Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)

PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
TBD
ENGG CERT

IAD
MSA
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

NORTHERN AREA OIL OPERATION

CAPITAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

BI-10-09111
JO/EWO
10-01978
01/14/18
DATE

DEBOTTLENECK TANAJIB WATER HANDLING FACILITY

NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER

01/14/18
MSA
SIL ASSIGNMENT STUDY REPORT
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER
IAD
01/14/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
Prepared By:
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

DATE:
BY:

JAN 2018
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
TBD

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ENGG CERT

IAD

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 3
MSA

2 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................ 3
3 OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................... 3
4 SIL STUDY TEAM ............................................................................................................... 4
5 DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... 5
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

6 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................. 8

DESCRIPTION

6.1 PROJECT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS............................................................................. 8

6.2 GENERAL REFERENCE DOCUMENTS....................................................................... 8
7 Project Description ............................................................................................................ 9
7.1 General .......................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................ 9
7.3 Produced Water Handling System ................................................................................. 9
7.4 Dehydrators Level Control Valves.................................................................................. 9
JO/EWO
10-01978

7.5 Recovered Oil Pump ...................................................................................................... 9

8 SIL Assignment Methodology......................................................................................... 10
01/14/18
DATE

9 SIL ASSIGNMENT: ........................................................................................................... 10

NO.
REV

10 LOPA Workshop Assumptions & Conventions ............................................................. 13

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MSA
11 Results & Findings .......................................................................................................... 14
DATE:
01/14/18 11.1 WORKSHEET .............................................................................................................. 14
PROJECT
ENGINEER 11.2 LOPA SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 14
IAD
01/14/18
12 Recommendations & ACTIONS ...................................................................................... 14
DATE:
CERTIFIED 13 .Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 15
TBD

DATE:
04104/13
01/14/18 14 Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 15
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
1 INTRODUCTION
TBD

SIL study session was conducted related to Project BI- BI-10-09111 “DEBOTTLENECK
ENGG CERT

IAD

TANAJIB WATER HANDLING FACILITY”

MSA

The SIL was facilitated by SNC Lavalin Fayez Engineering and attended by engineers
from Saudi Aramco and SLFE.

The SIL assessment session was conducted at SLFE office in Al-Khobar on 3rd Jan 2018.
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

The purpose of the SIL review within this study is to assign safety integrity levels to each
DESCRIPTION

Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in accordance with Saudi Aramco standards (SAEP-
250) in order to demonstrate that the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) proposed
provide adequate levels of risk reduction and meets the Risk Target Frequencies identified
by Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA).

Findings from the study session were recorded in LOPA worksheets (provided by Saudi
Aramco P&CSD) as per Saudi Aramco standards.
JO/EWO
10-01978

2 SCOPE
01/14/18
DATE

The scope of SIL assessment consists of facilitating and chairing SIL workshop,
performing SIL assessment using Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology in
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE accordance with the guidelines provided in the Saudi Aramco Engineering Procedure,
ENGINEER
MSA
SAEP-250 (4 Dec. 2012) & IEC-61511.
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER The purpose of this study is to access the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) so that
IAD
01/14/18
the Design of Safety Integrated Systems is adequate to protect personnel, environment
DATE:
CERTIFIED and assets against potentially hazardous situation. The SIL assignment study included all
TBD

DATE:
04104/13
01/14/18 high-risk areas, which were developed during the HAZOP study undertaken on original
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY design basis.
TBD
01/14/18
DATE: The team identified 02 SIF loops within the scope of the project. SIL Study was conducted
OPERATIONS
TBD for risk scenarios (identified during HAZOP) and recommended SIFs (identified in HAZOP
01/14/18
DATE: & listed in C&E) were evaluated for SIL Assignment.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION

3 OBJECTIVES
EDSD

The objective of this SIL study is to systematically identify SIF required to prevent or
DATE:
BY:

mitigate a hazardous event and to determine its Safety Integrity Level (SIL) required for
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

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CERTIFICATE

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BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

the intended SIF.

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

The SIL determination study covers all the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) as

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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identified in the referenced C&E diagrams.
TBD

Safety Integrity Level determination study is the part of overall safety studies, which
ENGG CERT

IAD

concentrates on risks associated with hazardous event and identification of independent

MSA

protection layers to mitigate that specific hazardous event. Establishing the necessary risk
reduction requirement and the corresponding SIL of SIFs is the purpose of SIL
assessment.

SIL assessment/determination is the phase 2 activity of the overall Safety Lifecycle (SLC)
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

of the SIS (Figure 8 of IEC 61511-1:2003). This Phase 2 activity in IEC 61511- 1:2003 is
referred as “Allocation of the Safety Functions to Protection Layers”.

Safety Life Cycle Phase 1, i.e.” Hazard & Risk Assessment”, is required to be undertaken
before the commencement of Phase 2. Results of Phase 1 are required to be available
before the start of Phase 2.

4 SIL STUDY TEAM

JO/EWO
10-01978

The team performing the SIL analysis comprised of

01/14/18
DATE

• SIL Facilitator
• SLFE Instrumentation Engineer
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE
• SLFE Process Engineer
ENGINEER
MSA • SLFE Project Management
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
• Saudi Aramco Loss Prevention Department
ENGINEER
IAD • Saudi Aramco Proponent/ operations representative(s)
01/14/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
• Saudi Aramco Project Management team
TBD
04104/13
01/14/18 Refer to Appendix A of this report for list of attendees.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

DEBOTTLENECK TANAJIB WATER HANDLING DOC

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THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
5 DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS
TBD

ABBREVIATION
ENGG CERT

IAD

ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable

BPCS Basic Process Control System
MSA

CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

C&E Cause and Effect
E/E/PES Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Systems
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FCV Flow Control Valve
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

HAZOP Hazard and Operability

DESCRIPTION

IEC International Electro technical Commission

IPL Independent Protection Layer
ISO International Standard Organization
LALL Level Alarm Low Low
LAHH Level Alarm High High
LCV Level Control Valve
NA Not Applicable
PALL Pressure Alarm Low Low
PAHH Pressure Alarm High High
JO/EWO
10-01978

PFD Probability of Failure on Demand

P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
RRF Risk Reduction Factor
01/14/18
DATE

SDV Shutdown Valve

SIF Safety Instrumented Function
NO.
REV

SIL Safety Integrity Level

A

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
SIS Safety Instrumented System
MSA TAHH Temperature Alarm High High
DATE:
01/14/18 ZV Remote Shut-Off Valve (or Emergency Isolation Valve)
PROJECT
ENGINEER
IAD

DATE:
01/14/18 DEFINITIONS
CERTIFIED
TBD
MTTR Mean Time to Restoration
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE: Mean Time to Restoration consists of mean time to repair logistical delay
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY time and administrative delay time. Mean Time to Restoration is the total
TBD downtime used in availability calculations
01/14/18
DATE: Availability The probability that a device is operating successfully at a given moment
OPERATIONS
in time. This is a measure of the uptime and is defined in units of percent.
TBD
β Factor Beta Factor, Indicating Common cause susceptibility. The fraction of total
01/14/18
DATE: failure rate that is attributed to a single cause in common with other units
CONTROL NUMBER

in the group. A common cause failure will result in all units with the group
VERIFICATION

failing simultaneously.
EDSD

BPCS Basic Process Control System. IEC-61508 term used to describe the
DATE:

regulatory control system.

BY:

Diagnostic A measure of system’s ability to detect failures. This is a ratio between the
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,

Coverage failure rates for detected failures to the failure rate for the all the failures in
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

the system.
(DCC) NO. _____________________

ESD Emergency Shut Down, a name used to describe a safety Instrumented

10-01091-0001-001

system.
SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
Fault Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the
TBD

Tolerance presence of faults or errors.

ENGG CERT

FE Final Element, This term included all the devices required for the purposes
IAD

of acting to remove of hazards.

Intermediate The frequency of the hazard outcome after IPL’s have been considered
MSA

Event but before any further protective function has been added. It is the
Frequency demand rate made on any additional safety functions required as a result
of analysis. Sometimes referred to unmitigated frequency.
IPF Instrumented Protective Function, A function comprising one or more
initiators, logic solver and one or more final element whose purposes is to
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

prevent mitigate hazardous situations.

DESCRIPTION

IPL Independent Protection Layer. This refers to various other methods of risk
reduction possible for a process. Examples include items such as rupture
disks and relief valves, which will independently reduce the likelihood of
the hazard escalating into a full accident with harmful outcome.
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis. A modified event tree where only the single
hazard outcome and resulting occurrence of the consequence are of
interest. An initiating event cause is analyzed together with all effective
IPL’s. The resulting frequency is called the intermediate Event Frequency,
(for the single event cause).
JO/EWO

PFDavg Average Probability of Failure on Demand, This is the probability that a

10-01978

system will fail dangerously and not be able to perform its safety function
when required. IEC 61508/61511 uses PFDavg as the the system metric
01/14/18
DATE

upon which the SIL is defined.

PST Process Safety Time: This is the time within which the Safety
Instrumented Function (SIF) must, upon detection of hazard, act to
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE prevent the occurrence of the consequence. The term is related to the
ENGINEER
MSA Fault Tolerant Time of the Process.
DATE:
01/14/18 Proof Test The periodic testing of the equipment, (usually SIF components and sub
PROJECT systems) to detect and correct any otherwise undetectable hardware
ENGINEER
IAD failures that would prevent the equipment form successfully operating on
01/14/18 demand.
DATE:
CERTIFIED PTC Proof Test Coverage: The percentage failures that are detected during the
TBD
servicing of the equipment. IEC-61508 allows people to assume that when
04104/13
DATE:
01/14/18
a proof test is performed any errors in the systems are detected and
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
corrected (100% proof test coverage); in practice, this is usually not the
TBD case.
DATE:
01/14/18
PTI Proof Test Interval: The time interval between servicing of the equipment.
OPERATIONS
TBD Redundancy Use of multiple elements or systems to perform the same function.
DATE:
01/14/18
Redundancy can be implemented by identical elements or diverse
elements. Redundancy is primarily used to improve reliability or
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION

availability.
EDSD

RRF Risk Reduction Factor: The inverse of PFDavg, so RRF=1/PFDavg

DATE:
BY:

SFF Safe Failure Fraction: The fraction of the overall failure rate of a device
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

that results in either a safe fault or diagnosed (detected) unsafe fault. The
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
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CERTIFICATE

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BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

safe failure fraction includes the detectable dangerous failures when those
(DCC) NO. _____________________

failures are annunciated and procedures for repair or shutdown are in

10-01091-0001-001

place.
SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
SIF Safety Instrumented Function: A set of equipment intended to reduce the
TBD

risk due to a specific hazard (a safety loop).

ENGG CERT

SIL Safety Integrity Level: A quantitative target for measuring the level of
IAD

safety in a process. Defining a target SIL level for the process should be
based on the assessment of the likelihood that an incident will occur and
MSA

the consequence of the incident.

SIL PFDavg RRF

-5 to -4
4 ≥10 <10 >10,000 to ≤100,000
3 ≥10-4 to <10-3 >1,000 to ≤10,000
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

-3 to -2
2 ≥10 <10 >100 to ≤1,000
DESCRIPTION

-2 to -1
1 ≥10 <10 >10 to ≤100
SIS Safety Instrumented System: Implementation of one or more Safety
Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of
Sensor(s), Logic Solver(s), and final elements(s).

Spurious These unnecessary trips result from safe failures of sensors, logic solvers,
Trips and final shutdown elements. The STR value is used to quantify the
expected frequency of these trips.
STR Spurious Trip rate: This is the average frequency of safe process trips
JO/EWO
10-01978

caused by failure within the safety Instrumented Function (SIF).

TI Test Interval: same as Proof Test interval (PTI)
01/14/18
NO. DATE
REV

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MSA
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER
IAD
01/14/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

DEBOTTLENECK TANAJIB WATER HANDLING DOC

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 Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
PMT OPRNS
TBD
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THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
6 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
TBD

6.1 PROJECT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS

ENGG CERT

IAD
MSA

Sr. # Document number Description

1 TB048008-001 REV C C& E Diagrams

2 TE-049048 HAZOP REPORT

3 TA-049012.001 REV D P&IDs

ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

4 TA-049013.001 REV D P&IDs

5 TA-049014.001 REV D P&IDs

6.2 GENERAL REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Sr. Document number Description

JO/EWO
10-01978

#
SAEP-250 (4th December 2012
1 Safety Integrity Level Assignment and Verification
01/14/18

revision)
DATE

Functional Safety of
2 IEC-61508;2010 Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
NO.
REV

Safety Related Systems

DISCIPLINE Functional Safety- Safety Instrumented Systems for
ENGINEER 3 IEC-61511:2003
MSA Process industry sector
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER
IAD
01/14/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

DEBOTTLENECK TANAJIB WATER HANDLING DOC

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 Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
7 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
TBD
ENGG CERT

7.1 General
IAD

Marjan Field is currently producing 500 MBCD of AM crude oil. The 2017-2019 Business
MSA

Plan Crude Program calls for increasing the AM crude oil MSC target for Marjan field by
100 MBCD in January 2018. The present water handling facility at Tanajib Onshore Plant
will be inadequate due to the increased water cut and GOR until 2022.
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the facilities is to support the corporate strategy to increase the MSC
target of Marjan field from 500 MBCD to 600 MBCD of AM crude by upgrading existing
water handling facilities at Tanajib Onshore Plant.

This upgrade will provide one (1) CPI separator, one (1) recovered oil pump, replacement
of three (3) existing level control valves of the dehydrators and flow elements at the
upstream of LCVs to handle the increase in the water cut and GOR until 2022. The
JO/EWO
10-01978

increase in the water cut and GOR after 2022 will be handled by Marjan Increment
Program.
01/14/18
NO. DATE
REV

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER 7.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
MSA
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER 7.3 Produced Water Handling System
IAD

DATE:
01/14/18 One (1) additional CPI Separator is required to meet the increase in this water cut. The
CERTIFIED
TBD new CPI Separator shall be placed next to the existing CPI separators and connected in
04104/13
01/14/18 parallel.
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18 7.4 Dehydrators Level Control Valves
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD In order to meet the forecasted water and crude rates increase, the three (3) existing Level
01/14/18 Control Valves (LCV-149/161/173) installed on produced water lines of three (3)
DATE:
Dehydrators (G80-D-5/6/7) will be replaced with new valves. Flow elements and flow
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION

transmitter (FE/FIT-138/150/162) will be also replaced to meet forecasted water flow rate.
EDSD

DATE:
BY:

7.5 Recovered Oil Pump

REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

The capacity of each CPI separator is 58.700 MBOD. To treat 121.4 MBOD of produced
(DCC) NO. _____________________

water all three CPI separators will be in operation. Currently, there are three (3) recovered
10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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 Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
PMT OPRNS
TBD
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THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
oil pumps (G80-G-50/51/52) (2 operating, 1 standby). To control the level of oil in CPI
TBD

separator a dedicated pump is required for each CPI separator. Therefore, a new pump
ENGG CERT

will be added. . Now there will be four (4) pumps (3 operating, 1 standby).
IAD
MSA

8 SIL ASSIGNMENT METHODOLOGY

Safety life cycle approach as per IEC-61511 and Saudi Aramco Engineering Procedure
identified in SAEP-250 is used for the SIL assignment of the Safety instrumented function
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

under this project.

DESCRIPTION

9 SIL ASSIGNMENT:
The SIL assessment comprises an assessment of the plant process equipment and
systems to be protected by Safety Instrumented System, to identify potential hazards and
to assess the risk that is present for persons and the environment and assets.

This assessment is made on the basis that no protective systems are in place so that a
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basic level of risk can be established for the equipment under control (EUC) or Process as
per IEC-61508 & IEC-61511 terminology.
01/14/18
DATE

Essentially the SIL derived rating is a measure of the performance availability that is
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE
required to be achieved by the safety–related control system, in order that the residual risk
ENGINEER
MSA level is within acceptable limits, or, is as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) as defined in
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
SAEP-250 in terms of target frequency.
ENGINEER
IAD
SIL assignment report contents follow the requirements of SAEP-250
01/14/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD The SIL rating shall be considered for the entire Safety integrated function i.e. from
04104/13
DATE:
01/14/18
initiating devices through the logic solvers / controllers to the final actuating elements in
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY order that the system will adequately meet the design intent.
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
SAEP-250 is used as the main data source (for initiating cause frequency/PFD of
OPERATIONS
TBD protection layers etc.)
01/14/18
DATE:
As per requirements of SAEP-250, LOPA methodology shall be used for SIL assessment.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION

SIL Assignment will be carried out based on LOPA based on following steps
EDSD

DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,

9.1.1 Identification of Hazardous Scenario

THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

HAZOP report, Cause and Effect shall be used for the identification/development of
10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
hazardous scenario, additional scenarios can be listed through brain storming during SIL
TBD

session. Each scenario must have a unique initiating event/consequence pair. LOPA is
ENGG CERT

IAD

limited to evaluating a single cause-consequence pair as scenario.

MSA

9.1.2 Quantitative Risk Target Frequency

Quantitative risk target frequency shall be assigned for the hazardous event identified that
is protected by identified SIF. Appendix-H of Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250 shall be
ISSUED FOR REVIEW

used as guideline for “Quantitative Risk Target Frequency” against each hazardous event/
DESCRIPTION

risk.
The consequences against each of the following category will be identified for each
hazard/risk and a target frequency will be assigned against each consequence as
identified below.

a- Personnel Safety
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b- Environment safety
c- Asset Safety
d- Reputation
01/14/18
DATE

Note: SIL assignment is carried out against lowest “risk target frequency” as this will lead
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE
to worst case scenario covering all the other categories.
ENGINEER
MSA
Refer to Appendix-C of this report for Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250.
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER 9.1.3 Initiating Event Frequency
IAD
01/14/18
DATE: For LOPA, each scenario has a single initiating event. The frequency of the initiating
CERTIFIED
TBD
event, causing the hazard, will be identified. Appendix-I of Saudi Aramco Standard SAEP-
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
250 shall be used as guideline for calculating initiating event frequencies. Expert
AGENCY
TBD judgment/operation experience and OREDA database will also be referred to identify the
01/14/18
DATE:
failure rate of some of the equipment that will be part of initiating cause of that hazard.
OPERATIONS
TBD Refer to Appendix-C of this report for referring Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

9.1.4 IPLs
One by one, all the IPLs (excluding SIF under evaluation) available were identified which
DATE:
BY:

are present to mitigate the consequences or reduce the frequency of the hazard event
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

An IPL is a device, system or action that is capable of preventing/mitigating a scenario

(DCC) NO. _____________________
10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating event or the
TBD

action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. Independent
ENGG CERT

IAD

Protection Layers (IPL) , when applied to mitigate the hazard shall reduce the
MSA

Identified risk by a factor of 10 or more, shall be specific, independent, dependable and

auditable.
IPL risk reduction values shall be taken based on conservative approach from Appendix I
of Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

9.1.5 Mitigated Event Frequency (MEF)

The risk reduction credit against each existing safeguard (protection layer) will be
assigned as per Appendix
Appendix-I of SAEP-250.
250. The mitigated event frequency is calculated by
multiplying the initiating event frequency by probabilities of all tthe
he IPLs failing to do their
intended function.. Conditional modifiers/Enabling conditions are also multiplied along with
other IPLs to calcuated the final MEF values
values.
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01/14/18
NO. DATE
REV

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MSA
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER
IAD
01/14/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
9.1.6 RRF CALCULATION
TBD

DATE:
01/14/18 Risk Target Frequency for the SIF will be calculated by dividing the mitigated
mi risk with the
CONTROL NUMBER

target Risk (identified in step c) to identify the Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) required by the
VERIFICATION
EDSD

SIF loop.
DATE:
BY:

9.1.7 SIL/PFD CALCULATION

REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

Inverse of RRF (i.e. 1/RRF) will lead to PFD of the SIF, against which SIL will be assigned
OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

for the SIF.

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
10 LOPA WORKSHOP ASSUMPTIONS & CONVENTIONS
TBD
ENGG CERT

IAD

• SIL study is conducted based on

MSA

a- the HAZOP findings and risk ranking ranked high in the HAZOP report &

b- the Safety instrumented functions listed in Cause & Effect diagram.

• The facility has been designed and engineered properly based on the Saudi Aramco
design/engineering codes, industry standards and good engineering practices.
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

• SIL study has been conducted for the SIFs which are covered under the scope of this
project BI-10-09111-001

• Permissive & Maintenance Bypasses are not covered in the SIL assessment.

• All equipment will be well maintained.

• The SIFs with hand switches and push button (PB) as initiators are considered SIL 1
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by default and are not studied during the SIL workshop (in accordance with SAEP-
250). Such manual initiators in a SIF require operator action that is used for both
01/14/18
DATE

prevention and mitigation of hazardous events, like total plant shutdown, unit
shutdown, equipment isolation and equipment protection systems shutdown.
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER • Alarms are considered as an IPL with a PFD of 0.1 provided the operator has clearly
MSA

DATE:
01/14/18 understood the alarm, Operator has more than specified time (15 minutes for control
PROJECT
ENGINEER room alarm ; 30 minutes for field alarms) to respond inorder to prevent the demand
IAD
01/14/18 occurring on the SIF. Also this credit shall only be given if the operator is trained and
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD regularly completes action as drilled exercise, has access to clear written procedures
DATE:
04104/13
01/14/18 and performs actions according to the appropriate procedures and operating.
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD • CCPS “Approach A’ is followed, i.e., where BPCS is an Initiating Event (IE) for a
01/14/18
DATE: scenario, no credit for protection layer in the BPCS is taken.
OPERATIONS
TBD
• Independence between BPCS protection and initiating cause is taken in accordance
01/14/18
DATE:
with the requirement of IEC-61511-2 section 9.4.2.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

• Team agreed to take credit for PZV-196/195 only on the condition that PZV is
adequately sized for blowby case as well as will be routed to the safe location.
DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

Team agreed that damage of water tank D-24 will result in stoppage of operation
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,

•
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

resulting in production loss which will lead to significant enonomic loss.

(DCC) NO. _____________________
10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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 Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
• Proponent confirmed that no dike at produced water tank D-24 to contain loss of
TBD

containment.
ENGG CERT

IAD

• SIL Committee agreed that due to low Process Safety Time in “Gas Blow by” case ;
MSA

operator action shall not be given any credit for risk reduction.

11 RESULTS & FINDINGS

11.1 WORKSHEET
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

The SIL workshop results are depicted in the LOPA Worksheets attached in Appendix D

with this report.

11.2 LOPA SUMMARY

The results of the SIL determination /assessment workshop are summarized below:
The following is the list of target SILs for the SIF tags; One (1) SIFs was assigned as SIL--2
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whereas the other one was assgined SIL-3.

SIF Description Target P&ID No. C&E No.
Numb SIL
01/14/18
DATE

er
Low Low oil Level (measured by
NO.
REV

LIT-2005) in CPI Separator G80-

TA-049014.001 REV
DISCIPLINE ZC-001 D-XXX1 resulting in Closure of SIL 3 TB048008.001 REV C
ENGINEER D
MSA ZV-2001 & shutdown of
Recovered Oil Pumps.
01/14/18
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER Low Low water Level (measured
IAD by LIT-2008) in CPI Separator TA-049014.001 REV
ZC-002 SIL-2 TB048008.001 REV C
DATE:
01/14/18 G80-D-XXX1 resulting in Closure D
CERTIFIED of ZV-2002.
TBD
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE: Table 1: SIF tags SIL assignment
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD Note: As the team developed LOPA scenarios, for some SIF tags there was no protection layer except the SIF
01/14/18
being studied, hence a PFD value ‘1’ was entered in the IPL column for the LOPA calculation.
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
01/14/18
DATE: 12 RECOMMENDATIONS & ACTIONS
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

1. Both SIF Loops (which are assigned SIL-2 and SIL-3) shall be part of Safety
instrumented system which shall conform ot IEC-61511 requirements.
DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

2. PZV-195/196 shall be adequately sized for blowby case as well as will be routed to
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

the safe location.

(DCC) NO. _____________________
10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

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 Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
PMT OPRNS
TBD
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY

THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
3. As per IEC-61511 section 11.2.10; A device used to perform part of a safety
TBD

instrumented function shall not be used for basic process control purposes.
ENGG CERT

IAD

4. As per ISA-TR84.00.02 ;Frequently, multiple safety functions are included in a single

MSA

ESD logic solver. Generally, the safety function case with the highest SIL requirement
will be the case that determines whether the logic solver meets performance
requirements.

5. System architecture for each SIF shall be designed in accordance with the
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION

requirements of standards identified in section 6.2 of this document.

Note:Team members suggested design improvment that failure of LIC-2007 shall not result in the non-
availability of two CPI separators

13 .CONCLUSIONS

Safety instrumented functions designed for the safety of personal; assets /equipment
& enviornment are sufficient with the assigned SIL level to meet the required risk
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target. Recommendations shall be implemented as per section 7 of this document.

01/14/18
DATE

14 APPENDICES
NO.
REV

DISCIPLINE Appendix A: Attendance Sheet

ENGINEER
MSA
01/14/18
Appendix B: Process & Instrumentation Diagrams.
DATE:
PROJECT
ENGINEER Appendix C : SAEP-250
IAD
01/14/18
Appendix D: LOPA Worksheets
DATE:
CERTIFIED
TBD
Appendix E: Cause & Effect
04104/13
01/14/18
DATE:
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
01/14/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD

DATE:
BY:
REVISIONCERTIFICATION

APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

BA

(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01091-0001-001

SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION

DEBOTTLENECK TANAJIB WATER HANDLING DOC

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