Observations of Social Processes and Their Formal Representations

Author(s): Charles Tilly

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 595-602
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 Observationsof Social Processesand TheirFormalRepresentations

CHARLES TILLY
ColumbiaUniversity

Distinctionsbetweenquantitativeand qualitativesocial science misrepresent the

actualchoicesconfronting analystsofobservations concerning socialprocesses.Analysts
regularly(ifnotalwaysself-consciously) choosebetweenadoptingand avoiding formal
representations of social processes.Despite widespreadprejudicesto the contrary,
formalisms are availableand helpful for all sortsofsocial scientific
evidence,including
thosecommonly labeledas qualitative.Availableformalismsvaryin two important
regards:(1) fromdirectto analogicalrepresentation oftheevidenceat hand;and (2)
fromnumericalto topologicalcorrespondence between formalism and evidence.Adop-
tion offormalisms facilitatesthe identification of erroneousarguments, hence the
correction of analyticerrorsand theproductionof moreadequateexplanations.

journalsliketo advertisetheircatholicity(or theirtolerance)bylisting

Social scientific
a widevarietyof scholarsas membersof theireditorialboards. More yearsago thanI
care to recall,thejournals Theoryand Societyand Social ScienceResearchrecruited
me to theireditorialboards. Somehowneitherone evergot aroundto firingme. As a
consequence,I stillregularlyreviewpaperssubmittedto thetwojournalsand at least
scan everyissue. No chance of confusingone withthe other:selectan articlefrom
Theoryand Societyat random,and you have almost no chance of encounteringa
table,a mathematicalformula,or a graphicrepresentation of data. Choose an article
fromSocial ScienceResearch,on the otherhand, withgreatassurancethatyou will
encounternumbers,graphs,and/ortables. Two different versionsof social science
seem to be in play.
Yet the enticingcomparisonleads easilyto a falseconclusion.Sociologistswould
spend less timeventilatinguselesslyif no one had ever inventedthe vivid but mis-
leading conceptual and institutionaldivision betweenqualitativeand quantitative
research.Of course, a reader of sociologicaljournals will find some of them (like
Social ScienceResearch)fillingtheirpages withnumbersand others(like Theoryand
Society)dependingalmostentirelyon verbaldistinctions. Clearly,stylesof reporting
sociological research differconsiderablyfrom one segmentof the discipline to
another.Indeed, if the qualitative-quantitativedivisionapplied only to styleof pre-
sentation,it would do littleharm,especiallyifits usersrecognizedit as a continuum
ratherthan as a dichotomy.
The distinctionbecomes much more slippery,however,if applied to research
methods.Even whenit eventuallyproducesnumbers,afterall, thebulkof sociological
researchinvolvesmakingnonquantitative observationsbeforeany quantitativetrans-
formationor analysisof theevidence.For all theirfinalquantitativeform,interview-
based surveysbegin not withnumbersbut withconversationsbetweeninterviewers
and respondents.Even demographerswho start their work with published vital
statisticsare actuallydrawingtheirevidencefrompreviouslywrittenregistrations of
individualbirths,deaths,and marriages,each one describedin its particularity.

Sociological Theory 22.:4 December 2004

? American Sociological Association. 1307 New York Avenue NW, Washington,DC 20005-4701

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596 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Althoughthisarticle'sreferences includea wide varietyof publicationsexplicitly

adopting formalisms in the studyof social processes,theessayitselffallsfarshortof a
comprehensivesurvey of formalisms in social science. It neitherreviewsprevious
claims forand againstthe qualitative-quantitative divisionnor covers the fullrange
of available social scientificformalisms. Drawingmainlyon myown long,varied,but
stillhighlyselectiveexperiencein social research,I argueherethe following:
* Dichotomizationof social scientific researchmethodsand subjectsinto quali-
tativeand quantitativedoes moreharmthangood.
* Such a divisionmisrepresents the actual choicesfacingsocial researchers.
* It also obscuresa genuine,consequentialchoice betweenusing and avoiding
formalismsin thetransformation and analysisof evidenceon social processes.
* Formalismsare available and useful for the analysis of all sorts of social
scientificevidence,includingthe evidencecommonlygatheredin fieldsthat
participantsoftencall qualitative.
* Formalismshave two signal advantagesfor social research:first,when well
chosentheydisciplinean inquiryfromtheoutset;second,theymake it easierto
discover that an otherwiseplausible formulationactually is mistakenand
therefore easierto improveon previousknowledge.
* Everysocial scientisttherefore
willbenefitfromseriousexposureto formalisms,
eveniftheyplay a minorpartin thepractitioner's own researchand writing.
If thesepointsare correct,theyimplythatgraduateeducationin social scienceshould
regularlyincludeseriousexposureto theuse of formalisms in theanalysisof evidence
concerning social processes.
It certainlymakes no sense to divide social phenomenaat large into inherently,
irreduciblyqualitativeor quantitative;no such distinctionexistsin nature(Podolny
2003; Katz 2002, 2001; White2002; Darrow 2001; Mahoney2000, 1999; Ragin 2000;
Desrosieres1998; Munck 1998; Tufte 1997; Ragin and Becker 1992). What is more,
the qualitative-quantitativedivide obscuresa contrastof great importancefor the
integrityof social research,between(1) employingrigorous,theoretically informed
formalismsfor confrontationwith the evidenceat hand; and (2) interpreting the
evidence directlywithoutthe disciplineof formalisms.In the hope of dispelling
confusioninducedby thequantitative-qualitative distinction,thisbriefarticlefocuses
on theplace of formalisms in social research.
By formalism I mean an explicitrepresentationof a setof elementsand of relations
among them.Formalismsthatmatterhererepresentelementsof social processesand
relationsamong those elements.Relationsmay consistof cause and effect,but they
also mayinvolveproximity, simultaneity, connection,or similarity.
Familiarexamples
in social science include probability-basedstatisticalmodels, network analyses,
grammars,otherrigoroustreatments of conversation,time-budgets, identification
of
sequences,measurementmodels,collectivebiography,lifetables,analysisof games,
formalrecastingof narratives,simulations,mathematicalmodels, spatial mapping,
and straightforward tabularcomparisons,so long as thosecomparisonsare theoreti-
callymotivated.
Such representations countas formalisms wheninvestigators adopt or createthem
in logical independenceof theirobservationsof social processes and then make
rigorouscomparisonsbetweenthe representations and the observations.Thus, a
demographerconstructsa lifetable forthepopulationat hand and comparesit with

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OBSERVATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS 597

the Coale-DemenySouth model on the expectationthatits patternof mortality over

lifetimeswillmoregreatlyresemblethoseof Italyand Spain thanthoseof Swedenand
Norway (Coale and Demeny 1966); a politicalscientistsets up a game to represent
choicesfacedbymembersoflinguistic minorities in newlyindependent countries(Laitin
1998); or a sociologistuses network models to specify the argumentthat greater
connectionamong persons prior to some crucial,riskycollectiveaction promotes
participation in thataction(Diani and McAdam 2003; Fernandezand McAdam 1988).
In social research,formalismssometimesfigurein the initialdiscipliningof the
evidence,as when coders translateresponsesof interviewees into standardizedcat-
egories. They often help in reordering data, as when researchers clustermultiple
responses into indicators of more generalorientations such as radicalism or optimism.
At times they serve for the examinationof bias in the selectionof respondents,
sources,or information. Theyplay centralpartsin hypothesistesting,as investigators
work out the logic of one explanationor another,and thendeterminewhetherthe
evidencematchesthatlogic.
A commonprejudice,to be sure,dividesthe social worldintophenomenathatare
suitableforquantification(populationdistributions, social mobility,etc.) and those
that are irreduciblyqualitative:conversation,narratives,biography,ethnography,
and historyoftenserveas examples.Formalismsclearlycan and do apply,however,
to thesephenomenaas well (see, e.g., Sawyer2003; Maynard2003; Murmann2003;
Kosto 2001; Mohr 2000, 1998; Wengraf2000; Collier 1999; Steinberg1999; Fitch
1998;Franzosi 1998a, 1998b;Kalb 1997;Roy 1997;Markoff1996;Stinchcombe1996;
van Leeuwenand Maas 1996; White 1995; Aminzade 1993; Bearman1993;Steinmetz
1993; Voss 1993). Althoughresearchers frequently discardor modifyformalisms in
to or
response inadequate surprising matches, the self-conscious employment of formal-
ismsdisciplines theencounter of argumentand evidence.
How so? Most social researcherslearn more frombeing wrongthan frombeing
right-providedtheythenrecognizethattheywerewrong,see whytheywerewrong,
and go on to improvetheirarguments.Post hoc interpretation of data minimizesthe
to
opportunity recognize contradictions between argument and evidence,whileadop-
tion of formalismsincreasesthat opportunity.Formalismsblindlyfollowedinduce
blindness.Intelligently adopted,however,theyimprovevision.Beingobligedto spell
out the argument,to check its logical implications,and to examine whetherthe
evidence conformsto the argumentpromotesboth visual acuity and intellectual
responsibility.
My claimrestson theassumptionthat,withinlimits,researchers can learnthetruth
about social processes.At a minimum,theycan distinguishbetweentotallyinad-
equate and lessinadequaterepresentations of social processes,thusopeningthewayto
increasingly reliableknowledge. If you think,on thecontrary, thatsocial processesare
intrinsically chaoticand/orthatinvestigators have no way of comparingtheadequacy
of competingaccounts,you will necessarilyrejectmy advocacy of formalismsas a
delusion and a waste of energy.In that case, you will have to figureout your own
alternative justificationfordoingsocial scienceat all. At thispoint,I assumethatany
remaining readers clingto thepossibilityof verification and falsification.
Let me repeat:I claim nothinglike fullfamiliarity withthe researchmethodsand
formalismscurrentlyemployedin social science. Over a checkeredcareer,I have
assembledand analyzeddata on urban residentialareas (e.g., Tilly 1961),conducted
sample surveys(e.g., Tilly 1965), recast Census data into analyticalcomparisons
(e.g., Tilly 1968), combined criminal and other administrativestatisticswith
newspaperreportsin analyses of the changinggeographyof crime and violence

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598 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

(e.g., Lodhi and Tilly1973),synthesized strikedata witha widevarietyof evidenceon

changes in industrial and social organization(e.g., Shorterand Tilly1974),constructed
collectivebiographies(e.g., Lees and Tilly 1974), produced geographicanalyses of
urbanchangeand contentious events(e.g.,Schweitzer and Tilly1982),carriedon simple
demographicanalyses(e.g., Tilly 1984), and conducted formalnetworkanalyses(e.g.,
Tilly1997a).
Straddlingfieldsoftenseparatedas quantitativeand qualitative,I oftenhave had
to write on historiography, on quantificationin history,and on methodological
problemsin the studyof politicalprocesses(e.g., Tilly2002a, 2001a, 2001b, 1997b).
But I can onlyclaimto have made a substantialmethodologicalcontribution to social
sciencein one area: withregardto theinvention,improvement, and analysisof event
catalogs for different sorts of political processes,especiallyconflictprocesses (for
reviewsof event catalogs, see Franzosi 2004, 1995; Tilly 2002b, 1995; Beissinger
2001; Olzak 1992, 1989; Rucht,Koopmans, and Neidhardt1998; White 1995).
Nevertheless, myvariedresearchexperienceprovidessome groundforreflection on
formalisms. Take thecase of historicalresearch,whichsome analyststreatas quintes-
sentiallyinterpretive, henceinaccessibleto formalisms. That characterization of histo-
ricalresearchrestson a double misunderstanding: identification of historicalresearch
entirely withthecollectionofevidence,and identification of historicalanalysiswiththe
writing of narratives. As a historian,ofcourseI have done plentyof both.I have spent
years in European and Americanarchives,carefullyreadingand copyingout such
sourcesas administrative correspondence. Formalismsappear only fleetingly in that
phase of theresearch,and mainlyin theformof schemasemployedby theauthorsof
thetexts.I also have written myshareof historicalnarratives, tellingsequentialstories
in an effortto show thatrelationsamong theirelementsparallel-or, forthatmatter,
failto parallel-those in a generalargument, myown or someoneelse's.No one should
take thisessayas a polemicagainstsloggingarchivalworkand synthetic narrative.
Let us assume,then,thatgood historicalworkalwaysincludesrespectful collection
of evidenceand oftenculminatesin synthetic narratives.Formalismsplay theirparts
in thespace betweentheinitialcollectionof archivalmaterialand thefinalproduction
ofnarratives.In myown historicalresearch,formalisms figureprominently fromearly
in the orderingof evidence to late in its analysis; they range fromestimatesof
selectivity in the sourcesto tabularanalysis,block modeling,and standardstatistical
treatments (see, e.g., Tilly 1995:393-405).As it happens,manyotherhistoriansrush
fromsourcesto reasonednarrativeswithoutpausingto employformalisms, or evento
reflectveryself-consciously on thelogicalstructure of theirarguments, henceon what
theevidenceshouldshowiftheirargumentsare correct.Preciselyat thatpointlies the
difference betweensocial scientificand conventionalformsof history(Tilly 2001c,
1987, 1985, 1981; Monkkonen1994; Landes and Tilly 1971).
Historyjoins withsocial sciencewhen its organizingargumentsbecome explicit,
falsifiable,and theoreticallyinformed.Formalismscementthe junction. Relevant
formalisms rangeacross demographicaccountingformulas,sequenceanalyses,mod-
els of discourse,economicmodels,mathematicalmodels,networkanalyses,statistical
treatmentof the evidence,and much more (e.g., Franzosi 2004; Gould 2003, 1995;
Btithe2002; Kaufman2002; Roehnerand Syme2002; Abbott2001; Hoffman,Postel-
Vinay,and Rosenthal2000; Bearman,Faris, and Moody 1999,Shapiroand Markoff
1998; Mohr and Franzosi 1997; Padgettand Ansell 1993). Good formalismsmake
explicitthe analyst'sclaims about relationsamong the elementsunder observation.
Theytherebymake thoseclaimsavailable to falsification and modificationas a result
of comparisonwiththeevidence.

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OBSERVATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS 599

Speaking more generally, available formalismsvary in roughly the way

described by Figure 1. In one dimension,we observe variation in how closely
the structureof the formal representationcorrespondsto the structureof the
available evidence. In the other,we observe variationin the extentto which the
formalismrelies on numbers,as distinguishedfrom its reliance on topological
relations among its elements. (Purists including my son-in-law, the algebraic
geometer,point out that a more precise descriptionwould run from standard
metricsto topologies withoutmetrics,but the approximationwill do.) These are
of course continua: verticallyfrom creation of mathematicalmodels in precise
mimicryof the data structureto formationof analogical schemes facilitating
recognitionthat ideal and observed patternsresemble each other, horizontally
fromemployingprecise numericalrepresentationsto identifying spatial relations
among the elements.
The catchall "schematics" appears in the topological-analogicalcorner of
the diagramto situatediagramsand flowchartsin whichconnectinglines,arrows,
and/orspatialcontiguity representproximity,
simultaneity, or cause-effect
similarity,
relations.(Figure 1 itselfpresentsan elementaryschematic,includingweak claims
about similaritiesand principlesof variation.) Spatial maps appear in the upper
right-hand cornerto capturetheirdirectrepresentation of the elements'distribution
in topological, not numerical,space, as when country-by-country maps show
us worldwidevariationsin the extentof poverty,inequality,or Internetaccess.
Simulationnestlesin the lower left-handcornerbecause (despite the existenceof
mechanicaland even theatricalsimulations),on the whole, social scientificpracti-
tionersof simulationworkwithnumericalapproximationsof the processestheyare
tryingto reproduceand are satisfiedif theycan produce recognizableanalogies to
thoseprocesses.

Direct
Mathematical
models Spatialmaps
statistics
Probability-based Network
analysis
Measurement models

Directness
of Tabularanalysis
Correspondence

Simulation Schematics
Analogical
Numerical Topological
FormofCorrespondence

Figure 1. A roughtypologyof formalrepresentations

in social science.

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600 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Tabular analysis occupies the diagram's center.From the simple yes-no/yes-no

truthtable to the multidimensionalarray by period, category,and/orplace, the
venerabletableprovidesa visible,vigorousversionof formalrepresentation. It almost
always depends on a radical reductionof the data's complexity-henceits vertical
placementbetween"direct"and "analogical." It also generallysubstitutes nominalor
ordinalforcardinalmeasurement, even whereindividualobservationsfallintointer-
val scales-hence itslocationhalfwaybetweennumericaland topologicalcorrespond-
ence to the originalevidence.Some tabularpresentations-forexample,thoseof the
Census-hide thetheorythatgoes implicitly intotheirconstruction (see, e.g., Kertzer
and Arel 2002; Curtis 2001). But those tables that investigatorscreate themselves
almostcompelthemto make argumentsin theform"themoreX, themoreY"; "ifX,
not Y"; "X plus Y is a necessaryconditionfor Z"; and the like. In short,tabular
analysisillustratestheuse of formalisms in its elementaryversion.
My placementof analyticmodes in thespace surelywillbothersome practitioners,
such as those users of simulationwho make precise comparisonsbetweentheir
models' outputsand some parallel set of empiricalobservations.But in generalthe
diagrammakesthiscrucialpoint:formalisms varygreatlyin structure,style,and logical
underpinnings. To apply formalisms in social sciencedoes not mean conforming to a
single dominant understanding of how the world works.On the contrary, the choice
amongformalisms commitstheirusersto substantially different
theoretical and meta-
theoreticalunderstandings.That is nottheirvice but their
virtue.
To adopt formalisms in
thecourseof social scientificworkmeansmakingtheadoptionof argumentsexplicit,
serious,and consequential.It meansincreasingthechanceof discovering thatyou were
wrongand, therefore, of learningsomething new.

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