QUO WARRANTO, R66

G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999

PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court 1 granting his petition
for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.

Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port Security
Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to
September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs
Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988. 2 On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs
Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of
Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic
Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.

On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.
Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the
salary and benefits of the position of Director III.

In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment
as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:

Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos and as a
consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for all government
benefits due [him].

Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureau of
Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."

Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and
without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the
Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258. 3 The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a decision
was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office
without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to
have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The
court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time
directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and
other benefits appurtenant thereto.

Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending
before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion,
Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became
final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996. 4

On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24,
1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent
Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo
warranto petition.5

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning
the order of the trial court. 6 On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. 7 Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner claims that:

The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued,
considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position. 8

The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules
of Court.Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by
what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the
Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority
from the state.9 In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his
claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. 10 The action may be
commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal 11 against individuals who usurp a
public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and
against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated. 12 The action may
also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 13
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. 14 If the court
finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the
office. 15 If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:

Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found. — When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall
be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action
as justice requires.

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
holding the same, the court may order:

(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of
all the parties to the action as justice requires. 16

The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of
the court and on the relief sought. 17 In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the following relief:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from the
position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, and
petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled thereto.

Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for. 18

In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this petition
for quo warranto by:

1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and

2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other monetary benefits
appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until reinstated. 19

The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted
from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner did not
specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other
monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were withheld until
reinstated."

The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment
because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was
deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent
Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his
successor-in-interest. 20

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This
rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. 21 A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This
follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to
perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. 22 In the case at bar, the
petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out
before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against
respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying
execution of the trial court's decision.

Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years
on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his
back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's
decision. 23

Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was
merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said
back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo
warranto. 24

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41801 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006

MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P. CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T.
FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON C. TABORA, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P. MALLARI, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur
for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985
up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of directors and
officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among
the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped
the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents.

On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga
City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents)
to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
action forquo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge
of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that
improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative
jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents below).
Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1)
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other
petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then
required to submit their respective memoranda.

On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which
originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated
functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise
known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in
Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the Court of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority
may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases."
Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority,
promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000
designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange
Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National
Capital Region and within the respectiveprovinces in the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in
the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was
designated as "special court" (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).

Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect on
March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases originally assigned or
transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court
specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.

On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.

From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try and
decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is
evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide these cases to
the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .

Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the
otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the
regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-
corporate dispute.

In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates
that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order
8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court
to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.

The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set on
July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.

For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court
of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.

SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The petition raises the following issues:

WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND
DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO
CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION

II

WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001 WHICH TOOK EFFECT
ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16, 2005. 3

In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and
dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the
Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the
wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that "all decisions and final orders in cases
falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;" and (3) the petition was intended
merely to delay the proceedings in the trial court because when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of
the Regional Trial Court, said court granted petitioners’ motion to hold the proceedings in view of the
present petition pending before this Court.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that on
January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted the premises
of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections estimated at ₱400,000.00.

The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13, 2005. It
is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals from judgments
or final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein petitioners’ prayer in their
Answer for the dismissal of respondents’ case against them. As a consequence of the trial court’s refusal
to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court
that had been designated as a special court to hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the
order was merely interlocutory as it does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more
to be done on its merits. Such being the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through
a petition under Rule 45. As we held in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit:

In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the well-
settled rule that:
. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it
be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary
course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment.6

It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for more
violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the Court proceeded
to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating
thus:

While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error
committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to
ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court
were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the
parties.8

In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC
under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the parties to
resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a petition for
review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper court. Thus,
the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.

It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a
case for an intra-corporate controversy. 9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting
Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against
persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)." 11

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred
to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

xxxx

As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the
phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules.
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public
office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as
corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore,
The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warrantofiled by respondents before
the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office
and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

The Interim Rules provide thus:

Section 1. (a) Cases covered. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases
involving the following:

xxxx

(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations, between and
among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;

(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of

corporations, partnerships, or associations;

xxxx

SEC. 5. Venue. – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association
concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
(effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide
cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this
Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:

Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.

Albay (Legaspi City) Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta

Sorsogon (Sorsogon) Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor

Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which provides that:

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court
dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-
03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July
2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial
Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission;

xxxx

4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of
the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours)

The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present
action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced
and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is
undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant
to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special
Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto filed by herein Respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition
for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-
corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC.

Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the
case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the
matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v.
Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,13 the Court held that the trial court, having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein
could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.

Note, further, that respondents’ petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such petitions shall be
filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court. Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur is the
Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for
almost two years by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why
respondents were not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should be filed.

The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to
order the transfer of respondents’ petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious because as
of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases formerly
cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court, had been in effect for almost two years. Thus, the filing of the
petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those
kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for quo
warrantoin Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled "Jose Pierre
A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 180443

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES
and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is
whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs)
that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.

Common Antecedents

The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under
the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, 2 CIBAC,
through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29,
2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-
Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were
attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two
newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News 4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer. 5

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, 6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The
amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson
Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members,
in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of
Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the
nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that
Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.

On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. 8 The
right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly
based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of
744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a
second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on
the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution
and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007. 9

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, 10 whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007 11 to partially proclaim the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May
14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party,
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad,
Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.

The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC,
Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each;
and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions
with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be
formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied,
however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden
D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the
nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth
nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second
nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's
nominees therefore shall be:

1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva

2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane R. Borje

SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC
were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by
Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included
the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as
well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had
always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had always
been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval,
was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the
party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office

as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007. 15

Precís of the Consolidated Cases

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12,
2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees,
respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC
to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804). 17 He alleges that Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. 18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby
implement.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due
to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s
proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.

For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a
petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the
second nominee of CIBAC.

Issues

The issues are the following:

(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act; and

(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on
matters that were intra-corporate in nature.

Ruling

The petitions are granted.

A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case

The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done
and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein
either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil
action for certiorari in this Court.

We do not agree.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled
to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of
the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but
not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not
a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it
concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of
CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to
unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-
list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a
nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same
party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not
involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other
cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review
of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance
with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the
COMELEC.

B
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus,
forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in
the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby
deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court. 19

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in
the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the
same issue.20
The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum
shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their
processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. 21

Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute
forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues.23Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24

Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second
nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an
additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No.
07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of
concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance
until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial
duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority
to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with
pending disputes.

On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007
resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to
challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s
withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.

Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties,
because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.

C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the
doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its
legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be
delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be
delegated.25

Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards
the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must
declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature
should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as
the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of
making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive
officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the
delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation
and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in
nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary
to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot
extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is
controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed,
administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.27

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 28

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall. 29 In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate
IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC
enforces and administers.30

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. 31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the
procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
the resolution itself.

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether
the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section
13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting
IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that
an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, 32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended
to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not
enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft
additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature. 33

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall

submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to
change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except
when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee
becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should
be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal
interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the
Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart. 34 When the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.35Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by
expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous. 36

The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter
the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:

MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any
provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or
to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after
submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?
MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay
and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly
consider the same.

MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC
officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been
submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political
party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the
political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party
affiliation.

MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the exception
rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to be a
change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the
prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected. 37

The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of
the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely
refrain from doing the forbidden act, 38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this
case.

Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but
merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’
names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The
COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the
party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real
intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in
newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a
party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the
nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to
make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its
nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the
submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.

D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can
substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC,
namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c)
when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of
the three exceptions.

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the
general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the
former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express
exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to
inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. 391avvphi1

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words.
Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to
all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be
resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a
statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the
statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or
his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he
withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list of nominees.

No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being
when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory
grounds for substituting a nominee.

We agree with Lokin.

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, 40 has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby.
The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented,
and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent
with the law they intend to carry out. 41

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because
an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 42

The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology.

The explanation does not persuade.

To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in
a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.

However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground
granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to
the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the
unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the
nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated).
The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of
the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the
electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.

We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be
ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of
making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but
must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they
must be held to be invalid and should be struck down. 45

F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law. 46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the
law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is
no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law. 47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof
cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s
withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees
were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could
only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s
approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution,
both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
the Commission on Elections.

Accordingly, we annul and set aside:

(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens’ Battle
Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil
Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and

(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-List

Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.

We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List
Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.

We make no pronouncements on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2 February
2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra.
Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the
COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The Facts

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy on 1 December 2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to
cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the
May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought
election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government
Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution 7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:

Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more
than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on the
grounds other than the main issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for
holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the three-term limit
rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time to infuse new blood
in the political arena of San Antonio.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of Candidacy
of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San Antonio,
Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates
for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.8

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May
2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and
were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray
of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. 9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally
required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion
No. 117, S. 201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal
conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed
permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated
6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed
Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without
prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]." 11

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first,
Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to
imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day ofprisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009
in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy
on 1 December 2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final judgment
of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the
same position in the May 2010 Elections.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.14

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention.15She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because
Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010
Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from
the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
elections.
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received
the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since
Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be
declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of
Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 44 16 of the Local
Government Code to succeed as Mayor.

The COMELEC’s Rulings

The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:

Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by
Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;

2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;

3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed
Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention
within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;

4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m.
COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.

WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance.

SO ORDERED.17

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanida’s
qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this
juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s disqualification." 18 The Resolution further
stated:

We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections. The
teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while
they remain sound jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from
the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and ineligibility to hold public
office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s name, as already
ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby:

1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;

2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo;

3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM

Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;

4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office
of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation;
and

5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III to
cause the implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local
Government.

SO ORDERED.19

Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.

The Issues

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is
dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of
the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of
whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011 Order.
They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor
pursuant to the Local Government Code’s rule on succession.

The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a false
representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and served
is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section
78; second, they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to the fact
that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a ground for a
petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a strained
statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that violation
of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office.

The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidate’s eligibility to the
office he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age, citizenship, or
residency, among others, which the law requires him to state in his COC, and which he must swear under
oath to possess. The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of a candidate’s eligibility on
the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material representation under Section 78 but as a
ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to well-established
jurisprudence.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for
Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications of
elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local Government Code
provide in pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.

xxxx

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of
a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are
specifically enumerated:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money
or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)

A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." 20 All the offenses mentioned in Section
68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws.
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this
Court ruled:

[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.
They are criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x

Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the
crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under
Section 68.
False Material Representation

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or
cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of information in
the certificate of candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of birth; political party
that nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office
address for election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period of
residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies four statements: a
statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that the
candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the
candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 23 The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath,
and filed within the period prescribed by law.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him
perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual
disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x

Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the
penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the
principal penalty.

xxxx

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if
conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to
such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this

article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce
the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of
the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to
such office.Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that
oftemporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, 24 the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right
to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of
temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the
other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation
if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:

On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction of a
crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal
Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and
for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the
right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:

Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to
such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.

The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind
of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.”

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the
duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last
sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it
is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any
elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or
to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became
final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October
2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run
for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his
certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false material
representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public)
office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes afalse material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained inFermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the
lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78
to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Latasa, Rivera and Ong:

The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election.
Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible
for said office.” The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties
and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice, 29 is found both in the Constitution 30 and the
law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election 32 because he is ineligible. One who
has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74,
the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality
of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of
Digos during Latasa’s third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001
elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course,
cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely
represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued
that he did not make any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote
after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and
now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of
candidacy for violation of the three-term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court
affirmed the COMELEC En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration.

We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on

Elections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been elected
and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to
2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the 2007 to
2010 term. Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the three-term limit rule
constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales’
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of
candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-term limit rule.

Loong, Fermin and Munder:

When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition

is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification

It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for
eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may
represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine locality 37 when he is actually a permanent
resident of another country. 38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his
choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple
remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the
election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using
grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.

The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed
in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur
Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office
of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation
as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day
period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s petition was
one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68.
Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly applied. We recognized
the possible gap in the law:

It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a
certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such
misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the
misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the
discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78
of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made.
During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the
candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could
avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto
against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to
it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the
government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for
elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may
have seen the need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the
law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these
petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy. 41

In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidate’s possession of the required one-year
residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the
one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before the
COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 43 and
filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot
supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of
ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds." 44 A petition for disqualification
can only be premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section
40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s possession of the required
one-year residency requirement, as distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a
foreign country, should be filed under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.

In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for
Munder’s disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a
registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even
though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s registration. Moreover, Munder’s
certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix
his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his grounds
are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of Munder’s
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days
after the filing of Munder’s certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his
petition.

The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second Division, the
COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of
whether Munder was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC
Second Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of registration
as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for
disqualification. We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim
that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under
Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for a petition under
Section 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section
68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for
public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government
Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the law. Section 68 is
explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under said Section. The grounds for filing a petition
for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to
the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions
add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule and falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the enumeration in Section 68.

The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the
three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to
the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus
Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. Any
other false representation regarding a material fact should be filed under Section 78, specifically under
the candidate’s certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as a condition
for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba legis doctrine and
well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.

In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus
qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such
fact is material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to
and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible
from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility
because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the
next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he was eligible for the office that he sought
election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.

Legal Duty of COMELEC

to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal
duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to
run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is
judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The
law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification,
it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." 46 The disqualification of a
convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
competent court, is part of theenforcement and administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct
of elections.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval:

As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already
ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list
of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En
Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of
Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc
resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the
three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final
judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words,
on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo,
since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales,
the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains
as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should
now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. 48 (Boldfacing and underscoring
in the original; italicization supplied)

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order dated 12
January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane
isDIRECTED to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the
duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and
desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:
Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed by Emmanuel A. de
Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent) from the position of
assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA).

On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as AGM0. 1 His
appointment was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution No.
09-10, Series of 2009.2 He took his oath on 17 August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani F. Fernando. 3

Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP)
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010.

OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states:

2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES)
positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their
duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been
accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever
comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime. 4

On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No.
106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was
then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The service
vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other
employees.

Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the Office of
the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24, 6 which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2
as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer
paid his salary beginning November 2010.

Petitioner sought a clarification7 from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper
classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply, 8 Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones
(Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified and
could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further stated that a
perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous position.
In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.

Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services
and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll, 9 petitioner sent a letter on 5
December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, assistant general manager (AGM) for Finance and Administration;
and Lydia Domingo, Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an action or a response
from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO through a letter addressed
to the Office of the President on 17 December 2010. 10

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed respondent as
the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.

Hence, the instant Petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, filed its Comment on 19 August
2011.12However, upon motion of petitioner, it was disqualified from representing respondent. Thus, a
private law firm13entered an appearance as counsel for respondent and adopted the Comment filed by
the OSG.14

Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011.

ISSUES

Petitioner raises the following issues15 for the consideration of this Court:

(1) Whether respondent Emerson S. Carlos was validly appointed by President Aquino to the position of
AGMO of the MMDA;

(2) Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position of AGMO; and

(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and financial benefits he received
during his illegal tenure as AGMO of the MMDA.

THE COURT’S RULING

Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the security of
tenure of employees in the civil service. He further argues that his appointment as AGMO is not covered
by OP Memorandum Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as determined by the CESB.

On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; thus, in order to have
security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains
that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature. Thus, considering that petitioner is a
non-CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.
Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court
by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Hierarchy of Courts

As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the
urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need for stability in the civil service and the
protection of the rights of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the
Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court
justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against a presidential
appointment.

Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals
and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 16 The
hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition."17 A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal
of a petition.18

A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important
reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. 19 The rationale behind this policy arises
from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court,
which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of
the Court’s docket.20

In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and
after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the
present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil
servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to
this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts
are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be
dismissed.

Nature of the AGMO Position

Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be
dismissed for lack of merit.

"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a
franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-
founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited." 21 Where the action is filed by a private
person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22

The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to all
non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO,
avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-
CES position.
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position of
AGMO of the MMDA.

Career vs. non-career

Section 4 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7924, 23 otherwise known as the MMDA Charter, specifically created
the position of AGMO. It reads as follows:

Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.

xxxx

The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President and who shall
continue to hold office at the discretion of the appointing authority. He shall be vested with the rank,
rights, privileges, disqualifications, and prohibitions of a Cabinet member.

The Chairman shall be assisted by a General Manager, an Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration, an Assistant General Manager for Planning and an Assistant General Manager for
Operations, all of whom shall be appointed by the President with the consent and concurrence of the
majority of the Council, subject to civil service laws and regulations. They shall enjoy security of tenure
and may be removed for cause in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, provides
for two classifications of positions in the civil service: career and non-career. 24

Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, 25 as contradistinguished from non-
career service whose tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to the
latter’s pleasure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose the appointment was made. 26

Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a career
position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure –
the core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.

CES vs. non-CES

Career service includes the following:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty
and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board,
all of whom are appointed by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President,
such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit
system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or

proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

In Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and PCSO, 28 the Court clarified the positions covered by
the CES:

Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to be covered by the CES, two
elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I,
Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career
Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a
presidential appointee. Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one
covered by the third-level or CES. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered as CES:

1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of
the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a position of equal rank as those enumerated and identified by the
CESB to be such position of equal rank; AND

2) The holder of the position is a presidential appointee. Records show that in reply 29 to Chairperson
Tolentino’s query on whether the positions of general manager and AGM of the MMDA are covered by
the CES,30 the CESB – thru Executive Director Allones – categorically stated that these positions are not
among those covered by the CES.

Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter, 31 the CESB similarly responded that the AGMO’s
position could not be considered as belonging to the CES. 32 Additionally, Executive Director Allones said
that petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, to wit:

A cursory perusal of your appointment papers would show that it does not bear any indication that you
are holding a coterminous appointment. Neither your position as AGMO can be considered as created in
excess of the authorized staffing pattern since RA 7924, the law that created the MMDA clearly provided
for such position. As further stated above, your position will not fall under paragraph No. 2 of OP MC 1
because it is not yet considered as belonging to the CES. Hence, we posit that you are not covered by OP
MC 1 and 2.33

However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through Resolution No. 799
already declared certain positions meeting the criteria set therein as embraced within the CES.

It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 May 2009, even prior to petitioner’s
appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreover, as early as 31 May 1994, the above classification was already
embodied in CSC Resolution No. 34-2925, circularized in CSC Memorandum Circular 21, Series of 1994.

Resolution No. 799 classified the following positions as falling within the coverage of the CES:

a. The Career Executive Service includes the positions of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
director, Assistant Bureau Director, regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide), Assistant
Regional Director (department-wide and bureau-wide), and Chief of Department Service;

b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters are embraced within the CES
provided that they meet the following criteria:

i.) The position is a career position;

ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,

iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of executive and managerial
functions.

Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in the above-cited paragraph(a)
but it clearly falls under paragraph(b) considering that it belongs to a government-owned and controlled
corporation with an original charter. The nature of AGMO is clear from the provisions of the MMDA
Charter.

First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position that enjoys security of tenure by
virtue of the MMDA Charter.

Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level, which is equivalent
to the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29. 34

Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the position
require the performance of executive and managerial functions.

Section 12.4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7924 provides the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of an AGMO, as follows:

12.4 Assistant General Manager for Operations

The Assistant General Manager for Operations shall perform the following functions:
a. Establish a mechanism for coordinating and operationalizing the delivery of metro-wide basic services;

b. Maintain a monitoring system for the effective evaluation of the implementation of approved policies,
plans and programs for the development of Metropolitan Manila;

c. Mobilize the participation of local government units, executive departments or agencies of the
national government, and the private sector in the delivery of metro-wide services; and

d. Operate a central radio communication system.

He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the above functions or as may be
assigned from time to time.

An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people,
resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating,
controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial
or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance,
leadership, and supervision.

For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.

In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments require examinations, are
grouped into three major levels:35

Sec. 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career service
appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:

(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions which involve non-
professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than
four years of collegiate studies;

(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least
four years of college work up to Division Chief levels; and

(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (Emphasis supplied)

Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities. 36 Those at the third level (CES
positions) require career service executive eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent
appointment.37

Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the
CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his
appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary.
Amores v. Civil Service Commission 38 is instructive as to the nature of temporary appointments in the
CES. The Court held therein that an appointee cannot hold a position in a permanent capacity without
the required CES eligibility:

We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent appointment
in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the
appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is
permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee
meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.

xxxx

With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service
eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the
subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires
eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has
previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position
provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that the
possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive
service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his
appointment to the position was permanent.

Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the
government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public
service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely
temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This
rule, according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v. Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v. Macaraig, is invariable even though the given appointment may
have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority.

xxxx

Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes
place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board x x x.

Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a permanent
capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was temporary
and "co-terminus with the appointing authority." 39 In Carillo v. CA,40 this Court ruled that "one who holds
a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the
pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause."
Therefore, we find no violation of security of tenure when petitioner was replaced by respondent upon
the latter’s appointment to the position of AGMO by President Aquino.
Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the CESB,
petitioner’s appointment is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945 issued on 14
June 2011, which reads:

WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PCSO v. CSC, G.R. NO. 185766 and
G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage of positions belonging to the CES to positions requiring
Presidential appointments.

WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymous to third level positions by
virtue of the said ruling.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to issue the
following guidelines to clarify the policy on the coverage of CES and its classification:

1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly enumerated under Section
7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely:

Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service, no classification of position is necessary to
place them under the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in which case a
position classification is required, in consultation with the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM).

2. For positions requiring Presidential appointments other than those enumerated above, a classification
of positions is necessary which shall be conducted by the Board, upon request of the head of office of
the government department/agency concerned, to place them under the coverage of the CES provided
they comply with the following criteria:

i.) The position is a career position;

ii.) The position is above division chief level; and,

iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial
functions.

All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified as part of the CES would be
deemed co-terminus with the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30
June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President
Aquino.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a
quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly
held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the
supposed usurper is immaterial. 41
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of
courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he
has undisturbed rights to the position of AGMO of the MMDA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211140

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son of a
sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be done as dictated by law and
justice solely for that reason.
Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte,
Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary
General, House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque .

Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this]
Honorable Court;"2 thus, he seeks the following reliefs:

a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering
said respondent to administer the proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the
position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner to assume the
position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives of said position of
Marinduque representative;

b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN] BARUA-YAP be issued ordering

said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein petitioner, in
her stead; and

c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT and PROHIBIT respondent
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of said position and performing
the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position. 3

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:

On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the Municipality
of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition 4 to deny due
course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that Reyes
made several material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident
of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country;(iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status
is single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to." 5 The case was
docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's COC was
accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.6

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.

But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections were held
on May 13, 2013.

The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.7

A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque,
through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.

Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for
the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in the HRET
docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality8 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), which
provides:

NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since the date of the
promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its execution, the Resolution of the
Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.9

On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No. 207264,
entitled"Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May
14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March
27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for material
misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.

In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC docketed
as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old Members of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako
Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void.

On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-010.
On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's
petition, viz.:

IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming
the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld. 10

Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her
since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court explained that to
be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.11

On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC),
wherein he prayed that:

[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this
Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the
PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections. 12

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the
functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.

On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the COMELEC En
Bancreversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void and without legal
effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is declared
NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby
proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of representative in the House of Representatives for
the province of Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.

On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i) granting Tan's
motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new
PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion. Accordingly, a new
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby constituted to be composed
of the following:

1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman

2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman

3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member

4. Three (3) Support Staffs

For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of the
New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the
COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q.
VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.

Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of
Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections.

Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the Certificate of
Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the House of
Representatives.14

On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner Velasco as
the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque with
48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts. 15

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint
session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of
Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in
open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without waiver of
her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET which is now the
proper forum."16

On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration 17 (of this Court's June 25, 2013 Resolution
in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry
of Judgment is ordered.18
On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.

On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was denied
by this Court.

On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially
demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to
relinquish the same in his favor.

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that
he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed
by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and enforce the
May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and the July
16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of
Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution be personally served
and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation
and enforcement of the aforementioned May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the
July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation issued by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable
Commission.19

the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its
Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013, the
Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and
furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the above-
mentioned request but to no avail.

On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier requests
(July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register his name in
her place as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests
to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands
for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she
continues to discharge the duties of said position.

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:
A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of
Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative and
allow him to assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said office.

B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of
Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and include
the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of PERMANENT. INJUNCTION
can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and
performing the functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said office. 21

As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear legal right and
basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus." 22 He insists that the final and executory decisions
of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of
respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.

Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to administer
the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the congressional seat for
Marinduque representative;"23 and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xx x as the
duly elected member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll ofM
embers." 24 Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to
the effect that the Speaker of the House of Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the
petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-
Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding
him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.26

With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful holding of
such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to [him] in that she has
already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that pertain to the position of
Marinduque Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the amount of around several
hundreds of thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to "restrain, prevent and prohibit [her]
from usurping the position."27

In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus
given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of
Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his
name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the
petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several cases. 28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition
for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and
absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that numerous jurisprudence have
already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House
of Representatives. Moreover, she insists that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically
states that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as,
in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction over quo warrantocases30 filed against Reyes by
several individuals.

Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul [her]
proclamation."31 But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that the
proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x x x" as he
was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from
asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election
Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31, 2014.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:

I.

UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE
ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION
AND HER ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.

Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed against
respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory, respondent Reyes
may not be restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Reyes :S name from the
Roll of Members of the House.

II.

CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT PETITIONER, BEING MERELY THE
SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF
MARINDUQUE REPRESENTATIVE.

Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to,
respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's name in the Roll of
Members of the House.

III.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. 32

The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court to revisit its
twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in GR. No. 207264, given that (i) this
Court was "divided" when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong dissents to the majority opinion.
It argues that this Court has in the past revisited decisions already final and executory; there is no
hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R. No. 207264.

Moreover, the OSG contends that:

Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution, upholding the
cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for the House to withdraw
its recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the absence· of any specific order
or directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v.
COMELEC that required any action from the House. Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor
respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.

Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent Reyes:

(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes;

(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and

(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.33

And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:

If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the winner, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would obviously be a clash of
jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the
appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. If,
as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office,
at noon of June 30 following the election, then quo warranto petitions and election protests filed on or
after said date would be dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of
time, where the winners have already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up
to June 14.34

In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015 dismissing
HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,35 the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of Victor
Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.36

In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No. 207264 is the
COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution." 37

To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of a Petition-In-
Interventionfiled by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of
merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo
Warranto against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco, however, moved for the reconsideration
of the said September 11, 2014 HR.ETResolution based on the argument that the latter was contrary to
law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-

The Tribunals Jurisdiction

It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the same vis-a-
vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that "after due
proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to
sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing the Province of Marinduque." In addition,
the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in
G.R. No. 207264.

On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the outright dismissal of
the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part,
respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of
evidence by the contending parties.

The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the Tribunal is
echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives."

xxxx

In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc,in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already resolved that
the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino
citizenship and residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When Regina
Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in
G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.

With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the nullification of her
proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume jurisdiction over the present
petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must
be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office, so the Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No.
207264, thus:

x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

xxxx

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a
member of the House of Representatives x x x.

xxxx

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled
that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.xx x

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office x x x.

Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first essential
element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of Representatives over which
the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina
Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme
Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction over the present
petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as
declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:
"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office,
there can be no valid and effective assumption of office."

The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate guardian of
the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication;
x x x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and
stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must take their
bearings from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court. 39

Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77 (Usurpation of
Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been filed in
court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "41

The Issue

The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to compel
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco in this
petition.

The Ruling

The petition has merit.

At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to re-
litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect the Entry of
Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22, 2013.

After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil
action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the
respondents.

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has
forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that
he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed
possession of the office.42 In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and
proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination
of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo
warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified
petition formandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or
duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has
a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.43

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. 44

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no discretion
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final
and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions
of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a
final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the
proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and beyond
dispute -Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque.

Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation.
Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election,
the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives
especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties
as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her proclamation, oath and assumption
of office - has not altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes.

The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when
Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque -for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the
election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was
promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's final and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC, the PBOC
who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes' s
COC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as
early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already received the said
decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the much argued proclamation was made in
clear defiance of the said COMELECEn Banc Resolution.

That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present petition
formandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into consideration:

First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the COMELEC En Banc in its
final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court,
as Reyes did not avail of the prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period of
five (5) days as required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was
forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.

Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC in its Resolutions of
June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are already final and executory.

Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 cancelled respondent
Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives in representation of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. The said
proclamation has not been challenged or questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.

Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in open session,
Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.

Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this case will
paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her and Velasco.

Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member of the
House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS
NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before
the HRET.

And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging and ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was
based on the existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 that Reyes is not
a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation. To reiterate this
Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v. Commission on Elections45-

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial
question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated,
was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent
oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.

xxxx

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After
14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x."

As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the basis of
her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we
here repeat that theproclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY
BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)

Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party, specially to Velasco,
who should be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the
leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme
Court

Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the HRET had
actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010.
Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's
well-defined, clear and certain right to the subject office.

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco
and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In other words,
the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of
the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in
character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion
or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound
to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said
ruling, now both final and executory.

It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative district and the
Secretary-General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition
formandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer
or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a
matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute:
petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14,
2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin;
on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been
challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte has been
finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule
of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule
of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise
register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has
taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC);(ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC en
banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10,
2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is
the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a
writ of Mandamus.

As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap
are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of the Decision rendered
therein nor argue that the doctrine of res judieata by conclusiveness of judgment applies to him and the
public respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is incorrect. Velasco, along with public
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-Yap, are all legally bound by this Court's
judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the COMELEC correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the
ground that the latter was ineligible for the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino
citizenship and the requisite one-year residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would
have our dockets unnecessarily clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all
registered voters not a party to a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted
interpretation of res judieata is intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be
sure, Velasco who was duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final
judgment that Reyes was ineligible for the subject position. 47

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take judicial
notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject position had already
been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary to
the Rule of Law and should not be countenanced.

In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, there is no
longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr.v. De Venecia,48 "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and
confusion."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte,
Jr.,Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And
public respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of Representatives, shall register
the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
after he has taken his oath of office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.