Constitutional Law 1 Case Digest

I. Philippine Constitutional System

1. Javellana vs Secretary
2. Imbong vs COMELEC
3. Santiago vs COMELEC
4. Lambino vs COMELEC
5. Lawyer’s League vs Aquino
6. In Re Saturnino Bermudez
7. De Leon vs Esguerra

Avellana vs Secretary

Ponente: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion

The Facts:

The Plebiscite Case

A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines was approved on

August 24, 1970 and began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. On September 21, 1972, the
President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention approved its Proposed Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents
from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,”
upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because
the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription
of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of
public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress “ and “there
is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there
being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification
or rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for
neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially.

“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
 L-35948 filed an “urgent
motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January
15, 1973.”

The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
“urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973 and set the
motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.”

While the case was being heard, the President issued Proclamation No. 1102.

“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE

CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered

cities. The said Citizens Assemblies were established to broaden the base of citizen participation
in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views
on important national issues.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142, as a “Filipino citizen, and a
qualified and registered voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense,
Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present
Constitution” referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the President ordered “the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the latter are acting without or
in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution. He construed that the
President is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the proposed
Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

The Issue:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore
non-justiciable, question?
 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people? (acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness.
Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

Decision and Ratio:

The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the petition but when the crucial question
of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion,
together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus
upholding the 1973 Constitution.

1. The Court held that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.”

2. Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not
validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance
with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. However, it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court.”

3. On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and
Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “The effectivity of the said Constitution,
in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve
which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this
Court, are relevant and unavoidable.

4. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice
and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed.
This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “As to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts
regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies,
especially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the
requirements thereof.

However, the fact that there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as
approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in
past ratifications, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in
doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political
aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and,
in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.”

Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar

Facts:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of
R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the
Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral
argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.

On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election
Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution
No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the
convention “shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative
districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative
district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those
required of members of the House of Representatives,” 1 “and that any other details relating to
the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the
Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it
shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution.” 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132,
implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular
provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong
impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the
same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.

Issue:

1. Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;

2. Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

Decision:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent
Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as
constitutional.

Ratio:

– Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

– Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis
employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for
that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this
case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

– Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent
political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the
Constituional Convention.

– Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of
political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular
party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Fernando “ I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban
on political parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit
provision that the freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. 2 The right of an individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue
common objectives and to engage in activities is embraced within if not actually encouraged by
the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This particular freedom has an indigenous
cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

Santiago vs COMELEC G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Ponente: Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.

Facts:

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then,
upon its approval

1. set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country,
2. caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and
3. instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations.

On 18 Dec 1996, Miriam Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin
Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the
petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the
People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The
extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes
revision and is therefore beyond the power of people’s initiative. The respondents argued that the
petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of it.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to call for People’s Initiative to amend the
constitution specifically to lift term limits of elected officials.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case

Decision:

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative.
Ratio:

Under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated
by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient
standard” tests.

Dissenting Opinion:

Justice Puno does not share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are
legally defective and cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise
submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that “. . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.” It ought to be so for this intent is crystal
clear from the history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate
Bill No. 17. 4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or
Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body.” Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not
include people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.

Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006

Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Facts:

Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes
the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding
Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to
implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

1. Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.
 2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course
to the Lambino Group’s petition.

Decision:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders
the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision,
it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Ratio:

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,”

LAWYER’S LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate

Decision:

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons
to be stated below.

1. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and
73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-
judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All
the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government.

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

PER CURIAM:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the
first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed
1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Claiming that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court “to
declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under
the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed
1986 Constitution refers to, . …

The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.

Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal,
43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or

vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record
and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and
provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization
of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the
second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held
that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy
of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All
the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No.
73972 [People’s Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.];
and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])

De Leon vs Esguerra 153 SCRA 602, August 31, 1987

Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA,J
Facts:

In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received
a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin
B. Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum
with the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De
Leon along with the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and
void and prevent the respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners
maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987
Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Issue:

Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:

The designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents
perpetually from ouster/take-over of petitioners’ position subject of this petition.

Ratio

The affectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8,
1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous
constitution as provided in Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution.

For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis
mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of
the Philippines or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar.

Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests Vol. 2

April 13, 2015Gi Lite

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS:
 1 Abueva vs Wood, 2 US vs Bull

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY:

1 Marbury vs Madison,

2 Angara vs Electoral Commission,

3 Tanada vs Cuenco

ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924

JOHNSON, J

The parties:

Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the commission was
ratified and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six of
the petitioners are members of the House of Representatives and four are members of the Senate
of the Philippine Islands and they all belong to the democratic party;

Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L.
Quezon and Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the
Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Independence Commission.

This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine
all the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements and
expenditures made out of the funds of the Independence Commission.

FACTS:

By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation
of one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not
otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including
publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said
appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the
House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act
hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that
no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to
make the payment or payments authorized by said act

Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to
prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in
open contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested
the respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to
the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the Independence
Commission.

Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said
vouchers and documentary proofs.

ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners

HELD:

1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the
courts.
2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere
agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of
the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts,
whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”

The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence
should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and
is therefore not justiciable.

The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910

Facts:

On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named
Standard commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that
said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate
shelter and proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals
to get hurt and others to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to
Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot
be filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked
would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ship
involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no
jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of
the Philippines. Defendant is thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the
high seas, but the moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the country. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial
waters. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that merchant vessels of one
country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves to the laws
which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was
an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but
they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adams’s term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury
applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

Issues: Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void?

Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution?

Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from
the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury
became effective when signed by President Adams.

Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy.
The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District
of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this
legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is
a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution,
and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what
is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all
other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave
it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and
inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a
cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual
to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of which is
required by law as an obligation.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).

Facts

On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was
an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office.

The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but
they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adams’s term.

William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury
applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”

Issues

Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?

Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void?

Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution?

Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)

Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from
the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury
became effective when signed by President Adams.

Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy.
The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District
of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this
legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is
a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution,
and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what
is specified in Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all
other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave
it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and
inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.

No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a
cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of
superior jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or
individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of
which is required by law as an obligation.

JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.

On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of
votes.

On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
a “Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions N0.8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filedo. Praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified

Issue:

Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?

HELD:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Conclusion:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules
and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each
house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required,
if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election
of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution
of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.

Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the
Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the
bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the
SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9
members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority
senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the
NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the
SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the
issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether
or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question.
Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those
will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its
own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.