SANTIAGO, Sara Andrea Nina P.

/ Statutory Construction/ 1:00-3:00

Latin Maxim: “lex prospicit, non respicit”

Case: MARCELINO BUYCO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

Facts:

Petitioner was indebted to respondent bank in the amount of P5, 102.90 plus interest thereon.
Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgement Certificate under R.A. No. 897. He offered to pay
respondent the deficit of his crop loan with his said backpay certificate but respondent answered petitioner
that since respondent’s motion for reconsideration in the Florentino case was still pending in court,
respondent “cannot yet grant” petitioner’s request. After the Court denied the motion for reconsideration,
petitioner again wrote respondent reiterating his request. Respondent contend that in view of the
amendment of its charter by R.A. No. 1576, it could not accept petitioner’s certificate.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 1576 may be applied retroactively.

Held: Petition granted with mandamus as the proper remedy and the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed woth costs gainst respondent.

Ratio:

R.A. 1576 does nt contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its
language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect,
and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is
familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all the rights that
had accrued to such amendment. Considering the facts and circumstances obtained in the case, the Court
agrees with the lower court that the appellant herein had impliedly admitted the right of the petitioner to
apply his backpay certificate in payment of his obligation.
Latin maxim: “lex prospicit, non respicit”

Case: AQUILINA LARGADO v. JUDGE LUPO MASAGANDA

Facts:

Private respondent filed a petition before the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan praying that he
be appointed as the guardian of the persons and properties of certain minors. The petition was given due
course and was set for hearing. Petitioner, mother of two minors because of the failure of her counsel to
appear, was declared in default. Thereupon, the justice of peace court issued an order appointing
respondent guardian as prayed for. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that said justice of
court has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian under R.A. 2613.

Issue: Whether or not a justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian at the time the
present petition was filed before the Justice of the Peace Court in Unisan.

Held: The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Ratio:

The court a quo answered the question in the negative relying on Section 10 of R.A. 2613 which
amends Section 88 of R.A. 296, provides that courts shall not extend, among others, to the appointment of
guardians even if the Secretary of Justice has ruled otherwise. The Court is in the opinion that the mistake
that cannot be corrected by executive fiat, but by legislation.
Latin maxim: “lex de futuro, judex de praterio”

Case: CELSO LARGA v. SANTIAGO RANADA

Facts:

Petitioner issued in favor of respondent Security Bank & Trust Company as payment for the
employer-employee contributions to the Pag-Ibig Fund. However, the check was dishonored for being stale.
Demand was made upon petitioner to replace the dishonored check or pay the full amount thereof, but he
failed and refused to comply. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash that the criminal liability for the offense with
which he was charged was extinguished with the issuance of E.O. 90, making the contribution voluntary.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 and 10 of E.O. 90 which amended Section 4 of P.D. 1752 may be applied
retroactively.

Held: The Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Ratio:

It goes without saying that from January 1, 1967 onwards, refusal of an employee or an employer
to become or remain a member of the Pag-Ibig Fund is no longer a violation of Section 4 of P.D. 1752 and
by the same token can no longer be the subject of criminal prosecution under Section 23 of P.D. 1986.
However, failure to merit contributions accruing on or before December 31, 1986 in a timely manner,
remains punishable as a violation of P.D. 1752. In the instant case, petitioner was prosecuted for failure to
remit to the HDMF employer-employee contributions which had accrued on or before April 1986.
Latin maxim: ‘lex de futuro, judex de praterio”

Case: HOSPICIO NILO v. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations electing the leasehold system. Private
respondent filed an ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Section
36(1) of R.A. 3844. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that “personal cultivation as a
ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been eliminated under R.A. 6389”.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that
were filed during the effectivity of the repealed provision.

Held: The petition is denied for lack of merit and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is aimed.

Ratio:

The general rule is that statues have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein. The
Court held that the Agricultural Land Reform Code must be enforced prospectively and not retroactively
and therefore, the rights created, granted, or recognized therein such as the right of redemption accrued
upon the enactment of said legislation and may be exercised thereafter in appropriate cases.
Latin maxim: “Absolute sentencia expositore non indigent”

Case: DOROTEO BANAWA, et. Al., v. PRIMITIVA MIRANO

Facts:

Spouses Doroteo Banawa and Julia Mendoza are a childless couple. They took Maria Mirano to
their house and reared her like their own child. Maria, in return, helped the spouses to do household
chores. In 1921, Doroteo Banawa acquired a parcel of land, the Iba Property, and paid it in the name of
Maria Mirano because they wanted to leave something to Maria when they are gone. They told Maria that
although they placed the property in her name, she would only become the real owner when the spouses
die. In 1935, another parcel of land was acquired by the spouses, and named it after Maria. the trial of
Banawa’s claim that the property was named in their favor. In 1949, Maria died while the Banawas are still
alive.

Issue: Whether or not is the Executive Construction valid.

Held: The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba Property.

Ratio:

The Court ruled that the Banawas cannot reclaim ownership of the Iba Property because the rule
on reversion adoptiva can only be involved if there is a judicial adoption and not an extra-judicial adoption.
In the instant case, Maria Mirano was not legally adopted by the Banawas.
Latin maxim: “Absolute sentencia expositore non indiget”

Case: PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU v. RICARDO CIPRIANO

Facts:

Respondent’s house was built on the property of petitioner spouses by virtue of an oral contract of
lease. Respondent was their lessee since 1954. Before 1969, the lease was on a year-to-year
arrangement, rentals being then payable at or on before the end of year. Starting January 1969, the lease
was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was increased to P30 a month. Their dispute
emanated on the failure of Cipriano to pay rental since January 1969 at the monthly rate mentioned.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 6126 may be applied retroactively.

Held: SC found the petition meritorious, thus, reversing the Trial Court’s Decision and ordering the trial
court for the prompt disposition.

Ratio:

The increase in the rental was warranted/ valid. It has effected in January 1969. The law in
question took effect on June 17, 1970, one and a half years after the increase in rentals had been effected.
Hence, the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March 1970 up to March 1971.
Outside and beyond that period the law did not, by express, mandate of the R.A.
Latin Maxim: “Optima statute interpretatix est insum statutum”

Case: Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)]

Facts:

A Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized
agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The
insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the
aforementioned policy. For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act, or acting
as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally
helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on
top of her husband’s desk to renew. The trial court found Mapalad guilty. On appeal the trial court’s
decision was affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act.

Held:

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a
person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for
insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while
the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third
paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that the
petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a
reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of
Section 189,which is “any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section.” Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or
contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Latin Maxim: “Ratio legis est anima”

Case: LCP v. COMELEC

Facts:

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by the
Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November 2008,
the judgment became final and executory. The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly
reversed its decision upholding the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

Issue: Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.

Held

Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact
doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior
to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the
operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself. Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the
payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts,
may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they
remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.
Latin maxim: “Ratio legis est anima”

Case” CHAVEZ v. JBC

FACTS:

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a
representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no “real
interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition. The respondents also
question petitioner’s belated filing of the petition.

Issues: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives
is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the
distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the
term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are
not nullified
Latin maxim: “Ratio legis”

Case: TANADA v. CUENCO

Facts:

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by
the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s
Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the
following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come
from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member
of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a
political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate
alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather
to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term
Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity;
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not
the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is
a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
Latin maxim: “Ratio legis”

Case: HIDALGO v. HIDALGO

Facts:

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo owned lands and sold it with two otherparcels of land for 4,000.
Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales as tenants alleged that the area of land they worked on is worth 1,
500 and thus they seek the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount by respondents-vendee in
their favor by way of redemption.2.Second case: parcel of land worth 750 was sold by respondent.
Petitioner-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo sought the execution of a deed of sale for the same
price by way of redemption.

Issue: WON the right of redemption granted by Sec12 of RA 3844 is also applicable to share tenants.

Held:

The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of
redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” only and not “shares
tenants” and that their respective rights and obligations are not coextensive or coequal.
Latin maxim: “Cessante ratione cesat ipsa lex”

Case: PEOPLE v. ALMUETE

FACTS:

Respondents, Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were
tenants of a certain Margarita Fernando. Fernando accused before the CFI Nueva Ecija that on December
1963, the respondents have violated Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law for pre-threshing a portion
of their respective harvests without her consent. Respondents filed to dismiss the case for lack of details as
to how they violated the law, Lower Court denied their motion. Thus, this appeal from the prosecution citing
the provision of Section 39 and 57 of the said Agricultural Tenancy Law.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the failure of the original petitioner to enumerate specific circumstances with its
corresponding violations to the cited law justified in granting of appeal in favor of the respondents

(2)Should the respondents be prosecuted under the said Agricultural Tenancy Law

HELD:

1. YES. Because failure of the petitioners to substantiate the violation of the Agricultural Tenancy
Law with facts prove the same gave respondents the power to question the accusation. While it is basic
that there is no crime when there is no law punishing it, the mere existence of a law does not make a crime
without the elements that constitute a violation thereof.

2. No. Because the Agricultural Tenancy Law, in the first place, was already repealed during time
when the alleged crime took place. The Agricultural Reform Code was already in force.
Latin Maxim: “Cessante ratione cesat ipsa lex”

Case: COMMENDADOR v. DE VILLA

Facts:

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear
in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot
applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC
now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. The private
respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were
being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing
that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the
trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held:

No, there was no denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present
their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again
after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were
again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and
otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and
quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention
that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special
Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because
hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. Accordingly, in G.R.
No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the
respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article
18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of
the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No
costs.
Latin Maxim: “Espresio unius est excluso alterius”

Case: LEOUEL SANTOS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married
and got a son and lived with Julia’s parents. The spouses occasionally quarrel over a number of things
aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family matters. In 1988, Julia left to work as a nurse
despite Leouel"s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July1989, But she never did. Leouel got a
chance to visit where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia butt all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed a complaint with the T- to
have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to
return home or to communicate with him are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. Julia, in her answer, opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming that it was the Leouel who had, in fact, !became irresponsible and incompetent

Issue:

Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated, which would render her marriage with Leouel void.

Held:

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Also, Julia is
not psychologically incapacitated, which would render her marriage with Leouel void since the alleged
incapacity did not pass the tests which are (1) gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
Latin Maxim: “Generalia specialibus non derogant”

Case: GORDON v. COURT OF APPEAL

Facts:

Two parcels of land owned by Restituto Vda. De Gordon were sold by City Treasurer of Quezon
City in a public auction to respondent Rosario Duazon because of unpaid taxes subject to redemption. The
lands sold have assessed value of P16,800 and were sold for only P10,500. Petitioner fails to redeem the
property within the one year period. She contends that the sale is void because of inadequacy of price.

ISSUE:Whether or not the price for the lands is inadequate so as to render the sale invalid.

HELD:

Alleged gross inadequacy of price is not material "when the law gives the owner the right to
redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is
for the owner to effect the redemption.
Latin Maxim: “Dura lex,sed lex”

Case: CIR v. LIMPON INVESTMENT

Facts:

BIR assessed deficiency taxes on Limpan Corp, a company that leases real property, for under-
declaring its rental income for years 1956-57 by around P20K and P81K respectively. Petitioner appeals on
the ground that portions of these underdeclared rents are yet to be collected by the previous owners and
turned over or received by the corporation. Petitioner cited that some rents were deposited with the court,
such that the corporation does not have actual nor constructive control over them. The sole witness for the
petitioner, Solis (Corporate Secretary- Treasurer) admitted to some undeclared rents in 1956 and1957, and
that some balances were not collected by the corporation in 1956 because the lessees refused to
recognize and pay rent to the new owners and that the corp’s president Isabelo Lim collected some rent
and reported it in his personal income statement, but did not turn over the rent to the corporation. He also
cites lack of actual or constructive control over rents deposited with the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BIR was correct in assessing deficiency taxes against Limpan Corp. for
undeclared rental income.

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner admitted that it indeed had undeclared income (although only a part and not the full
amount assessed by BIR). Thus, it has become incumbent upon them to prove their excuses by clear and
convincing evidence, which it has failed to do. When is there constructive receipt of rent? With regard to
1957 rents deposited with the court, and withdrawn only in 1958, the court viewed the corporation as
having constructively received said rents. The non-collection was the petitioner’s fault since it refused to
refused to accept the rent, and not due to nonpayment of lessees. Hence, although the corporation did not
actually receive the rent, it is deemed to have constructively