THOMAS AHNERT

The “Science of Man” in the Moral and Political

Philosophy of George Turnbull (1698—1748)

The project of formulating a “science of man” in the Scottish Enlight

enment is associated mainly with the thought of David Hume, who
declared in the introduction to his Treatise ofHuman Nature in 1739 that
““[t]here is no question of importance, whose decision is not com
priz’d in the science of man”. By this science of man Hume under
stood the investigation of human nature on the basis of “Newtonian”
and “experimental” principles. Hu.me believed that such a science
would provide the key to “all those sciences, which more intimately
concern human life”; from these one could then “proceed at leisure to
discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity”.
1
Hume was not the only theorist in the Scottish Enlightenme nt to
propose such a science of man, which would advance understanding
on a wide variety of questions. At about the same time as Hume, and
independently of him, another, less famous philosopher, George
Turnbull (1698—1748), also argued for the general importance of such
2 Similarly to Hume Turnbull wanted to establish this
an enterprise.
science of human nature on “experimental” principles, following the
example of Isaac Newton; and like Hume Turnbu.ll believed that this
interpretation of human nature was a requisite for improving other
areas of knowledge, moral philosophy and political theory in particu
lar.
Turnbull’s science of man, however, rested on premises, which
were very different from those of Hume’s sceptical philosophy, and
the most important of which was a strong notion of divine provi
dence. Unlike Hume, Turnbull maintained that it was possible to form
an idea of divine providence on the basis of natural reason and em

Hume (1978, P. xvi).

2 See, for example, Turnbull (2005), vol. 1, pp. 445—446.
 90 Thomas Ahnert

pirical evidence. Turnbull thereby was addressing one of the central

problems in philosophy and religion of the first half of the eighteenth
century, that of explaining the presence of evil in a world governed by
a perfectly just and benevolent God.
3 The problem had been raised,
provocatively, by the French sceptic Pierre Bayle, and had prompted a
variety of critical responses, from the De origine Ma/i (1702) of the
Anglican archbishop William King, to the Theodiy (1710) of the Ger
man philosopher and polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Turnbull
believed that the inquiry into nature, including human nature, would
reveal the workings of God’s providence in it. He argued, in particular,
that natural philosophical inquiry would show the principles of moral
action to be reinforced by a natural order, in which virtuous conduct
produced pleasure in the agent, and evil actions caused him or her
pain. “[Sjuch a constitution”, Turnbull wrote, “must be the workman
ship of such a perfectly virtuous and good Creator, as all the other
parts of nature prove its Author to be”.
4
Turnbull’s philosophy has been the subject of work by, among
others, David Fate Norton, M. A. Stewart, and Alexander Broadie,
who have emphasized the importance of Turnbull’s notion of divine
providence for his moral philosophy. This connection between Turn-
bull’s moral philosophy and his notion of providence will also be
discussed here, but this chapter also examines Turnbull’s ideas on the
significance of providence for political society, which have received
less attention than his moral philosophy. Turnbull’s views on this
relationship were complex: he believed in the beneficial influence of
the general laws of providence on political societies, but he also feared
that the operation of these laws contained the potential for national
corruption and decline.
5 Before turning to a more detailed discussion
of Turnbull’s ideas it is probably useful to summarize his career
briefly, since he remains one of the less well-known figures in the
history of the Scottish Enlightenment.

For a recent summaiy of European debates on this question, see Fonnesu (2006).
‘Turnbull (2005), vol. 1, p. 397.
Norton (1975); Stewart (1987); Broadic (2005).
5
 The “Science of Man” 91

1. George Turnbull, 1698_17486

George Turnbull was born on 11 July 1698 as the son of a Church of
Scotland parish minister in Aba. He entered the University of Edin
burgh in 1711, where he studied until 1716, though he did not gradu
ate until 1721, when he became a regent at Marischal College in Aber
deen. In the intervening years he appears to have prepared for the
ministry, and was also one of the founding members of the Rankenian
Club, established in Edinburgh in 1716 or 1717 by a group of students
interested in the philosophical ideas of Shaftesbury.
As a regent in Aberdeen Turnbull’s task was to instruct a cohort of
students in a variety of subjects, ranging from logic and metaphysics to
ethics, and, in the students’ final year, physics. In Edinburgh the sys
tem of regenting had by then been abolished and had been replaced by
a system of specialized academic chairs, but these reforms did not
begin to be adopted in Aberdeen until after the mid-century.
Turnbull’s two published graduation theses, written as exercises for his
students at Aberdeen, reveal some of the themes which re-appear in
his later work, the importance of a “Newtonian”, experimental study
of nature for moral philosophical 7
especially.
inquiry,

Turnbull seems to have disliked teaching at Aberdeen and soon

began to look for a position elsewhere. In March 1725 he left the
university without permission to act as tutor for an aristocratic family,
travelling on the European continent. Although he resumed teaching
in January 1726 he resigned, finally, in spring 1727, accepted the posi
tion of tutor for another aristocratic pupil and spent the next five
years travelling through the Low Countries, France, and Germany.
When he returned to Britain in 1732 it seems that he decided to seek a
career in the Anglican Church, since he matriculated at Exeter College
in Oxford and was awarded a BCL degree in 1733. Turnbull’s financial
situation apparently forced him to become a tutor again in 1735, when
he accompanied the son of Lord Rockingham to Italy. On his return
Turnbull again faced financial uncertainty, until he managed to be
ordained in the Anglican Church. He was then, in 1741, appointed
chaplain to the Prince of Wales, and in the following year became a
rector in county Derry. He was also made tutor to the son of Horace

6 This section is based on Stewart (1987) and Wood (2004).

Turnbull (1723a) and Turnbull (1723b).
 92 Thomas Ahnert

Walpole, a post which took him on another tour of Italy in 1744,

where he and his pupil resided in Milan, Turin, Florence, and Rome.
Besides acting as tutor, Turnbull seems to have been entrusted with
gathering intelligence on Jacobite exile communities. When Turnbull
died of unknown causes in The Hague in 1748, he was there to collect
information on local Jacobites.
Turnbull published little until about 1740, when all his major works
began to appear in quick succession. All he had produced before then
were his two graduation theses in 1723 and 1726 respectively, and two
religious tracts directed against the free-thinkers Anthony Collins and
Matthew Tindal in the early 1730s.
8 His first substantial work was the
Treatise ofAnciem’ Painti,g of 1740, on the educational usefulness of the
fine arts. In the same year he published his most comprehensive
theory of moral philosophy, the two-volume Principles of Moral and
Christian Philosophj. Originally he had intended to issue the two vol
umes separately, but his publisher seems to have persuaded him that
they would sell better if they appeared as one work.
9 In 1741 appeared
Turnbull’s annotated translation of the Methodical Sjstem of Universal
Law by the German jurist and professor Johann Gottlieb Heineccius
(1681—1 741).b0 Turnbull provided, often substantial, commentaries on
Heineccius’ text and added a separate “Supplement on the Duties of
Subjects and Magistrates”, as well as a “Discourse on the Origin of
Moral and Civil Laws”. Turnbull’s extensive notes on Heineccius’ text
surveyed modern natural law and introduced his readers to significant
authors such as the German Johann Franz Budde, who were little
known in Britain. Observations upon Liberal Education followed in 1742, a
work, which profoundly influenced curriculum reforms in Aberdeen
in 1753.11

8 Turnbull (1731) and Turnbull (1732).

‘
Broadie (2005, P. xi).
10 Heineccius (1740). A modern edition of
Turnbull’s translation and commentary is
being prepared by Peter Schröder and myself for the Liberty Fund’s Natural Law and
Enlzghtenment Classics series, under the general editorship of Knud Haakonssen.
11 Turnbull (2003).
 The “Science of Man” 93

2. The Nature of Divine Providence

In volume 1 of his Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophj Turnbull
said that his particular notion of divine providence was derived from
John Clarke’s Boyle lectures of 1719—1720 on the origin of evil.’ 2
Clarke was an English theologian and mathematicia n, and the brother
of the same Samuel Clarke who had corresponded with Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz on Newton’s cosmology. John Clarke’s aim in his
lectures was to refute the fideism of the French sceptic Pierre Bayle,
who had suggested that human reason was radically incapable of
understanding God’s purposes in allowing the existence of evil, and
that therefore humans had to allow their faith in the justice of the
divine will to override any doubts originating in natural reason. Clarke
contradicted Bayle by saying that while human reason was far inferior
to God’s intellect, it was at the same time similar in kind and not
without use in understanding the purposes of divine providence.
Human reason may be too weak or “shallow”, as Clarke put it, to
comprehend the totality of creation and the infinite relations of things
3 There were, however, sufficient signs of God’s goodness in
within it)
creation to convince cthe meanest Capacity” that he exercised a just
and benevolent government over the world, especially as further
inquiry into creation only increased the evidence for the existence of
such government.
14
Clarke also considered the limitations of human understanding to
be part of a progressive unfolding over time of God’s plan for human
ity; he referred to an often-cited passage in Paul’s first letter to the
Corinthians, chapter xiii, in which the Apostle declares that at present
“we know only in part”, and that human knowledge will improve and
expand in the course of time. “All our Knowledge is but comparative;
the Reason of Things will unfold itself proportionably to the
’ The limits of human knowledge thus
Enlargement of our Faculties”.
1
were no justification for the extreme and “absurd sort of Humilify”

12 Clarke (1720); Clarke (1721). See Turnbull (2005), vol. 1,

p. 13. The natural phi
losopher Robert Boyle (1627—1691) had provided for these annual lectures in his
will. Their purpose was the defence of natural and revealed religion.
13 Clarke (1721,
p. 13).
14 Ibid.

p. 17.
15 Ibid.,
 94 Thomas Ahnert

advocated by Bayle)
6 The mysteries of faith made known to humanity
in divine revelation were not contrary to natural reason, but additions
to it, “built upon the same Foundation.”
17 While human reason was
not sufficient to arrive at these truths of faith unaided, once they were
revealed they complemented natural reason; they did not contradict it.
Clarke believed that the existence of imperfection in creation gave
no grounds for doubting God’s providence and goodness. All created
beings were of necessity inferior to their Creator and did not share any
of God’s qualities to the same degree, if at all. Therefore they were not
absolutely good, either, and some degree of imperfection was inevita
ble, but they were capable of goodness relative to their particular
station in the hierarchy of all created beings, which reached from
inanimate matter at the bottom, to angels at its top. Humans were in
an intermediate position in that hierarchy. They were more likely than
angels to succumb to bodily passions and to sin, but they were also
able to act according to rational moral consideration, unlike brutes.
The presence of sin was the result of human choice, not God’s will.
Admittedly, it would have been better for the individual humans who
sinned if they had been created unable to do so, but that would have
also made them unable to acquire the merit of choosing virtuous over
immoral actions. In sum, it was better for all humans to be able to sin,
in order for some of them to be able to choose freely to be moral.
Imperfection gave humans the opportunity to progress morally and to
acquire merit, and the goodness this entailed outweighed the advan
tages of “determiniig Men to Goodness”, which would require making
“Men mere Machines not Men.”
18
Clarke’s view of divine providence differed significantly from the
more famous contemporary response to Bayle by the German phi
losopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
19 Leibniz argued that the pres
ence of evil was an unfortunate, inevitable consequence of creation,
but not the result of free human choice in Clarke’s sense. Leibniz
argued that in the created world there were limitations on the co
existence of different states of affairs, and although God desired moral

16 Ibid., p. 84.
17 Ibid., p. 91.
18 Ibid.,
p. 235.
19 Leibniz (1951). For
a lucid summary of Leibniz’ argument, see Riley (1996,
pp. 38—44).
 The “Science of Man” 95

goodness unconditionally, the actual existence of one particular good

might be incompatible with that of another. In those cases God would
necessarily choose the lesser evil. These limits imposed by the compossi
bilitas, the possible simultaneous existence of different states of affairs,
accounted for the presence of some injustice and evil in a world which
had been created by a supremely just God. This kind of evil reflected
the necessary shortcomings of a created world, not God’s lack of
goodness or power. Among all the worlds God could have created the
present one was the best possible.
Leibniz’ interpretation was controversial because it denied the
possibility of human free will. He distinguished between the material
world of physical action and the spiritual world, which included hu
man thought. The material world, which included all human actions,
followed laws of mechanical necessity. Human thoughts and inten
tions were so closely co-ordinated with these actions that it appeared
as if actions were the outcome of human choice. Leibniz argued that
the material and the spiritual world were like two clocks, which were
synchronized, but functioned independently of each other and obeyed
their own laws. Human thoughts and intentions were governed by a
quasi-mechanical necessity: none of them were free in the sense that
they could have happened otherwise, because there had to be a suffi
cient reason for each of them. The will could not be free in the sense
of being indifferent, or it would be impossible to explain why any
particular action was adopted over another. Humans were determined
by these sufficient reasons to be good or evil, in their thoughts and in
° Clarke, on the other hand, wanted to uphold the free
their actions.
2
dom of human action and believed that the presence of imperfection
was an opportunity for humans to exercise moral choice and to pro
gress morally. Mankind could have been made to act morally out of
necessity, but determining human actions in this way would make their
moral actions less meritorious, and thus reduce the total amount of
goodness within the world.

20 See Riley (1996), chapter 2.

 96 Thomas Ahnen’

3. Divine Providence and Moral Philosophy

Turnbull followed Clarke closely, as he pointed out in the introduction
to his Princbles of Moral and Christian Philosophj
21 Like Clarke, and
unlike Leibniz, Turnbull believed that the world was an arena in which
humans were given the chance to exercise their capacity for free moral
choice, to progress, and to acquire a virtuous character by their own
efforts. The fact that some humans chose to sin did not question
God’s goodness, because it was wrong “to argue against the utility of a
thing from the perversion of it” and “to infer that we are badly made,
because we are made capable of turning a very large stock of powers,
faculties, appetites and affections to very good account; in such a way
as we may have the merit of it, and the pleasure arising from the
consciousness of such merit”.
22 God was not to be blamed for the
poor use some humans made of the nature they had been given, and if
no evil existed, choosing wisely would be no 23 achievement. Even
physical evils and hardship, such as natural disasters or diseases, for
example, were an opportunity for the exercise of virtue. Turnbull thus
justified the existence of evil to a large extent by its educational pur
pose for humanity. He considered this life to be a period of trial and
formation, a “probationary state”, before the transition to the afterlife,
in which humans were to receive their just rewards and 24 punishments.
Hardship and evil therefore performed an important function in
God’s plan for humanity, but they were at the same time not so preva
lent as to cast doubt on the just and benevolent nature of divine
providence. Creation was governed by good general laws, but general
laws necessarily allowed for particular exceptions. Turnbull quotes a
passage from one of his favourite sources, Alexander Pope’s Essqy on
Man, which includes the following two lines: “Think we like some
weak prince th’Eternal Cause/Prone for his fav’rites to reverse his
25 The implication is that it would be improper and undignified
laws?”
for God not to act according to general laws, or to keep granting

21 Turnbull (2005), vol. 1, P. 12.

22 Ibid., p. 318.
23 Ibid.,
p. 345.
24 Ibid., vol. 2,
p. 741; see also ibid., vol. 1, pp. 392—395. On debates about the
afterlife in moral philosophy see Ahnert (2004b); Harris (2003).
25 Turnbull (2005),
vol. 1, p. 373; Pope’s Essqy on Man is frequently cited by Turnbufl.
The two lines are from Pope (1950), epistle 4, v. 121—122.
 The “Science of Man” 97

dispensation from them — an argument very reminiscent of Male

branche, though it is not clear whether Turnbull derived his notion of
26 Turnbull ar
providence from Malebranche’s works to any degree.
gued that, despite a few exceptions, which could be explained, there
were plentiful signs of God’s benevolent providence in the natural
order of which man was a part. The most evident of these was the way
in which the natural consequences of actions tended to reinforce
morality. Virtue, Turnbull believed, generally led to temporal happi
ness and prosperity, for on the whole “the far greater part of the evils
and miseries complained of in human life, are the effects and conse
quences of vicious passions, and their pursuits. ‘Whence else is it that
honesty is so universally pronounced the best policy, and dishonesty
27 These punishments for immorality and rewards for morally
folly?”
good actions were part of the natural order created by God, not im
posed in individual cases by particular acts of the divine will. In this
respect God differed from a human legislator, who had to invent
artificial punishments to enforce his will and create an “external obli
gation”. There was no need to add another, “external” obligation, a
28 because the existing, natural
“rule of rectitude”, to God’s commands,
connection between morality and happiness was already a sufficient
indication of God’s providential will for humanity.
The consequence of this providential order in human affairs was
that the actual distribution of external goods, such as success or
wealth, on the whole reflected the virtue and merit of those who
owned or enjoyed them. For if “we own a blind fortuitous dispensa
tion of goods, and much more, if we own a malignant disposition of
them, or a dispensation of them more in favour of vice than of virtue,
administration”. But in fact, “the
we deny a providence, or assert bad 29
universe is governed by excellent general laws, among which this is
one, ‘That industry shall be the purchaser of goods, and shall be gen
erally successful”

26 See Riley (2003).

27 Ibid., p. 383. See also Ahnert (2004a).
28 See Heineccius (1740), book I, Turnbuil’s comments following chapter III,

pp. 62—65.
29 Turnbull’s remarks in Heineccius (1740), book 1,
p. 197.
30 Ibid.
98 Thomas Ahnert

Although morality was usually advantageous, not every self-

interested action of course was automatically virtuous. Virtue should
not be exercised from motives of self-interest. Turnbull distinguished
the advantages of morality from vulgar notions of interest, which were
attributed to modern “Epicureans”, such as Thomas Hobbes and the
author of the notorious Fable of the Bees, Bernard Mandeville, and
which were thought to imply that actions were morally justified be
cause they were self-interested. The real motive for moral action and
its true reward in this life was not the material advantage, which gener
ally followed from it. It was a feeling of pleasure which was superior
to the satisfaction derived from material benefits, and which was the
highest form of pleasure possible in this life: ‘We are so constituted,
that the exercises of virtue, and the conscience of it, are our highest
enjoyment, and vice, whatever pleasure it may afford of the sensual
kind, always creates bitter remorse, and almost always great bodily
31 This pleasure was the product of a moral sense in humans,
disorder”
a natural desire to approve what was morally good and to reject what
was morally bad. The moral sense was part of human nature and was
evident from the natural philosophical, “experimental” study of it. In
the Preface to his Printiples of Moral and Christian Philosophj, for exam
ple, Turnbull stated that the “moral anatomy” of the human mind was
“not only a part, but the most useful part of Natural Philosophj, rightly
understood”. This was “too evident to need any proof to those who
will but take the trouble to consider what Natural Philosophj, in its full
extent, must mean.”
32 Moral philosophy, thus, became the study of
natural causes and effects, of matters of fact rather than normative
rules; it was a subdivision of natural philosophy, not distinct from it.
33
The “experiments” on which this science of man rested were, to some
extent, provided by daily experience. More importantly, it was history,
which supplied the raw material from which the science of man was to
be distilled: “it is a great happiness of mankind, that the history of
moral affairs from the most ancient times is so exactly transmitted to
us as it is: and indeed, in this case, the only thing that seems wanting,
is the art of making the proper uses of such experimental registers.”
34

31 Turnbull (2005), vol. I, pp. 396—397; see also p. 183.

32 Ibid., vol. 1, ‘Preface”, p. 7.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 452—453.
 The “Science of Man” 99

4. Divine Providence and Political Society

Turnbull’s argument that the distribution of external goods was the
product of divine providence was directly relevant to his conception
of political society. Turnbull believed that political society was
essential for humans to reach the highest degree of happiness possible
35 As he explained in his Princijles “many of the
for them in this life.
goods of life are by our social constitution dependent upon the right
government of society”, that is on “a good politic constitution, and
36 Constitutional structures and
the impartial execution of good laws”.
the distribution of property were closely related because “a greater
share of external goods, or of property, naturally begets power. And
hence it will and must always hold as a general law, That dominion will
follow property or that changes in property will beget certain
proportional changes in government”.
37
Turnbull’s belief in the close connection between government and
property ownership helps to explain his strong interest in the political
theory of James Harrington (1611—1677), whom he often quoted at
great length, especially in his edition of Heineccius’ Methodical Sjstem.
Harrington believed that political power depended on property,
38 The more land a person owned, the greater his
particularly land.
political power. After the fall of the feudal lords at the end of the
Gothic age land was widely distributed: “the whole people be
39 The situation resulting from this is almost that of a
landlords”.
Hobbesian state of nature with a multitude of individuals who are all
equally powerful. The difference to Hobbes is that Harrington
believed there could be no establishment of a single sovereign over
such a people, let alone by military conquest, because military power
depended on landownership and land was equally distributed. This is
why, for example, the Rump parliament failed. It could not rule by
fear because it did not control the military, and it did not own the

“[T]here is a perfection and happiness attainable by a rightly constituted civil state,

to which mankind can no otherwise attain.” (Turnbull’s remarks on Heineccius
(1740), book II, chapter vi, p. 109.)
36 Turnbull (2005), vol. I,
p. 392.
See the remark by Turnbull in Heineccius (1740), vol. 1, p. 198.
p. 70). This and the following paragraph are based on Fukuda’s
38 Fukuda (1997,

analysis of Harrington.
Fukuda (1997, p. 86).
 100 Thomas Ah,iert

territory required for ruling the military by “necessity”, that is material

° The question in such a state of equality was how to
4
dependence.
construct political institutions which guaranteed stability, without the
existence of any military power strong enough to govern. The answer,
Harrington argued, lay not in “necessity” or Hobbesian fear, but in
41 Government had to be constituted in such a way that
“interest”.
nobody had an interest in sedition. This was to be achieved with a
particular form of mixed government, for which he claimed to draw
the inspiration from Polybius, Scipio’s Greek captive, who maintained
that Rome had found the means to stop the circuitus civitatum, the
endless degeneration of one simple form of government into another.
Turnbull was not so much concerned with the threat of anarchy, or
with constructing a mixed constitution that would avoid it, but he
found Harrington’s theory congenial, because it allowed him to link
divine providence and political power. Harrington, Turnbull said,
“reasons from natural causes in these matters, as natural philosophers
do about phenomena commonly called natural ones”. 42 Like Harring
ton, Turnbull argued that the ownership of property, especially of
landed property, was the natural basis of power. If one man owns far
more land than all others taken together, then the constitution will be
that of an absolute monarchy. If a small group of people holds the
greatest proportion of land this leads either to aristocracy or a regu
lated monarchy. Popular government emerges when “neither one nor
the few over-balance the whole people”.
43 Turnbull thus turned his
theory of government into a part of his theory of divine providence
and justice. Any form of government which did not reflect the prevail
ing balance of property in a society was unnatural and had to be based
on violence. It was possible for humans to influence the distribution
of property, but “wherever, thro’ causes unforeseen by human pru
dence, the balance comes to be intirely changed, it is the more imme
diately to be attributed to divine providence: And since God cannot
will the cause, but he must also will the necessary effect or conse
quence, what government soever is in the necessary direction of the

° Fukuda (1997, P. 88).

41 Fukuda (1997, P. 93).
42 Turnbull’s remarks on
Heineccius (1740), book II, chapter vi, p. 119.
Turnbull’s remarks, ibid., pp. 112—113.
 The “Science of Man” 101

44 Ultimately, the providential

balance, the same is of divine right.”
distribution of material goods determined the balance of power within
the state.
At the same time Turnbull displayed considerable unease about the
role of property in political society. It was “a fact too evident to be
called into question” that “man is made to purchase every thing by
4 The
industry, and industry only, every good, internal or external”.
spirit of industry, however, led to opulence; opulence encouraged
refinement and politeness, but it also bred luxury, the effect of which
was indolence and corruption. From this followed a decline in the
° The natural,
spirit of industry and, eventually, a decline in wealth.
4
providential rewards for industry, therefore, to some extent contained
the seeds of its corruption. This was a matter of great importance for
those who held political power, because opulence was the basis of
national political greatness, relative to other states. Turnbull believed
that one of the main skills of legislators and rulers was to encourage
the spirit of industry while at the same time curbing some of its ef
fects, especially those of luxury: “Such a society”, Turnbull writes,
“must, in the nature of things, be a composition of contrary qualities,
from which harmony and general good are to be educed; which must
require very skilful management, accurately contrived laws, and a very
dextrous 47administration.” Turnbull’s concerns with corruption are
similar to those of Adam Ferguson in his Essqy on the History of Civil
Society of 1767.48 They reflect a belief that there is a tendency for the
development of societies to follow a cyclical pattern of rise and de
cline. Much of the historiography on the Scottish Enlightenment has
tended to emphasize the theme of progress in its historical and social
thought. While Turnbull believed that his age had seen increasing
refinement and wealth, he was at the same time worried about the
potential for corruption these improvements had generated.

44 remarks, ibid., p. 115.

Turnbull’s
Turnbull’s remarks ibid, book I, chapter ix, p. 197.
Turnbull (2005), vol. 1, p. 355.
Ibid., p. 356.
48 Ferguson (1995), Part VI.
 102 Thomas Ahnert

Conclusion
Turnbull believed that a science of man was necessary before the
improvement of moral philosophy would be possible. The main defect
of ancient philosophy had been its attempt to engage in moral phi
losophy before natural philosophy had reached a greater level of
49 It was only following the advances in natural philoso
sophistication.
phy in the seventeenth century, which were associated with figures
such as Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton, that moral
philosophy could progress substantially beyond the doctrines of the
various ancient schools. Turnbull’s belief in the need to treat moral
philosophy as a subdivision of natural philosophy, rather than as a
distinct discipline probably explains his dissatisfaction with the se
quence in which the different parts of philosophy were taught in the
standard undergraduate curriculum at Scottish universities. This began
with moral philosophy in the first year, and ended with natural phi
losophy in the fourth, an order the reverse of that which Turnbull
considered correct.
°
5
Turnbull’s science of human nature was linked to moral philosophy
by his belief in divine providence. The natural consequences of moral
and immoral actions were morally significant because they formed part
of a benevolent and just natural order willed by God. Turnbull’s focus
on pains and pleasures may seem to prefigure later, utilitarian argu
ments, but it is important to bear in mind two differences between his
theory and later utilitarianism. One is that Turnbull distinguished the
pains and pleasures of moral action conceptually from considerations
of crude utility or self-interest. Vulgar self-interest, whether this was
described as Hobbesian, Mandevillian or Epicurean, could not be the
object of moral action, and whatever pleasure resulted from virtue had
to be conceptually separate from this self-interest. The other differ
ence to utilitarianism is that Turnbull did not present pain and pleas
ure as the basic criteria of moral decisions, but argued that particular
actions were painful or pleasurable because they were immoral or
virtuous in the first place. The pleasures of virtue, as well as the miser
ies of vice were proof of a theodicy, God’s benevolent and just direc
tion of creation, including human nature.

Turnbull (2005), vol. 1, p. 439.

50 Stewart (1987), p. 101.
 The “Science of Man” 103

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