1.

Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be

believed, it must not only come from a credible witness but must be
credible in itself tested by human experience, observation, common
knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the
years1.

Daggers v. Van Dyck2, illuminates:

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of

a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of
human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance

2. In People v. Quino3 evidence to be believed must, not only proceed

from the mouth of a credible witness (which alone is already
doubtful in the case at bench), but must be credible in itself, such
that the common experience and observation of man can approve as
probable under the circumstances. |||

3. In the case of Abaya vs. Ang4, the Supreme Court ruled that “A
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of
the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal
respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial
court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal.
Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended
to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the
officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts
concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of
determining whether or not an information may be prepared against
the accused. After all, the purpose of preliminary investigation is not
only to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for

1 People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011

2 concurring opinion of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales in Lejano v. People, G.R. No.
176389, 14 December 2010 citing 37 N.J. Eq. 130, 132 as cited in People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011
3 G.R. No. 105580, [May 17, 1994], 302 PHIL 422-428
4 G.R. No. 178511. December 4, 2008
 trial; it is just as well for the purpose of securing the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial.” (Emphasis supplied)

4. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has

been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not
mean 'actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry . . .
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged5

5Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, 213163-78, 213540-41, 213542-43, 215880-94 &
213475-76, [March 15, 2016] citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 582 Phil. 505, 518-519 (2008);
emphases and underscoring supplied.