OVERVIEW OF IAEA PROJECT ON SAFETY ASPECTS OF NPP AGEING

Jaroslav Pachner
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, IAEA

This paper1 presents an overview of IAEA work on safety aspects of ageing NPPs and
indicates future direction aimed at strengthening capabilities of IAEA Member States in
managing long term NPP safety.

The IAEA initiated information exchange on safety aspects of NPP ageing in 1985 to increase
awareness of the emerging safety issue relating to physical ageing of plant systems, structures
and components (SSCs). A systematic project based on recommendations of 1988 Advisory
Group [1] was commenced in 1989 to assist Member States in understanding ageing of SSCs
important to safety and in effective ageing management of these SSCs. The project integrates
into a common knowledge base information generated by Member States on the evaluation
and management of safety aspects of NPP ageing, derives guidance, and assists Member
States in the application of this guidance.
This paper reviews main results of the project against the following mission and objectives
recommended by the 1988 Advisory Group.
Mission: To facilitate the exchange of information and to promote co-operation among IAEA
Member States towards understanding and managing the ageing degradation of NPP
components, with the aim of maintaining safe and reliable plant operation.
Objective: To establish and maintain, under the auspices of the IAEA, a programme of
international co-operation for increased awareness and understanding of ageing degradation
processes, and for the development of methods and guidelines to manage ageing for safe and
reliable operation of NPPs.
The main results of the project fall into three groups: awareness, guidance, and application of
the guidance.

1. AWARENESS
Following up on the first International Conference on Safety Aspects of Ageing and
Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants [2] which was organized by the IAEA in 1987,
increased awareness of physical ageing of SSCs and its potential safety impact was achieved
by the development and wide dissemination in 1990 of an IAEA-TECDOC on Safety Aspects
of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing [3]. This is a reference document addressing safety aspects of
ageing, material ageing mechanisms (for metals, concrete structures, polymers, electronics
and other non-metals), and an approach needed to manage ageing of SSCs effectively. While
in the 1980s most people believed that classical maintenance programmes were adequate for
dealing with the ageing of nuclear plants, in the 1990s the need for ageing and life
management of NPPs became widely recognized.

1
Presented at IAEA Technical Meeting on Enhancing NPP Safety, Performance and Life Extension through
Effective Ageing Management, 24-26 June 2002, Vienna
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2. GUIDANCE
To assist Member States in managing NPP ageing effectively, the Agency has developed a set
of programmatic guidelines, component specific guidelines for major NPP components
important to safety, and ageing management review guidelines.

2.1 Programmatic Guidelines

The following programmatic guidance reports have been developed using experience of
Member States.
Data Collection and Record Keeping for the Management of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing [4]
provides information on data requirements and a system for data collection and record
keeping. General data needs for the evaluation and management of physical ageing fall into
three categories: baseline information, operating history data, and maintenance history data.
Baseline information is the broad category of nuclear power plant data that define a
component and the plant and system in which it is located. It also describes the component’s
initial, undegraded material condition and functional capability, as well as a limiting operating
envelope represented by the design service conditions and other operational limits.
Operating history data describe the actual service conditions experienced by a component,
including data on process conditions, chemistry, the ambient environment and transients (such
as pressure-temperature transients for pressure retaining components) and data on the
component’s availability testing and failures.
Maintenance history data consist of condition monitoring data (generated by test, inspection
and surveillance activities that provide information on the degree of material and functional
degradation), repair or modification history of components, and the overall maintenance cost
history.
General data needs should be used only as a basis for deriving component specific data for
components important to safety or plant service life. Needs for component specific data vary
according to the different component types (e.g. pressure boundary components, mechanical
or electrical equipment). Guidance is provided in this respect as well as examples of data
needs for a reactor pressure vessel, an emergency diesel generator, and cables. This IAEA
report also presents guidance on a data collection and record keeping system that supports
ageing management, and gives examples of actual record keeping systems used at NPPs.
Methodology for the Management of Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components Important
to Safety [5] gives guidance on screening SSCs to make effective use of available resources
and on performing ageing management studies to identify or develop effective ageing
management actions for the selected components. The methodology documented in the report
consists of three basic steps:
(1) Selecting, from the safety perspective, plant components in which ageing should be
evaluated, by assessing the effects of ageing degradation on the ability of the
components to perform their design functions and crediting existing programmes and
activities that manage ageing effectively.
(2) Performing ageing management studies for the selected components to determine
appropriate ageing management actions. A two phased method reviews current
understanding, monitoring and mitigation of component ageing, and identifies or
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develops effective and practical technology and practices for component ageing
monitoring and mitigation.
(3) Using results of the ageing management studies to take appropriate ageing management
actions (i.e. improving existing operations and maintenance practices and the design)
and to improve relevant codes, standards and regulatory requirements.
Today, this methodology is widely accepted and used.
Implementation and Review of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing Management Programmes [6]
provides information on the systematic ageing management process and an organizational
model for its implementation. This guidance report supports increased emphasis on proper
organizational arrangements and utility processes to ensure that SSCs important to safety have
the required integrity and functional capability. The report recognizes existing NPP and
external programmes that contribute to the management of ageing, such as operations,
surveillance, maintenance, technical support (including operating experience feedback), and
research and development programmes, and provides guidance on their co-ordination and
integration using a systematic ageing management process. This generally applicable process
is illustrated in Fig. 1, which is an adaptation of Deming’s ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act’ cycle to
ageing management of an SSC.
PLAN
2. Co-ordination of SSC
ageing management programme

• Document regulatory requirements

and safety criteria
• Document relevant activities
• Describe co-ordination mechanism
• Optimize AMP based on current
Minimize
understanding, self-assessment
Improve expected
and peer reviews
AMP degradation
effectiveness

ACT
5. SSC maintenance
Managing ageing effects:
• Preventive maintenance
• Corrective maintenance
• Spare parts management
• Replacement
• Maintenance history
DO
1. Understanding SSC ageing
3. SSC operation/use
The key to effective ageing management:
• Materials and material properties Managing ageing mechanisms:
• Stressors and operating conditions • Operation according to procedures
• Ageing mechanisms and technical specifications
• Degradation sites • Chemistry control
• Condition indicators • Environment control
• Consequences of ageing • Operating history, including
degradation and failures transient records

CHECK
Correct 4. SSC inspection, monitoring Check for
unacceptable and assessments degradation
degradation Detecting and assessing ageing effects:
• Test and calibration
• In-service inspection
• Surveillance
• Leak detection
• Assessment of functional
capability / fitness for service
• Record keeping

FIG. 1. A systematic ageing management process (AMP: ageing management programme,

SSC: system, structure or component).
 –4–

SSC ageing is managed by:

- Prudent operation consistent with requirements aimed at minimizing degradation;
- Inspection and monitoring consistent with requirements aimed at timely detection and
characterization of any degradation;
- Assessment of the observed degradation in accordance with appropriate guidelines to
determine functional capability; and
- Mitigation, repair or replacement to correct unacceptable degradation.
Equipment Qualification in Operational Nuclear Power Plants [7] documents current
methods and practices relating to upgrading and preserving equipment qualification in
operational NPPs and reviewing the effectiveness of plant equipment qualification
programmes. Qualification of equipment important to safety ensures its capability to perform
designated safety functions on demand under postulated service conditions including harsh
accident environment (e.g. loss of coolant, high energy line break and seismic or other
vibration conditions).
Qualification considers ageing effects by simulating them during test; evaluating their
significance by analysis or operating experience; and minimizing age related degradation
through surveillance, maintenance and periodic replacement of installed equipment or parts
susceptible to ageing degradation. The report describes the equipment qualification (EQ)
process, illustrated in Fig. 2, and gives guidance on each of its phases.

Equipment Qualification (EQ) Process

Design Inputs Establishing EQ Preserving EQ

Feedback

Design Inputs Establishing EQ Preserving EQ

• identify PIEs • define EQ requirements and criteria • installation and maintenance control
• specify service conditions • select qualification method • replacement control
• determine required safety functions • establish qualification • modification control
• develop list of equipment, including • define installation and • service condition monitoring
functions and mission time maintenance requirements • analysis of degradation and failures
• document qualification results • analysis of experience feedback
• personnel training
• documentation
Upgrading EQ
Upgrading EQ is a special case of establishing EQ
that applies to existing equipment in operating plants.
Upgrading EQ may also involve establishing or verifying
design input information.

FIG.2. Equipment qualification process.

 –5–

The set of programmatic guidelines will be completed by a report on Proactive Ageing

Management (to be issued) that is being finalized. The report will give guidance on
recognizing common weaknesses in NPP ageing management and on the application of the
systematic ageing management process to strengthen the role of proactive ageing
management. Proactive strategy and culture facilitates forward planning, avoiding surprises,
and readiness for possible problems – it is one of the key organizational characteristics
important to both plant safety and performance.

2.2 Component specific guidelines

The guidance of Ref. [5] has been used to implement pilot studies on management of ageing
or representative NPP components important to safety [8] and follow up Co-ordinated
Research Projects on management of ageing of concrete containment buildings and in-
containment instrumentation and control cables, and to develop comprehensive technical
documents on Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plant
Components Important to Safety. The following comprehensive reports have been issued:
Steam generators [9]
Concrete containment buildings [10]
CANDU pressure tubes [11]
PWR pressure vessels [12]
PWR vessel internals [13]
Metal components of BWR containment [14]
In-containment I&C Cables [15]
CANDU reactor assemblies [16]
and the report on PWR primary piping is being finalized.
The information presented in these reports includes component description and design basis,
potential ageing mechanisms and their significance, operating guidelines to control age relate
degradation, inspection and monitoring requirements and technologies, and assessment and
maintenance methods. Respective roles of major NPP programmes in the management of
ageing and an approach for integrating them within a systematic components specific ageing
management programme are shown using an application of the systematic ageing
management process.

2.3 Ageing management review guidelines

AMAT Guidelines [17] is a reference document for IAEA Ageing Management Assessment
Teams (AMAT) and for utility self-assessments; these reviews can be programmatic or
problem oriented. The scope of a programmatic review of an NPP ageing management
programme (AMP) includes AMP strategy, AMP organization (including adequacy of
resources), AMP activities, AMP results (e.g. physical condition of SSCs), and AMP
monitoring (self-assessment and continuous improvement process). A problem oriented
review is focused on specific age-related problems or issues which could be specific
components or structures, (e.g. pumps, steam generators, cables, valves, structures) or specific
ageing mechanism (e.g. irradiation/thermal embrittlement, fatigue, corrosion, wear).
 –6–

3. APPLICATION OF GUIDANCE
Development of guidance is beneficial in its own right because it provides opportunities for
practitioners from organizations with both direct an indirect responsibility for nuclear safety
to address in an interactive environment important issues of common interest and to learn
from each other. However, it is the actual application of guidance which has a positive impact
on nuclear safety. The Agency, therefore, devotes significant effort in assisting Member
States in the application of its guidance. Three forms of assistance that have been used in the
project on Safety Aspects of NPP Ageing are training courses, advisory safety review services
and co-ordinated research projects.
Interregional, regional and national training courses on managing safety aspects of ageing
have been held within the framework of the Technical Cooperation programme, primarily for
participants from developing Member States. It is planned to update and repeat these courses
periodically.
Ad-hoc advisory services on the development of a systematic ageing management programme
have been provided since 1992 on request to interested organizations in Member States (e.g.
WWER 440/213 group of plant operators or the Swiss group of plant operators); and the
systematic AMAT missions have been carried out since 1999.
Co-ordinated research projects (CRPs), which bring together researchers from both
developing and industrialized countries to further research on a specific research topic, have
been used to assist Member States in the application of the methodology for management of
ageing [6] to selected plant components important to safety. Through the CRPs on ageing
management of concrete containment buildings and instrumentation and control (I&C) cables,
component specific ageing management methods have been developed/enhanced and know-
how transferred; the results of these CRPs are presented in Refs. [10] and [15].
In addition, it is worth to note that assistance on plant type specific age related degradation
has been provided through extrabudgetary programmes (EBP), such as the EBP on Mitigation
of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) in RBMK Reactors dia.300 mm Piping.
The EBP addressed all aspects of the issue: ISI, assessment techniques, repair and mitigation
techniques, and water chemistry and decontamination. The activities include technology
transfer, information exchange, training, and development of guidance on managing IGSCC
in RBMK reactors.

4. FUTURE PLANS
The focus of the project on Safety Aspects of NPP Ageing has progressively shifted from
developing awareness, to preparing first programmatic, and then component specific
guidelines. At present the focus is and in future is expected to be on providing services to
assist Member States in the application of the guidelines. A reduced effort is planned to
facilitate information exchange through the preparation of additional guidelines and updating
of existing guidelines.
Increased interest in long term operation/life extension2 of NPPs, has been shown by the
increasing number of Member State requests for assistance in ageing management, equipment

2
Life extension means a continuous operation beyond an established licensed term or a period established by safety
evaluation.
 –7–

qualification, design basis reconstitution, configuration management, PSR and life extension.
To provide for an effective support of Member States in this area, the Agency has therefore
formulated the Nuclear Safety Strategy on Long Term Operation of Nuclear Facilities. It is
outlined below.
The objective of the strategy is to strengthen Member States capabilities in managing safety
aspects of long term operation of nuclear facilities to ensure acceptable level of safety.
The main guidance document on safety aspects of long term NPP operation is a Safety Guide
on Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants issued in 1994, which has been revised
using Member States experience and approved by the Commission on Safety Standards in
June 2002. Periodic Safety Review (PSR) is an effective regulatory instrument used by many
IAEA Member States to control long term NPP operation, including life extension. PSR is a
comprehensive and systematic reassessment of NPP safety carried out at 10-year intervals,
which is complementary to ongoing regulatory surveillance and reviews. It includes review of
both physical and non-physical ageing to provide assurance that the plant is safe in light of
current safety standards and is likely to be safe until the next PSR or end of service life. For
more details see Ref. [18].
Implementation of the strategy relies on the following complementary groups of activities of
IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Installation Safety that build on the existing guidance and the
extensive experience in assisting Member States in its application.
(a) The regular programme activities that develop guidance on the basis of Member States
experience.
A supplementary guidance on PSR will be provided in a Tecdoc on “Experience of
Member States in Implementing PSRs” which is presently in preparation, in a planned
Tecdoc on “Major Safety Issues Identified by PSRs and Associated Safety
Improvements”, and in other guidance documents that will elaborate, as needed,
different Safety Factors of PSR relating to long term operation.
(b) National and regional Technical Co-operation projects that assist in the application in
Member States of the guidance developed by the regular programme.
Guidelines for safety review services on PSR/long term plant operation will be prepared
in the 2004-2005 programme; they will include comprehensive peer reviews as well as
reviews focused on specific Safety Factors of PSR.

The above activities are expected to help Member States achieve the following results
relevant to long term NPP operation: regulatory requirements and technical guidelines
consistent with international standards and practices; documented current licensing basis;
significant safety issues identified and adequately resolved; and continued safe plant
operation.
 –8–

5. CONCLUSION
Through the project on Safety Aspects of NPP Ageing and associated activities, the IAEA has
contributed to increased awareness and understanding of ageing processes and safety issues,
developed a comprehensive body of guidance on managing ageing, and helped Member States
in the application of the guidance and in the identification and resolution of age related safety
issues to ensure long term safety of ageing NPPs.
Looking forward, implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Strategy on Long Term
Operation of Nuclear Facilities will facilitate systematic, co-ordinated and effective assistance
to Member States to ensure long term safety of NPPs. Thus, it can be concluded that the
mission and objective of the programme recommended by the 1988 Advisory Group have
been successfully implemented.

Acknowledgement
It has been a privilege to lead and manage since 1990 the IAEA work on managing safety
aspects of ageing NPPs. This provided the opportunity to bring together many experts from
design, operating, technical support, regulatory, and research organizations. Results described
in the paper were produced together with these experts. The main contributors included:
Juan Carlos Almagro and Dario Jinchuk from Argentina; Tim Andreeff, Anand
Anandakumaran, Chris Cragg, Pel Castaldo, Brian Jarman, Bill Clendening, Bernie Ewing,
Cedric Jobe, Carmina Maruska, Bill Nowak, Ken Pereira, Claude Seni, Basma Shalaby, Don
Stonkus, Peter Wigful, Raidis Zemdegs from Canada; Kaisa Simola from Finland; Roger
Capel, François Carlin, Frederic Boutaud, Claude Faidy, Jean-Yves Henry, Jean-Pierre Hutin,
Alain Paziaud, Pierre Petrequin, François-Noel Remy from France; Bohumil Bartonicek,
Milan Brumovsky, Radim Havel, Petr Krs, Karel Matocha, Vladivoj Reznik from Czech
Republic; Peter Berg, Manfred Erve, Wolfgang Michel, Jürgen Schmidt from Germany; Joga
Singh Bora, Ashok Kumar Ghosh, Prabhat Kumar from India; Naotaki Ito, Hisaaki Kudoh,
Akira Nonaka, Hideyuki Okazaki, Wataru Sagawa, Takao Takahashi from Japan; Chi Se-
Hwan, Hwang Ill-Soon, Jin Tae-Eun, Sohn Gap-Heon from Korea; Bob de Boer, André de
Jong from the Netherlands; Sergei Bugaenko, Alexander Kononenko, Yuri Dragunov from
Russia; Karol Rovny from Slovak Republic; Leon Cizelj from Slovenia; Javier Alonso
Chicote, Juan Bros from Spain; Tore Nilsson, Kjell Spång from Sweden; Walter Heep, Peter
Krebs, Jan Stejskal, Marc Tavlet, Kurt Thoma, Phillip Tipping from Switzerland; Phil Banks,
Sue Burnay, Derek Goodison, Jim Seddon, Brian Tomkins, Bill West, John Wintle from the
United Kingdom; Lee Banic, Art DuCharme, Bob Hermannn, Pat Higgins, Phil Holzman,
David Hostetler, John Hutchinson, Chris Gratton, Soni Kasturi, Pao-Tsin Kuo, Phil
MacDonald, Dan Naus, Tom Mager, Vik Shah, Jeff Statton, Tom Tai, Gary Toman, Jit Vora
from the United States.
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 – 10 –

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