Plato Mathematicians Morrow

Philosophical Review
Plato and the Mathematicians: An Interpretation of Socrates' Dream in the Theaetetus (201e-
206c)
Author(s): Glenn R. Morrow
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 79, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 309-333
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PLATO AND THE MATHEMATICIANS: AN
INTERPRETATION OF SOCRATES' DREAM
IN THE THEAETETUS (201e-206c)1
INTHE Socratesexaminesand
thirdsectionof the Theaetetus
refutesTheaetetus' proposal that knowledge be defined as
"true belief (a'607g of'ca)accompanied by logos." The rejection
of thisthesisis surprising,forit seems at firstsightlike a good Pla-
tonic doctrine. We are not surprisedthat Socrates should reject
Theaetetus' firstattemptat a definition,thatknowledgeis percep-
tion, forto have accepted that would have been to renounce the
centraldoctrineofthe Phaedoand theRepublic. LikewiseTheaetetus'
second proposal, to define knowledge as true belief, denies a
distinction which had been firmlyasserted in the Meno,later
elaborated in the Republic, and reaffirmedin the Timaeus.But
when Theaetetus proposes that knowledge be defined as true
belief accompanied by logos, we seem at last to be on Platonic
ground. It at once recalls the statementin the Meno (98a) that
true belief becomes knowledge when it has been fastened by
reasoning. There is no obvious differencein meaning between
saying that knowledge is belief "bound by reasoning (Aoytcru45)"
and saying that it is belief "accompanied by logos (pEardAoVyov)."
Yet this last proposal is as decisivelyrejected as the two previous
ones have been.
Even more surprising is the perfunctorycharacter of the
examination given it. Socrates takes up in turnthe threemeanings
which he says the term logos might have in the formula, and
he finds that none of these meanings makes the formula satis-
factory.If logos means the expressionof a thoughtin words,then
any true beliefwhateverwhen put into words becomes knowledge
by virtueof being spoken or written,an obvious absurdity.If logos
means the enumerationof the parts of an object-a "tale," to use
an old English meaning of the word-then an accidentally
1 Thispaperwas deliveredat MichiganStateUniversity

as an Izenberg
MemorialLectureinFebruary,i967.
309

GLENN R. MORRO W
correctenumeration of the parts of a thing-for example, of the

letters in the name "Theaetetus"-counts as knowledge, even
though the person concerned may spell the name incorrectly
on the next occasion. Lastly, if logos be taken to mean the dis-
tinguishingmark of a thing-its "telling" characteristic,so to
speak-then supposing the belief about the thing is a true belief,
this belief will already involve the apprehension of the dis-
tinguishingcharacter of the object and the addition of the logos
will be redundant.
Even if these argumentswere unobjectionable, they would still
not formallyconstitutea refutation.Socrates says (2o6c, 2o8c),
though the statementis made unobtrusively,that logos must have
one ofthe threemeaningslisted.This would ofcourse be necessary
for a definitiverefutation,for only by trying out all possible
meanings of logos could the formulain which it occurs be proved
to be inadequate. But Socrates' enumeration is clearly not
exhaustiveand it is hard to believe that Plato thoughtit was. The
word logos has a significationmore varied than that of almost any
other term in Greek philosophy. Even in Plato's own dialogues
thereare examples of its use in many meanings other than the
three mentioned here. It sometimesmeans definition;sometimes
proposition, or statement; sometimes theory; sometimes argu-
ment, or dialogue; sometimes thinking,or inner dialogue; and
sometimes mathematical proportion.There are examples of most
of these other usages in the Theaetetusitself, a fact which is
likely to be obscured in translation.2Socrates' bland assumption
that he has exhausted the possibilities and thereby refuted
Theaetetus' proposal is enough to put us on our guard against
taking too seriously the apparent frustrationwith which the
dialogue ends.
A furtherpuzzling feature is the fact that this refutation
is introduced by a passage in which Socrates recounts a curious
"dream" which is put forward as an alternative statement of
Theaetetus' third proposal, but (strangely enough) is ignored
in the refutationof that proposal. The dream expounds a theory
that Socrates claims to have heard from someone, that the
2 See Cornford,
Plato'sTheory p. 142 n.
ofKnowledge,
310

PLA TO AND THE MATHEMATICIANS
elements of things are unknowable and only compounds know-

able. You can analyze a compound into its elements and thus
explain it; but the element, being simple and unanalyzable, is
unknown and unknowable. Now this appears to prepare the way
forthe refutationofthe later interpretationoflogos as meaning an
enumerationof constituentparts; but when this meaning of logos
is taken up later, the characteristic feature of the dream-
namely, the contention that the parts are unknowable-is
quietly dropped. It is obvious that Plato thought the dream
relevant to the proposal of Theaetetus, but just how is it so? Its
position shows that it is of fundamental importance, but with
respectto what problem?
Few commentators have believed that Plato himself was
stymiedat the end of the dialogue; we all tend to suppose that
there is some positive doctrine to which he is pointing, and of
which we could get glimpses if we examined carefullythe pre-
ceding pages. For example, very early in the dialogue Socrates
makes, as it were inadvertently,a positive statementabout the
nature of knowledge. After interpreting Protagoras' famous
dictum ("man is the measure of all things") as meaning that
whatever any man perceives is forhim, Socrates innocentlyasks
(I52C): "Perception then is knowledge because it is always of
something that is, and being knowledge is infallible?" What is
this, we may well ask, but the definition that Socrates and
Theaetetus are supposed to be huntingfor? That is, knowledge is
infallible apprehension of being. What is more, this is clearly a
Platonic conception, broughtin at this point to test the thesis of
Protagoras. Protagoras' thesis fails the test, because the sequel
shows that the object of perceptionis transitoryparticular things
and qualities, not "Being" in the Platonic sense; the Forms alone
are Being. This hidden definitionis used again several pages later
(i6ocd), and at ig6e Socrates chides himselfand Theaetetus for
saying so much about knowledge when they are supposed to be
ignorant of what it is. Thus we see clearly-and perhaps Plato
intended us to see-that a positive doctrine is the hidden mover
in the discussionthroughout.
What then is leftforthe reader at the end except to bring out
into the open the positivedoctrinebehind the Socratic elenchusand
3"I

GLENN R. MORROW
inferthat knowledgeis apprehensionof Forms? Cornfordbelieves

that this is the obvious teaching of the dialogue. He admits that
the Forms are never as such mentioned anywherein this lengthy
argument. On the contrary, Socrates persistentlydraws his
illustrationsof objects of knowledge from particular things and
persons: Socrates, Theaetetus, the numbers eleven and twelve, a
wagon, the names "Theaetetus" and "Theodorus," the sun.
Universals almost never appear. But to Cornfordthisverysilence
is telling. This absence of the element essential to any Platonic
theoryofknowledge-indeed, what looks like itsresoluteexclusion
from the inquiry-can only be, Cornford thinks, a deliberate
effortto show how impossible of solution the problem is if we
leave out the Forms. He writes, at the end of his commentary
(p. i62):
The Platonistwill draw the necessaryinference.True knowledgehas

for its object thingsof a different
order-not sensible things,but
Formsand truthsabout them.... The Theaetetus
intelligible leads us to
this old conclusionby demonstrating the failureof all attemptsto
extractknowledgefromsensibleobjects.
In my opinion, however, it would be hasty to assume that all

was clear sailing forPlato fromthispoint onward. I am sure he did
not think that Socrates had really refutedTheaetetus' proposal,
but I doubt that he could himselfat this time have supplied a
meaning forlogos that would make the proposal acceptable: and
since the differentation of knowledgefromtrue beliefis crucial for
the determinationof what knowledge is, this doubt implies that
Plato was still uncertain on the main issue. If this is true, the
dramatic frustrationat the end expresses Plato's awareness of
certainunansweredand importantquestions.
Unlike some of his modern followers,Plato was not so naive as
to believe that an appeal to the doctrineof Forms was sufficient to
settle all difficulties.If he had thought so, we should certainly
have seen it appearing more frequentlythan it does in the later
dialogues-unless, of course, he had abandoned the doctrine,
which I see no good reason for believing and strongreasons for
denying.For grantingthat knowledge is "apprehension of Forms
and of truths about them," there still remain embarrassing
312

questions. How am I to be sure,in any given instance ofpresumed

knowledge,that it is really an apprehensionof Forms? Even more
embarrassingis the question, How can I be sure that any alleged
truth about them is infallible? We must not forgetthat in the
hidden definitionof knowledgewhich I quoted earlier,knowledge
is supposed to be inerrant. Not only here, but elsewhere, Plato
describesknowledge as infallible,in contrastwith the uncertainty
of our sense judgments (for example, Rep. 477b, Tim. 5ide). As
Aristotlewas to say later, we know a thing when we know what
it is and that it could not possibly be other than it is (Post. Anal.
7ibg-i6). It is not enough, then, to have a true belief about
Forms or relationsbetween Forms; the beliefmust be necessarily
true, incapable of being false, if it is to count as knowledge. By
what procedure then can a true belief be transformedinto a
necessarilytrue belief? That, I think,is the important question
still unanswered at the end of the Theaetetusand the object of
Plato's concern.
Now there was one group of Plato's contemporaries-that is,
the mathematicians-whose professionaloccupation appears to
have been just this,to transformtrue beliefsinto necessarilytrue
beliefs. It seems to be characteristic of mathematics through
all its historyto insiston provingwhat is already obvious-such as
that when two straightlines intersect,the opposite angles are
equal, or that the diameter of a circle divides it into two equal
parts. A propositionintuitivelyseen to be true is very frequently
only the starting point of inquiry for the mathematician, an
inquiry directed to findinga proofof it: and until such a proofis
found, this evidentlytrue proposition is not counted among the
theoremsofthe science.3Democritusis reportedon good authority
to have seen and declared that the volume of a cone is one-third
the volume of the cylinderon the same base and of equal height,
and to have enunciated a correspondingformulafor the volume
of a pyramid.But it remainedforEudoxus, a half-century later,to
succeed in proving these "truths" and to incorporate them into
mathematicalscience.
3 Cf. Peirce: "Mathematicsis the science which draws necessaryconclu-

sions."
313

GLENN R. MORROW
Mathematicsis the fieldto whichPlato mostoftenturnsfor

illustrationsofwhathe considersto be knowledge, as distinct
from
opinion.We can easilysee one reasonwhyhe shoulddo so. The
objectsofmathematics are not the roughand variableobjectsof
senseexperience,butpreciseand changelessintelligible objectsof
thought,perfectexamplesof what Plato calls Forms.In dealing
withsuch entitiesmathematics is dealingwithBeing,and conse-
quentlyis to be regardedas knowledge, or nearto it. Thismuchis
clear to any readerofthedialogues.But thereis moreto mathe-
maticsthan the precisionof its definitions and the consequent
clearnessof its theorems.These theoremshave the notable
characterof not being subjectto question,at least not by any
competentmathematician, giventheentitieswithwhichtheyare
concernedand the proceduresby whichthe theoremshave been
established.They have exactlythat characterof necessity,of
compelling thehearer'sassentoncehe has acceptedthedefinitions
and thepremisesabout them,whichPlato's theoryofknowledge
demanded.The procedureofthemathematicians, is an
therefore,
exampleofthe kindoflogosthatin Plato's opinionwouldtrans-
forma truebeliefintoknowledge.
Thisis also thefieldofstudyto whichPlato,byhischoiceofthe
settingand thecharactersofthe Theaetetus, apparentlyintendsto
call our attention.The centralcharacterin the main dialogue,
apart from Socrates, is the brilliantyoung mathematician
Theaetetus,a memberof the Academy,whose relativelyearly
death is lamentedin the introductory dialogueas an eventthat
cut shorta careerfullof great promise.We knowfromother
sourcesthatbeforehis death Theaetetushad morethanfulfilled
thepromiseofhisyouth.He is creditedwithhavingdevelopedthe
theoryofirrationals, and withhavingcompletedthetheoryofthe
fiveregularsolids,whichPlato used to such good effectin the
Timaeus.4 The otherrespondentto Socratesin the dialogue is
Theodorus of Cyrene,an eminentgeometerof Plato's youth,
with whom Plato himselfis said to have studied duringhis
years of travel.5His eminenceis well attestedby the ancient
4 T. L. Heath,Greek
Mathematics,
I, 209-2I2.
5 Heath, op.cit.,I, 202-209.
314

PLATO AND THE MATHEMATICIANS
authorities,but the Theaetetus is the source of practically all we

knowofhis career and achievements.6
Besides these personages, the dialogue contains other re-
minders of mathematicians and their ways. At the beginning of
the discussionof Protagoras' dictum, Socrates argues that it leads
to strange consequences: no man is wiser than another, and
neither man nor god is wiser than any percipient creature
whatever-say, a pig or a dog-faced baboon. Theaetetus admits
that he is shaken by this reasoning. "That is because you are still
young," replies Socrates; "you listen eagerly and are readily
taken in. Protagoras or any friendof his will have an answer to
this." And then Socrates gives the answer as Protagoras might
have done.
My dear boys,old and young,you are sittingthereactinglike dema-

gogues,usingarguments thatappeal tothemob.... You have notgiven
anyproof(a&To'8ELs) whatever,normade anyuseofnecessity (acvacyKvj),
butonlyprobability(7-oEuKOS) . Now ifTheodorusoranyothergeometer
should make use of probabilityin geometry,he would not be worth
a fig.Are you and Theodorusgoing to allow questionsas important
as thisto be settledbyplausibility
and likelihood? [i 62d].
A more striking reminder of mathematics is provided by

the episode narrated by Theaetetus at the beginningof Socrates'
conversationwith him. Theaetetus and his companions have been
listening to a lecture by Theodorus on irrational magnitudes.
Theodorus had dealt one by one with a series of irrationals,
beginning with what we should call the square root of three,
proceeding to the square root of five,and so on to the square root
of seventeen,where for some reason his exposition ended. After-
ward Theatetus and a companion conceived the idea of attempt-
ing a general definitionof such quantities, which are evidently
infinitein number, so as to apprehend them all in a single for-
mula; and Theaetetus describes brieflytheir way of proceeding
and the resultwhich they reached. This littleincident gives us a
simple and elegant example of mathematical expertise. Even
6 See nevertheless
the fourteen-column
account of him by von Fritz in
Pauly-Wissowa,Realencyclopddie,
s.v.
315

GLENN R. MORRO W
moresignificant is thefactthattheproblemitself-howto handle

incommensurable magnitudes-wasof crucialimportanceto the
progressofgeometry in the fourthcenturyafterthe discoveryof
the incommensurability of the diagonaland side of a square. It
was EudoxusofCnidus,perhapshimself a memberoftheAcademy
at thistime,who finallycircumvented thedifficulty
withhisnew
theoryof proportionwhichsuppliesa definition of equalityof
ratios applicable to both commensurateand incommensurate
magnitudesalike.7The introduction of thisproblemhereshows
Plato's interestin the "growing-point" in the mathematicsof
his time; and it may be intendednot merelyas a testimonial to
Theaetetus'ability,but also as an indirectreference to Eudoxus,
makinghimin a sensea silentcharacterin thebackground.
Friedlinderhas remarkedthatPlato,likenature,does nothing
in vain; and thissetting,thesecharacters, and theseexamplesof
thesuperiority and forceofmathematical reasoningappear to be
includedforsomepurpose.What thatpurposeis, we shall tryto
see.
All theinformation thatwe have ofthedevelopment ofmathe-
maticsinthefourth centuryshowsthattheAcademywasthecenter
of mathematicalresearchduring this period. Our most in-
formative sourceis Proclus'Commentary ontheFirstBookofEuclid's
Elements-not a veryearlyauthority, it is true,forProcluslived
some eightcenturiesafterPlato; but his accountappears to be
reliable,since it is based on an early historyof geometryby
Eudemus,a pupil of Aristotle, a workwhichProclusfrequently
quotes and otherwiserefersto, but which has since been lost.
In the Prologueto his Commentary Proclussays: "Plato caused
mathematics in generaland geometry in particularto makevery
greatprogressbecauseofhis enthusiasm forthesestudies."8And
thenhe proceedsto give the names of eminentmathematicians
whoconsorted withPlatoin theAcademy:TheudiasofMagnesia,
authorof a pre-Euclideanbook on the "elements";Philippusof
Mende, probablythe same as the Philippusof Opus who edited
7Heath, op.cit.,I, 320-326.

8Proclus,CommentaryontheFirstBookofEuclid'sElements, 66.8-II (Friedlein).
The references
to Proclusthatfolloware all to be foundon pp.66-68.
3i6

Plato's Laws and wrote the Epinomis;Theaetetus of Athens and

Eudoxus of Cnidus, who are generally regarded as the two
greatest mathematicians of the century. Eudoxus brought his
school to Athens and merged it with the Academy for a time,
about the time when the Theaetetus was written; this means that
he broughtwith him several ofhis eminentpupils, also mentioned
by Proclus-that is, Amyntas, Menaechmus, Dinostratus, and
Athenaeus. We know from other sources9 that Archytas of
Tarentum, the founderof mechanics, was at times a residentin
the Academy; and it is probable that he always maintained close
relations with it through his friendshipwith both Plato and
Eudoxus. Most ofthesemen were individuallystarsofconsiderable
magnitude, and collectivelythey make a mathematical galaxy of
extraordinarybrilliance.
Why should this galaxy be found clustered around Plato? It
was certainly not because Plato himselfwas a creative mathe-
matician. He was obviously abreast of the mathematical knowl-
edge of his time, he followedthe new developmentswith interest
and enthusiasm,and he was able on occasion to suggestimportant
problems for investigation by his colleagues; but despite the
numerous attributionsto Plato in antiquityof this or that mathe-
matical theoremor discovery,thereis no decisive evidence that he
was the author of any of them.10The importantadvances in the
science appear to have been made by his associates and disciples.
Something else must be the factorresponsiblefortheirgathering
about him and forthe remarkable fruitfulness of their collabora-
tion. And here again Proclus' account givesus the clue.
It is difficultforus to see preciselywhat the mathematiciansof
this period were up to, since the monumental achievement of
Euclid blocks our view of the work of his predecessors; and
Euclid's work is so solid and so elegant that it seems like some
effortlessnatural growth,a prolessine matri.But the truth is, as
Proclus' account shows us, that the mathematicians long before
Euclid's time had become self-consciousabout theirmethods and
were endeavoring to introducegreaterrigorand systeminto their
9 See Pseudo-Eratosthenes,
in Heath,op.cit.,I, 245.
10For a discussionofPlato'scontributions
see Heath,op.cit.,I, 288-308.
317

GLENN R. MORROW
body of theorems.Proclus says that the firstperson of whom it is

recorded that he compiled "elements" was Hippocrates of Chios,
whose life almost paralleled that of Socrates-that is, more than
a hundred years before Euclid's time. After Hippocrates many
others must have attempted such a systematization.We know
fromProclus that a certain Leon, otherwisealmost unknown, as
well as Theudias of Magnesia, made other arrangementsof the
elements."1Proclus says of Theudias not only that he "arranged
the elements admirably," but also that he "stated many of the
definitions(or theorems) in a more general form." Of Amyntas,
Menaechmus, and Dinostratus Proclus says that they "made the
whole of geometrymore perfect,"which suggestsmore than that
theymerelyadded to the number oftheorems.Again ofLeodamas
of Thasos, Archytasof Tarentum, and Theaetetus of Athens, he
says that they "increased the number of theorems and made a
furtheradvance towards a more scientificgrouping of them."
Note that each of these men is mentioned as having made some
contribution,eitherto the systematizationof the whole or to the
perfecting of particular theorems already established. And
Euclid's work is presented as a culmination of their efforts."A
little after these men came Euclid," says Proclus, "who put
together the Elements,systematizingmany of the theorems of
Eudoxus, perfecting many of Theaetetus', and putting in
irrefutabledemonstrativeformmany of the thingsthat had been
onlylooselyproved by his predecessors."
Proclus' account shows clearly that the mathematicians of
Plato's time were concerned not merelyin extendingthe number
of their theorems, but in perfectingtheir methods and syste-
matizing their results.We can inferthat their procedure was an
early stage of that method later canonized in the Elements,a
procedure whereby theorems are established by being deduced
frompremisespreviouslyestablished or admitted. Some of these
premises are established by deduction from prior premises,and
all of them eventually are dependent on, or follow from,certain
starting points which are themselves accepted without demon-
11 It may be that Theudias' workwas the textbookused in the Academy

duringAristotle's fromtheform
time.Some ofthetheoremsthathe citesdiffer
theyhave in Euclid.
318

stration.These startingpoints are what we findplaced in Euclid

at the very beginningof the Elements,divided into three groups:
definitions, postulates, and common notions. It is doubtful
whetherthe distinctionbetween these groups of primarypremises
goes back to Plato's time, or whetherany of these termshad yet
become fixedin its later meaning. But the basic procedure is not
altered by these later refinements.This consisted in choosing
suitable startingpoints, probably because they were intuitively
evident, and thence proceeding to establish the theoremsto be
proved-the earliest propositionsdepending only on the initial
axioms or startingpoints, but the later ones, in increasing com-
plexity, being deduced from previously established theorems as
well as from the initial primary premises. This method is so
familiar to us that we have difficultyin realizing what a great
intellectual achievement it was when it was firstconceived and
applied. Its skillful and systematic use is what particularly
distinguishesGreek mathematics from the mathematics of the
Egyptians and the Babylonians. Despite the extentof mathemati-
cal knowledge among the Egyptians, and particularlythe Baby-
lonians, in some details even surpassingthe range of the Greek
mathematicians, neither of these peoples have left a trace in-
dicating that they used systematic deduction and methodical
demonstration.
It is a plausible hypothesisthat Plato's greatestcontributionto
the mathematicians who gathered about him in the Academy
was the help he gave them in clarifyingand perfectingtheir
methodology.We can at least be sure that the procedure of the
mathematicianshad great attractionforPlato. It had its analogies
in the Socratic method, as he portraysit in the earliest of his
dialogues. Socrates declares that he is a man who always needs to
be guided by reasons; and even in the Crito,when facing a
momentouspractical decision, he insistson recalling the premises
that have hithertoguided him, and when he findsthey are still
acceptable, he asks what theyimplyin the presentinstance. When
some common opinion is presented for examination, Socrates
insists on tracing its consequences; for until we have explored
its implicationsand theirrelationsto other beliefsthat we accept,
we cannot be sure that we believe, or even understand, the
319

GLENN R. MORROW
propositionthat we startedwith. Faith in deductive implication,

avoidance of contradiction-these are certainly features of the
mathematicians' method. Furthermore, in order to see an
implicationclearlywe need to have a precise understandingofthe
termsbetween which it is supposed to hold; hence the Socrates of
Plato's picture insistsabove all on accurate definitionsof terms.
In all these respectsthe Socratic method in its early formis at one
with the method of the mathematicians.In one respect,however,
it is relatively undeveloped as compared with theirs. Socrates'
elenchusis primarilydestructivein purpose; its intentis to bring
about a conviction of ignorance, according to the familiar
Socratic formula,and it operates predominantlyby bringingto
lightabsurditiesor inconsistenciesin accepted opinions.In mathe-
matics the situation is otherwise.The reductio ad absurdum, though
a powerfuland fundamentalresource,is only a part of a complex
system of procedures whose main purpose is constructive.
But a remarkable change takes place in the Socrates of Plato's
middle dialogues. Here dialectic begins to be used for con-
structivepurposes; and this is accompanied by a recognitionof
the important role played by hypotheses in all constructive
reasoning. Whether Plato learned the practice of hypothesizing
from the mathematicians we cannot say. The fact that it first
appears in the Meno, in connection with an illustrationof its
mathematical use, does suggest the source of Plato's inspiration.
But in any case what he says about the method of hypothesisin
the relevant passages of the Phaedo and the Republicgives it a
precisionand a general applicability that are clearlyhis own. It is
temptingto suppose that Plato is chieflyresponsibleforclarifying
its methodology and making it into that powerful instrument
which it became in later mathematics.To hypothesizea proposi-
tion, as Plato sees it, is not to set it up as somethingto be tested
by its consequences, or to be refuted,as usually happens in the
Socratic elenchus,but somethingquite different. It is to assume it as
a startingpoint of a deduction whose intentis to establish some
otherpropositionor beliefin which one is interested.This is by no
means an obvious intellectual device, and its discovery and
systematicuse are the secret of that extraordinaryintellectual
achievementthatwe call Euclidean geometry.
320

There is a very clear statementof this procedure of hypothesis

in the Phaedo. Socrates is interested-he openly admits it-in
establishingthe immortalityof the soul. This question involvesan
inquiry into the causes of generation and destruction; and
Socrates recountsat lengthhow he firstwent to the writingsof the
physicistsand how disappointed he was with them and how
blinded by their conflictinganswers. Fearing that he would
completelylose his vision fortruthunless he followed a different
method,he decided to resortto inquiryby means oflogoi.
This is how I proceeded.Hypothesizingon each occasiontheproposi-

tion (Aoyoso)which I judged to be the strongest,
whetherabout the
cause (of generation)or anythingelse, I posited as true whatever
seemed to me accorded with it, and as false whatever did not
accord[i ooa].12
Then he proceeds to state the hypothesisthat he intendsto use in

the present inquiry into the immortalityof the soul. This is
the familiar doctrine of Forms, which Socrates presents as
somethingthathe has oftensetforthon otheroccasions.
I come back to those well-wornmattersand startfromthem,hy-

pothesizingthatthereis a beautifulin itselfand a greatand a tall and
all the others;and if you grantme themand admit that theyexist,
I hope by means of them (sE'Kov'-wv) to demonstrate thecause and
discoverthatsoulis immortal[i oob].
The argumentthat followsconstitutesthe demonstrationbased on

this hypothesis.The Forms of life and death are opposites, each
excluding the other; from which it follows that soul, whose
essence is life, necessarilyexcludes the opposite of its essence-
namely death. This is a simple argument, in the form which
12 On the meaningof "accord" in thispassage see Robinson,Plato'sEarlier
Dialectic,pp. 126-128. "Plato choosesto be inaccurate,or at least inadequate,

in orderto preserveconversational simplicity.The two thingshe reallyhas in
mind,namelydeducibilityand inconsistency, cannotbe neatlyexpressedby a
singleverb and its negative,because theyare not contradictories, but con-
traries.So he dropssomethingof his meaning,trusting to its being 'divined',
and takes consistencyand inconsistency, which are contradictories and can
thusbe compactlyexpressed."
321

GLENN R. MORRO W
Aristotlewas later to call the second figure of the syllogism-

formallycorrect,neat, and conclusive if we admit the premises.
Here then is the mathematical method of hypothesismade into a
general tool ofreasoning.
An importantquestion immediatelyarises. How is the chosen
hypothesis-not merely in the present case but in all cases of
hypotheticalreasoning-to be established? And this question is
dealt within the sequel to the passage just read.
itself,you
If you shouldbe requiredto give a logos of the hypothesis
would do so in the same way, by hypothesizing anotherhypothesis,
whicheverseemedthebestofthoseabove [i oid].
"Best" here obviously has a logical flavor; you would posit the
hypothesisfrom which the questioned hypothesis can best be
deduced. This higher hypothesisin turn may need to be estab-
lished, and the same procedure is repeated until you come to
"something adequate" (hi2- iKavov; i oie). Here we see the full
range of the method as practiced by the mathematicians and
incorporated by Plato into his own methodology. Every dem-
onstrated conclusion rests upon premises which are, at some
stage or other, undemonstratedhypotheses; but eventually the
whole systemof theoremsis dependent upon somethingultimate
and "adequate."
In adopting the method of hypothesis into his own meth-
odology Plato may well have given the procedure a theoretical
clarityofwhich the practicingmathematicianswere not previously
aware. In any case, his conception of the method as universally
applicable wherevermen seek certaintyin thoughtor action gave
to it a validity and scope beyond the most ambitious dreams of
the mathematicians.In the RepublicPlato made himselfa kind of
propagandistformathematics,as a studycapable above all others
of trainingthe mind, enabling it to rise above sense experience to
the intelligible world where alone truth and science are to be
found, and thereforean essential part of the higher education of
the philosopherand the rulerofa good state.
At the same time, this commitmentto mathematical methods
raised problems for Plato which lay beyond the range of the
mathematicians' interestsbut which the philosopher could not
322

evade. Plato must often have asked himself,How solid is the

imposing edifice of the geometers' theorems? The very clarity
with which he expounds the hypotheticalmethod in the passage I
have just read from the Phaedobrings inescapably to light the
basic weakness of this structure:its foundations,the primary
premises on which all the others depend, need themselvesto be
established. He appears to have seen this when writing the
Phaedopassage, but gives only a crypticanswer: we must proceed
from hypothesisto prior hypothesisuntil we reach "something
adequate." This firstpremise, this ultimate anchor of our de-
duction, cannot itselfhave the necessitythat belongs to a dem-
onstrated theorem; but if it cannot be demonstrated,it would
appear to lack the kind ofadequacy thatwe need.
These doubts about the sufficiency of the method of hypothesis
are presented openly and emphatically in the discussion of
mathematicsin the Republic, togetherwith a hint of the way in
which Plato thinks the philosopher can meet the difficulties
involved. He unhesitatinglyplaces mathematics in the upper
halfofthe Divided Line. For the mathematicians
use visibleformsand maketheirargumentsabout them,althoughthey
are not thinkingof thembut of the thingswhichtheyresemble.They
make theirargumentsin orderto understandthesquare itselfand the
notthediagramwhichtheydraw[s iod].
diagonalitself,
This is preceded by an account ofthe methodof reasoningwhich

the mathematiciansuse.
You know,I think,thatthosewho occupythemselves withgeometry
and arithmeticand such subjectshypothesizethe odd and the even
and the figuresand threekinds of angles and other thingsakin to
them in each branch of inquiry. Assumingthat they know these
thingsand laying them down as their hypotheses,they no longer
thinkit incumbenton themto give a logos,eitherto themselves or to
others,ofthesethingsthatare plain to all; but takingthemas starting-
points,theyproceed withoutmore ado to go throughthe rest and
end by generalagreementat the pointwhichtheyset out to examine
[5Iocd].
There is an implied criticismhere. They do not thinkit incumbent
on them to give a logos of their basic hypotheses,as being clear
323

GLENN R. MORROW
to all. When Socrates recapitulates this discussion in a later

passage, thiscriticismis more pointed.
We said that geometryand the sciencesdependenton it graspsome-

thingof being; but we see thattheydream about it, being unable to
see it withwakingeyes,so long as theyuse hypothesesthat are un-
questioned,ofwhichtheyare unable to givea logos. For if the begin-
ningis what one does not know,and the end and whatcomesbetween
is woven fromwhat one does notknow,bywhatdevicecan such con-
sistencybe convertedintoknowledge?[533cd].
But Plato apparently thinks these insufficienciesof mathe-

matical method can be overcome by the philosopher intent on
going beyond them. The method by which this is to be done is
expounded in the description of the uppermost segment of the
Divided Line.
By the secondsectionoftheintelligible,understandme to mean what

reasoningitselflays hold ofby thepowerofdialecticwhenit treatsits
hypothesesnot as starting-points (ep~oxa)but as hypothesesin the
literalsense,i.e. as thingslaid down like steps on which one may
mountup tothefirst
principle ofthewhole[5 I b].
(dpX,4)
Thus the philosopher who wishes to rise above the level of
knowledge attainable by mathematics must recognize his hy-
potheses-eventually the primary premises, or axioms, must be
included here-not as self-evidenttruths but as provisional
assumptions,like all the others, which need to be established.
But it is to be noted that Plato proposes no new procedure to
replace the method of hypothesis.The dialectician continues to
establishhypothesesby positinghigherhypotheses,until somehow
or other (preciselyhow is not said) he reaches an ultimate that is
unhypothetical. The use of this negative term to describe the
anchor of all deduction shows that the difficultyconfronting
Plato is still unsolved. Being unhypothetical,this firstprinciple
cannot be a demonstrated conclusion from premises; but how
otherwiseit can be certainlyknownremainsto be discovered.
Now at last, afterthis long excursion, we are able to see the
special meaning ofthe passage in the Theaetetus
which we set out to
examine. It is inconceivable that Plato was not himselfaware of
324

thisunsolved problem, if not at the time the Republicwas written,

at least soon afterward.Assuming that he was conscious of this
unfinishedbusiness when he wrote the Theaetetus, we can now
readily see why he was not in a position to supply a meaning for
logos that would make Theaetetus' third proposal satisfactory.
He could hardly say that to convert a true beliefinto knowledge
we need only provide the kind of logos with which the mathe-
maticians were familiar-that is, a prooffrompremises.This may
have appeared satisfactory at the timewhen the Menowas written;
but Plato now sees that this would lead sooner or later to the
self-contradictory attempt to demonstratean unhypothesizedfirst
principle. On the other hand, what other kind of logos was
available for converting a true belief into knowledge? It is
probable that Plato was still confidentthat he could find some
other way whereby certaintycould be reached by dialectic, by
that practice of "giving and receiving logoi" (Soivat Kal
&e'aorau Aoyovs) of which we read so much in the later dialogues;
and it is possible that the clue to understandingsome puzzling
featuresin the dialectic oftheselater dialogues is to be foundin his
gropingforsuch a method of dialectic "proof." But at the time of
the Theaetetus he may well have been convinced only that this
method,whateverit mightbe, was not the familiarmethod of the
mathematicians.
Justhere,I think,we findthe meaning ofSocrates' dream which
introducesthe puzzling third section of our dialogue. We should
expect Plato to approve heartily of Theaetetus' third proposal:
that knowledge is right opinion accompanied by a logos-
that is, supportedby a demonstration.But we have seen why Plato
could not now give this answer. And as if he knew that thisis the
answer we should expect him to give, he explains in crypticterms
whyhe cannot give it.
This I take to be the meaning of the dream. Notice that the
dream professesto be a fullerstatementof Theaetetus' suggestion,
a statementmade necessaryin order that we may see the logical
dilemma which it presentsto us. Its presentationas a dream is
presumably a dramatic device for enabling Socrates to make a
contribution to an issue which had arisen after his time. The
difficultythat Plato saw in followingthe mathematical method
325

GLENN R. MORRO W
of logos to a satisfactoryresult is just such an issue. This is the

dream, as Socrates tells it, in language which, as the translation
triesto indicate,is highlyambiguous.
I seem to have heard some people say that the "firsts"(,apclira),as

were the "elements" (atXoLXEZa)of whichwe and all thingsconsist,
have no logos. Each of themjust by itselfcan only be named (or
asserted,o'vo Luat); nothingelse can be said of it,neitherthatitexists
(oris a fact,cogI've) northatitdoesnotexist(orisnota fact,cgo OVK & t),
forwe shouldat once be addingto it existence(truth)or non-existence
(falsehood),and we oughtto add nothingifwe are to expressjust it
alone (oxVirO EKEtO ,IOVOV). [Neither"just," nor "it," nor "alone," nor
"each," nor "this," oughtto be added, nor any otherof such terms,
ofwhichthereare many.These termscirculatefreely and are appliedto
everything, though they are different fromthat to which they are
applied; whereasif it were possibleto describea "first"by a logos
peculiar to itself,we oughtto speak of it withoutany of theseother
terms.The factis, it is impossibleto describeany of the "firsts"by a
logos; fornothingelse belongsto it; it can onlybe named (or asserted),
since a name is all that it has.] As forthe thingscomposedof them
[i.e., of the "firsts"],just as they themselvesare complex,so their
names when woven togetherproducea logos,fora logos (demonstra-
tion?) is preciselya textureof names (propositions?).Consequently
the elements(auotXEda,letters)are withoutlogosand unknowablebut
can be perceived,while compounds (syllables) can be known and
pronouncedand you can have a truebeliefabout them.When thena
man getshold of a true belief about somethingwithouta logos,his
mindgetsit rightbut he does notknowit; forhe who cannotgiveand
receivea logoswithregardtoa thingis ignorantofit.But whenhe has
also got hold of a logos,thenthisbecomespossibleforhimand he is
fullyknowing[20id-202c].
This dream contains many puzzling details, but the central

feature which runs through them all is clear enough. It is the
concept of "firsts"(1Tp61-ra),or "elements" (UzoLXEoa), forwhich
no logos can be given,and which can only be named, or asserted.
The term UTotXEcLa had long been used to designate the basic
premises of arithmetic and geometry; its use in this sense, if
Proclus' account is to be trusted,goes back at least to the time of
Hippocrates of Chios, a hundred years before Euclid. This sense
326

was well knownto Aristotle13 and was canonized,so to speak,

by Euclid's workbearingthis word as its title.It can safelybe
assumedthat it would be understoodin this sense by Plato's
mathematicalcolleagues.The dream then would naturallybe
takenas expoundingthebasiccharacterofgeometrical procedure;
that is, all demonstration is a textureof propositions composed
eventuallyof simplepremiseswhich,beingsimpleand ultimate,
cannot be demonstrated and therefore cannot be knownto be
true.
If we had only thismeaningof stoicheia to reckonwith,the
significance of Socrates'dreamcould not possiblyhave escaped
attention,as it seemsto have done. But the truthis, the term
UzotXELa had manyotheruses in Plato's time.It was frequently
employedto denotethebasicconstituents intowhichanycomplex
could be divided-such as the lettersof a word, the parts of
a physicalbody,or the ultimateelementsof the physicalworld.
One ofitsearliestusesis to denotetheseriesofmarkson a sundial
indicatingthe hours of the day. Plato himselfuses U-otXEca,
bothin thisdialogueand elsewhere, to designatethelettersofthe
alphabet.BothAristotle and Plato sometimes use it to referto the
ultimatebodies in the physicalworld.But Aristotlemoreoften
usesit as synonymous withprinciples(JpXal).The termtherefore
had a broad spectrumof meaningsin Plato's day. It seems
originally to havereferred to thepartsofa military formation, and
fromthat came veryearlyto be applied to any orderly array,
such as the markson a sundial,the lettersof the alphabet,the
orderlyarrayof propositions in geometryor arithmetic, or the
firstmembersof this orderlyarray,or more generallyto the
starting pointsin anyinquiry.14
This complexity ofmeaningsis clearlyexhibitedin the textof
Socrates' dream. Some of the detailssuggestphysicalanalysis,
some point towardanalysisof discourseand its parts,such as
lettersconsideredas partsofwords,and wordsas partsof state-
ments,or premisesas partsofarguments. This confusing wealthof
13 Cf. Topics)I58b 35 if.) i63b 23-25; Met.998a 25-27, IOI4a 35-36; Cat. I4a
39; PostAnal.84b 2 I.
14 On UroLXcEasee Diels, Elementum, pp. 14 if.; WalterBurkert,in Philologus,
103 (I 959), I 67 ff.
327

GLENN R. MORROW
detailhas greatlybefuddledefforts
to interpret
themeaningofthe
dream.Commentators have almostuniformlyseizedupon one of
the nonmathematical uses of UToLXEra and overlooked its mathe-
matical meaning.The most commoninterpretation is to take
UToLXEcLa as referring to the ultimatephysicalpartsof things-as
indeed is stronglysuggestedin the opening sentence: "the
elementsof which we and all other thingsare composed."
Consequently it has beenthoughtto be a reference to Democritus,
or to some other atomist.More sophisticatedinterpreters of
recentdays have ignoredthis lead and taken it to mean the
ultimateparts of statements-thatis, names. GilbertRyle has
arguedpersuasively in his lecturesthatthe theoryexpoundedis
thatoflogicalatomism,and itsrefutation in thesequelshows,he
thinks,thatPlato is here renouncingan earlierbeliefin atomic
elementsof discourse,such as the simple and unanalyzable
Forms.Likewise,Wittgenstein quotes thispassage in the Philo-
sophicalInvestigations (pp. 2I if.) in connectionwith his own
recantation ofthelogicalatomismofhis Tractatus.
Why does Plato not identifythe analystswho are his target
here? We have examplesin other dialogues of Plato's veiled
methodofdiscussing contemporary issues,and someofthedetails
in the dreammay have been deliberately insertedto conceal its
pointfromall but an elite amonghis mathematicalcolleagues.
But I thinka betterexplanationis thatinsteadofformulating a
theorythat could only be interpreted in one way, Plato has
constructed a kindofmodelapplicablealiketo all fieldsin which
analysisis practiced.His intentmaybe expressedschematically as
follows.
Physical Lexical Grammatical Mathematical
Compounds Things Words Statements Demonstrations

"Firsts" Parts Letters Words (names) Premises
Mathematicalanalysis,physicalanalysis,lexicaland grammatical
analysisalike aim at reachingultimateelementsby which the
compoundis to be explained.The dreamtherefore is a theoretical
model that exhibitsthe common nature of various types of
analysis.
328

But the dream also contains the stipulation that explanation

can be given only of compounds; the "firsts,"being simple and
unanalyzable, are incapable of explanation. Now whenever any
analysis into elementsforthe sake of understandinga compound
is accompanied by the assumptionthat the "firsts"are unknown
and unknowable, we have an identical problem of reconciling
the unknowabilityof the elementswith the assumed knowability
of the compound derived fromthem. The inconsistencyinvolved
is brought to light by a very neat argument which immediately
follows the statementof the dream. The argument consistsof a
dilemma. Either the compound (forexample, a syllable composed
of letters)is identical with the elementsof which it is composed,
or it is an entityin its own right distinctfrom the lettersand
having a character of its own. If we take the firstalternative,
he who knows the syllable will also know its constituentletters,
for the syllable is simply all the lettersthat make it up. If we
take the second alternative, then the syllable, having a simple
nature of its own, will be as unknowable as, by hypothesis,the
letters are. Hence either the elements must be known or the
compounds derived from them must be unknown. In short,
knowledge cannot be derived fromelements that are not them-
selvesknowable and known.
This refutationis applicable to any form of analysis that
professes to understand a complex whole by reducing it to
unknowable constituentparts. But if we take into account the
mathematical settingand charactersof the dialogue, the mathe-
matical significanceof the key term U-OtXELa, and if we recall the
direction and force of Plato's criticism of mathematics in the
Republic, we can only conclude that the chiefpoint of this refuta-
tion is to bringto lightthe epistemologicaldefectin the procedure
of mathematical demonstration.Plato leaves it to the intelligence
of his mathematical hearersto grasp the moral of the dream and
its refutation-namely, that if we start fromfirstprinciples that
ipsofacto,because they are first,cannot be known,in the sense in
which we are using the term "know," there is no way whereby
we can know anything.
For the mathematicians who got Plato's point this may have
been a surprisingresult. Was it surprisingto Plato? I doubt it.
329

GLENN R. MORRO W
Afterall, he had expressedmuchthe samejudgmenton mathe-

maticsin theRepublic. in thepresentcase is thathe
The difference
givesus no hint,as he had done in the Republic, of the way in
whichwe mightmeet and overcomethisdifficulty. Indeed the
unhypothetical startingpoint which he had postulatedas the
goal of dialecticin the Republic
seemscondemnedby his present
argument,as much as any otherundemonstrated "first."And if
he had discoveredanyotherprocedurebywhichcertainty can be
attained,he givesus no hintofit. The inconclusive endingofthe
dialogue,withitsperfunctory refutationofTheaetetus'promising
thesis,showsthat he was not willingas yet to show his hand.
It suggests,indeed,thathe was facinga problemthathe did not
yetknowhow to solve,exceptthatit mustbe by someprocedure
otherthanthemethodofdemonstration fromaxioms.
How Plato eventuallysolved thisproblem,if indeed he ever
did solveit in thetermsin whichit is statedin the Theaetetus,
we
cannotclearlysee. Friedlanderthinksthe negativeresultof the
dialogue showsthat Plato had come to the conclusionthat the
"way oflogos"mustbe abandonedifwe hopeto reachknowledge.
"Erkenntnis steht
nochhochfiberdemLogos."15 But to abandon logos
meansthatwe mustabandon the way of reasonand discursive
thought.I am notwillingto settleforthisinterpretation ofPlato's
later theoryof knowledge.The dialoguesthat come afterthe
Theaetetusseemto me to pointclearlyaway fromsuch an inter-
pretation.Dialecticand thepracticeofgivingand receivinglogoi
are frequently mentionedin theselater dialogues,and seem as
importantas theywere before.But thislater dialecticcertainly
was notmerelya continuation ofPlato'searlierprocedures. There
are hintsin themof Plato's searchingfornew toolsof analysis,
new methodsof inference, and even hintsthathe was recasting
theproblemitselfin termsthatwouldmakeit moreamenableto
solution.But I can onlymentionthesehintsin passing,withthe
convictionthat theymustbe fullyexploredforthe elementsof
noveltytheycontainif we are to understandthe later stage of
Plato's theoryof knowledge.We have usuallythoughtthat the
chiefproblemin thislater epistemology was how to relatethe
15 Platon,III, I70 f
330

transcendent Formsto thesenseworld.That, I believe,is a trail

thatdoes notlead to our quarry.Aristotleled the pack downit,
with loud baying against the Xwptuptos',only to flushfromthe
shrubbery anotherXwptajw'.ofhisown.It isratherremarkable how
serenelyindifferent Plato seemsto thisparticularproblemthat
has so botheredhiscommentators. He was confident thathe had
foundthe locus of scientific knowledgein the intelligible world;
and his efforts in later years were predominantly devoted to
exploringthe natureof thisintelligibleworld and of the levels
ofbeingwhichthestructure ofthisworldreveals.And ifwe trust
Aristotle'stestimony, mathematics was stillcentralin histhinking
on thisproblem.
In conclusionI should like to call attentionto a passage in
Aristotlethatseemsto confirm myinterpretation ofthisenigmatic
passagein the Theaetetus. If myinterpretationis correct,theissue
raisedin the dreammusthave been vigorously discussedin the
Academy,and precisely in theyearswhenAristotle was a member
of the group.Now Aristotle'sPosterior Analyticsappears to have
been composedduringtheseyearsof his membership beforethe
death of Plato, and whenAristotlewas himselfcollaboratingin
theclarification and formulation oftheproceduresofmathemati-
cal demonstration.16 The thirdchapterin the firstbook of this
treatisecontainsan accountofa livelydifference ofopinionthat
hingedon the veryissue discussedin Socrates'dream and its
refutation. It is hard to see what group of disputantsAristotle
could be referring to other than his fellow-members of the
Academy.Moreover,thispassage containstermsidenticalwith
those used in Socrates' dream; so that not merelythe issue
itselfbut the termsin whichit is statedpointto the passagewe
havebeendiscussing.
Let us firstrecall the contextin which this account of the
difference of opinionoccurs.In the precedingchapterAristotle
has reaffirmed his doctrinethatknowledge,in the strictsenseof
the term,means necessaryknowledge."What we knowis what
cannot possibly be otherwise."117 "Knowledge throughdem-
16This viewis confirmed bythelatestflull-scale ofAristotleand his
treatment
see IngemarDuring,Aristoteles,
writings; pp. 49-50.
17 Post.Anal.,7 i b I5-i6.
33'

GLENN R. MORROW
onstration" he declares is knowledge of this sort; and then

proceeds to lay down the conditionsthat must be met ifwe are to
have a rigorous demonstration.It is clear that Aristotle takes
as his model the procedure of the mathematicians,as Plato had
done, with its dependence upon strictdeduction frompremises,
themselvesdeduced fromprior premises,and ultimatelydepend-
ing upon what Aristotlecalls "firsts"(rp C-a) or "startingpoints"
(ipxaL). A considerable part of this second chapter is devoted to
the various kindsof
distinguishing -irpo-ra or dpxal. Aristotle's
classificationis so close to Euclid's later formulationthat we
must believe that Aristotlehimselftook part in the mathematical
research in the Academy which later led to Euclid's culminating
achievement.The epistemologicalcrux is the nature and validity
of these iTpC-0ra.Aristotle asserts that they must be "immediate"
(aLEToL) premises-that is, not depending upon any priormediat-
ing proposition, hence undemonstrable. Hence the issue dis-
cussed in the chapter that follows.Aristotlestates the differences
ofopinion withadmirable clarity.
Some hold that,owingto thenecessity ofknowingtheprimarypremises
(the p7WrTa),thereis no knowledge.Othersthinkthereis, but thatall
truthsare demonstrable.... The firstgroup,assumingthatthereis no
way of knowingother than by demonstration,maintain that an
infiniteregressis involved;and we cannotknowtheposteriorthrough
theprior,ifbehindthe priorstandsno "first"(-rrpJ3Tov). Theyareright
in this,forit is impossibleto traversean infiniteseries. If, on the
other hand, the series terminatesand there are primarypremises
(7Tpc7'ra),these are unknowablebecause incapable of demonstration,
which theysay is the only way of knowing.And since we cannot
know the primarypremises(7pWrT), neithercan we know,in the
properand unqualifiedsense,the conclusionsthatfollowfromthem.
The otherpartyagreewiththemas regardsknowing,holdingthatit is
only possibleby demonstration, but theysee no difficultyin holding
that all truthsare demonstrated, on the groundthat demonstration
maybe circularand reciprocal[Post.Anal.,I 3 72b5-I 8].
The firstparty to this dispute appears to have inferred,from

the negative outcome of the Theaetetus, that knowledge in the
strictsense of the term is impossible. They appear to have been
the advance guard of the thinkersin the Academy who later
332

made it, under Arcesilaus and Carneades, a strongholdof skep-

ticism.The other party,adhering to Plato's conception of knowl-
edge as necessarytruthbut also holding fastto the beliefthat such
knowledge is possible, had to make a strange modificationin
deductive procedure to provide for demonstrationof primary
premises.Aristotlespends the remainder of the chapter showing
that such a modification involves in fact a rejection of strict
demonstrationas practiced by mathematicians and accepted by
himself.It is not possible to identifyPlato with either of these
groups, so far as our knowledge goes; and Aristotle'stext gives
us no clues. But neitheris it possible to fail to see that the issue
that divides the two parties is Plato's clear formulationof the
dilemma in deductiveprocedure.
Aristotleis not one to leave a problem unsolved, and he has a
solutionto this.
Our own doctrineis thatnot all knowledgeis demonstration; on the
contrary,knowledgeof the immediatepremisesis independentof the
demonstration. The necessityof this is obvious; for since we must
knowthe priorpremisesfromwhichthe demonstration is drawn,and
since the regressmustend in immediatetruths,thesetruthsmustbe
indemonstrable[72b i 8-22].
There is a certain disingenuousnessin Aristotle's rather smug

solution. To affirmthat not all knowledge is demonstrableis to
reject what he has given everyshow of affirming in the preceding
chapter of this very treatise.Worst of all, the "necessity" which
he says compels us to assertthat knowledgeofimmediate premises
is independent of demonstrationis itself a consequence of the
assumption that knowledge in the strictsense is possible-which
is the verypoint at issue.
GLENN R. MORROW
University
ofPennsylvania
333


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Philosophical Review

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1 Thispaperwas deliveredat MichiganStateUniversity

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correctenumeration of the parts of a thing-for example, of the

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elements of things are unknowable and only compounds know-

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inferthat knowledgeis apprehensionof Forms? Cornfordbelieves

The Platonistwill draw the necessaryinference.True knowledgehas

In my opinion, however, it would be hasty to assume that all

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questions. How am I to be sure,in any given instance ofpresumed

3 Cf. Peirce: "Mathematicsis the science which draws necessaryconclu-

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Mathematicsis the fieldto whichPlato mostoftenturnsfor

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authorities,but the Theaetetus is the source of practically all we

My dear boys,old and young,you are sittingthereactinglike dema-

A more striking reminder of mathematics is provided by

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moresignificant is thefactthattheproblemitself-howto handle

7Heath, op.cit.,I, 320-326.

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Plato's Laws and wrote the Epinomis;Theaetetus of Athens and

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body of theorems.Proclus says that the firstperson of whom it is

11 It may be that Theudias' workwas the textbookused in the Academy

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stration.These startingpoints are what we findplaced in Euclid

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propositionthat we startedwith. Faith in deductive implication,

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There is a very clear statementof this procedure of hypothesis

This is how I proceeded.Hypothesizingon each occasiontheproposi-

Then he proceeds to state the hypothesisthat he intendsto use in

I come back to those well-wornmattersand startfromthem,hy-

The argumentthat followsconstitutesthe demonstrationbased on

12 On the meaningof "accord" in thispassage see Robinson,Plato'sEarlier

Dialectic,pp. 126-128. "Plato choosesto be inaccurate,or at least inadequate,

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Aristotlewas later to call the second figure of the syllogism-

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evade. Plato must often have asked himself,How solid is the

This is preceded by an account ofthe methodof reasoningwhich

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to all. When Socrates recapitulates this discussion in a later

We said that geometryand the sciencesdependenton it graspsome-

But Plato apparently thinks these insufficienciesof mathe-

By the secondsectionoftheintelligible,understandme to mean what

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thisunsolved problem, if not at the time the Republicwas written,

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of logos to a satisfactoryresult is just such an issue. This is the

I seem to have heard some people say that the "firsts"(,apclira),as

This dream contains many puzzling details, but the central

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was well knownto Aristotle13 and was canonized,so to speak,

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Physical Lexical Grammatical Mathematical

Compounds Things Words Statements Demonstrations

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But the dream also contains the stipulation that explanation

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