Fortich vs.
Corona indusrial area, which became the subject of
G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-
Santiago, J.
Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of
Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao,
Bukidnon), NQSR Management and
Development Corporation
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary
Ernesto Garilao
Facts:
On October 1997, alleged farmer-
beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike in
front of the Department of Agrarian Reform
compound in Quezon City. They protested
the decision of the Office of the President
(OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved
the conversion of a 144-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional
area. This decision already became final and
executory.
The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto
Quisumbing Sr. Management and
Development Corp). It was leased as a
pineapple plantation to Del Monte.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon became interested in the property,
and enacted an ordinance converting the
said land to industrial/institutional with a
view to attract investors in order to achieve
economic vitality.
Apparently, land conversion issues need to
go through the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The DAR rejected the land
conversion and instead opted to put the
same under CARP and ordered the
distribution of the property to the farmers.
The case reached the Office of the President
(OP). The OP rendered a decision reversing
the DAR and converting the land to agro-
the strike of the farmers.
The hunger strike was dramatic and well-
publicized which commanded nationwide
attention that even church leaders and some
presidential candidates tried to intervene for
their “cause”.
These events led the OP, through then
Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the so-
called “Win-Win” Resolution, substantially
modifying its earlier Decision (see decision
dated March 29, 1996) after it had already
become final and executory.
It modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and
ordered the remaining one hundred (100)
hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated
April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and
company and declared that the “Win-Win”
Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996
resolution of the OP already became final
and executory.
Aggrieved, respondents Corona and Garilao
filed [separate] motions for reconsideration
for the said ruling (separate MRs were filed
but was resolved by the Court through one
resolution).
The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17,
1998, voted TWO-TWO on the separate MRs
filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the
April 24, 1998 Decision.
Hence, the instant motion. The respondents
pray that this case be referred to the Court en
banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the
Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved
by a vote of two-two, the required number to
carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met.
Consequently, the case should be referred to
and be decided by this Court en banc, relying
on the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or
matters heard by a division
shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who
actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three
of such Members. When the
required number is not
obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided,
that no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the Court
in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except
by the Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the
aforementioned resolution of the Court (the
resolution addressing the MR, wherein the
justices voted 2-2) should be referred to the
Court en banc – NO.
Ratio:
 A careful reading of the above
constitutional provision, however,
reveals the intention of the framers
to draw a distinction between
CASES and MATTERS.
o CASES are “decided”.
o MATTERS, which include
motions, are “resolved”.
 Otherwise put, the word “decided”
must refer to “cases”; while the word
“resolved” must refer to “matters”,
applying the rule of reddendo
singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the
interpretation of the above-
quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other
provisions of the
Constitution where these
words appear.
 With the aforesaid rule of
construction in mind, it is clear that
only cases are referred to the Court
en banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not
obtained.
 Conversely, the rule does not apply
where, as in this case, the required
three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second
sentence of the aforequoted
provision speaks only of “case” and
not “matter”.
 The reason is simple. The above-
quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3)
pertains to the disposition of cases by
a division. If there is a tie in the
voting, there is no decision. The only
way to dispose of the case then is to
refer it to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case
has already been decided by
the division and the losing
party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of
the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the
decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the
members of the division to
muster the necessary vote for
its reconsideration.
 Quite plainly, if the voting results in
a tie, the motion for reconsideration
is lost. The assailed decision is not
reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the
ruling of this Court in the Resolution
of November 17, 1998.
 Respondents further argue that the
issues submitted in their separate
motions for reconsideration are of
first impression. They are arguing
that the local government unit
concerned still needs to obtain the
approval of DAR when converting
land. However, this was rebutted in
the resolution dated November 17,
wherein it was expressed that:
o “Regrettably, the issues
presented before us by the
movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to
merit the attention of the
Court en banc. In the case of
Province of Camarines Sur, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals
wherein we held that local
government units need not
obtain the approval of the
DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to
non-agricultural use.”
o The Court voted
unanimously in that case,
hence, the argument of the
petitioners that their MRs are
motions involving first
impression is flawed.
 Moreover, a second motion for
reconsideration is generally
prohibited, unless there is a showing
of extraordinary persuasive reasons
and a leave of court is filed. In this
case, there was none.
 Remember that the Court, in its
Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996
ruling of the OP because it was
already final and executory thus the
Win-Win resolution cannot be
implemented anymore? Well,
because of this, there was a litany of
protestations on the part of
respondents and intervenors
including entreaties for a liberal
interpretation of the rules. The
sentiment was that notwithstanding
its importance and far-reaching
effects, the case was “disposed of on
a mere technicality”.
o The Court however said that
it was not a “mere
technicality” because the
finality of the March 29, 1996
OP Decision accordingly
vested appurtenant rights to
the land in dispute on
petitioners as well as on the
people of Bukidnon and
other parts of the country
who stand to be benefited by
the development of the
property.
 Lastly, the Court determines
whether or not the farmer-
intervenors have standing to
intervene in this case. The Court said
there was none, because the source
of their “standing to file” is the
“Win-Win Resolution”
o Why was there no standing
on the part of the farmer-
intervenors who derived
their rights from the Win-
Win resolution? The issuance
of the Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA)
to them does not grant them
the requisite standing in view
of the nullity of the “Win-
Win” Resolution. No legal
rights can emanate from a
resolution that is null and
void.
[G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002] CAYO G.
GAMOGAMO, petitioner, vs. PNOC
SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT
CORP., respondent.
FACTS: Herein petitioner was first
employed for fourteen years with
Department of Health after his resignation
on November 2 1977. After which he was
hired as company dentist by Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), a
private domestic corporation which was
subsequently taken over by herein
respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation. Petitioner was among those
who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent
and continued to work as company dentist.
Respondent implemented a Manpower
Reduction Program, wherein retrenched
employees shall receive a two-month pay for
every year of service. Petitioner resigned
from PNOC upon reaching 60 years old
wherein he received a retirement pay
equivalent to one month pay for every year
of service and other benefits. Later, the
president of said company was replaced by
Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente who implemented
significant cost-saving measures and later
two employees were retrenched and were
paid a 2-month separation pay for every year
of service under Respondents Manpower
Reduction Program. Due to this, petitioner
filed a complaint at the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for the full
payment of his retirement benefits wherein
he argued that his service with the DOH
should have been included in the
computation of his years of service. The
Labor Arbiters dismissed his complaint
however, NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Respondent dismayed, filed
with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari, and was granted. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not petitioner’s years of
service with the DOH must be
considered as creditable service for
the purpose of computing his
retirement pay.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court did not uphold
petitioners contention that his fourteen years
of service with the DOH should be
considered because his last two employers
were government-owned and controlled
corporations, and fall under the Civil Service
Law. Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of
the 1987 Constitution states that--
“Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
It is not at all disputed that while
Respondent and LUSTEVECO are
government-owned and controlled
corporations, they have no original charters;
hence they are not under the Civil Service
Law. In addition, petitioner also signed and
delivered to Respondent a Release and
Undertaking wherein he waives all actions,
causes of actions, debts, dues, monies and
accounts in connection with his employment
with Respondent. This quitclaim releases
Respondent from any other obligation in
favor of petitioner. While quitclaims
executed by employees are commonly
frowned upon as contrary to public policy
and are ineffective to bar claims for the full
measure of the employee’s legal rights, there
are legitimate waivers that represent a
voluntary and reasonable settlement of
laborers claims which should be respected
by the courts as the law between the parties.