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Volume 40
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Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211
DOI 10.1007/s40622-013-0023-z
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Abstract Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) are con- (2007, 10) defines merger as a combination of the
sidered as the engines for accelerated and consistent interest of two companies to create a new enterprise
growth for companies. M&A is more significant in with the approval of the merger both sets of share-
today’s corporate world due to globalization, liberaliza- holders. Daga (2007, 10) defines acquisition1 as
tion and intensely competitive business environment. The acquiring of a company by acquirer by taking a
present study is an attempt to examine post M&A significant portion of the assets or securities of target
performance in manufacturing companies in India. company generally to restructure the operations of the
‘Economic value added’ (EVA), a registered trademark target company. It might be done by taking a large part
of Stern Stewart & Co and a measure of economic profit, of the voting shares or of a division of the target firm.
is considered in evaluating the industry adjusted returns The justification for such mergers and acquisitions
for the companies that have gone for acquisitions. The strategy is the synergistic effect where the two
scope of the study is limited to manufacturing companies companies combined together are likely to be more
in India that have gone for acquisitions. valuable and profitable than individual companies. It
also leads to the creation of shareholder value over and
Keywords Merger and acquisition Economic above the sum of the two companies. Nevertheless,
value added Financial performance one has to check if these mergers and acquisitions
Manufacturing companies really lead to better corporate performance.
M&A deals have gone up manifold in India in recent
Introduction years. Earlier studies were based on a limited number
of M&A deals. Hence, there is a need to re-look at the
As the Indian industry opens up to the worldwide post M&A scenario in India. The present paper is an
competition, there is a wave of mergers and acquisi- attempt to show whether corporate performance in
tions for corporate restructuring and renewal. Daga terms of EVA, a measure of economic profit, which is
considered as the real profit for shareholders, improves
or not after companies go for acquisition deals.
N. M. Leepsa (&) C. S. Mishra
Vinod Gupta School of Management, Indian Institute of
Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur 721302, India
e-mail: leepsa@vgsom.iitkgp.ernet.in; 1
For the purpose of this study, the acquisition is defined as per
n.m.leepsa@gmail.com
the CMIE Prowess database. Acquisition are the takeover
C. S. Mishra transactions where a company takes over substantial part of
e-mail: csmishra@vgsom.iitkgp.ernet.in shares of another company.
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Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211 199
industry to which target belongs. Sometimes they go measures of performance, Economic Value Added
for wrong deals just to use free cash flow, thus leading (EVA) is considered as a better performance metric.
to failed acquisitions. Related acquisitions signifi- EVA is essentially the difference between profit
cantly outperform compared to conglomerate or earned by the company and the cost of capital.
unrelated acquisitions. Ghani et al. (2005) view that, EVA is the actually
Depamphilis (2010) cited that acquirer’s return to based on earlier economic theories which states that the
public firms in the USA is less for equity financed real profit of a company is calculated by deducting all
acquisitions deals compared to cash financed deals. expenses or losses from all revenues or gains including
While in European countries acquirer’s return (either the opportunity cost of capital. The author agrees to
of the public or private firms) is more for equity- Drucker (1995) who states that if business brings
financed acquisitions compared to cash financed deals. profits more than the cost of capital then wealth is
Charlie et al. (2004) taking into consideration the created or else wealth is destroyed. Alfred Marshall
acquisition experience, found that those who are (1890) who also considers that the economic or real
successful in first merger show declining performance profit should be calculated by deducting from net
later. profits all interest expenses on capital invested. The
Authors like Asquith et al. (1983); Kumar (2009); author stated Bidle and Bowne (1999) definition of
Depamphilis (2010) discussed regarding the M&A EVA as the difference between the profit obtained by
performance taking size as an important factor influ- the entity and the costs of capital implied for producing
encing corporate performance. The size may be or obtaining this profit. The author also reported Stern
(a) size of the acquirer among all acquirers or Stewart (1993)’s definition of EVA, which is the
(b) size of the target compared to the size of the difference between the companies’s Net Operating
acquirer. The authors found that the smaller acquirers Income after Taxes (NOPAT) and the cost of both the
get better returns compared to larger acquirers. Small debt and equity capital employed by the company to
deals create higher returns compared to larger deals. generate NOPAT. (Pandey 2005) also view that the
The size of the target company is positively related to concept of economic profitability is equivalent to the
the abnormal return of the acquirer such that larger the concept of economic value added (EVA).
target larger the abnormal return. The merger of Roztocki and Needy (2010, 1) considers EVA as a
relatively larger target companies shows improved single and simple measure that gives a real picture of
profitability in post-merger period, while the mergers stockholder wealth creation. Yao et al. (2009, 42)
of relatively smaller target firms do not. The return to argues that EVA has gained importance in the
acquirer is superior when acquisition is a large for the corporate and investment world as the more current
target firm but small to the acquiring firm. yardstick for company performance. Xiao and Tan
(2009) conclude that EVA and rates of EVA are the
Studies on economic value added as measure new measures of performance that correct any bias-
of performance esness due to differences or in accounting policies.
EVA has 40 % explanatory ability compared to a
Traditional accounting measures are criticized as maximum of 13 % from traditional methods. EVA is a
unsatisfactory performance measure as they lack in more effective measure of M&A performance com-
directing towards the goal of shareholder wealth pared to other traditional methods.
maximization. Performance measures relating to Xiao and Tan (2009) found that companies perform
profitability ignores the cost of capital which is better than the industry in terms of improved efficiency
essential for determining value creation for share- in the year of M&A. The performance of companies
holders. Sometimes in certain situations, even if a declines in the first year and the starting of the second
company gets positive net income as well as higher year after M&A. It indicates that a M&A to be
accounting rate of return, there might be a decline in successful needs some time to adjust to the new
the shareholder wealth. Earnings might be lesser than environment. In the long run, M&A improves the
the required rate of return that shareholders could have operating ability of the company due to different factors
earned by investing in other investment opportunities such as pressure from government policies, demand of
of similar risk. In the backdrop of limitations of old the market and also the efforts taken by the companies
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200 Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211
after M&A deal is completed. York (2004) using EVA x1 (Pre-M&A) and x2 (Post-M&A) are sample
as performance measure found that the operating statistics.
performance declines after the acquisition similar to l1 and l2 are the population parameters.
the performance of other companies in the industry. The study is carried out over various years under
consideration for the pre and post-acquisition perfor-
mance that are compared using the economic value
Research objectives
added (economic profit) as the measure of performance
to observe whether M&A performance shows any
Based on the research gap found in the literature
different results compared to past studies. All the
survey, the following objective is framed in the study:
financial performance parameters are adjusted for the
• To find out the long term post-acquisition perfor- industry average. Industry average represents the
mance in terms of EVA with respect to in performance of companies that have not gone through
manufacturing companies in India merger and acquisition during the period under refer-
ence. The pre and post-M&A performance is compared
Besides overall manufacturing companies, the
using the economic value added (EVA) (a metric of
study also classifies the sample into different catego-
economic profit) as the measure of performance to
ries viz, family verses non family owned, small verses
observe whether M&A performance shows any differ-
large target, smaller and larger acquiring company,
ent results compared to past studies.
cash payment verses stock payment and related verses
The formula for the EVA is as follows:
unrelated acquisitions. Subsequently, comparative
analysis is made for each such classification. EVA ¼ Net operating profit before interest and after
tax ðNOPATÞ ðWACC invested capitalÞ
Methodology
where, WACC stands for weighted average cost of
Hypotheses capital.
Several accounting adjustments are suggested by
Based on the research objectives the following Stern and Stewart for finding NOPAT and invested
research hypotheses are tested: capital. These accounting adjustments are beyond the
scope of this study since such information and data are
Ho There is no difference between the pre and post- not easily available. Pandey (2005) also views that the
acquisition performance (in terms of rate of EVA or concept of economic profitability is equivalent to the
economic profit) in manufacturing companies in India. concept of economic value added (EVA). This study
As discussed in previous sections, the comparison basically takes EVA, a measure of economic profit
of pre and post acquisition performance is done for the which is defined as the spread between return on equity
companies grouped as per different classifications. and cost of equity. Hence, from equity-holders’ point
of view, economic value added can be found as below:
Tools and techniques Economic value added ¼ Net profit cost of equity
average net worth
The performance is evaluated using ‘‘paired two
sample t tests’’2 Ke ¼ Rf þ bi ðRm Rf Þ
x l0 where Rf is the Risk free rate of return; Rm is the Rate
t¼
psffiffiffi
n of Return on Market Index; Ke is the cost of equity
(calculated below); bi is the Beta.
where, s is the standard deviation of the sample and n
is the sample size. Basic specifications for the study
The degrees of freedom used in this test is n - 1.
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Table 1 Interest rates in Central Government dated Securities • The median of the total assets of the acquirer
Year Central Government
company in the acquisition year is taken into
Securities (Per cent consideration for segregating the acquirer into
per annum) large and small companies.
• For the relative size of the companies (size of the
2001–2002 9.44
acquirer to the size of the target) the total assets of
2002–2003 7.34
the acquirer are compared with the total assets of
2003–2004 5.71
the target companies in the acquisition year.
2004–2005 6.11
• Companies with acquisition experience are those
2005–2006 7.34
acquirers who have gone for any merger or
2006–2007 7.89
acquisition before the event year.
2007–2008 8.12
• Method of payment is categorized into two viz.
2008–2009 7.69 Stock and cash.
2009–2010 7.23
2010–2011 7.92
2011–2012 8.52 Period of study
The risk free rate is the average of Central Government
Securities for the sample period of study = 7.5
The period of study is from 2000–2001 to 2009–2010.
This period is selected so as to evaluate the perfor-
Source Reserve Bank of India records
mance of the acquisition deals during 2003–2004 to
2006–2007. The data for these years are available.
Table 2 Compound annual growth rate
Sources of data
Annual averages of share price indices and market
capitalisation
The sources for collecting the acquisition deals and
Year BSE Sensex (base: company annual reports for financial data are Centre
1978–1979 = 100)
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Business
1990–1991 1,049.53 Beacon Database and CMIE Prowess Database.
2010–2011 186,05.18
Compound annual growth rate: 15.46 %
Scope of study
Source RBI website
• The study is confined to post-acquisition perfor-
mance of manufacturing companies in India.
from 2001 to 2002 till 2010–2011 is considered as
shown in Table 1. As a result the risk free rate of
return is 7.5 %. For calculating Risk Free Rate, the Sample selection
reference of Table 1 is taken
• For market return rate, the compounded annual
• The sample consists of listed manufacturing com-
growth rate (CAGR) in BSE Sensex has gone up
panies in India.
from 1,049.53 in 1990–1991 to 18,605.18 in
• The study is carried out for the pre and post
2010–2011. The CAGR is calculated as 15.5 %
acquisition period of 3 years due to availability of
as shown in Table 2.
data up to that period. The sample is further filtered
• For the study the rate of EVA (EVA/Average Net
so that 3 years pre and 3 years post-acquisition
worth) is taken so that it would adjust for the size
data for both acquired and target companies are
of the companies.
available.
• The M&A cases are classified into large and small
acquirers and also on the basis of relatedness. Indian chemical industry constitutes 13 % of the total
• Total assets are taken as the proxy for the size of export, 13 % of the total industrial output and seven
the companies. percent of the GDP. There is around 10–12 % growth
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202 Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211
Chemical 3 1 4 2 10 34 4 2 3 2 11 38
Food and beverage 2 2 0 2 6 21 0 1 1 2 4 14
Textiles 0 3 2 1 4 14 0 0 3 1 4 14
Transport equipment 0 0 1 3 4 14 0 0 1 1 2 7
Diversified 0 0 2 1 3 10 0 0 0 1 1 3
Metals and metal products 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 3
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 3
Machinery 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 4 0
Non metallic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3
Total 6 6 9 9 29 100 7 4 9 9 29 100
Source compiled from CMIE prowess database
per annum in this industry. The Indian pharmaceutical and acquisition deals prior to the event date. It shows
industry ranks fourth in volume and thirteenth in term companies are continuously adopting the M&A strat-
of value in the world. India is a strong player in the egy for their growth.
generic pharmaceutical market. India is the second More number of cash deals are made compared to
largest producer of Agrochemicals in Asia.3 The stock deals because of the benefits associated with it.
highest number of deals found in doing in chemical Around 62 % of deals are done through cash while
industry followed by food and beverage and textile 38 % through stock. Cash deals do not dilute the
companies. Chemical Industry is growing in India. So ownership of the company. There are lesser chances of
it may be their strategy to go for M&A for growth and EPS dilution from the acquiring company. Cash may
development. have been invested so that they won’t remain idle.
There were more of related acquisitions (55 %) In 76 % of cases, the target firms are found to be
compared to unrelated acquisitions (45 %) over the smaller than the acquirer. It shows the companies
sample period. The companies go for unrelated prefer to go for M&A deals more in the cases where
(conglomerate) deals may be because of the diversi- the size of the target company is less than the size of
fication and expansion motive. the acquired firm (Tables 3, 4).
Ownership is considered for the target company on The description for control firms is given in the
the basis of promoter holdings. The family ownership Table 5. Control firms are those companies which
is considered as those companies whose promoter have not gone for any M&A deals during the sample
holding is more than 10 % and Non-family owned period. Control firms are selected based on the type of
business are those whose promoter holding is between Industry. Industry medians are taken for the EVA or
0 and 10 percent. Srivastava (2011) has shown that in rate of EVA.
India there is more of family owned business com-
pared to non-family owned business and Indian
companies are dominated by promoter holdings. The
Results and discussions
sample has around 93 % target firms have family
owned business. So the comparative analysis is not
The performances of studies are evaluated by different
done for such classification.
categories:
Around 79 % of the acquired firms have previously
acquired experience. They have made other merger • Acquirers, target, combined firms
• Relative size of target (relative small size of target
3
Source: Chemical industry in India: interesting facts, http:// & relative large size of target)
www.cacci.org.tw/ACC%20Newsletter/May05/Katiyar2.pdf. • Size of acquirer (small acquirer & large acquirer)
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Table 4 Sample of
Category Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
acquisitions by different
categories Volume Total deals 7 4 9 9 29
Type of deal Related 3 2 4 5 14
Unrelated 4 2 5 4 15
Ownership of target Family 7 4 8 8 27
Non Family 0 0 1 1 2
Acquisition Firms with acquisition 5 2 8 8 23
experience experience
Firms without acquisition 2 2 1 1 6
experience
Method of payment Cash 3 4 7 4 18
Stock 4 0 2 5 11
Relative size of target Large target 1 2 2 2 7
Source Compiled from Small target 6 2 7 7 22
CMIE prowess database
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204 Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211
Fig. 1 EVA of
Manufacturing Companies
from 2000 to 2010. The
primary axis (Line Chart)
shows the EVA in absolute
terms in Rs. Crore. The
Secondary axis (Bar Chart)
shows the Rate of EVA in
percentage. Source
Calculated with data from
the CMIE prowess database
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
?ve EVA 84 (44) 78 (41) 76 (40) 91 (48) 122 (64) 128 (67) 136 (72) 154 (81) 151 (79) 117 (62) 128 (67)
-ve EVA 106 (56) 112 (59) 114 (60) 99 (52) 68 (36) 62 (33) 54 (28) 36 (19) 39 (21) 73 (38) 62 (33)
PAT 74.41 92.20 91.79 146.98 224.65 284.73 311.78 474.46 574.40 453.82 601.47
Average net worth 670.10 723.44 771.20 829.53 945.87 1,135.97 1,390.18 1,741.05 2,262.96 2,863.51 3,415.98
Table 8 shows the paired sample t test results to on the positive ranks, the performance is statistically
show the industry adjusted post acquisition perfor- insignificant (P C 0.05). Based on the positive ranks,
mance of manufacturing companies in India. the performance of companies in unrelated acquisition
Similar to the performance of companies without deals declined. The results show that there is no
control firms, there are negative returns to the target statistically significant difference between pre and
firm and combined firm. There is a decrease in the post acquisition period performance (P [ 0.05)
EVA returns to the shareholders of large and small (Table 10).
acquirer companies in the post acquisition event. Both Successful acquisition deals are those post acqui-
in related as well as unrelated acquisitions there is no sition performance is greater than the pre acquisition
improvement in the industry adjusted EVA returns. period. Among these 33 companies, there are around
The decline of performance in case of related acqui- 11 the acquisition deals those have a positive EVA
sition deals is statistically significant. rate in the post acquisition period. The positive
Since the sample of companies is small (\30), so performance is basically in the chemical and food
the performance is also evaluated using Wilcoxon and beverage industry. Among these 11 deals, four
Sum of Rank Test. The results of the Wilcoxon Rank are in related deals. Among these 33 companies,
Test are summarized in Table 9. there are 19 acquisition deals those have a negative
There is improvement in the performance of EVA rate in the post acquisition period. Among
acquirers after the acquisition in 11 companies while these 19 acquisition deals, seven are from unrelated
in 18 companies the performance has declined. Based deals.
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Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211 205
Table 7 Post acquisition performance without adjusted for the post acquisition period. Companies are success-
industry ful both in related and unrelated deals.
Paired sample t test without industry adjusted returns
• The deal of 2004 Supreme Industries Ltd. (Chem-
Particulars Mean difference Sig. ical) vs. Supreme Petrochem Ltd. (Chemical)
in performance (2-tailed) • The deal of 2006 English Indian Clays Ltd.
Acquirers -0.01 0.79 (Diversified) versus Greaves Cotton Ltd.
Target 0.07 0.32 (Machinery)
Combined firms 0.02 0.43 The following shows those acquisition deals where
Non family 0.02 0.73 companies had a positive EVA rate in the pre
Family 0.02 0.46 acquisition period but negative EVA rate in the post
Relative small size of target -0.01 0.72 acquisition period. Most of the deals were done in
Relative large size of target 0.04 0.36 2007.
Small acquirer 0.01 0.88
• 2006 Deal GTN Industries Ltd.(Textiles) versus
Large acquirer 0.04 0.30
Patspin India Ltd. (Textiles)
Stock 0.02 0.49
• 2007 Deal Andhra Sugars Ltd. (Diversified) versus
Cash 0.03 0.57
Andhra Petrochemicals Ltd. (Chemicals)
Without acquirer experience 0.01 0.88
• 2007 Deal Ashok Leyland Ltd. (Transport) versus
With acquirer experience 0.03 0.44
Punjab Tractors Ltd. (Machinery)
Unrelated -0.01 0.75
• 2007 Deal Bajaj Hindusthan Ltd. (Food and
Related 0.07 0.17
Beverages) versus Bajaj Hindusthan Sugar and
Source processed data Industries. Ltd. (Food and Beverages)
• 2007 Deal RSWM Ltd. (Textiles) versus Cheslind
Table 8 Industry adjusted post acquisition performance Textiles Ltd. (Textiles)
Paired sample t test with industry adjusted returns Table 11 shows the performance of companies in
different industries. Performance of companies in the
Particulars Mean t Sig.
(2-tailed) diversified and miscellaneous industry has improved
after acquisition while in other industry the perfor-
Acquirer 0.01 0.26 0.80 mance has deteriorated in the post acquisition period
Target 0.10 1.56 0.13 compared to the pre acquisition period.
Combined firms 0.05 1.59 0.12 There are around ten deals that are made in the
Non family 0.02 0.64 0.64 chemical industry. Out of the 10 deals, seven deals
Family 0.05 1.55 0.13 were done in the same industry of the target firm.
Relative small size of target 0.02 0.79 0.45 Eight deals have positive EVA and one deal has a
Relative large size of target 0.06 1.42 0.17 negative EVA both before and after acquisition.
Small acquirer 0.04 0.91 0.38 Only one has changed from negative EVA to
Large acquirer 0.05 1.34 0.20 positive EVA.
Stock 0.03 1.20 0.26 There are three deals done in diversified industry
Cash 0.06 1.24 0.23 where the target companies are from textile, chem-
Without acquirer experience 0.04 0.68 0.53 ical and machinery. From the three deals, one deal
With acquirer experience 0.05 1.41 0.17 had a negative EVA before and after acquisition,
Unrelated 0.02 0.40 0.70 one deal has a negative EVA before acquisition but
Related 0.08 1.82 0.09 positive EVA after acquisition, one deal has a
positive EVA before acquisition but negative EVA
Source processed data
after acquisition. The 2006 deal between English
The following deals are those acquisition deals Indian Clays Ltd and Greaves Cotton Ltd has
where the companies had a negative return in the improved performance after acquisition in diversi-
pre acquisition period while positive EVA rates in fied industry.
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206 Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211
There were a total of six deals that are done in • Only long term performance measures are consid-
this industry. Five deals have positive EVA both in ered. Short term returns as a result of announce-
pre and post acquisition period. The deal between ments of M&A (event studies) are not considered.
Bajaj Hindustan Ltd and Bajaj Hindustan Sugar and Long year is defined as 3 years only.
Industries Ltd has turned the positive EVA in pre • Multiple M&A (same company making more than
acquisition period to negative EVA in the post one M&A deals within the sample period) are not
acquisition period. Three deals made deals with excluded from sample keeping in view the sample
target company in food and beverage industry while size.
three deals with target company in the chemical
industry.
There was one deal in the sample, which was done
Summary and concluding remarks
in the metal and metal products industry. The deal has
a positive EVA before and after acquisitions. Simi-
This study attempted to evaluate the post acquisition
larly, there was one deal in the sample, which was
performance of manufacturing companies in India
done in the miscellaneous industry. The deal has a
new measures of corporate performance, i.e. Eco-
positive EVA before and after acquisitions.
nomic profit. Although the results are subject to the
One deal had negative EVA before and after
limitations noted above, this is an important finding in
acquisition, one deal has deal positive EVA before
academic literature in Indian M&A context given the
and after the acquisition, two deals turned from
use of EVA to evaluate M&A performance. The poor
negative EVA to positive EVA. Two deals in the
performance companies in post acquisition period
transport industry had positive EVA in the pre and post
using the new EVA performance measure are not
acquisition period, while one deal has a negative EVA
different from the traditional performance parameters
both pre and post acquisition period.
from studies like Dickerson et al. (1997); Ooghe et al.
(2006); Pazarskis et al. (2006).
In the pre-acquisition period there are six negative
EVA companies and 23 positive EVA companies
Limitations of the study
while in post-acquisition period there are nine nega-
tive EVA companies and 20 positive companies. It
• The period of study is up to 2004–2007, since shows in the post acquisition period many companies
3 years post acquisition performance data are have failed to perform better compared to the pre—
required for the study. acquisition period. There are 18 companies who have
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Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211 207
Table 11 EVA
Industry average values Pre M&A Post M&A Difference Change (%)
comparison across sample
EVA EVA
industries
Chemical 0.132 0.112 -0.021 -16
Diversified -0.094 -0.095 -0.001 1
Food and beverage 0.102 0.063 -0.042 -42
Metals and metals products 0.156 0.101 -0.055 -35
Miscellaneous 0.018 0.113 0.095 520
Textiles 0.023 -0.139 -0.161 -711
Transport equipment 0.037 -0.038 -0.075 -204
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208 Decision (December 2013) 40(3):197–211
experience
pre and post acquisition positive EVA and four
Acquirer
companies who have pre and post acquisition negative
EVA. It shows that there was no change in the
0
performance due to the acquisition event. Among
payment
Method
them two negative EVA companies turned positive
EVA companies while five positive EVA companies
of
0
turned negative EVA companies in the post acquisi-
acquirer
Size of
tion period. Seven percent has improved the com-
pany’s performance 17 % of sample companies who
0
have gone for acquisitions have failed to give positive
Relative
size of
return to their shareholders in terms of EVA compared
target
to the control firms. Around 76 % of the company’s
0
performances are indifferent to the acquisition event.
Ownership
It may be because of the fact that performance is
company
of target
evaluated on the economic profit or real profit rather
than the traditional measures.
1
The most interesting finding is that related deals
Type
deal
were more unsuccessful than unrelated deals. It may
of
0
be because of the fact that they are in diversified areas
which acted as putting eggs in different basket so as
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
Year
deal
of
not to suffer from losses.
Adjusted for industry average, the performance
of companies had declined in the post acquisition
Non Metallic
Machinery
Chemicals
Chemicals
period. This is observed in case of all classifica-
Chemical
Industry
International Ltd.
such deals are made because of different other
Batteries (India)
Marksans Pharma
High Energy
Coromandel
Ltd.
Ltd.
Ltd.
the additional wealth creation in case of manufac-
turing companies in India.
Miscellaneous
Metals and
beverage
beverage
Chemical
Food and
Food and
product
Acquirer
metals
Appendix
Alchemist Ltd.
123
Table 12 continued
Acquirer Acquirer Target Target Year Type Ownership Relative Size of Method Acquirer
Industry Industry of of of target size of acquirer of experience
deal deal company target payment
123
Table 12 continued
210
Acquirer Acquirer Target Target Year Type Ownership Relative Size of Method Acquirer
Industry Industry of of of target size of acquirer of experience
123
deal deal company target payment
123