LIU Ming-Wood The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-Yen Buddhism PDF

The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism
Author(s): Liu Ming-Wood 廖明活

Source: T'oung Pao, Second Series, Vol. 68, Livr. 4/5 (1982), pp. 181-220
Published by: Brill
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T'oung Pao LXVIII, 4-5 (1982)
THE THREE-NATURE DOCTRINE AND

ITS INTERPRETATION IN HUA-YEN BUDDHISM
BY
LIU MING-WOOD )i
CONTENTS *
Introduction ........................... ....................... 181

I. The Concept of the Three Natures and its Transformation ........ ........ 182
II. The Dual Aspects of the Three Natures ................ ....................... 195
III. The Unity of the Three Natures .......................... ...................... 200
IV. Criticisms of the Yogacara Version of the Three-Nature Doctrine: The
Positions of Madhyamika Buddhism and Hua-yen Buddhism Com-
pared ................. .......................................... 211
This article is written as a sequel of a former paper of mine enti-

tled "The P'an-chiao System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese Bud-
dhism''," and it is basically an attempt to bring out the fundamen-
tal orientation of Hua-yen * thought through an examination of
its interpretation of the concept of the three natures. However, to
achieve this end, some background knowledge of the original im-
port of the doctrine and its historical transformation would be
necessary. Our study will commence with a short account of the
gradual development of the three-nature doctrine from its first in-
ception in the Samdhinirmocana-suitra to its fusion with the tatha--
gatagarbhadoctrine ("the final teaching of the Mahayana" in Hua-
* Abbreviations:
HTC (R) Hsu tsang-ching MOM, edited by Ying-yin Hsu-tsang-chingwei-yuan-

hui 1 (Hong Kong: 1967).
IBK Indogaku bukkyo-gaku kenkyu-FPtT*f 7M 5
MS Mahk-yainasamrraha-saistra by Asafiga.
SS Samdhzinirmocana-su-tra.
T Taisho- shinshu- daizjkyo- )TVTA 9 , edited by Takakusu Junjiro
r4JiJRkPg & Watanabe Kaikyoku A&HRM (Tokyo: 1924-1932).
TCCHL Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun Ak# rAk
TCIC Ta-ch'eng i-chang kA wig- by Hui-yiuan MA.
Treatise Hua-yen wu-chiao chang # HM by Fa-tsang i .
1
Liu Ming-Wood, "The P'an-chiao System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese
Buddhism", T'oung Pao LXVII (1981), pp. 10-47.
182 LIU MING-WOOD
yen terminology) in the writings of Hui-yiuan NA of the Ching-

ying Temple --,-, one of the most influential Ti-lun masters
JIN ii of the sixth century China. The main body of the article will
consist of a detailed critical analysis of the Hua-yen understanding
of the three-nature concept as seen in the works of Fa-tsang &i ,
the so-called third patriarch of the Hua-yen School.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE THREE NATURES AND ITS TRANSFORMATION
1. The Three-Nature Doctrine in the Samdhinirmocana-sutra:

The three natures are "imaginary nature" (parikalpita-svabhava),
"dependent nature" (paratantra-svabhava)and "perfect nature"
(parinispanna-svabhava).The doctrine of the three natures is one of
the principal tenets in the teaching of the Yogacara School in Indian
Buddhism, and already in the Samdhinirmocana-sutra(henceforth-
abbreviated to SS), the earliest extant Yogacara text,2 an entire
chapter is devoted to the elucidation of the concept, where the three
natures are called "character" (laksana, hsiang t) instead of
"nature" (svabhava, hsing i ).3
It is said that in brief, the characters of dharmasare of three types. What are these
three? They are: first, "imaginary character", secondly, "dependent character",
and thirdly, "perfect character". What is "imaginary character"? It indicates
names and conventions which attribute to all dharmasself-nature and distinctions,
and as a consequence, language arises. What is "dependent character"? It in-
dicates the conditioned nature of all dharmas, as is meant [by the Buddha when he
declares], "When this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises.
Conditioned by ignorance are the karma-formations, ... and such is the origin of the
whole mass of suffering." What is "perfect character"? It indicates the equal and
2
The SS is commonly regarded as the forerunner of Yogacara Buddhism
because it is the earliest extant piece of writing which attempted to define in some
detail such concepts as the "storehouse-consciousness" (alaya-vuj'nana),"seeds"
(boja) and "three natures" (trisvabhava), concepts which later formed the basic fur-
niture of Yogacara philosophy. However, it should be stressed that its treatment of
these concepts is far from systematic, and despite the fact that Asanga and
Vasubandhu quoted it as authority on many occasions, it is basically a text on
religious practice and differs considerably both in style and content from such well-
known Yogacara classics as the Yogdcaryabhumi-sastra.the MS and the
Trimsikadvinapti-kdrika.
3
In most early Yogacara texts, "svabhava" (nature) and "laksana" (character)
are used interchangeably to designate the three natures. Refer to Iwata Ryozo
fEt_, "Sansho setsu ni okeru laksana, svabhava,' nihsvabhava ni tsuite
£^1iS~~-j laksana, svabhava, nihsvabhava o_<'C, IBK, 26.2 (1978), pp.
945-948.
HUA-YEN BUDDHISM 183
true nature of all dharmas. This true nature is comprehended by bodhisattvasdue to

their courage and energy, their well-directed mental effort and their abstinence
from false thoughts. As a result of the gradual attainment of this comprehension,
they realize fully the supreme, perfect enlightenment.4
From this passage, we can see that even though the three natures
are given as "characters of dharmas", they have more to do with the
destinies of sentient beings relative to their ability to realize the con-
ditioned nature of their existence than with the nature and constitu-
tion of the physical and mental world. It is a common Buddhist
belief that our world and its objects are produced from causes and
as such are impermanent and devoid of self-essence. However, one
of the most deep-seated prejudices of man is his tendency to take the
impermanent as permanent and to attribute the character of in-
dependent being to them. As a consequence, all sorts of false
distinctions arise. These distinctions, which do not correspond to
the true nature of things and are reflected in the distorting influence
of ordinary language, are termed "imaginary character" by the
sutra. "Dependent character" is related here to the doctrine of
dependent origination, and as such, it indicates not only the condi-
tioned nature of things but also the endless cycles of birth and death
as well as their ground - in short, the totality of conditioned ex-
istence ("the whole mass of suffering") in which man is imprisoned
due to his inclination to look on the "imaginary" as real. "Perfect
character" refers to the state when all discriminating activities have
come to an end, when the nature of dharmasis comprehended as it
actually is, impermanent and without essence. Since the com-
prehension of the true nature of dharmas would lead to "the
supreme, perfect enlightenment", it is given the epithet of
"'perfect".
The sutra goes on to outline the relation of the three natures as
follows:
Imaginary character comes into being due to the attaching of names to
phenomena. Dependent character comes into being due to the grasping of ima-
ginary character [attributed to] dependent character. Perfect character comes into
being due to the non-grasping of imaginary character attributed to dependent
character. Sons of good family! If bodhisattvascomprehend exactly the imaginary
character attributed to dependent character, they would comprehend exactly all
dharrnaswhich are without [self-] character. If bodhisattvascomprehend exactly the
dependent character, they would comprehend exactly all soiled dharmas. If bodhisat-
4 T, vol. 16, p. 693a. 15-25. Etienne Lamotte, trans., SS (Louvain: Universite
de Louvain, 1935), pp. 188-189.
184 LIU MING-WOOD
tvas comprehend exactly the perfect character, they would comprehend exactly all
pure dharmas.5
Men wrongly believe that there are self-sufficient objects with

definite properties corresponding to the names people use to
designate them. These properties, which men wrongly imagine into
phenomena which are actually conditioned in nature, are their
"imaginary character". That is why the sutra asserts, "Imaginary
character comes into being due to the attaching of names to
phenomena... If bodhisattvascomprehend exactly the imaginary
character attributed to dependent character, they would com-
prehend exactly all dharmaswhich are without [self-] character". As
a consequence of this misapprehension, men remain forever in the
realm of dependent origination, driven by their ignorance from one
form of karma-existence to another, and are completely oblivious of
the real nature of their being. That by "dependent character" the
sutra refers primarily to this benighted state of existence is attested
by the description of it as "soiled" and as the outcome of "the
grasping of imaginary character attributed to dependent
character". Finally, "perfect character" is the "non-grasping of
imaginary character attributed to dependent character", a condi-
tion which is depicted as "pure" in the suitrabecause in this state,
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness has finally come to an end.
Realizing the transient and illusory nature of conventional life, men
are at last ready to be delivered from it. So the sutra continues:
Sons of good family! If bodhisattvascomprehend [exactly the imaginary character
attributed to dependent character, they would comprehend exactly all] dharmas
which are without [self-] character. [On comprehending exactly all dharmaswhich
are without self-character,] they would put an end to dharmaswhich are soiled. On
putting an end to dharmaswhich are soiled, they would realize dharmaswhich are
pure.6
2. The Three-Nature Doctrine in the Mahaya-nasamgraha-s'astra:

As the above discussion has shown, the three-nature doctrine
first formulated in the SS is essentially a doctrine on religious
deliverance, and as such, there is little in it that can be called
peculiarly "Yogacara".7 It appears to be little more than a reaffir-
5 T, vol. 16, p. 693b. 21-c.l. Etienne Lamotte, trans., p. 190.
6
T, vol. 16, p. 693c. 1-3. Etienne Lamotte, trans., p. 190.
7 Though the SS propounds a theory of the evolution of the phenomenal world
resembling the ideation-only philosophy of the Yogararins in the chapter entitled,

"On the Characters of the Mind", no attempt is made to apply this theory to the
exposition of the three nature concept.
mation of the orthodox Buddhist view that the comprehension of

the conditioned nature of things is a prerequisite of enlightenment.
Moreover,, since no attempt is made in the SS to relate the tenet to a
particular - ontological theory of reality, the doctrine in this
rudimentary form is compatible with the teachings of all Buddhist
traditions, alike including the Madhyamikas. It was only when
such typical Yogacara concepts as the "storehouse-consciousness"
(alaya-vniiana), "seeds" (by/a), etc., were brought in to fill in the
outline of the tenet as presented in the SS that the three-nature doc-
trine began to take on Yogacara character. Thus, much of the later
Madhyamika criticism of the doctrine was in many ways not a
criticism of the doctrine in its elementary form as found in the SS,
but an attack on many of the basic Yogacara principles which had
come to be associated with the doctrine when it was gradually
transformed into an integral part of the system of thought of
Yogacara Buddhism.
The Yogacarins were not uniform in opinion in their formula-
tions of the doctrine of the three natures, and Wen-pei 3{& a
follower of Hsiuan-tsang AM, mentioned nine different versions of
the tenet.8 Among the early Yogacara expositions of the doctrine,
the ones in the Yogdcaryabhuimi-sastra and the Madhyadntavibhaga-sastra
are the most interesting; but so far as the Chinese understanding of
the concept is concerned, it is the version found in the Mahalyana-
samgraha-s'astra(henceforth abbreviated to MS) of Asaniga which has
proved to be the most influential. The view of the MS on the prob-
lem of the three natures is found mainly in the second chapter of the
work entitled "On the Character of the Cognizable". The chapter
opens with the following account of "dependent character":
What is dependent character? It refers to various ideas which have the
storehouse- consciousness as seeds and which proceed from false discriminations.
From these various ideas proceed all modes of being, all destinies and all im-
purities; and based on [ideas] dependent in character, [all forms of] false
discriminationsarise. Thus, these ideas all proceed from false discriminationsand
are in essence nothing more than ideas. Since they are the support of fictitious
manifestations, they are described as "dependent character".9
As for "imaginary character", the s'astracomments, "It is the

manifestation of objective [character, even though] there are on ob-
8Refer to Tun-lun , ed., Yu-ch'ieh-lun chi *WAC, T, vol. 42, p. 759a-b.
9 T, vol. 31, pp. 137c. 29-138a. 11. Etienne Lamotte, trans. LaSommeduGrand
Vihiculed'Asaiga (Louvain, 1973), pp. 87-89.
186 LIU MING-WOOD
jects but ideas only''.10 Finally, "perfect character" is "the com-

plete absence of objective character in dependent character'".
The expcsition of the three natures in the MS outlined above cor-
responds in main with that of the SS; but the analysis which follows
is far more intricate due to the design of the MS to bring the doc-
trine in line with the ideation-only framework of Yogacara
philosophy. Like the SS, "dependent character" is given out in the
MS as encompassing the entirety of common existence, both
physical and mental. However, the conditioned nature of existence
is no longer described in such general, orthodox terms as "when
this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises", but is
explained by relating it to the Yogacara thesis of the presence in
every sentient being of a storehouse-consciousness, from which
evolves the whole world which it experiences. Thus, according to
the MS, our world is dependent in character because it consists of
ideas originating from seeds in the storehouse-consciousness. These
ideas are further depicted as "proceeding from false discrimina-
tions", for the storehouse-consciousness as conceived in the MS and
understood in Yogacara Buddhism in general is the subject of
transrnigration, and as such, is associated with impurities of all
forms from the beginningless past."2 The sastra traces the origin of
imaginary nature as follows:
Again, only at the presence of "imagination" and "the object of imagination"
would "imaginary nature" come into being. What do we mean by
imagination", "the object of imagination" and "imaginary nature" here?
It should be understood that the mind-consciousness is "imagination", for it has
[the function ofl making discriminations. Why? Because the mind-consciousness
has as seeds its own impregnation of names and speech, and it also has as seeds the
impregnation of names and speech of all [other] consciousnesses. As a conse-
quence, the mind-consciousness evolves with its myriad [forms of] discriminating
activities. Since the mind-consciousness discriminates and construes in all man-
ners, it is described as "imagination".
Next, "dependent nature" is "the object of imagination".
Finally, in the manner one [discriminates and] turns dependent nature into [ob-
jects] imagined, [the dependent nature] so [discriminated] is known as "imaginary
nature".13
0~T, vol. 31, p. 138a. 12-13. Etienne Lamotte, trans., p. 90.
0
T, vol. 31, p. 138a. 14-15. Etienne Lamotte, trans., p. 90.
12 Even though the MS describes the storehouse-consciousness as the support of
both pure and impure dharmas (T, vol. 31, p. 135b. 23-26, Etienne Lamotte,
trans., p. 49), it maintains that only impure seeds are proper to the nature of the
dlaya, whereas pure seeds, produced by attending to true doctrines, only reside pro-
visionally in this root-consciousness (T, vol. 31, p. 136c, Etienne Lamotte, trans.,
pp. 66-67).
13 T, vol. 31, p. 139b. 10-18. Etienne Lamotte, trans., pp. 108-109.
"Imaginary nature" comes into being when the mind-conscious-

ness ("imagination") applies its function of discriminating to ideas
proceeding from the storehouse-consciousness, i.e. , to "dependent
nature" ("the object of imagination'").14 For example, being ig-
norant of the truth that all beings are ideation-only, the mind-
consciousness ascribes to them the property of independent reality,
and comes up with such notions as "permanent self" and "perma-
nent objects". These properties, which the mind-consciousness
falsely attributes to ideas but which are actually chimerical, are
what is meant by "imaginary nature". "Perfect nature" is the cor-
rect comprehension of the imaginary as imaginary, which arises
when the objective character which the mind-consciousness wrong-
ly imputes to ideas is finally realized to be void. In the teaching of
the Yogacarins, this intellectual transformation is at once a spiritual
transformation, which in Yogacara terminology would mean the
freeing of the storehouse-consciousness and its ideas (i.e., depen-
dent nature) from their former union with false discriminations
(i.e., imaginary nature), and their assuming a new form of being
which is perfectly pure and good.'5 The fact that "perfect nature"
in the MS is also taken to denote this new state of being is suggested
by the quotation below, where "perfect nature" is characterized as
''immutable'', 'the object of pure thoughts'" and "the
quintessence of all good dharmas":
If perfect nature is the complete absence of the character of the imaginary, why is
it perfect? Why do we call it "perfect"? We call it perfect because it is immutable.
Again, since it is the objectof pure [thoughts]and the quintessenceof all good dharmas, it is
given the most excellent designation "perfect" .6
14 From the very beginning of its existence, Buddhism recognized the existence
of six consciousnesses, i.e., eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-

consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness and mind-consciousness.
With the emergence of the concept of the storehouse-consciousness in Yogacara
Buddhism, a system of seven consciousnesses was formed, and that is the system
found in the SS. Chinese Yogacarins generally believe in the existence of eight con-
sciousnesses, adding another consciousness called manas to the original scheme of
seven; but it is debatable whether this system of eight consciousnesses was taught in
such early Yogacara works as the Yogdca-ryabhu-mi-s'a-stra and the MS.
15 In Buddhism, intellectual progress is meaningful only if it brings about
spiritual progress, and there is no such thing as pure speculation or "knowledge for
knowledge's sake". Much modern misinterpretation of Buddhist teachings stems
from failure to apprehend this soteriological intent of Buddhist philosophy.
16 T, vol. 31, p. 139b. 6-9. Etienne Lamotte, trans., pp. 107-108.
188 LIU MING-WOOD
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis of the

three-nature doctrine in the MS:
i. It agrees in outline with the characterization of the three
natures in the SS, but develops it further along the line of the
ideation-only philosophy of Yogac-ara Buddhism.
ii. Just as in the SS, "dependent nature" in the MS, refers to the
realm of birth and death, which results from man's failure to com-
prehend the conditioned nature of all entities. In the ontology of the
MS, this failure signifies the construction of an imaginaryworld of
real selves and objects out of various categories of ideas. This is why
"dependent nature" is depicted as "the support" of "false
discriminations" (imaginary nature) on the one hand, and it is also
said to proceed from them on the other hand. Finally, "perfect
nature" indicates the liberation from the cycle of mutual generation
of the "dependent" and the "imaginary", when all entities are
perceived as they actually are, i.e. ideas only.
iii. So far as sentient beings are either non-enlightened or
enlightened, "dependent nature" always exists either as "ima-
ginary nature" or as "perfect nature". For ideas are either the
ideas of the non-enlightened and so are the product of false ima-
gination; or the ideas of the enlightened, in which case all unfound-
ed hypostatizations have disappeared.
3. The Tatha/gatagarbhaDoctrine of the Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun

7tf" (henceforth abbreviated to TCCHL) and the Three-
Nature Doctrine in the Ta-ch'eng i-chang . (henceforth ab-
breviated to TCIC).
The exposition of the three natures in the MS is on the whole
representative of the position of the early Indian Yogacarins.
However, this was not the way the doctrine was comprehended
when it was first introduced into China. This had something to do
with the peculiar development Yogacara Buddhism underwent in
China when it was initially imported into the country in the fifth
and sixth centuries.As we have seen, in the teaching of the MS, the
root-consciousness of sentient beings (the storehouse-conscious-
ness) as the repository of both good and bad karma is regarded as
neither perfectly pure nor perfectly impure."7 Moreover, so long as
17 To be more exact, the MS regards the storehouse-consciousness as essentially

impure, but amenable to good influences. See n. 12 above.
it represents the ground of everyday existence and the origin of all

defilements, it is something which has to be chastened and
transformed by religious practice. While this is the manner most In-
dian Yogacara masters perceived the root-consciousness, the Ti-lun
and She-lun masters $Nilib as the early Chinese Yogacarins were
called, believed on the contrary in the existence in every sentient
being of an intrinsicallypure root-consciousness which they identified
with such well-known Buddhist concepts as the buddha-nature, the
tathagatagarbha,the amala-consciousness, and even the storehouse-
consciousness.18 The teaching of these early Chinese Yogacarins is
succinctly laid down in the TCCHL which was formerly attributed
to As'vaghosa, the founder of Mahayana Buddhism, but now com-
monly believed to be the work of a Ti-lun master living in the se-
cond half of the sixth century. 19 Due to Fa-tsang's great enthusiasm
for this text as well as the enormous impact which the text had
asserted on Fa-tsang's teaching in general and his interpretation of
the three-nature doctrine in particular,20 we have to spend a little
time on the system of thought of the TCCHL before continuing with
our discussion of the three natures themselves.
The basic tenet of the TCCHL is that there is in every sentient be-
ing a mind which can be viewed from two aspects: the absolute and
the phenomenal. In the absolute aspect, the mind is "the realm of
truth" (Dharmadha/tu),and as such, it is unborn, imperishable, and
undifferentiated, transcending all forms of verbalization. It is said
to be "truly empty", for it is unperturbed by defilements and free
from all marks of distinction. It is also said to be "truly
non-empty", for it is immutable, pure, and self-sufficient.
The absolute aspect of the mind is usually referred to in the
when
TCCHL as the tathata, but it is also called the tatha/gatagarbha,
18 For a short sketch of the history of this early form of Chinese Yogacarism, re-
fer to my article, op. cit., p. 13, nnf. 10 & 11.

19 The orthodox view is that the work was composed by As'vaghosaand trans-
lated into Chinese by Paramarthain 553. Both claims have been challenged, and
the debate on the origin and authenticityof the TCCHLconstitutes one of the most
intriguing chapters in the history of modern Buddhist scholarship. For titles of
classic studies on the subject, refer to the selected bibliographyin Yoshito S. Hake-
da, trans., The Awakeningof Faith (New York & London: Columbia University
Press, 1967).
20 Fa-tsang's commentary on the TCCHL, entitled the Ch'i-hsin-lun i-chi
COAMAid2 is unanimously regarded as the most authoritative interpretation of

the TCCHL, and has contributedmore than any other commentaryto the wide po-
pularity of the work in China in later times.
190 LIU MING-WOOD
the author comes to deal with the mind's phenomenal aspect, which
is identified with the storehouse-consciousness, the basis of the
phenomenal world. So it reads,
The mind as phenomena (samsdra) depends on the tathagatagarbhafor its ex-

istence. Thus it is said that what is called the storehouse-consciousness is that in
which "neither birth nor death (nirvadna)"merges harmoniously with "birth and
death (samsaira)", [and yet the two] are neither identical nor different.21
The storehouse-consciousness again has two aspects: the aspect of

enlightenment and the aspect of non-enlightenment. The aspect of
enlightenment is none other than the pure mind itself. The aspect of
non-enlightenment arises due to man's estrangement from this
pure origin. Thus, according to the TCCHL, man is by nature en-
dowed with the tathalgatagarbha,the quintessence of all virtues. Due
to his "ignorance" of this fact, the storehouse-consciousness and
the phenomenal world with all its impurities come into being. As a
consequence, all sorts of deluded thoughts, discriminations and at-
tachments appear, and man remains forever in samsadra.
However, tht_ TCCHL is careful to point out that non-
enlightenment does not have reality outside the mind, for non-
enlightenment is part of the phenomenal aspect of the mind:
The mind, though pure in its self nature from the beginning, is accompanied by
ignorance. Being defiled by ignorance, a defiled [state of] mind comes into being.22
To emphasize the inseparability of the pure mind, ignorance and

the phenomenal world, the TCCHL resorts to the simile of the
ocean and the wind:
Ignorance does not exist apart from enlightenment: therefore, it cannot be
destroyed (because one cannot destroy something which does not really exist), and
yet it cannot not be destroyed (in so far as it remains). This is like the relationship
that exists between the water of the ocean (i.e., enlightenment) and its waves (i.e.,
modes of mind) stirred by the wind (i.e., ignorance). Water and wind are in-
separable; but water is not mobile by nature, and if the wind stops, the movement
ceases. But the wet nature remains undestroyed. Likewise, man's mind, pure in its
own nature, is stirred by the wind of ignorance. Both mind and ignorance have no
particular forms of their own and they are inseparable. Yet mind is not mobile by
nature, and if ignorance ceases, then the continuity [of defiled activities] ceases.
But the essential nature of wisdom (i.e., the essence of mind, like the wet nature of
the water) remains undestroyed.23
21 T, vol. 32, p. 576b. 7-9. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., op. cit., p. 36.

22 T, vol. 32, p. 577c. 2-4. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., p. 50.
23 T, vol. 32, p. 576c. 10-16. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., p. 41.
This theme of the oneness of the noumenal and the phenomenal is

undoubtedly central to the TCCHL, and posterity has not erred in
underscoring its significance. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind
that the TCCHL also judges it a "biased view" of the ordinary
men, who, "hearing that it is explained in the suitrathat all defiled
states of samsadra in the world exist on the ground of the tathalgatagar-
bha and that they are therefore not independent of the tathata, they,
not understanding this, think that the tatha/gatagarbha literally con-
in the world''24 To cor-
tains in itself all the defiled state of samsadra
rect this biased view that the tathagatagarbhais tainted, it should be
understood that:
The tathalgatagarbha,from the beginning, contains only pure excellent qualities
outnumbering the sands of the Ganges, and is not separate, severed or different
from the tathata. Defiled and soiled dharmasoutnumbering the sands of the Ganges
are mere illusions. They are non-existent in essence, and from the beginningless
beginning have never been united with the tatha-gatagarbha.25
From the above account, it is obvious that the teaching of the

TCCHL coincides perfectly with Fa-tsang's delineation of "the
final teaching of the Mahayana" in his system of five teachings.
Thus, it is not surprising that Fa-tsang has always regarded the
TCCHL and its tathagatagarbha doctrine as the paragon of that par-
ticular form of Buddhist thought.26 However, so far as the three-
nature doctrine is concerned, Fa-tsang was not the first person to
apply the concept of the tatha/gatagarbha
and the ontological scheme it
represents in China to the interpretation of the three natures.
Almost a century before the advent of Fa-tsang, Hui-yiian
(531-601), an eminent Ti-lun master and one of the most prolific
Chinese Buddhist monks of all times, had already begun the task of
reformulating the tenet of the three natures in that direction.27 Hui-
yuan's discussion of the three natures is found mainly in the
chapter entitled "Analysis of the Eight Consciousnesses in Ten Sec-
tions" in the TCIC, an encyclopaedia of Buddhism compiled from
the standpoint of the early Chinese Yogacarins. There, Hui-yiian
identifies "perfect nature" with the tatha-gatagarbha,the intrinsically
pure consciousness in man:
24 T, vol. 32, p. 580a. 17-20. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., pp. 76-77.

25 T, vol. 32, p. 580a. 21-24. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., p. 77.
26
Refer to the account on the final teaching of the Mahayana in section 3 of my
article, op. cit.
27 Biography of Hui-yiuan in Tao-hsiuan I', Hsu kao-seng-chuan iMAR, T,
vol. 50, pp. 489c-492a.
192 LIU MING-WOOD
As for perfect nature, it refers to the real itself. Since the real is in essence eter-
nally quiescent and is not accompanied by falsehood, it is described as perfect.28
As for "dependent nature", Hui-yiuan defines it as "the real

[perceived] from the perspective of the false":
As for dependent nature, it refers to the real [perceived] from the perspective of
the false. Since the false comes into being supported by the real, and the real
evolves together with the false, we describe [their relation] as dependent.29
Thus, if put in the words of the TCCHL, by "dependent nature",

Hui-yiuan has in mind the phenomenal aspect of the mind, which
comes into being when the pure mind comes under the influence of
falsehood. This interpretation is further borne out by the passage
below, where Hui-yiian places under "dependent nature" the root-
conciousness and the entire phenomenal realm proceeding from it:
As for dependent nature, there are various ways of analysing it:
Taken as a whole, it refers to all [entities] which are in nature dependent on
others.
Or it may be divided into two aspects, i.e., the true and the false, each [support-
ing] the other and so dependent on the other.
It may also be divided into three aspects: First, it refers to the root-
consciousness, which arises when the tathdgatagarbha,perfumed by evil habits [ac-
cumulated] from the beginningless past, appears in the abode of ignorance and
mingles with it.A0Secondly, with the root-consciousness as basis, there arises the
28
TCIC, T, vol. 44, p. 528a. 23-24. Also see p. 528c. 20-24.
29
Ibid., p. 528a. 21-23.
30
This sentence is based upon a passage on the talhagatagarbhain the Lankdvatdra-
suitra.See T, vol. 16, p. 556b-c and Daisetzu T. Suzuki, The LankdvatdraSiitra(Lon-
don: George Routledge &Sons, Ltd., 1932), pp. 190-191. Judged solely from what
is said here, Hui-yiian seems to maintain that the tathagatagarbhaand the root-
consciousness are two different consciousnesses, and together with the seven con-
sciousnesses which are given in the discussion of the next two aspects of dependent
nature, they constitute a system of nine consciousnesses. The idea of the existence
of nine consciousnesses was actually propounded by the She-lun masters of Hui-
yuan's time. Though Hui-yuan saw nothing amiss in this teaching, being brought
up in the Ti-lun tradition, he would prefer the scheme of eight consciousnesses.
Further, following the practice of the Ti-lun School, he identified the storehouse-
consciousness with the pure mind in sentient beings, and called it by such names as
the "tathagatagarbha",the "holy-consciousness", the "true-consciousness', etc. In
general, we may say that Hui-yiian means by "storehouse-consciousness" what
the TCCHL means by the pure mind, with "tathagatagarbha" and "root-
consciousness" referring to the noumenal and phenomenal aspects of this mind
respectively. It is obvious that such readings of the concepts "storehouse-
consciousness" and "root-consciousness" represent a considerable departure from
the traditional Indian usage of the terms.
ddana-mindwhich is attached to [the idea of] the self.31This mind is always accom-
panied by the four defilements, namely, secondary ignorance, self-belief, self-love
and self-conceit. Why does [this mind] come into being? This [mind with] attach-
ment [as its nature] comes into being due to the impregnationof the primeval habit
of grasping at [the idea of] the self. Nevertheless, it has as its ground the root-
consciousnes, for its [nature of] attachmentevolves from the root-consciousness....
Thirdly, with the root-consciousness as basis, there arises the six bodily organs
(i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind) and [their corresponding]objects and
consciousnesses. Why do they come into being? They come into being due to the
impregnation of names and concepts pertaining to the [five] skandhas,[eighteen]
dhatusand [twelve] dyatanas from the beginningless past, as well as the impregnation
of deeds good or bad.32
Hui-yiuan begins his explanation of "imaginary nature" with a

discussion of what constitutes "the imaginary":
As for "the imaginary", it refers to the false itself. Due to the fabricationof the
false mind, erroneous appearancesarise in profusion, which the false mind in turn
grasps at or rejects. That is why it is described as "imaginary'"33
This passage seems to suggest that by "imaginary nature", Hui-

yuan has in mind what the MS means by "imagination", i.e., "the
function of false discriminations". However, subsequent discussion
shows beyond doubt that in the TCIC, "imaginary nature" is
meant to encompass objects imagined also. For example, when
Hui-yiuan attempts to prove the oneness of the three natures, he
takes "imaginary nature" to be the "erroneous attachment to the
changing aspect of dependent nature" as well as "false dharmas":
The tathagatagarbhais perfect nature, which is the ground [of all beings]. What
evolves together with [perfectnature] when the latter comes under the influence of
bad habits and is born in [the abode of] ignorance is called dependent nature.
Besides perfect nature, there is nothing which [dependent nature] can depend on.
The erroneous attachment to the changing aspect of dependent nature is called
imaginary nature. Besides dependent nature, there is nothing which [the imagina-
tion] can imagine on. Again, in one dependent nature is included the false dharmas
which are described as "imaginary" and the true dharmaswhich are described as
''real'.. 34
31
In both the SS and the MS, ddana-consciousnessis the other name of the
storehouse-consciousness.Hui-yiuan, however, adopts the practice of Paramartha
and the She-lun School, and uses the term to refer to the seventh consciousness,
which has as its basic function the discrimination of the self.
32 TCIC, T, vol. 44, p. 528c. 3-14. The two forms of
imprepnation are men-
tioned and explained in the MS. See T, vol. 31, p. 137c and Etienne Lamotte,
trans., p. 85.
33 TCIC, T, vol. 44, p. 528a. 15-17.
34 Ibid., p. 529a. 11-16. Refer to n. 55 below.
194 LIU MING-WOOD
Comparing the accounts of the three-nature doctrine in the MS

and the TCIC, we can see that the most apparent divergence rests
on their conception of "perfect nature". In the MS, "perfect
nature" indicates the transformedvision of theformerly non-enlightened
who after innumerable aeons of ceaseless assertion at last comes to
recognize the conditioned nature of mundane existence. The TCIC,
on the other hand, regards "perfect nature" as thepure consciousness
from theverystart,and it remains im-
whicheverysentientbeingpossesses
maculate even amidst impurities. Given their different understan-
ding of the original nature of man as shown in their different
readings of "perfect nature", the metaphysical implications of
"dependent nature" and "imaginary nature" in the two works
naturally are not the same, though their objects of reference may
appear to be identical. Even though in both the MS and the TCIC,
"dependent nature" refers to the storehouse-consciousness and
ideas proceeding from it, whereas "imaginary nature" refers to all
the false distinctions which people read into "dependent nature",
these two natures are, in the MS, part and parcel of the original
constitution of man, for all are endowed with the inclination to
make unfounded distinctions and to be attached to the self to begin
with. The TCIC, on the other hand, shares the view of the TCCHL
and sees the eight consciousnesses as well as the entire phenomenal
world as the product of the interaction of the tathagatagarbha(i.e.,
man's intrinsically pure consciousness) with a force foreign to its
essence, which it calls "evil habit" or "ignorance". Such being the
case, "dependent nature" and "imaginary nature" are in the on-
tological sense secondary to "perfect nature", even though in ac-
tuality they may accompany "perfect nature" all the time. In other
words, in the system of thought of the TCIC, there can be no
"dependent nature" and "imaginary nature" without "perfect
nature", but that is obviously not the case with the MS.
Thus, in the TCIC, the three-nature doctrine has become a vehi-
cle for the elucidation of a notion of reality quite different from that
of the MS.35 Or in the words of Fa-tsang, the version of the MS
represents the position of the elementary teaching of the
Mahayana, whereas that of the TCIC, the standpoint of the final
35 It should be noted that Hui-yuan quotes the MS frequently in his exposition of
the three natures. There are passages in the MS, which, taken out of context,
would seem to support an interpretation of the three natures similar to that of Hui-
yuan. These passages will be examined in detail in section III below.
teaching of the Mahayana. Nevertheless, the aforementioned

dissimilarities in the two interpretations should not blind us to
several points on which they are similar:
i. In both works, the three-nature doctrine is intended for
teaching us what enlightenment consists of. That is, the three-
nature doctrine is presented basically as a soteriological doctrine in
both the MS and the TCIC.
ii. Both interpretations reflect a belief in the existence of a basic
consciousness in every sentient being, though they disagree on the
original nature of this consciousness.
iii. Both interpretations attempt to trace the origination of the
phenomenal world to a basic consciousness, though they diverge
again in their conceptions of the process of originating.
II. THE DUAL ASPECTS OF THE THREE NATURES 36
Fa-tsang's (643-712) exposition of the three-nature doctrine is

mainly found in the final division of the Taisho/edition of the Hua-
yen wu-chiao chang gEg (Treatise on the Five Teachings,
henceforth abbreviated to Treatise), where he attempts to refor-
mulate a number of central Buddhist concepts to bring them in line
with the Hua-yen view of universal harmony.37 It would seem
strange that Fa-tsang has chosen to begin this division, which
represents his most systematic description of Hua-yen thought,
36 Fa-tsang's interpretation of the three-nature doctrine has been much dis-
cussed, though not always with insight. For some information in English, consult
K. N. Oh, "A Study of Chinese Hua-yen Buddhism with Special Reference to the
Dharmadhatu (Fa-chieh)Doctrine", Ph.D. diss., McMaster University, 1976, pp.
158-162 and F. H. Cook, Hua-yenBuddhism(University Park & London: Penn-
sylvania State University Press, 1977), pp. 56-62. For an English translationof the
section on the three natures in Fa-tsang's Treatise,see F. H. Cook, "Fa-tsang's
Treatiseon theFiveDoctrines:
An Annotated Translation", Ph.D. diss., University of
Wisconsin, 1970, pp. 404-443. Among the numerousJapanese studies on this sub-
ject, the best ones are:
i. Nagao Gajin A t , "Hozo no sansho setsu ni taisuru jakkan no gimon
Re ^XtR;t if;5 W+cD<>W", Essays in Celebration of the Semicentennial of
the Faculty of Letters of Kyoto University (in Japanese) (Kyoto: 1956), pp. 183-
205.
ii. Yamada Ryoken [II1B "Kegon sansho setsu no tachiba
R ^fftE@t%", Otani gakuho t@r* , 35.4 (1956), pp. 27-39.
iii. --, "Kegon Hozo no sansho setsu ni tsuite I X",IBK,
4.2 (1956), pp. 194-197.
37 See T, vol. 45, pp. 499a-501c.
196 LIU MING-WOOD
with a discussion on a concept which by popular consent belongs to

a form of Buddhist teaching different from his own,38 if we do not
take into consideration the close historical and doctrinal ties which
existed between Hua-yen Buddhism and Yogacara Buddhism in
China. Indeed, the inordinate importance Fa-tsang attaches to the
three-nature concept demonstrates a point which I have observed
several times in my article on the p'an-chiao IUAk system of the
Hua-yen School: Despite Fa-tsang's repeated claim of supremacy
for his "round teaching", Hua-yen Buddhism has its theoretical
basis in the teaching of the old Yogacara tradition of the Ti-lun and
She-lun masters (i.e., the final teaching of the Mahayana), all of
whom believe in the presence of an intrinsically pure consciousness
in every sentient being. Beside the Treatise,there are two important
sources for the study of Fa-tsang's interpretation of the three
natures: his commentaries on the Ghanavyuiha-suitra and the
entitled the Mi-yen-chingsu WWKAand the
Dvadas'amukha-s'astra,
su t9
Shih-erh-men-lun l JiL. These two works are especially
usefulin helpingto fill in some of the gaps in Fa-tsang'snot very
systematicpresentationof the problemin the Treatise.39
To beginwith, it shouldbe notedthat Fa-tsangis not consistent
in his designationof the threenaturesin the Treatise.
Sometimes,he
follows Paramartha'stranslationof the MS, and calls "perfect
nature", "dependentnature"and "imaginarynature" "chen-shih
hsing Jit", "i-t'a hsing {Mt9ff' and "fen-pieh hsing XJJ1f'
respectively.Yet, thereare also occasionswhen he seemsto prefer
Hsiuan-tsang'srenderingof the lattertwo, and speaksof them in
their better known names of "i-t'a-ch'i hsing kfj,ff' and
"pien-chiso-chihhsing XPtIt". 40 More interesting still is that in
the majorityof cases when "perfectnature" is discussedin the
it is referredto as "chen-ju_Apn"
Treatise, "(tathata-)or simply"chen
x", while very seldom is it mentionedby its standard Chinese
translation of "yian-ch'eng-shih hsing [M . Another fact
worthnoticingis the peculiarorderin whichthe threenaturesap-
pear in the Treatise.As we have seen earlier,in the SS, the three
38 In Fa-tsang's p'an-chiaoscheme, the SS and MS represent the elementary
teaching of the Mahayana, whereas the TCIC, the work of a Ti-lun master, would
belong to the final teaching of the Mahayana.
39 See HTC, vol. 34, pp. 251d-252b & T, vol. 42, pp. 215b-217b.
40 In the Mi-yen-chingsu, Fa-tsang follows Paramartha'sdesignation of the three

natures. In the Shih-erh-men-lun su, however, he adopts the translation of Hsiian-
tsang.
natures are discussed in the order of "imaginary nature", "depen-

dent nature" and "perfect nature". The same is true of the TCIC.
The MS, on the other hand, begins with "dependent nature", and
then proceeds on to "imaginary nature" and "perfect nature".
These are the usual orders in which the three natures appear in
Yogdcaratexts of Indian origin. Fa-tsang, however, begins his ex-
position of the three natures with "perfect nature", and then goes
on to "dependent nature" and "imaginary nature". This indicates
that in Fa-tsang's version of the three-nature doctrine, "perfect
nature" replaces "dependent nature" and "imaginary nature" as
the focus of concern.
To facilitate discussion, we begin our analysis of Fa-tsang's doc-
trine of the three natures in the reverse order, and start with "ima-
ginary nature". Fa-tsang has given us two quite different explica-
tions of "imaginary nature". In the Mi-yen-ching su, Fa-tsang tries
to define "imaginary nature" by examining the meaning of its two
different Chinese translations "fen-pieh hsing" and "pien-chi so-chih
hsing", and places more emphasis on the function of imagining of
the false mind than on the nature of the objects imagined in his ac-
count:
First, "fen-pieh hsing" is also called "pien-chi so-chih hsing". It is called "fen-pieh
hsing" because the deliberationand calculation of the false mind do not correspond
to [the nature of] the objective world. It refers to the function [of imagining of the
false mind]. Furthermore, since this false mind discriminatesand gets attached to
the objects which it is grasping at, it is given the appellation "pien-chi so-chih hsing".
It is not the objects which the discriminating mind grasps at which is described as
"pien-chi hsing". Rather, it is a name given in regard to the interactionof the func-
tion [of the false mind] with its objects.41
In taking "imaginary nature" as "the function of imagining of the

false mind", Fa-tsang's understanding of "imaginary nature"
seems to differ considerably from that of the SS and MS, where
"imaginary nature" is used principally to refer to the nature of
what are imagined rather than to the act of imagining. Moreover,
since Fa-tsang continues to assert that the latter interpretation of
the term is "contrary to the truth", we cannot help but feel a little
astonished when we turn to the Treatiseand the Shih-erh-men-lunsu,
where "imaginary nature" is apparently regarded as a term
descriptive of the unreal nature of imagined entities. Thus, the
Treatise describes "imaginary nature" as "what is totally non-
41 HTC, vol. 34, p. 252a. 10-13.
198 LIU MING-WOOD
existent, even though assuming the semblance of being in concur-

rence with our desires and attachments".42 Furthermore, both texts
speak of the dual aspects of "imaginary nature": that things ima-
ginary in nature "appear to have being to commonsense, but are
non-existentin reality ffIl, ". Thus, the Shih-erh-men-lunsu com-
pares objects imaginary in nature to flowers in the sky, which look
real to those suffering from ailments in the eye, but are known as il-
lusory to the enlightened, even if they do appear before their "pure
eyes".43 The Treatiseuses the illustration of a tree stump which has
been mistaken for a demon. While the demon appears to be actual
to those who are deceived, it is in fact non-existent.44 Fa-tsang duly
reminds us that these two aspects of "appearing to have being
to commonsense" and "non-existent in reality" of imaginary
nature complement each other, for "to appear to have being to
commonsense" implies "non-existent in reality", and vice versa.
The Mi-yen-ching su says the following of "dependent nature":
As for "dependent nature (i-ta hsing)', it is also called "the nature of originating
from conditions (yian-ch'ihsing ft1it)" or "the nature of coming into existence
depending on others (i-t'a ch'i hsing)".All these terms convey the sense equally well
without distortion.45
So far, this definition of "dependent nature" does not seem to dif-

fer from the orthodox understanding of the term. In the Treatiseand
the Shih-erh-men-lun su, "dependent nature", like "imaginary
nature", is also said to consist of two aspects, this time,
"semblances of existence" PJ,", and "without self-nature"
ifti,". Thus, Fa-tsang states:
Even though "semblances of existence" appear because of the coming together
of conditons, these "semblances of existence" are definitely "without self-
nature", for all things originating from conditions are "without self-nature".46
It is therefore not difficult to understand how Fa-tsang can main-

tain that these dual aspects of dependent nature are "one unity",
for as given in the above quotation, they explain rather then con-
tradict each other. In the words of Fa-tsang:
If objects are not "without self-nature", they are not dependent on conditions;
and since they are not dependent on conditions, they would not be [mere]
42
T, vol. 45, p. 499b. 25-26.
43
T, vol. 42, p. 217a.
44
T, vol. 45, p. 499b-c.
45
HTC, vol. 34, p. 252a. 18-b.1.
46
Treatise,T, vol. 45, p. 499b. 12-14.
"semblances of existence". If "semblances of existence" are formed, they must

arise from various conditions; and since they arise from various conditions, they
must be "without self-nature". Thus, objects are "semblances of existence"
because they are "without self-nature", and objects are "without self-nature"
because they are [mere] "semblances of existence' '47
It is in his explanation of "perfect nature" that Fa-tsang deviates

most apparently from the SS and MS, and his agreement with the
opinion of Hui-yiian, the Ti-lun master, the most apparent. In all
three sources, Fa-tsang treats, "perfect nature" as a synonym of
the tathadgatagarbhaand the tathata. Moreover, the terms
"tathagatagarbha"and "tathata" are spoken of in all three texts in the
language of the TCCHL, so that it is beyond doubt that by "perfect
nature", Fa-tsang means something more than the transformed
understanding of the enlightened as is the case with the SS and the
MS. For example, in the Treatise,Fa-tsang depicts "perfect nature"
as follows:
Take the case of perfect nature. Even though it gives rise to [phenomena] impure
and pure in response to conditions, it never loses its pure essence; and it is just
because it never loses its pure essence that it can respond to conditions and give rise
to [phenomena] impure and pure. It is just like a bright mirror reflecting both the
impure and the pure. Even though it reflects both the impure and the pure, its
bright nature is never lost; and it is just because its bright nature is never lost that it
can reflect both impure and pure [phenomena].48
Thus, by "perfect nature", Fa-tsang has in mind the pure mind

which every sentient being is endowed with and which gives rise to
myriad phenomena when coming under the influence of ignorance.
As for the dual aspects of "perfect nature", i. e., its
"changelessness T " and its "responding to conditions am",
the Treatisecontinues to explain:
By its reflecting the impure and the pure, we know that the mirror is bright; and
by the brightness of the mirror, we know that it can reflect both the impure and the
pure. So the two aspects [of "being bright" and "reflecting the impure and the
pure"] are one in essence.... It should be understood that the same is true of the
tathatai.Not only does it give rise to [phenomena] impure and pure without chang-
ing its pure nature, it is exactly in its [faculty] to give rise to [phenomena] impure
and pure that its pure nature is manifested. Not only does it reveal its pure nature
without [annihilating] phenomena impure and pure, it is exactly in its being pure
in nature that it can give rise to [phenomena] impure and pure. So the two aspects
of "changelessness" and "responding to conditions" [of perfect nature] take in
each other completely, and there is one single essence, not two.49
47 Ibid., p. 499b. 14-17. Also refer to Shih-erh-rnen-lun
su, T, vol. 42, pp.
215c-216a.
48 T, vol. 45, p. 499a. 29-b.4.
49 Ibid.,p. 499b. 4-12.
200 LIU MING-WOOD
This is, of course, none other than the teaching of the one mind in
two aspects of the TCCHL, "changelessness" referring to the
mind's absolute aspect, whereas "responding to conditions" in-
dicating the mind's phenomenal aspect.
Fa-tsang is not the first to talk of the dual aspects of the three
natures, for the Trisvabhavanirdeda,attributed to Nagarjuna or
Vasubandhu, contains similar ideas.50 However, since the
Trzisvabhavanirdedahas not been translated into Chinese, it is im-
possible to determine whether Fa-tsang has been influenced by it or
not. One reason why Fa-tsang analyses each of the three natures in-
to two aspects is that he believes that the establishing of the dual
characters of the three natures is an important step towards the
demonstration of their unity. Another reason is that the long-
standing conflict between the Yogacarins and the Madhyamikas
came to a head in India around the time of Fa-tsang, and one of the
most debated issues between the two groups was the doctrine of the
three natures. Fa-tsang was obviously aware of the controversy, but
he insisted that when correctly understood, one would see no ir-
reconcilable differences between the positions of the two in the mat-
ter.5' In showing that each of the three natures comprises two
diverse aspects, Fa-tsang is probably attempting to prove that the
truth of the middle, a central principle of Madhyamika Buddhism,
is actually embodied in the three-nature doctrine, a doctrine com-
monly taken as peculiar to Yogacara Buddhism.52
III. THE UNITY OF THE THREE NATURES
A feature which emerges with our exegesis of Fa-tsang's thesis of

the dual aspects of the three natures is that Fa-tsang's version of the
three-nature doctrine almost coincides completely with that of Hui-
yiuan. Both apply ideas proper to "the final teaching of the
Mahayana" to their analyses of the concept of the three natures,
and in their hands, the three-nature doctrine has been turnrd into
50 The Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the text is still extant and it has been
translated into French by L. de La Valle'e Poussin under the title "La petit traite'
de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur les trois natures", Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques2
(1932-1933), pp. 147-161. Refer especially to slokas 10-22.
51 See section IV below.
52 In the Shih-erh-men-lunsu, the three natures are introduced to explain the idea
of "the middle path as embodied in [the principle of] the two truths" (erh-ti
--
chung-tao 4Xp ) which Fa-tsang maintains to be the central theme of the
Dvddasamukha-idstraof Nagarjuna.
an expression of an understanding of reality similar to that of the

TCCHL. In both versions, "perfect nature" indicates what the
TCCHL calls the noumenal aspect of the pure mind, whereas
"dependent nature" and "imaginary nature", its phenomenal
aspect. Thus, it is not surprising that Fa-tsang has included in his
examination of the three natures a demonstration of their unity, for
has he not repeatedly lauded "the final teaching of the Mahayana"
as "the teaching of the perfect harmony of the two aspects of the
noumenal and the phenomenal' '?
1. In the simple way given in the SS, there is a sense in which the
three natures can be said to be one, for the three natures do not
represent three separate substances, but only indicate the spiritual
progress of a follower of the Buddha from his former involvement in
false discriminations to his realization of the conditioned nature of
all forms of existence. The MS speaks of the relation of the three
natures as ''neither different nor identical":
Again, are these three natures different or identical? It should be said that they
are neither different nor identical. Dependent nature is "dependent" in one sense,
"imaginary" in another sense, and "perfect" in the third sense.
In what sense is dependent nature "dependent"? In so far as it depends on the
impregnated seeds [in the storehouse-consciousness] for its arising.
In what sense is it "imaginary"? In so far as it is the object of imagination, and
is the material on which imagination works.
In what sense is it "perfect"? In so far as it absolutely does not exist in the man-
ner in which it is imagined.54
The three natures are not identical, because the ideas (dependent
nature) of the enlightened (perfect nature) and of the non-
enlightened (imaginary nature) are not of the same moral species.
However, they can also be described as not different, for "perfect
nature" arises as a consequence of the correct perception of the
"imaginary" as "imaginary", as the result of which the ideation-
only character of all beings (dependent nature) also becomes ap-
parent. Hui-yiian's TCIC also comprises a section on the relation of
the three natures, in which the three natures, as in the MS, are also
described as "neither different nor identical". But as it differs from
the MS in its interpretations of the three natures, the reason it gives
for the three natures' being "neither different nor identical"
naturally are not the same:
53 Consult the discussion on the final teaching of the Mahayana in section 3 of
my article, op. cit.

54 T, vol. 31, p. 139b. 24-c.2. Etienne Lamotte, trans., p. 110.
202 LIU MING-WOOD
These three [natures] are neither identical with nor different from each other. If
we consider the derivative as separated from the origin, we can say that they are
not identical.... [For] the false seen as false is imaginary nature, the real seen from
the perspective of the false is dependent nature, and the real seen as real is perfect
nature. [On the other hand,] if we consider the origin as encompassing the
derivative, we can say that [the three natures] are not different. Why is it so? For
the tatha/gatagarbhais perfect nature, which is the ground [of all beings]. What
evolves together with [perfect nature] when the latter comes under the influence of
bad habits and is born in [the abode of] ignorance is called dependent nature.
Besides perfect nature, there is nothing which [dependent nature] can depend on.
The erroneous attachment to the changing aspect of dependent nature is called im-
aginary nature. Besides dependent nature, there is nothing which [imaginary
nature] can imagine on.55
Since the tathdgatagarbha,i.e., perfect nature, is entirely pure,

whereas its derivatives, i.e., dependent nature and imaginary
nature, are entangled in falsehood, they are not identical. Never-
theless, since the derivatives (dependent nature and imaginary
nature) have their metaphysical basis in the tathagatagarbha(perfect
nature) and there would be no derivatives without the existence of
the pure origin, the three natures can also be said to be not dif-
ferent. Thus, judging solely from the fact that "dependent nature"
and "imaginary nature" are ontologically dependent on "perfect
nature", there seems to be some grounds for maintaining that the
three natures are one.
2. Fa-tsang's proof of the unity of the three natures follows the

same line of reasoning as that of Hui-yiian, but it is far more in-
tricate and requires much more detailed analysis.
Two expositions of unity of the three natures can be extracted
from the section on the three natures in the Treatise.The first one is
found at the beginning of the section, and is related to the idea of
the dual characters of the three natures:
Due to the three meanings of "changelessness" of perfect nature, "without self-
nature" of dependent nature and "non-existent in reality" of imaginary nature,
the three natures are one and not different from each other. That is what is meant
by "without destroying the derivatives, the origin is ever present". So the
[Vimalak&rti-nirdesa-suitra
says, "Since sentient beings are one with nirvana, there is
no more entering into nirvana." Similarly, due to the three meanings of "respond-
ing to conditions" of perfect nature, "semblances of existence" of dependent
nature, and "appearing to have being to commonsense" of imaginary nature, the
three natures are also not different. That is what is meant by "without disturbing
the origin, the derivatives always [come into being]". So the [Pu-tsengpu-chzien]suitra
5 T, vol. 44, p. 529a. 7-14.
T-T190i says, "When the dharmakdya [of the Buddha] transmigratesin the five
paths,56it is called sentient beings." [Moreover,] since the second three meanings
of the three natures and the first three meaning are not of the same category, [it is
said that] the true [source] embraces the false derivatives, and the false
[derivatives] penetrate the true source. Thus, [the true] essence and [the false]
phenomena perfectly interfuse, and do not impede or obstruct each other.57
This exposition of unity of the three natures proceeds in two steps.

The first step asserts the unity of each of the dual aspects of one
nature with each of the dual aspects of the other two natures:
Table 1
Argumentfor the Unity of the ThreeNatures
A B
Perfect Nature: changlessness responding to conditions

Dependent Nature: without self-nature semblances of existence
Imaginary Nature: non-existent in reality appearing to have being to com-
monsense
All the items under category A are said to be the same, and so are
all the items under category B. In the second step, Fa-tsang goes
on to declare that although category A and category B are dif-
ferent, they nevertheless "perfectly interfuse" each other. In this
manner, Fa-tsang arrives at the conclusion that the three natures
are one.
The weakness of this exposition is all too apparent. When Fa-
tsang declares that category A and category B "perfectly
interfuse", he is no doubt thinking of the oneness of the two aspects
of each of the three natures, his proof of which we have already set
out in the previous section. Yet, even if we grant that his argument
in this respect is valid,58 Fa-tsang has yet to give us his reason for
taking the first step, i.e., how it can be said that all items under
each of the two categories are the same, and that he has not done.
Thus, this exposition is incomplete. Taken in the proper perspec-
tive, this exposition is primarily a declaration of general principle,
56
The five paths are the five different forms of rebirth, namely, as god, as man,
as animal, as hungry ghost and as being in hell.
57 T, vol. 45, p. 499a. 15-23.
58 As we shall see, the argument for the oneness of the two aspects of perfect
nature is not so.
204 LIU MING-WOOD
which, if acceptable at all, is acceptable on grounds which are not

yet fully stated at this point of the Treatise. For a clearer picture of
the unity of the three natures, we have to turn to the second exposi-
tion, which is found at the end of the section.
3. The second exposition of the unity of the three natures consists
almost entirely of quotations from the MS and the
Mahayanasamgraha-bha.sya of Vasubandhu. It commences with the
proclamation: "The three natures are one. Take anyone of them
and all the others are included in it. For the true and the false
mutually interfuse, and their natures do not impede each other' .59
This is then followed by a quotation from Paramartha's version of
the MS: "Just as it is written in the Brahmapariprccha-suitrai: [Ques-
tion:] Bhagavat, what do you have in mind when you say that the
Tathagata neither sees samsadra nor nirvana?[Answer:] Based on the
fact that 'dependent nature' comprises [both] 'imaginary nature'
and 'perfect nature', [it is said that] samsadraand nirvanaare not dif-
ferent. Why? For 'dependent nature' with the one part of it which is
imaginary, constitutes samsara;and with the other part of it which is
perfect, constitutes nirvda''"60 Fa-tsang then continues to give his
interpretation of this passage by citing Vasubandhu's comments on
it as found in the Mahayanasamgraha-bhadsya translated by Paramar-
tha:
Dependent nature is not samsa-ra,for this nature with its perfect aspect constitutes
nirvana. This nature is [also] not nirva&na.
Why? For this nature with its imaginary
aspect constitutes samsa-ra.Thus, we cannot say definitely which one of the two
aspects [of dependent nature is the dependent nature itselfl] If we can see that one
aspect [of dependent nature] is not different in essence from its other aspect, [we
can understand why the Buddha declares that the Tathagata] sees neither samsara
nor nirvana.61
Fa-tsang goes on to quote another passage from the MS, which is on

the three categories of dharmas, i.e., those which are soiled, those
which are pure, and those which comprise both aspects:
In the Mahalyanabhidharma-su-tra,the Buddha declares that dharmasfall under three
categories, i.e., those which are soiled, those which are pure, and those which com-
prise both impure and pure aspects. Why does he say so? For the imaginary nature
in dependent nature is soiled, and the perfect nature in dependent nature is pure.
As for dependent nature, it consists of both pure and impure aspects.62
5 T, vol. 45, p. 501c. 6-7.

60 Ibid., p. 501c. 7-12.
61 Ibid., p. 501c.
12-16.
62 Ibid.,
p. 501c. 17-21.
This quotation is again followed by a citation from the

Paramartha's version of the Maha-yanasamgraha-bha.sya:
According to what is said in the Mahdyandbhidharma-suitra, imaginary nature has
as its nature [the aspect of] defilement, while perfect nature has as its nature the
aspect of purity. Since dependent nature comprises both aspects, it has the two
natures (i.e., imaginary nature and perfect nature) as its nature. So [the
Maha/ydnabhidharma-suitra]says that dharmas are of three types: those which are de-
filed, those which are pure, and those which comprise both types.63
Then Fa-tsang concludes this exposition with a declaration of the

truth of the unity of the three natures, this time in his own words:
The above discussion again brings out that the true [source] embraces the false
derivatives in perfect accord, and the false [derivatives] penetrate the true source
without disturbing it. Thus, the true and the false permeate each other, and these
two aspects mutually interfuse and include each other completely without obstruc-
tion.64
What is most striking about this second exposition is that its

characterization of the three natures is quite different from that
found in the first part and used in the first exposition. While Fa-
tsang still maintains that "dependent nature" has two aspects, the
two aspects are no longer set forth as "without self-nature" and
"semblances of existence". They are "perfect nature" and "im-
aginary nature", which Fa-tsang, following the suggestion of the
passages from the MS and the Mahayanasamgraha-bhasya,now
regards to be two parts of "dependent nature". More interesting
still, references to the dual characters of "perfect nature" and "im-
aginary nature" vanish completely from the picture. Rather,
"perfect nature" is portrayed here as the cause of nirvadna and being
completely pure, and "imaginary nature" is represented as the
cause of samsadra and being totally impure.
As for the reason given for the thesis of the unity of the three
natures, judged solely from the comments cited above, Fa-tsang
seems to have done little more than reproducing the words of the
cited passages from the MS and the Mahayanasamgraha-bhayya:
"'Dependent nature ", "'perfect nature'" and "'imaginary nature "
are one, for the pure "perfect nature" and the impure "imaginary
nature" are two parts of "dependent nature", which comprises both
pure and impure aspects. Presented in such a literal fashion, this
explanation sounds very vague, and we are left very much on our
63 Ibid., p. 501c. 21-25.

64 Ibid., p. 501c. 26-28.
206 LIU MING-WOOD
own to surmise what further significance Fa-tsang would want us to

read into this sketchy framework.65 That is, however, not very hard
to do, for we have ample indications from the Mi-yen-ching su and
the discussion of the dual aspects of the three natures above what
Fa-tsang has in consideration by the pure "perfect nature", the im-
pure "imaginary nature", and the partly pure and partly impure
"dependent nature".
Since Fa-tsang often identifies "perfect nature" with the
tathalgatagarbhaor the tathatd, the "perfect nature" which is totally
pure can be taken to be the tathagatagarbha or the tathata. As for how
"imaginary nature" which is impure and "dependent nature"
which is both pure and impure are to be understood, a passage in
the Mi-yen-ching su offers some valuable clues:
Since [dharmasdependent in nature] come into existence depending on [the ac-

tivities of] imaginary nature, they are described as "dependent in nature". It is
because in [the teaching of] the Mahayana, all dharmas are considered as products
of the mind, and as products of the mind, all dharmasdo not exist apart from the
mind and have the mind as their basis. If there is no false mind [working] in the
realm of samsdra, [dharmas] "dependent in nature" would not arise by themselves.
Thus, in various sutras, [we find] it stated that the twelve links of dependent
origination are "dependent in nature". Since the twelve links of dependent
origination begin with ignorance, we know that dependent nature depends on
something which is discriminating.66
This paragraph gives a peculiar twist to the meaning of dependent

nature. In most of Fa-tsang's discussions of the three natures,
"dependent nature" is defined either very generally as "dependent
on conditions" or more specifically as "dependent on the mind".
Here, however, the condition on which "dependent nature"
depends is given very specifically as the "false mind" or "ig-
norance". If we remember that Fa-tsang has also equated "im-
aginary nature" with the "false mind" in the immediately
preceding paragraph in the Mi-yen-chingsu,67 it is not surprising that
65
The meaning of these passages as found in the MS and the Maha-yanasamgraha-
bhdasya is quite obvious. When Asanga quotes the Brahmapariprcch&-sutra and main-
tains that dependent nature comprises both perfect nature and imaginary nature,
he is trying to tell us that perfect nature and imaginary nature are two states of be-
ing of dependent nature, the former indicates the state of enlightenment, while the
latter, the state of non-enlightenment. Which state a person is in depends of course
on his level of his spiritual attainment.
66
HTC, vol. 34, p. 252b. 1-5.
67 See n. 41 above.
Fa-tsang would come to conclude that "dependent nature" is

called dependent because it depends on "imaginary nature".
When "perfect nature", "imaginary nature" and "dependent
nature" are understood respectively as the tathagatagarbha,the false
mind, and dharmascoming into existence as a consequence of the
activities of the false mind, and when it is also perceived that Fa-
tsang refers to the false mind as "ignorance" in the Mi-yen-chingsu,
a picture gradually comes together in our mind. For has not the
TCCHL taught that "ignorance" (imaginary nature in the present
case), like the wind of agitation, disturbs the calmness of the ocean
which is the tathata (perfect nature in the present case) and rouses
up waves, i.e., phenomena (dependent nature in the present case)?
As for the unity of the three natures, has not the TCCHL argued
that ignorance (imaginary nature) does not exist apart from
enlightenment (perfect nature) and so cannot be destroyed and yet
also cannot not be destroyed? Moreover, has not the TCCHL also
declared that the mind of each sentient being has two aspects, i.e.,
the absolute and the phenomenal, and so "perfect nature" (the
tatha-gatagarbha,or the absolute aspect) and "dependent nature"
(dharmas resulting from the interaction between the tathalgatagarbha
and ignorance [imaginary nature], or the phenomenal aspect), be-
ing two aspects of the same entity, can also be regarded as one uni-
ty? Thus, a whole train of statements can be brought in from the
TCCHL to develop an argument for the unity of the three natures,
with perfect nature (tathacgatagarbha) understood as pure, "im-
aginary nature" (ignorance) understood as impure, and "depen-
dent nature" (phenomenal existences) understood as both pure and
impure, just as described in the passages cited from the MS and the
Maha-yanasamgraha-bha-sya. 68
The problem is whether Fa-tsang actually has such ideas in mind
when he quotes from the MS and the Mahayanasarngrahabhaasya.
Several reasons can be given to support attributing this argument of
the oneness of the three natures to Fa-tsang:
i. Fa-tsang's thought, as we have said, is strongly influenced by
the TCCHL and its tatha-gatagarbha doctrine, and he quotes several
times from the TCCHL in the section on the three natures in the
Treatise.
68
For discussion on the relation between the tatha-gatagarbha,
phenomena and ig-
norance as given in the TCCHL, refer to section I above.
208 LIU MING-WOOD
ii. Fa-tsang refers to "perfect nature" throughout the Treatiseas

the tathagatagarbhaor tathata. Moreover, he also openly identifies
imaginary nature" with ignorance and "dependent nature" with
dharmas arising from the activities of ignorance in the Mi-yen-ching
su.
iii. Equating "perfect nature", "dependent nature" and "im-
aginary nature" with the tathagatagarbha,the phenomenal world,
and ignorance respectively fits perfectly the characterizations of the
three natures in the quotations from the MS and the
Mahayanasamgraha-bhdasya: "perfect nature" being completely pure,
"imaginary nature" being totally impure, and "dependent
nature" being partly pure and partly impure.
iv. Fa-tsang's account of the two aspects of "perfect nature"
shows definitely that he has in mind the TCCHL and its thesis of the
two aspects of the one mind when he is composing the section on the
three natures in the Treatise.
v. Perhaps the most conclusive proof is found in Fa-tsang's reply
to the question as to how he can assert that the aspect of
"semblances of existence" of dependent nature and the aspect of
'without self-nature" of imaginary nature are the same in the
Treatise:
... Secondly, it is due to the fact that without imaginary nature, [the aspect of]
"semblances of existence" [of dependent nature] would not arise. It should be
understood that the same is true of [the aspect ofl "responding to conditions" [of
perfect nature]. For without imaginary nature, there would be no "responding to
conditions' 1'69
While this answer is presented as part of the first exposition of the

unity of the three natures, it in fact points towards the second ex-
position, for "imaginary nature" is mentioned here not just as the
nature of illusory objects, but also as the cause of the coming into
existence of "dependent nature" and the condition to which perfect
nature" responds. In short, it is the second exposition succinctly
stated.
If we have not erred in attributing this argument to Fa-tsang, Fa-
tsang is actually endorsing the TCCHL's position that the
tathagatagarbha,the phenomenal world, and ignorance are one when
he argues for the unity of the three natures. The next question to
ask is how far the TCCHL has succeeded in justifying this claim.
9 T, vol. 45, p. 499a. 25-27.
4. Fa-tsang of course has no second thought on this issue. Thus,

in his system of p 'an-chiao,he criticizes Yogacara Buddhism, which
he calls "the elementary teaching of the Mahayana", for its one-
sided emphasis on the phenomenal, and sees the excellency of "the
final teaching of the Mahayana", of which the TCCHL is the most
worthy representative, in its having established the oneness of the
noumenal and the phenomenal:
When the holy [scriptures] assert that the tathata is immutable, they mean by
"eternal" the fact that the tathata does not lose its self-essence even when it
responds to conditions and gives rise to beings of all forms. Since the tathataiis the
eternal not separated from the non-eternal, it is known as "the inconceivable eter-
nal". [In describing the tathataas "eternal",] they do not have in mind immutable
in the ordinary sense of the term, which does not give rise to dharmas.Thus, when
the Srimadlddevisimhandda-su7tra calls [the tathata] "the non-defiled which is yet
defiled", it refers to the fact that it gives rise to all forms of dharmasin response to
conditions. [When it calls the tathata] "the defiled which is yet non-defiled", it
refers to the fact that it never loses its self-nature while responding to conditions.
Due to the first aspect [of the tathata], we have the [realm of] mundane truths. Due
to the second aspect [of the tathatad],we have the [realm of] absolute truth re-
established. Since the absolute and the mundane are only two aspects [of the
tathata] and are not two independent entities, they interfuse without obstruction,
and discriminations of all forms are abandoned.70
But the question which needs to be asked is why the noumenal (the
tathataor tathagatagarbha),which is perfectly pure, should "interfuse
with-" and "be not separate from" the phenomenal", which con-
tains impure elements? In other words, given its assumption that all
sentient beings are originally pure in nature, has the TCCHL of-
fered us an explanation of the source of defilements by which the
non-defiled and the defiled can be said to be essentially one?
Since the TCCHL uses the simile of the ocean and the wind to ex-
plain the arising of the phenomenal from the noumenal,7' Bud-
dhists who endorse a vision of reality similar to that of the TCCHL
usually resort to the simile in attempting to answer the aforesaid
query. Thus, they would say that the mind (the noumenal) is like
the ocean, and its purity, the wet nature of the ocean. Ignorance,
like the wind, blows on the water and stirs up waves, i.e., impure
phenomena. But just as motion is not an essential property of
water, impure phenomena are also not an essential part of the
mind. Moreover, even when stirred, the purity of the mind, like the
wet nature of the ocean, remains undestroyed; and once the wind of
70 Treatise, T, vol. 45, p. 485a. 11-19.

71 See n. 23 above.
210 LIU MING-WOOD
ignorance ceases, the waves of impure phenomena will also disap-

pear, and the mind will be its own pure self once more.
It is easy to see that in the above argument, a new factor other
than the noumenal and the phenomenal has been introduced into
the picture, i.e., ignorance. It is ignorance which, like the wind,
works on the mind which is the ocean, and arouses waves, which
are the impure phenomena.72 While the introduction of the concept
"ignorance" does help us to envisage how impure phenomena can
originate from the noumenal which is pure, it is of no help whatever
in demonstrating that they are in essence inseparable. On the con-
trary, it brings out even more clearly that the noumenal can exist
apart from the phenomenal; for with the cessation of ignorance,
phenomena will cease to arise, but the absolute aspect of the mind
(the tathdgatagarbha) will continue to exist.73 The phenomenal would
be an essential aspect of the mind only if ignorance, the necessary
condition of its arising, is intrinsic to the mind. That the TCCHL is
aware of this point is shown in its constant emphasizing that not on-
ly the noumenal and the phemomenal are one, but the same is true
of the noumenal and ignorance. For example, we find in the
TCCHL such remarks as "Ignorance does not exist apart from
enlightenment"' '74 and "Each of the two aspects [of the mind] em-
braces all forms of existence (and so ignorance)".75 But the ques-
tion formerly applied to the relation between the noumenal and the
phenomenal can now be asked of the relation between the
noumenal and ignorance: If the noumenal is perfectly pure, how
can it have "ignorance", the condition of the arising of all im-
purities, as its intrinsic property? Serious as the problem is, the
TCCHL has offered us no clue whatsoever for its solution.
72 The falling back on the concept of ignorance to explain the origin of im-
purities is quite natural within the context of Buddhism, for ignorance, as is well-
known, is one of the twelve links of dependent origination; and being ignorant of
such central Buddhist tenets as the four noble truths, the five skandhas,the eightfold
noble paths, etc., has always been considered by Buddhists as the main cause of
man s remaining in samsara.
73 The TCCHL states explicitly that ignorance has an end, but the pure mind
does not have an end:

Again the defiled principle (dharrna),from the beginningless beginning, con-
tinues perpetually to permeate until it perishes with the attainment of Bud-
dhahood. But the permeation of the pure principle has no interruptionand no end.
(T, vol. 32, p. 579a. 8-10. Y. S. Hakeda trans., p. 64).
74 T, vol. 30, p. 576c, 10. Y. S. Hakeda, transl., p. 41.
75 T, vol. 32, p. 576a. 6-7. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., p. 31.
Thus, we have to conclude that the question whether or not the

TCCHL has succeeded in showing that the tathagatagarbha,the
phenomenal world, and ignorance are essentially one has to be
replied in the negative. With this is also refuted Fa-tsang's second
argument for the unity of the three natures, for, as we have seen,
Fa-tsang bases his second proof of the unity of the three natures on
the contention that the TCCHL and the final teaching of the
Mahayana it represents have constructed a system of thought in
which the difference between the noumenal and the phenomenal
has been reconciled. It should be noted that this failure to establish
the unity of the three natures brings to light a fundamental
weakness in Fa-tsang's entire philosophical enterprise, i.e., his
endeavour to formulate a form of teaching most fully exemplifying
the Buddhist ideal of the round. As we have seen in our article on
Fa-tsang's p'an-chiao system, Fa-tsang's "round teaching" is drawn
up on the premise that the final teaching of the Mahayana has
established the truth of "the non-obstruction of the noumenal and
the phenomenal", while his round teaching introduces further
refinement in founding the truth of "the non-obstruction of
elements of the phenomenal with each other". In other words, the
final teaching of the Mahayana provides the general ontological
framework in which Fa-tsang develops his round teaching. And if
the soundness of the framework is suspected, the validity of the
superstructure would also become open to doubt.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE YOG2ACARAVERSION OF THE THREE-NATURE

DOCTRINE: THE POSITIONS OF MADHYAMIKA BUDDHISM AND
HUA-YEN BUDDHISM COMPARED
To sum up, the following comments can be made on the section

on the three natures in the Treatise:
i. This section consists of two parts, the first part is chiefly on the
dual aspects of the three natures, while the second part is mainly
concerned with establishing the unity of the three natures. The
descriptions of the three natures found in these two parts, with the
exception of "perfect nature", do not exactly correspond.
ii. The detailed discussion on the dual aspects of the three
natures is given by Fa-tsang most probably with the intention of
showing that the long-standing disagreement between the
Madhyamikas and the Yogacarins on the subject of the three
212 LIU MING-WOOD
natures is unreal, and that when correctly interpreted, the three-

nature doctrine, traditionally closely allied to Yogacara Buddhism,
can be used to illustrate the Madhyamika principle of the middle.
iii. Fa-tsang has given two expositions of the unity of the three
natures in this section. The first exposition, related to the dual
characters of the three natures and based on one set of meaning of
the three natures, is largely incomplete. The second exposition,
which is based on another set of descriptions of the three natures,
does not work either, for the ontology of the TCCHL, on which it
is based, cannot support the contention that the noumenal (perfect
nature), the phenomenal (dependent nature), and ignorance (im-
aginary nature) are in essence one.
iv. This section, which opens the final division of the Treat'se
which is devoted to the elucidation of the round teaching, has sur-
prisingly little to do with the principle of "one in all and all in one"
which characterizes this form of thinking. Both the discussions on
the dual aspects of "perfect nature" and the unity of the three
natures are basically attempts to establish the truth of the two
aspects of the one mind and their identity - a truth which is taught
in the TCCHL and so in Fa-tsang's own opinion would belong
more to the final teaching of the Mahayana. This is yet another in-
dication as to how closely Fa-tsang's round teaching is related to the
final teaching of the Mahayana, i.e., the old Yogacara tradition.
Before we close our discussion of the doctrine of the three

natures, it is worthwhile to spend a little time on Fa-tsang's
criticism of the Yogacara version of the three-nature doctrine, and
to compare his criticism with the one given by the Madhyamikas.
As we have pointed out, in the very simple form in which the doc-
trine appeared in the SS, there was hardly anything in it that the
Madhyamikas need to object to. It was only when the doctrine was
taken up in later Yogacara texts to explain the Yogacara teaching of
ideation-only and as a consequence each of the three natures was
assigned a particular place in the overall metaphysical scheme of
Yogacara Buddhism that the doctrine became a natural target of at-
tack to the Madhyamikas. Thus, the disagreement between the
Yogacarins and the Madhyamikas on the question of the three
natures reflects more fundamental differences, and affords us a
glimpse into some of the root issues which have kept these two tradi-
tions apart for so many centuries.
Madhyamika criticism of the Yogacara doctrine of the three

natures is well documented.76 The heart of the matter can be
brought out by a brief survey of the doctrine of the three meanings
of "without self-nature" (nihsvabhdva) in the Ch'eng wei-shih lun
f4r ii of Hsiian-tsang (660-664), a doctrine which from the
time of the SS onward has always been expounded together with the
doctrine of the three natures.77 After giving an analysis of the three
natures essentially similar to that of the MS, the Ch'eng wei-shih lun
continues to point out that the epithet "without self-nature" can be
applied equally to all the three natures, only that with regard to
each nature, the term takes on a different meaning. When used to
describe "imaginary nature", "without self-nature" indicates that
objects imagined (such as permanent selves) are "both in essenceand
appearanceabsolutely non-existent, like flowers in the sky".78 When
used in connection with "dependent nature", it tells us that things
in general are without self-nature in respect to their origination,
because they owe their being to "various conditions." However,
the Ch'engwei-shih lun also reminds us that things "are not absolute-
ly without self-nature", for even though they are reducible to
various causes and conditions and do not enjoy independent ex-
istence, the causes and conditions on which they are based are not
76
Madhyamika criticism of the three-nature doctrine of the Yogacarins can be
found in chapter 5 of the Madhyamakahrdaya-s'astra and chapter 25 of the
by Bhavaviveka, which survive today in their
Prajfdpradipa-mulamadhyamaka-vritti
Tibetan translationsand have been renderedintoJapanese by Yamaguchi Susumu
[LI:n and Yasui Kosai %cPiA in their Bukkyo ni okeru mu to u to no tairon
{~7_k~o^W; & M6&f©A and Chukan shiso no kenkyu 1QPf,,IrfDF respec-
tively. The final section of Yasui's work entitled "Chukan shiso no yuga yuishiki
shiso to no taiketsu ,,,i ftGS),~ ,O©a4" gives a very lucid and
perceptive treatment of the subject. Also consult: Yasui Kosai, "Nitai-setsu to
sansho-setsu -&LEt ", , Otanigakuho,33.1 (1953), pp. 19-40. f
77 The Ch'eng wei-shih lun is a commentary on Vasubandhu's Tri.msikadvjinapti-
kdrikdcompiled by Hsian-tsang and based primarily on the interpretationof the
TrirmikdvZijnapti-kdrika
by Dharmapala, one of the so-called "ten great sdstra-
masters" in Yogacara Buddhism. The compilation of the Ch'engwei-shihlun laid
the ground for the formation of the Fa-hsiang School iS?, which, in its being
developed later than the brand of Yogacarism practisedby the She-lun and Ti-lun
masters, is often named "the new Yogacara tradition". Generally speaking, its
teaching is truer to the Indian form of Yogacarism than that of the old Yogacara
tradition. There are two Western translationsof the text, one by La Vallee Poussin
and the other by Wei Tat *.
78 T, vol. 31, p. 48a. 10-11. Wei Tat,
trans., Ch'eng wei-shih lun (Hong Kong:
1973), p. 657.
214 LIU MING-WOOD
non-existent.79 That is understandable, for the storehouse-

consciousness, from which all ideas originate, is considered as a real
entity in Yogacara metaphysics. As for the meaning of "without
self-nature" in relation to "perfect nature", the Ch'eng wei-shih lun
says:
The highest truth (perfect nature) is far removed from the first nature of mere-
imagination, in which things are believed to be real atmansand real dharmas.
Therefore, we conventionally allege that it is non-existent, but it is not wholly
without self-nature. Just as great space, although it envelops and penetrates all
forms, is revealed by the absence of self-nature of forms, [so the highest truth is
revealed by the voidness of attachments to atmansand dharmas,and in this respect
may be described as having no nature of its own.] 80
Thus, when it is said that "perfect nature" is "without
self-nature", the statement is made in consideration of what the
term "self-nature" implies when it is used in connection with ob-
jects imaginary in nature. The belief that objects of imagination
have self-nature is generally linked to implicit clingings to such
dualities as "existence and non-existence", "identity and dif-
ference", "inclusiveness and exclusiveness", etc. To indicate that
such dualities are not applicable to "perfect nature", we say that
"perfect nature" is "without self-nature". However, this does not
entail that "perfect nature" cannot have a special nature of its own
in another sense. "Perfect nature", as we have seen, stands for in
Yogacarism the state of mind of the enlightened, in which objects
are revealed as they actually are: ideation only. Since all associa-
tions with "the first nature of mere-imagination" cease when this
state of mind is attained "perfect nature" can be described as
'without self-nature". Yet, in this new state of existence, the mind
is an actual entity endowed with all sorts of excellent qualities, and
in that sense, "perfect nature" can also be described as having self-
nature. 81
79 T, vol. 31, p. 48a. 11-13. Wei Tat, trans., ibid.
80
T, vol. 31, p. 48a. 13-16. Wei Tat, trans., ibid.
81 Also refer to the section on the three natures and the two modes of existence in
the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, where perfect nature is described as having "real
existence". (T, vol. 31, p. 47c. Wei Tat, trans., p. 651) As for dependent nature,
while conceding that objects of such nature are "mere designation" in the sense
that they are only complexes of conditions, Hsiuan-tsang continues:
But the mind, mental states and forms are born of causes; it is therefore said of
them that they have real existence.If no real dharmasexist, dharmasof designation will
not exist either, because there can only be [dharmasof] designation in relation to a
reality which is the cause thereof." (T, vol. 31, p. 47c. 11-12. Wei Tat, trans., p.
651).
Thus, in the opinion of the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, objects imaginary

in nature are non-existent both in appearance and substance. Ob-
jects dependent in nature are non-existent in appearance only, for
they originate from an actual entity, i.e., the storehouse-
consciousness and its ideas, is real. The same is true of "perfect
nature", which is "without self-nature" in the conventional sense,
but is the ultimate truth in the real sense. This view of the Ch'eng
wei-shih lun is shared by the MS which openly declares that "depen-
dent nature" is not totally non-existent, and is representative of the
Yogacara position in general.82 When this is understood, it is not
difficult to discern what objection the Madhyamikas could see in
the doctrine. True to the aversion to metaphysical speculation in-
herent in their tradition, the Madhyamikas insist that "perfect
nature" and "dependent nature" should be considered as empty in
the same way "imaginary nature" is considered as empty, and they
censure the Yogacarins for drawing a distinction between "emp-
tiness" and "the derivative" on the one hand, and "being" and
"the origin" on the other hand, while maintaining the non-reality
of "imaginary nature" and .he reality of "dependent nature" and
"perfect nature".83 The Yogacarins counter by accusing the
Madhyamikas of the fallacy of Nihilism in suggesting that all three
82 Since Yogacara texts generally take as their point of departure sentient beings
in their non-enlightened state, they often portray dependent nature as "impure"

and "illusory". The MS, for example, compares dependent nature to "a magical
appearance, a mirage, a dream, a reflection, an image, an echo, reflection of the
moon on the water," etc. (T, vol. 31, p. 140b. 3-4. Etienne Lamotte, trans., p.
120) However, such descriptions of dependent nature does not carry the implica-
tion that with the annihilation of erroneous discriminations (imaginary nature), the
root consciousness (dependent nature) will disappear and no more ideas will arise.
That would be the fallacy of Nihilism shunned by all Mahayanists alike. Instead,
the MS calls the transformed consciousness of the enlightened (perfect nature),
"the non-defiled consciousness", which would continue to evolve ideas spon-
taneously to fulfil its mission of universal deliverance. Furthermore, the MS insists
that despite its constant association with the imaginary, dependent nature is not a
complete nonentity:
Again, if it does not exist as it appears, why is dependent nature not totally non-
existent? Because without it, "perfect nature" also would not exist. [Because]
without it, nothing would come into being. If dependent nature and perfect nature
do not exist, there would be no pure and impure [dharmas]. Since we have pure and
impure [dharmas], it is false that all are non-existent. (T, vol. 31, p. 140a. 22-27.
Etienne Lamotte, trans., p. 120).
83 Read the account given of the debate between Hsiuan-tsang and Simharas'mi
on the perfect nature and dependent nature in Hui-li MA Ta- T'ang Ta-tz '-en-ssu
San-tsang Fa-shih chuan i T, vol. 50, p. 244b-c.
216 LIU MING-WOOD
natures are empty, and defend themselves by asserting that their

doctrine of the three natures has the aspect of "emptiness" and
"derivative" in its conception of the non-reality of "imaginary
nature", and the aspect of "being" and "origin" in its conception
of the reality of "perfect nature" and "dependent nature".
We have to concede that there is some substance in the
Madhyamikas' complaint. It is hard to imagine how the Yogacarins
can ward off the Madhyamika criticism that to consider "depen-
dent nature" and "perfect nature" as real and "imaginary
nature" as unreal amounts to harbouring a essential distinction
between "emptiness" and "derivative" on the one hand, and "be-
ing" and "origin" on the other hand. The defence outlined at the
end of the preceding paragraph does not work, for the crux of the
matter rests not upon whether or not the three natures as a group
comprise elements of both sides, but rather upon whether or not the
two sides are related in the doctrine in such a way that they form an
organic whole, so that it can truly be said that there is no essential
distinction between them. So long as the relation between the store-
house-consciousness and objects originating from it is given as a
relation of cause and effect as is the case with the MS and the Ch'eng
wei-shih lun, this criticism would always remain an embarrassing
problem to the Yogacarins. As for the Yogacarins' counter-charge
of Nihilism, the Madhyamikas can reply that when they maintain
that "perfect nature" and "dependent nature" should be considered
as "empty" as "imaginary nature", they mean only to refute the
Yogacara belief in the reality of "perfect nature" and "dependent
nature". They are not offering an alternative interpretation of the
three natures based on an ontology other than the ideation-orly on-
tology of the Yogacarins. If they are coerced into giving a more
viable interpretation of the meaning of the three natures, they can
cite the one of the SS, or they may simply observe: "We do not have
any theory on the three natures. They are concepts in your on-
tology, whereas we, as Madhyamikas, do not harbour any specific
ontology. "
This brief appraisal of course can hardly do justice to the complex
nature of the dispute, which is a worthy subject for another research
project. Nevertheless, we hope that it has brought out that the
dispute is not just a dispute over the proper understanding of the
meaning of the three natures. It involves much broader issues, and
reflects two very different appraoches to metaphysics in Mahayana
Buddhism: First, the "reductive approach", as exemplified by the
Yogacarins, who try to reduce all forms of existence to one fun-

damental reality (the storehouse-consciousness) with the intention
of showing that they are not worthy objects of pursuit; and second-
ly, the "bracketing-off approach", as exemplified by the
Madhyamikas, who "bracket-off" metaphysical speculation of all
kinds as expedient devices, and hold that the transcending of world-
ly cares does not necessarily entails commitment to a particular
theory of their origin.
Fa-tsang is obviously aware of the heated debates raging around
this subject in Indian Buddhist circles, for he mentions them both in
the Treatiseand the Shih-erh-men-lunsu. 84 Unfortunately, he is totally
oblivious of what actually is at stake. Thus, in the Treatise,he states
that he sees no irreconcilable difference in the positions of the two
parties on the subject, which, in his own words, "do not contradict
but rather complement each other".85 This is how he explains the
Madhyamika idea of the emptiness of dependent nature:
During the period of the decay of the Law, the faculty of sentient beings gradual-
ly degenerates; and when they hear that dependent nature exists, they do not
understandthat it is a [special] form of existence not differentfrom emptiness, and
grasp at it as existence in the ordinary sense. Thus, masters like Bhavaviveka [try
to] undermine their belief in the reality of dependent nature, until they see it as
empty. [They assert that] only when the absolute emptiness of dependent nature is
apprehended would the peculiar meaning of existence with respect to dependent
nature be known.86
As we have seen, when the Madhyamikas declare that "dependent

nature" is empty, they do not have the criticism of the ordinary
people's belief in the reality of conditioned objects in mind. They
are trying to refute the Yogacarins' belief that while things depen-
dent on causes and conditions are unreal, the causes and conditions
giving rise to things are not unreal. In short, they are trying to
refute the realistic assumption underlying the Yogacara teaching of
ideation-only. Fa-tsang understands the Yogacara view of the reali-
ty of "dependent nature" in the following manner:
Again, when sentient beings hear that dependent nature is absolutely empty,
they cannot comprehend that it is a [particular] form of emptiness not different
from existence, and grasp at it as emptiness in the ordinary sense. Thus, masters
like Dharmapala refute their [misconceived] notion of emptiness, and retain the
idea of illusory being. [They maintain that] only when [the concept of] illusory ex-
84
Consult T, vol. 45, p. 501a-b & T, vol. 42, p. 215-a-b respectively.
85
T, vol. 45, p. 501a. 15-16.
86
Ibid., p. 501a. 16-20.
218 LIU MING-WOOD
istence is established would the non-duality of emptiness and being be understood.

For the negation of all beings is not the true emptiness. Thus, in order to establish
the true emptiness, they reject [the conventional understanding ofl emptiness.87
As has been shown, when the Yogacarins declare that "dependent

nature" is real, they are thinking of the storehouse-consciousness
and its ideas, which provide the material for the formation of condi-
tioned objects. When "existence" is used to refer to the actual ex-
istence of the origin of all conditioned objects, i.e., the storehouse-
consciousness and its ideas, the term means much more than "il-
lusory being", and to read the Madhyamika idea of "tentative ex-
istence" into the Yogacara characterization of "dependent nature"
as something real only obscures what is actually at issue.
It is also enlightening to see where Fa-tsang locates the weakness
of the Yogacara conception of the three natures, which has
prompted him to offer a new interpretation of his own. When it is
asked how he can maintain that the tathata(perfect nature) has the
aspect of "responding to conditions" when all holy scriptures
describe it as immutable and eternal, Fa-tsang responds:
When the holy [scriptures] describe the tathata as "immutable", [they mean
that] when the tathata, in response to conditions, forms [phenomena] pure and im-
pure, it never loses its self-essence, even though it forever gives rise to [phenomena]
pure and impure. Since the tathatdis the eternal which is not different from the non-
eternal, it is known as the "inconceivable eternal". [In describing the tathataas im-
mutable,] they do not have in mind "immutable" in the ordinary sense of the
term, which does not give rise to dharmas. If one thinks that the tathatais described
as immutable because it does not give rise to dharmas,this is an erroneous view, and
one has missed the real meaning of the "true eternal". For the true eternal is the
eternal which is not different from the non-eternal. Since the eternal which is not
different from the non-eternal is above all discriminations, it is given the name of
the true eternal ".88
If we remember that Fa-tsang in his p 'an-chiao has criticized

Yogacarism for the rigid line it draws between the tathata and the
storehouse-consciousness, it is clear that the phrase "erroneous
view" in the above quotation has a definite referent, i.e., the
Yogacara conception of the tathata as "immutable and not giving
rise to dharmas".89 Thus, we can see that even though both the
Madhyamikas and Fa-tsang have discerned serious shortcomings in
the Yogacara doctrine of the three natures, they are miles apart
87 Ibid., p. 501a. 21-26.

88 Ibid., p. 500a. 20-27.
89
Refer to T, vol. 45, p. 484c.
with regard to where the shortcoming exactly lies. To the

Madhyamikas, what is objectionable in the Yogacara version of the
three-nature doctrine is the general ontological framework within
which the doctrine is understood. Fa-tsang, on the other hand, does
not share the Madhyamikas' misgivings regarding metaphysical
speculation. Rather, his dissatisfaction is directed at the Yogacara
conception of the tathata("perfect nature" in Fa-tsang's version of
the three natures), which, in Fa-tsang's opinion, has only the aspect
of "changelessness" but not the aspect of "responding to condi-
tions ".
Two observations should be made on Fa-tsang's criticism:
i. Fa-tsang maintains that his conception of the tathatd(perfect

nature) is superior to that of the Yogacarins, for unlike the
Yogacarins who separate the eternal from the non-eternal, the
tathatawhich he teaches is "the eternal which is not different from
the non-eternal". In other words, it embraces both aspects of
"changelessness" and "responding to conditions". However, even
if we grant that, we may still ask whether the unity of the eternal
(noumenal) and the non-eternal (phenomenal) in Fa-tsang's notion
of the tathatais a necessary unity basic to the nature of the tathata,or
merely a contingent unity which can be removed in theory without
affecting the identity of the two sides in question. As we have seen
at the end of the last section, so long as the tathatais considered as
absolutely pure, so that ignorance, the immediate cause of the aris-
ing of phenomena, cannot be said to be intrinsic to its nature, its
non-eternal aspect is only the outcome of its contingent association
with a factor foreign to its essence, and as such, is not necessary to
its being. To borrow the simile of the ocean and the wind of the
TCCHL, it is true that so long as the wind of ignorance is blowing,
waves (the non-eternal, phenomena) will appear on the surface of
the ocean (the eternal, the noumenal). However, once the wind
calms down, the waves (the non-eternal, phenomena) will cease to
arise. Nevertheless, the ocean (the eternal, the noumenal) is still the
same ocean even without its former undulating appearance.
ii. We have seen that the Madhyamikas criticize the Yogacarins
for making a distinction between the origin and the derivative in
taking "perfect nature" and "dependent nature" as real and "im-
aginary nature" as unreal. The same charge can be brought
against Fa-tsang's thesis of the dual aspects of "perfect nature".
And if this criticism has proved embarrassing to the Yogacarins, it
220 LIU MING-WOOD
is even more pernicious in the case of Fa-tsang. Since the

Yogacarins consider the "origin" (storehouse-consciousness) as
partly pure and partly impure, the condition for the arising of the
"derivative" (phenomena) can still be located in the origin itself. In
maintaining that the tathata is perfectly pure and "never loses its
self-essense", it is difficult to conceive how Fa-tsang can justify his
claim that the "changeless" aspect of perfect nature (which is
perfectly pure) is one with its aspect of "responding to conditions"
(which brings forth all forms of impurities) and both are equally
essential to the nature of the tathata-,they are "one single essence,
not two. "'90
University of Hong Kong
90 Refer to n. 49 above.

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The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism

Author(s): Liu Ming-Wood 廖明活

THE THREE-NATURE DOCTRINE AND

Introduction ........................... ....................... 181

This article is written as a sequel of a former paper of mine enti-

HTC (R) Hsu tsang-ching MOM, edited by Ying-yin Hsu-tsang-chingwei-yuan-

yen terminology) in the writings of Hui-yiuan NA of the Ching-

I. THE CONCEPT OF THE THREE NATURES AND ITS TRANSFORMATION

1. The Three-Nature Doctrine in the Samdhinirmocana-sutra:

true nature of all dharmas. This true nature is comprehended by bodhisattvasdue to

4 T, vol. 16, p. 693a. 15-25. Etienne Lamotte, trans., SS (Louvain: Universite

de Louvain, 1935), pp. 188-189.

Men wrongly believe that there are self-sufficient objects with

2. The Three-Nature Doctrine in the Mahaya-nasamgraha-s'astra:

resembling the ideation-only philosophy of the Yogararins in the chapter entitled,

mation of the orthodox Buddhist view that the comprehension of

As for "imaginary character", the s'astracomments, "It is the

jects but ideas only''.10 Finally, "perfect character" is "the com-

"Imaginary nature" comes into being when the mind-conscious-

of six consciousnesses, i.e., eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-

Several conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis of the

3. The Tatha/gatagarbhaDoctrine of the Ta-ch'eng ch'i-hsin lun

17 To be more exact, the MS regards the storehouse-consciousness as essentially

it represents the ground of everyday existence and the origin of all

fer to my article, op. cit., p. 13, nnf. 10 & 11.

COAMAid2 is unanimously regarded as the most authoritative interpretation of

The mind as phenomena (samsdra) depends on the tathagatagarbhafor its ex-

The storehouse-consciousness again has two aspects: the aspect of

To emphasize the inseparability of the pure mind, ignorance and

21 T, vol. 32, p. 576b. 7-9. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., op. cit., p. 36.

This theme of the oneness of the noumenal and the phenomenal is

From the above account, it is obvious that the teaching of the

24 T, vol. 32, p. 580a. 17-20. Y. S. Hakeda, trans., pp. 76-77.

As for "dependent nature", Hui-yiuan defines it as "the real

Thus, if put in the words of the TCCHL, by "dependent nature",

Hui-yiuan begins his explanation of "imaginary nature" with a

This passage seems to suggest that by "imaginary nature", Hui-

Comparing the accounts of the three-nature doctrine in the MS

35 It should be noted that Hui-yuan quotes the MS frequently in his exposition of

teaching of the Mahayana. Nevertheless, the aforementioned

II. THE DUAL ASPECTS OF THE THREE NATURES 36

Fa-tsang's (643-712) exposition of the three-nature doctrine is

36 Fa-tsang's interpretation of the three-nature doctrine has been much dis-

with a discussion on a concept which by popular consent belongs to

38 In Fa-tsang's p'an-chiaoscheme, the SS and MS represent the elementary

40 In the Mi-yen-chingsu, Fa-tsang follows Paramartha'sdesignation of the three

natures are discussed in the order of "imaginary nature", "depen-

In taking "imaginary nature" as "the function of imagining of the

41 HTC, vol. 34, p. 252a. 10-13.

existent, even though assuming the semblance of being in concur-

So far, this definition of "dependent nature" does not seem to dif-

It is therefore not difficult to understand how Fa-tsang can main-

"semblances of existence". If "semblances of existence" are formed, they must

It is in his explanation of "perfect nature" that Fa-tsang deviates

Thus, by "perfect nature", Fa-tsang has in mind the pure mind

III. THE UNITY OF THE THREE NATURES

A feature which emerges with our exegesis of Fa-tsang's thesis of

an expression of an understanding of reality similar to that of the

53 Consult the discussion on the final teaching of the Mahayana in section 3 of

my article, op. cit.

Since the tathdgatagarbha,i.e., perfect nature, is entirely pure,

2. Fa-tsang's proof of the unity of the three natures follows the

5 T, vol. 44, p. 529a. 7-14.