3
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a
passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and
Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a
plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor.
Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding
his said purchase of marijuana. 4
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation
to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and
S/Sgt. Moliñawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested
appellant, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not,
however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three
accused. The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for investigation. 5
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in
the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant. Taduran did not go with
them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a
plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any
search warrant. 6
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention
but appellant was detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken from and executed by
him, was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no
counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation.
The arrestees were also examined by personnel of the PCCL and were found
positive for ultraviolet powder. 7
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987
listening to the radio. Later, he ate his merienda and then went out to buy
cigarettes from the store. While he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him.
Several armed men alighted therefrom and ordered him to get inside the jeep. He
refused but he was forced to board the vehicle. He was even hit by the butt of a
gun. 8
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated
and was repeatedly asked regarding the whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was
manhandled by the NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the camp.
He was then made to hold a P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he
was taken to the PCCL and examined, he was found positive of the ultraviolet
powder. He was also made to sign some papers but he did not know what they
were all about. 9
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of
his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave
the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him that their father
was taken by some military men the preceding night. Appellant went to Camp
Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of July 2,
1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana
incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he was
made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for
examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was
detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his
complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana. 1 0
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in (1) admitting in evidence the sworn statement of appellant which was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the
crime charged despite the fact that the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves
allegedly bought from him were not properly identified; (3) convicting appellant of
the crime charged despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution is weak
and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
selling or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana to
CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In
disposing of this case, however, we feel that the issues raised by appellant
should properly be discussedseriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the
term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught
redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person
acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents
failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution,
after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC
Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and
taking him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural
course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust
operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having
been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty
by an agent of the law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was
squarely placed in issue and, as correctly pointed out by the defense, said sworn
statement is inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
"Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of
his constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during
custodial examination. He was also asked if he was waiving his right to be
assisted by counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However, while the
rights of a person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver must
be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in the presence
and with the assistance of counsel. 13 In the present case, the waiver made by
appellant being without the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is
sufficient to invalidate said sworn statement. 14
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting
in evidence against appellant the articles allegedly confiscated during the raid
conducted in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. cdll
Exh. 'D' — Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
seventeen grams.
Exh. 'E' — One plastic syringe." 22
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-
called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered
question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the
basis of appellant's conviction. 23 In People vs. Rubio, 24 this Court had the
occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof
must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal
to the cause of the prosecution. cdphil
The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct
examination, he declared that they arrested the three accused all at the same
time on the fateful night of July 1, 1987. But, in his cross-examination and as
corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 28 submitted by him and Moliñawe, it
appeared that Lonceras and Segovia were arrested on different times and that
appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were arrested. Instead, it
was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a much later time.
With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more
credibility to the testimony of appellant Rodrigueza. While it is true that
appellant's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a
criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing
to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his
testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night of July 1,
1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza was not
with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents.
Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the
accused was also revealed during the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses
Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel
Segovia, testified that Sgt. Moliñawe, who has since been reportedly dismissed
from the service, asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange for the
liberty of the accused. 29 This allegation was never refuted by the prosecution.
Hence, the rule laid down by this Court that the statements of prosecution
witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit 30 has no application in the case at
bar.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense.31 As clearly shown by the evidence, the
prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant
should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations
against him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It is hereby ordered that he be immediately
released from custody unless he is otherwise detained for some other lawful
cause.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Rodrigueza, G.R. No. 95902, [February 4, 1992], 282 PHIL 829-842)
EN BANC
ROLITO GO y
TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE
HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
FELICIANO, J : p
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot
wound(s). prcd
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the
facts of the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since
petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991
had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested
six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General
invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7)
cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc. v. Ramos et al., 17 where a
majority of the Court upheld a warrantless arrest as valid although effected
fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been
arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the
provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and
because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions ofArticle 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information
for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the
police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge"
required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no
lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not
apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is,
in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six
vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners
made from one (1) to fourteen (14) days after the actual commission of the
offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes."
Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like
the New Peoples Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner
was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and
completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that
the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantless "arrest" or
detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section
5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows:
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component
part of due process in criminal justice. 20 The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any
one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a
preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already
arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment. 21 In the instant case, petitioner Go had
vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before
the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for
a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail,
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v.
Selfaison, 22 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation." 23 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked
for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot
reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In
fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim
to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to
accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate
and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 24
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner
was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the
prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong.
Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge
recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself
within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no
evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order
issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be
released on bail as a matter ofright.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the
instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having
already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a
preliminary investigation and secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail?
Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in
respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released
on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner
remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has
already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and
a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 25 It is true that the
prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand,
conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor
conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not
warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that
petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due
process. 26 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to
trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause
from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment and
trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking. During
the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for
arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear
petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely
because of the denial ofpreliminary investigation. 27 So energetic and
determined were petitioner's counsel's protest and objection that an obviously
angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to
replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, just before the prosecution
called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his
objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation; petitioner's counsel
made or record his "continuing objection." 28 Petitioner had promptly gone to the
appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the
procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his
detention. 29 If he did not walkout on the trial, and if he cross-examined the
Prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be
represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the
risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only
test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner
remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence
already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the
Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for
cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the
motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the
deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own
wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights ofaccused
persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to
accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this
point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But
the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not
be idle ceremony; rather it would be a celebration by the State ofthe rights and
liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination
to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on
Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE
and NULLIFIED, and the Decision ofthe Court of Appeals dated 23 September
1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith
a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to
complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from
commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the
Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a
cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release
shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
(Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, [February 11, 1992],
|||
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J : p
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in
this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab
and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police
(INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were
within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the
two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2)
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade a
2 3
and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to
4
the police station for further investigation. In the course ofthe same, the petitioner
was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to
the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits
a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty ofthe offense
charged as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at the
time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5)
months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the
costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in
favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed
to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City." 5
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on February
23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the
petitioner. 6
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being
no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the
possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then
carried by the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a
search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrantof the
petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as
follows:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a, 17a)"
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant
may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the
petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers
and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the
lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended
the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or
was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify
an arrest without a warrant. llcd
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop
and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by
this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
"Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission ofestablishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban
centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about
by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop
and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain thestatus quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the
case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men
repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where
they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the
suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the
behavior of the men indicated that they were sizing up the store for an
armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men and asked
them for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer
grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding a
concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found
another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a
concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up.
The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated." 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
(Posadas y Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, [August 2, 1990], 266
|||
PHIL 306-313)
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CRUZ, J :p
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-
appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T.
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles
stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He
pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to
the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his
part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was
licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted"
on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A,
B and C and admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the
weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation
of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having
been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a
lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also
effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony
regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should
also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or
seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute
prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that
"only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable
in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the
seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private
person may without a warrant, arrest a person: Cdpr
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless
arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the
suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and
placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while
she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he surreptitiously
examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made
the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground
that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the
arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on
his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from
these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the
warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while
he was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was he actually committing
or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He
was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as
the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional
requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have
also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time
of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession or the firearm found
on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its
owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote'
identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm
or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be
committed in is presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or
just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record
of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent
case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and
searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because
of a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with
a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually
committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is
not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice
on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as
the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the
evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the
prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The
testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not
sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the
accused-appellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did
not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her
client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no
expectation of material reward makes her representation even more
commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have
succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better
of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
LLpr
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the
very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the
clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those
who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he
is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
(People v. Mengote y Tejas, G.R. No. 87059, [June 22, 1992], 285 PHIL 642-
|||
651)
EN BANC
SAMMY MALACAT y
MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin and Martinez Law Offices for
petitioner.
SYNOPSIS
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, petitioner
was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
keeping, possessing and/or acquiring a hand grenade, without first securing the
necessary license and permit from the proper authorities. On arraignment,
petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea ofnot guilty. After trial on
the merits, the court a quo found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under the said law and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of not less than seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal as minimum and not more than thirty years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum. Petitioner filed a notice ofappeal indicating that he was appealing to
the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision. Unable to accept conviction, petitioner filed the instant
petition alleging that the respondent court erred in affirming the findings of the
trial court that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and legal.
The Supreme Court finds the petition impressed with merit. For
purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the
maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have
been to the Court and not the Court of Appeals. Hence, the challenged decision
immediately fall in jurisdictional grounds. Additionally, the Court is convinced that
the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty. First,
serious doubts surrounds the story of police office Yu that a grenade was found
in and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify
in court the grenade he allegedly seized. Second, if indeed petitioner had a
grenade with him and that two days earlier he was with the group about to
detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, it was then unnatural and against
common experience that petitioner simply stood in Plaza Miranda in proximity to
the police officers. Lastly, even assuming that petitioner admitted
possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation police officer
Serapio, such admission is inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable
violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Verily, the
search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. In view thereof, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside for lack of jurisdiction and on ground of reasonable doubt.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J : p
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep,
possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the
necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment 3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio,
entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A,"
"A-1," and "A-2," 4 while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were
not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested
petitioner. 5
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its
witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino C. Serapio, the
investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on
27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
cornerof Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were
acting suspiciously with "[t]their eyes . . . moving very fast." 6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one
group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase,
Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu
found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then
brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. 8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a
report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the
vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25
August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt
to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch
any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely
standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August
1990. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly
acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue
any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner. 9
Josefino C. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990,
petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for
investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects,
informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent
and independent counsel. Despite Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan
manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a
lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there
being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the
grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking
sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the
Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance
Disposal Unit for examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession
knowing it was inadmissible in evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties
included, among other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that
on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo
Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then
affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and
time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of the
grenade, he "found that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and
fuse assembly [were] all present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and
capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a certification stating his findings,
a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on
22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30
in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a
breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males
to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found
nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought
to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police
officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and
shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then inserted the
muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot
me."
Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in
Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found
on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was
akin to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information." 15 Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a
crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation,
hence to require probable cause would have been "premature." 16 The RTC
emphasized that Yu and his companions were "[c]onfronted with an emergency,
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner
and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
"reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in
different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not
necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such
fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug
Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994,
the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced him to
suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as
minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was
appealing to this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a
notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH
UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE
SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM
"WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to
absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, citing People vs.Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and
the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the
trial court and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a
quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual
finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession
was not raised as an issue. Further, respondentcourt focused on the admissibility
in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the
issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the
ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting
to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a
live grenade and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with
unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political
tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim
that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention
that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site
especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's
posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a
bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days
prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his
companions acted suspiciously, the "accumulation" ofwhich was more than
sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be
committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross
negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross
incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade,
and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others,
before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion
that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement
with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation
should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the
practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and
prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down
in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in
light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report
that someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in
possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were
responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the
series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving
intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the
historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for
about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the area.
Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal
knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had]
personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda
two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and
assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS
ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the
validity of the warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the
evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the
corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast"
and "looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally,
petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and
that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that
the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the
challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To
repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND
ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more
than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall
unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the
maximum of the penalty isreclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have
been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation to Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term
"life imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary
Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion
perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's
decision to this Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to
the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered
without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to
us, with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the comment
thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the
memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the
prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was
found in and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify,
in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to
his commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander
was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade
presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the
latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not
immediately after petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later or on 19
March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu
never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the
former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the
grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he
examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement
authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in
cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he
was with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and
his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and
his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police
officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner
simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed
petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in
order to discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during
his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was
inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presenceof counsel.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CRUZ, J :p
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was
nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from
the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who
were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was
filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the
accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one
of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by name. 8 Acting on
this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him
as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to
contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in
his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of
pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even
know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to
have been carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused
that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two
watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00
for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the
two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 1 6 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged
not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even
know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing
that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was
the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and
had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or
voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which
may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact
amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that
the accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain
about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or
realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that
time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free
since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed
for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it
is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making
the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against
him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his
part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the
arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of
the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as
incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized
the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier
received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them
that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony
varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this
matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:
"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the
coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984
we have already reports of the particular operation which was
being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling
operation.
"COURT:
"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before
June 25, 1984, did you also receive any report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin?
"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
"Q What were those activities?
"A Purely marijuana trafficking.
"Q From whom did you get that information?
"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot identify the
person.
"Q But you received it from your regular informer?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. LLARIZA:
"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that
Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
"A Marijuana, sir.
"Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
"A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
"Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days
before?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know
that Aminnudin was coming?
"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received
the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he has already consummated the
act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
"COURT:
"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Are you sure of that?
"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984,
you had already gathered information to the effect that
Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
"A Only on the 23rd of June.
"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of
the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
"A No, more.
"Q Why not?
"A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive
result.
"Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do
not need a search warrant anymore?
"A Search warrant is not necessary." 23
435)
EN BANC
DECISION
PADILLA, J : p
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers,
was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When
accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the
Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer
about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as
having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4,
Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused
Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds
him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for proper
disposition under Section 20, Article IV ofRepublic Act 425, as amended.
SO ORDERED." 4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the
crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there
is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. LLphil
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case. 9
DECISION
SERENO, J : p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February
2011 2 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1
of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified
that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw
the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused
to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down
the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept
on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told
the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly
put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin
or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two
(2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled
out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four
(4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two
(2) contained suspected shabu. 3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not
guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and
raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, 4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs 5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery
on his person of two plastic sachets later found to containshabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED. 6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October
2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i)THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii)THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii)THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv)THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic). 7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was
no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims
that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of
crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of
Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused
himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he
was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in
his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused,
being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could
therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. . .
..8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons
alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. 9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. 10 It is effected by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter:
SECTION 29.Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations
issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau
therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a
period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue
of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended,
and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground
for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual 12 provides the
following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7.Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. — This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot
pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following,
when applicable: . . .
m.If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver
or any of the vehicle's occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention
on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into
custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was
at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as
found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost
in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at
length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure
is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly
curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any,
of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either
to ignore a policeman's signal to stop one's car or, once having stopped,
to drive away without permission. . . .
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the
Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be
warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 467. First, detention of a
motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and
brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A
motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and
registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he
most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect,
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from
stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which
the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are
not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the
police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion
in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly,
the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. . . .
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to
a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), than to
a formal arrest. . . . The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold
that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in
custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not
come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed
to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment
that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to
the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregonv.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was
not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation
was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated
by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court,a warrant of arrest need not
be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to
have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent
to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while
awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest
were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show
that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they
might make could be used against them. 14 It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to
relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial
setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist,"
and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular
confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by
in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they
are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time — after the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugs — as he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain
view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. 15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioner's pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. 16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to
be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to
take out the contents of his pocket. 18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6)
the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given. 19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was
alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to
a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. 20
In Knowles v. Iowa, 21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full
search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-
blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police
officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search
incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order
to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later
use at trial. . . . But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the
present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale — officer safety — is "'both
legitimate and weighty,'" . . . The threat to officer safety from issuing a
traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows
the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station." 414 U.S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the
police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234,
n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief
encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' . . .
than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where
there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the
police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the
case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at
110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer
safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion
of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by
itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers
have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect
themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle
both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers,
Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any
passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown"
of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion
that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even
conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any
containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search
incident to arrest — the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No
further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the
person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed
to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. 24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs
are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused. 26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction
dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga
City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. n Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED.The bail bond posted for his provisional liberty
is CANCELLED and RELEASED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur
(Luz y Ong v. People, G.R. No. 197788, [February 29, 2012], 683 PHIL 399-
|||
415)
THIRD DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review of the decision of the court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR
No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court ofManila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for
violation of Article II Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records of the case reveal that
herein petitioner was caught in possession of and under his custody twelve
plastic cellophane bags weighing 5.5 grams containing crushed flowering tops,
marijuana which is a prohibited drug. In his appeal before the Supreme Court,
petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
because (1) the pieces ofevidence seized were inadmissible; (2) the
superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the
doctrine of presumption of regularity; (3) he was denied the constitutional
right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (4) his conviction was
based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified. CIScaA
The Supreme Court finds that there was no compelling reason to reverse the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts. In this case, the findings of the
trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the
defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, in
testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug
abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi set up by petitioner deserved scant
consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the
time of the incident. Lastly, the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence because he was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-
bust operation conducted by police officers. However, as for the other ten
cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, the same are
inadmissible in evidence considering that the said bags were seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest, hence, do not fall under the exceptions
provided under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. In view thereof, the
instant petition is denied and the challenged decision is affirmed with modification
as to the penalty.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
ROMERO, J : p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court ofManila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for
violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. aisadc
809)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the
search was limited to the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located
at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They
averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application,
Rabe's affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the
building where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon
Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524
Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address, and the new address
was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the
warrant was not implemented in any other place. 13
In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those
listed in the search warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the
building located at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the
premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court. 14 In accordance with
the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of Appeals, 15the respondents served a
copy of their pleading on UNILAB. 16
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order 17 granting the motion of the
respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox,
were not those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial
court issued an advisory 18 that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in
evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had
already been quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the
NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used
by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents,
and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The
respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending
that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The
respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off
the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized
were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue
corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating
on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized
in the search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself.
The respondents emphasized that the Shalimar Laboratories is authorized to
manufacture galenical preparations of the following products:
Products:
- Povidone Iodine
- Chamomile Oil
- Salicylic Acid 10 g.
- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution
- Aceite de Alcamforado
- Aceite de Manzanilla 19
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of
the counsel of UNILAB, and insisted that it was not authorized to appear before
the court under the Rules of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that the
BFAD was the authorized government agency to file an application for a search
warrant.
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the
motion for reconsideration because it was the one which sought the filing of the
application for a search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings
and filing pleadings. The only parties to the case were the NBI and UNILAB and
not the State or public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party,
or the holder of a license to operate, may intervene through counsel
underSection 16 of Rule 110, in relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by
the NBI officers. 20 In their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular
inspection was the option to look forward to. 21 However, no such ocular
inspection of the said premises was conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of
the Disudrin and Inoflox samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar
Building. On its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD
declared that the substance failed the test. 22 The BFAD, likewise, declared that
the examined Disudrin syrup failed the test. 23The BFAD had earlier issued the
following report:
PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS
1. Phenylpropanolamine Unilab 21021552 3-06 - Registered, however,
(Disudrin) label/physical appearance
12.5 mg./5mL Syrup does not conform with the
BFAD approved
label/registered
specifications.
2. Ofloxacin (Inoflox) Unilab 99017407 3-05 - Registered, however,
200 mg. tablet label/physical appearance
does not conform with the
BFAD approved
label/registered
specifications. 24
On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order 25 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only
authorized to take possession of "finished or unfinished products of
United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and
documents evidencing the counterfeit nature of said products. The
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant does not,
however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not
these seized products are imitations of UNILAB items is beside the point.
No evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on
the application for search warrant relative to the seized products.ACTESI
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence,
cannot be sustained. 26
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, where the following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes
of Inoflox 200 mg. are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the
respondents because they constitute the "fruit of the poisonous tree" or,
CONVERSELY, whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs
is justified and lawful under the "plain view" doctrine and, hence, the
same are legally admissible as evidence against the respondents in any
and all actions? 27
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial
court quashed the search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the
respondents herein in their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that
the trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists
that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to due process. The petitioner
asserts that the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized —
"finished or unfinished products of UNILAB" — is sufficient to include counterfeit
drugs within the premises of the respondents not covered by any license to
operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or
repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 28 the petitioner asserts that the products
seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The
petitioner posits that the respondents themselves admitted that the seized
articles were in open display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of the
implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should
have been filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are
raised. They also assert that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition
involving the validity and the implementation of the search warrant. They argue
that the petitioner merely assisted the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of
Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the said government agencies as
parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because under the
1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the
government and its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the
Supreme Court. The respondents further assert that the trial court may consider
issues not raised by the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the
just determination of the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed
boxes so fast even before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the
seizure took place at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412 as stated in the search
warrant. They assert that the ruling of the Court in People v. Court of
Appeals 29 is applicable in this case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to
prove the factual basis for the application of the plain view doctrine. 30
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-
interest to defend the validity of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it
was upon its instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by the
NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No.
8203 from filing a criminal complaint against the respondents and requesting the
NBI to file an application for a search warrant. The petitioner points out that the
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically prohibit a private complainant
from defending the validity of a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a
state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all, the petitioner
insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of a search warrant is
not a criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place sought to be searched
was sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building on
the two parcels of land described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is
located, the place searched by the NBI officers. 31 It also asserts that the building
is located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. 32
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case
because the boxes were found outside the door of the respondents' laboratory on
the garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding
team — precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos.
The boxes in which the items were contained were themselves so designated to
replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left
hand corner of one side of some of the boxes 33 the letters "ABR" under the
words "60 ml," appeared to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as
it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The
petitioner pointed out that "ABR" is the acronym for "amber bottle round"
describing the bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for children) is
contained. CTAIHc
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own "license plates"
which were instituted as among its internal control/countermeasures. The license
plates indicate that the items within are, supposedly, "Disudrin." The NBI officers
had reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data
appearing on their supposedly distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists
that although some of the boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo were,
indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the original because these,
too, were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its
pleading pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched showing
respondent Isip; 34the boxes seized by the police officers containing Disudrin
syrup; 35 and the boxes containing Inoflox and its contents. 36
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper
party to file the petition at bench; (2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file
the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (3)
whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of
the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened,
contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner's contention that a search warrant
proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action 37 or the commencement of a
prosecution. 38 The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings. 39 While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal
action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery
employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. 40 It is in the nature
of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. 41 A search
warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant
must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. 42
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for
adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. 43 It concerns the
public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights
of private persons. 44 It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public
prosecution. 45
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to
a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such
as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant
proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by
the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal
case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or
such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash
the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the
court order granting such motion to quash. 46
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents'
motion to quash the search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply
and opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr. 47 The
court a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed
by it and its counsel. CacTIE
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme
Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings
is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 48 the Court allowed a private
corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and
considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even
held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were
involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant
No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule
is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once
the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due
process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants
therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling,
the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to
argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor
General. 49
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted
by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it. 50 In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition,
considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioner's contention that the issue of
whether the Disudrin and Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised
in the pleadings of the respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents
failed to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant; in their reply,
however, they averred that the seized items were not included in the subject
warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding team. They also
averred that the said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu,
as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search. 51 In their
Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the
following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of
whether there is a legal basis to quash the search warrant and/or to
suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the articles allegedly
seized during the implementation of the search warrant — Disudrin and
Inoflux products — were not included in the search warrant, they were,
therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per
se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu as to
justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view
or some such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without
proper examination or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples
allegedly seized from respondent's place were counterfeit. All the
relevant presumptions are in favor of legality. 52
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner
that the respondents never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the
seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11,
2004 Order of the court a quo on the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue
as to the alleged failure to particularly describe in the search
warrant the items to be seized but upon which NOchallenge was
then existing and/or NO controversy is raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that "finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB" cannot stand the test of a
particular description for which it then reasons that the search is,
supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is
lawfully inadmissible against respondents. 53
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it
before finally resolving to deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the
petitioner was denied its right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and
Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner. DSAacC
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim
that the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to
prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence
should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential
requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the
respondents' motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI
and the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately
apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception relied upon by the
petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even
attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to
present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the
petitioner's representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the
warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who
enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and
their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately
apparent. 65 There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of
the sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to
prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
(United Laboratories Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, [June 28, 2005], 500 PHIL
|||
342-364)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J : p
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction,
filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan Ponce Enrile,
Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against
Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain
goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the
enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further
proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the
determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing
the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said
case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila
Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3,
1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of
petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of
the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs
zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November
4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks,
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions
of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the
goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in
the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks
and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or
preliminary injunction," docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among
others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
she hired the trucks owned by Valentin B. Lanopa to transport the goods from
said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the
goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search
warrant issued by a competent court; that Manila Chief of Police
Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales
be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then
Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and
supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming
them to have been misdeclared and undervalued, were not subject to seizure
under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that
they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although
Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding
the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights
would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining
order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or
their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of
mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for
actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex
parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in
the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and
at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on
November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the
Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department,
an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent
Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in
Civil Case No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro
Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police
Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966,
their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the
trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative
defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to
try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition
stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the
Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full
duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila
Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not
unreasonable; and that the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of
the Tariff and Customs Code could effect searches, seizures and arrests in
inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the
court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that
Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the
release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff
and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to
forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer
irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the
restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the
parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the
presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of
Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On
December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing
the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex
parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods
seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be
released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate
bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the
release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the
case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared
and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by
herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure
proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs
of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal
of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should
thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein
petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other
charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein
respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the
motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to
herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding
bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under
bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by
the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending
termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and
alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners
allege, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in
ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for
the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by
respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent
Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies
before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the
negligent and/or illegal acts of its agents in not collecting the correct taxes; and
(4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly
insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and
certiorari in this case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1)
that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge
to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before
seizure and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question
were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer
go after the goods in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been
paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were no longer within the
control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago is a
purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be
the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the
goods was effected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place
outside the control and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and effected without
any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of
seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal
and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers
have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of
prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present
action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not
interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for
whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that the
bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge
had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the
goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others,
(1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other
dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs
laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs;
and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were
imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry." 2 As long as the importation has not been
terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties,
taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of
entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment
of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the
Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid
in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been
assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales
upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was
underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example,
Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there were
40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the
"compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece
of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch
bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and
5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal
watch bands (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal watch
bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were
declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in
bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in
bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the
nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530,
pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this
Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to
law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject
to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been
brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over
the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle
on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under
directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo G. Papa, who had been formally
deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had
regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and
Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according
to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the
disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore,
could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.,"
G. R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely
applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy
Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales
of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported
and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to
Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods were about to leave the
customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held
them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be
different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the
release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods;
that a local purchase was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to
examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October
26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release
the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of
Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported
to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes because the
transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands
of the importer nor subject to said importer's control, nor were the goods
imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that
the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of
Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification against the
goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view
of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The court of first instance held
resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits.
On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon
a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the
resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and
mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional
bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on
January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
"This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau
jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceeding against
them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the
goods?
"Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of
First Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of
the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),
the Customs bureau should yield to the jurisdiction of the said court.
"The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually
seized on October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in
court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify
whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation.
Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for
the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu
Port (Petition Annex 'L'). As to goods imported illegally or released
irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to seizure under
Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
"The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others, to
collect revenues from imported articles, fines and penalties and
suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff
and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
"The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu.
Should they be found to have been released irregularly from Customs
custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the
proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
"Said proceedings should be followed; the owner of the goods may set
up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966). From the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax
Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11
of Republic Act 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the
power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff Code and deprive the
Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As
this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and
1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively
upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law
being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the
former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to
the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities."
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive
jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs
laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if
no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November
4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over
the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to
the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First
Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector
of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12,
1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of
said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did
not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of
jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the
Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order
of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila
Police Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search
warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police
Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable
property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine
any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such
article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo
G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of
the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter
has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened
precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and
seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the
Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the
interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace . . ." 17 It is our considered view,
therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R.,
790, 799, wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211
of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:
"Thus, contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we
find in the first Congress, and in the following second and fourth
Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant
between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house
or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a movable vessel, where they readily could be put out of
reach of a search warrant . . ."
"Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L. 231,
232, chap. 94), it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board
and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to
stop, search, and examine any vehicle, beast, or person on which or
whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to
duty or had been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast
or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise
thereon, which they had probable cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and
the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed
April 27, 1816 (3 Stat. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year and expired. The
Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above
described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section
was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201,
14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes
as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161.
Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked
as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as
operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 219,
27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503 . . ."
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks
and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the court below
Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a
search. 18 All that they complained of was,
"That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without
any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila
Police, where they were detained."
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search
warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thus, it has been held that:
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant
may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-
514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S., 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S.
Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389,
27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686),
the question raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or
an automobile could be searched without search warrant or other process and
the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the
prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court said:
". . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits
search and seizure without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only
'unreasonable' search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
". . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the
language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question;
but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the
circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development,
which has multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our
highways in battalions, until the slower, animal- drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles
to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed
rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a
disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the
history of the world before their advent. The question of their police
control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a
serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called
"bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which is itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is
not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling
extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of
crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency,
to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and
seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without
a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined
as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is
made."
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that
seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and
decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the
purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in
their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order
of respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Case No.
67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March
31, 1967 restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or
implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila; and
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C . J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ ., concur.
||| (Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, [February 28, 1968], 130 PHIL 886-905)
THIRD DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
ROMERO, J : p
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision,
dated August 31, 1990, 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City,
Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section
4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
"That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2)
wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a
prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt.
Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City,
who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the appellant;
(2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City,
who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena
Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP
Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the
prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows: LLjur
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa.
Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name - Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at
the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the
test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been
taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime
Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of
the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a
letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. 'B'), which was stamped
'RECEIVED' by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. 'E-1') on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime
Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to
her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive
results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results
of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December
14, 1989, (Exh. 'J', 'J-1', 'J-2', 'J-3', 'J-4' and 'J-5'). Mrs. Anderson
identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of
each specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. 'C-1' and 'D-
1'). She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at
the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. 'E-1').
Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. 'J' & sub-
markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped
marijuana through his initial, the words 'buy-bust' and the words
'December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M.' (written on Exhs. 'C' and 'D'). Belarga
also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883)
(Exh. 'L'), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh. 'L-
1'). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989,
addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. 'B') and his signature
thereon (Exh. 'B-2') and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked
'RECEIVED' (Exh. 'B-1')." 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant
Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the
version of the defense, thus:
"[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was
in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife,
Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist,
and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while
he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room
of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes,
got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM
agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced
that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched
Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search
warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents
found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not
know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother,
Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in another
house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed
and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for
clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM
Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office,
Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation
was reduced into writing. The writing or document was interpreted to
Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the marijuana belonged
to Mari Musa and MariMusa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused
to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he
was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although
he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by
counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his
right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The
NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While
Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM
building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination
Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the
Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the
marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single
question, MariMusa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did
not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents
because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
cdll
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two
wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00
bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he
was afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana
was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child
to support. MariMusa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana
before. 5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following
disposition:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II
of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay
the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary
imprisonment." 6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not
credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the
other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa;
and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of
marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought
one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported the successful
operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga
conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles
headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of
operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound,
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose
other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked
P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at
strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the
appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more
marijuana. 12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went
inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana
which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there
were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made
the pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents,
accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The
agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked
him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife.16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani
regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension,
prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and
forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it
deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani
because they do not know each other is without merit. The day before the buy-
bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a
wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt.
Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more
marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover,
the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be
strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of
the marijuana. 17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was
impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and
manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling
prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence of
other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the
consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v.
Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are
known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that
these people will not report him to the authorities. cdll
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the
credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga
admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he
could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a
policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by
the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly
did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of
Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified
that he and his companion were certain that the appellant therein handed
marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the
cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
"This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with
inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were
marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary
cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn,
November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of
rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were
observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters." 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw
the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was
an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt.
Belarga's testimony reads: 2 2
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house
of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt.
Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house
near the road and he was met by one person and later known as
Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I
saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by
Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back later and
handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt.
Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the
appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that
what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana because of the
distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which
the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following
material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance
and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on
December 13, 1939; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office
and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one
wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt.
Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga
City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be
used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant
while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in
strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took
place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence
given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police
officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the
appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be
fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or
circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to
prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug. cdll
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic
bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's
kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other
NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon
being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his
wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed
what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging
at the corner of the kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its contents but
failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the
trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the
marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are
admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2,
the following:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down
in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in
violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure
may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v.
Dizon, 36 the Court stated that "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for
a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest." 37
623-642)
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent
representation. The lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of an extra-judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-
112322. Appellants Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano,
Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as well as their co-accused
— Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr. y Granados — were
convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando
Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y
Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, are hereby
convicted of the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are
ordered to pay the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of this action,
November 9, 1992, until fully paid." 2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-accused
were charged as follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with others whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away punctured currency notes due for shredding in the total amount of
P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as
represented by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y
Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and
Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said offense with grave abuse of
confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers,
Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party
and as such they had free access to the property stolen." 4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9,
1992. Appellants, however, obtained two Release Orders from RTC Vice
Executive Judge Corona Ibay-Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, upon their
filing of a cash bond to secure their appearance whenever required by the trial
court. 5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective
counsels, pleaded not guilty. 6 On September 30, 1998, the trial court declared
that Datuin Jr. and Peralta were at large, because they had failed to appear in
court despite notice. 7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft
in the appealed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's version of
the facts as follows:
"About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita
of Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) [now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western
Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified
Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia,
Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating
officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills
with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly
recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of
punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The
punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and
were later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash
Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said
rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for
shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no
longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded,
they were stolen from the BSP by the above-named accused.
"On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was
apprehended in front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while
he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was
brought to the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police
officers, Garcia gave three separate statements admitting his guilt and
participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other named
accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the participation
of each and everyone of them.
"On the basis of Garcia's sworn statements, the other named accused
were invited for questioning at the police station and were subsequently
charged with qualified theft together with Garcia." 8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the
Central Bank from 1978 to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who
had identified himself as a police officer arrested accused-appellant
Garcia while waiting for a passenger bus in front of the Golden Gate
Subdivision, Las Piñas City. He was arrested without any warrant for his
arrest. The police officer who had arrested accused-appellant Garcia
dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride . . . a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed
behind his back, and he was made to bend with his chest touching his
knees. Somebody from behind hit him and he heard some of the
occupants of the car say that he would be salvaged if he would not tell
the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he
told them that he does not know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and . . . up
and down . . . the stairs. While being dragged out of the car, he felt
somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-
accused and he told them that he does not know his co-accused. . . .
Whenever he would deny knowing his co-accused, somebody would box
him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accused-appellant
Garcia's nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water
that had been poured on his nose [at first], but somebody covered his
mouth. As a result, he could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the
torture anymore, he decided to cooperate with the police, and they
stopped the water pouring and allowed him to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody
utter, 'may nakikinig.' Suddenly his two ears were hit with open palm[s]. .
. . As he was being brought down, he felt somebody return his personal
belongings to his pocket. Accused-appellant Garcia's personal
belongings consisted of [his] driver's license, important papers and coin
purse.
"He was forced to ride . . . the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and
handcuffs were removed when he was at the office of police officer
Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter's
name, age and address. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash
Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, interrupted the interview,
and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant
Garcia's wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel
supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-
appellant Garcia's wallet and the former insisted that they recovered the
said perforated notes from accused-appellant's wallet. SPO4 Coronel
took down the statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave
the answers appearing in accused-appellant Garcia's alleged three
sworn statements dated November 4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and . . .
November 6, 1992. cASIED
Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency
notes for retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence
pointing to appellants as the authors of the crime.
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people
who had similar access to the shredding machine area and the currency
retirement vault. 23 Appellants were pinpointed by Labita because of an
anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the
theft; and of the unexplained increase in their spending, which was incompatible
with their income. Labita, however, did not submit sufficient evidence to support
his allegation.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the
remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
Second Issue:
Demurrer to Evidence
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the
demurrer to evidence filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of
the documents offered by the prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC
established the alleged qualified theft of perforated notes, and not one of the
pieces of evidence showed appellants' participation in the commission of the
crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge's determination of
the sufficiency or the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution
to establish a prima facie case against the accused. Unless there is a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a
motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 24
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not
become apparent until after Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the
confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former were held to be
inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of
the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying their demurrer to evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants
are hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are
being detained for any other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby directed to submit his report on the release of the appellant
or the reason for his continued detention within five (5) days from notice of this
Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Garcia y Tupas, G.R. No. 145176, [March 30, 2004])
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PADILLA, J : p
848)
RULE 113
Arrest
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by
his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be
subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. — It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest
the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)
Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered
for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10)
days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a
report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the
reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
Section 6. Time of making arrest. — An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or
night. (6)
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an arrest by virtue of a
warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a
warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer
need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)
Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an arrest without a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is
either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has
escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of
such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)
Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a private person shall inform
the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either
engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped,
flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the
giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (9a)
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. — An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as
many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by
an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to
himself. (10a)
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. — An officer, in order to make an arrest
either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or
enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance
thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)
Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. — Whenever an officer has entered the
building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when
necessary to liberate himself. (12a)
Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. — If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any
person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the
Philippines. (13)
Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. — Any member of the Philippine Bar
shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and
confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night.
Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)
RULE 126
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of personal property:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon
which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a
house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the
affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date.
Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a
detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and
seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found
the seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a)
The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a
true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and
require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall
ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the
judge.
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant. (12a)
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only
by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may
be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to
resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved
by the latter court. (n)