Admin Full Text Set 1

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1051. May 19, 1903.]
THE UNITED STATES , complainant-appellee, vs . FRED L. DORR ET AL. ,

defendants-appellants.
F .G. Waite for appellants.

Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITION; GOVERNMENT DEFINED. — The term

"government" as employed in Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission
is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the
concrete organism of the Government.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. — When an
offense may be committed in any of several different modes and the complaint alleges
the crime to have been committed in two or more modes, it is sufficient to prove the
offense committed in any one of them.
3. ID.; SEDITION. — The publication of an article can not be punished under
Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies
unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws.
4. ID.; ID. The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine
Commission and its members is not a libel upon the Government and does not fall
within said Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.
DECISION
LADD , J : p
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government
of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The
complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as
follows:
"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct
any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to
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cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court."
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April
6, 1902, under the caption of " A few hard facts."
The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following passages of the article as those
upon which he relies to sustain the conviction:
"Sidney Adamson, in a late letter in 'Leslie's weekly,' has the following to
say of the action of the Civil Commission in appointing rascally natives to
important Government positions:
"'It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil Commission,
through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its continual disregard for the
records of natives obtained during the military rule of the Islands, has, in its
distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be
in jail or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the appointment of one Tecson
as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work that the Commission is
doing all over the Islands, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the
men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.'
xxx xxx xxx
"There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a
good many instances rascals.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Commission has exalted to the highest positions in the Islands
Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no
personal character.
xxx xxx xxx
"Editor Valdez, of 'Miau,' made serious charges against two of the native
Commissioners — charges against Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true,
would brand the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result? . . .
[Reference is then made to the prosecution and conviction of Valdez for libel
'under a law which specifies that the greater the truth the greater the libel.'] Is it the
desire of the people of the United States that the natives against whom these
charges have been made (which, if true, absolutely vilify their personal characters
) be permitted to retain their seats on the Civil Commission, the executive body of
the Philippine Government, without an investigation?
xxx xxx xxx
"It is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by
the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt. The fiscal system, upon which life,
liberty, and justice depends, is admitted by the Attorney-General himself to be
most unsatisfactory. It is a fact that the Philippine judiciary is far from being what
it should. Neither fiscals nor judges can be persuaded to convict insurgents when
they wish to protect them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing in the province
[of Tayabas], and especially the northern end of it; it is said that it is impossible to
secure the conviction of lawbreakers and outlaws by the native justices, or a
prosecution by the native fiscals.
xxx xxx xxx
"The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand for an arbitrary
government, especially when evidences of carpet bagging and rumors of graft are
too thick to be pleasant."
We do not understand that it is claimed that the defendants succeeded in establishing at

the trial the truth of any of the foregoing statements. The only question which we have
considered is whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No.
292, above cited.
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that
section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels
which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which
tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which
suggest or incite rebellions conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to be
punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed against
the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
and must, in addition, tend to some one of the results enumerated in the section. The
article in Question is described in the complaint as "a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
which tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests
and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order of the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in
considering indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several
different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been
committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed
in any one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense" (Com.
vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., Mass., 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if
any one of the substantive charges into which the complaint may be separated has been
made out.
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article in question has no
appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office," or to
"instigate'' any person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of
Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of a certain form of libel, may be
characterized in general terms as seditious tendencies. This is recognized in the
description of the offenses punished by this section, which is found in the title of the act,
where they are defined as the crimes of "seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."
Excluding from consideration the offense of publishing "scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,"
which may conceivably stand on a somewhat different footing, the offenses punished by
this section all consist in inciting, orally or in writing, to acts of disloyalty or disobedience
to the lawfully constituted authorities in these Islands. And while the article in question,
which is, in the main, a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil Commission in
appointing natives to office, may have had the effect of exciting among certain classes
dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures, we are unable to discover anything
in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may be
called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. There can be no conviction,
therefore, for any of the offenses described in the section on which the complaint is based,
unless it is for the offense of publishing a scurrilous libel against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Can the article be regarded as embraced within the description of "scurrilous libels against
the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands?"
In the determination of this question we have encountered great difficulty, by reason of the
almost entire lack of American precedents which might serve as a guide in the
construction of the law. There are, indeed, numerous English decisions, most of them of
the eighteenth century, on the subject of libelous attacks upon the "Government, the
constitution, or the law generally," attacks upon the Houses of Parliament, the Cabinet, the
Established Church, and other governmental organisms, but these decisions are not now
accessible to us, and, if they were, they were made under such different conditions from
those which prevail at the present day, and are founded upon theories of government so
foreign to those which have inspired the legislation of which the enactment in question
forms a part, that they would probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In
England, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, any "written censure upon public men
for their conduct as such," as well as any written censure "upon the laws or upon the
institutions of the country," would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the
Government. (2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to
be the law in England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the common law of any
American State. "It is true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication
tending to possess the people with an ill opinion of the Government is a seditious libel (per
Holt, C. J., in R. vs. Tuchin, 1804, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in R. vs. Cobbett,
1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that doctrine now. Unless the words
used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to disturb the peace and
tranquillity of the Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all public
affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of England, 450.) Judge Cooley says (Const. Lim., 528): "The
English common-law rule which made libels on the constitution or the government
indictable, as it was administered by the courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and
circumstances of the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted in the
several States."
We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute (Code, sec. 6663), which is
apparently the only existing American statute of a similar character to that in question, and
from which much of the phraseology of the latter appears to have been taken, though with
some essential modifications.
The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. "92 by the
expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general
and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the
aggregate of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being,
administered? Either sense would doubtless be admissible.
"We understand, in modern political science . . . by the term "government",
that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to
live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society
by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is
the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration" again, we
understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the
aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the
time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms "government and
''administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that "government" is
often used for ''administration.''
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act," it is made
an offense to "write, print, utter, or publish," or "cause to procure to be written, printed,
uttered, or published," or to "knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing,
uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the
Government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or
the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either
house of the said Congress or the said President, or to bring-them, or either of them, into
contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either or any of them the hatred of the
good people of the United States," etc. The term "government" would appeal to be used
here in the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the
concrete organisms of the Government — the houses of Congress and the Executive —
which are also specially mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term is used in the
enactment under consideration.
It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort of a libel,
upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the laws and institutions of a
country, but we think an answer to this suggestion is that the expression "scurrilous libel"
is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the sense in which it is used in the general libel
law (Act No. 277) — that is, in the sense of written defamation of individuals — but in the
wider sense, in which it is applied in the common law to blasphemous, obscene, or
seditious publications in which there may be no element of defamation whatever. "The
word 'libel' as popularly used, seems to mean only defamatory words; but words written, if
obscene, blasphemous, or seditious, are technically called libels, and the publication of
them is, by the law of England, an indictable offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D.,
607, 627, per Bramwell, L. J. See Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, 211.)
While libels upon forms of government, unconnected with defamation of individuals, must
in the nature of things be of uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means an
imaginary one. An instance of a prosecution for an offense essentially of this nature is
Respublica vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 267, where the defendant was indicted "as a factious
and seditious person of a wicked mind and unquiet and turbulent disposition and
conversation, seditiously, maliciously, and willfully intending, as much as in him lay, to bring
into contempt and hatred the independence of the United States, the constitution of this
Commonwealth and of the United States, to excite popular discontent and dissatisfaction
against the scheme of polity instituted, and upon trial in the said United States and in the
said Commonwealth, to molest, disturb, and destroy the peace and tranquillity of the said
United States and of the said Commonwealth, to condemn the principles of the Revolution,
and revile, depreciate, and scandalize the characters of the Revolutionary patriots and
statesmen, to endanger, subvert, and totally destroy the republican constitutions and free
governments of the said United States and this Commonwealth, to involve the said United
States and this Commonwealth in civil war, desolation, and anarchy, and to procure by art
and force a radical change and alteration in the principles and forms of the said
constitutions and governments, without the free will, wish, and concurrence of the people
of the said United States and this Commonwealth, respectively," the charge being that "to
fulfill, perfect, and bring to effect his wicked, seditious, and detestable intentions aforesaid
he . . . falsely, maliciously, factiously, and seditiously did make, compose, write, and publish
the following libel, to wit: 'A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national
history. Its omens are always sinister and its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights of
experience blazing before our eves, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form
of government. It was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in
Rome. It has been tried in France and terminated in despotism. It was tried in England and
rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here and its issue will be
civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns its imperfections; no good
man but shudders at its miseries; no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave
man but draws his sword against its force. The institution of a scheme of polity so
radically contemptible and vicious is a memorable example of what the villainy of some
men can devise, the folly of others receive, and both establish, in despite of reason,
reflection, and sensation.'"
An attack upon the lawfully established system of civil government in the Philippine
Islands, like that which Dennie was accused of making upon the republican form of
government lawfully established in the United States and in the State of Pennsylvania
would, we think, if couched in scandalous language, constitute the precise offense
described in section 8 of Act No. 292 as a scurrilous libel against the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands.
Defamation of individuals, whether holding official positions or not, and whether directed
to their public conduct or to their private life, may always be adequately punished under the
general libel law. Defamation of the Civil Commission as an aggregation, it being "a body of
persons definite and small enough for its individual members to be recognized as such" (
Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, art. 277), as well as defamation of and of the
individual members of the Commission or of the Civil Governor, either in his public capacity
or as a private individual, may be so punished. The general libel law enacted by the
Commission was in force when Act No. 292 was passed. There was no occasion for any
further legislation on the subject of libels against the individuals by whom the Insular
Government is administered — against the Insular Government in the sense of the
aggregate of such individuals. There was occasion for stringent legislation against
seditious words or libels, and that is the main if not the sole purpose of the section under
consideration. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in enacting this
section, may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or scurrilous nature upon the
existing political system of the United States, or the political system established in these
Islands by the authority of the United States, as necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it
is not so reasonable to suppose that they conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the
government as necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems probable
that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of 1798, have expressly and
specifically mentioned the various public officials and collegiate governmental bodies
defamation of which they meant to punish as sedition.
The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United
States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the
Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the
governmental system by which the authority of the United States is enforced in these
Islands. The form of government by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not
assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the
government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of
their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy.
The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes
no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, with costs de
oficio.
Arellano, C .J ., Torres, Willard and Mapa, JJ ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956.]
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO , plaintiffs-appellees,

vs . NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants,
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS ,
defendants-appellants.
Valentin C. Gutierrez for appellees.

First Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Lorenzo Mosqueda for
appellants National Coconut Corporation and Board of Liquidators.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; TERM "GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES" CONSTRUED. — The term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines"
used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers to that government entity
through which functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty,
and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective
whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what
we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are
given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the Corporation Law, such as the National Coconut Corporation. Their
powers, duties and liabilities have to determined in the light of that law and of their
corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed
in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
2. STENOGRAPHERS; TRANSCRIPT FEES; PAYMENT OF FEES BEYOND THE
LIMIT PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES OF COURT, VALID. — It is true that in section 8, Rule
130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of not
less than 200 words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after filing of
the appeal, but where, as in the case at bar, the party has agreed and in fact has paid P1
per page for the services rendered by the stenographers and has not raised any
objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor General, the
payment of the fees became contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the
limit prescribed by the Rules of Court.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO , J : p
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of

First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court,
entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs
complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of
their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T.
Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed
the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19,
1953, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed
that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the
payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General issued an
order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct from the salary of
Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of P25 every payday and from the salary of Mateo A.
Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent
deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the National
Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a
government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers' fees under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. After trial, the court found for the plaintiffs declaring (1) "that
defendant National Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview
of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the payments already made by
said defendant to plaintiffs herein and received by the latter from the former in the total
amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic transcripts in question, are valid, just
and legal; and (3) that plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to make a refund of
these payments already received by them." This is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the
Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and among these
fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by
them that may be requested by any interested person (section 8). The fees in question
are for the transcript of notes taken during the hearing of a case in which the National
Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript was requested by its assistant
corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code de nes the
scope of the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as follows:
"'The Government of the Philippine Islands' is a term which refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is
made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to
the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government."
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation
may be considered as included in the term "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
As may be noted, the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" refers
to a government entity through which the functions of government are exercised,
including the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial or
municipal branches or other form of local government. This requires a little digression
on the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be de ned as "that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are
exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those
which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are
those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and
are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
"'(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons
and property from violence and robbery.
'(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and
between parents and children.
'(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
'(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
'(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
'(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
'(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations
of citizens.
'(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the
state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, p.
19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public
education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and
industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain
of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare
those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a
government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
(Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or
controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our
people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-
owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or
one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporations under
the Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation perform
certain functions of government make them a part of the Government of the
Philippines?
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that
they do not come under the classi cation of municipal or public corporation. Take for
instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of
"adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the
United States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of copra products and
the proper utilization of coconut by-products", a function which our government has
chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate
power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the
provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, "The
mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it
a public corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-
587). "By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government
divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the
corporation. . . . Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency
or instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer,
50 Phil., 288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term "Government of the Republic of
the Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local
government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from
the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties
and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate
charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in section
16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
"Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a
portion of the State." (Section 3, Act No. 1459 n , Corporation Law).
"'The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only
include organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and
legislative powers for the local, civil government and police regulations of the
inhabitants of the particular district included in the boundaries of the corporation.'
Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 312."
"In its more general sense the phrase 'municipal corporation' may include
both towns and counties, and other public corporations created by government
for political purposes. In its more common and limited signification, it embraces
only incorporated villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues,
85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661." (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p.
385.)
"We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and
strict sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the
inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate
capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation
with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local government
is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal
corporation proper." (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees
P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is taken
and P0.15 for each page after the ling of the appeal, but in this case the National
Coconut Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the services
rendered by the plaintiffs and has not raised any objection to the amount paid until its
propriety was disputed by the Auditor General. The payment of the fees in question
became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit
prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the question of procedure raised by appellants, su ce it to say that
the same is insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to a money claim
disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of prohibition the purpose of which
is to restrain the o cials concerned from deducting from plaintiffs' salaries the
amount paid to them as stenographers' fees. This case does not come under section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the Auditor General.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is a rmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Republic Act No. 1459" in the original document.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-45710. October 3, 1985.]
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ACTING DIRECTOR

ANTONIO T. CASTRO, JR. OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL
AND SAVINGS BANK, in his capacity as statutory receiver of Island
Savings Bank , petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and SULPICIO M. TOLENTINO , respondents.
I.B. Regalado, Jr., Fabian S. Lombos and Marino E. Eslao for petitioners.
Antonio R. Tupaz for private respondent.
DECISION
MAKASIAR , C.J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside as null and void the decision of the
Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. No. 52253-R dated February 11, 1977, modifying the decision
dated February 15, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, which dismissed the
petition of respondent Sulpicio M. Tolentino for injunction, specific performance or
rescission, and damages with preliminary injunction.
On April 28, 1965, Island Savings Bank, upon favorable recommendation of its legal
department, approved the loan application for P80,000.00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as
a security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate mortgage over his 100-
hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, Agusan, and covered by TCT No. T-305, and
which mortgage was annotated on the said title the next day. The approved loan
application called for a lump sum P80,000.00 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments
for a period of 3 years, with 12% annual interest. It was required that Sulpicio M. Tolentino
shall use the loan proceeds solely as an additional capital to develop his other property
into a subdivision.
On May 22, 1965, a mere P17,000.00 partial release of the P80,000.00 loan was made by
the Bank; and Sulpicio M. Tolentino and his wife Edita Tolentino signed a promissory note
for P17,000.00 at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of execution of
the contract at semi-annual installments of P3,459.00 (p. 64, rec.), An advance interest for
the P80,000.00 loan covering a 6-month period amounting to P4,800.00 was deducted
from the partial release of P17,000.00. But this pre-deducted interest was refunded to
Sulpicio M. Tolentino on July 23, 1965, after being informed by the Bank that there was no
fund yet available for the release of the P63,000.00 balance (p. 47, rec.). The Bank, thru its
vice-president and treasurer, promised repeatedly the release of the P63,000.00 balance
(p. 113, rec.).
On August 13, 1965, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, after finding Island Savings
Bank was suffering liquidity problems, issued Resolution No. 1049, which provides:
"In view of the chronic reserve deficiencies of the Island Savings Bank against its
deposit liabilities, the Board, by unanimous vote, decided as follows:
"1) To prohibit the bank from making new loans and
investments [except investments in government securities] excluding
extensions or renewals of already approved loans, provided that such
extensions or renewals shall be subject to review by the Superintendent of
Banks, who may impose such limitations as may be necessary to insure
correction of the bank's deficiency as soon as possible;
. . ." (p. 46, rec.).
On June 14, 1968, the Monetary Board, after finding that Island Savings Bank failed to put
up the required capital to restore its solvency, issued Resolution No. 967 which prohibited
Island Savings Bank from doing business in the Philippines and instructed the Acting
Superintendent of Banks to take charge of the assets of Island Savings Bank (pp. 48-49,
rec.).
On August 1, 1968, Island Savings Bank, in view of non-payment of the P17,000.00 covered
by the promissory note, filed an application for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage covering the 100-hectare land of Sulpicio M. Tolentino; and the sheriff
scheduled the auction for January 22, 1969.
On January 20, 1969, Sulpicio M. Tolentino filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Agusan for injunction, specific performance or rescission and damages with preliminary
injunction, alleging that since Island Savings Bank failed to deliver the P63,000.00 balance
of the P80,000.00 loan, he is entitled to specific performance by ordering Island Savings
Bank to deliver the P63,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from April 28, 1965, and if
said balance cannot be delivered, to rescind the real estate mortgage (pp. 32-43, rec.).
On January 21, 1969, the trial court, upon the filing of a P5,000.00 surety bond, issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Island Savings Bank from continuing with the
foreclosure of the mortgage (pp. 86-87, rec.).
On January 29, 1969, the trial court admitted the answer in intervention praying for the
dismissal of the petition of Sulpicio M. Tolentino and the setting aside of the restraining
order, filed by the Central Bank and by the Acting Superintendent of Banks (pp. 65-76, rec.).
On February 15, 1972, the trial court, after trial on the merits, rendered its decision, finding
unmeritorious the petition of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, ordering him to pay Island Savings
Bank the amount of P17,000.00 plus legal interest and legal charges due thereon, and
lifting the restraining order so that the sheriff may proceed with the foreclosure (pp. 135-
136, rec.).
On February 11, 1977, the Court of Appeals, on appeal by Sulpicio M. Tolentino, modified
the Court of First Instance decision by affirming the dismissal of Sulpicio M. Tolentino's
petition for specific performance, but it ruled that Island Savings Bank can neither
foreclose the real estate mortgage nor collect the P17,000.00 loan (pp. 30-31, rec.). prcd
Hence, this instant petition by the Central Bank.

The issues are:
1. Can the action of Sulpicio M. Tolentino for specific performance prosper?
2. Is Sulpicio M. Tolentino liable to pay the P17,000.00 debt covered by the promissory
note?
3. If Sulpicio M. Tolentino's liability to pay the P17,000.00 subsists, can his real estate
mortgage be foreclosed to satisfy said amount?.
When Island Savings Bank and Sulpicio M. Tolentino entered into an P80,000.00 loan
agreement on April 28, 1965, they undertook reciprocal obligations. In reciprocal
obligations, the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the
other (Penaco vs. Ruaya, 110 SCRA 46 [1981]; Vda. de Quirino vs. Pelarca, 29 SCRA 1
[1969]); and when one party has performed or is ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract, the other party who has not performed or is not ready and willing to perform
incurs in delay (Art. 1169 of the Civil Code). The promise of Sulpicio M. Tolentino to pay
was the consideration for the obligation of Island Savings Bank to furnish the P80,000.00
loan. When Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage on April 28, 1965, he
signified his willingness to pay the P80,000.00 loan. From such date, the obligation of
Island Savings Bank to furnish the P80,000.00 loan accrued. Thus, the Bank's delay in
furnishing the entire loan started on April 28, 1965, and lasted for a period of 3 years or
when the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 967 on June 14, 1968,
which prohibited Island Savings Bank from doing further business. Such prohibition made
it legally impossible for Island Savings Bank to furnish the P63,000.00 balance of the
P80,000.00 loan. The power of the Monetary Board to take over insolvent banks for the
protection of the public is recognized by Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, which took effect on
June 15, 1948, the validity of which is not in question.
The Monetary Board Resolution No. 1049 issued on August 13, 1965 cannot interrupt the
default of Island Savings Bank in complying with its obligation of releasing the P63,000.00
balance because said resolution merely prohibited the Bank from making new loans and
investments, and nowhere did it prohibit Island Savings Bank from releasing the balance of
loan agreements previously contracted. Besides, the mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an
engagement does not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does it constitute any
defense to a decree of specific performance (Gutierrez Repide vs. Afzelins and Afzelins, 39
Phil. 190 [1918]). And, the mere fact of insolvency of a debtor is never an excuse for the
non-fulfillment of an obligation but instead it is taken as a breach of the contract by him
(Vol. 17A, 1974 ed., CJS p. 650). LexLib
The fact that Sulpicio M. Tolentino demanded and accepted the refund of the pre-
deducted interest amounting to P4,800.00 for the supposed P80,000.00 loan covering a 6-
month period cannot be taken as a waiver of his right to collect the P63,000.00 balance.
The act of Island Savings Bank, in asking the advance interest for 6 months on the
supposed P80,000.00 loan, was improper considering that only P17,000.00 out of the
P80,000.00 loan was released. A person cannot be legally charged interest for a non-
existing debt. Thus, the receipt by Sulpicio M. Tolentino of the pre-deducted interest was
an exercise of his right to it, which right exist independently of his right to demand the
completion of the P80,000.00 loan. The exercise of one right does not affect, much less
neutralize, the exercise of the other.
The alleged discovery by Island Savings Bank of the over-valuation of the loan collateral
cannot exempt it from complying with its reciprocal obligation to furnish the entire
P80,000.00 loan. This Court previously ruled that bank officials and employees are
expected to exercise caution and prudence in the discharge of their functions (Rural Bank
of Caloocan, Inc. vs. C.A., 104 SCRA 151 [1981]). It is the obligation of the bank's officials
and employees that before they approve the loan application of their customers, they must
investigate the existence and valuation of the properties being offered as a loan security.
The recent rush of events where collaterals for bank loans turn out to be non-existent or
grossly over-valued underscore the importance of this responsibility. The mere reliance by
bank officials and employees on their customer's representation regarding the loan
collateral being offered as loan security is a patent non-performance of this responsibility.
If ever, bank officials and employees totally rely on the representation of their customers
as to the valuation of the loan collateral, the bank shall bear the risk in case the collateral
turn out to be over-valued. The representation made by the customer is immaterial to the
bank's responsibility to conduct its own investigation. Furthermore, the lower court, on
objections of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, had enjoined petitioners from presenting proof on the
alleged over-valuation because of their failure to raise the same in their pleadings (pp. 198-
199, t.s.n., Sept. 15, 1971). The lower court's action is sanctioned by the Rules of Court,
Section 2, Rule 9, which states that "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Petitioners, thus, cannot raise the
same issue before the Supreme Court.
Since Island Savings Bank was in default in fulfilling its reciprocal obligation under their
loan agreement, Sulpicio M. Tolentino, under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, may choose
between specific performance or rescission with damages in either case. But since Island
Savings Bank is now prohibited from doing further business by Monetary Board Resolution
No. 967, WE cannot grant specific performance in favor of Sulpicio M. Tolentino.
Rescission is the only alternative remedy left. WE rule, however, that rescission is only for
the P63,000.00 balance of the P80,000.00 loan, because the bank is in default only insofar
as such amount is concerned, as there is no doubt that the bank failed to give the
P63,000.00. As far as the partial release of P17,000.00, which Sulpicio M. Tolentino
accepted and executed a promissory note to cover it, the bank was deemed to have
complied with its reciprocal obligation to furnish a P17,000.00 loan. The promissory note
gave rise to Sulpicio M. Tolentino's reciprocal obligation to pay the P17,000.00 loan when
it falls due. His failure to pay the overdue amortizations under the promissory note made
him a party in default, hence not entitled to rescission (Article 1191 of the Civil Code). If
there is a right to rescind the promissory note, it shall belong to the aggrieved party, that is,
Island Savings Bank. If Tolentino had not signed a promissory note setting the date for
payment of P17,000.00 within 3 years, he would be entitled to ask for rescission of the
entire loan because he cannot possibly be in default as there was no date for him to
perform his reciprocal obligation to pay.
Since both parties were in default in the performance of their respective reciprocal
obligations, that is, Island Savings Bank failed to comply with its obligation to furnish the
entire loan and Sulpicio M. Tolentino failed to comply with his obligation to pay his
P17,000.00 debt within 3 years as stipulated, they are both liable for damages. Cdpr
Article 1192 of the Civil Code provides that in case both parties have committed a breach
of their reciprocal obligations, the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered
by the courts. WE rule that the liability of Island Savings Bank for damages in not furnishing
the entire loan is offset by the liability of Sulpicio M. Tolentino for damages, in the form of
penalties and surcharges, for not paying his overdue P17,000.00 debt. The liability of
Sulpicio M. Tolentino for interest on his P17,000.00 debt shall not be included in offsetting
the liabilities of both parties. Since Sulpicio M. Tolentino derived some benefit for his use
of the P17,000.00, it is just that he should account for the interest thereon.
WE hold, however, that the real estate mortgage of Sulpicio M. Tolentino cannot be entirely
foreclosed to satisfy his P17,000.00 debt.
The consideration of the accessory contract of real estate mortgage is the same as that of
the principal contract (Banco de Oro vs. Bayuga, 93 SCRA 443 [1979]). For the debtor, the
consideration of his obligation to pay is the existence of a debt. Thus, in the accessory
contract of real estate mortgage, the consideration of the debtor in furnishing the
mortgage is the existence of a valid, voidable, or unenforceable debt (Art. 2086, in relation
to Art. 2052, of the Civil Code).
The fact that when Sulpicio M. Tolentino executed his real estate mortgage, no
consideration was then in existence, as there was no debt yet because Island Savings Bank
had not made any release on the loan, does not make the real estate mortgage void for
lack of consideration. It is not necessary that any consideration should pass at the time of
the execution of the contract of real mortgage (Bonnevie vs. C.A., 125 SCRA 122 [1983]). It
may either be a prior or subsequent matter. But when the consideration is subsequent to
the mortgage, the mortgage can take effect only when the debt secured by it is created as
a binding contract to pay (Parks vs. Sherman, Vol. 176 N.W. p. 583, cited in the 8th ed.,
Jones on Mortgage, Vol. 2, pp. 5-6). And, when there is partial failure of consideration, the
mortgage becomes unenforceable to the extent of such failure (Dow, et al. vs. Poore, Vol.
172 N.E. p. 82, cited in Vol. 59, 1974 ed. CJS, p. 138). Where the indebtedness actually
owing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sum named in the mortgage, the
mortgage cannot be enforced for more than the actual sum due (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
vs. Peterson, Vol. 19, F(2d) p. 88, cited in 6th ed., Wiltsie on Mortgage, Vol. 1, p. 180). LLpr
Since Island Savings Bank failed to furnish the P63,000.00 balance of the P80,000.00 loan,
the real estate mortgage of Sulpicio M. Tolentino became unenforceable to such extent.
P63,000.00 is 78.75% of P80,000.00, hence the real estate mortgage covering 100
hectares is unenforceable to the extent of 78.75 hectares. The mortgage covering the
remainder of 21.25 hectares subsists as a security for the P17,000.00 debt. 21.25
hectares is more than sufficient to secure a P17,000.00 debt.
The rule of indivisibility of a real estate mortgage provided for by Article 2089 of the Civil
Code is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Article 2089 provides:
"A pledge or mortgage is indivisible even though the debt may be divided among
the successors in interest of the debtor or creditor.
"Therefore, the debtor's heirs who has paid a part of the debt can not ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied.
"Neither can the creditor's heir who have received his share of the debt return the
pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of other heirs who have not been
paid."
The rule of indivisibility of the mortgage as outlined by Article 2089 above-quoted

presupposes several heirs of the debtor or creditor which does not obtain in this case.
Hence, the rule of indivisibility of a mortgage cannot apply.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED FEBRUARY 11, 1977 IS
HEREBY MODIFIED, AND
1. SULPICIO M. TOLENTINO IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY IN FAVOR OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS THE SUM OF P17,000.00, PLUS P41,210.00 REPRESENTING 12% INTEREST
PER ANNUM COVERING THE PERIOD FROM MAY 22, 1965 TO AUGUST 22, 1985, AND
12% INTEREST ON THE TOTAL AMOUNT COUNTED' FROM AUGUST 22, 1985 UNTIL PAID;
2. IN CASE SULPICIO M. TOLENTINO FAILS TO PAY, HIS REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
COVERING 21.25 HECTARES SHALL BE FORECLOSED TO SATISFY HIS TOTAL
INDEBTEDNESS; AND
3. THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE COVERING 78.75 HECTARES IS HEREBY DECLARED
UNENFORCEABLE AND IS HEREBY ORDERED RELEASED IN FAVOR OF SULPICIO M.
TOLENTINO.
NO COSTS. SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino (Chairman) and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27275. November 18, 1967.]
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION , plaintiff-appellee, vs. NATIONAL

WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY , defendant-appellant.
The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.

Cesar R. Canonizado and E. Ignacio for plaintiff-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REP. ACT 912; MEANING OF TERM

"GOVERNMENT" THEREIN. — The term "government" without any qualification as used in
Republic Act 912, should be construed in its implied sense and not in the strict
signification of the term "Government of the Philippines" as the political entity through
which political authority is exercised.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COM. ACT 138; GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS NOT EXEMPTED FROM REP. ACT 912. — The observation that
Commonwealth Act 138 expressly includes purchases by Government-owned companies,
while Republic Act 912 merely relates to construction or repair work done by the
Government, is no argument for the proposition that government-owned or controlled
corporations have been excepted from the operation of the latter law, for it is clear that
Commonwealth Act 138 also ordains that the Purchase and Equipment Division of
government-owned companies authorized to purchase or contract for materials and
supplies for public use, buildings, or public works, shall give preference to locally produced
materials or products. Being statutes in pari materia, they should be construed together to
attain the purpose of an expressed national policy.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF BOTH ACTS. — The main objective of the Government is to
develop our domestic industries so that the country will be economically self-sufficient.
And both Commonwealth Act 138 and Republic Act 912 aim to contribute to the
realization of the aforesaid nationalistic policy by requiring the use of Philippine made
products or materials, whenever available, practicable and usable in government
construction work or repair projects. The alleged conflict between the two laws is more
apparent than real, and should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of these laws.
4. ID.; ID.; NAWASA IS EMBRACED IN TERM "GOVERNMENT" IN REP. ACT 912. — The
NAWASA, like any other corporation exercising proprietary or governmental functions
should be deemed embraced within the term "Government" found in Republic Act 912, and
in the repair or construction of their works or projects or the purchase of materials
therefor, local materials should be given preference whenever available, practicable and
usable.
5. ID.; ID.; STATUTES GRANTING ADVANTAGES TO PRIVATE PERSONS, STRICTLY
CONSTRUED. — Statutes granting advantages to private persons have in many instances
created special privileges or monopolies for the grantees and thus have been viewed with
suspicion and strictly construed. This is altogether appropriate in the majority of
situations, for if public advantage is gained by the grant, it normally appears to be of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
secondary significance compared with the advantage gained by the grantee (Sutherland
Statutory Construction, Vol. II, sec. 3404, p. 240). These rules should apply to the case at
bar where the law invoked grants a preference to locally produced products or materials.
6. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF LOCALLY PRODUCED MATERIALS. —
Since Republic Act 912 grants preference only upon the certification of availability,
practicability and usability of locally produced materials by the Director of Public Works,
that certification must be existing and effective before any right arising therefrom may be
claimed to have been violated.
7. ID.; EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF REP. ACT 4858. — The decision appealed from had
virtually become moot and academic by reason of the passage of Republic Act 4858
which authorizes the President to allow the procurement of supplies necessary for the
rehabilitation of the project as an exception to the restrictions and preferences provided
for in Republic Act 912.
DECISION
ANGELES , J : p
The main issue in this appeal is, whether or not the call for bids for the supply of steel and
centrifugal cast iron pipes for the waterworks projects in Manila and suburbs, and in the
cities of Davao and Iloilo, the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NAWASA)
violated the provisions of Republic Act No. 912, section 1 of which provides as follows:
"Section 1. In construction or repair work undertaken by the Government,
whether done directly or through contract awards, Philippine made materials and
products, whenever available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose
as equally well as foreign made products or materials, shall be used in said
construction or repair work, upon the proper certification of the availability,
practicability, usability and durability of said materials or products by the Director
of the Bureau of Public Works and/or his assistants."
In the decision appealed from the Court of First Instance of Manila has permanently
enjoined the NAWASA from the procurement of the materials needed for the projects
involved which, according to the appellant, are designed to alleviate the sufferings of the
millions of inhabitants in said places where there is a crying need for more water — an item
so vital to human existence — and the delay occasioned by the injunctions complained of,
has in no little way, further aggravated the inconvenience of the consuming public in said
metropolitan areas where acute water crises have recurred through the years.
Nevertheless, it is vehemently contended by the appellee that the declaration of an
economic national policy as envisioned in the aforequoted provision of the law which, like
the original "Flag Law 1 is impressed with the clear nationalistic policy of giving preference
to locally produced materials and products, has been violated; and if this is so, no amount
of public clamor could justify the acts of the NAWASA complained of, for above all the
supremacy of the law must be upheld. We have, therefore, examined the record of this
case with these considerations foremost in Our minds.
It appears that the case, originally commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila, on
July 7, 1965, as a petition for declaratory relief for the purpose of securing a judicial
pronouncement on the interpretation of the word "practicable" as used in Republic Act No.
912, i.e., whether it means that the cheapest materials among the locally produced or
manufactured products should be preferred and specified in construction and repair
works undertaken by the Government, was later converted into an action for prohibition
with preliminary injunction through the process of supplemental pleadings.
THE SAN PABLO WATERWORKS SYSTEM —
The corresponding complaint was filed on 19 July 1965, alleging that the NAWASA had
started to negotiate for direct purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes (CCI) for the
improvement of the San Pablo Waterworks System in violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 912 and the law on public biddings, excluding the C & C Commercial
Company, the plaintiff, which can supply instead asbestos cement pressure pipes which
are available, practicable and usable, and will serve the purpose of the said project at a
much lower cost.
On 6 August 1965, the NAWASA filed its answer to the complaint. On 10 August 1965, the
Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation, with leave of court, also filed its answer in
intervention.
On 16 August 1965, as prayed for in the complaint, the court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the NAWASA from further negotiating the purchase of the CCI pipes
from the intervenor.
On 23 September 1965, the plaintiff and the NAWASA entered into a partial stipulation of
facts, on the basis of which and the additional evidence adduced at the hearing, the court
rendered a partial decision on 31 January 1966, dismissing the complaint insofar as the
San Pablo Waterworks System was concerned and dissolving the preliminary injunction
issued thereunder. This partial decision has become final.
THE DAVAO METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS —
On 22 January 1965, the NAWASA called for bids for the furnishing of labor and the supply
of materials for the construction of the proposed improvement of the Davao Metropolitan
Waterworks System. In the call for bids, the bidders were required to submit proposals for
the supply of 24-inch steel pipes, asbestos cement pressure pipes, and cast iron pipes.
The bidding was held on 23 February 1965. On 16 March 1965, the committee on award of
the NAWASA recommended to the board of directors that the bid be awarded to the
lowest bidder, Tirso del Rosario, under his proposal to supply steel pipes.
On 10 August 1965, the plaintiff filed a (First) supplemental complaint seeking to restrain
the NAWASA from proceeding with the award of the project in Davao, alleging that in
specifying steel pipes for the project, which is admittedly imported material, without giving
preference to locally produced asbestos cement pressure pipes manufactured by the
plaintiff, violates the provisions of Republic Act 912. On 14 August 1965, the court
admitted the supplemental complaint; and as prayed for therein, on 17 September 1965,
the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
THE ILOILO WATERWORKS SYSTEM —
As early as on 26 November 1962, the NAWASA called for bids for the supply of 18-inch
steel pipes for the improvement of the Iloilo Waterworks System. The bidding was
conducted on 27 December 1962, C & C Commercial Co. participated in the bidding
offering to supply the needed 18-inch steel pipes for the project, but lost in the bidding.
The lowest bidder for the supply of the specific 18-inch steel pipes was the Regal Trading
Corporation, and the bid was awarded to it.
On 8 September 1965, almost three (3) years after the date of the bidding, the C & C
Commercial Co. filed a (Second) supplemental complaint seeking to restrain the NAWASA
from formalizing or implementing the award on the aforesaid Iloilo project for the supply
of 18-inch steel pipes, alleging that in specifying steel pipes for the particular project, the
NAWASA has violated the provisions of Republic Act 912 which requires the purchase of
Philippine made materials and products which are available, practicable and usable locally,
like plaintiff's product — asbestos cement pressure pipes — in construction and repair
undertaken by the government. On 24 September 1965, over the objection of the NAWASA,
the second supplemental complaint was admitted by the court. The record is not clear
when the restraining order under the second supplemental complaint was issued, although
the NAWASA alleges that a restraining order was issued under date of 10 September
1965, which fact has not been traversed by the plaintiff.
THE MANILA AND SUBURBS WATERWORKS SYSTEM —

On 13 September 1965, the NAWASA advertised for bids for the supply of 30 to 42 -inch
steel pipes for the use and improvement of the interim waterworks project in the City of
Manila and suburbs, the bidding to take place on 14 December 1965. On 10 November
1965, the C & C Commercial Co. filed a (Third) supplemental complaint seeking to restrain
the NAWASA and its representatives from holding the bidding under the aforementioned
notice to bid, averring identical facts as those alleged in the previous supplemental
complaints, that the call for bid for steel pipes for the Manila project and suburbs violates
the provisions of Republic Act 912. Over the objection of the defendant NAWASA, the
supplemental complaint was admitted; and as prayed for therein, on 20 November 1965, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued restraining the NAWASA from holding the bidding
scheduled on 14 December 1965, or on any subsequent date, until further orders from the
court.
Pending the case in the court a quo, the NAWASA filed three separate motions praying for
the dissolution of the preliminary injunctive writs issued in connection with the Davao, Iloilo
and Manila projects, pleading to the court to consider the crying need for a more adequate
supply of water in those cities, particularly in the City of Manila and its suburbs, where the
lack of adequate supply of potable water has been a recurrent crisis which affected to a
dangerous extent, the health and the life of the inhabitants, and that the continuation of the
injunctive writs may bring about the cancellation of the $20,200,000.00 loan of the
NAWASA from the World Bank, which would result from the failure of the NAWASA to
comply with the formulated work schedule of the waterworks projects, which under the
agreement with the World Bank, has to be completed in the month of October 1967; but
the court failed to take any action on the motions. Parodying Shakespeare, "Set honor in
one eye, and death in the other, and I will look on both indifferently."
After a trial of the case, of 15 August 1966 the court rendered a decision finding and
concluding that the act of the NAWASA in specifying steel pipes for the project of the City
of Manila and its suburbs, and in awarding the contracts for the supply of steel pipes in the
cases of the Davao and Iloilo Waterworks System, constituted a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act 912; the dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"(a) On the supplemental complaint, making permanent the preliminary
injunction dated September 2, 1965 enjoining the defendant or its representatives
and agents from formalizing or implementing the award for the construction of
the Davao Waterworks Project in respect of the award of pipes to be used therein;
rescinding the award made in favor of Tirso del Rosario; and ordering the
reappraisal of the bids with a view to complying with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 912;
"(b) On the second supplemental complaint ordering the issuance of a

permanent injunction to enjoin the defendants or its agents and representatives
from formalizing the award of the contract for the furnishing of 18" steel pipes for
the Iloilo Waterworks System; ordering a new bidding for the said project so as to
include in the call for bids for the supply and delivery of materials, asbestos
cement pipes, as well as CCI pipes; and rescinding the award of the contract in
favor of the Regal Trading Corporation;
"(c) On the third supplemental complaint making permanent the preliminary

injunction dated December 14, 1965, or any other subsequent date calling for
imported steel pipes from 30" to 42" diameter for the interim Development of
Waterworks System for Manila and suburbs; and ordering the defendant to
specify asbestos cement pressure pipes for the said project; and
"(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs."
From the decision, NAWASA appealed to this Court.

Appellant contends that the provisions of Republic Act 912, are applicable only to
construction or repair works undertaken by the Government. It argues, that since the
NAWASA, though a public corporation, is not a municipal corporation or agency of the
State empowered to regulate or administer the local affairs of a town or city, 2 nor one of
the various arms of the government through which political authority is made effective in
the Islands, consequently, the NAWASA should not be included within the meaning of the
term "Government" as used in the law. 3 It is to be noted, however, that Section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code defining the term "Government" which is heavily relied upon
by the appellant recognizes an exception: "when a different meaning for the word or phrase
is given a particular statute or is plainly to be collected from the context or connection
where the term is used." In this context of the law, the term "government" without any
qualification as used in Republic Act 912, should be construed in its implied sense and not
in the strict signification of the term "Government of the Philippines" as the political entity
through which political authority is exercised. A comparative analysis of Republic Act 912
and Commonwealth Act 138, otherwise known as the "Flag Law", the latter "An Act to Give
Native Products and Domestic Entities the Preference in the Purchase of Articles for the
Government", and the former "An Act to Require the Use, Under Certain Conditions, of
Philippine Made Materials or Products in Government Projects or Public Works
Construction, Whether Done Directly by the Government or Awarded thru Contracts",
discloses that both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic
purpose or object: to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases, works or
projects of the Government. The observation that Commonwealth Act 138 expressly
includes purchases by Government-owned companies, while Republic Act 912 merely
relates to construction or repair work done by the Government, is no argument for the
proposition that government-owned or controlled corporations have been excepted from
the operation of the latter law, for it is clear that Commonwealth Act 138 also ordains that
the Purchase and Equipment Division of government-owned companies authorized to
purchase or contract for materials and supplies for public use, buildings, or public works,
shall give preference to locally produced materials or products. Being statutes in pari
materia, they should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national
policy. Thus, it has been aptly stated:
"On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that in
the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was
enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and
they all should be construed together. Provisions in an act which are omitted in
another act relating to the same subject matter will be applied in a proceeding
under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes relating
to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions; and if
possible by reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is given
to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict,
are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other." 4
The main objective of the Government is to develop our domestic industries so that the
country will be economically self-sufficient. And both Commonwealth Act 138 and
Republic Act 912 aim to contribute to the realization of the aforesaid nationalistic policy by
requiring the use of Philippine made products or materials, whenever available, practicable
and usable in government construction work or repair projects. The alleged conflict
between the two laws is more apparent than real, and should not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of these laws. We have to declare, therefore, that, the NAWASA, like any other
corporation exercising proprietary or governmental functions should be deemed
embraced within the term "Government" found in Republic Act 912, and in the repair or
construction of their work or projects or the purchase of materials therefor, local materials
should be given preference whenever available, practicable and usable.
The next issue for consideration is: Did the NAWASA violate the provisions of Republic Act
912?
Appellant vehemently denies the charge and decries the holding of the lower court
appealed from that in specifying steel pipes in the call for bids for the supply of materials
for the waterworks projects under consideration it had defied the mandate of the law.
Appellant insists that at the time it called for bids for the Davao project, followed by the
call for the supply of materials for the Iloilo project, herein appellee's plant was only
capable of producing asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches diameter; while at
the time the call for bids for the supply of materials for the Interim Project of Manila and
suburbs was advertised, the largest size of asbestos cement pipes available were of 24
inches being produced at the time by another local manufacturer, the Eternit Corporation,
which never protested against the bids in question.
We have reexamined the record of the case with painstaking solicitude and, indeed, We
find the facts indubitable and conclusive that the C & C Commercial Corporation had not
theretofore and even up to the present time ever produced pipes larger than 12 inches in
diameter. Said appellee corporation has implicitly admitted this as a fact; and although it
claims to have a complete plant that is equipped with the necessary machinery,
technicians and skilled laborers capable of producing pipes in the sizes called for in those
bids (18 to 42 inches in diameter) had the NAWASA specified them in asbestos cement,
the weakness of the argument is at once exposed by a mere examination of the pertinent
evidence adduced during the trial of the case on this particular point. The claim is belied by
Leopoldo del Rosario, a staff civil engineer of the NAWASA, who testified as follows:

"Q. Engineer Del Rosario, what is the limitation of the local asbestos cement
pressure pipes that are locally manufactured in the Philippines?
A. We based on NAWASA's experience, we have purchased only sizes up to
12 inches, but on certification of the Bureau of Public Works, a report has
been submitted to us that asbestos cement pressure pipes (is) being
manufactured by one local manufacturing company in the Philippines, The
Eternit Corporation, which is a pipe manufacturer, and we have recently
purchased pipes for the Manila interim project of sizes up to 24 inches
non-pressure pipes.
Q. Is there any other local manufacturer of asbestos cement pressure pipes
besides C & C Commercial Corporation?
A. None, sir, only the C & C Commercial Corporation. 5
Q. Engineer del Rosario, as staff civil engineer and the specification engineer,
member-secretary of the Pre-Qualifications Committee and the present
chairman of all the bidding committees of the NAWASA, do you know if C
& C Commercial Corporation, the plaintiff herein, is manufacturing
asbestos cement pressure pipes from sizes thirty inches and up in
diameter?
A. The company does not manufacture size beyond twelve inches.
Q. Why do you say that the C & C Commercial Corporation is not
manufacturing asbestos cement pressure pipes beyond twelve inches?
A. Because we had bi-yearly inspection of all local plants here as a matter of
policy of the committee to determine the capacity or capability of the local
manufactures to supply, and even to bid. So every six months the pre-
qualifications committee in collaboration with the procurement inspects all
the facilities of the chemical producing plant, this cast iron and asbestos
plant, the galvanized non pipe plant, these are regularly inspected every six
months and so the pre-qualifications would know what is available." 6
And the foregoing testimony relative to the "non-availability" of appellee's products in

sizes above 12 inches in diameter was corroborated by Mrs. Clara Reyes Pastor, herein
appellee corporation's President, who declared as follows:
"Q. Is not a fact Mrs. Reyes, that the sizes of asbestos cement pressure pipes
locally manufactured by you and which you furnish the NAWASA is only
12 inches in diameter? Yes or No?
"A. Yes, sir, because that is the only pipe required at the time I delivered it.
Q. And the asbestos cement pressure pipes from sizes 12 to 42 inches that
you have supplied the NAWASA in the past, they were all imported by you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I heard you testify Mrs. Reyes, that in case you win in this particular
bidding, you intend to import equipments from abroad, is that correct?
A. Not equipments, only mandril.
Q. So that presently what is the biggest size of mandril that you have?

A. I have a 16-inch mandril, the biggest of them all." 7
From the foregoing testimony of witnesses, and in the light of other evidence submitted by
the parties, the following may be deduced: that it is the practice of the NAWASA — which
We find both practical and logical — to send out its own men to the various local
manufacturing plants for the purpose of knowing the availability of materials needed for
its projects; that at the time it specified 18 and 24 inches diameter steel pipes for the
Davao and Iloilo waterworks projects, there were no locally produced materials in said
sizes; and that with respect to those sizes that were already available, the NAWASA has
actually specified and used them in various other construction and repair works even
without the certification of the Director of Public Works. We really do not see Our way clear
how herein appellee could have charged that the NAWASA had discriminated against its
products under the circumstances when its own president admits that it has supplied the
NAWASA before locally produced asbestos cement pressure pipes up to 12 inches
diameter only and all those with diameters above 12 inches were of foreign manufacture.
The evidence, therefore, is conclusive that locally produced asbestos pipes above 12
inches in diameter were not available for purposes of claiming any preference under the
provisions of Republic Act 912. And this conclusion becomes even more cogent if We are
to consider the fact that C & C Commercial Corporation failed to produce the necessary
certification from the Director of Public Works to show that its products were already
certified as available, practicable and usable at the time that the call for bids for the supply
of materials for the Davao, Iloilo and Manila Interim projects were made to give some
semblance of the right it claims to have been violated.
Of course, appellee points out the fact that it has subsequently secured the necessary
certification from the Director of Public Works certifying to the availability, practicability,
usability and durability of the asbestos cement pressure pipes produced from its plant.
We agree, and there should be no quarrel at all that with respect to pipes of 4 to 12 inches
in diameter which it is actually producing now, the preference claimed under the law may
be allowed. Be that as it may, however, the certification referred to did not in any way
improve its position; for the stubborn fact still remains that at the time said certification
was issued on July 6, 1966, C & C Commercial Corporation was actually producing
asbestos pipes up to 12 inches only, which its existing equipment or machinery, when
inspected by a representative of the Office that issued the certification, was found capable
of producing. Hence, We cannot subscribe to the holding of the court below that locally
produced asbestos cement pipes above 12 inches in diameter may be considered
"available" within the meaning of Republic Act 912 simply because the President of herein
appellee corporation had manifested or promised that it can procure bigger mandrils
worth $25,000.00 from abroad and will be able to produce pipes in the larger sizes called
for in the questioned bids shortly after their installation, for that would be giving the term
"available" a very strained meaning. It would really be unfair to require in order to be
"available" within the meaning of the law that herein appellee should have in stock the sizes
of pipes called for in the bids in the quantity needed by the appellant; but We cannot also
believe, by any stretch of the imagination, that the Director of Public Works would certify to
the availability, practicability, usability and durability of certain products even before the
machinery, equipment or tools needed to produce said products are actually bought from
abroad and installed in its plant by the manufacturer.
Statutes granting advantages to private persons have in many instances created special
privileges or monopolies for the grantees and thus have been viewed with suspicion and
strictly construed. This is altogether appropriate in the majority of situations, for if public
advantage is gained by the grant, it normally appears to be of secondary significance
compared with the advantage gained by the grantee. 8 And rights which exist only by virtue
of such statutes come into being only after strict compliance with all the conditions found
in those statutes. 9 These rules should apply to the case at bar where the law invoked
grants a preference to locally produced products or materials. Since Republic Act 912
grants preference only upon the certification of availability, practicability and usability of
locally produced materials by the Director of Public Works, that certification must be
existing and effective before any right arising therefrom may be claimed to have been
violated. Notwithstanding the clear nationalistic policy of the law aforementioned, We
cannot, by any mistaken sympathy towards herein appellee, recognize the existence of its
right under the law alleged to have been violated, which C & C Commercial Corporation has
miserably failed to prove in this case.
With respect to the Interim Project for the City of Manila and its suburbs. It would seem
that the decision appealed from had virtually become moot and academic by reason of the
passage of Republic Act 4858 which authorizes the President to allow the procurement of
supplies necessary for the rehabilitation of the project as an exception to the restrictions
and preferences provided for in Republic Act 912, and the President appears to have
authorized the General manager of the NAWASA under the said statutory power to
purchase all the pipes and materials necessary for the project by negotiated sales.
For all the foregoing, We find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors assigned by
the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, with costs against the
appellee. The writs of preliminary injunctions issued by the lower court are set aside, and
declared null and void.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1. Commonwealth Act No. 138, Nov. 7, 1936.
2. Citing NAWASA vs. NAWASA Consolidated Unions, et al., L-18938.

3. Citing Section 2, Rev. Adm. Code which provides, inter alia, as follows: "The Government
of the Republic of the Phil. is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
central government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other forms of local
government.
4. Sutherland & Statutory Construction, Vol. II, pp. 530-532.
5. T.S.N., June 27, 1966, pp. 54-55.

6. T.S.N., June 7, 1966, pp. 8-10.
7. T.S.N., June 27, 1966, pp. 44-45.
8. Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, sec. 3404, p. 240.
9. Id., Vol. III, sec. 5812, p. 94.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-49705-09. February 8, 1979.]
TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED

TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI,
petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH
DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et al., respondents.
[G.R. Nos. L-49717-21.]
LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, The REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII,
and ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents.
Lino M. Patajo for petitioners in G.R. No. L-49705-09 and for private respondent
in G.R. No. L-49717-21.
Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents in G.R. No. L-49705-09 and for
petitioner in G.R. No. L-49717-21.
Office of the Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan (KB) candidates, the Regional Board of
Canvassers of Region XII issued a resolution declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) candidates elected representatives to the Batasang Pambansa. The KB
candidates appealed the resolution to the Comelec which consequently issued the now
assailed resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidates as having
obtain the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim
the winning candidates. The Aratuc petition alleged that the Comelec in arriving at its
conclusion committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
Mandangan petition, on the other hand, claims that it was error of law for Comelec to
consider spurious and manufactured the returns in voting centers showing that the votes
of the candidates obtaining the highest number of votes exceeded the highest possible
number of valid votes, because the excess was not more than 40% as was the rule
followed in Bashier/Basman (L-33758, February 24, 1972), and that the Comelec exceeded
its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner in extending its inquiry beyond the
election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon
by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the returns form
voting centers showing 90% to 100% voting in places where military operations were
certified by the army to be going on, the same being unsupported by evidence.
The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the actuations of the Comelec
and in Mandangan held (1) that considering the historical antecedents relative to the highly
questionable manner in which elections have been held in the past in the provinces
involved, the Comelec may deem spurious and manufactured the returns in voting centers
showing that the votes of the candidates obtaining the highest number of valid votes
exceeded the highest possible number of votes cast therein even if the excess number of
votes were not more than 40%; and (2) that the Comelec could extend its inquiry beyond
that undertaken by the Board of Canvassers and take cognizance of the fact that voting
centers affected by military operations have been transferred to the poblaciones, because
as a superior body having supervision and control over the Board of Canvassers, it may do
directly what the latter was supposed or ought to have done. In Aratuc et al., the Supreme
Court found that the Comelec did consider the high percentage of voting coupled with
mass substitute voting as proof that the pertinent returns had been manufactured, and
that apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, the Comelec had
adhered to the Supreme Court's guidelines in examining and passing on the returns from
the voting centers and in denying petitioner's motion for the opening of ballot boxes
concerned. Further, the High Court stated, it might disagree with the Comelec as to which
voting center should be excluded or included, but still a case of grave abuse of discretion
would not come out considering that Comelec, which concededly is in a better position to
appreciate and assess the vital circumstances clearly and accurately, cannot be said to
have acted whimsically or capriciously, or without basis.
Petition dismissed.
SYLLABUS
Of the Ruling of the Court

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUPREME COURT'S POWER OF
CERTIORARI OVER DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS OF THE COMELEC UNDER THE
1978 CONSTITUTION. — While under the constitution of 1935 "the decisions, orders, and
rulings of the Commissions shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" (Section 2,
first par., Article X), the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section
II, Article XII), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials" (Section 2(2), Article XII).
Correspondingly, the Election Code of 1978, which is the first legislative construction of
these pertinent constitutional provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions, orders or
rulings (in such controversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election contests,
"the decisions of the Commission shall be final and appealable" (Section 192). The framers
of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what its means
to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the
Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the
Commission's actuations be instead brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", the
Supreme Court cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy,
considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in
remedial law. A review includes digging into the merits or unearthing errors of judgment,
while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even
when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies indifferent disregard of the
law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision
arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an error of judgment may not
differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their
nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or
entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process
only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
2. CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; CONSIDERING AS SPURIOUS VOTES
EXCEEDING THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF VALID VOTES THAT CAN BE CAST IN A
VOTING CENTER, NOT A CASE OF. — It is not grave abuse of discretion for the Comelec to
deem as spurious and manufactured votes exceeding the highest possible number of valid
votes that can be cast in a voting center even if the total number of excess votes in the
voting center is not more than 40%, considering the historical antecedents relative to the
highly questionable manner in which elections have been held in the past in the provinces
involved in this case, of which the Supreme Court has judicial notice.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT A CASE OF; COMELEC MAY DO DIRECTLY WHAT THE BOARD OF
CANVASSERS IS SUPPOSED TO DO OR OUGHT TO HAVE DONE. — Under Section 168 of
the Revised Election Code of 1978, the Comelec shall have direct control and supervision
of the board of canvassers, and that relatedly Section 175 of the same Code provides that
it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The authority of the
Commission in reviewing actuations of the board of canvassers does not spring from any
appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such
provision any where in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control
and supervision endowed by Section 168 of the Code. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done.
4. ID.; ID.; ERRORS OF JUDGMENT NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT. —
Where it appears from the records that the Comelec has taken pains to consider as
meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by both parties would permit all the
contentions of petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to such evidence, the
Supreme Court will not hold that the Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its
conclusions. If errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment
which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial evidence.
5. ID.; ID.; NOT A CASE OF; WHERE COMELEC PASSED UPON RETURNS USING
COMMON SENSE AND PERCEPTION ONLY; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES. — Where the Comelec did not examine the questioned election
returns with the aid of experts but "using common sense and perception only", apart from
presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, a case of grave abuse of discretion
would not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically
or capriciously or without any rational basis, particularity if it is considered that in many
respects and from the very nature of the Supreme Court's and the Commission's
respective functions, the Commission is in a better position to appreciate and assess the
vital circumstances closely and accurately.
6. ID.; NON-IDENTIFICATION OF BALLOT BOXES IN DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE COMELEC HAS EXAMINED,
STUDIED AND PASSED UPON THE RECORDS RELATED THERETO. — Non-identification of
defective ballot boxes by the Comelec does not constitute grave abuse of discretion
where it has examined, studied and passed upon the records related thereto. If at all,
deeper inquiry into this point would be of real value in an electoral protest.
DECISION
BARREDO , J : p
Petition in G.R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary
injunction filed by six (6) independent candidates for representatives to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng
Bayan which, however, was not registered as a political party or group under the 197&
Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, Sergio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred
Tamula, Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi, hereinafter referred to as petitioners,
to review the decision of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) resolving
their appeal from the rulings of the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers for Region
XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives to
the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21, for certiorari with
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, also a candidate
for representative in the same election in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec
declaring respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of the eight
winners in said election. prcd
The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in G.R. No. L-48097, wherein Tomatic
Aratuc, et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent
Board in Cotabato City and in which canvass, the returns in 1,966 out of a total of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results as
follows:
"NAMES OF CANDIDATES NO. OF VOTES
1. Roldan, Ernesto (KB) 225,674
2. Valdez, Estanislao (KBL) 217,789
3. Dimaporo, Abdullah (KBL) 199,244
4. Tocao, Sergio (KB) 199,062
5. Badoy, Anacleto (KBL) 198,956
6. Amparo, Jesus (KBL) 184,764
7. Pangandaman, Sambolayan (KBL) 183,646
8. Sinsuat, Datu Blah (KBL) 182,457
9. Baga, Tomas (KBL) 171,656
10. Aratuc, Tomatic (KB) 165,795
11. Mandangan, Linang (KB) 165,032
12. Diaz, Ciscolario (KB) 159,977
13 Tamula, Fred (KB) 153,734

14. Legaspi Bonifacio (KB) 148,200
15. Guro, Mangontawar (KB) 139,386
16. Loma, Nemesio (KB) 107,455
17. Macapeges, Malamama (Independent) 101,350
(Votes of the independent candidates who actually were not in contention

omitted.)" (Page 6, Record, L-49705-09.).
A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon. Venancio S. Duque,
had conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged
irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of
Lanao del Sur, the whole City of Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely,
Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai, Nunungan, Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and Tangcal,
seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely, Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog, Parang,
South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in North Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan,
Kidapawan, Magpet, Matalam, Midsayap, Pigcawayan, Pikit, Pres. Roxas and Tulonan,
ana eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely, Bagumbayan, Columbio, Don Mariano
Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak, Lutayan, Palimbang, President Quirino
and Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the returns from said
voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before the start of the hearings, the
canvass was suspended, but after the supervisory panel presented its report, on May
15, 1978, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the
canvass to be done in Manila. This order was the one assailed in this Court. We issued a
restraining order.
After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued the
following guidelines to be observed thereat:
"1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be held in the Comelec main
office in Manila starting not later than June 1, 1978;
"2. That in preparation therefor, respondent Commission on Elections shall
see to it that all the material election paraphernalia corresponding to all the voting
centers involved in Election Cases Nos. 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are
taken to its main office in Manila, more particularly, the ballot boxes, with their
contents, used during the said elections, the books of voters or records of voting
and the Listing or records of registered voters, on or before May 31, 1978;
"3. That as soon as the corresponding records are available, petitioners and
their counsel shall be allowed to examine the same under such security measures
as the respondent Board may determine, except the contents of the ballot boxes
which shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or
respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident, the purpose
of such examination being to enable petitioners and their counsel to expeditiously
determine which of them they would wish to be scrutinized and passed upon by
the Board as supporting their charges of election frauds and anomalies,
petitioners and their counsel being admonished, in this connection, that no
dilatory tactics should be indulged in by them and that only such records as
would support substantial objections should be offered by them for the scrutiny
by Board:
"4. That none of the election returns referred to in the petition herein shall be
canvassed without first giving the herein petitioners ample opportunity to make
their specific objections thereto, if they have any, and to show sufficient basis for
the rejection of any of the returns, and, this connection, the respondent Regional
Board of Canvassers should gave due consideration to the points raised in the
memorandum filed by said petitioners with the Commission on Elections in the
above cases dated April 26, 1978;
"5. That should it appear to the Board upon summary scrutiny of the records
to be offered by petitioners that there is sufficient indication that in the voting
centers concerned, no election was actually held and/or that election returns were
prepared either before the day of the election or at any other time, without
counting the ballots or without regard thereto or that there has been massive
substitution of voters, or that ballots and/or returns were prepared by the same
groups of persons or individuals or outside of the voting centers, the Board should
exclude the corresponding returns from the canvass;
"6. That appeals to the Commission on Elections from rulings of the Board
may be made only after all the returns in question in all the above five cases shall
have been passed upon by the Board and, accordingly, no proclamation shall be
made until after the Commission shall have finally resolved the appeal without
prejudice to recourse to this Court, if warranted as provided by the Code and the
Constitution, giving the parties reasonable time thereof;
"7. That the copies of the election returns found in the corresponding ballot
boxes shall be the one used in the canvass;
"8. That the canvass shall be conducted with utmost dispatch, to the end that
a proclamation, if feasible, may be made not later than June 10, 1978; thus, the
canvass may be terminated as soon as it is evident that the possible number of
votes in the still uncanvassed returns will no longer affect the general results of
the elections here in controversy;
"9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate such other directive not
inconsistent with this resolution as it may deem necessary to expedite the
proceedings herein contemplated and to accomplish the purposes herein
intended." (Pp. 8-9, Record.
On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were modified:

". . . in the sense that the ballot boxes for the voting centers just referred to need
not be taken to Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular voting centers as to which
the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be
opened in order that the votes therein may be counted because said ballots unlike
the election returns, have not been tampered with or substituted, in which
instances the result of the counting shall be the basis of the canvass, provided
that the voting centers concerned shall be specified and made known by
petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3, 1978; it
being understood, that for the purposes of the canvass, the petitioners shall not
be allowed to invoke any objection not already alleged in or comprehend within
the allegations in their complaint in the election cases above-mentioned." (Page 8,
Id.).
Thus, respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein petitioners
presenting objections, most of them supported by the report of handwriting and finger-
print experts who had examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting
centers, out of 2,700 which they specified in their complaints or petitions in Election Cases
78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78- 11 and 78-12 in the Comelec. In regard to 501 voting centers, the
records of which, consisting of the voters lists and voting records were not available and
could not be brought to Manila, petitioners asked that the results therein be completely
excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass
and declared the result of the voting to be as follows:
NAMES OF CANDIDATE VOTES OBTAINED
"VALDEZ, Estanislao 436,069
DIMAPORO, Abdullah 429,961
PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan 408,106
SINSUAT, Blah 403,445
AMPARO, Jesus 399,997
MANDANGAN, Linang 387,026
BAGA, Tomas 386,399
BADOY, Anacleto 374.999
ROLDAN, Ernesto 276.141
TOCAO, Sergio 299,914
ARATUC, Tomatic 205,829
GURO, Mangontawar 190,489
DIAZ, Ciscolario 190,077
TAMULA, Fred 180,280
LEGASPI, Bonifacio 174,996
MACAPEGES, Malamama 160,271
"(Pp. 11-12, Record.)
Without loss of time, the petitioner brought the resolution of respondent Board to the
Comelec. Hearing was held on April 26, 1978, after which hearing, the case was declared
submitted for decision. However, on August 30, 1978, the Comelec issued a resolution
stating inter alia that: LexLib
"In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly:
"a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and
registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and
registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to
decide to open the ballot boxes; and
"b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested
persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7,
1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affected." (Page 12),
Record, L-49705-09.).
On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the parties "to file their respective written
comments on the reports they shall periodically receive from the NBI Comelec team of
finger-print and signature experts within the inextendible period of seven (7) days from
their receipt thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al., "petitioners submitted their
various comments on the report the principal gist of which was that it would appear
uniformly in all the reports submitted by the Comelec NBI experts that the registered
voters were not the ones who voted as shown by the fact that the thumb prints appearing
in Form 1 were different from the thumbprints of the voters in Form 5." But the Comelec
deemed a motion of petitioners asking that the ballot boxes corresponding to the voting
centers the records of which are not available be opened and that a date be set when the
statements of witnesses referred to in the August 30, 1978 resolution would be taken, on
the ground that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary to proceed with such opening of
ballot boxes and taking of statements.
For his part, counsel for petitioner Mandangan in G.R. No. L-49717-21 filed with Comelec
on December 19, 1978 a Preliminary Memorandum. To quote from the petition:
"On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through counsel, filed a 'Preliminary
Memorandum for the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Candidates on the
Comelec's Resolution of December 11, 1978,' a xerox copy of which is attached
hereto and made a part hereof as Annex 2, wherein they discussed the following
topics: (I) Brief History of the President Case; (II) Summary of Our Position and
Submission Before the Honorable Commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal Ad
Cautelam. And the fourth topic, because of its relevance to the case now before
this Honorable Court, we hereby quote for ready reference:
"IV
"OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO
THE RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978
"We respectfully submit that the Resolution of this case by this Honorable
Commission should be limited to the precincts and municipalities involved in the
KB's Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8 to 78-12, on which evidence had been submitted
by the parties, and on which the KB submitted the reports of their
handwriting/finger-print experts. Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal of
the KB. For under the Supreme Court Resolution of May 23, 1978, original
jurisdiction was given to the Board, with appeal to this Honorable Commission.
Considerations of other matters beyond these would be, in our humble opinion,
without jurisdiction.
"For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable Commission that we stand by
the reports and findings of the COMELEC/NBI experts us submitted by them to
the Regional Board of Canvassers and as confirmed by the said Regional Board
of Canvassers in its Resolution of July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the
majorities we have already above mentioned. The Board did more than make a
summary scrutiny of the records' required by the Supreme Court Resolution,
Guideline No. 5, of May 23, 1978. Hence, if for lack of material time we cannot file
any Memorandum within the non-extendible period of seven (7) days, we would
just stand by said COMELEC/NBI experts' reports to the Regional Board, as
confirmed by the Board (subject to our appeal ad cautelam)."
"The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the reports of the NBI-COMELEC
experts. For lack of material time due to the voluminous reports and number of
voting centers involved, the Christmas holidays, and our impression that the
COMELEC will exercise only its appellate jurisdiction, specifically as per resolution
of this Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L-48097), we, the KBL, did
not comment any more on said reports." (Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.)
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases,
declaring the final result of the canvass to be as follows:
"CANDIDATES VOTES
VALDEZ, Estanislao 319,514
DIMAPORO, Abdullah 289,751
AMPARO, Jesus 286,180
BADOY, Anacleto 285,985
BAGA, Tomas 271,473
PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan 271,393
SINSUAT, Blah 269,905
ROLDAN, Ernesto 268,287
MANDANGAN, Linang 251,226
TOCAO, Sergio 229,124
DIAZ, Ciscolario 187,986
ARATUC, Tomatic 183,316
LEGASPI, Bonifacio 178,564
TAMULA, Fred 177,270
GURO, Mangontawar 163,449
LOMA, Nemesio 129,450"
(Page 14, Record, L-49705-09.)
It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that:

"The Comelec committee grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction:
"1. In not pursuing further the examination of the registration records and
voting records from the other voting centers questioned by petitioners after it
found proof of massive substitute voting in all of the voting records and
registration records examined by Comelec and NBI experts;
"2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of
voters and voting records could not be recovered be the Commission in spite of its
repeated efforts to retrieve said records;
"3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a
very high percentage of voting and coupled with massive substitution of voters is
proof of manufacturing of election returns;

"4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from
voting centers whose records are not available for examination to determine
whether or not there had been voting in said voting centers;
"5. In not identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and Especially
those that were found to be empty while they were shipped to Mania pursuant to
the directive of the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of this
Honorable Court;
"6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of
examination of the voting records and registration records show that the
thumbprints of the voters in CE Form 5 did not correspond to those of the
registered voters as shown in CE Form 1;
"7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the
voting centers, municipal treasurers and other election officials in the voting
centers where irregularities had been committed and not giving credence to the
affidavits of watchers of petitioners;
"8. In not including among those questioned before the Board by petitioners
those include among the returns questioned by them in their Memorandum filed
with the Commission on April 26, 1978 filed which Memorandum was attached
as Annex 'I' to their petition filed with this Honorable Court said in its Guidelines
should be considered by the Board in the course of the canvass (Guidelines No.
4)." (Pp. 15-16, Record, Id.).
On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that the Comelec committed the
following errors: LLpr
"1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz vs. Commission on

Elections (November 29, 1971; 42 SCRA 426), and particularly the highly
restrictive criterion that when the when obtained by the candidates with the
highest number of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes,
the COMELEC ruled to exclude from the canvass the election returns reflecting
such results, under which the COMELEC excluded 1,004 election returns, involving
around 100,000 votes, 95% of which are for KBL candidate, particularly the
petitioner Linang Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair, unjust and
oppressive.
"2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the Diaz-Case is not the total
exclusion of election returns simple because the total number of votes exceed to
total number of highest possible valid votes, but 'even if all to votes cast by
persons identified as registered voters were added to the votes cast by persons
who can not be definitely ascertained as registered or not, and granting, ad
arguendo, that all of them voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting total is
much below the number of votes credited to the latter in returns for Sagada, 'and
that 'of the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly one half (1,012) were cast by
persons definitely identified as not registered therein,' or still more than 40% of
substitute voting which was the rule followed in the later case of Bashier/Basman
(Diaz Case, November 19, 1971, 42 SCRA 426,432).
"3. In not applying the rule and formula in the later case of Bashier and
Basman vs. Commission on Elections (February 24, 1972, 43 SCRA 238) which
was the one followed by the Regional Board of Canvassers, to wit:
'In Basman vs. Comelec (L-33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the Supreme Court
upheld the ruling of the Comelec in setting the standard of 40% excess
votes to justify the exclusion of election returns. In line with the above
ruling, the Board of Canvassers may likewise set aside election returns with
40% substitute votes. Likewise, where excess voting occurred and the
excess was such as to destroy the presumption of innocent mistake, the
returns was excluded.
(COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 22), which this Honorable Court must
have meant when its Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R. No. L-48097), it referred to
'massive substitution of voters.'
"4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC experts, the records in more than
878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional
Board of Canvassers which was all that was within its appellate jurisdiction; is
examination of more election records to make a total of 1,085 voting centers
(COMELEC's Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being beyond its jurisdiction and
a denial of due process as far as the KBL, particularly the petitioner Mandangan,
were concerned because they were informed of it only in December, 1978, long
after the case has been submitted for decision in September, 1978; and the
statement that the KBL acquiesced to the same is absolutely without foundation.
"5. In excluding election returns from areas where the conditions of peace and
order were allegedly unsettled or where there was a military operation going on
immediately before and during elections and where the voter turn out was high
(90% to 100%), and where the people had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling
without jurisdiction and in violation of due process because no evidence was at
all submitted by the parties before the Regional Board of Canvassers." (Pp. 23-25,
Record, L-47917-21.).
Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify
first the nature and extent of the Supreme Court's power of review in the premises. The
Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec
"committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight
specifications. On the other hand, the Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and
jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its
appellate authority of review. cdphil
This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first
paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court the petition for "certiorari or
review" shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance
not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord
with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3, Rule 43), and such
provisions refer not only to election contests but even to pre-proclamation proceedings,
the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of
the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court" on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from this receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11, Article XII c), even
as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective
provincial and city officials" (Section 2 (2).)
Correspondingly, the Election Code of 1978, which is the first legislative construction of
the pertinent constitutional provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions, orders or
rulings (in such controversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election contests,
"the decision of the Commission shall be final, and executory and inappealable." (Section
193)
It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a
definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the
independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and
honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite
knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission
"subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision
intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the
remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well
known in remedial law.
Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified pertinent
constitutional provision is to the effect that the actuations of the Commission are final,
executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of the
Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly
narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to
what is strictly, the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are of the
considered opinion that the statutory modifications are consistent with the apparent new
constitutional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari technically connotes something less
than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court", when it comes
to the measure the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the premises.
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while
certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when
the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law,
arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision
arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an error of judgment may not
differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their
nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or
entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process
only in cases of patent arbitrariness.cdrep
Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the Commission on Elections.
Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular
suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed con-comittant powers, it is but
proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to
its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may
achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its
members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that
actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics should not, unless the
contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and
consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same
manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members drawn
from the political ranks or even from the military is at all times deemed insulated from
every degree or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal
motivations that could arise from such background or orientation.
We hold, therefore, that under the existing constitutional and statutory provisions, the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec is not
as abroad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in
this light that We shall proceed to examine the opposing contentions of the parties in
these cases.
THE MANDANGAN CASE
Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21 first.
The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main propositions, namely, (1) that it
was an error of law on the part of respondent Comelec to have applied to the extant
circumstances hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec, 42 SCRA 426 instead of
that of Bashier vs. Comelec, 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that respondent Comelec exceeded its
jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner Mandangan in extending its inquiry
beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and
passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the
returns, showing 90 to 100% voting, from voting centers where military operations were
certified by the Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting centers had to be
transferred to the poblaciones, the same being unsupported by evidence.
Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and Bashier rulings are not
mutually exclusive of each other, each being an outgrowth of the basic rationale of
statistical improbability laid down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and Climaco, 16 SCRA 176.
Whether they should be applied together or separately-or which of them should be applied
depends on the situation on hand. In the factual milieu of the instant case as found by the
Comelec, We see no cogent reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why returns in voting
centers showing that the votes of the candidate obtaining the highest possible number of
valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as spurious and manufactured just because
the total number of excess votes in said voting centers were not more than 40%. Surely,
this is not the occasion, considering the historical antecedents relative to the highly
questionable manner in which elections have been held in the past in the provinces herein
involved, of which the Court has judicial notice as attested by its numerous decisions in
cases involving practically every such election, of the Court to move a whit back from the
standards it has enunciated in those decisions.
In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by herein petitioner, it is of
decisive importance to bear in mind that under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code
of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision over the
board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 176 of the same Code provides that it
"shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." While nominally, the
procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of
canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission
and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23, 1978 quoted earlier in this opinion,
as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing
such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific
provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from
the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-
quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled
postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done. llcd
Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to
the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended
its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvassers. On the contrary, it must be
stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of
its envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of elections and
electoral processes and procedures in doing what petitioner claims it should not have
done. Incidentally, it cannot be said that Comelec went further than even what Aratuc, et al.
have asked, since said complainants had impugned from the outset not only the returns
from the 878 voting centers examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their
complaints in the election cases filed originally with the Comelec enumerated in the
opening statements hereof, hence respondent Comelec had that much field to work on.
The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the Commission regarding the
voting centers affected by military operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not
considered by the board of canvassers, that said voting centers had been transferred to
the poblaciones. And, if only for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We are
persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due process for the Commission to have taken
into account, without the need or presentation of evidence by the parties, a matter so
publicly notorious as the unsettled situation of peace and order in some localities in the
provinces herein involved that they may perhaps be taken judicial notice of, the same being
capable of unquestionable demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129).
In this connection, We may as well, perhaps, say here as later that regrettably We cannot,
however, go along with the view, expressed in the dissent of our respected Chief Justice,
that from the fact that some of the voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones
there is already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission should have also
subjected all the returns from the other voting centers of the same municipalities, if not
provinces, to the same degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of the Court feels
that had the Commission done so, it would have fallen into the error precisely alleged by
petitioner Mandangan about denial of due process, for it is relatively unsafe to draw
adverse conclusions us to the exact conditions of peace and order in those other voting
centers without at least some prima facie evidence to rely on considering that there is no
allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting centers in question are so close to
those excluded by the Commission as to warrant the inescapable conclusion that the
relevant circumstances found by the Comelec as obtaining in the latter were identical to
those in the former.
Premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby dismissed, for lack of
merit.
THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION
Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted to, the seventh and the
eight do not require any extended disquisition. As to the issue of whether the elections in
the voting centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date designated by law, or
earlier, to which the seventh alleged error is addressed, We note that apparently petitioners
are not seriously pressing on it anymore, as evidenced by the complete absence of any
reference thereto during the oral argument of their counsel and the practically cavalier
discussion thereof in the petition. In any event, We are satisfied from a careful review of
the analysis by the Comelec in its resolution now before Us that it took pains to consider
as meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by both parties would permit all
the contentions of petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to such evidence.
The detailed discussion of said evidence is contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp.
70-89) of the resolution. In these premises, We are not prepared to hold that Comelec
acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If
errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment which are not
reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial evidence.
As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents' comment is that the results in the
voting centers mentioned in this assignment of error had already been canvassed at the
regional canvassing center in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the
board of canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if only because
in the guidelines set by this Court, what appears to have been referred to is, rightly or
wrongly, the resumption only of the canvass, which does not necessarily include the
setting aside and repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City.
The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting centers the corresponding
voter's record (C.E. Form 1) and record of voting, (C.E. Form 6) of which have never been
brought to Manila because they were not available. The record is not clear as to how many
are these voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but in the Comelec
resolution in question, the number mentioned is only 408, and this number is directly
challenged in the petition. Under the second assignment, it is contended that the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion in including in the canvass the election returns from these
voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it is alleged as fourth assignment that
petitioners' motion for the opening of the ballot boxes pertaining to said voting centers
was arbitrarily denied by respondent Comelec. prcd
The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that confronted the Commission in
regard to the 408 voting centers referred to as follows:
"The Commission had the option of excluding from the canvass the election
returns under this category. By deciding to exclude, the Commission would be
summarily disenfranchising the voters registered in the voting centers affected
without any basis. The Commission could also order the inclusion in the canvass
of these election returns under the injunction of the Supreme Court that extreme
caution must be exercised in rejecting returns unless these are palpably irregular.
The Commission chose to give prima facie validity to the election returns
mentioned and uphold the votes cast by the voters in those areas. The
Commission held the view that the failure of some election officials to comply
with Commission orders (to submit the records) should not prejudice the right of
suffrage of the citizens who were not parties to such official disobedience. In the
case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the Supreme Court ruled that when
voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified because
the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of
the ballot have not complied with their duty. (cited in Laurel on Elections, p. 24)"
(Pp. 139-140, Record).
On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General, however, it is stated that:

"At all events, the returns corresponding to these voting centers were examined by
the Comelec and 141 of such returns were excluded, as follows:

'SUMMARY
PROVINCE TOTAL EXCLUDED INCLUDED
Lanao del Norte 30 — 30
Lanao del Sur 342 137 205
Maguindanao 21 1 20
North Cotabato 7 1 6
Sultan Kudurat 12 2 10
—— —— ——
Totals 412 141 271"

==== ==== ====
(Page 301, Record.)
This assertion has not been denied by petitioners.

Thus, it appears that precisely because of the absence or unavailability of the CE Forms 1
and 5 corresponding to the more than 400 voting centers concerned in our present
discussion, the Comelec examined the returns from said voting centers to determine their
trustworthiness by scrutinizing the purported relevant data appearing on their faces,
believing that such was the next best thing that could be done to avoid total
disenfranchisement of the voters in all of them. On the other hand, petitioners' insist that
the right thing to do was to order the opening of the ballot boxes involved.
In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's explanation in its resolution is:
". . . The commission had it seen fit to so order, could have directed the opening of
the ballot boxes. But the Commission did not see the necessity of going to such
length in a proceeding that was summary in nature and decided that there was
sufficient bases for the resolution of the appeal. That the Commission has
discretion to determine when the ballot boxes should be opened is implicit in the
guidelines set by the Supreme Court which states that '. . . the ballot boxes [which]
shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent
Commission, after the need therefor has become evident . . .' (guideline No. 3;
italics supplied). Furthermore, the Court on June 1, 1978, amended the guidelines
by providing that the "ballot boxes for the voting centers . . . need not be taken to
Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular centers as to which the petitioners have
the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes he opened . . . provided
that the voting centers concerned shall be specified and made known by
petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3, 1978 . . .'
(emphasis supplied). The KB, candidates did not take advantage of the option
granted them under these guidelines.' (Pp. 106-107, Record.)
Considering that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had the facilities to identify on its own
the voting centers without CE Form, 1 and 5, thereby precluding the need for the
petitioners having to specify them, and under the circumstances the need for opening the
ballot boxes in question should have appeared to it to be quite apparent, it may be
contended that Comelec would have done greater service to the public interest had it
proceeded to order such opening, as it had announced it had thoughts of doing in its
resolution of August 30, 1978. On the other hand, We cannot really blame the Commission
too much, since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued by Us left it with very little
elbow room, so to speak, to use its own discretion independently of what We had ordered.
What could have saved matters altogether would have been a timely move on the part of
petitioners on or before June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our resolution. After all, come to
think of it, that the possible outcome of the opening of the ballot boxes would favor the
petitioners was not a certainty — the contents thereof could conceivably boomerang
against them, such as, for example, if the ballots therein had been found to be regular and
preponderantly for their opponents. Having in mind that significantly, petitioners filed their
motion for opening only on January 9, 1979, practically on the eve of the promulgation of
the resolution, We hold that by having adhered to Our guidelines of June 1, 1978, Comelec
certainly cannot be held to be guilty of having gravely abused its discretion, whether in
examining and passing on the returns from the voting centers referred to in the second
and fourth assignments of error in the canvass or in denying petitioners' motion for the
opening of the ballot boxes concerned.
The first, third and sixth assignment of errors involve related matters and maybe
discussed together. They all deal with the inclusion in or exclusion from the canvass of
certain returns on the basis of the percentage of voting in specified voting centers and the
corresponding findings of the Comelec on the extent of substitute voting therein as
indicated by the result of either the technical examination by experts of the signatures and
thumb-prints of the voters thereat.
To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did not examine and study 1,694 of
the records in all the 2,775 voting centers questioned by them is hardly accurate. To be
more exact, the Commission excluded a total of 1,267 returns coming under four
categories namely: 1,001 under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because of 90-100% turnout of
voters despite military operations, 105 palpably manufactured ones and 82 returns
excluded by the board of canvassers on other grounds. Thus, 45.45% of the claims of the
petitioners were sustained by the Comelec. In contrast, in the board of canvassers, only
453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed as to 6 of these, and 821 returns were
excluded by Comelec over and above those excluded by the board. In other words, the
Comelec almost doubled the exclusions by the board. llcd
Petitioners would give the impression by their third assignment of error that Comelec
refused to consider high percentage of voting, coupled with mass substitute voting as
proof that the pertinent returns had been manufactured. That such was not the case is
already shown in the above specifications. To add more, it can be gleaned from the
resolution that in respect to the 1,065 voting centers in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City
where a high percentage of voting appeared, the returns from the 867 voting centers were
excluded by the Comelec and only 198 were included a ratio of roughly 78% to 22%. The
following tabulation drawn from the figures in the resolution shows hour the Comelec went
over those returns center by center and acted on them individually:
"90% — 100% VOTING
MARAWI CITY AND LANAO DEL SUR
NO. OF V/C THAT V/C WITH 90% to 100%

MUNICIPALITIES FUNCTIONED VOTING No. of
V/C Excluded Included

Marawi City 151 112 107 5
Bacolod Grande 28 28 27 1
Balabagan 53 53 49 4
Balindong 22 22 15 7
Bayang 29 20 13 7
Binidayan 37 33 29 4
Buadiposo Buntoug 41 10 10 0
Bubong 24 23 21 2
Bumbaran 21 (all excluded)
Butig 35 33 32 1
Calanogas 23 21 21 0
Ditsaan-Ramain 42 39 38 1
Ganassi 39 38 23 15
Lumba Bayabao 64 63 47 16
Lumbatan 30 28 17 11
Lumbayanague 37 33 28 5
Madalum 14 13 6 7
Madamba 20 20 5 15
Maguing 57 55 53 2
Malabang 59 47 5 42
Marantao 79 63 41 22
Marugong 37 35 32 3
Masiu 27 26 24 2
Pagayawan 15 13 9 4
Piagapo 39 39 36 3
Poona-Bayabao 44 44 42 2
Pualas 23 20 20 0
Saguiaran 36 32 21 11
Sultan Gumander 35 31 31 0
Tamparan 24 21 15 6
Taraka 31 31 31 0
Tubaran 23 19 19 0
— — — —

TOTALS: Marawi &
Lanao del Sur 1,218 1,065 867 198"

==== ==== === ===
We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, that
there is enough showing in the record that it did examine and study the returns and
pertinent records corresponding to all the 2775 voting centers subject of petitioners'
complaints below. In one part of its resolution the Comelec states:
"The Commission as earlier stated examined on its own the Books of Voters
(Comelec Form No. 1) and the Voters Records Comelec Form No. 5) to determine
for itself which of these election forms needed further examination by the
COMELEC-NBI experts. The Commission, aware of the summary nature of this
pre-proclamation controversy, believes that it can decide, using common sense
and perception, whether the election forms in controversy needed further
examination by the experts based on the presence or absence of patent signs of
irregularity." (Pp. 137-138, Record.)
In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the Commission, the bare charge of
petitioners that the records pertaining to the 1,694 voting centers assailed by them
should not create any ripple of serious doubt. As We view this point under discussion,
what is more factually accurate is that those records complained of were not examined
with the aid of experts and that Comelec passed upon the returns concerned "using
common sense and perception only." And there is nothing basically objectionable in
this. The defunct Presidential, Senate and House Electoral Tribunals examined, passed
upon and voided millions of votes in several national elections without the assistance
of experts and "using" only "common sense and perception". No one ever raised any
eyebrows about such procedure. Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that
Comelec preliminary screened the records and whatever it could not properly pass
upon by "using common sense and perception" it left to the experts to work on. We
might disagree with he Comelec as to which voting center should be excluded or
included, were We to go over the same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave
abuse of discretion would not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be said to
have acted whimsically or capriciously or without any rational basis, particularly if it is
considered that in many respects and from the very nature of our respective functions,
becoming candor would dictate to Us to concede that the Commission is in a better
position to appreciate and assess the vital circumstances closely and accurately. By
and large, therefore, the rst, third and sixth assignments of error of the petitioners are
not well taken. cdll
The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and academic. The identification of the
ballot boxes in defective condition, in some instances open and allegedly empty, is at best
of secondary import because, as already discussed, the records related thereto were after
all examined, studied and passed upon. If at all, deeper inquiry into this point would be of
real value in an electoral protest.
CONCLUSION
Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to
dispose of the cases in a minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or reasoned
out opinion later, so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however,
that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety
of yielding to the conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are
strong considerations warranting further meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be
earmarks of seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are held in the
municipalities and provinces herein involved, and he is joined in this pose by two other
distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put down at
least some of the important considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in dispute
the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record their points of view.
In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their respective
reactions in proper perspective.
In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to advert to the following portion of the
ratiocination of respondent Board of Canvassers adopted by respondent Commission
with approval in its resolution under question:
"First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine that canvassing boards
must exercise "extreme caution" in rejecting returns and they may do so only
when the returns are palpably irregular. A conclusion that an election return is
obviously manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the
canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most
convincing proof. Any plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a
reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation,
should suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the resulting
disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. (Anni vs.
Isquierdo et al, L-35918, June 28, 1974; Villalon v. Comelec, L-32008, August 31,
1970: Tagoranao v. Comelec, 22 SCRA 978). In the absence of strong evidence
establishing the spuriousness of the return, the basis rule of their being accorded
prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes for
canvassing and proclamation purposes must be applied, without prejudice to the
question being tried on the merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial
and real, in the corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier vs. Comelec, L-33692,
33699, 33728, 43 SCRA 236, February 24, 1972). The decisive factor is that where
it has been duly determined after investigation and examination of the voting and
registration records that actual voting and election by the registered voters had
taken place in the questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot be
disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of the voters, but
must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the
voting for canvassing and proclamation purposes. Where the grievances relied
upon is the commission of irregularities and violation of the Election Law the
proper remedy is election protest. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et al, Supra)." (P. 59, Record,
L-49706-09).
The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally check on the citations to be doubly
sure they were not taken out of context, considering that most, if not all of them, arose
from similar situations in the very venues of the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We
are satisfied they do fit our chosen posture. More importantly, they actually came from the
pens of different members of the Court, already retired or still with Us, distinguished by
their perspicacity and their perceptive prowess. In the context of the constitutional and
legislative intent expounded at the outset of this opinion and evident in the modifications
of the duties and responsibilities of the Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that
have concerned Us herein, particularly the elevation of the Commission as the "sole judge
of pre-proclamation controversies" as well as of all electoral contests, We find the
aforequoted doctrines compelling as they reveal through the clouds of existing
jurisprudence the polestar by which the future should be guided in delineating and
circumscribing separate spheres of action of the Commission as it functions in its equally
important dual role just indicated bearing as they do on the purity and sanctity of elections
in this country. cdrep
In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given
due course. Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando,
Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such
dismissal.
Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Aquino, and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar and Herrera JJ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
1
At the outset I must state that constraints of time effectively prevent me from writing an
extended dissent. Hence, this abbreviated exposition of my views.
For a clear understanding of the issues, a summary of the essential events relative to these
cases is necessary.
On April 7, 1978, elections of representatives to the Batasang Pambansa were held
throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in
Region XII (Central Mindanao) which comprises the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan
and Cotabato. (The entire Region had a total of 4,107 voting centers, but only 3,984 were
functional).
On June 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection
of the Konsensiya ng Bayan (KB) candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec.
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL
candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering
the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates
forth with interposed the present petition; in due time the respondents filed their
comments.
Oral argument was had before the Court for two days, specifically on January 31 and
February 1, 1979. Atty. Lino Patajo argued for and in behalf of the KB candidates,
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez for the KBL and the private respondents, and Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza for the public respondents. The Court subjected the three
counsels to intensive interrogation. The cases were then submitted for decision in the
afternoon of February 1.
2
I have carefully read the entire record, more particularly the Comelec resolution of January
13, 1979, and I must confess that until now my mind cannot rest easy on a number of
questions sharply in issue, some of which are hereunder briefly discussed. LLjur
a. After the Comelec examined very closely the voting returns, books of voters and
voting records from 1,116 voting centers protested by the KB candidates, to the extent of
subjecting them to detailed documentary examination and fingerprint comparison by
Comelec experts, and thereafter annulled 31.84% of the votes cast, why did it refuse to
proceed to subject all the records of the remaining 1,659 voting centers protested by the
KB candidates to the same manner of close scrutiny?
b. Why did not the Comelec examine, utilizing the same meticulous method, similar
documents and records appertaining to a total of 164 voting centers in Lanao del Sur and
19 voting centers in Lanao del Norte — two provinces where concededly there had been
military operations — and an additional number of voting centers in the other provinces, all
of which registered a 100% turnout of voters? The peace and order conditions in the two
cities of Iligan and Cotabato on the day of the elections were normal, and yet the total
percentages of voting were only 79% and 52%, respectively. How then can the Comelec
explain why and how in many voting centers located in areas where there had been military
operations there was a voting turnout of 100%? Assuming that the KB candidates did not
call the attention of the Comelec — although they actually did — to the stark improbability
of 100% vote turnout in the said places, because the peace and order conditions were far
from normal it perforce devolved on the Comelec to conduct, motu proprio, an in-depth
and full-blown inquiry into this paradox. The record shows that there was 100% voting in
the whole of each of three municipalities, over 99% voting in each of thirteen other
municipalities, and an average 97% turnout in five more municipalities. Of inescapable
significance is the fact that most of these municipalities are located in the provinces of
Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, the past election history of which is replete with the
perpetration of massive frauds, terrorism and scandalous substitutions of voters.
c. Why did the Comelec deny the motion of the KB candidates for the opening of ballot
boxes pertaining to a total of 408 voting centers — the voting records of which were not
available as they had somehow mysteriously disappeared — to determine whether or not
the election in each of the said voting centers was a sham? This remedial measure was
resorted to by the Comelec in 1969 when it ordered the opening of a number of ballot
boxes in the pre-proclamation contest in Lucman vs. Dimaporo in order to see whether or
not there were ballots in side them, without counting the ballots, and determine whether
there had been an actual election in each of the disputed precincts. In that case the
Supreme Court sustained the action of the Comelec.
d. Why did the Comelec include in the canvass the voting returns from some indicated
100 voting centers when the ballot boxes corresponding thereto were found to be
completely empty? And why did the Comelec also include in the canvass the election
returns corresponding to almost 200 ballot boxes found to be without padlocks?
3
Of incalculable significance is the absence of any statement in the Comelec resolution that
indicates that, granting that all the questions I have above raised would be resolved in
favor of the KB candidates, the election results would not be materially altered. Upon the
other hand, the KB candidates state categorically, with benefit of extrapolation, that the
election results would be considerably changed in their favor.
4

The majority of my brethren anchor their denial of the petition on two principal grounds,
namely:
a. The issues raised by the KB candidates would be better and properly ventilated in an
election protest; and
b. No grave abuse of discretion is discernible from the actuations of the Comelec.
Anent the first ground, it is a notorious fact in the history of Philippine politics that an
election protest not only is usually inordinately protracted but as well entails heavy and
prohibitive expenditure of time, money and effort on the part of the protestant. More than
this, should the protestant in the end win, very little time or none at all is left for him to
assume and discharge the duties of his office. In the meantime, the person previously
proclaimed elected continues to fraudulently represent the people who bad in law and in
fact duly elected someone else to represent them. cdphil
Besides, taking a broad view of the fundamental issues raised by the KB candidates, I am
of the opinion that resolution of these issues by the Comelec would not take more than six
months of conscientious labor — and surely this period is short, very short indeed,
compared to the time that will be wasted by the Comelec in deciding a formal electoral
protest.
Is it not time the Supreme Court asserted its powers in order to excise completely the Old
Society pernicious evil of "grab the proclamation at all costs"?
Anent the second ground, I squarely traverse the statement that no grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the Comelec. The grave misgivings I have above articulated
demonstrate what to my mind constitute the size and shape of the remissness of the
Comelec. And more compelling and overriding a consideration than the overwrought
technicality of "grave abuse of discretion" is the fundamental matter of the faith of the
people of Region XII in the electoral process. There will always be the nagging question in
the minds of the voters in that Region as to the legitimacy of those who will be proclaimed
elected under the Comelec resolution should the Court refuse to direct that body to
continue the meticulous search for legitimacy and truth.
5
Upon all the foregoing, it behooves the Court to remand these cases to the Comelec, with
the direction that that body immediately convene and, within an unextendible period and as
speedily as possible, resolve with definitiveness all the questions I have above posed,
under such unequivocal guidelines as the Court may prescribe.
For my part, unless and until this is done, I shall continue to entertain grave doubt as to the
correctness and validity of the results already reached by the Comelec, especially when
political history, placed in perspective, pointedly reminds me of the massive frauds,
terrorism and scandalous substitutions of voters that have characterized past elections in
the two Lanao provinces.
Makasiar and Herrera, JJ., concurs.
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
The present case has afforded Us an early opportunity to examine and define the extent of
the power of judicial review as granted to the Supreme Court over any decision, order or
ruling of the Commission on Elections under the new Constitution the pertinent provision
of which reads:
"Section 11. Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof." (Article XII, Constitution).
The Commission on Elections has been granted powers under the new Constitution which,
under the old Constitution, belonged either to the legislative body (Electoral Tribunals) or
to the courts. This is evident from the provision of the new Constitution which reads:
"(2) Be the sole judge of all contents relating to the elections, returns, and
qualification of all Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and
city officials." (Section 2, Article XII, Constitution).
The Commission is thus envisioned to exercise exclusive powers on all electoral matters
except the right to vote, such as the enforcement and administration of laws relative to the
conduct of elections deciding administrative questions affecting elections, except those
involving the right to vote, but also those that heretofore have been regarded, as matters
for strictly judicial inquiry, such as the hearing and disposition of election contests, as is
doubtlessly shown by the transfer thereto of the powers previously conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal of Congress and the Courts. (see Section 2, par. 2, Article XII, New
Constitution). This change may properly be viewed as having the intention to relieve the
Courts, particularly the Supreme Court, of those burdens placed upon them relating to the
conduct of election and matters incident thereto. It could have been, likewise, intended to
insulate judicial bodies from the baneful effects of partisan politics, the more deleterious
ones being those that could come from the higher seats of political power, such a those in
the Assembly and in the provincial and city government levels.
It is, therefore, my view that what was intended by the new Constitution is to limit the
intervention of the Supreme Court in the acts of the Commission as constitutional body
like said Court, but with broadened powers, allocating to it a domain as exclusive as that of
the legislative body (which includes the President or Prime Minister) on matters of
lawmaking, to that of "judicial inquiry". This power is confined to justifiable questions not
of political nature, and always involving alleged violation of constitutional rights or the
constitution itself. For a controversy of a political character, commonly referred to as
"political questions", is excluded from the scope of the Supreme Court's power of judicial
inquiry. 1 The exclusive character of the power conferred upon the Commission on
Elections, and considering that political rights, as distinguished from civil and personal or
property rights, 2 are for the most part, if not in their totality, the subject of its authority,
should counsel against an expansive intervention by the Supreme Court in the acts of the
Commission on Elections. With the confernment of exclusive authority on the electoral
process upon it, the Commission may be said to have been given full discretionary
authority, the exercise of which would give rise to a controversy involving a political
question. 3
What then is the test or criterion in determining whether the Supreme Court may exercise
its power under Article XII, Section 11 of the new Constitution? It is my humble submission
that the aforecited provision is merely a reassertion of the power of the Supreme Court, as
guardian of the Constitution and protector of constitutional rights, of which, under no
circumstance, could it be deprived, if our present constitutional system is to be
maintained. For it is a power constitutionally assigned to it as the essence of the high
judicial power of the Supreme Court, for the orderly and salutary apportionment of
governmental powers among the different branches of the government, as well as the
special constitutional bodies created to deal more effectively with specific matters
requiring governmental action. Cdpr
Examining the instant petition, nothing reveals itself as raising more than questions merely
affecting the conduct of the election held on April 7, 1978, much less a truly constitutional
question, aside perhaps from the allegation that the COMELEC undertook an examination
of election records beyond those examined during the pendency of the controversy before
the Regional Board of Canvassers, allegedly without notice to the petitioners, thus
intimating a violation of due process. This particular matter, however, can easily be
disposed of by citing the provision of Section 175 of the Electoral Code of 1978 which
reads:
". . . The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies
and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may,
motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the
suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if
one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and
174 hereof."
If the Commission has the power to suspend motu proprio the proclamation of a
candidate-elect, it must have the power to conduct inquiry into the cause for which it
ordains the suspension of the proclamation, such as making its own examination of the
integrity of election returns or inquiring into any relevant matter affecting the purity of the
ballot. Notice is required by the legal provision cited, but this must be notice to the party
adversely affected, the candidate elect whose proclamation is suspended. The action
taken by the COMELEC in examining additional election documents to those examined by
the KB experts during the pendency of the controversy with the Regional Board of
Canvassers was, therefore, one of which petitioners cannot be heard, nor have any reason,
one of which petitioners cannot be heard, nor have any reason, to complain, for it even
resulted in one KB candidate getting into the winners' column. If the COMELEC stopped at
a certain point in its examination, instead of going through all those questioned by the
petitioners, evidently due to time constraint as fixed in the guidelines, set by this Court, and
the summary character of pre-proclamation proceedings, it cannot be charged with abuse
of discretion, much less a grave one. It did not have the conduct the additional
examination, in the first place. The controversy which was heard and decided, in the first
instance, by the Regional Board of Canvassers, with guidelines set by this Court, was
appealed to the COMELEC. The latter's appellate authority was thus limited to a review of
the decision of the Board rendered on the basis of the evidence presented before it,
rendering its own decision on the basis of the same evidence, and no more. It incorporated
the result of its own examination of additional election returns, and found one KB as one of
the winning candidate, a fact clearly showing that COMELEC did examine the said
documents, otherwise, the result as previously declared by the Board of Canvassers with a
clean sweep of the KBL candidate would have remained unaltered.
Expounding more on the one circumstance inclining me to the theory that with the
enlarged power and broadened authority of the COMELEC which extends to and cover
virtually the entire electoral process, as exclusively as the power of legislation is
constitutionally lodged in the law-making body, what is given to the Supreme Court as its
reviewing authority over acts of the COMELEC is no more than what it could exercise under
its power of judicial inquiry with respect to acts of the legislative body, which is the
transfer to the COMELEC of the powers pertaining to the Electoral Tribunals and the
courts under the old Constitution over election contests, it must not be hard to concede
that with the composition of the electoral tribunals in which six of the justices of the
Supreme Court sit in said bodies, the Supreme Court could no longer exercise any
reviewing authority over the acts of the said electoral tribunals except possibly when
violation of the Constitution or constitutional rights are involved. With this limited concept
of this Court's authority over the defunct electoral tribunals now applied to an equally
constitutional body that the COMELEC is that took over the function of the Electoral
Tribunals, I would hesitate to hold that Supreme Court may grant the relief as in prayed for
in the present petition. LLjur
If this is so under the law and the Constitution, it should also be upon consideration of
public policy. The last elections were called by the President as a test or experiment as to
how the vital reforms and changes of political and social discipline and moral values he
has instituted to evolve a new order have affected the thinking and the attitudes of our
people. There should be extreme caution, if not restraint, in any act on our part that might
reflect on the success or failure of that experiment intended, at the same time as a big
stride in the way back to normalization. This is specially true in the field of politics where
the ills of the Old Society has been most grave, because our elections then as a
democratic process, have tarnished the image of our country as a representative
democracy. Except on very compelling reasons then, which I believe do not exist in the
case before Us, should we make any pronouncement that would detract on how
successful the last political exercise had been, as the first election held under the new
Constitution. We must refrain from imputing to the COMELEC which has been enlarged
with fresh mandate and a bigger trust by the Constitution failure in the performance of its
functions either by willful neglect, official incompetence, much less by deliberate partiality,
in the first real test of its capability.
In the light of the foregoing, I vote, in concurrence with the majority, to dismiss the petition,
first, as to the matter allegedly involving a violation of the petitioners' right of due process
on the ground that there was no denial thereof, and second, as to the other matters
involving no violation of constitutional rights, on the ground they are purely political
questions, and that in any case, no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by, much
less is there lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of, the Commission on Elections.
Footnotes

1. Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Tañada & Macapagal vs. Cuenco, L-10520, February
28, 1967; Gonzales vs. Comelec, L-28196 and L-28224, November 9, 1967; The Plebiscite
Cases, 60 SCRA 30 (1973); Peralta vs. Commission on Elections, et al., L-4771, March 11,
1978; Juan T. David vs. Commission on Elections, et al., L-47803, March 11, 1978; Youth
Democratic Movement, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, L-47816, March 11, 1978;
Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333.
2. Political right consists in the power to participate directly or indirectly in the

establishment of the government. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, 77 Phil., 192).

3. A political question relates to "those question which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which fall discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or the executive branch of the
government. Tañada vs. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1967).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19337. September 30, 1969.]
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. , petitioner, vs . COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS and COURT OF TAX APPEALS , respondents.
Laurea, Laurea & Associates for petitioner.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and
Solicitor Sumilang V . Bernardo for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS; ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION,

WEIGHT OF. — Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the of ce charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the
construction placed by It should be given controlling weight.
2. ID.; ID.; PERIOD PRESCRIBED TO EXPORT, NON-EXTENDIBLE AND MANDATORY. — In
the light of the well established rule that exemptions from taxation are not favored, and
that tax statutes are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority, the court is of the opinion that the one-year period with
which to export imported containers prescribed in Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of
1909 is non-extendible; compliance therewith is mandatory.
3. ID.; ID.; JUTE BAGS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE WORD "CONTAINERS." — The words
"jute bags" are included in the phrase "cylinders and other containers" mentioned in
Administrative Order No. 389, for the reason that the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the
Tariff and Customs Code, speak of "containers" in general, and the enumeration following
said word merely serves to give example of containers and do not specify the particular
kinds thereof.
DECISION
CASTRO, J : p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of
November 20, 1961, which denied recovery of the sum of P28,629.42, paid by the
petitioner, under protest, in the concept of customs duties and special import tax, as
well as the petitioner's alternative remedy to recover the said amount minus one per
cent thereof by way of a drawback under sec. 106(b) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The petitioner Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of
centrifugal sugar for export, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as
jute bags. In 1957 it made two importations of jute bags. The rst shipment consisting of
44,800 jute bags and declared under entry 48 on January 8, 1957, entered free of customs
duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's ling of Re-exportation and Special
Import Tax Bond no. 1 in the amounts of P25,088 and P2,464.50. conditioned upon the
exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation. The second
shipment consisting of 75,200 jute bags and declared under entry 243 on February 8,
1957, likewise entered free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's
ling of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 in the amounts of P42,112 and
P7,984.44, with the same conditions as stated in bond no. 1.
Of the 44,800 jute bags declared under entry 48, only 8,647 were exported within one year
from the date of importation as containers of centrifugal sugar. Of the 75,200 jute bags
declared under entry 243, only 25,000 were exported within the said period of one year. In
other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported
within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the
expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their importation.
On February 6, 1958 the petitioner, thru its agent Theo. H. Davies & Co., Far East, Ltd.,
requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, giving the following
as the reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one
year: (a) typhoons and severe oods; (b) picketing of the Central railroad line from
November 6 to December 21, 1957 by certain union elements in the employ of the
Philippine Railway Company, which hampered normal operations; and (c) delay in the
arrival of the vessel aboard which the petitioner was to ship its sugar which was then ready
for loading. This request was denied by the Commissioner per his letter of April 15, 1958.
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353
jute bags within one year from their importation, the Collector of Customs of Iloilo, on
March 17, 1958, required it to pay the amount of P28,629.42 representing the customs
duties and special import tax due thereon, which amount the petitioner paid under protest.
In its letter of April 10, 1958, supplemented by its letter of May 12, 1958, the petitioner
demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the ground that its request for
extension of the period of one year was led on time, and that its failure to export the jute
bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel on
which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line. Alternatively,
the petitioner asked for refund of the same amount in the form of a drawback under
section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
After hearing, the Collector of Customs of Iloilo rendered judgment on January 21, 1960
denying the claim for refund. From his action, appeal was taken to the Commissioner of
Customs who upheld the decision of the Collector. Upon a petition for review the Court of
Tax Appeals affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
The petitioner imputes three errors to the Court of Tax Appeals, namely:
"1. In not declaring that force majeure and/or fortuitous event is a suf cient
justi cation for the failure of the petitioner to export the jute bags in question
within the time required by the bonds.
"2. In not declaring that it is within the power of the Collector of Customs and/or
the Commissioner of Customs to extend the period of one (1) year within which
the jute bags should be exported.

"3. In not declaring that the petitioner is entitled to a refund by way of a drawback
under the provisions of section 106, par. (b), of the Tariff and Customs Code."
1. The basic issue tendered for resolution is whether the Commissioner of Customs is
vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then applicable law, with discretion to
extend the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Act. Section 23 reads:
"SEC. 23. That containers, such as casks, large metal, glass, or other receptacles
which are, in the opinion of the collector of customs, of such a character as to be
readily identi able may be delivered to the importer thereof upon identi cation
and the giving of a bond with sureties satisfactory to the collector of customs in
an amount equal to double the estimated duties thereon, conditioned for the
exportation thereof or payment of the corresponding duties thereon within one
year from the date of importation, under such rules and regulations as the Insular
Collector of Customs shall provide." 1
To implement the said section 23, Customs Administrative Order 389 dated December 6,
1940 was promulgated, paragraph XXVIII of which provides that "bonds for the re-
exportation of cylinders and other containers are good for 12 months without extension,"
and paragraph XXXI, that "bonds for customs brokers, commercial samples, repairs and
those led to guarantee the re-exportation of cylinders and other containers are not
extendible."
And insofar as jute bags as containers are concerned, Customs Administrative Order 66
dated August 25, 1948 was issued, prescribing rules and regulations governing the
importation, exportation and identi cation thereof under section 23 of the Philippine Tariff
Act of 1909. Said administrative order provides:
"That importation of jute bags intended for use as containers of Philippine
products for exportation to foreign countries shall be declared in a regular import
entry supported by a surety bond in an amount equal to double the estimated
duties, conditioned for the exportation or payment of the corresponding duties
thereon within one year from the date of importation."
It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the superseding
sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while xing at one year the period within which
the containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said
period may be extended. It was surely by reason of this silence that the Bureau of Customs
issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66, already adverted to, to eliminate confusion and
provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, 2 and, more speci cally, to make of cially
known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
Considering that the statutory provisions in question have not been the subject of previous
judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for
administrative construction," 3 would, initially, be in order.
"Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the
rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by
administrative or executive departments of the state." 4
"The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous
or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged
with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest
respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining
the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long
continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the rst workings of the
statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency." 5
The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with the intention of the
legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year,
without extension, from the date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff and
Customs Code to supersede the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have
amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the long- standing view of the
Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not extendible.
"Implied legislative approval by failure to change a long- standing administrative

construction is not essential to judicial respect for the construction but is an
element which greatly increases the weight given such construction." 6
"The correctness of the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with
administering its provision is indicated where it appears that Congress, with full
knowledge of the agency's interpretation, has made signi cant additions to the
statute without amending it to depart from the agency's view." 7
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the of ce charged with implementing and
enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it
thereon should be given controlling weight.
"In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical
construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as
bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle
controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves.
These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment
and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the
agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the
agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering de ciencies,
inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute; . . ." 8
If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation are not favored, 9 and that tax
statutes are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority, 1 0 then we are hard put to sustain the petitioner's stand that it was
entitled to an extension of time within which to export the jute bags and, consequently, to a
refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.
In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered view that the one-year period prescribed in
section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 is non-extendible and compliance therewith
is mandatory.
The petitioner's argument that force majeure and/or fortuitous events prevented it from
exporting the jute bags within the one-year period cannot be accorded credit, for several
reasons. In the rst place, in its decision of November 20, 1961, the Court of Tax Appeals
made absolutely no mention of or reference to this argument of the petitioner, which can
only be interpreted to mean that the court did not believe that the "typhoons, oods and
picketing" adverted to by the petitioner in its brief were of such magnitude or nature as to
effectively prevent the exportation of the jute bags within the required one-year period. In
point of fact nowhere in the record does the petitioner convincingly show that the so-
called fortuitous events or force majeure referred to by it precluded the timely exportation
of the jute bags. In the second place, assuming, arguendo, that the one- year period is
extendible, the jute bags were not actually exported within the one-week extension the
petitioner sought. The record shows that although of the remaining 86,353 jute bags
21,944 were exported within the period of one week after the request for extension was
led, the rest of the bags, amounting to a total of 64,409, were actually exported only
during the period from February 16 to May 24, 1958, long after the expiration of the one
week extension sought by the petitioner. Finally, it is clear from the record that the
typhoons and oods which, according to the petitioner, helped render impossible the
ful llment of its obligation to export within the one- year period, assuming that they may
be placed in the category of fortuitous events or force majeure, all occurred prior to the
execution of the bonds in question, or prior to the commencement of the one-year period
within which the petitioner was in law required to export the jute bags.
2. The next argument of the petitioner is that granting that Customs Administrative Order
389 is valid and binding, yet "jute bags" cannot be included in the phrase "cylinders and
other containers" mentioned therein. It will be noted, however, that the Philippine Tariff Act
of 1909 and the Tariff and Customs Code, which Administrative Order 389 seeks to
implement, speak of "containers" in general. The enumeration following the word
"containers" in the said statutes serves merely to give examples of containers and not to
specify the particular kinds thereof. Thus, sec. 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act states,
"containers such as casks, large metals, glass or other receptacles," and sec. 105(x) of the
Tariff and Customs Code mentions "large containers," giving as examples "demijohn,
cylinders, drums, casks and other similar receptacles of metal, glass or other materials."
(emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that the customs
authorities had intended, in Customs Administrative Order 389 to circumscribe the scope
of the word "container," any more than the statutes sought to be implemented actually
intended to do.
3. Finally, the petitioner claims entitlement to a drawback of the duties it had paid, by virtue
of section 106 (b) of the Tariff and Customs Code, 1 1 which reads:
"SEC. 106. Drawbacks: . . .
"b. On Articles Made from Imported Materials or Similar Domestic Materials and
Wastes Thereof. — Upon the exportation of articles manufactured or produced in
the Philippines, including the packing, covering, putting up, marking or labeling
thereof, either in whole or in part of imported materials, or from similar domestic
materials of equal quantity and productive manufacturing quality and value, such
question to be determined by the Collector of Customs, there shall be allowed a
drawback equal in amount to the duties paid on the imported materials so used or
where similar domestic materials are used, to the duties paid on the equivalent
imported similar materials, less one per cent thereof: Provided That the
exportation shall be made within three years after the importation of the foreign
material used or constituting the basis for drawback . . ."
The petitioner argues that not having availed itself of the full exemption granted by sec.
105 (x) of the Tariff and Customs Code due to its failure to export the jute bags within
one year, it is nevertheless, by authority of the above-quoted provision, entitled to a 99%
drawback of the duties it had paid, averring further that sec. 106 (b) does not
presuppose immediate payment of duties and taxes at the time of importation.
The contention is palpably devoid of merit.
The provision invoked by the petitioner (to sustain his claim for refund) offer two options
to an importer. The rst under sec. 105 (x), gives him the privilege of importing, free from
import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year
from the date of acceptance of the import entry, which period, as shown above, is not
extendible. The second, presented by sec. 106(b), contemplates a case where import
duties are rst paid. subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid, provided
the articles mentioned therein are exported within three years from importation.
It would seem then that the Government would forego collecting duties on the article
mentioned in section 105 (x) of Tariff and Customs Code as long as it is assured, by the
ling of a bond, that the same shall be exported within the relatively short period of one
year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. Where an importer cannot provide
such assurance, then the Government, under sec. 106(b) of said Code, would require
payment of the corresponding duties rst. The basic purpose of the two provisions is the
same which is, to enable a local manufacturer to compete in foreign markets, by relieving
him of the disadvantages resulting from having to pay duties on imported merchandise,
thereby building up export trade and encouraging manufacture in the country. 1 2 But there
is a difference, and it is this: under section 105(x) full exemption is granted to an importer
who justi es the grant of exemption by exporting within one year. The petitioner, having
opted to take advantage of the provisions of section 105(x), may not, after having failed to
comply with the conditions imposed thereby, avoid the consequences of such failure by
being allowed a drawback under section 106 (b) of the same Act without having complied
with the conditions of the latter section.
For it is not to be supposed that the legislature had intended to defeat compliance with the
terms of section 105 (x) thru a refuge under the provisions of section 106(b). A
construction should be avoided which affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with
the terms of a statute. 1 3 Rather courts should proceed on the theory that parts of a
statute may be harmonized and reconciled with each other.
"A construction of a Statute which creates an inconsistency should be avoided
when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the
plain words of the act and will carry out the intention of Congress.
"In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle, embodied in the maxim, 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat,' that
the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence to the spirit
and language of an act, so interpret the statute to give it ef cient operation and
effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nulli ed, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory." 1 4
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals of November 20, 1961 is
affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
Concepcion, C . J ., Dizon, Saldivar, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ ., did
not take part.
Makalintal and Sanchez, JJ ., did not take part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J ., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1. This section was superseded by sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code which took
effect on July 1, 1957. Section 105 (x) provides:
"Large containers (e g., demijohns, cylinders, drums, casks and other similar receptacles of
metal, glass or other material) which are, in the opinion of the Collector of Customs, of
such a character as to be readily identi able may be delivered to the importer thereof
upon identi cation and the giving of a bond in an amount equal to one and one-half
times the ascertained duties, taxes and other charges thereon, conditioned for the
exportation thereof or payment of the corresponding duties, taxes and other charges
within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry."
2. Magruder v. W.B. & A. Realty Corp., 316 U.S. 69; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134; see 2
Am. Jur. 2d 61, 63.
3. In applying this doctrine courts often refer generally to the "administrative practice," a term
taken to include any formal or informal act of the administrative agency by which it
construes, interprets, or applies the law (2 Am. Jur. 2d 69).
4. Ahlers v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 264 NW 894.
5. 2 Am. Jur. 2d 66-67.
6. 2 Am. Jur. 2d 70, footnote 11, par. 2.
7. 2 Am. Jur. 2d 70, footnote 11, par. 3; see also Phil. Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of
Customs, 51 Phil. 131, cited in Cia. Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Acting Commissioner
of Customs, 23 SCRA 600, wherein this Court held that the very fact that Congress has
not seen fit to repeal or change the law is a very potent argument in favor of sustaining a
construction given to it by courts.
8. 2 Am. Jur. 2d 69-70.

9. Comm. of Int. Rev. v. Visayan Electric Co., 28 SCRA 715, 726, citing Esso Standard Eastern,
Inc. v. Actg. Comm. of Customs, 18 SCRA 488; Farm Implement & Machinery Co. v.
Comm. of Customs, 24 SCRA 905.
10. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Actg. Comm. of Customs, supra; La Carlota Sugar Central v.
Jimenez, L-12436, May 31, 1961; Phil. Int'l. Fair, Inc. v. Collector, L-12928 & L-12932,
March 31, 1962.
11. Which is a substantial reproduction of sec. 22 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the law in
force at the time the importations of the jute bags in question were made.
12. 25 C.J.S. 530-531; U.S. v. Passavert, 169 U.S. 16; U.S. v. Whidden, 28 F. Cas. No. 10, 670
cited in 25 C.J.S. 530; Tidewater Oil v. U.S., 171 U.S. 210, 219; U.S. Code Congressional
News, Vol. 2, p. 3577 (85th Congress, 2nd Session).
13. State v. Lipkin, 84 SE 340, LRA 1915F 1018, cited in 50 Am. Jur. 366.
14. 50 Am. Jur. 358-359.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166062. September 26, 2006.]
SALVADOR M. PEREZ and JUANITA A. APOSTOL , petitioners, vs . HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman , respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questioning the twin
Resolutions 1 of the Sandiganbayan dated 7 May 2004 (promulgated 18 May 2004), 2 and
27 September 2004 (promulgated 1 October 2004). 3
The following facts were culled from the records of the case:
In a resolution dated 24 April 2001, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
resolved to file charges of violation of Section 3(e) 4 of Republic Act No. 3019 5 against
petitioners, San Manuel, Pangasinan Mayor Salvador M. Perez, and Municipal Treasurer
Juanita Apostol. The Information alleges a crime committed as follows:
That on or about September of 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SALVADOR
PEREZ, being then the Municipal Mayor and JUANITA APOSTOL, ZAPANTA,
Municipal Treasurer of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one
another, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage
of their official functions, and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause the purchase of one (1) computer unit costing P120,000.00
acquisition by personal canvass which is in violation of Secs. 362 and 367 of R.A.
7160, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of San Manuel,
Pangasinan. 6
On 16 January 2002, prior to the scheduled arraignment, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation alleging the discovery of new evidence which will change
the outcome of the case if presented and appreciated. The alleged newly discovered
evidence consists in the reassessment by the auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA)
that, though the prices between the subject computer and that canvassed by the COA are
different, such difference is "not really that material." 7
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation in an Order dated 4 April 2002. On a subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration, however, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered the 4 April 2002 Order, and
granted petitioners ten days from receipt of the current 6 September 2002 Resolution
within which to formalize their Motion for Reconsideration in the Office of the
Ombudsman. DIESHT
Complying with the 6 September 2002 Resolution, petitioners formalized their Motion for
Reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Accordingly, the Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation. Assistant
Special Prosecutor Warlito F. Galisanao prepared a Memorandum dated 23 October 2003,
recommending the withdrawal of the Information. 8 However, in the portion of the
Memorandum earmarked for the Special Prosecutor's action, Special Prosecutor Dennis
M. Villa-Ignacio chose the action "DO NOT CONCUR" by drawing two lines on the action "I
CONCUR," and wrote the following marginal note:
I am, instead adopting the enclosed memorandum of Pros. Chua dated Jan. 22,
2004 recommending that in the meantime, further fact-finding be conducted, and
an administrative case be filed against accused Apostol, after withdrawing the
Information for viol. of Sec. 3(e) R.A. 3019. 9
On the other hand, new Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo crossed out both actions
(APPROVED/DISAPPROVED), and wrote the following marginal note dated 16 February
2004:
The resolution of this case is deferred. There are two modes of violating Section
3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: a) causing undue injury or b) giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference. OSP should study whether the accused, assuming
arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the seller of the subject computer. Kindly submit your
recommendation soonest. 1 0
In an 8 March 2004 Supplemental Memorandum, Assistant Special Prosecutor III Warlito

F. Galisanao recommended an amendment of the Information, instead of a withdrawal
thereof, to wit: ISDCaT
This is a Supplemental Memorandum to an earlier Memorandum dated October

23, 2003 to the Honorable Tanodbayan, Simeon V. Marcelo who directed the
deferment of action on undersigned's recommendation for the withdrawal of the
Information.
As earlier found, the acquisition of the unbranded computer set was questionable
on the following grounds:
1. There was no public bidding and the mode of procurement was by

canvass.
2. Under Sec. 367 of the Local Government Code, procurement through

Personal Canvass requires approval of the Committee on Awards.
There was no committee approval to speak of in this case because
none has been constituted. This committee is supposed to be
composed of:
a. Local General Services Officer or the Municipal Treasurer;
b. Local Accountant;
c. The head of office of department for whose use the supplies

are being procured. CDHSac
3. Purchases under this section allows municipalities outside Metro

Manila with the following limits:
Second and Third Class — Forty Thousand Pesos

(P40,000.00)
Fourth Class and Below — Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00)
These limits are applicable for all items procured by any one (1) month period
only. The local government of San Manuel, Pangasinan, incidentally, is a fourth
class municipality.
It must be noted that the canvass made on all the stores/suppliers were done by
accused Treasurer Juanita Apostol and attested by Mayor, Salvador Perez. To
attest means to affirm to be correct, true or genuine (Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition)[.]
In the earlier memorandum, there is no unanimity of conclusion as far as the

reasonableness of the purchase price of the computer set is concern[ed].
However, the circumstances of its acquisition clearly indicate that the public
officials involved gave the supplier, Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center, a
private party, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence by paying much more
than the prevailing price for a comparable computer set in the market. HcSaTI
This conclusion is derived from accused's deliberate disregard of the rules on

procurement discussed above. The Information must, therefore, be amended to
reflect the manner of the commission of the offense. In regard to Prosecutor
Elvira Chua's recommendation which is endorsed by the Special Prosecutor, the
issue of overpricing must be referred to the appropriate office for further fact-
finding and probable administrative investigation for violation of COA rules and
RA 7160 otherwise, known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Information be amended

instead of withdrawing the same. Further, the case of overpricing be referred for
fact-finding and possible administrative investigation for violation of Secs. 362
and 367 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 1 1
This time around, Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio approved the Supplemental

Memorandum and, pursuant thereto, Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao filed a
Motion for Leave to File Amended Information dated 12 March 2004. The Amended
Information, which again charges petitioners Perez and Apostol for violation of Sec. 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, provides:
That on or about January 21, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SALVADOR
PEREZ, being then the Municipal Mayor and JUANITA A. APOSTOL, Municipal
Treasurer of said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of their
official functions, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of official
functions to Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center causing the purchase of
one (1) computer unit costing P120,000.00, an acquisition by personal canvass
which is in violation of Sections 362 and 367 of RA 7160, thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan. 1 2
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in the first assailed resolution, thus:
There having been no arraignment yet and the pre-maturity of the amendment is
of the prosecution's risk, the motion to Amend the Information is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Amended Information submitted by the prosecution is admitted.
13
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the second
assailed resolution:
The Court resolves to deny the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused.
Indeed, the power of a prosecuting prosecutor to amend or cause the amendment
of the information does not need the approving authority of the Ombudsman. The
Information was maintained only with some amendments made which the Court
feels do not violate any law since there was no arraignment yet.
Accordingly, accused Motion for Reconsideration dated June 4, 2004 is denied for
lack of merit. 1 4
Petitioners assail the foregoing Resolutions before this Court, presenting the following
issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not there is a denial of procedural due process on the part of
the petitioners when the Special Prosecutor filed the Amended Information
without authority from or the approval of the Honorable Ombudsman, and
against the latter's specific instruction;
2. Whether or not the Amended Information is valid in the absence of such

authority or approval of the Ombudsman under the circumstances; and cCaIET
3. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it admitted the
Amended Information which bears no approval of the Honorable Ombudsman,
and against the latter's written instruction to submit to him for approval the result
of the re-study before the filing of said Amended Information. 1 5
This is not the first time the respective powers of the Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor were pitted at loggerheads against each other since these positions were
reinvented in the 1987 Constitution. The Offices of the Ombudsman (now also called the
Tanodbayan) and the Special Prosecutor (then called the Tanodbayan) were reintroduced,
with modified powers and designation, in the following provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution:
Sec. 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy,
and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of
the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
A judicial examination of the prosecutorial powers of these two Constitutional positions

came barely a year after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, when then Special
Prosecutor Raul Gonzalez filed criminal cases against Antique Governor Enrique Zaldivar.
Zaldivar claimed that said cases were filed without legal and constitutional authority since,
under the 1987 Constitution, it is only the Ombudsman (not the incumbent Tanodbayan
who should now be called the Special Prosecutor) who has the authority to file the cases
with the Sandiganbayan. In granting the petitions and nullifying the criminal informations
filed against Zaldivar, this Court held:
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the
incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:
"Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13,
par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
"The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the

Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." (Art. XI, Section
7) (Italics ours).
IcHDCS
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the
incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution
and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman)
is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the
filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that
time, he has been divested of such authority.
Under the present constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a

mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and
prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special
Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only
conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman . Even his
original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d) of PD
1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it
in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
1 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
The following year, Republic Act No. 6770, 1 7 otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989, was passed into law. Among other things, said law:
1) expressly included the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman; 1 8
2) gave the Special Prosecutor the power, under the supervision and control and upon
the authority of the Ombudsman, to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and to perform such other
duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman; 1 9 and, most importantly,
3) granted the Ombudsman the powers to: CHIScD
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases. 2 0
A few years later, several persons charged in a complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman (in connection with the alleged summary execution of Kuratong Baleleng
gang members) instituted petitions for certiorari with this Court, claiming that it is the
Special Prosecutor which has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation and file
the proper information against them. In the oral arguments, the parties agreed to limit the
issues, with petitioners praying for the re-examination of the Zaldivar ruling on the
argument that the Constitution did not give the Ombudsman prosecutorial functions, and
contending that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among the offices
under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
unconstitutional. DSacAE
In upholding Zaldivar, we held that while there was indeed an intention to withhold
prosecutorial functions from the Ombudsman, the legislature nevertheless recommended
that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions and
duties to the Ombudsman. 2 1 Thus, paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution,
provides that the Ombudsman may exercise other functions and duties as may be
provided by law. 2 2 Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature enacted Republic Act No.
6770, which granted prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman.
On the claim that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among the
offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
unconstitutional, we ratiocinated that:
The contention is not impressed with merit. Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue
Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate that the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the President. The said statement obviously
referred to the Tanodbayan under P.D. No. 1630 — note how specific the erstwhile
Commissioner was in stating; ". . . as the decree now reads . . ." Further, in
complete contrast to the petitioner's stand, one of the principal reasons for the
proposal to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was precisely to
remove the office from presidential control. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then
existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter
may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation.
It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special
Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those
powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as
may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In
the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the
Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as
Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A
No. 6770. 2 3
While it is clear that Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman upheld Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
insofar as the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases is concerned, there has been
a shift in its ratio decidendi. Hence, it was pronounced that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute was based on Republic Act No. 6770, as authorized by
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. This being the case, and considering
that Republic Act No. 6770 also gives the Special Prosecutor the power to prosecute
criminal cases (albeit under the supervision and control and under the authority of the
Ombudsman), was there likewise a modification of our ruling in Zaldivar prohibiting the
then Special Prosecutor to initiate criminal cases unless authorized by the Ombudsman?
Or should there now be a presumed authority, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6770, to
prosecute cases unless prohibited by the Ombudsman? SDIaHE
The determination of this question is necessary in the case at bar, where it is the
petitioners' central contention that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction when it admitted the Amended
Information which, according to petitioners, bears no approval of the Ombudsman, thus,
constituting denial of procedural due process. 2 4
Particularly, petitioners allege that the amendment of the Information and the admission of
the Amended Information is premature, since the Ombudsman has not yet acted with
finality on the 23 October 2003 Memorandum. 2 5 The Ombudsman, by stating in the
marginal notes of the 23 October 2003 Memorandum that "(t)he resolution of this case is
deferred," and "(k)indly submit your recommendation soonest," allegedly decreed that the
reinvestigation stage would not be completed until his final determination. 2 6
Respondent People's defense is that compliance with the specific instructions of the
Ombudsman is merely an internal matter and the alleged failure to heed the specific
instructions of the Ombudsman is speculative. 2 7
The marginal notes of Ombudsmen to the recommendations of investigating prosecutors
are hardly internal matters. In Cruz, Jr. v. People, 2 8 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 2 9 and
Gallardo v. People, 3 0 the marginal notes, even one-liners as in the case of Gallardo, were
judicially considered sufficient dispositions by the Ombudsmen and Special Prosecutors
concerned. We held in Olivarez that: AICDSa
The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was
contained in a marginal note is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on
the part of respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they
gravely abused their discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the case against petitioner. . . .
31

Was there, as petitioners assert, a violation of the orders of the Ombudsman as stated in
his marginal note?
For reference, we reiterate the marginal note of Ombudsman Marcelo dated 16 February
2004:
The resolution of this case is deferred. There are two modes of violating Section
3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: a) causing undue injury or b) giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference. OSP should study whether the accused, assuming
arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the seller of the subject computer. Kindly submit your
recommendation soonest. 3 2
Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao's Special Memorandum, quoted in full in the

narration of facts, show complete compliance with Ombudsman Marcelo's order to "study
whether the accused, assuming arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to the seller of the subject computer." Assistant Special
Prosecutor Galisanao answered the query in the affirmative, stating that unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference were given to Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales
Center through the "deliberate disregard of the rules on procurement discussed above."
Ombudsman Marcelo's order, however, to "(k)indly submit your recommendation soonest,"
is another matter. The marginal note did not indicate to whom the recommendation should
be submitted. As the recommendation was prepared by a subordinate in the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, would a submission to the Special Prosecutor be sufficient
compliance with the order of the Ombudsman? What is imperative is that the
recommendation be submitted to someone who has the authority to implement such
recommendation, by authorizing the filing of the proper information.
Republic Act No. 6770, by conferring upon the Ombudsman the power to prosecute,
likewise grants to the Ombudsman the power to authorize the filing of informations. As to
the Special Prosecutor, respondent People invokes the aforesaid authority of the
Ombudsman in Section 15(10) to delegate his powers, and claim that there was a general
delegation of the authority to approve the filing of informations in Office Order No. 03-97,
series of 2003 (dated 15 September 2003), and Office Order No. 40-05, series of 2005
(dated 4 April 2005). AaHTIE
Office Order No. 40-05 is a consolidation of several office orders, including the
aforementioned Office Order No. 03-97, which is thus superceded by the former. 3 3 Office
Order No. 40-05 provides:
In the exigency of the service, except when otherwise ordered by the Ombudsman,
the disposition of administrative and criminal cases involving any of the
following, viz:
1) City and Municipal mayors;
xxx xxx xxx
as the highest ranking respondent, where the offense charged involves injury or
damage amounting to, or valued at Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) or less, or
where the maximum imposable penalty for any of the offense charged does not
exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment, shall be subject to the final approval of
the Deputy Ombudsman concerned; provided, that, where the offense charged
involves injury or damage amounting to, or valued at, more than Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00), or where the maximum imposable penalty for any of the
offense charged is more than twenty (20) years imprisonment, the disposition
shall be subject to the final approval of the Ombudsman.
In the foregoing dispositions that are subject to the final approval of the Deputy
Ombudsman concerned, the undersigned hereby delegates to the latter further
authority to approve and sign any corresponding criminal information, whether to
be filed with the regular courts or the Sandiganbayan; provided, however, that,
preparatory to the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor may review and modify the same, subject to the approval
of the Special Prosecutor, without departing from, or varying in any way, the
contents of the basic Resolution, Order or Decision. 3 4
Contrary to the contention of respondent People, the delegation of the power to authorize
the filing of informations under Office Order No. 40-05 was only made to Deputy
Ombudsmen, and not to the Special Prosecutor. All that was delegated to the Special
Prosecutor was the discretional 3 5 authority to review and modify the Deputy
Ombudsmen-authorized information, but even this is subject to the condition that such
modification must be "without departing from, or varying in any way, the contents of the
basic Resolution, Order or Decision." Even the title of Office Order No. 40-05 betray the
contention of delegation to the Special Prosecutor: "DELEGATION OF FINAL APPROVING
AUTHORITY TO THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR
VISAYAS AND DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR MINDANAO." IDTHcA
Neither does it help that, under Section 11(4) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Special
Prosecutor was given the rank and salary of Deputy Ombudsman. In Office of the
Ombudsman v. Valera, 3 6 this Court held:
The petitioner's contention that since the Special Prosecutor is of the same rank
as that of a Deputy Ombudsman, then the former can rightfully perform all the
functions of the latter, including the power to preventively suspend, is not
persuasive. Under civil service laws, rank classification determines the salary and
status of government officials and employees. Although there is substantial
equality in the level of their respective functions, those occupying the same rank
do not necessarily have the same powers nor perform the same functions. 3 7
There being no express delegation of the power to prosecute, we are constrained to go

back to our main query: Is there an implied delegation of the power to prosecute under
Republic Act No. 6770, such that Special Prosecutors are presumed to have been
delegated such power, in the absence of a prohibition from the Ombudsman?
Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and
control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea-bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman. 3 8
This Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." 3 9 The power of
supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties." 4 0 Under the Administrative Code of
1987 4 1 :
Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance
of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. . . .
Springing from the power of control is the doctrine of qualified political agency, wherein
the acts of a subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless actually
disapproved by the latter. 4 2 Thus, taken with the powers of control and supervision, the
acts of Department Secretaries in the performance of their duties are presumed to be the
act of the President, unless and until the President alters, modifies, or nullifies the same.
By arguing that "[w]hat is important is that the amended Information has not been
withdrawn, and or recalled by the Honorable Ombudsman, [a] clear showing that the latter
acknowledged/upheld the act of the Special Prosecutor in signing the Amended
Information," 4 3 respondent People claims that the doctrine of qualified political agency
should be applied as well to the relationship between the Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor. acEHSI
Petitioners counter that the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply to the
Office of the Ombudsman, since the latter is an apolitical agency, and is far different from
the bureaucracy to which said doctrine applies. 4 4
Petitioners are correct.

The doctrine of qualified political agency was adopted in our system of government on the
following pronouncement of this Court in Villena v. The Secretary of the Interior 4 5 :
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under
the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1,
section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the
law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887].
122 U.S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141; see also U. S. vs. Eliason
[1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U.S., 202; 34
Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey v. Chapman [1880], 101 U.S., 755; 25
Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.) 4 6
While we do not underestimate the quantity of work in the hands of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the same simply does not measure up to the workload of the Office of the
President as to necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the
Ombudsman. In any case, the Office of the Ombudsman could very well make a general
delegation of powers to the Special Prosecutor, if it is so desired. An examination of the
office orders issued by the Ombudsman, however, reveal that there had been no such
intention to make a general delegation.
Indeed, a statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be
liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was
created. 4 7 Yet, the Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his power of
control if we are to allow the Special Prosecutor to authorize the filing of informations in
the first instance. This is because while the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has
been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which
has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed,
without the approval of the said court. 4 8
We, therefore, resolve to grant the Petition. We realize that, once transmitted to the new
Ombudsman, she can so easily approve the 8 March 2004 Supplemental Memorandum of
Assistant Special Prosecutor Galisanao, and the same Amended Information can be filed
in no time. However, when the law entails a specific procedure to be followed, unwarranted
shortcuts lead to the violation of the sacred right to due process, which we cannot
countenance. CASTDI
Finally, as regards other informations authorized by the Special Prosecutor to be filed

without the approval of the Ombudsman, we also recognize that the former prevailing
interpretation of the law may shield these informations from illegality. Such reliance upon
the operative fact, however, would cease upon the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan admitting the Amended Information is SET ASIDE. Let the 8 March
2004 Supplemental Memorandum of Assistant Special Prosecutor III Warlito F. Galisanao
be TRANSMITTED to the Office of the Ombudsman for approval or disapproval.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Both Resolutions were penned by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Edilberto G.

Sandoval with Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. and Efren N. dela Cruz,
concurring.
2. Records, p. 213.
3. Id. at 242.
4. SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
5. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

6. Rollo, pp. 20-21.
7. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 3.
8. Rollo, pp. 60-69.
9. Id. at 69.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 70-73.
12. Records, pp. 202-204.
13. Id. at 213.
14. Id. at 242.
15. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 7.
16. Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-79690-707, 27 April 1988, 160 SCRA 843, 846-
847.
17. Approved on 17 November 1989.

18. Republic Act No. 6770, Section 3: "The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the
Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy
for the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the
Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other
Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman."
19. Republic Act No. 6770, Section 11 (4): "The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under
the supervision and control and under the authority of the Ombudsman, have the
following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

20. Republic Act No. 6770, Section 11(1); In Uy v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 105965-70, 20
March 2001, 354 SCRA 651, 659), we set aside our earlier Decision (312 SCRA 77, 9
August 1999) and Resolution (unreported, 20 February 2000), and held that Section
11(1) gives the Ombudsman the power to prosecute criminal cases not only within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but also those within the jurisdiction of regular
courts.
21. Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 120422 & 120428, 27 September 1995,
248 SCRA 566, 575-576.
22. SEC. 13. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
xxx xxx xxx
Promulgate its rules and procedures and exercise such other functions or duties
as may be provided by law . (Emphasis supplied.)
23. Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 21 at 581-582.
24. Rollo, p. 155.
25. Id. at 161.
26. Id. at 161.
27. Id. at 175.
28. G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 450-451.
29. 319 Phil. 45 (1995).
30. G.R. No. 142030, 21 April 2005, 456 SCRA 494, 504-505.
31. Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 29 at 58-59.

32. Rollo, p. 69.
33. Office Order No. 40-05 states: "This Office Order is being issued to consolidate
the contents of existing officer orders, to wit : Office Order No. 05-11, dated 19
January 2005; Office Order No. 03-97, dated 15 September 2003 ; Office Order No.
03-116, dated 17 October 2003; Office Order No. 04-32, dated 12 May 2004; and Office
Order No. 04-45, dated 8 July 2004. Said Office Orders are deemed superseded by this
Office Order." (Emphasis supplied.)
34. Rollo, pp. 218-220.

35. ". . . [T]he Office of the Special Prosecutor may review and modify the same." (Id. at
219.)
36. G.R. No. 164250, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 715.

37. Id. at 746-747.
38. Republic Act No. 6770, Section 11(4).
39. Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).

40. Id.
41. Executive Order No. 292, Book 4, Chapter 7, Section 38 (1).
42. See Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan
ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 85439, 13 January 1992, 205
SCRA 92, 110.
43. Rollo, p. 175.

44. Id. at 164.
45. 67 Phil. 451 (1939).
46. Id. at 463-464.

47. Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, 21 September 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 653.
48. Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129904, 16 March 2000, 328 SCRA 292, 300,
citing Ocampo, v. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA 725, 730 (1993).

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-31152. March 27, 1974.]
UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES, JAIME HERNANDEZ, SR., and

JAIME HERNANDEZ, JR. , petitioners, vs. HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ,
as Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations, and the
UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES GUARDIANS UNION , respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for petitioners.

Mariano B. Tuason and Francisco M. de los Reyes for respondent Judge, CIR.
Augusto A. Pardalis and Mariano M. Abes for respondent Union.
DECISION
BARREDO , J : p
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, relative to the
orders of respondent Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations dated July 30,
1969 and October 6, 1969, which in effect held that the determination of whether or not a
charge of unfair labor practice, investigated by the Prosecution Division of said court,
should be dismissed outright because of any fatal defect of form or substance is the
exclusive prerogative of said Presiding Judge, to the exclusion of the court en banc, on the
theory that the function involved in such determination is not judicial but purely
administrative and hence entrusted to his exclusive administrative authority as head of
said court.
On June 17, 1969, respondent University of Nueva Caceres Guardians Union filed with the
Bicol branch of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an unfair labor practice
charge against petitioners, accompanied by the joint affidavit of Benito de la Paz and
George Offemaria. At the hearing of said charge before the prosecutor of the CIR,
petitioners moved to dismiss the same on the grounds: (1) it is not verified; (2) it does not
specify the particular provisions of Section 4 (a) of the Industrial Peace Act, RA 875, as
amended, supposed to have been violated, and (3) the supporting joint affidavit contains
"falsities, misstatements and improbabilities on points otherwise material to the charge."
Instead of dismissing the charge, the prosecutor, although finding the grounds of the
dismissal motion to be more or less plausible, granted respondent Union five (5) days "to
file an amended charge and amended affidavit," which said Union did on July 8, 1969. On
July 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the ruling of the prosecutor, but on July 30,
1969, respondent Presiding Judge denied the same, admitted the amended charge and
directed the Court Prosecutor to set the said amended charge for preliminary
investigation. On August 16, 1969, petitioners moved again for reconsideration of the
order of July 30, 1969. Apparently, petitioners assumed their motion for reconsideration
would be acted upon by the court en banc, for when on October 6, 1969, respondent Judge
issued an order, signed by him alone, denying it, the present petition was filed charging
said respondent with having acted in excess of jurisdiction in acting on a matter
addressed to and within the jurisdiction of the CIR en banc and of grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the dismissal of the charge upon the grounds invoked by them.
The assertion by respondent Judge, implicit in his order of October 6, 1969, of jurisdiction,
to the exclusion of the court en banc, over the matter herein involved cannot be sustained.
It is Our considered view that unlike the preliminary investigation of criminal cases by
fiscals which are under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, 1 the
peculiar procedure prescribed by law in unfair labor practices partakes of the nature of
judicial investigations, since they are conducted, to quote the language of the law, by "the
Court or any agency or agent designated by the Court", (Section 5 (b), Rep. Act 875)
similarly to the preliminary investigations undertaken by courts of first instance in election
cases 2 and charges of violation of the Anti-Subversion Act. 3 Surely, no one can pretend
that in such preliminary investigations, the courts of first instance are performing
administrative or non-judicial functions. In such cases, the courts act in the same judicial
capacity as they do in trying the cases on the merits and cannot, in any respect or measure,
be controlled by the Secretary of Justice. The fact that the law authorizes the CIR to
delegate the investigation to "any agency or agent designated by the Court" does not alter
the nature of the court's function in the premises, just as the appointment of
commissioners by the courts under Rule 34 does not make the procedure administrative
or less judicial. Indeed, under the provision aforementioned, the investigation could very
well be assigned to one of the judges of the CIR, and in that event, how can it be
maintained that the function is administrative? Withal, it is implicit in this procedure that
the work of the "agency or agent designated by Court" is as much the responsibility of the
court as if it were the court itself that were acting directly.
The contention of respondent Judge that the function of overseering the Prosecution
Division of the CIR in its work of filing and dismissing charges of unfair labor practice is
purely administrative in nature and falls within his exclusive competence is without merit. It
is true that reference to the court in the law must be construed to mean the Presiding
Judge and not the court en banc when the action contemplated is purely administrative in
character, but, precisely, the point missed is that, as already explained, the Industrial Peace
Act does not consider the investigation by the CIR, either by itself or thru an agent, as an
administrative matter but a judicial one like the preliminary investigations in election and
anti-subversion cases.
Maybe the development in the United States recounted by respondent Judge whereby the
Taft-Hartley Law transferred from the National Labor Relations Board to its General
Counsel the exclusive function and power to determine with finality whether or not an
unfair labor practice charge should be filed with the Board is good, in the sense of avoiding
that the Board be the accuser, investigator and judge all rolled into one, but there is nothing
in either Commonwealth Act 103 or the Industrial Peace Act indicating that the American
experience has influenced the enactment and phraseology of the pertinent provisions of
our laws. Quite on the contrary, as already pointed out, Section 5(b) of RA 875 very
explicitly confers the function of investigating unfair labor charges upon the CIR itself,
albeit it allows the court to designate any other agency or agent for the purpose.
As regards the other impugned order of July 30, 1969, the result of the foregoing
discussion and ruling is that the same should first be submitted to the CIR en banc for
appropriate action. Much as the writer of this opinion feels that the objections thereto
raised by petitioners are rather strained and are not very consistent with the interests of
justice, which would not permit the throwing out of an unfair labor practice charge merely
because of non-jurisdictional defects which can anyway be corrected, the Court would not
pre-empt the power of the CIR en banc to make the corresponding ruling relative thereto in
the first instance.
Before closing, it might be stated that, to be sure, the creation of the National Labor
Relations Commission, may have altered the procedure in cases involving alleged unfair
labor practices, but that point is not and cannot be raised anymore in this proceeding and
We do not consider it necessary to pass on it now.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition insofar as the assailed order of July
30, 1969 is concerned is denied, without prejudice to the appropriate action on petitioners'
motion for reconsideration thereof by the CIR en banc, but the petition for certiorari and
mandamus relative to the impugned order of respondent Presiding Judge of October 6,
1969 is granted, the said order is hereby declared null and void and set aside, as in excess
of jurisdiction, and respondent Presiding Judge or whoever is acting in his stead is ordered
to refer the motion for reconsideration of petitioners dated August 16, 1969 to the CIR en
banc for appropriate action. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court on
November 24, 1969 is made permanent, without prejudice to the resolution by the CIR of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration just referred to. The manifestation of Acting
Presiding Judge Ansberto Paredes to the effect that he has desisted and continues to
desist from following the practice of former Presiding Judge Martinez declared illegal in
this decision is noted. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO , J ., concurring :
I concur in the main opinion, with the following additional observations:

In the United States, the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, separate the prosecuting authority from the judicial authority in
unfair labor practice proceedings.
According to Werne, "the General Counsel, who has supervision of the regional directors in
the board's various regional offices and their staffs, constitutes the ultimate prosecuting
arm of the agency, while the board's functions in unfair labor practice cases are restricted
exclusively to decisional powers." Thus, the General Counsel is granted by said Act, "final
authority to act in the name of, but independently of any direction, control, or review by the
Board in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board." 1 In other
words, the aforesaid Act grants the General Counsel "final authority in the investigation of
charges and the issuance of complaints." 2
After showing the basic and fundamental difference between the "charge" and the
"complaint," Rothenberg observes that "the proceedings (as the equivalent of litigation)
commences only with the issuance by the Board of a complaint, from which time forward
the Board's judicial functions come into play. Its prior acceptance of the charge and the
resultant investigation are purely of an administrative character." 3
Such is not the case in this jurisdiction, however, because section 5(b) of the Industrial
Peace Act expressly confers upon the Court of Industrial Relations investigatory as well as
decisional powers in unfair labor practice cases. It is important, therefore, to comprehend
the unique and dual nature of the functional character of the court. In the exercise of its
investigatory powers, in unfair labor practice cases, the court may conduct the
investigation itself or authorize any of its members or designate any agent, such as its
prosecutor, to conduct the investigation of the charges filed by the aggrieved party. In the
latter case, the designated agent acts on behalf of the court which retains the final
authority in the disposition of the charges and in the issuance of the complaint.
It is, therefore, a matter which is not embraced within the "administrative" authority of
respondent Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations. The term "administrative"
connotes, or pertains, to "administration, especially management, as by managing or
conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things." 4 It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of
evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.
Fernando, J ., concurs.
Footnotes
1. Estrella vs. Orendain, Jr. and Quilog, L-19611, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 640.
2. Sec. 234, Revised Election Code of 1971 (R.A. 6388).
3. Sec. 5, R.A. 1700; Sec. 16, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court.
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
1. House Conference Report No. 510, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p. 37; Amended Act, Sec.
3(d), Sec. 153(d) 29 USCA (1947) Supp.).
2. Benjamin Werne, The Law of Labor Relations, p. 93, 1951 ed.

3. Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 600.
4. Fluet v. McCabe, 12 N.E. 2d. 93.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141309. June 19, 2007.]
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO , petitioner, vs . FORTUNE TOBACCO

CORPORATION , respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.
The complaint led by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of
its constitutional rights arising from petitioner's issuance of Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. 3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while
respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of
different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took
effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands "Champion," "Hope," and
"More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%.
However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC
37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. 4 RMC 37-93 in effect
subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654,
speci cally, to Sec. 142, 5 (c) (1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classi ed and taxed at 55% , and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided
that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack." 6
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent
via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in
particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certi ed xerox
copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent led a motion for reconsideration
requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. 7 The
same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax de ciency amounting to
P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10
days from receipt thereof. 8 On August 3, 1993, respondent led a petition for review with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction
enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. 9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the
CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined
petitioner from collecting the de ciency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-
93. This ruling was af rmed by the Court of Appeals, and nally by this Court in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals . 1 0 It was held, among others, that
RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
DHaEAS

On April 10, 1997, respondent led before the RTC a complaint 1 1 for damages against
petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held
liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC
37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process
of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner led a motion to dismiss 1 2 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her of cial
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3)
the certi cation against forum shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in violation
of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss holding that to rule
on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case
without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the
certi cation against forum shopping was cured by respondent's submission of the
corporate secretary's certi cate authorizing its counsel to execute the certi cation against
forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss led by the
defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge
from the record the said motion to dismiss led by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco
Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered
to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED. 1 3
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate
court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on
the civil liability of public of cers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that
governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the
complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certi cation against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate
secretary's certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.
Undaunted, petitioner led the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her
acts done in the performance of her functions as a public of cer, hence, it is Section 38,
Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability
will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She
further averred that the Civil Code, speci cally, Article 32 which allows recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public
of cers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the
superior public of cers' liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not
allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a
cause of action. As to the defect of the certi cation against forum shopping, she urged the
Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public of cers'
"acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals
speci cally with the public of cers' violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision
which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the
case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 1 4 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is
not required that said public of cer should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it
concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad
faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public of cer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint
states a cause of action? IEAacS
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the rst issue, the general rule is that a public of cer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his of cial duties and within the
scope of his assigned tasks. 1 5 An of cer who acts within his authority to administer the
affairs of the of ce which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. 1 6 However, a public
of cer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in
bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions. 1 7
Speci cally, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
of cer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer's act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus —
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Of cers. — (1) A public of cer shall not be
civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his of cial duties, unless there is
a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Of cers. — No subordinate of cer or

employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the
performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts
done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs
even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , 1 8 that a public of cer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public of cer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the
of ce, where said public of cer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2)
where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint led by respondent stated a cause of
action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit
any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is
generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a
particular portion or section of the state only. 1 9
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and
should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving
effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter
and thus con ict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as
intended to affect the more particular and speci c provisions of the earlier act, unless it is
absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. 2 0
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not
change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to,
or a quali cation of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special
statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly
or by necessary implication. 2 1
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico, 2 2 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which
holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of
defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision and should
prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the
liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for
damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local of cials to enforce the provision of
the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce
the same. As explained by the Court: ADHaTC
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because
Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila,
whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is
true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is
a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject
matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes
a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury
to persons or property arising from the failure of" city of cers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the
city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other of cers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities .
. . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason"
— speci cally — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other
words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action
is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon. 2 3
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez , 2 4 the issue was which law should govern the
publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats
ordinances in general and which requires their publication before enactment and after
approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying
or imposing taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after
approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act
since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general
law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone de nes
general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as
one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said
is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law.
The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the
rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a
subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is]
exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in
general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas,
Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore,
to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is
doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when
it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees
or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here,
as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special
provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 32. Any public of cer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; DECSIT
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission,
as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes
proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public of cial liable for
violation of another person's constitutional rights only if the public of cial acted
maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for
these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public of cials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justi able motives or good faith in the performance of
their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to of cial abuse by
the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
"Mr. Chairman, this article is rmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in
the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a
public of cial is abusing and we made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in
good faith, that of cial is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very
few public of cials who openly and de nitely abuse the individual rights of the
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justi ed on a plea of desire to enforce the
law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article,
that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object
of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justi ed by a plea of good faith,
which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights." 2 5
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public of cers but also
private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suf ces that there is a violation of the constitutional right
of the plaintiff. 2 6
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. 2 7 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been de ned as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or
reputation. 2 8 There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial.
The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.
2 9 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful
an act which is otherwise an invasion of another's legal right; that is, liability in tort is not
precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent. 3 0
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in
the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent
of the defendant. 3 1 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the
Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President
Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on
civil liberties.

In Aberca v. Ver , 3 2 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of
accountability of public of cials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and
assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior of cial relax his vigilance or
abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not
have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people
power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous
or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily
be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear
in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly,
as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the
rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public of cers for acts done in the
performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public of cers, the
presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable
for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government of cials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of
of cial duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit
against the official concerned. SDHacT
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code speci es in clear and unequivocal terms a particular
specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public of cer, and
that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special
provision that deals speci cally with violation of constitutional rights by public of cers. All
other actionable acts of public of cers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, speci cally, the Chapter on Human Relations is a
general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and speci c provision that holds a
public of cer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that
may be committed by public of cers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the speci c provision which must be
applied in the instant case precisely led to seek damages for violation of constitutional
rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of
the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a
cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a
violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent
submission of the secretary's certi cate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the
certi cation against forum shopping cured the defect of respondent's complaint. Besides,
the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules. 3 3
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which af rmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 62-71. Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Ho leña and concurred in by
Associate Justices Omar U. Amin and Teodoro P. Regino.
2. Id. at 598-602. Penned by Judge Reuben P. De La Cruz.
3. 329 Phil. 987 (1996).
4. Prior to its amendment by RA 7654, Section 142 (c) (1) of the National Internal Revenue
Code, (as amended by R.A. No. 6956), provides:
"On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fty- ve percent

(55%) Provided, That this rate shall apply regardless of whether or not the right to use or
title to the foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to the local manufacturer.
Whenever it has to be determined whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the
listing of brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World
Tobacco Directory shall govern."
5. Pertinent portion thereof, states:
SEC. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes. —

xxx xxx xxx
(c) Cigarettes packed by machine. — There shall be levied, assessed and collected on
cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below based on the
constructive manufacturer's wholesale price or the actual manufacturer's wholesale
price, whichever is higher:
(1) O n locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classi ed and taxed at
fty- ve percent (55%) or the exportation of which is not authorized by contract or
otherwise, fty- ve (55%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
(2) O n other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty- ve percent (45%) provided that the
minimum tax shall not be less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.
6. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals , supra note 3 at 1001-1003; Separate
Opinion of Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, id. at 1014-1015.
7. Id. at 1004.
8. Rollo, pp. 542-543.
9. Id. at 569.
10. Supra note 3. The motion for reconsideration of the Court's Decision was denied with
finality on October 7, 1996. ETaSDc

11. Rollo, pp. 533-552.
12. Id. at 555-584.
13. Id. at 602. Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration but was denied on December 4, 1997
(Rollo, pp. 603-606).
14. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299.
15. Orocio v. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992, 213 SCRA 109, 126, cited
in Agpalo, Philippine Administrative Law, 2004 edition, p. 473.
16. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86147, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 721, 728.
17. Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82220, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 162, 174.
18. G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602, 604.
19. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, second edition (1990), p. 197.
20. Id. at 197-198.
21. Id. at 198.

22. G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 267.
23. Id. at 269-270. Emphasis supplied.
24. G.R. No. L-41613, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306, 311-312. (Emphasis added)
25. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the Amendments to the New Civil
Code, XVI The Lawyers' Journal, No. 5, May 31, 1951, 258. Cited in Lim v. Ponce de Leon ,
supra note 14 at 309. Article 32 of the Civil Code was also applied in the following cases:
Aberca v. Ver , G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 590; MHP Garments, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86720, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 227; Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 18; Obra v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 120852, October 28,
1999, 317 SCRA 594; Lui v. Matillano , G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 449;
Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta , G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA
660.
26. Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta, supra.
27. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the Amendments to the New Civil
Code, XVI The Lawyers' Journal, No. 5, May 31, 1951, p. 259.
28. 74 Am Jur 2d, Torts, Section 1, 620.

29. Id., Section 6, 623-624.
30. Id. at 624.
31. In the report on the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the Amendments to the
New Civil Code, Dean Bocobo expressed that while the defendant may not be exonerated
on the basis solely of good faith, the inherent justi ability of his/her act, which is up to
the courts to decide under the peculiar circumstance of each case, may be the basis of
absolution. Thus:
CONGRESSMAN DE LEON. So that Mr. Justice, under the provisions [Article 32] of the new
Civil Code, there is no more plea of acting in good faith?

DEAN BOCOBO. It would not be good faith but it would be inherent justi ability of the act,
which is up to our courts to decide under the peculiar circumstance of each case,
because we had back in our minds the old saying that "Hell is paved with good
intentions." (Lawyers' Journal, No. 5, May 31, 1951, p. 259.)
32. Supra note 25.
33. LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 137, 144-145.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.]
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO
H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL
HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN
BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS
GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P.
LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC
eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; 1 or (2) when it is executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 2 In the present
case, the Commission on Elections approved the assailed Resolution and awarded
the subject Contract not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but also
in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. For the automation
of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, Comelec
awarded the Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that had not
participated in the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the actual
automation Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.," a company that joined
the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements.
Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without
adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal
requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software
even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections, especially the
following three items:
• They failed to achieve the accuracy rating criteria of 99.9995 percent
set-up by the Comelec itself
• They were not able to detect previously downloaded results at various

canvassing or consolidation levels and to prevent these from being
inputted again
• They were unable to print the statutorily required audit trails of the
count/canvass at different levels without any loss of data
Because of the foregoing violations of law and the glaring grave abuse of
discretion committed by Comelec, the Court has no choice but to exercise its
solemn "constitutional duty" 3 to void the assailed Resolution and the subject
Contract. The illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the Commission have not
only desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but have also cast serious
doubts upon the poll body's ability and capacity to conduct automated elections.
Truly, the pith and soul of democracy — credible, orderly, and peaceful elections
— has been put in jeopardy by the illegal and gravely abusive acts of Comelec.
The Case
Before us is a Petition 4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) to
declare null and void Resolution No. 6074 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), which awarded "Phase II of the Modernization Project of the
Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC);" (2) to enjoin the
implementation of any further contract that may have been entered into by
Comelec "either with Mega Pacific Consortium and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions,
Inc. (MPEI);" and (3) to compel Comelec to conduct a re-bidding of the project.
The Facts
The following facts are not disputed. They were culled from official documents,
the parties' pleadings, as well as from admissions during the Oral Argument on
October 7, 2003.
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, 5 which authorized Comelec
to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and
allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 6 authorizing
Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new
electoral forms and printing materials.
Initially intending to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998
presidential elections, Comelec — in its Resolution No. 2985 dated February 9,
1998 7 — eventually decided against full national implementation and limited
the automation to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some automated
ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire
Province of Sulu. 8
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both
national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had
been acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints.
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for
the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting and
Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order
No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10,
2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an
additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for
Eligibility and to Bid," which we quote as follows:
"INVITATION TO APPLY FOR ELIGIBILITY AND TO BID
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), pursuant to the mandate of

Republic Act Nos. 8189 and 8436, invites interested offerors, vendors,
suppliers or lessors to apply for eligibility and to bid for the procurement
by purchase, lease, lease with option to purchase, or otherwise, supplies,
equipment, materials and services needed for a comprehensive
Automated Election System, consisting of three (3) phases: (a)
registration/verification of voters, (b) automated counting and
consolidation of votes, and (c) electronic transmission of election results,
with an approved budget of TWO BILLION FIVE HUNDRED MILLION
(Php2,500,000,000) Pesos. EICDSA
Only bids from the following entities shall be entertained:

a. Duly licensed Filipino citizens/proprietorships;
b. Partnerships duly organized under the laws of the Philippines and

of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the interest belongs
to citizens of the Philippines;
c. Corporations duly organized under the laws of the Philippines,

and of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the outstanding
capital stock belongs to citizens of the Philippines;
d. Manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves

into a joint venture, i.e., a group of two (2) or more
manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to
be jointly and severally responsible or liable for a particular
contract, provided that Filipino ownership thereof shall be at
least sixty percent (60%); and
e. Cooperatives duly registered with the Cooperatives Development
Authority.
Bid documents for the three (3) phases may be obtained starting 10
February 2003, during office hours from the Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) Secretariat/Office of Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, 7th
Floor, Palacio del Governador, Intramuros, Manila, upon payment at the
Cash Division, Commission on Elections, in cash or cashier's check,
payable to the Commission on Elections, of a non-refundable amount of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php15,000.00) for each phase. For this
purpose, interested offerors, vendors, suppliers or lessors have the
option to participate in any or all of the three (3) phases of the
comprehensive Automated Election System.
A Pre-Bid Conference is scheduled on 13 February 2003, at 9:00 a.m. at
the Session Hall, Commission on Elections, Postigo Street, Intramuros,
Manila. Should there be questions on the bid documents, bidders are
required to submit their queries in writing to the BAC Secretariat prior to
the scheduled Pre-Bid Conference.
Deadline for submission to the BAC of applications for eligibility and bid
envelopes for the supply of the comprehensive Automated Election
System shall be at the Session Hall, Commission on Elections, Postigo
Street, Intramuros, Manila on 28 February 2003 at 9:00 a.m.
The COMELEC reserves the right to review the qualifications of the

bidders after the bidding and before the contract is executed. Should
such review uncover any misrepresentation made in the eligibility
statements, or any changes in the situation of the bidder to materially
downgrade the substance of such statements, the COMELEC shall
disqualify the bidder upon due notice without any obligation whatsoever
for any expenses or losses that may be incurred by it in the preparation
of its bid." 9
On February 11, 2003, Comelec issued Resolution No. 5929 clarifying certain
eligibility criteria for bidders and the schedule of activities for the project bidding,
as follows:
"1.) Open to Filipino and foreign corporation duly registered and licensed
to do business and is actually doing business in the Philippines,
subject to Sec. 43 of RA 9184 (An Act providing in the
Modernization Standardization and Regulation of the Procurement
Activities of the Government and for other purposes etc.)
2.) Track Record:
a) For counting machines — should have been used in at least one
(1) political exercise with no less than Twenty Million Voters;
b) For verification of voters — the reference site of an existing data
base installation using Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (AFIS) with at least Twenty Million.
3.) Ten percent (10%) equity requirement shall be based on the total
project cost; and
4.) Performance bond shall be twenty percent (20%) of the bid offer.
RESOLVED moreover, that:
1) A. Due to the decision that the eligibility requirements and the rest of
the Bid documents shall be released at the same time, and the
memorandum of Comm. Resurreccion Z. Borra dated February 7,
2003, the documents to be released on Friday, February 14, 2003
at 2:00 o'clock p.m. shall be the eligibility criteria, Terms of
Reference (TOR) and other pertinent documents;
B. Pre-Bid conference shall be on February 18, 2003; and
C. Deadline for the submission and receipt of the Bids shall be on March
5, 2003.
2) The aforementioned documents will be available at the following offices:

a) Voters Validation: Office of Comm. Javier
b) Automated Counting Machines: Office of Comm. Borra

c) Electronic Transmission: Office of Comm. Tancangco" 10
On February 17, 2003, the poll body released the Request for Proposal (RFP) to
procure the election automation machines. The Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) of Comelec convened a pre-bid conference on February 18, 2003 and gave
prospective bidders until March 10, 2003 to submit their respective bids.
Among others, the RFP provided that bids from manufacturers, suppliers and/or
distributors forming themselves into a joint venture may be entertained,
provided that the Philippine ownership thereof shall be at least 60 percent. Joint
venture is defined in the RFP as "a group of two or more manufacturers,
suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or
liable for a particular contract." 11
Basically, the public bidding was to be conducted under a two-envelope/two stage
system. The bidder's first envelope or the Eligibility Envelope should establish
the bidder's eligibility to bid and its qualifications to perform the acts if accepted.
On the other hand, the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself. The
RFP outlines the bidding procedures as follows:
"25. Determination of Eligibility of Prospective Bidders
"25.1 The eligibility envelopes of prospective Bidders shall be opened first

to determine their eligibility. In case any of the requirements specified in
Clause 20 is missing from the first bid envelope, the BAC shall declare
said prospective Bidder as ineligible to bid. Bid envelopes of ineligible
Bidders shall be immediately returned unopened.
"25.2 The eligibility of prospective Bidders shall be determined using

simple 'pass/fail' criteria and shall be determined as either eligible or
ineligible. If the prospective Bidder is rated 'passed' for all the legal,
technical and financial requirements, he shall be considered eligible. If the
prospective Bidder is rated 'failed' in any of the requirements, he shall be
considered ineligible.
"26. Bid Examination/Evaluation
"26.1 The BAC will examine the Bids to determine whether they are
complete, whether any computational errors have been made, whether
required securities have been furnished, whether the documents have
been properly signed, and whether the Bids are generally in order.
"26.2 The BAC shall check the submitted documents of each Bidder
against the required documents enumerated under Clause 20, to
ascertain if they are all present in the Second bid envelope (Technical
Envelope). In case one (1) or more of the required documents is missing,
the BAC shall rate the Bid concerned as 'failed' and immediately return to
the Bidder its Third bid envelope (Financial Envelope) unopened.
Otherwise, the BAC shall rate the first bid envelope as 'passed'.
"26.3 The BAC shall immediately open the Financial Envelopes of the
Bidders whose Technical Envelopes were passed or rated on or above the
passing score. Only Bids that are determined to contain all the bid
requirements for both components shall be rated 'passed' and shall
immediately be considered for evaluation and comparison.
"26.4 In the opening and examination of the Financial Envelope, the BAC
shall announce and tabulate the Total Bid Price as calculated. Arithmetical
errors will be rectified on the following basis: If there is a discrepancy
between words and figures, the amount in words will prevail. If there is a
discrepancy between the unit price and the total price that is obtained by
multiplying the unit price and the quantity, the unit price shall prevail and
the total price shall be corrected accordingly. If there is a discrepancy
between the Total Bid Price and the sum of the total prices, the sum of
the total prices prevail and the Total Bid Price shall be corrected
accordingly. HcSaAD
"26.5 Financial Proposals which do not clearly state the Total Bid Price
shall be rejected. Also, Total Bid Price as calculated that exceeds the
approved budget for the contract shall also be rejected.
27. Comparison of Bids
"27.1 The bid price shall be deemed to embrace all costs, charges and
fees associated with carrying out all the elements of the proposed
Contract, including but not limited to, license fees, freight charges and
taxes.
"27.2 The BAC shall establish the calculated prices of all Bids rated
'passed' and rank the same in ascending order.
xxx xxx xxx
"29. Postqualification
"29.1 The BAC will determine to its satisfaction whether the Bidder
selected as having submitted the lowest calculated bid is qualified to
satisfactorily perform the Contract.
"29.2 The determination will take into account the Bidder's financial,
technical and production capabilities/resources. It will be based upon an
examination of the documentary evidence of the Bidder's qualification
submitted by the Bidder as well as such other information as the BAC
deems necessary and appropriate.
"29.3 A bid determined as not substantially responsive will be rejected by
the BAC and may not subsequently be made responsive by the Bidder by
correction of the non-conformity.
"2 9 . 4 The BAC may waive any informality or non-conformity or

irregularity in a bid which does not constitute a material deviation,
provided such waiver does not prejudice or affect the relative ranking of
any Bidder.
"29.5 Should the BAC find that the Bidder complies with the legal,
financial and technical requirements, it shall make an affirmative
determination which shall be a prerequisite for award of the Contract to
the Bidder. Otherwise, it will make a negative determination which will
result in rejection of the Bidder's bid, in which event the BAC will proceed
to the next lowest calculated bid to make a similar determination of that
Bidder's capabilities to perform satisfactorily." 12
Out of the 57 bidders, 13 the BAC found MPC and the Total Information
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were
referred to the BAC's Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST).
In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said
that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical
evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003,
promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission
publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its
president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter 14 to Comelec
Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to
Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding
process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as
well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been
discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.
In a letter-reply dated June 6, 2003, 15 the Comelec chairman — speaking
through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive assistant — rejected the protest and
declared that the award "would stand up to the strictest scrutiny."
Hence, the present Petition. 16
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
"1. The COMELEC awarded and contracted with a non-eligible entity; . . .
"2. Private respondents failed to pass the Technical Test as required in the
RFP. Notwithstanding, such failure was ignored. In effect, the
COMELEC changed the rules after the bidding in effect changing the
nature of the contract bidded upon.
"3. Petitioners have locus standi.
"4. Instant Petition is not premature. Direct resort to the Supreme Court
is justified." 17
In the main, the substantive issue is whether the Commission on Elections, the
agency vested with the exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee elections,
gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its administrative functions,
it awarded to MPC the contract for the second phase of the comprehensive
Automated Election System.
Before discussing the validity of the award to MPC, however, we deem it proper
to first pass upon the procedural issues: the legal standing of petitioners and the
alleged prematurity of the Petition.
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Procedural Issue:
Locus Standi of Petitioners
Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi, inasmuch as
they are not challenging the validity or constitutionality of RA 8436. Moreover,
petitioners supposedly admitted during the Oral Argument that no law had been
violated by the award of the Contract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no
actual and material interest in the Contract and, hence, do not stand to be
injured or prejudiced on account of the award.
On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers,
registered voters and concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this
case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly,
Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an
unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the
electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression
of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic
system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract
for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts;
therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must
be followed strictly.
We agree with petitioners. Our nation's political and economic future virtually
hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there
can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest"; 18 in other words, it is of "paramount
public interest" 19 and "transcendental importance." 20 This fact alone would
justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this
Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our
society." 21 Petitioners' legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a
claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being
"deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law." 24 In the instant case, individual petitioners, suing as
taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the
winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to
law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain respondents from
implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted
expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners
possess locus standi.
Second Procedural Issue:
Alleged Prematurity Due to Non-Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies
Respondents claim that petitioners acted prematurely, since they had not first
utilized the protest mechanism available to them under RA 9184, the
Government Procurement Reform Act, for the settlement of disputes pertaining
to procurement contracts.
Section 55 of RA 9184 states that protests against decisions of the Bidding and
Awards Committee in all stages of procurement may be lodged with the head of
the procuring entity by filing a verified position paper and paying a protest fee.
Section 57 of the same law mandates that in no case shall any such protest stay
or delay the bidding process, but it must first be resolved before any award is
made.
On the other hand, Section 58 provides that court action may be resorted to only
after the protests contemplated by the statute shall have been completed. Cases
filed in violation of this process are to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Regional trial courts shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the
procuring entity, and court actions shall be instituted pursuant to Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. cECTaD
Respondents assert that throughout the bidding process, petitioners never

questioned the BAC Report finding MPC eligible to bid and recommending the
award of the Contract to it (MPC). According to respondents, the Report should
have been appealed to the Comelec en banc, pursuant to the aforementioned
sections of RA 9184. In the absence of such appeal, the determination and
recommendation of the BAC had become final.
The Court is not persuaded.
Respondent Comelec came out with its en banc Resolution No. 6074 dated April
15, 2003, awarding the project to Respondent MPC even before the BAC
managed to issue its written report and recommendation on April 21, 2003.
Thus, how could petitioners have appealed the BAC's recommendation or report
to the head of the procuring entity (the chairman of Comelec), when the
Comelec en banc had already approved the award of the contract to MPC even
before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation?
It is claimed 25 by Comelec that during its April 15, 2003 session, it received and
approved the verbal report and recommendation of the BAC for the award of the
Contract to MPC, and that the BAC subsequently re-affirmed its verbal report and
recommendation by submitting it in writing on April 21, 2003. Respondents insist
that the law does not require that the BAC Report be in writing before Comelec
can act thereon; therefore, there is allegedly nothing irregular about the Report
as well as the en banc Resolution.
However, it is obvious that petitioners could have appealed the BAC's report and
recommendation to the head of the procuring entity (the Comelec chair) only
upon their discovery thereof, which at the very earliest would have been on April
21, 2003, when the BAC actually put its report in writing and finally released it.
Even then, what would have been the use of protesting/appealing the report to
the Comelec chair, when by that time the Commission en banc (including the
chairman himself) had already approved the BAC Report and awarded the
Contract to MPC?
And even assuming arguendo that petitioners had somehow gotten wind of the
verbal BAC report on April 15, 2003 (immediately after the en banc session), at
that point the Commission en banc had already given its approval to the BAC
Report along with the award to MPC. To put it bluntly, the Comelec en banc itself
made it legally impossible for petitioners to avail themselves of the
administrative remedy that the Commission is so impiously harping on. There is
no doubt that they had not been accorded the opportunity to avail themselves of
the process provided under Section 55 of RA 9184, according to which a protest
against a decision of the BAC may be filed with the head of the procuring entity.
Nemo tenetur ad impossible, 26 to borrow private respondents' favorite Latin
excuse. 27
Some Observations on the BAC Report to the Comelec
We shall return to this issue of alleged prematurity shortly, but at this interstice,
we would just want to put forward a few observations regarding the BAC Report
and the Comelec en banc's approval thereof.
First, Comelec contends that there was nothing unusual about the fact that the
Report submitted by the BAC came only after the former had already awarded
the Contract, because the latter had been asked to render its report and
recommendation orally during the Commission's en banc session on April 15,
2003. Accordingly, Comelec supposedly acted upon such oral recommendation
and approved the award to MPC on the same day, following which the
recommendation was subsequently reduced into writing on April 21, 2003. While
not entirely outside the realm of the possible, this interesting and unique spiel
does not speak well of the process that Comelec supposedly went through in
making a critical decision with respect to a multi-billion-peso contract.
We can imagine that anyone else standing in the shoes of the Honorable
Commissioners would have been extremely conscious of the overarching need
for utter transparency. They would have scrupulously avoided the slightest hint
of impropriety, preferring to maintain an exacting regularity in the performance
of their duties, instead of trying to break a speed record in the award of multi-
billion-peso contracts. After all, between April 15 and April 21 were a mere six (6)
days. Could Comelec not have waited out six more days for the written report of
the BAC, instead of rushing pell-mell into the arms of MPC? Certainly,
respondents never cared to explain the nature of the Commission's dire need to
act immediately without awaiting the formal, written BAC Report.
In short, the Court finds it difficult to reconcile the uncommon dispatch with
which Comelec acted to approve the multi-billion-peso deal, with its claim of
having been impelled by only the purest and most noble of motives.
At any rate, as will be discussed later on, several other factors combine to lend
negative credence to Comelec's tale.
Second, without necessarily ascribing any premature malice or premeditation on
the part of the Comelec officials involved, it should nevertheless be conceded
that this cart-before-the-horse maneuver (awarding of the Contract ahead of the
BAC's written report) would definitely serve as a clever and effective way of
BAC's written report) would definitely serve as a clever and effective way of
averting and frustrating any impending protest under Section 55.
Having made the foregoing observations, we now go back to the question of
exhausting administrative remedies. Respondents may not have realized it, but
the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28
serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest
against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed
by/ f or , inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and
Ma. Corazon Akol.
Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure
outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.
And even without that May 29, 2003 letter-protest, the Court still holds that
petitioners need not exhaust administrative remedies in the light of Paat v. Court
of Appeals. 29 Paat enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency

concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an

alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval
of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be

unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention." 30
The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10
and 11: "(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself made the exhaustion of
administrative remedies legally impossible or, at the very least, "unreasonable."
In any event, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the unconventional
rendition of the BAC Report and the precipitate awarding of the Contract by the
Comelec en banc — plus the fact that it was racing to have its Contract with MPC
implemented in time for the elections in May 2004 (barely four months away) —
have combined to bring about the urgent need for judicial intervention, thus
prompting this Court to dispense with the procedural exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case.
Main Substantive Issue:
Validity of the Award to MPC
We come now to the meat of the controversy. Petitioners contend that the award
is invalid, since Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it did the following:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in
the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to
meet the mandatory eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to
MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which
formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21,
2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the
bidding process, there were violations of the mandatory
requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in
Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the automated
election system IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding

despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests
conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct
of the bidding for the automated counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the
Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following
major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC
as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the
DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and
DOST after the award, and their effect on the present
controversy
A.
Failure to Establish the Identity, Existence and Eligibility
of the Alleged Consortium as a Bidder
On the question of the identity and the existence of the real bidder, respondents
insist that, contrary to petitioners' allegations, the bidder was not Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI), which was incorporated only on February 27, 2003, or 11
days prior to the bidding itself. Rather, the bidder was Mega Pacific Consortium
(MPC), of which MPEI was but a part. As proof thereof, they point to the March 7,
2003 letter of intent to bid, signed by the president of MPEI allegedly for and on
behalf of MPC. They also call attention to the official receipt issued to MPC,
acknowledging payment for the bidding documents, as proof that it was the
"consortium" that participated in the bidding process.
We do not agree. The March 7, 2003 letter, signed by only one signatory —
"Willy U. Yu, President, Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., (Lead Company/Proponent)
For: Mega Pacific Consortium" — and without any further proof, does not by itself
prove the existence of the consortium. It does not show that MPEI or its
president have been duly pre-authorized by the other members of the putative
consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf and, more
important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid undertakings. The
letter is purely self-serving and uncorroborated.
Neither does an official receipt issued to MPC, acknowledging payment for the
bidding documents, constitute proof that it was the purported consortium that
participated in the bidding. Such receipts are issued by cashiers without any
legally sufficient inquiry as to the real identity or existence of the supposed
payor.
To assure itself properly of the due existence (as well as eligibility and
qualification) of the putative consortium, Comelec's BAC should have examined
the bidding documents submitted on behalf of MPC. They would have easily
discovered the following fatal flaws.
Two-Envelope, Two-Stage System
As stated earlier in our factual presentation, the public bidding system designed
by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the Automation of the 2004
Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first
envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its
qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while
the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself.
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of
incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT
certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary
evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and
production capabilities to perform the contract; and financial documents,
including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the
bidder's financial capacity.
In the case of a consortium or joint venture desirous of participating in the
bidding, it goes without saying that the Eligibility Envelope would necessarily
have to include a copy of the joint venture agreement, the consortium
agreement or memorandum of agreement — or a business plan or some other
instrument of similar import — establishing the due existence, composition and
instrument of similar import — establishing the due existence, composition and
scope of such aggrupation. Otherwise, how would Comelec know who it was
dealing with, and whether these parties are qualified and capable of delivering
the products and services being offered for bidding? 32
In the instant case, no such instrument was submitted to Comelec during the
bidding process. This fact can be conclusively ascertained by scrutinizing the two-
inch thick "Eligibility Requirements" file submitted by Comelec last October 9,
2003, in partial compliance with this Court's instructions given during the Oral
Argument. This file purports to replicate the eligibility documents originally
submitted to Comelec by MPEI allegedly on behalf of MPC, in connection with the
bidding conducted in March 2003. Included in the file are the incorporation
papers and financial statements of the members of the supposed consortium and
certain certificates, licenses and permits issued to them.
However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement,
consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed
among the members of the purported consortium.
The only logical conclusion is that no such agreement was ever submitted to the
Comelec for its consideration, as part of the bidding process.
It thus follows that, prior the award of the Contract, there was no documentary
or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a consortium had actually been
formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with Election.com and ePLDT.
33 Neither was there anything to indicate the exact relationships between and
among these firms; their diverse roles, undertakings and prestations, if any,
relative to the prosecution of the project, the extent of their respective
investments (if any) in the supposed consortium or in the project; and the precise
nature and extent of their respective liabilities with respect to the contract being
offered for bidding. And apart from the self-serving letter of March 7, 2003, there
was not even any indication that MPEI was the lead company duly authorized to
act on behalf of the others.
So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis
at all for determining that the alleged consortium really existed and was eligible
and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory
and sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's
interest.
Notwithstanding such deficiencies, Comelec still deemed the "consortium"
eligible to participate in the bidding, proceeded to open its Second Envelope, and
eventually awarded the bid to it, even though — per the Comelec's own RFP —
the BAC should have declared the MPC ineligible to bid and returned the Second
(Bid) Envelope unopened.
Inasmuch as Comelec should not have considered MPEI et al. as comprising a
consortium or joint venture, it should not have allowed them to avail themselves
of the provision in Section 5.4 (b) (i) of the IRR for RA 6957 (the Build-Operate-
Transfer Law), as amended by RA 7718. This provision states in part that a joint
venture/consortium proponent shall be evaluated based on the individual or
collective experience of the member-firms of the joint venture or consortium and
of the contractor(s) that it has engaged for the project. Parenthetically,
respondents have uniformly argued that the said IRR of RA 6957, as amended,
have suppletory application to the instant case.
Hence, had the proponent MPEI been evaluated based solely on its own
experience, financial and operational track record or lack thereof, it would surely
not have qualified and would have been immediately considered ineligible to bid,
as respondents readily admit.
At any rate, it is clear that Comelec gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily
failing to observe its own rules, policies and guidelines with respect to the
bidding process, thereby negating a fair, honest and competitive bidding.
Commissioners Not Aware of Consortium
In this regard, the Court is beguiled by the statements of Commissioner
Florentino Tuason Jr., given in open court during the Oral Argument last October
7, 2003. The good commissioner affirmed that he was aware, of his own
personal knowledge, that there had indeed been a written agreement among the
"consortium" members, 34 although it was an internal matter among them, 35
and of the fact that it would be presented by counsel for private respondent. 36
However, under questioning by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and Justice Jose
C. Vitug, Commissioner Tuason in effect admitted that, while he was the
commissioner-in-charge of Comelec's Legal Department, he had never seen, even
up to that late date, the agreement he spoke of. 37 Under further questioning, he
was likewise unable to provide any information regarding the amounts invested
into the project by several members of the claimed consortium. 38 A short while
later, he admitted that the Commission had not taken a look at the agreement
(if any). 39
He tried to justify his position by claiming that he was not a member of the BAC.
Neither was he the commissioner-in-charge of the Phase II Modernization project
(the automated election system); but that, in any case, the BAC and the Phase II
Modernization Project Team did look into the aspect of the composition of the
consortium.
It seems to the Court, though, that even if the BAC or the Phase II Team had
taken charge of evaluating the eligibility, qualifications and credentials of the
consortium-bidder, still, in all probability, the former would have referred the
task to Commissioner Tuason, head of Comelec's Legal Department. That task
was the appreciation and evaluation of the legal effects and consequences of the
terms, conditions, stipulations and covenants contained in any joint venture
agreement, consortium agreement or a similar document — assuming of course
that any of these was available at the time. The fact that Commissioner Tuason
was barely aware of the situation bespeaks the complete absence of such
document, or the utter failure or neglect of the Comelec to examine it —
assuming it was available at all — at the time the award was made on April 15,
2003. TIaDHE
In any event, the Court notes for the record that Commissioner Tuason basically
contradicted his statements in open court about there being one written
agreement among all the consortium members, when he subsequently referred
40 to the four (4) Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) executed by them. 41
At this juncture, one might ask: What, then, if there are four MOAs instead of
one or none at all? Isn't it enough that there are these corporations coming
together to carry out the automation project? Isn't it true, as respondent aver,
that nowhere in the RFP issued by Comelec is it required that the members of
the joint venture execute a single written agreement to prove the existence of a
joint venture. Indeed, the intention to be jointly and severally liable may be
evidenced not only by a single joint venture agreement, but also by
supplementary documents executed by the parties signifying such intention.
What then is the big deal?
The problem is not that there are four agreements instead of only one. The
problem is that Comelec never bothered to check. It never based its decision on
documents or other proof that would concretely establish the existence of the
claimed consortium or joint venture or agglomeration. It relied merely on the
self-serving representation in an uncorroborated letter signed by only one
individual, claiming that his company represented a "consortium" of several
different corporations. It concluded forthwith that a consortium indeed existed,
composed of such and such members, and thereafter declared that the entity
was eligible to bid.
True, copies of financial statements and incorporation papers of the alleged
"consortium" members were submitted. But these papers did not establish the
existence of a consortium, as they could have been provided by the companies
concerned for purposes other than to prove that they were part of a consortium
or joint venture. For instance, the papers may have been intended to show that
those companies were each qualified to be a sub-contractor (and nothing more)
in a major project. Those documents did not by themselves support the
assumption that a consortium or joint venture existed among the companies.
In brief, despite the absence of competent proof as to the existence and
eligibility of the alleged consortium (MPC), its capacity to deliver on the Contract,
and the members' joint and several liability therefor, Comelec nevertheless
assumed that such consortium existed and was eligible. It then went ahead and
considered the bid of MPC, to which the Contract was eventually awarded, in
gross violation of the former's own bidding rules and procedures contained in its
RFP. Therein lies Comelec's grave abuse of discretion.
Sufficiency of the Four Agreements
Instead of one multilateral agreement executed by, and effective and binding on,
all the five "consortium members" — as earlier claimed by Commissioner Tuason
in open court — it turns out that what was actually executed were four (4)
separate and distinct bilateral Agreements. 42 Obviously, Comelec was furnished
copies of these Agreements only after the bidding process had been terminated,
as these were not included in the Eligibility Documents. These Agreements are
as follows:
• A Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and SK C&C
• A Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and WeSolv
• A "Teaming Agreement" between MPEI and Election.com Ltd.

• A "Teaming Agreement" between MPEI and ePLDT
In sum, each of the four different and separate bilateral Agreements is valid and
binding only between MPEI and the other contracting party, leaving the other
"consortium" members total strangers thereto. Under this setup, MPEI dealt
separately with each of the "members," and the latter (WeSolv, SK C&C,
Election.com, and ePLDT) in turn had nothing to do with one another, each
dealing only with MPEI.
Respondents assert that these four Agreements were sufficient for the purpose of
enabling the corporations to still qualify (even at that late stage) as a consortium
or joint venture, since the first two Agreements had allegedly set forth the joint
and several undertakings among the parties, whereas the latter two clarified the
parties' respective roles with regard to the Project, with MPEI being the
independent contractor and Election.com and ePLDT the subcontractors.
Additionally, the use of the phrase "particular contract" in the Comelec's Request
for Proposal (RFP), in connection with the joint and several liabilities of
companies in a joint venture, is taken by them to mean that all the members of
the joint venture need not be solidarily liable for the entire project or joint
venture, because it is sufficient that the lead company and the member in charge
of a particular contract or aspect of the joint venture agree to be solidarily liable.
At this point, it must be stressed most vigorously that the submission of the four
bilateral Agreements to Comelec after the end of the bidding process did nothing
to eliminate the grave abuse of discretion it had already committed on April 15,
2003.
Deficiencies Have Not Been "Cured"
In any event, it is also claimed that the automation Contract awarded by
Comelec incorporates all documents executed by the "consortium" members,
even if these documents are not referred to therein. The basis of this assertion
appears to be the passages from Section 1.4 of the Contract, which is reproduced
as follows:
"All Contract Documents shall form part of the Contract even if they or
any one of them is not referred to or mentioned in the Contract as
forming a part thereof. Each of the Contract Documents shall be mutually
complementary and explanatory of each other such that what is noted in
one although not shown in the other shall be considered contained in all,
and what is required by any one shall be as binding as if required by all,
unless one item is a correction of the other.
"The intent of the Contract Documents is the proper, satisfactory and
timely execution and completion of the Project, in accordance with the
Contract Documents. Consequently, all items necessary for the proper
and timely execution and completion of the Project shall be deemed
included in the Contract."
Thus, it is argued that whatever perceived deficiencies there were in the

supplementary contracts — those entered into by MPEI and the other members
of the "consortium" as regards their joint and several undertakings — have been
cured. Better still, such deficiencies have supposedly been prevented from arising
as a result of the above-quoted provisions, from which it can be immediately
established that each of the members of MPC assumes the same joint and
several liability as the other members.
The foregoing argument is unpersuasive. First, the contract being referred to,
entitled "The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project Contract," is between
Comelec and MPEI, not the alleged consortium, MPC. To repeat, it is MPEI — not
MPC — that is a party to the Contract. Nowhere in that Contract is there any
mention of a consortium or joint venture, of members thereof, much less of joint
and several liability. Supposedly executed sometime in May 2003, 43 the
Contract bears a notarization date of June 30, 2003, and contains the signature
of Willy U. Yu signing as president of MPEI (not for and on behalf of MPC), along
with that of the Comelec chair. It provides in Section 3.2 that MPEI (not MPC) is
to supply the Equipment and perform the Services under the Contract, in
accordance with the appendices thereof; nothing whatsoever is said about any
consortium or joint venture or partnership.
Second, the portions of Section 1.4 of the Contract reproduced above do not have
the effect of curing (much less preventing) deficiencies in the bilateral
agreements entered into by MPEI with the other members of the "consortium,"
with respect to their joint and several liabilities. The term "Contract Documents,"
as used in the quoted passages of Section 1.4, has a well-defined meaning and
actually refers only to the following documents:
• The Contract itself along with its appendices
• The Request for Proposal (also known as "Terms of Reference")
issued by the Comelec, including the Tender Inquiries and Bid
Bulletins
• The Tender Proposal submitted by MPEI

In other words, the term "Contract Documents" cannot be understood as
referring to or including the MOAs and the Teaming Agreements entered into by
MPEI with SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. This much is very clear and
admits of no debate. The attempt to use the provisions of Section 1.4 to shore up
the MOAs and the Teaming Agreements is simply unwarranted.
Third and last, we fail to see how respondents can arrive at the conclusion that,
from the above-quoted provisions, it can be immediately established that each of
the members of MPC assumes the same joint and several liability as the other
members. Earlier, respondents claimed exactly the opposite — that the two
MOAs (between MPEI and SK C&C, and between MPEI and WeSolv) had set forth
the joint and several undertakings among the parties; whereas the two Teaming
Agreements clarified the parties' respective roles with regard to the Project, with
MPEI being the independent contractor and Election.com and ePLDT the
subcontractors.
Obviously, given the differences in their relationships, their respective liabilities
cannot be the same. Precisely, the very clear terms and stipulations contained in
the MOAs and the Teaming Agreements — entered into by MPEI with SK C&C,
WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT — negate the idea that these "members" are on
a par with one another and are, as such, assuming the same joint and several
liability. IHTASa
Moreover, respondents have earlier seized upon the use of the term "particular
contract" in the Comelec's Request for Proposal (RFP), in order to argue that all
the members of the joint venture did not need to be solidarily liable for the
entire project or joint venture. It was sufficient that the lead company and the
member in charge of a particular contract or aspect of the joint venture would
agree to be solidarily liable. The glaring lack of consistency leaves us at a loss.
Are respondents trying to establish the same joint and solidary liability among all
the "members" or not?
Enforcement of Liabilities Problematic
Next, it is also maintained that the automation Contract between Comelec and
the MPEI confirms the solidary undertaking of the lead company and the
consortium member concerned for each particular Contract, inasmuch as the
position of MPEI and anyone else performing the services contemplated under
the Contract is described therein as that of an independent contractor.
The Court does not see, however, how this conclusion was arrived at. In the first
place, the contractual provision being relied upon by respondents is Article 14,
"Independent Contractors," which states: "Nothing contained herein shall be
construed as establishing or creating between the COMELEC and MEGA the
relationship of employee and employer or principal and agent, it being
understood that the position of MEGA and of anyone performing the Services
contemplated under this Contract, is that of an independent contractor."
Obviously, the intent behind the provision was simply to avoid the creation of an
employer-employee or a principal-agent relationship and the complications that it
would produce. Hence, the Article states that the role or position of MPEI, or
anyone else performing on its behalf, is that of an independent contractor. It is
obvious to the Court that respondents are stretching matters too far when they
claim that, because of this provision, the Contract in effect confirms the solidary
undertaking of the lead company and the consortium member concerned for the
particular phase of the project. This assertion is an absolute non sequitur.
Enforcement of Liabilities Under the Civil Code Not Possible
In any event, it is claimed that Comelec may still enforce the liability of the
"consortium" members under the Civil Code provisions on partnership, reasoning
that MPEI et al. represented themselves as partners and members of MPC for
purposes of bidding for the Project. They are, therefore, liable to the Comelec to
the extent that the latter relied upon such representation. Their liability as
partners is solidary with respect to everything chargeable to the partnership
under certain conditions.
The Court has two points to make with respect to this argument. First, it must be
recalled that SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT never represented
themselves as partners and members of MPC, whether for purposes of bidding or
for something else. It was MPEI alone that represented them to be members of a
"consortium" it supposedly headed. Thus, its acts may not necessarily be held
against the other "members."
Second, this argument of the OSG in its Memorandum 44 might possibly apply in
the absence of a joint venture agreement or some other writing that discloses
the relationship of the "members" with one another. But precisely, this case does
not deal with a situation in which there is nothing in writing to serve as
reference, leaving Comelec to rely on mere representations and therefore
justifying a falling back on the rules on partnership. For, again, the terms and
stipulations of the MOAs entered into by MPEI with SK C&C and WeSolv, as well
as the Teaming Agreements of MPEI with Election.com and ePLDT (copies of
which have been furnished the Comelec) are very clear with respect to the
extent and the limitations of the firms' respective liabilities.
In the case of WeSolv and SK C&C, their MOAs state that their liabilities, while
joint and several with MPEI, are limited only to the particular areas of work
wherein their services are engaged or their products utilized. As for Election.com
and ePLDT, their separate "Teaming Agreements" specifically ascribe to them the
role of subcontractor vis-a-vis MPEI as contractor and, based on the terms of their
particular agreements, neither Election.com nor ePLDT is , with MPEI, jointly and
severally liable to Comelec. 45 It follows then that in the instant case, there is no
justification for anyone, much less Comelec, to resort to the rules on partnership
and partners' liabilities.
Eligibility of a Consortium Based on the Collective Qualifications of Its
Members
Respondents declare that, for purposes of assessing the eligibility of the bidder,
the members of MPC should be evaluated on a collective basis. Therefore, they
contend, the failure of MPEI to submit financial statements (on account of its
recent incorporation) should not by itself disqualify MPC, since the other
members of the "consortium" could meet the criteria set out in the RFP.
Thus, according to respondents, the collective nature of the undertaking of the
members of MPC, their contribution of assets and sharing of risks, and the
community of their interest in the performance of the Contract lead to these
reasonable conclusions: (1) that their collective qualifications should be the basis
for evaluating their eligibility; (2) that the sheer enormity of the project renders
it improbable to expect any single entity to be able to comply with all the
eligibility requirements and undertake the project by itself; and (3) that, as
argued by the OSG, the RFP allows bids from manufacturers, suppliers and/or
distributors that have formed themselves into a joint venture, in recognition of
the virtual impossibility of a single entity's ability to respond to the Invitation to
Bid.
Additionally, argues the Comelec, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
6957 (the Build-Operate-Transfer Law) as amended by RA 7718 would be
applicable, as proponents of BOT projects usually form joint ventures or
consortiums. Under the IRR, a joint venture/consortium proponent shall be
evaluated based on the individual or the collective experience of the member-
firms of the joint venture/consortium and of the contractors the proponent has
engaged for the project.
Unfortunately, this argument seems to assume that the "collective" nature of
the undertaking of the members of MPC, their contribution of assets and sharing
of risks, and the "community" of their interest in the performance of the
Contract entitle MPC to be treated as a joint venture or consortium; and to be
evaluated accordingly on the basis of the members' collective qualifications
when, in fact, the evidence before the Court suggest otherwise.
This Court in Kilosbayan v. Guingona 46 defined joint venture as "an association
of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise;
generally, all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community of
interest in the performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the
policy in connection therewith, and [a] duty, which may be altered by agreement
to share both in profit and losses."
Going back to the instant case, it should be recalled that the automation Contract
with Comelec was not executed by the "consortium" MPC — or by MPEI for and
on behalf of MPC — but by MPEI, period. The said Contract contains no mention
whatsoever of any consortium or members thereof. This fact alone seems to
contradict all the suppositions about a joint undertaking that would normally
apply to a joint venture or consortium: that it is a commercial enterprise
involving a community of interest, a sharing of risks, profits and losses, and so
on.
Now let us consider the four bilateral Agreements, starting with the
Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and WeSolv Open Computing, Inc.,
dated March 5, 2003. The body of the MOA consists of just seven (7) short
paragraphs that would easily fit in one page! It reads as follows:
"1. The parties agree to cooperate in successfully implementing the
Project in the substance and form as may be most beneficial to both
parties and other subcontractors involved in the Project.
"2. Mega Pacific shall be responsible for any contract negotiations and
signing with the COMELEC and, subject to the latter's approval, agrees to
give WeSolv an opportunity to be present at meetings with the COMELEC
concerning WeSolv's portion of the Project.
"3. WeSolv shall be jointly and severally liable with Mega Pacific only for
the particular products and/or services supplied by the former for the
Project.
"4. Each party shall bear its own costs and expenses relative to this
agreement unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.
"5. The parties undertake to do all acts and such other things incidental
to, necessary or desirable or the attainment of the objectives and
purposes of this Agreement.
"6. In the event that the parties fail to agree on the terms and conditions
of the supply of the products and services including but not limited to the
scope of the products and services to be supplied and payment terms,
WeSolv shall cease to be bound by its obligations stated in the
aforementioned paragraphs.
"7. Any dispute arising from this Agreement shall be settled amicably by
the parties whenever possible. Should the parties be unable to do so, the
parties hereby agree to settle their dispute through arbitration in
accordance with the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Even shorter is the Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and SK C&C Co.
Ltd., dated March 9, 2003, the body of which consists of only six (6) paragraphs,
which we quote: IDCHTE
"1. All parties agree to cooperate in achieving the Consortium's objective

of successfully implementing the Project in the substance and form as
may be most beneficial to the Consortium members and in accordance
with the demand of the RFP.
"2. Mega Pacific shall have full powers and authority to represent the
Consortium with the Comelec, and to enter and sign, for and in behalf of
its members any and all agreement/s which may be required in the
implementation of the Project.
"3. Each of the individual members of the Consortium shall be jointly and
severally liable with the Lead Firm for the particular products and/or
services supplied by such individual member for the project, in
accordance with their respective undertaking or sphere of responsibility.
"4. Each party shall bear its own costs and expenses relative to this
agreement unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties.
"5. The parties undertake to do all acts and such other things incidental
to, necessary or desirable for the attainment of the objectives and
purposes of this Agreement.
"6. Any dispute arising from this Agreement shall be settled amicably by
the parties whenever possible. Should the parties be unable to do so, the
parties hereby agree to settle their dispute through arbitration in
accordance with the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines."
(Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted that the two Agreements quoted above are very similar in
wording. Neither of them contains any specifics or details as to the exact nature
and scope of the parties' respective undertakings, performances and deliverables
under the Agreement with respect to the automation project. Likewise, the two
Agreements are quite bereft of pesos-and-centavos data as to the amount of
investments each party contributes, its respective share in the revenues and/or
profit from the Contract with Comelec, and so forth — all of which are normal for
agreements of this nature. Yet, according to public and private respondents, the
participation of MPEI, WeSolv and SK C&C comprises fully 90 percent of the
entire undertaking with respect to the election automation project, which is
worth about P1.3 billion.
As for Election.com and ePLDT, the separate "Teaming Agreements" they entered
into with MPEI for the remaining 10 percent of the entire project undertaking are
ironically much longer and more detailed than the MOAs discussed earlier.
Although specifically ascribing to them the role of subcontractor vis-a-vis MPEI as
contractor, these Agreements are, however, completely devoid of any pricing
data or payment terms. Even the appended Schedules supposedly containing
prices of goods and services are shorn of any price data. Again, as mentioned
earlier, based on the terms of their particular Agreements, neither Election.com
nor ePLDT — with MPEI — is jointly and severally liable to Comelec.
It is difficult to imagine how these bare Agreements — especially the first two —
could be implemented in practice; and how a dispute between the parties or a
claim by Comelec against them, for instance, could be resolved without lengthy
and debilitating litigations. Absent any clear-cut statement as to the exact nature
and scope of the parties' respective undertakings, commitments, deliverables and
covenants, one party or another can easily dodge its obligation and deny or
contest its liability under the Agreement; or claim that it is the other party that
should have delivered but failed to.
Likewise, in the absence of definite indicators as to the amount of investments to
be contributed by each party, disbursements for expenses, the parties' respective
shares in the profits and the like, it seems to the Court that this situation could
readily give rise to all kinds of misunderstandings and disagreements over
money matters.
Under such a scenario, it will be extremely difficult for Comelec to enforce the
supposed joint and several liabilities of the members of the "consortium." The
Court is not even mentioning the possibility of a situation arising from a failure
of WeSolv and MPEI to agree on the scope, the terms and the conditions for the
supply of the products and services under the Agreement. In that situation, by
virtue of paragraph 6 of its MOA, WeSolv would perforce cease to be bound by its
obligations — including its joint and solidary liability with MPEI under the MOA —
and could forthwith disengage from the project. Effectively, WeSolv could at any
time unilaterally exit from its MOA with MPEI by simply failing to agree. Where
would that outcome leave MPEI and Comelec?
To the Court, this strange and beguiling arrangement of MPEI with the other
companies does not qualify them to be treated as a consortium or joint venture,
at least of the type that government agencies like the Comelec should be dealing
with. With more reason is it unable to agree to the proposal to evaluate the
members of MPC on a collective basis.
In any event, the MPC members claim to be a joint venture/consortium; and
respondents have consistently been arguing that the IRR for RA 6957, as
amended, should be applied to the instant case in order to allow a collective
evaluation of consortium members. Surprisingly, considering these facts,
respondents have not deemed it necessary for MPC members to comply with
Section 5.4 (a) (iii) of the IRR for RA 6957 as amended.
According to the aforementioned provision, if the project proponent is a joint
venture or consortium, the members or participants thereof are required to
submit a sworn statement that, if awarded the contract, they shall bind
themselves to be jointly, severally and solidarily liable for the project proponent's
obligations thereunder. This provision was supposed to mirror Section 5 of RA
6957, as amended, which states: "In all cases, a consortium that participates in
a bid must present proof that the members of the consortium have bound
themselves jointly and severally to assume responsibility for any project. The
withdrawal of any member of the consortium prior to the implementation of the
project could be a ground for the cancellation of the contract."
The Court has certainly not seen any joint and several undertaking by the MPC
members that even approximates the tenor of that which is described above. We
fail to see why respondents should invoke the IRR if it is for their benefit, but
refuse to comply with it otherwise.
B.
DOST Technical Tests Flunked by the Automated Counting Machines
Let us now move to the second subtopic, which deals with the substantive issue:
the ACM's failure to pass the tests of the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST).
After respondent "consortium" and the other bidder, TIM, had submitted their
respective bids on March 10, 2003, the Comelec's BAC — through its Technical
Working Group (TWG) and the DOST — evaluated their technical proposals.
Requirements that were highly technical in nature and that required the use of
certain equipment in the evaluation process were referred to the DOST for
testing. The Department reported thus:
TEST RESULTS MATRIX 47
[Technical Evaluation of Automated Counting Machine]

KEY REQUIREMENTS MEGA-PACIFIC TOTAL INFORMATION
[QUESTIONS] CONSORTIUM MANAGEMENT
YES NO YES NO
1. Does the machine have
an accuracy rating of at
least 99.995 percent?
At COLD ü ü
environmental
conditions
At NORMAL ü ü
environmental
conditions
At HARSH ü ü
environmental
conditions
2. Accurately records and ü ü
reports the date and time
of the start and end of
counting of ballots per
precinct?
3. Prints election returns ü ü
without any loss of date
during generation of
such reports?
4. Uninterruptible back-up ü ü
power system, that will
engage immediately to
allow operation of at
least 10 minutes after
outage, power surge or
abnormal electrical
occurrences?
5. Machine reads two- ü ü
sided ballots in one Note: This
pass? particular
requirement
needs further
verification
6. Machine can detect ü ü
previously counted
ballots and prevent
previously counted
ballots from being
counted more than
once?
7. Stores results of counted ü ü
votes by precinct in Note: This
external (removable) particular
storage device? requirement
needs further
verification
8. Data stored in external ü ü
media is encrypted? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
9. Physical key or similar ü ü
device allows, limits, or
restricts operation of the
machine?
10. CPU speed is at least ü ü
400mHz? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
11. Port to allow use of ü ü
dot-matrix printers?
12. Generates printouts of
the election returns in a
format specified by the
COMELEC?
Generates printouts ü ü
In format specified by ü ü
COMELEC
13. Prints election returns ü ü
without any loss of data
during generation of
such report?
14. Generates an audit trail
of the counting
machine, both hard copy
and soft copy?
Hard copy ü ü
Soft copy ü ü
Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
15. Does the ü ü
City/Municipal Note: This
Canvassing System particular
consolidate results from requirement
all precincts within it needs further
using the encrypted soft verification
copy of the data
generated by the
counting machine and
stored on the removable
data storage device?
16. Does the ü ü
City/Municipal Note: This Note: This
Canvassing System particular particular
consolidate results from requirement requirement
all precincts within it needs further needs further
using the encrypted soft verification verification
copy of the data
generated by the
transmitted through an
electronic transmission
media?
17. Does the system output ü ü
a Zero City/Municipal Note: This
Canvass Report, which particular
is printed on election requirement
day prior to the conduct needs further
of the actual canvass verification
operation, that shows
that all totals for all the
votes for all the
candidates and other
information, are indeed
zero or null?
18. Does the system ü ü
consolidate results from Note: This
all precincts in the particular
city/municipality using requirement
the data storage device needs further
coming from the verification
counting machine?
19. Is the machine 100% ü ü
accurate? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
20. Is the Program able to ü ü
detect previously Note: This
downloaded precinct particular
results and prevent these requirement
from being inputted needs further
again into the System? verification
21. The System is able to
print the specified
reports and the audit
trail without any loss of
data during generation
of the above-mentioned
reports?
Prints specified reports ü ü
Audit Trail ü ü
Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
22. Can the result of the ü ü
city/municipal Note: This
consolidation be stored particular
in a data storage device? requirement
needs further
verification
23. Does the system ü ü
consolidate results from Note: This
all precincts in the particular
provincial/district/ requirement
national using the data needs further
storage device from verification
different levels of
consolidation?
24. Is the system 100% ü ü
accurate? Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
25. Is the Program able to ü ü
detect previously Note: This
downloaded precinct particular
results and prevent these requirement
from being inputted needs further
again into the System? verification
26. The System is able to
print the specified
reports and the audit
trail without any loss of
data during generation
of the abovementioned
reports?
Prints specified reports ü ü
Audit Trail ü ü
Note: This
particular
requirement
needs further
verification
27. Can the results of the ü ü
provincial/district/ Note: This
national consolidation particular
be stored in a data requirement
storage device? needs further
verification
According to respondents, it was only after the TWG and the DOST had conducted
their separate tests and submitted their respective reports that the BAC, on the
basis of these reports formulated its comments/recommendations on the bids of
the consortium and TIM. HaTSDA
The BAC, in its Report dated April 21, 2003, recommended that the Phase II
project involving the acquisition of automated counting machines be awarded to
MPEI. It said:
"After incisive analysis of the technical reports of the DOST and the
Technical Working Group for Phase II — Automated Counting Machine,
the BAC considers adaptability to advances in modern technology to
ensure an effective and efficient method, as well as the security and
integrity of the system.
"The results of the evaluation conducted by the TWG and that of the
DOST (14 April 2003 report), would show the apparent advantage of
Mega-Pacific over the other competitor, TIM.
"The BAC further noted that both Mega-Pacific and TIM obtained some
'failed marks' in the technical evaluation. In general, the 'failed marks' of
Total Information Management as enumerated above affect the counting
machine itself which are material in nature, constituting non-compliance
to the RFP. On the other hand, the 'failed marks' of Mega-Pacific are mere
formalities on certain documentary requirements which the BAC may
waive as clearly indicated in the Invitation to Bid.
"In the DOST test, TIM obtained 12 failed marks and mostly attributed to
the counting machine itself as stated earlier. These are requirements of
the RFP and therefore the BAC cannot disregard the same.
"Mega-Pacific failed in 8 items however these are mostly on the software
which can be corrected by reprogramming the software and therefore
can be readily corrected.
"The BAC verbally inquired from DOST on the status of the retest of the
counting machines of the TIM and was informed that the report will be
forthcoming after the holy week. The BAC was informed that the retest is
on a different parameters they're being two different machines being
tested. One purposely to test if previously read ballots will be read again
and the other for the other features such as two sided ballots.
"The said machine and the software therefore may not be considered the
same machine and program as submitted in the Technical proposal and
therefore may be considered an enhancement of the original proposal.
"Advance information relayed to the BAC as of 1:40 PM of 15 April 2003
by Executive Director Ronaldo T. Viloria of DOST is that the result of the
test in the two counting machines of TIM contains substantial errors that
may lead to the failure of these machines based on the specific items of
the RFP that DOST has to certify.
OPENING OF FINANCIAL BIDS
"The BAC on 15 April 2003, after notifying the concerned bidders opened
the financial bids in their presence and the results were as follows:
Mega-Pacific:
Option 1 — Outright purchase: Bid Price if Php1,248,949,088.00
Option 2 — Lease option:
70% Down payment of cost of hardware or Php642,755,757.07

Remainder payable over 50 months or a total of Php642,755,757.07
Discount rate of 15% p.a. or 1.2532% per month.
Total Number of Automated Counting Machine — 1,769 ACMs

(Nationwide)
TIM:
Total Bid Price – Php1,297,860,560.00
Total Number of Automated Counting Machine — 2,272 ACMs (Mindanao
and NCR only)
"Premises considered, it appears that the bid of Mega Pacific is the lowest
calculated responsive bid, and therefore, the Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) recommends that the Phase II project re Automated Counting
Machine be awarded to Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc." 48
The BAC, however, also stated on page 4 of its Report: " Based on the 14 April
2003 report (Table 6) of the DOST, it appears that both Mega-Pacific and TIM
(Total Information Management Corporation) failed to meet some of the
requirements. Below is a comparative presentation of the requirements wherein
Mega-Pacific or TIM or both of them failed: . . .." What followed was a list of "key
requirements," referring to technical requirements, and an indication of which of
the two bidders had failed to meet them.
Failure to Meet the Required Accuracy Rating
The first of the key requirements was that the counting machines were to have
an accuracy rating of at least 99.9995 percent. The BAC Report indicates that
both Mega Pacific and TIM failed to meet this standard.
The key requirement of accuracy rating happens to be part and parcel of the
Comelec's Request for Proposal (RFP). The RFP, on page 26, even states that the
ballot counting machines and ballot counting software "must have an accuracy
rating of 99.9995% (not merely 99.995%) or better as certified by a reliable
independent testing agency."
When questioned on this matter during the Oral Argument, Commissioner Borra
tried to wash his hands by claiming that the required accuracy rating of 99.9995
percent had been set by a private sector group in tandem with Comelec. He
added that the Commission had merely adopted the accuracy rating as part of
the group's recommended bid requirements, which it had not bothered to amend
even after being advised by DOST that such standard was unachievable. This
excuse, however, does not in any way lessen Comelec's responsibility to adhere
to its own published bidding rules, as well as to see to it that the consortium
indeed meets the accuracy standard. Whichever accuracy rating is the right
standard — whether 99.995 or 99.9995 percent — the fact remains that the
machines of the so-called "consortium" failed to even reach the lesser of the
two. On this basis alone, it ought to have been disqualified and its bid rejected
outright.
At this point, the Court stresses that the essence of public bidding is violated by
the practice of requiring very high standards or unrealistic specifications that
cannot be met — like the 99.9995 percent accuracy rating in this case — only to
water them down after the bid has been award. Such scheme, which discourages
the entry of prospective bona fide bidders, is in fact a sure indication of fraud in
the bidding, designed to eliminate fair competition. Certainly, if no bidder meets
the mandatory requirements, standards or specifications, then no award should
be made and a failed bidding declared.
Failure of Software to Detect Previously Downloaded Data
Furthermore, on page 6 of the BAC Report, it appears that the "consortium" as
well as TIM failed to meet another key requirement — for the counting
machine's software program to be able to detect previously downloaded precinct
results and to prevent these from being entered again into the counting
machine. This same deficiency on the part of both bidders reappears on page 7 of
the BAC Report, as a result of the recurrence of their failure to meet the said key
requirement.
That the ability to detect previously downloaded data at different canvassing or

consolidation levels is deemed of utmost importance can be seen from the fact
that it is repeated three times in the RFP. On page 30 thereof, we find the
requirement that the city/municipal canvassing system software must be able to
detect previously downloaded precinct results and prevent these from being
"inputted" again into the system. Again, on page 32 of the RFP, we read that the
provincial/district canvassing system software must be able to detect previously
downloaded city/municipal results and prevent these from being "inputted" again
into the system. And once more, on page 35 of the RFP, we find the requirement
that the national canvassing system software must be able to detect previously
downloaded provincial/district results and prevent these from being "inputted"
again into the system.
Once again, though, Comelec chose to ignore this crucial deficiency, which should
have been a cause for the gravest concern. Come May 2004, unscrupulous
persons may take advantage of and exploit such deficiency by repeatedly
downloading and feeding into the computers results favorable to a particular
candidate or candidates. We are thus confronted with the grim prospect of
election fraud on a massive scale by means of just a few key strokes. The
marvels and woes of the electronic age!
Inability to Print the Audit Trail
But that grim prospect is not all. The BAC Report, on pages 6 and 7, indicate that
the ACMs of both bidders were unable to print the audit trail without any loss of
data. In the case of MPC, the audit trail system was "not yet incorporated" into
its ACMs.
This particular deficiency is significant, not only to this bidding but to the cause
of free and credible elections. The purpose of requiring audit trails is to enable
Comelec to trace and verify the identities of the ACM operators responsible for
data entry and downloading, as well as the times when the various data were
downloaded into the canvassing system, in order to forestall fraud and to identify
the perpetrators. CTIDcA
Thus, the RFP on page 27 states that the ballot counting machines and ballot
counting software must print an audit trail of all machine operations for
documentation and verification purposes. Furthermore, the audit trail must be
stored on the internal storage device and be available on demand for future
printing and verifying. On pages 30–31, the RFP also requires that the
city/municipal canvassing system software be able to print an audit trail of the
canvassing operations, including therein such data as the date and time the
canvassing program was started, the log-in of the authorized users (the identity
of the machine operators), the date and time the canvass data were downloaded
into the canvassing system, and so on and so forth. On page 33 of the RFP, we
find the same audit trail requirement with respect to the provincial/district
canvassing system software; and again on pages 35–36 thereof, the same audit
trail requirement with respect to the national canvassing system software.
That this requirement for printing audit trails is not to be lightly brushed aside by
the BAC or Comelec itself as a mere formality or technicality can be readily
gleaned from the provisions of Section 7 of RA 8436, which authorizes the
Commission to use an automated system for elections.
The said provision which respondents have quoted several times, provides that
ACMs are to possess certain features divided into two classes: those that the
statute itself considers mandatory and other features or capabilities that the law
deems optional. Among those considered mandatory are "provisions for audit
trails"! Section 7 reads as follows: "The System shall contain the following
features: (a) use of appropriate ballots; (b) stand-alone machine which can count
votes and an automated system which can consolidate the results immediately;
(c) with provisions for audit trails; (d) minimum human intervention; and (e)
adequate safeguard/security measures." (Italics and emphases supplied.)
In brief, respondents cannot deny that the provision requiring audit trails is
indeed mandatory, considering the wording of Section 7 of RA 8436. Neither can
Respondent Comelec deny that it has relied on the BAC Report, which indicates
that the machines or the software was deficient in that respect. And yet, the
Commission simply disregarded this shortcoming and awarded the Contract to
private respondent, thereby violating the very law it was supposed to
implement.
C.
Inadequacy of Post Facto Remedial Measures
Respondents argue that the deficiencies relating to the detection of previously
downloaded data, as well as provisions for audit trails, are mere shortcomings or
minor deficiencies in software or programming, which can be rectified. Perhaps
Comelec simply relied upon the BAC Report, which states on page 8 thereof that
"Mega Pacific failed in 8 items[;] however these are mostly on the software
which can be corrected by re-programming . . . and therefore can be readily
corrected."
The undersigned ponente's questions, some of which were addressed to
Commissioner Borra during the Oral Argument, remain unanswered to this day.
First of all, who made the determination that the eight "fail" marks of Mega
Pacific were on account of the software — was it DOST or TWG? How can we be
sure these failures were not the results of machine defects? How was it
determined that the software could actually be re-programmed and thereby
rectified? Did a qualified technical expert read and analyze the source code 49 for
the programs and conclude that these could be saved and remedied? (Such
determination cannot be done by any other means save by the examination and
analysis of the source code.)
Who was this qualified technical expert? When did he carry out the study? Did he
prepare a written report on his findings? Or did the Comelec just make a wild
guess? It does not follow that all defects in software programs can be rectified,
and the programs saved. In the information technology sector, it is common
knowledge that there are many badly written programs, with significant
programming errors written into them; hence it does not make economic sense
to try to correct the programs; instead, programmers simply abandon them and
just start from scratch. There's no telling if any of these programs is
unrectifiable, unless a qualified programmer reads the source code.
And if indeed a qualified expert reviewed the source code, did he also determine
how much work would be needed to rectify the programs? And how much time
and money would be spent for that effort? Who would carry out the work? After
the rectification process, who would ascertain and how would it be ascertained
the rectification process, who would ascertain and how would it be ascertained
that the programs have indeed been properly rectified, and that they would work
properly thereafter? And of course, the most important question to ask: could the
rectification be done in time for the elections in 2004?
Clearly, none of the respondents bothered to think the matter through. Comelec
simply took the word of the BAC as gospel truth, without even bothering to
inquire from DOST whether it was true that the deficiencies noted could possibly
be remedied by re-programming the software. Apparently, Comelec did not care
about the software, but focused only on purchasing the machines.
What really adds to the Court's dismay is the admission made by Commissioner
Borra during the Oral Argument that the software currently being used by
Comelec was merely the "demo" version, inasmuch as the final version that
would actually be used in the elections was still being developed and had not yet
been finalized.
It is not clear when the final version of the software would be ready for testing
and deployment. It seems to the Court that Comelec is just keeping its fingers
crossed and hoping the final product would work. Is there a "Plan B" in case it
does not? Who knows? But all these software programs are part and parcel of the
bidding and the Contract awarded to the Consortium. Why is it that the
machines are already being brought in and paid for, when there is as yet no way
of knowing if the final version of the software would be able to run them
properly, as well as canvass and consolidate the results in the manner required?
The counting machines, as well as the canvassing system, will never work
properly without the correct software programs. There is an old adage that is still
valid to this day: "Garbage in, garbage out." No matter how powerful, advanced
and sophisticated the computers and the servers are, if the software being
utilized is defective or has been compromised, the results will be no better than
garbage. And to think that what is at stake here is the 2004 national elections —
the very basis of our democratic life.
Correction of Defects?
To their Memorandum, public respondents proudly appended 19 Certifications
issued by DOST declaring that some 285 counting machines had been tested and
had passed the acceptance testing conducted by the Department on October 8
–18, 2003. Among those tested were some machines that had failed previous
tests, but had undergone adjustments and thus passed re-testing.
Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and
by what standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the
machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the passing
mark. Apart from that fact, the remedial efforts of respondents were, not
surprisingly, apparently focused again on the machines — the hardware. Nothing
was said or done about the software — the deficiencies as to detection and
prevention of downloading and entering previously downloaded data, as well as
the capability to print an audit trail. No matter how many times the machines
were tested and re-tested, if nothing was done about the programming defects
and deficiencies, the same danger of massive electoral fraud remains. As anyone
who has a modicum of knowledge of computers would say, "That's elementary!"

And only last December 5, 2003, an Inq7.net news report quoted the Comelec
chair as saying that the new automated poll system would be used nationwide in
May 2004, even as the software for the system remained unfinished. It also
reported that a certain Titus Manuel of the Philippine Computer Society, which
was helping Comelec test the hardware and software, said that the software for
the counting still had to be submitted on December 15, while the software for
the canvassing was due in early January.
Even as Comelec continues making payments for the ACMs, we keep asking
ourselves: who is going to ensure that the software would be tested and would
work properly?
At any rate, the re-testing of the machines and/or the 100 percent testing of all
machines (testing of every single unit) would not serve to eradicate the grave
abuse of discretion already committed by Comelec when it awarded the Contract
on April 15, 2003, despite the obvious and admitted flaws in the bidding process,
the failure of the "winning bidder" to qualify, and the inability of the ACMs and
the intended software to meet the bid requirements and rules.
Comelec's Latest "Assurances" Are Unpersuasive
Even the latest pleadings filed by Comelec do not serve to allay our
apprehensions. They merely affirm and compound the serious violations of law
and gravely abusive acts it has committed. Let us examine them.
The Resolution issued by this Court on December 9, 2003 required respondents
to inform it as to the number of ACMs delivered and paid for, as well as the total
payment made to date for the purchase thereof. They were likewise instructed to
submit a certification from the DOST attesting to the number of ACMs tested, the
number found to be defective; and "whether the reprogrammed software has
been tested and found to have complied with the requirements under Republic
Act No. 8436." 50
In its "Partial Compliance and Manifestation" dated December 29, 2003, Comelec
informed the Court that 1,991 ACMs had already been delivered to the
Commission as of that date. It further certified that it had already paid the
supplier the sum of P849,167,697.41, which corresponded to 1,973 ACM units
that had passed the acceptance testing procedures conducted by the MIRDC-
DOST 51 and which had therefore been accepted by the poll body. ICTcDA
In the same submission, for the very first time, Comelec also disclosed to the
Court the following:
"The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the
manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the development of three
(3) types of software, which are intended for use in the following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures

3. Election Day Use."
Purchase of the First Type of Software Without Evaluation

In other words, the first type of software was to be developed solely for the
purpose of enabling the evaluation of the bidder's technical bid. Comelec
explained thus: "In addition to the presentation of the ACM hardware, the
bidders were required to develop a 'base' software program that will enable the
ACM to function properly. Since the software program utilized during the
evaluation of bids is not the actual software program to be employed on election
day, there being two (2) other types of software program that will still have to be
developed and thoroughly tested prior to actual election day use, defects in the
'base' software that can be readily corrected by reprogramming are considered
minor in nature, and may therefore be waived."
In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to
award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation
of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore nothing but
a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one that would be
used on election day. Keeping in mind that the Contract involves the acquisition
of not just the ACMs or the hardware, but also the software that would run them,
it is now even clearer that the Contract was awarded without Comelec having
seen, much less evaluated, the final product — the software that would finally be
utilized come election day. (Not even the "near-final" product, for that matter).
What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was
the subject of the Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo
innumerable changes before being considered as being in final form? And that is
not all!
No Explanation for Lapses in the Second Type of Software
The second phase, allegedly involving the second type of software, is simply
denominated "Testing and Acceptance Procedures." As best as we can construe,
Comelec is claiming that this second type of software is also to be developed and
delivered by the supplier in connection with the "testing and acceptance" phase
of the acquisition process. The previous pleadings, though — including the DOST
reports submitted to this Court — have not heretofore mentioned any
statement, allegation or representation to the effect that a particular set of
software was to be developed and/or delivered by the supplier in connection with
the testing and acceptance of delivered ACMs.
What the records do show is that the imported ACMs were subjected to the
testing and acceptance process conducted by the DOST. Since the initial batch
delivered included a high percentage of machines that had failed the tests,
Comelec asked the DOST to conduct a 100 percent testing; that is, to test every
single one of the ACMs delivered. Among the machines tested on October 8 to
18, 2003, were some units that had failed previous tests but had subsequently
been re-tested and had passed. To repeat, however, until now, there has never
been any mention of a second set or type of software pertaining to the testing
and acceptance process.
In any event, apart from making that misplaced and uncorroborated claim,
Comelec in the same submission also professes (in response to the concerns
expressed by this Court) that the reprogrammed software has been tested and
found to have complied with the requirements of RA 8436. It reasoned thus:
"Since the software program is an inherent element in the automated counting
system, the certification issued by the MIRDC-DOST that one thousand nine
hundred seventy-three (1,973) units passed the acceptance test procedures is
an official recognition by the MIRDC-DOST that the software component of the
automated election system, which has been reprogrammed to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8436 as prescribed in the Ad Hoc Technical
Evaluation Committee's ACM Testing and Acceptance Manual, has passed the
MIRDC-DOST tests."
The facts do not support this sweeping statement of Comelec. A scrutiny of the
MIRDC-DOST letter dated December 15, 2003, 52 which it relied upon, does not
justify its grand conclusion. For clarity's sake, we quote in full the letter-
certification, as follows:
"15 December 2003
"HON. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA
Commissioner-in-Charge
Phase II, Modernization Project

Commission on Elections
Intramuros, Manila
Attention: Atty. Jose M. Tolentino, Jr.
Project Director
"Dear Commissioner Borra:
"We are pleased to submit 11 DOST Test Certifications representing 11
lots and covering 158 units of automated counting machines (ACMs) that
we have tested from 02–12 December 2003.
"To date, we have tested all the 1,991 units of ACMs, broken down as
follow: (sic)
1st batch — 30 units 4th batch — 438 units
2nd batch — 288 units 5th batch — 438 units
3rd batch — 414 units 6th batch — 383 units
"It should be noted that a total of 18 units have failed the test. Out of
these 18 units, only one (1) unit has failed the retest.
"Thank you and we hope you will find everything in order.
"Very truly yours,
"ROLANDO T. VILORIA, CESO III

Executive Director cum
Chairman, DOST-Technical Evaluation Committee"
Even a cursory glance at the foregoing letter shows that it is completely bereft of
anything that would remotely support Comelec's contention that the "software
component of the automated election system . . . has been reprogrammed to
comply with" RA 8436, and "has passed the MIRDC-DOST tests." There is no
mention at all of any software reprogramming. If the MIRDC-DOST had indeed
undertaken the supposed reprogramming and the process turned out to be
successful, that agency would have proudly trumpeted its singular achievement.
How Comelec came to believe that such reprogramming had been undertaken is
unclear. In any event, the Commission is not forthright and candid with the
factual details. If reprogramming has been done, who performed it and when?
What exactly did the process involve? How can we be assured that it was
properly performed? Since the facts attendant to the alleged reprogramming are
still shrouded in mystery, the Court cannot give any weight to Comelec's bare
allegations.
The fact that a total of 1,973 of the machines has ultimately passed the MIRDC-
DOST tests does not by itself serve as an endorsement of the soundness of the
software program, much less as a proof that it has been reprogrammed. In the
first place, nothing on record shows that the tests and re-tests conducted on the
machines were intended to address the serious deficiencies noted earlier. As a
matter of fact, the MIRDC-DOST letter does not even indicate what kinds of tests
or re-tests were conducted, their exact nature and scope, and the specific
objectives thereof. 53 The absence of relevant supporting documents, combined
with the utter vagueness of the letter, certainly fails to inspire belief or to justify
the expansive confidence displayed by Comelec. In any event, it goes without
saying that remedial measures such as the alleged reprogramming cannot in
any way mitigate the grave abuse of discretion already committed as early as
April 15, 2003.
Rationale of Public Bidding Negated by the Third Type of Software
Respondent Comelec tries to assuage this Court's anxiety in these words: " The
reprogrammed software that has already passed the requirements of Republic
Act No. 8436 during the MIRDC-DOST testing and acceptance procedures will
require further customization since the following additional elements, among
other things, will have to be considered before the final software can be used on
election day: 1. Final Certified List of Candidates . . . 2. Project of Precincts . . . 3.
Official Ballot Design and Security Features . . . 4. Encryption, digital certificates
and digital signatures . . . The certified list of candidates for national elective
positions will be finalized on or before 23 January 2004 while the final list of
projects of precincts will be prepared also on the same date. Once all the above
elements are incorporated in the software program, the Test Certification Group
created by the Ad Hoc Technical Evaluation Committee will conduct meticulous
testing of the final software before the same can be used on election day. In
addition to the testing to be conducted by said Test Certification Group, the
Comelec will conduct mock elections in selected areas nationwide not only for
purposes of public information but also to further test the final election day
program. Public respondent Comelec, therefore, requests that it be given up to
16 February 2004 to comply with this requirement."
The foregoing passage shows the imprudent approach adopted by Comelec in the
bidding and acquisition process. The Commission says that before the software
can be utilized on election day, it will require "customization" through addition of
data — like the list of candidates, project of precincts, and so on. And inasmuch as
such data will become available only in January 2004 anyway, there is therefore
no perceived need on Comelec's part to rush the supplier into producing the final
(or near-final) version of the software before that time. In any case, Comelec
argues that the software needed for the electoral exercise can be continuously
developed, tested, adjusted and perfected, practically all the way up to election
day, at the same time that the Commission is undertaking all the other distinct
and diverse activities pertinent to the elections.
Given such a frame of mind, it is no wonder that Comelec paid little attention to
the counting and canvassing software during the entire bidding process, which
took place in February–March 2003. Granted that the software was defective,
could not detect and prevent the re-use of previously downloaded data or
produce the audit trail — aside from its other shortcomings — nevertheless, all
those deficiencies could still be corrected down the road. At any rate, the
software used for bidding purposes would not be the same one that will be used
on election day, so why pay any attention to its defects? Or to the Comelec's
own bidding rules for that matter? HcTIDC
Clearly, such jumbled ratiocinations completely negate the rationale underlying

the bidding process mandated by law.
At the very outset, the Court has explained that Comelec flagrantly violated the
public policy on public biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the
bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding
the Contract to MPC/MPEI. Now, with the latest explanation given by Comelec, it
is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by
permitting the winning bidder to change and alter the subject of the Contract
(the software), in effect allowing a substantive amendment without public
bidding.
This stance is contrary to settled jurisprudence requiring the strict application of
pertinent rules, regulations and guidelines for public bidding for the purpose of
placing each bidder, actual or potential, on the same footing. The essence of
public bidding is, after all, an opportunity for fair competition, and a fair basis for
the precise comparison of bids. In common parlance, public bidding aims to "level
the playing field." That means each bidder must bid under the same conditions;
and be subject to the same guidelines, requirements and limitations, so that the
best offer or lowest bid may be determined, all other things being equal .
Thus, it is contrary to the very concept of public bidding to permit a variance
between the conditions under which bids are invited and those under which
proposals are submitted and approved; or, as in this case, the conditions under
which the bid is won and those under which the awarded Contract will be
complied with. The substantive amendment of the contract bidded out, without
any public bidding — after the bidding process had been concluded — is violative
of the public policy on public biddings, as well as the spirit and intent of RA 8436.
The whole point in going through the public bidding exercise was completely lost.
The very rationale of public bidding was totally subverted by the Commission.
From another perspective, the Comelec approach also fails to make sense.
Granted that, before election day, the software would still have to be customized
to each precinct, municipality, city, district, and so on, there still was nothing at
all to prevent Comelec from requiring prospective suppliers/bidders to produce, at
the very start of the bidding process, the "next-to-final" versions of the software
(the best software the suppliers had) — pre-tested and ready to be customized to
the final list of candidates and project of precincts, among others, and ready to be
deployed thereafter. The satisfaction of such requirement would probably have
provided far better bases for evaluation and selection, as between suppliers, than
the so-called demo software.
Respondents contend that the bidding suppliers' counting machines were
previously used in at least one political exercise with no less than 20 million
voters. If so, it stands to reason that the software used in that past electoral
exercise would probably still be available and, in all likelihood, could have been
adopted for use in this instance. Paying for machines and software of that
category (already tried and proven in actual elections and ready to be adopted for
use) would definitely make more sense than paying the same hundreds of
millions of pesos for demo software and empty promises of usable programs in
the future.
But there is still another gut-level reason why the approach taken by Comelec is
reprehensible. It rides on the perilous assumption that nothing would go wrong;
and that, come election day, the Commission and the supplier would have
developed, adjusted and "re-programmed" the software to the point where the
automated system could function as envisioned. But what if such optimistic
projection does not materialize? What if, despite all their herculean efforts, the
software now being hurriedly developed and tested for the automated system
performs dismally and inaccurately or, worse, is hacked and/or manipulated? 54
What then will we do with all the machines and defective software already paid
for in the amount of P849 million of our tax money? Even more important, what
will happen to our country in case of failure of the automation?
The Court cannot grant the plea of Comelec that it be given until February 16,
2004 to be able to submit a "certification relative to the additional elements of
the software that will be customized," because for us to do so would
unnecessarily delay the resolution of this case and would just give the poll body
an unwarranted excuse to postpone the 2004 elections. On the other hand,
because such certification will not cure the gravely abusive actions complained of
by petitioners, it will be utterly useless.
Is this Court being overly pessimistic and perhaps even engaging in speculation?
Hardly. Rather, the Court holds that Comelec should not have gambled on the
unrealistic optimism that the supplier's software development efforts would turn
out well. The Commission should have adopted a much more prudent and
judicious approach to ensure the delivery of tried and tested software, and
readied alternative courses of action in case of failure. Considering that the
nation's future is at stake here, it should have done no less.
Epilogue
Once again, the Court finds itself at the crossroads of our nation's history. At
stake in this controversy is not just the business of a computer supplier, or a
questionable proclamation by Comelec of one or more public officials. Neither is
it about whether this country should switch from the manual to the automated
system of counting and canvassing votes. At its core is the ability and capacity of
the Commission on Elections to perform properly, legally and prudently its legal
mandate to implement the transition from manual to automated elections.
Unfortunately, Comelec has failed to measure up to this historic task. As stated
at the start of this Decision, Comelec has not merely gravely abused its
discretion in awarding the Contract for the automation of the counting and
canvassing of the ballots. It has also put at grave risk the holding of credible and
peaceful elections by shoddily accepting electronic hardware and software that
admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements. Inadequate
as they are, the remedies it proffers post facto do not cure the grave abuse of
discretion it already committed (1) on April 15, 2003, when it illegally made the
award; and (2) "sometime" in May 2003 when it executed the Contract for the
purchase of defective machines and non-existent software from a non-eligible
bidder.
For these reasons, the Court finds it totally unacceptable and unconscionable to
place its imprimatur on this void and illegal transaction that seriously endangers
the breakdown of our electoral system. For this Court to cop-out and to close its
eyes to these illegal transactions, while convenient, would be to abandon its
constitutional duty of safeguarding public interest.
As a necessary consequence of such nullity and illegality, the purchase of the
machines and all appurtenances thereto including the still-to-be-produced (or in
Comelec's words, to be "reprogrammed") software, as well as all the payments
made therefor, have no basis whatsoever in law. The public funds expended
pursuant to the void Resolution and Contract must therefore be recovered from
the payees and/or from the persons who made possible the illegal disbursements,
without prejudice to possible criminal prosecutions against them.
Furthermore, Comelec and its officials concerned must bear full responsibility for
the failed bidding and award, and held accountable for the electoral mess
wrought by their grave abuse of discretion in the performance of their functions.
The State, of course, is not bound by the mistakes and illegalities of its agents
and servants.
True, our country needs to transcend our slow, manual and archaic electoral
process. But before it can do so, it must first have a diligent and competent
electoral agency that can properly and prudently implement a well-conceived
automated election system.
At bottom, before the country can hope to have a speedy and fraud-free
automated election, it must first be able to procure the proper computerized
hardware and software legally, based on a transparent and valid system of public
bidding. As in any democratic system, the ultimate goal of automating elections
must be achieved by a legal, valid and above-board process of acquiring the
necessary tools and skills therefor. Though the Philippines needs an automated
electoral process, it cannot accept just any system shoved into its bosom through
improper and illegal methods. As the saying goes, the end never justifies the
means. Penumbral contracting will not produce enlightened results.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and
VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the
CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject
Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55
Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or
agreement entered into with regard to this project.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman which shall
determine the criminal liability, if any, of the public officials (and conspiring
private individuals, if any) involved in the subject Resolution and Contract. Let
the Office of the Solicitor General also take measures to protect the government
and vindicate public interest from the ill effects of the illegal disbursements of
public funds made by reason of the void Resolution and Contract.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, J ., concur, and also joins the opinion of J . Ynares-Santiago.
Quisumbing, J., concurs in the result.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see concurring opinion.
Corona and Azcuna, JJ., join the dissent of J. Tinga.
Tinga, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
I join Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug in his separate opinion and strongly recommend,
for the reasons therein stated, that this case be DISMISSED.
Let me further add other compelling reasons which strengthen my view that this
case should be dismissed.
The Court did not issue a Temporary Restraining Order in this case. This showed
an initial finding that on its face the allegations in the petition were insufficient
to justify or warrant the grant of a temporary restraining order. In the meantime
then the parties were not barred from performing their respective obligations
under the contract. As of today, the COMELEC has already paid a large portion of
its contracted obligation and the private respondent has delivered the contracted
equipment for automation. It is to be reasonably presumed that during the same
period the COMELEC focused its attention, time and resources toward the full
and successful implementation of the comprehensive Automated Election System
for the May 2004 elections. Setting aside the contract in question at this late
hour may have unsettling, disturbing and even destabilizing effect. For one, it
will leave the COMELEC insufficient time to prepare for a non-automated
electoral process, i.e., the manual process, which would necessarily include the
acquisition of the security paper and the purchase of a "dandy roll" to watermark
the ballot paper, printing of other election forms, as well as the bidding and
acquisition of the ballot boxes. For another, the law on Automated Election
System (R.A. 8436) and Executive Order No. 172 (24 January 2003) which
allocated the sum of P2.5 Billion, and Executive Order No. 175 (10 February
2003) which allocated the additional sum of P500 Million for the implementation
in the May 2004 elections of the Automated Election System would be put to
naught as there is absolutely no more time to conduct a re-bidding.
Finally, there is no suggestion that graft and corruption attended the bidding
process, or that the contract price is excessive or unreasonable. All that the
petitioners claim is that "the bidding and the award process was fatally flawed.
The public respondents acted without or excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it [sic]
awarded the project." It may be precipitate for this Court to declare void the
contract in question.
VITUG, J.:
While the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and prohibition (along with petitions for prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction), that jurisdiction, however, is not
exclusive. 1 A direct recourse to the Supreme Court, for the issuance of these
writs, in disregard of the rule on hierarchy, should be appropriate only when,
besides the attendance of clearly exceptional and compelling reasons clearly set
out in the petition, 2 there are no contentious factual assertions of the parties
that need to be threshed out before any objective and definitive conclusion can
be reached.
What appears to be a significant issue in the instant petition is the legality of
respondent COMELEC's award of the contract relative to the procurement of
automated counting machines to respondent Mega Pacific under alleged
questionable circumstances. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; indeed, a
review of the evidence is not the proper office of a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. 3 These proceedings are availed of only when there
can be no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
I n certiorari or prohibition, issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board
and officers involved may be resolved solely on the basis of undisputed facts. 4
The enormity of the factual disputes in the instant petition, among which include
the eligibility of Mega Pacific to participate in the bidding process, the veracity
and effectivity of the testing, and the technical evaluation conducted by the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) on the automated counting
machine of the bidders, would essentially require an extensive inquiry into the
facts. An insistence that it be resolved despite unsettled factual points would be
inadequate to allow an intrusion by the Court. 5
The Supreme Court is not expected, whenever one is simply minded, to pass
judgment on an action of a government agency upon which authority, as well as
corresponding duty, devolves. The Court neither controls nor supervises the
exercise of authority and the discharge of function by another government office.
If it were otherwise, the act of governance and the responsibility that thereto
attaches are then effectively shifted from where they belong over to where they
should not be. The Court is bound merely to construe and to apply the law,
regardless of its wisdom and salutariness, and to strike it down only when
regardless of its wisdom and salutariness, and to strike it down only when
constitutional proscriptions are disregarded. It is what the fundamental law
mandates, and it is what the Court must do.
The electoral process, it is true, should be of paramount and immediate concern
to every Filipino. It is also probably true that the computerization/automation of
our electoral process, as well as the progress that it brings, is just as important.
Nevertheless, it could also be unwise for the Court, for that sake alone, to
precipitately take on the case; after all, we have been without it for decades. The
opinions expressed by my colleagues, collectively and individually, should indeed
give compelling reasons for the Commission on Elections to perhaps take notice
and, on its own, to forthwith reexamine the assailed bidding process.
Accordingly, at this stage, I am constrained to vote against the Court's taking
cognizance of the case.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring:
I am mindful of our ruling, expressed only recently in Makalintal v. COMELEC, 1

that the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"), being an independent
constitutional body, ought to be given considerable latitude in the discharge of its
functions. The key point to be remembered is the fundamental objective which
all of the COMELEC's actuations should be destined to achieve, i.e. the
accomplishment of free, orderly and honest elections. If the means adopted by
the COMELEC run clearly contrary to its fundamental objective, it is our right —
more, our duty — to nullify the COMELEC's actuations.
Our experience during the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 2 should have taught us that
the Philippines may be unprepared for the use of automated counting machines.
Whereas it is successfully adopted in many countries around the world, this
sophisticated technological advancement seems beyond the reach of the
Philippines at this stage in our country's development. If we persist in
attempting the use thereof, even if — as in this case — such machines do not
meet the standards of accuracy that our own laws demand, we would be
tampering with the conduct of free, orderly and honest elections, and thus we
would be distorting the will of the electorate.
As pointed out by the Honorable Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Separate Opinion, this
Court is not a trier of facts, and a review of the technical evidence is not the
proper office of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 3 The
questions of law, however, and the questions of the COMELEC's grave abuse of
discretion, are squarely within the purview of this Court in this case.
In my opinion, there are three main grounds which warrant granting the instant
petition. First, I believe that the special circumstances availing in this case
warrant the relaxation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Second, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it clearly contracted
with a non-eligible entity, and therefore the contract for the second phase of the
automated counting system is null and void. Finally, even assuming the
eligibility of the other contracting party, the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it changed the technical requirements for accuracy of the
automated machines and software, which warrants the nullification of the
contract.
I.
On Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that regular courts of justice should
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. 4 The underlying
principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the
presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is
afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly. 5
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule.

This doctrine is relative, and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. 6
In the past, the principle has been disregarded when (1) there is a violation of
due process; 7 (2) the issue involved is purely a legal question; 8 (3) the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; 9 (4) there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; 10 (5) there is irreparable injury; 11 (6) the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied and
assumed approval of the latter; 12 (7) to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; 13 (8) it would amount to a nullification of a
claim; 14 (9) the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; 15 (10)
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and (11) there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, 16 as when
public interest is involved. 17
There is no plainer example of a case in which the issues are of transcendental
importance. The preservation of an honest, upright system of electing our
nation's public officers bears urgent public interest considerations. More, as I will
discuss below, the administrative action involved here is patently illegal,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These two reasons warrant the relaxation of the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
II.
On the Non-Eligibility of Private Respondents.
I am not persuaded by the argument that the individual members of the so-
called "Consortium" bound themselves to perform particular obligations under
individual agreements executed with MPEI, and that these separate agreements
suffice to constitute an eligible "joint venture" under the Request For Proposal
("RFP") promulgated by the COMELEC. The fact that WeSolv, SK C & C,
Election.Com and ePLDT bound themselves to MPEI does not mean that a joint
venture was executed. These individual entities are merely the sub-contractors
of MPEI, and their liability for any breach is only to MPEI.
Under the RFP, a "joint venture" has been given a very strict definition. To be
eligible to submit a bid, the following criteria must be met:
Manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into a
joint venture, that intend to be jointly and severally liable for a particular
contract, provided Filipino ownership thereof shall be 60% . 18 (emphasis
supplied)
There are therefore three qualifications for eligibility under the RFP. First, the
manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors must expressly form themselves
into a joint venture. Second, this joint venture must demonstrate an intent that
the individual members be jointly and severally liable for a particular contract.
Finally, the Filipino ownership of the joint venture must be 60%.
Whereas the RFP does not require the members of the joint venture to execute a
single document to constitute the joint venture, there must be sufficient
evidence that such a joint venture was indeed formed, whether this evidence is a
single document, or a multiplicity of documents. It is plain that the "joint
venture" must be formed as a single entity, responsible for the entirety of the
contract, even if separate agreements among the individual members of the
joint venture would lay out the specific tenor of their obligations to each other;
otherwise, it would be impossible to evaluate the nationality of this joint
venture, which nationality is the third requirement for eligibility.
Conspicuously absent from the records of this case are documents that
demonstrate that the individual members of the so-called "Consortium" actually
formed or constituted themselves into a joint venture. Jurisprudence discussing a
joint venture lays out the rule that such an entity "presupposes generally a
parity of standing between the joint co-ventures or partners, in which each party
has an equal proprietary interest in the capital or property contributed, and
where each party exercises equal rights in the conduct of the business." 19
I n Aurbach, et al. v. Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corporation, et al. , 20 we
expressed the view that a joint venture may be likened to a partnership, thus:
The legal concept of a joint venture is of common law origin. It has no
precise legal definition, but it has been generally understood to mean an
organization formed for some temporary purpose. It is hardly
distinguishable from the partnership, since their elements are similar —
community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and losses, and
a mutual right of control. The main distinction cited by most opinions in
common law jurisdiction is that the partnership contemplates a general
business with some degree of continuity, while the joint venture is formed
for the execution of a single transaction, and is thus of a temporary
nature. This observation is not entirely accurate in this jurisdiction, since
under the Civil Code, a partnership may be particular or universal, and a
particular partnership may have for its object a specific undertaking. It
would seem therefore that under Philippine law, a joint venture is a form
of partnership and should thus be governed by the law of partnerships.
The Supreme Court has however recognized a distinction between these
two business forms, and has held that although a corporation cannot
enter into a partnership contract, it may however engage in a joint
venture with others. (citations omitted)
In other words, the legal concept of a "joint venture", since akin to a partnership,
involves a common agreement — in which all individuals and entities party to
the joint venture bind themselves, jointly, to perform a common undertaking or
undertakings. The definition of a "joint venture" under the RFP is in line with this
legal definition.
There is nothing in the records that would indicate that any such entity was
created by the individual members of the so-called "Consortium". In the absence
of any evidence, we must conclude that no such agreement exists.
Since we are unable to conclude that the "joint venture" has any legal existence,
it is impossible to evaluate whether or not the third criterion — setting out the
nationality requirement for an eligible joint venture — has been met by the so-
called "Consortium". The so-called "Consortium", therefore, has failed to meet
the first and third criteria.
There is also a gross failure on the part of the private respondents to meet the
second criterion. There is a marked absence of intent that the individual
members of the so-called "Consortium" be jointly and severally liable for the
contract.
The records contain particular individual agreements that MPEI entered into with
other entities. A perusal of the individual agreements that MPEI entered into
with the other entities readily demonstrates that it was always the intent of
MPEI to have direct and primary liability for any breach of the Contract with
COMELEC.
Part of the records are so-called "Teaming Agreements" which MPEI entered into
with Election.Com Ltd. 21 and ePLDT Inc., 22 both dated March 3, 2003. An
examination of the language of these "Teaming Agreements" would once more
demonstrate that it was MPEI, and MPEI alone, which intended to bid for the
Contract with the COMELEC, and intended to be bound thereby. First, both these
"Teaming Agreements" contain stipulations designating MPEI as the "Contractor"
and the other party as merely the "Subcontractor". 23 Each of these "Teaming
Agreements" acknowledges that the agreements were entered into in the
expectation that COMELEC would award the Contract to the Contractor, MPEI. 24
Absent from either of these "Teaming Agreements" is any reference to the
possibility that COMELEC would contract with the so-called "Consortium".
Moreover, both of these agreements state that the obligation of the
Subcontractor was the delivery of equipment or provision of services to the
Contractor, MPEI, 25 and indeed expressly limit the Subcontractor's role in the
entire project to be merely that of a provider of the equipment and services. 26
Liability for failure to perform these obligations is expressly limited. The
Subcontractors would be liable only to MPEI, and not to the COMELEC.
Also part of the records is the "Memorandum of Agreement" entered into
between MPEI and WeSolv Open Computing, Inc. 27 The very first preambulatory
clause thereof reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to an open competitive bidding to be conducted by
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") of the Philippine Government,
Mega Pacific intends to submit a bid for Phase II: Automated Counting
and Canvassing System (the "Project") of the Modernization Program of
the Philippine Electoral System; 28 (emphasis supplied)

"Mega Pacific", the entity referred to, is defined as "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc."
29 and not the so-called "Consortium". In other words, MPEI and WeSolv
understood that MPEI would be bidding for the Contract, and MPEI alone would
be contracting with COMELEC.
The expression of "joint and several liability" of "WeSolv" does not transform the
agreement into a joint venture. There is a clear limit to the extent of this liability.
As plainly stated in the Memorandum of Agreement:
WeSolv shall be jointly and severally liable with Mega Pacific only for the
particular products and/or services supplied by the former for the Project.
30
The very first reference to any so-called "Consortium" is in the "Memorandum of

Agreement" dated March 9, 2003, between MPEI and SK C & C, "a corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Korea".
31 The initial preambulatory clause reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to an open competitive bidding to be conducted by

the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") of the Philippine Government,
the Mega Pacific Consortium shall bid for Phase II: Automated Counting
and Canvassing System (the "Project") of the Modernization Program of
the Philippine Electoral System; . . . 32
That Memorandum of Agreement also contains the following clause:

Each of the individual members of the Consortium shall be jointly and
33
Three things are significant about this Memorandum of Agreement.

First, whereas there is reference to a "Consortium", the specific composition of
the "Consortium" is not specified. Thus, the records are bereft of any evidence
that would demonstrate which entities, if any, would be parties to this
"Consortium". It is therefore impossible to make a factual determination as
regards whether the "Consortium" would meet the strict requirements for a
qualified bidder outlined in the RFP.
Second, the Memorandum of Agreement specifically limits the liability of each
member of this "Consortium" only in accordance with their respective
undertaking or sphere of responsibility. Thus, the "joint and several" liability of
each member of the Consortium would again be only within a very limited
application, i.e., only to the extent of its individual undertaking.
Third, and most significant, the Memorandum of Agreement is only between
MPEI and SK C & C. There is no evidence of any similar Memorandum of
Agreement, referring to a Consortium, entered into between MPEI and any other
entity. The joint and several liability referred to in the quoted paragraph,
therefore, would pertain only to MPEI and SK C & C, since these are the only two
parties to this particular contract, and not to any other member of the
Consortium, if any. In the absence of evidence, it is impossible to conclude that
there are other members of the Consortium, and equally impossible to
determine the extent of their liability, if any.
In sum, therefore, there is a conspicuous dearth of evidence to demonstrate that
there was, indeed, a Consortium; if there was a Consortium, the specific
composition thereof; and, if there was a Consortium, the liability of its individual
members, for breach of the contract to COMELEC.
All this demonstrates that, even if the other contracting party were the so-called
"Consortium", this "Consortium" would be ineligible to enter into the contract
with the COMELEC.
However, it is plain that the COMELEC entered into a contract not with this
"Consortium", but rather with MPEI — an entity which, it is acknowledged, would
per se be ineligible to bid. A plain reading of the contract denominates the parties
to be:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, the government institution charged with
the enforcement and administration of laws relative to the conduct of
elections, with principal office address at Postigo Street, Intramuros,
Manila, Philippines, represented in this act by its Chairman, Hon. Benjamin
S. Abalos, hereinafter referred to as the "COMELEC".
— and —
MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC., a corporation duly organized and

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
with principal office address at Suite 707, Tower One & Exchange Plaza,
Ayala Triangle, Ayala Avenue, Makati City, Philippines, represented in this
act by its President, Willy U. Yu, hereinafter referred to as "MEGA". 34
The "Contract Documents" referred to are the following:

1.4. Contract Documents
The following documents, referred to collectively as the Contract
Documents, are hereby incorporated and made integral parts of the
Contract:
(1) this Contract together with its Appendices;
(2) the Request for Proposal (also known as "Terms of Reference") issued
by the Comelec including Tender Inquiries and Bid Bulletins;
(3) Tender Proposal as submitted by Mega.
All Contract Documents shall form part of the Contract even if they or
any one of them is not referred to or mentioned in the Contract as
one although not shown in the other shall be as binding as if required by
all, unless one item is a correction of the other.
The Intent of the Contract Documents is the proper, satisfactory, and
timely execution and completion of the Project in accordance with the
included in the Contract.
Again, conspicuously absent from this contractual definition of a "Contract

Document" is any mention of any subsidiary agreement between a purported
"Consortium" and the COMELEC. Indeed, a plain reading of the definition of the
"Contract Document" would indicate that, insofar as the parties to the contract
were concerned, the bid itself was submitted by MPEI and not the "Consortium".
Moreover, the definition of "Contract Document" could easily have integrated the
subsidiary agreements, incorporating them by reference, in the same way that
the "Request for Proposal" and "Tender Proposal" were incorporated by reference.
These contracts were not even appended as annexes to the main contract. The
appendices to the main contract are: "Products and Services to be Acquired from,
and Provided by, Mega Pacific Solutions, Inc., and Technical Specifications"; 35
"Ballot Counting System"; 36 "Canvassing of Votes System/Software"; 37 "Project
Management Approach"; 38 "Implementation and Roll-Out Plan"; 39 "Timelines";
40 "List of Goods"; 41 "List of Documentation"; 42 "Training Summary"; 43 "List of
Services"; 44 "Schedule of Communication/Information Dissemination Materials";
45 and "Global Price Summary". 46
Moreover, an examination of the various obligations in the contract readily

demonstrates that all those obligations pertain only to either COMELEC or MPEI.
None of the other entities under the so-called "Consortium" has any obligations
to COMELEC under the Contract. It is apparent that only COMELEC and MPEI are
bound thereunder. The argument that the "Consortium", as an entity, bound
itself to perform particular obligations under the contract is easily debunked by
an examination of the contract itself.
Various other documents also support the fact that only MPEI, not any so-called
"Consortium", contracted with COMELEC. For instance, there is the Secretary's
Certificate, dated March 5, 2003, executed by Enrique T. Tansipek, the Corporate
Secretary of MPEI, which attests to the corporate authority given by the MPEI
board to enable M PE I (not the so-called "Consortium") to participate in the
bidding, in its own behalf, and not in behalf of any so-called "Consortium". 47
There are various "Affidavits of Undertaking" dated March 7, 2003, executed by
Willy U. Yu, President of MPEI, which attest that (1) M PEI (not any so-called
"Consortium") will be participating in the bid for the contract; and (2) the other
entities, such as WeSolv, Oracle, and Election.com Ltd., are referred to merely as
the "foreign suppliers", 48 an d not as joint venture partners, or as individual
members of a so-called "Consortium".
III.
On the Failure of Private Respondents to Meet the Requirements for Eligible
Bids.
Finally, even if we were to concede that the COMELEC contracted with an eligible
entity, it appears that the counting machines and ballot-counting software
submitted by the so-called "Consortium" simply failed to meet the accuracy
rating required by the RFP.
In the RFP, the COMELEC required that both the counting machines and ballot-
counting software should have an accuracy rating of 99.9995 or better.
After the bids were submitted, the accuracy criteria were suddenly changed to
99.995 percent.
Only very recently, in the Piatco 49 case, we held:
An essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all bidders must
be on equal footing. Not simply in terms of application of the procedural
rules and regulations imposed by the relevant government agency, but
more importantly, on the contract bidded upon. Each bidder must be able
to bid on the same thing. The rationale is obvious. If the winning bidder is
allowed to later include or modify certain provisions in the contract
awarded such that the contract is altered in any material respect, then
the essence of fair competition in the public bidding is destroyed. A public
bidding would indeed be a farce if after the contract is awarded, the
winning bidder may modify the contract and include provisions which are
favorable to it that were not previously made available to the other
bidders.
It is inherent in public biddings that there shall be a fair competition among the
bidders. The specifications in such biddings provide the common ground or basis
for the bidders. The specifications should, accordingly, operate equally or
indiscriminately upon all bidders. 50
To change the eligibility requirements mid-stream, and after bids had already
been submitted, completely subverts the integrity of the bidding process and
warrants the nullification of the award of the contract, whether the other
contracting party was MPEI or the so-called "Consortium".
In sum, the serious defects in the bidding process indicate a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent COMELEC, which seemed to display a
marked bias in favor of awarding the contract to the private respondent MPEI or
the so-called "Consortium". Whereas automated counting might greatly speed up
our election process, we should take great pains to make certain that the
machines used are not flawed. To my mind, the subversion of the bidding process
already makes the automation of the 2004 elections inherently suspect, which
will have a potential negative effect on the integrity of the results. At this stage
in our nation's history, we should all strive toward restoring the public's faith in
the stability of our government institutions, and the use of suspect machines in
counting votes cannot but subvert that faith.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I CONCUR with the majority opinion and vote to GRANT the
petition, specifically, to: (1) declare NULL and VOID Resolution No. 6074 of the
COMELEC awarding the contract for the second phase of the automated counting
and canvassing system of the Modernization Program of the Philippine Electoral
System to either Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. or the Mega Pacific Consortium; (2)
PROHIBIT the COMELEC from implementing any contract entered into with
either Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. or the Mega Pacific Consortium for the second
phase of the automated counting and canvassing system of the Modernization
Program of the Philippine Electoral System; and (3) COMPEL the COMELEC to
conduct a re-bidding of the second phase of the automated counting and
canvassing system of the Modernization Program of the Philippine Electoral
System.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., concurring:
"Hasty and adventurous schemes are at first view flattering, in execution

difficult, and in the issue disastrous." 1
Election is indeed the bedrock of every democratic institution. Thus, when it

comes to automating the election system, the standards must be as high as the
stakes. The government and the suppliers of the voting machines carry the
burden of proof that the machines are working correctly and that the election
results will be accurate. All of democracy is founded on the idea that the loser of
an election understands that he lost fair and square and that the election
represents the will of the electorate. If we get into elections with outcomes that
people do not believe in, where the candidates challenge the integrity of the
machine, people are going to feel less and less confident in the results of
elections run on these machines. 2
The petition before us raises a number of serious concerns about the viability of
the automated voting machines intended for the May 2004 Elections. The matter
strikes at the heart of our democratic system. If the system fails, there again
looms a threat to our country's stability. More than any other time, what we
need today is a system that will bolster the legitimacy of our government.
With the foregoing premise, I vote to grant the petition and declare Comelec
Resolution No. 6074 null and void.
The facts are undisputed.
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 3 authorizing
the Commission on Election (COMELEC) to use an automated election system for
the process of voting, counting of votes and consolidating results of the national
and local elections. It mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACM), computer equipment, devices and materials. 4
Accordingly, the COMELEC issued an Invitation to Bid on January 28, 2003,
inviting interested bidders to apply for eligibility and to bid for the supply and
delivery of the ACM with an estimated budget of P2,500,000,000.00. 5
On February 17, 2003, the COMELEC released to the public the "Request for
Proposal" providing that bids from manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors
forming themselves into a joint venture may be entertained as long as the
Filipino ownership thereof shall be at least 60%. For this purpose, a joint venture
was defined as "a group of two (2) or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or
distributors that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for the
contract." 6
The next day, February 18, 2003, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)
convened a pre-bid conference and gave prospective bidders until March 10, 2003
to submit their bid proposals.
On March 10, 2003, Mega Pacific Consortium (MP CONSORTIUM) submitted its
bid. Enclosed in it bidding documents was a letter dated March 7, 2003
expressing that Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI), Election.Com, Ltd.
(Election.Com), WeSolv Open Computing, Inc. (WeSolv) , SK CeC, ePLDT and
Oracle System (Philippines), Inc. (Oracle) have agreed to form a consortium to bid
for the Project. In the same letter, MPEI, through its President, made known its
role as the lead company and proponent of MP CONSORTIUM.
Of more than 57 bidders, the BAC found MP CONSORTIUM and Total Information
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible to bid. Their bid proposals were
thereafter referred to the BAC's Technical Working Group (TWG) and the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for technical evaluation.
Thereafter, the TWG prepared a Technical Evaluation Form listing the minimum
requirements for the Project with columns to indicate whether the bidder
"passed" or "failed" to meet certain requirements. Requirements that were
highly technical in nature and called for technical equipment for evaluation were
referred to the DOST.
Based on the findings of the TWG and the DOST, the BAC submitted a Report 7
noting that both MP CONSORTIUM and TIMC obtained some failed marks in the
technical evaluation. Regardless thereof, the COMELEC en banc, in Resolution No.
6074 awarded the Project to MP CONSORTIUM on April 15, 2003. It publicized
this Resolution on May 16, 2003.
Unsatisfied with the COMELEC's bidding process, five individuals and entities
(including petitioner Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines) wrote
a letter dated May 29, 2003 to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr.
protesting the award of the contract to MP CONSORTIUM. They cited MP
CONSORTIUM's non-compliance with eligibility as well as technical
requirements.
On June 6, 2003, COMELEC Chairman Abalos rejected the protest and declared
that the award "would stand up to strictest scrutiny."
Undaunted, Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP), Ma
Corazon M. Akol, Miguel Uy, Eduardo H. Lopez, Augusto C. Lagman, Rex C. Drilon,
Miguel Hilado, Ley Salcedo and Manuel Alcuaz, Jr., petitioners herein, filed the
present petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking (1) to declare null and
void COMELEC's Resolution No. 6074; (2) to enjoin the implementation of the
contract that may have been entered into by COMELEC either with MP
CONSORTIUM or MPEI; and (3) to compel COMELEC to conduct a re-bidding of the
Project.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, I find the exhaustive ponencia
of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban worthy of my fullest concurrence.
First, I must deal with the procedural roadblocks.
Petitioners come to us via a petition for prohibition and mandamus, thus, it is
argued that the recourse taken is improper. It is a well established rule,
particularly in public biddings, that courts cannot compel an agency to do a
particular act or to enjoin such act within its prerogative or discretion. This is not
an iron-clad rule. One noted exception is when in the exercise of its authority it
gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. 8 Judicial review may be justified on
the grounds of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrary rejection of bids, and lack of
freedom of competition among bidders. 9 In the case at bar, petitioners alleged in
their petition that public respondents "acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion" 10 when they awarded the Project
to MPEI. Thus, the following pronouncement of this Court in JG Summit Holdings,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 11 deserves reiteration:
Be that as it may, the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the
petition on the sole ground of the impropriety of the special civil action of
mandamus. It must be stressed that the petition was also one for
certiorari, seeking to nullify the award of the sale to private respondent of
the PHILSECO shares. Verily, the petition alleges that 'respondents COP
and APT have committed such a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of their jurisdiction in insisting on awarding the bid to
Philyards, for the various reasons stated herein, particularly since the
right of first refusal and the right to top the bid are unconstitutional,
contrary to law and public policy.' Petitioner's failure to include certiorari in
its caption should not negate the fact that the petition charged public
respondent with grave abuse of discretion in awarding the sale to private
respondent. Well-settled is the rule that it is not the caption of the
pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the
action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and
the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
Neither can I subscribe to respondents' view that petitioners have no legal

standing to file the present case and that the petition should be dismissed for
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8436 provides that the COMELEC, in the procurement of an
automated election system, shall create an "Advisory Council to be composed of
technical experts from the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP), the University of
the Philippines (UP) and two (2) representatives form the private sector
recommended by the Philippine Computer Society (PCS)."
Obviously, petitioner ITFP is a member of the Advisory Council mandated to aid
the COMELEC in the procurement of the ACM. As such, it has "actual and
material interest" to ensure that in the procurement of the ACM, the bidding
procedures are followed and the technical requirements are complied with. The
same interest redounds to petitioners who are members of the ITFP and who, in
addition, are suing as "taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens of the
Philippines." In Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 12
we ruled that taxpayers are allowed to sue (1) where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, (2) or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, (3) or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. Considering that the assailed award involves the disbursement of billions of
pesos from the public treasury, I must say that petitioners possess the required
locus standi.
Anent petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies, suffice it to say

that their letter dated May 29, 2003 to COMELEC Chairman Abalos objecting to
the process which led to the award of the contract to MPEI satisfies the above
procedural condition. Certainly, petitioners could not be expected to follow the
protest mechanisms outlined in Section 55, 13 Rule XVII of Republic Act No. 9184
14 considering that the assailed award was made known to the public only on
May 16, 2003 or more than one (1) month from the time Resolution No. 6074
was promulgated. Respondents would argue that under the subsequent
provision, Section 58 15 of the same Rule, the court which has jurisdiction over
final decisions of the head of the procuring entity is the Regional Trial Court. This
is not really a legal obstacle. In Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla, 16
we ruled that: "[T]he doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum.
On several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national
interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and
proceed with the judicial determination of the case. 17 The case at bar is of similar
import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to government
contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the alleged contract
involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our
country's election process."
The substantive issues in this case may be reduced into two queries: first, Did the
Comelec abuse its discretion when it allowed MPEI to actively participate in the
bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility requirement?; and
second, Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion when it awarded the contract to
MPEI?
At this juncture, it bears stressing that MPEI was incorporated only on February
27, 2003 as evidenced by its Certificate of Incorporation. 18 This goes to show
that from the time the COMELEC issued its Invitation to Bid (January 28, 2003)
and Request for Proposal (February 17, 2003) up to the time it convened the Pre-
bid Conference (February 18, 2003), MPEI was literally a non-existent entity. It
came into being only on February 27, 2003 or eleven (11) days prior to the
submission of its bid, i.e. March 10, 2003. This poses a legal obstacle to its
eligibility as a bidder. The Request for Proposal requires the bidder to submit
financial documents that will establish to the BAC's satisfaction its financial
capability which include:
"(1) audited financial statements of the Bidder's firm for the last three (3)
calendar years, stamped "RECEIVED" by the appropriate government
agency, to show its capacity to finance the manufacture and supply of
Goods called for and a statement or record of volumes of sales;
(2) Balance Sheet;
(3) Income Statement; and
(4) Statement of Cash Flow."
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, how could MPEI comply with the above
requirement of audited financial statements for the last three (3) calendar years
if it came into existence only eleven (11) days prior to the bidding?
To do away with such complication, MPEI asserts that it was MP CONSORTIUM
who submitted the bid on March 10, 2003. It pretends compliance with the
requirements by invoking the financial capabilities and long time existence of
the alleged members of the MP CONSORTIUM, namely, Election.Com, WeSolv,
S K C e C , ePLDT and Oracle. It wants this Court to believe that it is MP
CONSORTIUM who was actually dealing with the COMELEC and that its (MPEI)
participation is merely that of a "lead company and proponent" of the joint
venture. This is hardly convincing. For one, the contract for the supply and
delivery of ACM was between COMELEC and MPEI, not MP CONSORTIUM. 19 As a
matter of fact, there cannot be found in the contract any reference to the MP
CONSORTIUM or any member thereof for that matter. 20 For another, the
agreements among the alleged members of MP CONSORTIUM do not show the
existence of a joint-venture agreement. Worse, MPEI cannot produce the
agreement as to the "joint and several liability" of the alleged members of the
MP CONSORTIUM as required by this Court in its Resolution dated October 7,
2003.
What is apparent from the four (4) agreements I gathered is the existence of
either a "contractor-subcontractor" or "buyer-supplier" relationship between MPEI
on the one hand and the alleged members of the MP CONSORTIUM. There was
no assumption of a "joint and several liability" over the entire Project of the
COMELEC nor an intention to enter directly into a contract with COMELEC.
In the "Memorandum of Agreement" between MPEI and WeSolv, the latter only
agreed to be one of its suppliers. Contrary to MPEI's asseveration that it was MP
CONSORTIUM which bid for the project, the Memorandum clearly states that
MPEI "will undertake negotiations with the COMELEC for the purpose of finalizing
the contract for the said Project in the event that it [MPEI] is declared as the
winning bidder and the Project is awarded in its [MPEI] favor." As if to emphasize
the absence of "joint and several liability" over the entire Project, the
Memorandum expressly provides that WeSolv shall be jointly and severally liable
with MPEI "only for the particular products and/or services supplied by the
former for the Project" and that "in the event that they failed to agree on the
terms and conditions of the supply of the products and services including but not
limited to the scope of the products and services to be supplied and payment
terms, WeSolv shall cease to be bound by its obligations." The same provisions
are to be found in the "Memorandum of Agreement" between MPEI and SK C &
C. 21
The "Teaming Agreement" between MPEI and Election.Com 22 also negates
MPEI's assertion that it was MP CONSORTIUM that bid for the Project. Here, MPEI
is singled out as the one who intended to submit a proposal to the COMELEC.
Under the Teaming Agreement, MPEI "has identified the subcontractor
[Election.Com] as one of its suppliers." It was stipulated therein that "the parties
shall each be individually liable for any penalties or liabilities incurred by them in
connection with the Project, if it can be shown that the said penalties or
liabilities are a direct result of errors in data or, non-performance of products
and/or services supplied." The same limitation on liability is present in the
"Teaming Agreement" between MPEI and ePLDT. 23
Surely, it is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC to award a
billion worth of contract to an entity whose existence and eligibility is highly
questionable. It risks the accomplishment of a great undertaking such as the
automation of our country's election system. From a brief survey of the four (4)
agreements, I am convinced that the COMELEC, and ultimately the people, stand
on the losing end should the Project fail because of the obvious difficulty in
determining where the culpability lies.
It bears reiterating for the consumption of our public officers that in the exercise
of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the legality,
propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a
high degree of caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-
advised or improvident action. 24 Prudence should be their primordial virtue.
Thus, even though they have broad discretion to determine the qualifications of
the bidders, it may not act arbitrarily and they must conform to statutory
requirements governing the awarding of public contracts. 25 Reason must govern
the acts of such officials, and courts will not hesitate to interfere when it is
clearly made to appear that they have acted arbitrarily, dishonestly or beyond
the reasonable limits of the discretion conferred upon them.
Another arbitrary act of the COMELEC is its awarding of the contract to MPEI
despite the fact that it failed in some of the technical requirements.
"Below is a comparative presentation of the requirements wherein Mega-
Pacific or TIM or both of them failed.
KEY REQUIREMENTS BIDDER/S THAT FAILED
Does the machine have an
accuracy rating of at least
99.995 percent? (Item No. 1,
Table 6, DOST Report)
At normal environment Mega TIM

At harsh environment Mega
Uninterruptible back-up power
system, that will engage
immediately to allow operation of
at least 10 minutes after outrage,
power surge or abnormal
electrical occurrences? (Item No. TIM
4, Table 6, DOST Report)
Machines read two sided ballots TIM*
in one pass? (Item No. 5,
Machine can detect previously
counted ballots and prevent
previously counted ballots from TIM
being counted more than once?
(Item No. 6, Table 6, DOST
Report)
Store results of counted votes by
precinct in external (removable) TIM
storage device? (Item No. 7,
Data stored in external media is TIM
encrypted? (Item No. 8, Table 6,
DOST Report)
CPU speed is at least 400 mHz? TIM
Report)
Generates printouts of the
election returns in a format
specified by the Comelec?
(Item No. 12, Table 6, DOST Mega TIM
Report)
Generates an audit trail of the
counting machine, both hard and
soft copy? (Item No. 14, Table 6,
DOST Report) TIM*
Soft copy
Does the city/municipal
canvassing system consolidates
results from all precincts within it
using the encrypted soft copy of
the data generated by the
counting machine and stored on
the removable data storage
device? (Item No. 15, Table 6, TIM*
DOST Report)
Does the city/municipality
canvassing system consolidate TIM*
results from all precincts within
it using the encrypted soft copy
of the data generated by
transmitted through an
electronic transmission media? Mega
Report)
Note: No facilities/resources
available to test the transmission
of data through electronic means.
Does the system output a Zero

City/Municipal Canvass Report, TIM*
which is printed on election day
prior to the conduct of the actual
canvass operation, that shows
that all totals for all the votes for
all the candidates and other
information are indeed zero or
null? (Item No. 17, Table 6, DOST
Report)
Does the system consolidate
results from all precincts in the
city/municipality using the data TIM*
storage device coming from the
counting machine? (Item No. 18,
Is the machine 100% accurate?
(Item No. 19, Table 6, DOST TIM*
Report)
Is the Program able to detect
previously downloaded
precinct results and prevent
these from being inputted again Mega Mega
into the System? (Item No. 20,
The System is able to print the
specified reports and the audit
trail without any loss of data
during generation of the
abovementioned reports? (Item
No. 21, Table 6, DOST Report)
Print specified reports
Audit trail Mega TIM*
(Note: Audit TIM*
trail not yet
incorporated)
Can the result of the

city/municipal consolidation be
stored in a data storage device? TIM*
Report)
Does the System consolidate

results from all precincts in the
provincial/district/national using
the data storage device from
different levels of consolidation?
Report) TIM*
Is the System 100% accurate?

Report)
Is the Program able to detect

previously downloaded precinct
results and prevent these from
being imported again into the
System? (Item No. 25, Table 6,
DOST Report)
The System is able to print the
specified reports and the audit
trail without any loss of data
during generation of the
abovementioned reports? (Item
No. 26, Table 6, DOST Report)
Print specified reports?

Audit trail? TIM*
Mega TIM*
(Audit trail not
yet incorporated)
Can the results of the provincial/

district/national consolidation be
stored in a data storage device? TIM*
Report)
Notwithstanding the above failed marks the COMELEC still awarded the contract
to MPEI. This is highly irregular. The above requirements where MPEI failed
cannot be considered as insubstantial. They have a bearing on the required
features of the automated election system under Section 7 of R.A. No. 8436, such
as (1) use of appropriate ballots, (2) stand-alone machine which can count votes
and an automated system which can consolidate the results immediately, (c)
with provisions for audit trails, (d) minimum human intervention, and (e)
adequate safeguard/security measures.
COMELEC's stance that it can waive certain requirements is misplaced in the
present case because what it waives are those which concerns the integrity and
accuracy of the ACM and thus, affect the substance and the validity of the bids.
Statutory or regulatory mandatory requirements with respect to bidding on
public contracts cannot be waived. Presidential Decree No. 1594, 26 for one,
expressly states that the Government, in the evaluation of bid received,
"reserves the right to waive the consideration of minor deviations in the bids
received which do not affect the substance and validity of the bids." Thus, while a
reservation in the advertisement of the right to reject any bid generally vests in
the authorities a wide discretion as to who is the best and most advantageous
bidder, however, it may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award. 27 Should
this be the case, judicial interference would be justified.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the Petition. COMELEC Resolution No. 6074 is
declared NULL and VOID.
TINGA, J., dissenting:
Prologue
Once again, the Court availing of its extraordinary powers or so-called "certiorari"
jurisdiction has struck down a government contract, sealed no less by the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the exercise of its
administrative powers granted by the Constitution in relation to the conduct of
elections. Apparently, the Court has opted to trudge the trail it blazed recently in
the Amari 1 and PIATCO 2 cases. Amari voided the Manila Bay reclamation project
on constitutional grounds 3 a n d PIATCO struck down the NAIA Terminal III
contract for violations of the Constitution 4 and some other laws 5 to boot.
But in this case, no constitutional provision or letter of a statute was alleged to
have been violated. The Court nullified the contract for an automated election
system ("AES") simply on the ground that in making the award the COMELEC
has allegedly violated its bidding rules and an unfounded apprehension that the
counting machines would not work on election day. On the other hand, not one
of the losing bidders has joined the petition, as neither they nor the petitioners
questioned the fairness of the price tag for the machines.
The year 2004 could have well been marked in the annals of the Philippines by
the maiden use of the automated election. But the country was deprived of the
golden chance to join the growing roster of states with modern election systems
which include developing countries such as Kenya, Mali, Zambia, Romania,
Albania, Mexico and Argentina because of the Decision of the Court.
In the process, the Court has disregarded the fundamental postulates by which
this case should have been decided. They are the following:
First. The instant original petition is one for prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without
or in excess of the respondent's jurisdiction or are attended with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 6
Mandamus, on the other hand, is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or when the respondent excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 7
Second. In deciding the instant case, the Court shall consider only the undisputed
or admitted facts and resolve only the specific questions raised by the parties. 8
The Court is not a repository of remedies or a "super-legal-aid bureau." 9 We
cannot grant relief for every perceived violation of the law or worse, on the basis
of prophetic wisdom. Paraphrasing an old decision, Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter
wrote: "Judicial power, however large, has an orbit more or less strictly defined
by well-recognized presuppositions regarding the kind of business that properly
belongs to courts. Their business is adjudication, not speculation. They are
concerned with actual, living controversies, and not abstract disputation." 10
Third. The Court does not, as indeed it cannot, guarantee the success of the
automation or the integrity of the coming elections. It is not the Court's function
t o actively ensure that the automation is successfully implemented or that the
elections are made free of fraud, violence, terrorism and other threats to the
sanctity of the ballot. This duty lies primarily with the COMELEC. 11

Fourth. The Court has constantly underscored the importance of giving the
COMELEC considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the objective for which it was created — to promote free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Thus, in the past we have
prudently declined to interfere with the COMELEC's exercise of its administrative
functions absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. 12 As luminously
stated in Sumulong v. COMELEC, 13 "[I]n the matter of the administration of the
laws relative to the conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of
election inspectors, we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the
Commission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this
court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used
sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases." 14
For the reasons I shall discuss hereunder, I find myself unable to subscribe to the
ponencia and join the ranks of my colleagues in the majority.
Let me first mention that at the opening part of the Decision, the Court opined
that there is grave abuse of discretion when the assailed act is contrary to
"jurisprudence." Yet, the 99-page Decision failed to mention a single Court
decision which the respondents have defied.
Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies
I agree with the respondents that the petitioners failed to exhaust, or better still
avail of, the administrative remedies outlined in R.A. 9184, as follows:
"SEC. 55. Protests on Decisions of the BAC. — Decisions of the BAC in all
stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the procuring
entity and shall be in writing. Decisions of the BAC may be protested by
filing a verified position paper and paying a non-refundable protest fee.
The amount of the protest fee and the periods during which the protests
may be filed and resolved shall be specified in the IRR.
SEC. 56. Resolution of Protests. — The protests shall be resolved strictly
on the basis of the records of the BAC. Up to a certain amount to be
specified in the IRR, the decisions of the Head of the Procuring Entity
shall be final.
SEC. 57. Non-interruption of the Bidding Process. — In no case shall any

protest taken from any decision treated in this Article stay or delay the
bidding process. Protests must first be resolved before any award is
made.
SEC. 58. Resort to Regular Courts; Certiorari. — Court action may be
resorted to only after the protests contemplated in this Article shall be
have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of the process
specified in this Article shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
regional trial court shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head
of the procuring entity. Court actions shall be governed by Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on the Supreme
Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and
injunctions relating to Infrastructure Projects of Government." [Emphasis
supplied]
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, at no time during the entire bidding
process did the petitioners question the determination of the COMELEC Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) finding Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) eligible to bid.
Under R.A. 9184, decisions of the BAC should be appealed to the COMELEC en
banc. Consequently, the determination of the BAC that MPC was eligible to bid,
adopted subsequently by the COMELEC, became final.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an
administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before the courts will act. No recourse can be had until all such
remedies have been exhausted and special civil actions against administrative
officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officers could grant
relief. 15 In Hon. Carale v. Hon. Abarintos, 16 the Court enunciated the reasons for
the doctrine, thus:
Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a sound practice and policy. It ensures an orderly procedure
which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to
matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency,
avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative agency by
withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its
course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to
them in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are
both legal and practical reasons for this principle. The administrative
process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions
to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
will not entertain the case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum.
Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also
pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention
in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort
to the court. 17 [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, under the Rules of Court, judicial review of administrative decisions

may be availed of only through special civil actions. Such proceedings cannot lie
if there is an appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 18
I n Paat vs. Court of Appeals, 19 the Court enumerated the instances when the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded:
. . . (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there
is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when
there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 20
The petitioners' allegations do not bring their case within the jurisprudentially
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is
noteworthy that the protest mechanism outlined in R.A. 9184, in allowing
protests of decisions of the BAC "in all stages of procurement," 21 reinforces and
even institutionalizes the exhaustion doctrine insofar as public bidding is
concerned. Hence, had petitioners intended to pursue the available
administrative remedies, they could have easily asked for a reconsideration the
moment the BAC determined MPC eligible to bid, failing which, they could have
filed a protest with the COMELEC en banc itself.
Petitioners did neither. Instead they sat in waiting until the final hour and now
insist that the Court disregard the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
on the puerile reason that there was no opportunity for the protest mechanism
instituted in R.A. 9184 to apply because the BAC rendered its report and
recommendation in open session on April 15, 2003, the same day and on the
same occasion that the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 6074
awarding the Contract to MPC.
The majority opinion posits that it would have been futile for petitioners to
protest/appeal the BAC report to the COMELEC chair since by the time they could
have made the move the COMELEC had already approved the report. Not
necessarily so. The petitioners could have, or better still, should have appealed
directly to the COMELEC en banc. After all, matters of this nature have to be
decided by the COMELEC as a collegial body. To state that the poll body would not
act on the appeal is to uncharitably state that it would disregard its duty to
respond as required by the Code of Ethical Conduct. 22 Thus, the Court's
statement that the COMELEC en banc made it impossible for petitioners to make
use of the administrative remedy is simply baseless.
Be it noted that the petitioners wasted nearly five (5) months from the time the
BAC Report was released on April 21, 2003 before they filed the instant Petition
on August 6, 2003. The significant time gap precludes the availability of the
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. Specifically, the petitioners cannot
successfully claim that to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would
be unreasonable, or that the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, or that judicial intervention has become urgent because of the
circumstances.
Considering the circumstances, it is my view that the premature invocation of
this Court's judicial power is fatal to the petitioners' cause of action.
MPC, the consortium, participated in the bidding
According to the Court, the first major concern which bears on the issue of grave
abuse of discretion relates to the identity and existence of the MPC as a bidder.
Petitioners claim that the real bidder was Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI). On
the other hand, the respondents insist that the bidder was MPC of which MPEI
was the lead member.
On record are the following documents:
1. Letter of MPEI's President, Willy Yu, dated March 7, 2003, which states:
March 7, 2003
BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE
Commission On Election
Intramuros, Manila
Sir:
In response to your Invitation to Bid for the COMELEC Modernization

Project corresponding to the various phases which are as follows:
Phase I : Voters Registration – Voters Validation System
Phase II : Vote Counting and Canvassing — Automated
Counting/Canvassing
Phase III : Transmission & Dissemination of Results — Electronic
Transmission/Consolidation & Dissemination of
Result
The following companies listed below have agreed to form a consortium
to bid for the said project;
Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.
Election.Com Ltd
EPLDT
SK C & C
WeSolv Open Computing, Inc. (Subsidiary of Fujitsu Phils. Inc.)
Oracle System (Philippines) Inc.
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) WILLY U. YU
President
MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.
(Lead Company/Proponent)
For: MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM

2. Agreements among the members of the consortium, namely:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement betw een M PEI and WeSolv Open Computing,
Inc. (WeSolv) dated March 5, 2003 and notarized on March 7, 2003;
(b) Memorandum of Agreement betw een MPEI and SK C&C Co. Ltd. (SK C&C)
dated March 9, 2003 and notarized on March 9, 2003;
(c) Teaming Agreement betw een M P E I and Election.Com Ltd. (Election.Com)
dated March 3, 2003 and notarized on March 9, 2003; and
(d) Agreement between MPEI and ePLDT dated March 3, 2003 and notarized on
March 9, 2003.
These documents all bear execution and notarization dates prior to the
submission by MPC of its bid documents on March 10, 2003.
Contrary to the Court's assessment, the fair assumption to make is that the
letter of MPEI's President on behalf of MPC and the agreements between MPEI
and the members of the consortium had already been submitted to the
COMELEC when the BAC evaluated the bids and the poll body acted upon the
BAC's recommendation and accordingly resolved to award the Contract to MPC.
On the basis of the bid documents submitted by MPEI on behalf MPC, including
the consortium agreements, the COMELEC awarded Phase II of the AES (Project)
t o M P C p e r Resolution No. 6074 dated April 15, 2003. The full text of the
Resolution reads, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. 6074

This pertains to the Award of the Contract for Phase II (Automated
Counting Machine) of Modernization Program of the Commission.
Two (2), out of the three, bidders passed the eligibility requirements,
namely:
1. MEGA Pacific Consortium

2. Total Information Management Corporation (TIM)
In consonance with the mandate of Republic Act No. 8436, the
Commission sought the assistance of Department of Science and
Technology in the technical evaluation on identified key requirements,
outlined in the Request for Proposal (RFP) and Section 7 of the aforecited
law, mainly covering various parameters pertaining to vote counting
accuracy, consolidation/canvassing accuracy, ballot counting speed,
security features (both hardware and software), and system reliability of
the Automated Counting Machines (ACMs).
Upon receipt of the test results on the ACMs provided by the two
prospective suppliers, the BAC proceeded with the evaluation of their
financial bids, and thereafter made a recommendation to the Commission
while the same was in session on 15 April 2003.
After a thorough deliberation on the matter, the Commission had solid
basis to award the project.
Earlier the Chairman was given authority by the Commission in Resolution
No. 5989 promulgated 27 March 2003 to award to the winning bidders
the three (3) phases of the modernization program. However,
considering the present discussion, with the members of the BAC in
attendance and recommending award of the project to Mega Pacific, the
Chairman have the matter passed upon by the Commission.
Meantime, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain submitted a memorandum
stated in this wise:
"xxx xxx xxx

With regard to the Automated Counting Machines award of the
contract, undersigned would have preferred to register his vote,
however, the BAC report which is the basis for the award, has not
yet been submitted to the Commissioners as of this writing.
At this juncture, undersigned would just like to inform the bank
that, in case of a vote, he will be voting on the basis of the results
of the first test participated by both bidders as called for under the
terms of the bid."
In view of the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to award Phase II of the Modernization Project of the
Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium, having been declared as the
bidder that submitted the lowest calculated responsive bid for the
Automated Counting Machines. [Emphasis supplied]
Yet, the Court disputes the authority of MPEI or its President to represent the
consortium.
In the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between M PE I a n d WeSolv dated
March 5, 2003, which was reproduced in the Decision, the following stipulations
are found:
2. Mega Pacific shall be responsible for any contract negotiations and
signing with the COMELEC and, subject to the latter's approval, agrees to
give WeSolv an opportunity to be present at meetings with the COMELEC
concerning WeSolv's portion of the Project.
3. WeSolv shall be jointly and severally liable with Mega Pacific only for the
particular products and/or services supplied by the former for the Project.
[Emphasis supplied]
The MOA between MPEI and SK C&C dated March 9, 2003, also reproduced in the
Decision, contains similar provisions:
2. Mega Pacific shall have full powers and authority to represent the
Consortium with the Comelec, and to enter and sign, for and in behalf of
its members any and all agreement/s which may be required in the
implementation of the Project.
3. Each of the individual members of the Consortium shall be jointly and
[Emphasis supplied]
It appears that the Court assumed that the documents which establish the
existence of the consortium were not with the COMELEC and it had no basis for
determining that the consortium had existence 23 during the bidding process
simply because the documents were not included in the "Eligibility
Requirements" folder it submitted to the Court on October 9, 2003. 24 With due
respect, let me state nothing is farther from the truth.
The Court required the submission of the documents bearing on the existence of
the consortium only after the oral arguments on October 7, 2003. The directive
is contained in the Court's Resolution of even date quoted below:
In open court, Atty. Lazaro, counsel for private respondent Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc., was DIRECTED by the Court to submit the following
documents, a day after the hearing:
(a) contract executed between consortium represented by Mega
Pacific eSolutions, Inc. and COMELEC;
(b) agreement among the consortium members;
(c) financial statements of the members of the consortium;
(d) agreement as to the joint and several liability of the members of
the consortium;
(e) status report of the Department of Science and Technology

(DOST) as to whether the machines are already free of the
eight (8) defects or failing marks it mentioned in a previous
report or if the software has been reprogrammed
successfully to eliminate the defects or failing marks.
Clearly, the directive was addressed to Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. So, it was he who
had to submit the documents and he did so on October 10, 2003. The COMELEC
was not required to submit any document. But since the DOST status report
which is among the documents mentioned in the Resolution was not in the
custody of MPEI, the COMELEC elected to submit it along with the "Eligibility
Requirements" folder.
Obviously to prop up the hypothesis that the COMELEC was unaware of the
consortium agreements during the bidding process, the majority picked on
Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr. and portions of his answers to the questions
asked of him during the oral arguments. Although he was evidently not the
Commissioner assigned to speak on behalf of the COMELEC but Commissioner
Resureccion Borra, Commissioner Tuason deferred to the Court and responded to
the questions as best as he could. To put the answers in context, I quote them in
full along with the questions.
JUSTICE QUISUMBING:
May I know if somebody from the Commission on Elections who knows
the elements of the so-called verbal agreement on solidary liability
of all the parties of this Mega Pacific, whatever it is?

Do you know anybody from the COMELEC who knows the elements of
this oral agreement if any?
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Yes, would Commissioner Borra be willing to help the Assistant Sol. Gen.?
ASG RAMOS:
Perhaps Commissioner Tuason could speak to this Court with regard to

that matter.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Commissioner Tuason.
Yes, Commissioner Tuazon would you be able to enlighten the Court on

the questions profounded (sic) by Justice Vitug and the request of
Justice Quisumbing?
COMMISSIONER TUASON:
Good morning, Your Honors, I am sorry for my attire (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
It is okay, we did not expect you really to argue but there seems to be
an orderly information for the enlightenment of the Court.
As far as I know, your Honor, I am not in-charge of the, I am not In-
charge of the phase 2, which is the Modernization Program, I am
here because I am in-charge of the Legal Department and I oversee
the legal activities of COMELEC.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Who is in-charge then?

Insofar as a written agreement among the members of the consortium
there is Your Honor, I was privy to the fact that when we were
having conferences with the legal counsel of the private respondent
there is indeed an agreement among the members of the
consortium. That is my personal knowledge, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
Writing or (interrupted)
In writing, Your Honor, because the so-called agreement amongst the
members of the consortium is of course an internal affair or an
internal matter between the members of the consortium. But I do, I
am aware of the fact that there is indeed a written agreement, Your
Honor. And I am sure that when the time that the counsel for the
private respondent will argue before this Honorable Court he will be
presenting the written agreement amongst the members of the
consortium.
JUSTICE VITUG:
Are you telling us that the COMELEC did not look into this matter?
I do think that they did, Your Honor, because I am not a member of the
BAC, I am not the Commissioner-in-charge of the Phase II but I am
aware that there is such agreement, Your Honor, which will be
presented today and I think that this was taken into consideration
(interrupted) 25
xxx xxx xxx
We did Your Honor because we asked the BAC on whether all these
documents including the joint venture agreement or consortium
agreement or agreement among the parties were taken into
consideration.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You took the word of the BAC?
Of course, your Honor, because they are the ones mandated at that
particular time, Your Honor, I did not personally.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
All right, did you also look at the joint and several undertaking of the
consortium members?
The condition under the request for proposal Your Honor is that
manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves
into a joint venture, a group of two or more manufacturers,
suppliers, and or distributors that intend to be jointly and severally
responsible or liable for a particular contract provided that Filipino
ownership is 60%.
In other words, it is not a mandatory requirement that they be jointly

and severally liable, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Now, That is interesting because you are contracting with a consortium
that does not by itself have an independent legal personality.
Yes, that is right, Your Honor. 26
The responses of Commissioner Tuason attest to the existence of the agreement

and in essence do not contradict the provisions thereof. So do the answers of
Atty. Lazaro, counsel for MPEI, who was queried quite extensively on the matter.
27
The consortium agreements were not submitted to the Court obviously because
the Petition did not raise any question about the joint and several undertaking of
the members of the consortium. It was only during the oral arguments that the
Court saw the need to secure copies of the documents. Thus, the Court issued the
Resolution of October 7, 2003.
All told, MPEI as lead member of MPC submitted as part of the bid documents not
only the letter dated March 7, 2003 but the following agreements, to wit:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and WeSolv dated March 5, 2003
and notarized on March 7, 2003;
(b) Memorandum of Agreement between MPEI and SK C&C dated March 9, 2003
and notarized on March 9, 2003;
(c) Teaming Agreement betw een MPEI an d Election.Com dated March 3, 2003
and notarized on March 9, 2003; and
(d) Agreement between MPEI and ePLDT dated March 3, 2003 and notarized on
March 9, 2003.
before the deadline for submission of bids. Any contrary conclusion is baseless
in fact and founded on pure conjecture.
The consortium agreements are sufficient
The majority opinion, nonetheless, insinuates that it is not sufficient that a joint
venture be formed, but that the members of the joint venture all bind
themselves jointly and severally liable for the performance of the Contract. It
asserts that there was no joint venture agreement, much less a joint and several
undertaking, among the members of the alleged consortium. Thus, the BAC
should not have found MPC eligible to bid.
I cannot subscribe to this position. The RFP specifically defines a joint venture as
a group of two (2) or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that
intend to be jointly and severally responsible or liable for the contract. 28
Nowhere in the RFP is it required that the members of the joint venture execute
a single written agreement to prove the existence of a joint venture. Indeed, the
intention to be jointly and severally liable may be evidenced not only by a single
joint venture agreement but by supplementary documents executed by the
parties signifying such intention.
As the respondents pointed out, separate agreements were entered into by and
between MPEI on the one hand and WeSolv, SK C&C, Election.Com, and ePLDT
on the other. The Memorandum of Agreement 29 between MPEI and WeSolv and
MPEI and SK C&C set forth the joint and several undertakings among the parties.
On the other hand, the Teaming Agreements 30 between MPEI and Election.Com
and MPEI an d ePLDT clarified their respective roles with regard to the Project,
with MPEI being the "independent contractor" and Election.Com and ePLDT the
"subcontractors".
The ponencia mistakenly attributes to the respondents the argument that the
phrase "particular contract" in the RFP should be taken to mean that all the
members of the joint venture need not be solidarily liable for the entire project, it
being sufficient that the lead company and the member in charge of a "particular
contract" or aspect of the joint venture agree to be solidarily liable. Nowhere in
any of the respondents' pleadings was this argument ever raised. If it was,
inestimable gain goes to the respondents because this contention is ultimately
logical and coherent.
The RFP itself lays down the organizational structure of the joint venture and the
liability dynamics of the members thereof. It reads:
"d. Manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors forming themselves into
a joint venture, i.e., a group of two (2) or more manufacturers, suppliers
and/or distributors that intend to be jointly and severally responsible or
reliable for a particular contract, provided that Filipino ownership thereof
shall be at least sixty percent (60%)." 31 [Emphasis supplied]
So, the RFP adverts to "particular contract." It does not speak of "entire Project"
or "joint venture," from which the phrase "particular contract" should be
distinguished. The clear signification is that all the members of the joint venture
need not be solidarily liable for the entire Project or joint venture; it is sufficient
that the lead company and the member in charge of a particular contract or
aspect of the joint venture agree to be solidarily liable.
In any case, the Contract 32 incorporates all documents executed by the
consortium members even if the same are not referred to therein. It provides:
"1.4 Contract Documents
The following documents referred to collectively as the Contract
Documents, are hereby incorporated and made integral parts of the
Contract:
(1) this Contract together with its Appendices;
(2) the Request for Proposal (also known as 'Terms of Reference')
issued by the Comelec including the Tender Inquiries and Bid
Bulletins;
(3) Tender Proposal submitted by Mega.
All Contract Documents shall form part of the Contract even if they or
any one of them is (sic) not referred to or mentioned in the Contract as
one although not shown in the other shall be considered contained in all,
and what is required by any one shall be as binding as if required by all,
unless one item is a correction of the other.
The intent of the Contract Documents is the proper, satisfactory and
timely execution and completion of the Project, in accordance with the
included in the Contract." 33 [Emphasis supplied]
Clearly, whatever perceived deficiencies there are in the supplementary
contracts entered into by M PEI and the other members of the consortium as
regards their joint and several undertaking were cured, or better still prevented
from arising, by the above-quoted provisions from which it can be immediately
established that each of the members of M PC is solidarily liable with the lead
company, MPEI, albeit only for the particular contract or aspect of the joint
venture of which it is in charge.
Moreover, the Contract provides several options which the COMELEC may take in
case of MPC's breach or non-performance of the material terms thereof. It
provides:
"12.5. In the event of termination of this Contract pursuant to Article 12.2
hereof, COMELEC may exercise any or all of the following remedies:
12.5.1 Procure the facilities from another supplier, charging the
amount over an (sic) above the contract price stipulated in this
Contract, if any, to the account of MEGA;
12.5.2 Impose penalty for late delivery at the rate of 1/10 of 1%
(0.001) for everyday of delay of the total value of the undelivered
item(s);
12.5.3 Terminate this Contract;
12.5.4 Execute on MEGA's Performance Security." 34
Significantly, MPEI posted a performance bond which amounts to 20% of the bid
offer 35 against which the COMELEC may execute in case of breach.
COMELEC is protected under the contract and the Civil Code
But the Court dismisses the respondents' use of the Contract as basis for the
enforcement of the claims of COMELEC against the consortium on the premise
that the Contract is between the COMELEC and MPEI, not MPC. 36 That is so
because MPEI, as lead member of the consortium, is empowered by WeSolv
a n d SK C&C, which along with M P E I itself, represent 90% of the total
consortium interest, to represent them. This is clear from the stipulations in
their MOAs. 37 Thus, as the Contract was executed by MPEI as the authorized
representative of the key members of the MPC, it is the same as if MPC itself
was the named party thereto.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the absence of a single formal joint venture
agreement among all the members of the joint venture does not preclude the
COMELEC from enforcing their liability in case of breach. In any event, the
COMELEC may still enforce the liability of the consortium members under the
general provisions of the Civil Code on partnership as correctly pointed out by
the OSG in its Memorandum, 38 thus:
"Respondent COMELEC is not and will not be precluded from asserting
the solidary liability of all consortium members who represented
themselves to be such. In the absence of a joint venture agreement, and
in cadence with [the] rule on partnership that a partner is considered as
the agent of his co-partners and of the partnership in respect of all
partnership transactions (Article 1803, Civil Code), private respondent's
members acted as agents of each other and are as such solidarily bound
by their own and the other members' undertaking. Further, the rule is
that when a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct,
represents himself, or consents to another representing him to anyone,
as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more persons not
actual partners, he is liable to any such persons to whom such
representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such
representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if
[he] has made such representation or consented to its being made in a
public manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has
or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit
by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the
representation or consenting to its being made. When a partnership
liability results, he is liable as though he was an actual member of the
partnership. (Article 1825, Civil Code)"
It should be recalled that MPEI, SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.Com and ePLDT

represented themselves and/or allowed themselves to be represented as
partners and members of MPC for purposes of bidding for the Project. They are,
therefore, liable to the COMELEC to the extent that the latter relied upon such
representation. 39 Their liability as partners is solidary with respect to everything
chargeable to the partnership under certain conditions. The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting
in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the
authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not
being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so acting
or omitting to act.
Art. 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss:

(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent
authority receives money or property of a third person and
misapplies it; and
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives
money or property of a third person and the money or
property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in
the custody of the partnership.
Art. 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for
everything chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823."
[Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the solidary liability of the members of the consortium is inescapable,

whether by the language of their own contracts inter se or the provisions of the
Civil Code.
The consortium is eligible
The ponencia further echoes the petitioners' objection to the BAC's conclusion,
fi ndi n g M P C eligible to bid notwithstanding the absence of some financial
documents of its member corporations, particularly MPEI which was incorporated
only on February 27, 2003.
Under the RFP, the bidder shall furnish, as part of its bid, an eligibility envelope,
consisting of legal, technical and financial documents, which should establish the
bidder's eligibility to bid and its qualifications to perform the Contract if its bid is
accepted. The documentary evidence of the bidder's eligibility to bid shall
establish to the BAC's satisfaction that the bidder, at the time of submission of
its bid, is eligible to bid. 40 The eligibility envelope shall include the bidder's legal,
technical and financial documents, viz:
"(a) Legal Documents which shall include:
(1) Articles of Incorporation issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Business Registration, current licenses and
permits, DTI Certificate of Registration, Mayor's Permit, or by
appropriate government agencies and VAT certification, if
applicable;
(2) Approval of the Board of Directors for the Bidder to participate
and enter into a contract with the COMELEC;
(3) Waiver of execution by its President under the authority of its
Board that it is submitting to the jurisdiction of the Philippine
government and thereby waives its right to question the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts;
(4) Waiver executed by the President under the authority of its
Board, to seek and obtain writ of injunctions (sic) or
prohibition or restraining order against Purchaser to prevent
and restrain the bidding procedures related thereto, the
holding of bidding and any procedure related thereto, the
negotiating and award of a contract to a successful bidder,
and the carrying out of the awarded contract;
(5) Certificate issued by bidder's duly authorized representative
that, it has no record of suspension and that it is not
presently suspended nor blacklisted by any Philippine
government agency or by any international institution,
whether in its individual capacity or as a member of a Joint
Venture/Consortium;
(6) Certificate that the Bidder is licensed by the Bidder's country to
export the goods to be supplied under the contract.
(b) Technical Documents which shall contain documentary evidence to
establish to the BAC's satisfaction the Bidder's technical and
production capabilities necessary to perform the Contract. It shall
include:
(1) Single sale/lease transaction with a contract value of at least
ONE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (Php100,000,000.00) for
same and similar type of equipment for the last three (3)
years. Bidder shall be required to submit contracts and/or
certificate/s of acceptance by the concerned Purchaser
indicating therein the contract value;
(2) ISO 9000 Certificate or its equivalent;

(3) Literature and brochures describing the equipment, the
manufacturer's factory, manufacturing facilities, products
and service centers;
(4) Certification from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or
similar government agency of the country of origin that the
product meets the environment protection requirements
therein;
(5) Certificate that if awarded the project, Bidder will submit a
warranty for a minimum of two (2) years from date of
delivery for units found to be imperfect or damaged due to
factory defect.
(c) Financial Documents shall contain documentary evidence to establish
to the BAC's satisfaction the Bidder's financial capability. Such
evidence shall include:
(1) audited financial statements of the Bidder's firm for the last
three (3) calendar years, stamped "RECEIVED" by the
appropriate government agency, to show its capacity to
finance the manufacture and supply of Goods called for and
a statement or record of volume of sales;
(2) Balance Sheet;
(3) Income Statement; and
(4) Statement of Cash Flow.
The bidders shall be evaluated according to their liquidity, solvency and
stability. The company's current assets should be more than its current
liabilities. Its long term assets should be more than its long term liabilities.
The BAC may disqualify companies that are having financial difficulty and
thus, making its long term prospects dim. This will eventually affect their
ability to deliver and meet the requirements for the election automated
machines."
On the other hand, the Bid Envelope shall contain the technical specifications
and the bid price. 41
According to the documents it submitted to substantiate eligibility, M PEI was
incorporated only on February 27, 2003. Thus, it was not able to submit the
required financial documents, i.e., Audited Financial Statements for the last
three (3) years, Balance Sheet, Income Statement and Statement of Cash Flow.
However, the failure of MPEI to submit its financial documents due to its newly-
acquired corporate personality should not by itself disqualify MPC. It should be
pointed out that the purpose of the RFP in requiring the submission of the
financial documents of the bidder is to determine the financial soundness of the
latter and its capacity to perform the Contract if its bid is accepted. This purpose
may well be attained by examining the financial documents submitted by the
other members of the joint venture. In this regard, the respondents emphasized
that SK C&C, ePLDT an d WeSolv submitted the required financial documents.
Moreover, MPEI has a paid in capital of P300,000,000.00, an amount which is
substantially over and above the 10% equity based on the total project cost
required by the RFP. 42 Thus, I cannot subscribe to the majority's myopic
interpretation of the RFP that each of the members of MPC must comply with all
the requirements thereunder.
I n Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 43 we defined a joint venture as "an association of
persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally
all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community of interest in the
performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in
connection therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share
both in profit and losses." 44
The collective nature of the undertaking of the members of MPC, their
contribution of assets and sharing of risks, and the community of their interest in
the performance of the Contract all lead to the reasonable conclusion that their
collective qualifications should be the basis for evaluating their eligibility.
Practical wisdom dictates this to be so because the sheer enormity of the Project
renders it improbable to expect any single entity to be able to comply with all
the eligibility requirements and undertake the Project by itself. As emphasized by
the OSG, the RFP precisely allowed bids from manufacturers, suppliers and/or
distributors forming themselves into a joint venture in recognition of the virtual
impossibility that a single entity would be able to respond to the Invitation to
Bid.
Further, as pointed out by the COMELEC, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations ("IRR") of R.A. No. 6957, 45 as amended by R.A. No. 7718, 46 is
instructive since proponents of Build-Operate-Transfer projects usually form joint
ventures or consortiums. Under said IRR, "[A] joint venture/consortium
proponent shall be evaluated based on the individual or collective experience of
the member-firms of the joint venture/consortium and of the contractor(s) that it
has engaged for the project." 47
On another point, the RFP provides that the documentary evidence of the
bidder's qualifications to perform the contract if its bid is accepted shall establish
to the satisfaction of the BAC that in case a bidder offering to supply goods under
the contract did not manufacture or otherwise produce the goods itself, the
bidder must show that it is an established dealer of the goods for at least five (5)
years and shall produce documentary evidence to show that he has been duly
authorized by the goods' manufacturer or producer to supply the goods to the
Philippines. 48
The RFP also requires that the documents submitted shall show that the bidders
have the financial, technical and production capability necessary to perform the
contract. For this purpose, the primary technology proponent, i.e., the
manufacturer of the counting machine itself, and the creator of the consolidation
software, should have a minimum of five (5) years corporate existence in good
standing, whereas the members of the consortium providing ancillary services,
i.e., project management and human resources training, should show
documentary evidence that their services have been contracted for at least one
(1) political exercise with at least 20,000,000 voters and their companies have
been issued an ISO certification. Finally, the ACMs should have been used in at
least one (1) political exercise with no less than 20,000,000 voters. 49
The Comment 50 of the OSG and Memorandum 51 submitted by MPC detailed the
qualifications and track record of the members of MPC, viz: SK C&C, the primary
technology proponent and manufacturer of the ACMs, is a corporation in good
standing in South Korea since 1991. The ACMs have been used in two (2) Korean
national elections with more than 20,000,000 voters. Election.Com, which shall
be responsible for system integration, is a corporation in good standing in
Delaware, U.S.A. since 1991 and has experience with more than 400 elections in
the U.S.A. and Europe. WeSolv, which is responsible for the rollout, training and
maintenance functions of MPC, is a Philippine corporation in good standing since
1994. Oracle, which shall provide complete information solutions, is a Philippine
corporation in good standing since 1996. ePLDT, the provider of computer
security and encryption, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company. Finally, MPEI, which shall install and maintain the ACMs,
provide system integration services and project leadership, is a Philippine
corporation incorporated on February 27, 2003. Clearly, all these show that MPC
has the financial, technical and production capability necessary to perform the
Contract.
Noticeably, the petitioners failed to contest the qualifications of the members of

the consortium in any of their pleadings. The Decision, uncharacteristically silent
on this matter except for its general objection to the inability of MPEI to submit
some of the financial documents required by the RFP, seemingly concedes that
the members of the consortium are eligible and qualified to perform the
Contract.
In my opinion, these paper requirements should yield to the reality that,
collectively, the members of the consortium have furnished the COMELEC with
sufficient information to enable it to judiciously gauge MPC's eligibility and
qualifications. The strict and inflexible adherence to the bidding requirements by
each and every component of the consortium advanced by the petitioners would
negate the salutary purpose of R.A. 8436 and frustrate the long-anticipated
modernization of the electoral system.
Counting machines supplied by MPC meet the features prescribed by law
Unfortunately, the ponencia's nitpicking did not stop there. It asserts that MPC
failed the technical evaluation conducted by the DOST. Hence, the COMELEC
should have disqualified MPC.
It should be recalled that the COMELEC required prospective suppliers/bidders to
submit a certified accuracy rating for both the vote counting and consolidation
system from the DOST for each model of counting machine and canvassing
system that they intend to offer. The machine must be certified by the DOST that
it will operate properly and accurately under various working conditions. For this
purpose, the COMELEC identified key requirements for evaluation, namely: vote
counting accuracy, consolidation/canvassing accuracy, ballot counting speed,
security features for both the hardware and software, and system reliability. 52
In its Report, the BAC noted the results of the evaluation conducted by its
Technical Working Group (TWG) and by the DOST as follows:
"The BAC further noted that both Mega-Pacific and TIM obtained some
'failed marks' in the technical evaluation. In general, the 'failed marks' of
Total Information Management as enumerated above affect the counting
machine itself that are material in nature, constituting non-compliance to
(sic) the RFP. On the other hand, the 'failed marks' of Mega-Pacific are
mere formalities on certain documentary requirements, which the BAC
may waive, as clearly indicated in the Invitation to Bid.
In the DOST test, TIM obtained 12 failed marks mostly attributed to the
counting machine itself as stated earlier. These are requirements of the
RFP and therefore the BAC cannot disregard the same.
Mega-Pacific in 8 items however these are mostly on the software, which
can be corrected by reprogramming the software and therefore can be
readily corrected." 53 [Emphasis supplied]
Parenthetically, in his sponsorship remarks on R.A. No. 8436, 54 Rep. Abueg

underscored the salient features which must be found in the AES. He said:
"a. The system shall utilize appropriate technology for voting and
electronic devices for counting of votes and canvassing of results;
b. A stand-alone machine that is not hooked to any centralized computer

or other device through which data may be manipulated. The
machine will admit no data or input source other than from a valid,
official ballot. This feature is different from the computer networking
systems of banks, cellular phones, radios and from machines
employing other voting systems where keyboards and other
devices are used precisely to input data or modify that previously
inputted;
c. Utilizes visible light technology that allows the scanner to read marks
similar to the human eye;
d. Can read 150 ballots per minute and accepts only valid ballots;
e. Provides audit trail;
f. Entails minimal human intervention;
g. To get the result per precinct, the election officer presses one button
on the keypad and the precinct report is instantly generated.
Multiple copies of the results/report are also available;
h. Accumulation of totals in seconds — At the counting center, totals are
read in seconds, providing precincts detail reports, cumulative
reports, and the official canvass. Reports may be displayed in
monitors or large screen TV for the media, candidates or general
public." 55
Accordingly, R.A. 8436 categorized into mandatory and optional the features
which the AES must contain, thus:
"Sec. 7. Features of the System. — The System shall utilize appropriate
technology for voting, and electronic devices for counting of votes and
canvassing of results. For this purpose, the Commission shall acquire
automated counting machines, computer equipment, devices and
materials and adopt new forms and printing materials. The System shall
contain the following features: (a) use of appropriate ballots, (b) stand-
alone machine which can count votes and an automated system which
can consolidate the results immediately, (c) with provisions for audit trails,
(d) minimum human intervention and (e) adequate safeguard/security
measures. In addition, the System shall as far as practicable have the
following features:
1. It must be user-friendly and need not require computer-literate
operators;
2. The machine security must be built-in and multi-layer existent on
hardware and software with minimum human intervention using
latest technology like encrypted coding system;
3. The security key control must be embedded inside the machine sealed
against human intervention;
4. The Optical Mark Reader (OMR) must have a built-in printer for
numbering the counted ballots and also for printing the individual
precinct number on the counted ballots;
5. The ballot paper for the OMR counting machine must be of the quality
that passed the international standard like ISO-1831, JIS-X 9004 or
its equivalent for optical character recognition;
6. The ballot feeder must be automatic;
7. The machine must be able to count from 100 to 150 ballots per
minute;
8. The counting machine must be able to detect fake or counterfeit ballots
and must have a fake ballot rejector;
9. The counting machine must be able to detect and reject previously
counted ballots to prevent duplication;
10. The counting machine must have the capability to recognize the
ballot's individual precinct and city or municipality before counting
or consolidating the votes;
11. The System must have a printer that has the capacity to print in one
stroke or operation seven (7) copies (original plus six (6) copies) of
the consolidated reports on carbonless paper;
12. The printer must have at least 128 kilobytes of Random Access
Memory (RAM) to facilitate the expeditious processing of the
printing of the consolidated reports;
13. The machine must have a built-in floppy disk drive in order to save the
processed data on a diskette;
14. The machine must also have a built-in hard disk to store the counted
and consolidated data for future printout and verification;
15. The machine must be temperature-resistant and rust-proof;
16. The optical lens of the OMR must have a self-cleaning device;
17. The machine must not be capable of being connected to external
computer peripherals for the process of vote consolidation;
18. The machine must have an Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS);
19. The machine must be accompanied with operating manuals that will
guide the personnel of the Commission on the proper use and
maintenance of the machine;
20. It must be so designed and built that add-ons may immediately be
incorporated into the System at minimum expense;
21. It must provide the shortest time needed to complete the counting of
votes and canvassing of the results of the election;
22. The machine must be able to generate consolidated reports like the
election return, statement of votes and certificate of votes at
different levels; and
23. The accuracy of the count must be guaranteed, the margin of error
must be disclosed and backed by warranty under such terms and
conditions as may be determined by the Commission. . . ."
[Emphasis supplied]
It is well to note that all the 1,991 ACMs supplied by MPC under the Contract
were found to have satisfied the mandatory requirements of the AES, to wit: (a)
use of appropriate ballots, (b) stand-alone machine 56 which can count votes and
an automated system which can consolidate the results immediately, (c) with
provisions for audit trails, (d) minimum human intervention and (e) adequate
safeguard/security measures. As stated in the BAC Report, the failed marks of
MPC were mere formalities in certain documentary requirements. Further, these
failed marks were attributable to the software which can be readily corrected by
reprogramming. The failed marks, therefore, were not material in nature and
were, at worst, mere optional features of the System. 57 The RFP clearly
authorizes the BAC to waive any informality, non-conformity or irregularity in a
bid which does not constitute a material deviation, provided that such waiver
does not prejudice or affect the relative ranking of any bidder. 58
As regards the issue relating to the accuracy rating of 99.9995% mandated for
the counting machine by the RFP, right off I observe that the petitioners made
pronounced changes in their position at every turn. In the Petition, they simply
alleged that the COMELEC had erred when it "failed to declare a failed bidding
and to conduct a re-bidding of the project despite the failure of the bidders to
pass the technical tests," including the test on the accuracy rating of the
machine. 59 At the oral arguments, however, they claimed that the COMELEC had
"waived the accuracy requirement." 60 Finally, in their Memorandum they
accused the poll body of having "changed the accuracy criteria from 99.9995
percent to only 99.995 percent." 61
However, there is no competent evidence on record that the COMELEC had
waived or changed the prescribed accuracy rating. In fact, in the Contract
between COMELEC and MPEI, the same accuracy rating of 99.9995 percent was
required. Also in the letter dated October 24, 2003 of DOST, it clarified its Report
62 stating that upon further verification, it found that "except for 1 ACM (with an
accuracy rating of 99.998%), all of the 456 machines (including the retested 9
units) that were tested by the DOST (as of October 20, 2003) have an accuracy
rating of 100% provided that the ballots are shaded correctly and fed into the
ACMs following the right orientation." 63 Notably, the DOST Report itself states
that the machines are 100% accurate. 64 This official evaluation has mooted the
petitioners' challenge and rendered the pursuit thereof an inconsequential
exercise.
Harping on the requirement for audit trail, the ponencia proceeds to conclude
that the ACMs are deficient because of their alleged inability to print the audit
trail.
It should be emphasized that Table 6 of the DOST Report 65 shows that the tested
ACM of MPC generates audit trails which reflect the exact date and time of the
start and end of counting of ballots per precinct. 66 The ACM was also able to
generate hard and soft copies of the audit trail of the counting machine, with
hard copies generated regularly. 67 Moreover, R.A. 8436 itself merely requires
that the AES shall have "provisions for audit trail," which the ACM, as tested, has
complied with.
Anent the inability of the machine to detect previously downloaded data and
prevent these from being inputted again into the system, suffice it to state that
this is neither a mandatory nor an optional feature of the AES under R.A. 8436.
In any case, it is deemed satisfied with DOST's final favorable evaluation.
In compliance with the Resolution dated December 9, 2003, the COMELEC filed
i t s Partial Compliance and Manifestation dated December 24, 2003 informing
the Court that 1,991 units of ACMs have already been delivered to the
Commission. Of these, a total of P849,167,697.41, corresponding to 1,973 ACMs
which have passed DOST testing, has been paid to MPC.
The misgivings regarding the alleged deficiencies in the software are largely
explained by the Commission in their Partial Compliance and Manifestation.
According to the Commission, the Project involved the development of three (3)
types of software for use during the evaluation of technical bids, testing and
acceptance procedures and on election day.
For purposes of the evaluation of technical bids, the bidders were asked to
develop a "base" software program that will enable the ACMs to function
properly. The base software is not the actual software to be used on election day.
Hence, the software defects were considered minor in nature, and accordingly,
waived.
On the other hand, for purposes of the technical and acceptance procedures, a
Testing and Acceptance Manual (Manual) was prepared by the Ad Hoc Technical
Evaluation Committee, which ensured compliance of the Manual with the Terms
of Reference approved by the COMELEC and the provisions of R.A. 8436. The
software used for the ACMs was reprogrammed to comply with the Manual. Upon
testing, the DOST certified that 1,973 units passed the technical and acceptance
procedures. 68
Anent the software to be used on election day, additional elements such as the
final certified list of candidates, project of precincts, official ballot design and
security features, and encryption, digital certificates and digital signatures have
to be integrated into the software. Understandably, because of the timeline
followed with regard to these additional elements, the software has not yet been
finalized. The ponencia, however, chooses to view these circumstances with
insularity. It even holds suspect the certifications issued by the DOST declaring
that the ACMs had passed the acceptance tests conducted by the Department.
It is not amiss to state at this juncture that these declarations should be accorded
full faith and credit there being no justification for a contrary stance. Reckoned
from the standpoint of the established legal presumptions of validity of official
acts and regularity in the performance of official duty, I find it unjustified to
speculate, as theponencia does, on the good or bad motives that impelled the
COMELEC to award the Contract to MPC.
Epilogue
In view of the foregoing, the majority's position that the COMELEC should have
conducted a re-bidding of the Project is plainly injudicious. The procedure is
warranted only if no bid is received or qualified as the lowest calculated and
responsive bid. It is not amiss to mention again that there were more than 50
bidders 69 for the Project, out of which MPC was qualified as the lowest calculated
and responsive bid. A re-bidding of the Project would not serve any further
purpose because the bidding had actually drawn the participation of as many
bidders as realistically possible and that considering the enormity of the Project,
a new bidding would not reasonably attract new bidders. There is therefore no
basis to conclude that there was a failure of bidding, and the contract should be
re-advertised and re-bid. 70 Remarkably besides, none of the losing bidders
questioned the process undertaken by the BAC. The logical conclusion is that the
losing bidders have conceded MPC's eligibility and qualifications and deferred to
the decision of the COMELEC to award the Contract to MPC.
It is also to the COMELEC's credit that its award of the Contract to M P C has
resulted in substantial savings for the government. The paramount objective of
public bidding is to ensure that the government obtains the lowest and best price
in the market. 71 This objective was undoubtedly attained by the award of the
Contract to MPC. As emphasized in the respondents' pleadings and in newspaper
advertisem ents, 72 MPC's bid covering nationwide automation was
P49,000,000.00 lower than that submitted by TIMC, with its coverage restricted
to Mindanao and the National Capital Region. 73
As stated at the outset, the Court has unfailingly stressed the importance of
giving the COMELEC considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of the objective for which it was created — to
promote free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections — and perforce
prudently declined to interfere with COMELEC's exercise of its administrative
functions absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. I see no justification
for the departure from this principle in the instant case.
Let it be noted that R.A. No. 8436 was precisely intended as an initial step
towards the modernization of the Philippine electoral system which seeks to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The COMELEC must
be given enough latitude to bring into fruition this laudable purpose.
All the challenges, whether factual or legal, to the acts of COMELEC, to my mind,
have been adequately explained and clarified.
The most crucial point raised against the respondents is the alleged non-
submission of the consortium agreements before the bidding deadline. The
ponencia adverted to it no less than five times. But the assertion which is one of
fact is debunked by the consortium agreements themselves which were
notarized not later than March 9, 2003, or before the bidding deadline. To ignore
the public character of the documents is to unfairly ascribe bad faith to
COMELEC.
As for the fact that MPEI was made the party to the Contract with COMELEC, this
was so simply because M PE I was authorized to sign in behalf of the other
consortium members.
Seemingly, the ultimate resolution of this case has narrowed down to the
question of which prognostication of the technical performance of the counting
machines on election day is accurate: That of the COMELEC's or this Court's? But
that would lead the Court to tread on unfamiliar waters. More fundamentally,
the question was not raised in the Petition.
In closing, I refer to the definition of "grave abuse of discretion" which the Court
made in Tañada v. Angara, 74 cited at the opening of the Decision: 75
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on the
part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the
dismissal of the petition.
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate,
whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress
and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are
presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions,
this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-
accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of
regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent
reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of
Article VII of the Constitution. 76
Like the Senate to which the Court graciously deferred in the cited ruling, I
respectfully submit, the COMELEC deserves the same degree of deferential
treatment given its status as a constitutional body. But quite lamentably, the
Decision would bring disrepute to and even cause havoc on the COMELEC as an
institution. It will never be the same.
I therefore vote to dismiss the instant Petition.
Footnotes
1. Republic v. Cocofed, 372 SCRA 462, 493, December 14, 2001.
2. Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 79, May 2, 1997.
3. Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 and consolidated cases,
November 10, 2003, per Morales, J .
4. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 3-48. While petitioners labeled their pleading as one for prohibition
and mandamus, its allegations qualify it also as one for certiorari.
5. An act authorizing the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide

demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in the March
1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for
other purposes.
6. An act authorizing the Commission on Elections to use an automated election
system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent
national and local electoral exercises, providing funds therefor and for other
purposes.
7. Section 6 of RA 8436 provides "[i]f in spite of its diligent efforts to implement this
mandate in the exercise of this authority, it becomes evident by February 9,
1998 that the Commission cannot fully implement the automated election
system for national positions in the May 11, 1998 elections, the elections for
both national and local positions shall be done manually except in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where the automated election
system shall be used for all positions."
8. Loong v. Comelec, 365 Phil. 386, April 14, 1999; see also Panganiban, Leadership by
Example, 1999 ed., pp. 201-249.
9. Annex "7" of the Comment of Private Respondents MPC and MPEI, rollo, Vol. II, p.
638.
10. Annex "8" of the Comment of Private Respondents MPC and MPEI, rollo, Vol. II, pp.
641-642.
11. Annex "G" of the Petition, Request for Proposal, p. 12; rollo, Vol. I, p. 71.
12. Id., pp. 21-23 & 80-82.
13. According to Public Respondent Comelec's Memorandum prepared by the OSG, p.
8; rollo, Vol. IV, p. 2413.
14. Photocopy appended as Annex "B" of the Petition; rollo, Vol. I, pp. 52-53.
15. Photocopy appended as Annex "C" of the Petition; rollo, Vol. I, pp. 54-55.
16. The case was deemed submitted for decision on November 5, 2003, upon this
Court's receipt of Private Respondent MPC/MPEI's Memorandum, which was
signed by Attys. Alfredo V. Lazaro Jr., Juanito I. Velasco Jr. and Ma. Concepcion
V. Murillo of the Lazaro Law Firm. On October 27, 2003, the Court received
petitioners' Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Alvin Jose B. Felizardo of
Pastelero Law Office, and Public Respondent Comelec's Memorandum, signed
by Comelec Comm. Florentino A. Tuason Jr. Apart from these, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed another Memorandum on behalf of Comelec, also
on October 27, 2003, signed by Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega, Asst. Sol.
Gen. Renan E. Ramos, Sol. Jane E. Yu and Asso. Sol. Catherine Joy R. Mallari,
with a note that Sol. Gen. Alfredo L. Benipayo "inhibited himself." The writing of
the Decision in this case was initially raffled to Justice Dante O. Tinga. However,
during the Court's deliberations, the present ponente's then "Dissenting
Opinion" to the draft report of Justice Tinga was upheld by the majority. Hence,
the erstwhile Dissent was rewritten into this full ponencia.
17. Page 11; rollo, Vol. IV, p. 2390. During the Oral Argument on October 7, 2003, the
Court limited the issues to the following: (1) locus standi of petitioners; (2)
prematurity of the Petition because of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies for failure to avail of protest mechanisms; and (3) validity of the award
and the Contract being challenged in the Petition.
18. Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government , 360 Phil. 133, December
9, 1998, per Panganiban, J .
19. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, November 16, 1995, per Mendoza, J .
20. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy , 346 Phil. 321, November 5,
1997, per Puno, J .
21. Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation , 346 SCRA 485,
November 29, 2000, per Puno, J .
22. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra.
23. Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, January 22, 1980, per Melencio-Herrera, J.
24. Philconsa v. Mathay, 124 Phil. 890, October 4, 1966, per Reyes J.B.L., J .
25. Respondent Comelec's Memorandum, pp. 50-51.
26. The law obliges no one to perform the impossible.
27. See private respondents' Memorandum, p. 60.
28. Photocopy appended as Annex "B" of the petition.
29. 334 Phil. 146, January 10, 1997.
30. Id., p. 153, per Torres Jr., J .
31. Although by its Resolution 6074, Comelec awarded the bid to MPC, the actual
Contract was entered into by Comelec with MPEI. The Contract did not indicate
an exact date of execution (except that it was allegedly done on the "____ day
of May,") but it was apparently notarized on June 30, 2003.
32. In connection with this, public respondents, in their Memorandum made reference
to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
(the Build-Operate-Transfer Law), and considered said IRR as being applicable to
the instant case on a suppletory basis, pending the promulgation of
implementing rules for RA 9184 (the Government Procurement Act). For our
purposes, it is well worth noting that Sec. 5.4 of the IRR for RA 6957 as
amended, speaks of prequalification requirements for project proponents, and
in sub-section (b)(i), it provides that, for purposes of evaluating a joint venture
or consortium, it shall submit as part of its prequalification statement a business
plan which shall among others identify its members and its contractor(s), and
the description of the respective roles said members and contractors shall play
or undertake in the project. If undecided on a specific contractor, the
proponent may submit a short list of contractors from among which it will
select the final contractor. Short listed contractors are required to submit a
statement indicating willingness to participate in the project and capacity to
undertake the requirements of the project. The business plan shall disclose
which of the members of the joint venture/consortium shall be the lead
member, the financing arm, and/or facility operator(s), and the contractor(s). In
other words, since public respondents argue that the IRR of RA 6957 as
amended would be suppletorily applicable to this bidding, they could not have
been unaware of the requirement under Sec. 5.4 (b)(i) thereof, in respect of
submission of the requisite business plan by a joint venture or consortium
participating in a bidding.
33. Now, what would prevent an enterprising individual from obtaining copies of the
Articles of Incorporation and financial statements of, let us say, San Miguel
Corporation and Ayala Corporation from the SEC, and using these to support
one's claim that these two giant conglomerates have formed a consortium with
one's own penny-ante company for the purpose of bidding for a multi-billion
peso contract? As far as Comelec is concerned, the answer seems to be:
Nothing.
34. TSN, October 7, 2003, p. 104.
35. Ibid.
36. Id., pp. 104-105.

37. Id., pp. 103-108.
38. Id., pp. 108-114.
39. Id., pp. 142-145.
40. On pp. 42-43 of the Memorandum of public respondents, filed with this Court on
October 27, 2003, Comm. Tuason himself signed this pleading in his capacity as
counsel of all the public respondents.
41. Copies of these four agreements were belatedly submitted to this Court by MPEI
through a Manifestation with Profuse Apologies filed on October 9, 2003.
42. Copies of the four separate bilateral agreements were submitted to the Court last
October 9, 2003.
43. The date was carelessly stated as "____ May, 2003."
44. At p. 38.
45. During the Oral Argument, counsel for public respondents admitted that Comelec
was aware that not all the members of the "consortium" had agreed to be jointly
and solidarily liable with MPEI.
46. 232 SCRA 110, 144, May 5, 1994, per Davide Jr., J . (now CJ).
47. Culled from table 6, DOST Report; rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1059-1072.
48. Annex "I" of the Petition, Vol. I, pp. 116-118.
49. Source code is the program instructions in their original form. Initially, a
programmer writes a computer program in a particular programming language.
This form of the program is called the source program, or more generically,
source code. To execute the program, however, the programmer must
translate it into machine language, the language that the computer
understands. Source code is the only format that is readable by humans. When
you purchase programs, you usually receive them in their machine-language
format. This means that you can execute them directly, but you cannot read or
modify them. Some software manufacturers provide source code, but this is
useful only if you are an experienced programmer.
50. The key passages of the Court's Resolution of December 9, 2003 were cited and
reproduced verbatim in the Comelec's Partial Compliance and Manifestation.
51. Metals Industry Research and Development Center (MIRDC) of the Department of
Science & Technology (DOST).
52. Photocopy of the MIRDC-DOST letter of Dec. 15, 2003 is attached as Annex "A" to
Respondent Comelec's Partial Compliance and Manifestation. However, the 11
Test Certifications of the DOST (covering 11 lots or 158 ACMs) which were
purportedly attached to this letter, have not been reproduced and submitted to
the Court, for reasons known only to respondents.
53. For example, one can conduct tests to see if certain machines will tip over and fall
on their sides when accidentally bumped, or if they have a tendency to collapse
under their own weight. A less frivolous example might be that of conducting
the same tests, but lowering the bar or passing mark.
54. In the December 15, 2003 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer is an item titled
'Digital 'dagdag-bawas': a nonpartisan issue" by Dean Jorge Bocobo, from which
the following passages appear:
"The Commission on Elections will use automated counting machines to tally paper
ballots in the May elections, and a telecommunications network to transmit the
results to headquarters, along with CDs of the data. Yet, with only five months
to go, the application software packages for that crucial democratic exercise —
several hundred thousand lines of obscure and opaque code — has not yet
even been delivered in its final form, Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos
admitted last week.
"My jaw dropped in amazement. Having built software for General Electric Co.'s
medical systems business and military aircraft engines division (in another
lifetime), I have learned the hard and painful way that 90 percent of unintended
fatal problems with complex software lies in the last 10 percent of the code
produced. From experience, I can assure you now with metaphysical certainty
that not even the people furiously writing that software know whether it will
actually work as intended on May 10, much less guarantee it. Simply put, the
proposed software-hardware combination has neither been tested completely
nor verified to comply with specifications."
55. Dated "____ May, 2003" but notarized on June 30, 2003.
VITUG, J.:
1. People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415.
2. Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633.
3 . People v. Chavez, 358 SCRA 810.
4 . Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals , 263 SCRA 490;
Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople, et al., 70 SCRA 139.
5. See Article VIII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring:
1. G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003.
2. See Loong v. Commission on Elections, 365 Phil. 386 (1999).
3. Separate Opinion, Vitug, J., at p. 2.
4. Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation v. Macaraig, 359 Phil. 831 (1998);
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 79538, 18
October 1990, 190 SCRA 673; Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 310
Phil. 549 (1995). See SEVERIANO S. TABIOS, Annotation on Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies as a Ground for Motion To Dismiss, 165 SCRA 352,
357-362 (1988).
5. Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , 352 Phil. 808 (1998); University
of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 338 Phil. 808 (1997).
6. Paat v. Court of Appeals , 334 Phil. 146 (1997).
7. Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, 5 February 1991, 193 SCRA 520;
Salinas v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114671, 24 November 1999, 319 SCRA 54; Samson v.
NLRC, 32 Phil. 135 (1996). See SEVERIANO S. TABIOS, Annotation on Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies as a Ground for Motion to Dismiss, 165 SCRA
352, 357-362 (1988).
8. Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA
533; Paat v. Court of Appeals , 334 Phil. 146 (1997).
9. Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat , G.R. No. L-29171, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA
19.
10. Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377 (1959).
11. De Lara v. Cloribel, 121 Phil. 1062 (1965).
12. Demaisip v. Court of Appeals , 106 Phil. 237 (1959).

13. Cipriano v. Marcelino, 150 Phil. 336 (1972).
14. Alzate v. Aldana, 107 Phil. 298 (1960).
15. Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. L-38962, 15 September 1986, 144 SCRA 116.
16. Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, 5 February 1991, 193 SCRA 520;
Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education (CHED), G.R.
No. 139371, 4 April 2001, 356 SCRA 367.
17. Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education (CHED), G.R. No.
139371, 4 April 2001, 356 SCRA 367, citing Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 222 SCRA 37, 47 (1993); Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA 211, 220 (1996);
Tan v. Court of Appeals , 275 SCRA 568, 574-575 (1997); and Tan Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 292 SCRA 452, 457-458 (1998).
18. RFP, at p. 12.
19. Sevilla v. Court of Appeals , G.R. Nos. L-41182-83, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 171.
20. G.R. No. 75875, 15 December 1989, 180 SCRA 130.

21. Rollo, p. 2355.
22. Id., p. 2364.
23. Id., pp. 2355 and 2364.
24. Id., pp. 2358 and 2367.
25. Id., pp. 2355 and 2364.
26. Id.
27. Id., p. 2348.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id., p. 2349.
31. Id., p. 2352.
32. Id.
33. Id., p. 2353.

34. "Automated Counting and Canvassing Project Contract", Rollo, at p. 2198.
35. Id., Appendix A, Rollo, at p. 2218.
36. Id., Appendix B, Rollo, at p. 2238.
37. Id., Appendix C, Rollo, at p. 2259.
38. Id., Appendix D, Rollo, at p. 2275.
39. Id., Appendix E, Rollo, at p. 2292.
40. Id., Appendix F, Rollo, at p. 2310.
41. Id., Appendix H, Rollo, at p. 2314. Appendix G, if any, is not part of the records.
42. Id., Appendix I, Rollo, at p. 2322.
43. Id., Appendix J, Rollo, at p. 2326.
44. Id., Appendix K, Rollo, at p. 2335.
45. Id., Appendix L, Rollo, at p. 2341.
46. Id., Appendix M, Rollo, at p. 2344.
47. Rollo, p. 1408.

48. Id., pp. 1870; 1954; 2052.
49. Lopez v. Piatco, G.R. No. 155661, 5 May 2003.
50. A. Cobacha & D. Lucenario, LAW ON PUBLIC BIDDING AND GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS 13 (1960).
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., concurring:
1. LIVY, History. Bk. XXXV , ch. 32.
2. Electronic Voting: What You Need To Know , William Rivers Pitt, Interview of David L.
Dill, a Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University. Monday, 20
October 2003.
3. An act authorizing the Commission on Elections to use an automated election
system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent
national and local electoral exercises, providing funds therefore and for other
purposes.
4. Section 7.
5. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had earlier issued Executive Order (EO) No. 172
on January 24, 2003, allocating P2,500,000,000.00 to fund the AES. To
augment this amount, the President issued EO No. 175 on February 10, 2003,
allocating an additional P500,000,000.00 for the Project. The COMELEC
reconfigured the modernization program into the three (3) phases mentioned
above and reallocated the budget as follows: (a) P1 Billion for Phase I; (2) P1.7
Billion for Phase II; and (3) P300 Million for Phase III.
6. Rollo at 124.
7. Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposal on Phase II.
8. Republic of the Philippines vs. Silerio, G.R. No. 108869, May 6, 1997, 272 SCRA 280,
citing Provident Tree Farms, Inc. vs. Batario, Jr., 231 SCRA 471 (1994); Lim, Sr.
v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 34 SCRA 751 (1970).
9. 50 SCRA 498-499 (1973).
10. Petition at 39.
11. G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 143.
12. G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 485.
13. Section 55. Protests on Decisions of the BAC
55.1 Decisions of the BAC with respect to the conduct of bidding may be protested
in writing to the head of the procuring entity; Provided, however, That a prior
motion for reconsideration should have been filed by the party concerned
within the reglementary periods specified in this IRR-A and the same has been
resolved. The protest must be resolved filed within seven (7) calendar days
from receipt by the party concerned of the resolution of the BAC denying its
motion for reconsideration. A protest may be made by filing a verified position
paper with the head of the procuring agency concerned, accompanied by the
payment of a non-refundable protest fee. The non-refundable protest fee shall
be in an amount equivalent to no less than one percent (1%) of the ABC.

14. An Act Providing for the Modernization, Standardization, and Regulation of the
Procurement Activities of the Government and for Other Purposes.
15. Section 58. Resort to Regular Courts: Certiorari.
58.1 Court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated in this
Rule shall have been completed, i.e., resolved by the head of the procuring
entity with finality. The regional trial court shall have jurisdiction over final
decisions of the head of the procuring entity. Court actions shall be governed
by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
16. G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002, 389 SCRA 353.
17. See Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001;
Dario vs. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 84; Fortich vs.
Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624.
18. Rollo, Vol. IV at 1784.
19. In open court, Atty. Lazaro, counsel for private respondent Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc. was directed by this Court to submit the following documents:
(a) contract executed between consortium represented by Mega Pacific eSolutions,
Inc. and COMELEC;
(b) agreement among the consortium members;
(c) financial statements of the members of the consortium;
(d) agreement as to the joint and several liability of the members of the consortium;
status report of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) as to
whether the machines are already free of the eight (8) defects or failing marks.
(Resolution dated October 7, 2003, Rollo, Vol. II at 1221-1222.)
20. Rollo, Vol. IV at 2198.
21. The MOA between MPEI and SK C & C was entered only on March 9, 2003.
22. Rollo, Vol. IV at 2355-2363.
23. Id. at 2364-2371.
24. Rivera vs. Maclang, G.R. No. L-15948, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 57.
25. 64 Am Jur 2d § 64.
26. Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government
Infrastructure Contracts; Promulgated June 11, 1978.
27. Fernandez, Jr., A Treatise on Government Contracts Under Philippine Law , 2001 at
30-31, citing Borromeo vs. City of Manila, 62 Phil. 512 (1960); Jalandoni vs.
NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 (1935); Filipinas Engineering vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-31455,
February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 25.
TINGA, J., dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002.
2. G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003.

3. Secs. 2 & 3, Art. XII, 1987 CONST.
4. Sections 17 & 19, Art. XII, 1987 CONST.
5. BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
6. Sec. 2.
7. Sec. 3.
8. For instance, issues covering Phase I (Voters' Registration and Validation System)
and Phase III (Electronic Transmission) which were raised in the media are not
before the Court.
9. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Uveges v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437.
10. Frankfurter, Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court Extra Judicial Essays on the
Court and the Constitution, 1970, p. 339, citing United States v. Ferreira, 1 How.
40 (1851).
11. E.g., the COMELEC has to promulgate new rules on casting of votes, appreciation,
counting and canvassing of ballots, conduct a voters' education program on
the automated system and train personnel who will operate the ACMs.
12. Cauton v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
13. 73 Phil. 288 (1942).
14. Id. at 295-296.
15. Gonzales, Administrative Law — A text , 1979, p. 137.
16. 336 Phil. 126 (1997).
17. Id. at 135-136.
18. Sec. 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

19. 334 Phil. 146, citations omitted.
20. Id. at 153.
21. Sec. 55.
22. Pars. (a) & (d) Sec. 5, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.
23. Decision, pp. 33 & 34.
24. Resolution, p. 3.
25. TSN, October 7, 2003, pp. 101-105.
26. TSN, October 7, 2003, pp. 144-146.
27. TSN, October 7, 2003, pp. 264-278.
28. Rollo, p. 71.
29. Id. at 2348-2351 and 2352-2354, respectively.
30. Id. at 2355-2363 and 2364-2373, respectively.
31. Id. at 71.

32. Id. at 2199-2217.
33. Id. at 2200.
34. Id. at 2212.

35. Id. at 72.
36. Decision, p. 44.
37. Supra, infra, p.15.
38. Supra, note 28 at 2427.
39. Art. 1825, Civil Code.
41. Id. at 76-79.
42. Id. at 72.
43. G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110.
44. Id. at 144.
45. "An Act Authorizing The Financing, Construction, Operation And Maintenance Of
Infrastructure Projects By The Private Sector And For Other Purposes." It is
otherwise known as the BOT Law.
46. "An Act Amending Certain Sections Of Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled "An Act
Authorizing The Financing, Construction, Operation And Maintenance Of
Infrastructure Projects By The Private Sector, And For Other Purposes."
47. Sec. 5.4, b (i).

49. Id. at 74-75.
50. Id. at 384-385.
51. Id. at 2598-2599.
52. Report on the Testing and Technical Evaluation of Automated Counting Machines
by the DOST, April 1-3, 2003, p. 1.
53. Supra, note 28 at 2431-2432.
54. Sponsorship Remarks of Rep. Abueg at the House of Representatives, May 20,
1997; TSN, pp. 7-8.
55. Id. at 10-11.

56. During the oral arguments, Com. Borra asserted that the ACMs are stand alone
machines in that they do not have inputs or outputs that enable them to be
networked. TSN, October 7, 2003, pp. 176-179.
58. Id. at 81.
59. Id. at 31-33.
60. TSN, October 7, 2003, p. 26.
62. Supra note 52.

63. Supra, note 28 at 2541-2542, letter from the Executive Director cum Chairman of
the DOST Technical Evaluation Committee, Mr. Rolando Viloria, addressed to
Com. Borra.
65. Id. at 1257.
66. Id. at 1258.
67. Id. at 1264.
68. The letter dated December 15, 2003 addressed to Com. Borra from Rolando T.
Viloria, Executive Director and Chairman of the DOST-Technical Evaluation
Committee states that the DOST tested a total of 1,991 ACMs. Of these, 18
units failed the test. Out of the 18 units, only one (1) unit failed the retest.
69. The Memorandum of the OSG (Rollo, p. 2428) states that there were more than
50 prospective bidders for the Project.

71. Cobacha and Lucenario, Law on Public Bidding and Government Contracts , 1960,
p. 7.
72. Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 20, 2003.
73. Supra, note 28 at 2503-2504.
74. G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18.

75. Decision, p. 2.
76. Supra, note 77 at 79-80.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 97149. March 31, 1992.]
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR. , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications; COMMODORE
ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; and
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Administrative Action Board, DOTC , respondents.
Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; NOT A

PENALTY IN ITSELF BUT A MERE MEASURE OF PRECAUTION. — The imposition of
preventive suspension on a government employee charged with an administrative offense
is subject to the provision of Section 41 of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807. Imposed
during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a
penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged
may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while
the same is being investigated.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. — Preventive
suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the
one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 857. While the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty
which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final
disposition of the case.
3. ID.; PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA); GENERAL MANAGER; WITH
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE AND DECIDE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST
ITS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES. — The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority
who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a
respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are
sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No.
807 granting heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees" in the PPA.
4. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; PERIOD LIMITED
TO NINETY (90) DAYS. — The period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted
even if the disciplining authority has not finally decided the administrative case provided
the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has been
exhausted. The employee concerned may then be reinstated.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD INTERRUPTED BY COURT PROCESSES. — However, the said
ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that any
fault, negligence or petition of a suspended employee may not be considered in the
computation of the said period. Thus, when a suspended employee obtains from a court of
justice a restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an
administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in the reckoning
of the permissible period of the preventive suspension.
6. ID.; ID.; ATTACHMENT; DEFINED. — "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38, Book IV,
Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, as to the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or coordination.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ATTACHED AGENCY HAS A LARGER MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE
FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED; WITH FREEDOM FROM
INTERFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER. — An attached agency has
a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one
which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is
borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency.
The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental
control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with
respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover,
the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and
control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department. Hence, the
inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached
agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and control. This is
more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857.
8. ID.; PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY; GENERAL MANAGER; POWER TO REMOVE
ERRING EMPLOYEES BELOW THE RANK OF ASSISTANT MANAGER, IMPLIEDLY GRANTED.
— Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an
administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the
law impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of
Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, ESSENTIAL. — During
such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee
concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. Only after gathering sufficient facts
may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the
latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL MAY BE MADE TO DEPARTMENT HEAD OR
SECRETARY OR DIRECTLY TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. — From an adverse
decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned
may elevate the matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal
directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department
Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807).
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSMITTAL OF COMPLAINT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
BOARD (AAB), PREMATURE. — It is clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA
General Manager to the AAB (Administrative Action Board) which was created during the
tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed
to act, decide and recommend to him "all cases of administrative malfeasance,
irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department," was premature.
12. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; NOT EXEMPT FROM THE
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. — Its special nature as a quasi-judicial
administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from the observance of due
process in its proceedings. We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents
protestation that petitioner waived his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be
observed that petitioner was precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction when it sought
judicial recourse.
DECISION
ROMERO , J : p
The instant-petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its Administrative
Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to
the said Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in
1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in
1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed
Terminal Supervisor. cdphil
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative
Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty,
grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously
assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA.
Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. After a preliminary
investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-
04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-
88, was filed against Beja by the PPA general manager also for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. The charge consisted of
six (6) different specifications of administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA
in the total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension
pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter,
the PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action." At the scheduled
hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the
charges against him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to
present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. 2 Two days later,
he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of Administrative
Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding
before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to file
before this Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v.
Hon. Reinerio O. Reyes, etc., al." In the en banc resolution of March 30, 1989, this Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for "appropriate action." 3 G.R. No. 87352 was
redocketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-
89. Its dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the following, namely:
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz are
exonerated from the charge against them;
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the service;

c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are declared forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the government

service;
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.

Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989."
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also rendered
a decision 4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order."
We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a decision and
hence, the filing of memoranda has been dispensed with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions of
substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions" of this
Court. 5 Specifically, Beja contends that the Court, of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he
was denied due process; (b) the PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive
suspension order without the necessary approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the
PPA general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against him to
the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB
itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the administrative case against
him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the
jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases
against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager. cdphil
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a
preventive suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree
No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
"(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint
and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the PPA
General Manager is the "proper disciplining authority." 6
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates
"preventive suspension" as a remedial measure with "suspension" as a penalty for
administrative dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a government
employee charged with an administrative offense is subject to the following provision of
the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
"Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of
duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service."
Imposed during the tendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is

not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is
charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated. 7 Thus, preventive suspension is
distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned
in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the
investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted
upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case. cdphil
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D.
No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the
"jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against
officers and employees" in the PPA. Cdpr
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the
disciplining authority has not finally decided the administrative case provided the ninety-
day period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has been exhausted. The
employee concerned may then be reinstated. 8 However, the said ninety-day period may be
interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that any fault, negligence or petition
of a suspended employee may not be considered in the computation of the said period.
Thus, when a suspended employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order or a
preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an administrative case, the lifespan of such
court order should be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive
suspension. 9
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may
initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant
General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that law, the
corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the
Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power
"to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of
the Authority and other personnel."
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857. Sec. 4(a) thereof
created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be "attached" to the then Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated
January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was
issued, the PPA retained its "attached" status. 1 0 Even Executive Order No. 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV,
Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached to the DOTC "shall
continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective charters or laws
creating them, except when they conflict with this Code.
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships
mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being
supervision and control and administrative supervision. "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38
thereof as follows:
"(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or coordination. The
coordination shall be accomplished by having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a
member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having
the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting
which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in
the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal
operations shall be left to the discretion or judgment of the executive officer of
the agency or corporation. In the event that the Secretary and the head of the
board or the attached agency or corporation strongly disagree on the
interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to resolve
the disagreement, he shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and
direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to a department
shall submit to the Secretary concerned their audited financial statements within
sixty (60) days after the close of the fiscal year; and
(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements, the corporation
shall continue to operate on the basis of the preceding year's budget until the
financial statements shall have been submitted. Should any government-owned
or controlled corporation incur an operation deficit at the close of its fiscal year, it
shall be subject to administrative supervision of the department; and the
corporation's operating and capital budget shall be subject to the department's
examination, review, modification and approval." (Emphasis supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which
it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program
coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached
agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that
even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance
with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987.
1 1 Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on
supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department.
12
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel,
an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and control.
This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides:
"SEC. 8. Management and Staff . — a) The President shall, upon the
recommendation of the Board, appoint the General Manager and the Assistant
General Managers.
b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and
appointed on the basis of merit and fitness based on a comprehensive and
progressive merit system to be established by the Authority immediately upon its
organization and consistent with Civil Service rules and regulations. The
recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority,
including temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine
the staffing pattern and the number of personnel of the Authority, define their
duties and responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments. For
professional and technical positions, the General Manager shall recommend
salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar positions in
other government-owned corporations, the provisions of existing rules and
regulations on wage and position classification notwithstanding.
d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint
and remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an
administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the
law impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of
Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such
investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee
concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 1 3 Only after gathering sufficient
facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It
is the latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors. 1 4
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the
employee concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Head or Secretary.
Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive
recourse to the Department Secretary is sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807)
under the following provisions:
"SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (a) The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty
of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen
against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide
the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of
officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to be taken."
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. The decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the department head.
"xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to
the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its
approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein
petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB
take jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No.
88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and recommend to him "all cases
of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the
Department." Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came into being
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the President on May 25, 1987. 1 5 Its
special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not
exempt from the observance of due process in its proceedings. 1 6 We are not satisfied
that it did so in this case the respondents protestation that petitioner waived his right to
be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was precisely questioning
the AAB's jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse. cdasia
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the
power of the PPA General Manager to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and
REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and rules that due process has been
accorded the petitioner.
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its
reinvestigation.
The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless after a determination of its
duration, it is found that he had served the total of ninety (90) days in which case he shall
be reinstated immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ ., concur.
Feliciano, J ., is on leave.
Padilla and Bellosilo, JJ ., took no part.
Footnotes
1. Petitioner was referred to as "Fidencio Y. Beja" in the proceedings below. He appears as

"Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr." for the first time in this forum.
2. Case No. 89-053.
3. Two other cases involving substantially the same issues were likewise referred by the
Court to the Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 86468-69 (Leopoldo F. Bungabung v. Hon.
Reinerio O. Reyes, et al.) and G.R. No. 86646 (Reinerio O. Reyes, et al. vs. Cristeto O.
Dinopol, et al.).
4. Penned by Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Fidel P.

Purisima and Abelardo M. Dayrit.
5. Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
6. Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
7. Bautista v. Peralta, L-21967, September 29, 1968, 18 SCRA 223, 225-226.
8. Sec. 42, P.D. No. 807.
9. Orbos v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 92358, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 563.
10. Sec. 18 (a).
11. Sec. 38 (2), par. (b).
12. Sec. 39 (2).
13. "SEC. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. — (a)
Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn written complaint
of any other persons.
(b) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant
shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses
together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie
case is found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima
facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the
latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other
documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two
hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath,
together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate
whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered
satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss
the case.
(c) Although a respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall
nevertheless be conducted when from the allegations, of the complaint and the answer
of the respondent, including the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot
be decided judiciously without conducting such an investigation.
(d) The investigation shall be held not earlier than five days nor later than
ten days from the date of receipt of respondent's answer by the disciplining authority,
and shall be finished within thirty days from the filing of the charges, unless the period
is extended by the Commission in meritorious cases. The decision shall be rendered by
the disciplining authority within thirty days from the termination of the investigation or
submission of the report of the investigator, which report shall be submitted within
fifteen days from the conclusion of the investigation.
(e) The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent shall consist
of the sworn statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint or
answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional
evidence deemed necessary but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the
complaint, or answer, upon which the cross-examination, by respondent and the
complainant, respectively, shall be based. Following cross-examination, there may be
redirect and recross-examination.
(f) Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require
the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor
through the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
(g) The investigation shall be conducted only for the purpose of
ascertaining the truth and without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in
judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining authority concerned or
his authorized representative.
The phrase 'any other party' shall be understood to be a complainant other than
those referred to in subsection (a) hereof."
14. Under the last paragraph of Sec. 36 of P.D. No. 807, the disciplining authority may
impose the penalty of removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension
for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six months'
salary, or reprimand.
15. Respondents Comment, p. 1; Rollo, p. 85.
16. Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, G.R. No. 89687, September 26, 1990, 190 SCRA
69.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 109406. September 11, 1998.]
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ROMEO T. ACOSTA, DINAH A. AGATI,

RODRIGO AGIR, JR., REY M.T. AGUINALDO, ELEAZAR S. ALAIRA,
MARCIAL C. AMARO, JR., LEONOR M. ARZADON, MARLENE C.
ARZAGA, MIGUEL G. BADION, NORMITA S. BALLON, SOCORRO B.
DEL MONTE, TEODORA B. CABRERA, ERLINDA CANTIL, ARIEL P.
CATINDIG, MA. HAYLEY N. CONCEPCION, MARY ANN C. CRUZ, MA.
VICTORIA ASUMPTU P. DACANAY, FEBES M. DE LEON, LIBERTY M.
DELIMA, MARITESS I. ESCUBIO, RITA D. FLORELIZ, CARIDAD C.
FRANCISCO, LEVI F. CABALFIN, FE GARRIDO, JULIE GOROSPE,
NELSON V. GOROSPE, IMELDA GUINTANGUIJO, NENITA
GUTIERREZ, SALLY B. IMPERIAL, NERISSA B. JARABE, FE G. LOO,
MA IRENE E. LORENZO, LORIDA D. MACARAAN, DANILO P.
MANOLOTO, ADORACION M. MENDOZA, CECILIA MENDOZA,
EMMANUEL MIRAFLORES LLARINA S. MOJICA, ZENAIDA B. MUNOZ,
ALICIA S. NERY, NOEL O. PADILLA, ERVY C. PASCUAL, MA.
MADELINE R. PATAWARAN, CRISTINA B. PAULINO, IRENEO T.
PEREZ, MA. EVELINA RASCO, AUDREY T. ROSETE, LUMINADA C.
ROTOL, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., JULIET U. TEXON, HELEN A.
TOBIAS, LARRY R. VILLAFLOR, RAYMOND R. VIRGINO, LILY YBAO,
VICKY U. YLAGAN, NENITA R. ZABALA, CHARLIE U. AGATI, NOEL C.
AQUINO, ERLINDA P. AYAP, CONRADO A. BRAVANTE, JR., EMMA F.
CABRERA, MAY R. CANLAS, SUSAN CASTILLA, CORAZON B. CHECA,
BLESILDA T. CORRO, EMMA DIEZ, MA. LOURDES G. FERRER,
LILIHUA B. GARCIA, JESLINA B. GOROSPE, MYRNA GUMANGAN,
LERMA D. HONRADO, ISRAEL S. INOCENCIO, JONAS P. LEONES,
AVEL A. MORADO, JUANITA NACINO, GENEVIEVE AUSTRIA
PADILLA, ALMA O. PELOBELLO, NELIA J. QUESADA, CRISTINA M.
REGUNAY, DEMILOUR B. REYES, MOLINA REYNALDO, GLENN
ADONIS M. RICO, BELEN E. SOTALBO, ANDREA B. TALOSIG,
FLORDELIZA TENAZAS, MERLY B. TOMILLUSO, MA. ROSALINA
VELASCO, NATIVIDAD YABES, PAULO F. ABESAMIS, FELICITAS
AREVALO, FORCIA B. ATOS, BELINDA I. DEANG, CONSUELO T.
DUANO, ERNESTINA JOSE, GERARDO O. MENDOZA, LUZVIMINDA P.
MENDOZA, AMANTE S. PERALTA, YOLANDA M. TATANG, DOLORES
M. ANGCO, MA. VENUS BERONGOY, LYDIA M. BONA, MA. LOURDES
CASAL, MABEL COLOMA, MARY JUNE D. DANDAN, ERLINDA O.
DOMINGO, JOSEPHINE P. EBORA, ELENA B. FERNANDEZ,
EVANGELINE FERRER-LIMYOLO, AMPARO V. GEREZ, ZENAIDA V.
GUTIERREZ, MILAGROS C. IMBAO, JULIE JALAAN, LETICIA A.
LLAMERA, CAROLINA A. LOPEZ, MARIUS NORMAN MACALALAD,
ALICIA L. MALLILLIN, REMEDIOS L. MERCADO, DINA B.
MONTEALEGRE, SUSAN MORTOS, JUANITO F. MUNSAYAC, PAULA
ONG, DALISAY PASCUAL, MA. ALMA M. PILIPINA, NICETA A.
ROXAS, AMADOR ATENDIDO, LUZCELY H. VEDAN, NELLY
VILLARAMA, ESTALA S. AGUILES, JEAN F. ALLADO, YVONNE B.
BALDADO, EUPREFIA BALDEMOR, NICETAS B. BAUTISTA, ANTONIO
BENITEZ, JANETTE BERNARDO, MARIA B. BONGCO, GREGORIO
ALEXIS M. CAAYAO, FREDESVINDA G. CASUNCAD, ROSA G. COPON,
AMILYN DANTES, HERMINIA ECLEO, FILIPINA V. EDRALIN,
ROSALINA O. ENRIQUEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA B. GIMENO,
LEONARDO C. HERNANDEZ, ERLINDA MENDOZA, AURORA V. PIDO,
FORTUNATA C. RAYOSO, MARIA V. RICAFORT, DORINA S. ROJAS,
LEONITA R. SIBUNGA, ERNA D. SY, ALMEIDA J. TAGALA, EDGARDO
TUBANG, SOFIA VELACRUZ, EUGENE N. ANTOLIN, MA. ELVIRA P.
JAVIER, LISETTE G. MONENO, CLEOFE P. PATANAO, MARY JEAN V.
REYES, SHIRLEY G. AQUINO, CHRISTY GEMPES, JOSE FEDERICO M.
GEMDRANO, JOSEPHINE G. RANCAP, JOSETTE B. SAN LUIS,
MARINA A. BORRETA, CHERRY B. CID, OLIVIA P. JOVE, MA. TERESA
M. MARING, BETTY P. MOJICA, EDITHA T. MUNIELA, EMMANUEL T.
PILAR, JOVITA C. ROBOSA, MA. NENA M. VILLANUEVA, MARK A.
ANTONIO, PRISCILLA G. BACENA, SUSAN C. BENOZA, RHODORA A.
CALUNGCAGIN, ANA MARIA M. CRISOSTOMO, ELENITO E.
CUNANAN, ROMANA A. DE LEON, EDMUNDO B. FLORENDO, DANIEL
GARCIA, AMELIN F. MAGAT, PATRIA A. NULLAS, MYRNA S. TADENA,
THELMA TOTANES, ALFONSO A. VERGARA, BELEN M. ANTIPORDA,
ROSALINA B. CARANDO, ESTELLA P. DE LEON, CRESENCIA I.
OLIVAR, LOURIE A. OLIVERIO, TERESITA A. RAMOS, ELISEO T.
REYES, PUREZA T. SAYON, JOSEFINA B. TEJANA, VILLAROSA C.
ABEN, JONATHAN ACABAL, POLICARPIO ALCARAZ, TERESITA C.
AMOG, GLORIA AROGANTE, EVENLYN BANDOLIN, GERRY
BANDOLIN, ADOR BARROS, CELSO L. BAUTISTA, FELICITAS S.
BAUTISTA, CRISTNINA DE GUZMAN, ESTELA C. FACELO, RAMON
FLORES, ANGELITO V. FONTANILLA, GERMAN GALAOS, REMEDIOS
S. GARCIA, MANNY G. GINGCO, VIRGILIO HALILI, ZENAIDA IBAY,
ERNESTO B. JARABE, OSCAR LEANO, TEODORA O. LEONCIO,
CARMEN R. LUARCA, EMER REX MATIBAG, MARLYN R. MENDOZA,
BIBIANO C. MIRANDA, ROMERICO MA. T. MOLINA, ERLINDA C.
POYATOS, GIANINA H. PUNZALAN, CRISTINA H. REYES, PETER
RAMIL REYES, RUTH JEAN B. SOLANO, WILFREDO C. TORREDONDO,
NARCISO VILLAMOR, ERLINDA S. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR H. VILLAS,
GUILLERMA B. ALCONIS, AGNES CAMPO, JOCELYN CLEMENTE,
AMADO B. ESPANOL, LEONILO G. GONZALES, FE A. MENDIZABAL,
TERESITA MORANARTE, ERLINDA P. ROMULO, FLORA TANGCO,
HONARIO T. TORRENUEVA, WILMA YNGENTE, SUSANA N. ANTOLIN,
JOEL U. BAUN, RHODORA C. BRUCAL, CARMELITA G. CAYABAN,
CARIDAD CLARIN, LIDINILA N. CONCEPCION FARIDA F. FLAVIANO,
TEODORA B. MACARAYAN, HILARIA G. MAGCULANG, HERNAN
MARILLA, MONINA R. MENDRES, HERMINA A. MOLINA, YOLANDA
GIGI H. MOLINA, RHODORA C. PADILLA, SANTIAGO PALACPAC, JR.,
ROMMEL PANGILINAN, DIANA JEAN N. PINAROC, MELANIE C. REY,
MERCY L. REYES, HELEN RUTH BRIONES TABION, MARIA AMELITA
DJ. ORTIZ TAMAYO, LEONIDES VALERO NELIA F. VILLANUEVA, MA.
CRISTINA F. ABAYA, MACARIO A. BASCON, NANCY ROSE CAUGMA,
ELIGIO T. ILDEFONSO, MA. DELIA P. MEIMBAN, ROMEO G.
MENDIZABAL, MICHAEL LL. TADEO, JOSE HENRY M. TALABIS,
MELCHOR R. TARUC, PONCIANO M. ARANEZ, REMEDIOS A.
ASUNCION, EDILBERTA BUENO, ELIZABETH F. CRUZ, ARACELI V.
ESPINO, RICARDO A. FIAN, LOURDES JM. FLORES, MA. ELIZABETH
GALANG, JOSE C. MORALES JR., JOSELITO R. OCHING, JANET
REYES, BENITO C. SORIANO, MARCELO B. VALDERAMA, LINDBERG
M. S. VALEROS, SARITA RENDON VALEROS, STEPHEN E. ABELLA,
MARIA FRANCIA ALFEREZ, FELY BALABBO, FE BOJOCAN, CARMELO
Z. CAUSAPIN, NIDA R. DEDEL, JOSEFINA S. DIMALANTA, MARIA
TERESITA ESPINOL, BELEN FERNANDEZ, GERUNDIO C. FERNANDEZ,
HELEN LEE D. JIMENEZ, JAKE MAKI, ROSITA M. PINIANO, CHITO
REYES, EFREN F. REYES, EVELYN REYES, ENRICO A.O SANTOS,
NELIE VALLANGCA VALENTE VILLANUEVA, MANUEL D. ROJAS,
PAULINA G. CASTRO, FANCY M. LEONES, ZENAIDA R. OPENA,
FRANCISCO B.A SAAVEDRA, ARNOLD L. SINZACA, MANUEL P.S.
SOLIS, DEMETRIA STA. ANA, LALLYJEAN S. AGUILAR, ELENA D.
APOLONIO, RODOLFO A. DE AUSEN, MARITES O. DELFIN,
EMMANUEL M. ESGUERRA, NELSON ITLIONG, ALBINO A. BELEN,
ROBERTO E. BELEN, FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., ANTONIO
CENTENO, ERNESTO R. FRUTAS, JOSEFINA C. IGNACIO, PEDRITO N.
KALALANG, BELLA P. MILLO, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., CERLINO
ALMENDAREZ, WILLIE V. AMBROCIO, MA. TERESA G. AQUINO,
JUANITA BAUTISTA, CELODONIO C. BERNABE, REMEDIOS T.
BLAQUERA, ALICIA CASTILLO, ANITA D. ESPARES, JOEL FLORES,
CITA G. GERADA, ROBERTO O. IGSOC, ANNALISA V. JAVIER,
VICTORIA B. MALACAD, ANTONIO C. MANILA, EVELYN MENDEZ,
LERMA M. MENDOZA, EUFEMIA NUCUM, LEONVINA A. OLIVO, AMIE
T. RABANG, LILIA J. RADA, DELAGIA D. ROBEL, DEGNISITA G.
SERRANO, PETRONIO TADIOSA, RODERICO A. TAN, CHARLITO
VALDEZ, ALMA M. VAZQUEZ, PEDRO E. VICTORIA, SERGIO ABUAN,
RODOLFO ANGELES, MARTINIANO ROTOL, MERLIE T. CASIGAY,
THELMA F. CHUSON, ENCARNACION CONCEPCION, IMELDA
CORTEZ, OBDULIA B. DORADO, EVELYN S. ESTRADA, MARIO S.
FERNANDEZ, RUPERTO E. GABUTAN, SONIA R. IGAYA, RAYMUNDA
O. LABUGUEN, AUREA LACHICA, LINA M. MANALAYSAY, SALVADOR
MANIOSO, BERLINA B. MANOSO, FLORANGEL MEDRANO, TERESITA
S. MESTA, JOCELYN MONTILLANO, LUZ C. PERALTA, SOFIO B.
QUINTANA, YOLANDA B. QUINTANA, SANTOS RABARA, ROSALINO
R. ROMUALDO, MARIFE RUBA, CRISTETA RULLODA, RHORODA
SANTOS, VICTOR SEE, ELNORA G. TALEON, VIRGINIA V. TALEON,
MELCHOR U. TAMAYO, MILAGROS VALDEZ, MARITA WELGAS-BRIZ,
VISITACION A. ZANO, ELVIRA D. AGPOON, VIRGINIA ANGELES,
ISABELITA V. AUSTRIA, ADELAIDA S. BALANZA, ORPHA B. BALILLA,
FE T. CARPIO, LOIDA E. HUNAT, ROSEMARIE LABIS, LUZ MARIA S.
LANSIGAN, BONIFACIO RABANG, ANGELITA RECELI, BERTRAM
SIGAION, SARAH F. TUBIG, MYRNA M. VILORIA, LOURDES C.
WAGAN, SILVERIA M. ANTOLIN, BONIFACIO ARCE, MARINA ASIAO,
PERIGRINO S. BAGUNU, ARISCALITA A. BAKER, MARIETTA L. BAL,
NELY M. BUTIC, MOISES H. BUTIC, GLORIA S. CABATIC, GERARDO
T. CABREROS, BENJAMIN C. CARINO, ERASMO M. CORTADO,
EVANGELINE J. DE LEON, EVARISTO C. EUSEBIO, EDEN M. GAZAL,
EVA M. JACA, VELERIANO V. LADIA, JR., NORMA CASUCOG, FELIX L.
LECHONCITO, MA. DOLORES M. LEGARDA, RODOLFO P. LIPAOPAO,
JR., LETY A. LORENZO, MARLON C. MELCHOR, ELPIDIO M.
MOLINYAWE, JUAN S. ODANGA, SUEMELITO V. PAA, VENIA T.
RAYALA, FLORDELINO M. REY, CARME T. ROSETE, CORAZON C.
SALAMAT, ANASTACIO B. SISON, VICENTA F. GAERLAN, JULIET G.
TOLENTINO, GLORIA E. URBIZTONDO, ANDRA C. ABARQUEZ,
THELMA S. ALCARAZ, SALVE A. ASUNCION, ALLAN V. BARCENA,
NERA S. BAYANI, NEMESIO E. BERONILLA, PIO P. BOTE, DOLORES
R. CATINDIG, CORWIN B. CECILLANO, ALEX A. CHENG, GERTRUDEZ
C. CORTEZ, ARNULFO A. ESCOBIDO, EUGENE V. ESTRADA, GENESIS
J. FRANCISCO, VIVIEN O. GALEON, FLORDELIZA D. GARCIA,
MITCHELLE A. LACHICA, THELMA I. LAGMAN, MA. CAROLINA G.
MELICOR, MA. MAGDALENA E. MORENO, FRANCIONIE G. NONO,
BERNARDO A. RESURRECCION, VILMA A. SABADO, ELVIRA G.
SABANDO, ALEJANDRO R. SIBUCAO, JR., WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA,
HERMENIGILDO S. ALLASCO, REBECCA BURGOS, MARIEL D.
GARCIA, BELINDA M. LEAL, AGAPITA MAGBOJOS, MA. LOURDES
VICTUELLES, CARMELITA ALMENDAREZ, PERLA ABELLA,
ESMERALDA R. DE CLARO, LOURDES DECAMORA, ROMUALDO DELA
CRUZ, RUFINO DIAROG, HAYDEE LATTO, CARMEN MELCHOR,
MERCEDES U. ULIBAS, EMY R. ZAPANTA, NELDA C. ABLAN,
VENERANDO R. ATUD, NESTOR A. BAMBALAN, PROCESO V.
BAUTISTA, EMMA C. CONCEPCION, JUAN G. DAYAG, ELISA Q.
FARRO, EMILIE M. LICO, TEODORA B. PAJARILLAGA, CONCESA P.
QUINONES, VERONICA G. REY, TERESITA O. SERRANO, AVELINA
VALDEZ, ELVIRA L. ADVINCULA, RENATO P. AGUILAR, ROSALINA
ALFORJA, LORENSO ALMENDAREZ, SATA H. ALTAP, JAIME AQUINO,
DOMINICO ARROBAN, JR., OCTAVIUS L. ASPACIO, MYRNA V.
BERNABE, CRECENSIO R. CALDERON, JR., RUPITO C. CARACAS,
PILAR F. CHUA, ENGRACIA M. CRUZ, MANUEL CRUZ, AGUSTIN
DELASAN, NATIVIDAD C. ESPIRITU, ROLANDO I. ETEROSA, EDEN
FABIAN, LILIA A. FILAMOR, MIGUEL O. GAPAS, ODENCIO GARCIA,
PIEDAD R. GARCIA, BIEN GUICO, PRESENTASION O. HAZAL,
MARILYN B. LAGADAY, LORENZO LAMENDAREZ, ALEJANDRINO
MANAS, ROMEO L. MANOSO, MELINDA MARTINEZ, JOYBERT
MIJARES, WENCESLADA A. MIRAN, TEOFILO V. OBLENA, AMELIA C.
OLIVERIA, SOCORRO C. PALENCIA, NELSON PANGILINAN,
FAUSTINO PASON, ELIAS PATAL, ANDRES PELA, AURORA V. PIOL,
NOLI PRADO, ANITA C. RAMBAYON, EVANGELINE E RODRIGUES,
ROSE R. SUNICO, JULIETA F. TABERNILLA, SALVACION B. VAZQUEZ,
EMILY VERANO, EDWIN VILLANUEVA, JOEL V. VILLAR, SATURNINA
VITE, DON ABARRIENTOS, JOSENDEL O. AGRA, MARISTELA ARIEL,
JOHN B. ARROBANG, ALBERTO A. BANATAO, FEDERICO M.
BARREDA, PAULO BERINA, RENATO M. BORJA, GENARO BORQUIN,
FLOR A. CABUNOG, ELIZABETH S. CALDERON FRESCILLA N.
CALIMAG, CRISTETA A. CASTRO, MA. ELENA CONSTANTINO, MILA
CORRE, RENATO D. CRUZ, JOSEFINA L. DE LEON, RHODORA R. DE
VEYRA, CONSOLADORA A. DIMARANAN, ERNESTO R. DIONISIO,
ERNESTO S. DIONISIO, JR., LIGAYA B. DIONISIO, OSCAR EMBERGA,
PEDO FALLARIA, MA. LOURDES V. FELICITAS, GRISELDA V.
GALEON, CRESENCIO MAXIMO GARCIA, MARY ANN GENEROSO,
WHYLEEN SM. GONZALES, ANGELINA C. GREGORIO, SALVADOR B.
JANA, JR., LYNETTE T. LAROYA, OFELIA G. LIPORADA, GRACIANO
MANUEL, BIBIANO H. MEJINO, THEODORE MORAL, ANTONIO P.
MORENO, JR., ANICETO D. ORDEN, IMELDA C. PANGGA,
CONSOLACION PANGILINAN, ROSITA P. PARINA, ELPIDIO N.
QUITERO, MYRNA RAMOS, GLENDA B. REFIL, MA. TERESA
REFORSADO, HEIDI D. REGALA, RUFINA R. REYES, SUSAN H.
ROQUERO, AJIT RYE II, LEO J. SAGUGUIT, MARINO K. SANTOS, LINA
D. SEGUNIAL, ALBA SORIANO, JESSICA SORIANO, ROMEO B.
TRONO, ANGELITA T. VILORIA, TIRSO ABAD, FEDERICO ABILO,
LOLITA L. ANOVA, OPRIASA ANTONIO, JERRY B. AQUINO,
RODERICK ARAO, RENATO ARROYO, RUBEN ASENSI, ERNESTO
BALINGIT, ALBERTO A. BANATA, JOSEPHINE BARRIENTOS,
MARCELINO BERINA, WILFREDO BONILCA, ED C. BONILLA,
FRANCISO BRAZA, ANONINA S. BRILLANTES, ROGELIO O.
CADADAN, RENE CALICA, TERESITA CALUMA, EDGARDO CAPARAS,
ALEX M. CARANDANG, MIGNON C. CARLOS, CRISTETA CASTRO, MA.
ERLINDA B. CAUSAY, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, DANILO
CERVANTES, ELEJIA R. CHARIE, CARMEN G. CLUTARlO, MANUEL F.
CRUZ, DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, ABAS DE JESUS, ROMULO DEL
MUNDO, JUAN B. DESPABILADERO, GAVINO ESMERO, FIDEL C.
ESTANISLAO, ROWEN A. EUSTAQUIO, CORAZON FERNANDEZ,
ALBERTINE FLORES, RIOLITA H. GALLEGO, MARCELINO
GATCHALIAN, JIMMY GIDRAMA, RUFINO GUTIERREZ, MERCEDITA
S. HARING, MAY HARINGA, ROMEO P. IBARRIENTOS, BERLINO
INFANTE, JOSELYN V. VILLA, CATALINO LIMBO, ORIOSA LISING,
BOYET F. LITA, ENRICO LIWANAG, ALTHEA O. LOTA, VINA P.
MACATANGAY NORBERTO MADADO, FLORINIA NADADO, JAIME
NADADO, CONNIE NAGAMOS, TESSIE NAGAMOS, AMALIA U. NELL,
EDILBERTO OROCAY, RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, ROSITA P. PARINA,
EUGENIO PATAG, FERMIN PAVIA, BERNARDO PENA, JOSEMARIA P.
PEREZ, ARMIDA D. PULLO, LAURO S. PUNZALAN, JUSTINA
QUINORES, NANOY C. REANO, EDDIE REYES, FRANCISCO ROMERO,
SUSAN ROQUERO, WILFREDO RUZGAL, CONRADO SALAZAR,
ODENCIA C. SALVADOR, TEODORA B. SANDOVAL, RODANTE
SANTIAGO, GLORIA SANTOS, JOSE C. SANTOS, FLORANTE P.
SOMERA, MELISSA B. STA. CRUZ, JOSE TABIGAN ANTONIO
TALASTAS, DOMINGO G. TARNATE, JR. IGMEDIO TIONGSON,
STEPHEN U. TOLEDO, ROMEO UMAYAN, BENJAMIN URBANO,
MALOU B. VERA, JERRY VISTO, AUGUSTO YUSON, JOSE S.
AGUSTIN, LEIS ALEJANDRO, EDWIN E. ALLADA, ROLANDO
ANDRADE, LHITA CABUNGAN, LOUIE CATUDIO, REYNALDO M.
CENTENO, DIOSMEDADO T. COCAL, EVANGELINE I. CORCUERA,
REMY D. CORTEZ, JONATHAN C. DANGA, FRED DE CLARO, MAURO
DE JESUS, EFREN DE JUCOS, GEORGE DE LEON, SHIRLEY
DEPASUCAT, MARIA REYNA DONDAY, AURA ALELI P. DUIROS,
DIONICIA DURANTE, MARCELO ENRIQUE, FERDINAND ESPIRITU,
MIRASOL ESPIRITU, RUBY T. FAMORCAN, JOSE C FORTUNO,
BEVERLY FRANCISCO, JOSE Z. GALLARDO, REYNALDO GANTONG,
NILO GARCIA, LONESTO GENOVEZA, FELIPE HERRERA, FELIPE G.
ISIP, JR., RANDY C. MABANA, CESAR MACAALAY, ROGELIO
MANGILIT, EMILIO MANUEL, JOSE MARINAS, JAIME MATA, DANILO
MIANO, JOVITO NAROG, FELISA A. NUESCA, REYNALDO OLAHAY,
ANSELMO PARANAS, JR., RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, MARIAN G.
PASCUAL, MARCELLANO P. PEREZ, NEIL PIAMONTE, REYNALDO
QUIROS, EFREN RAMOS, CARLOS RAMOS, MAMERTO
RESURRECCION, QUINONES RONILO, ARTURO C. SANTOS, M.C.
SANVICTORES, ROMEO G. SUMULONG, AURELIO G. TAN, JUNIFER
TAN, TERESITA B. TOMAS, APOLLO URBANO, VICTORIA B. VALDEZ,
CONCESA L. ALDAY, ELMER Y. CORPUS, ANNIE L. CORPUZ,
ZENAIDA M. DE GUZMAN, MERLINDA V. DE JESUS, ISAURO R.
DOROSAN, MA. ELENA D. EBONA, LETICIA C. EUSEBIO, ALEJANDRO
V. FERNANDEZ, EVITA B. GARABILES, NELSON GARCIA, ROWENA M.
HUISCA, JESSE LADISLA, JUVY P. LADISLA, RANDY LAGUNILLA,
LANIE A. MABANA, SAMSON MACOB, ANTONIO MAMMAY, RICARDO
PALAGANAS, LUNINGNING C. PANGILINAN, VILMA PORCADELA,
ROGELIO RONQUILLO, MA. VICTORIA P. SOMERA, MIRASOL R.
TUGADE, DOMINADOR ABAD, BRICCIO P. ABAN, KELVIN C. ABARRA,
NESTOR ABENIS, SYLVIA C. ABUNGAN, (ATTY.) ANSELMO
ABUNGAN, ELENITA A. ACUNA, DANILO C. ADINA, PETRONIO C.
AGUILA, SYLVIA S. ALCANTARA, MARCELO ALILIO, ROMEO L.
ALMEDA, NORBERTO ALMERINO, LUISITO M. ALMOGELA, DAHLIA R.
ALMOSARA, JOEL P. ALMOSARA, CATER AMBROSIO, EDITHA A.
AMISCARAY, MA. VICTORIA I. AMORES, LEONARDO APIL, ANTONIO
N. APOSTOL, JR., NENA T. AQUINO, PATRICIO M. ARAGON, JR.,
SYLVIA ARBOLEDA, JOSE P. ARZADON, MARIO ASIS, ADELAIDA
AUAYANG, MARIO A. AURELIO, ROBERTO M. AVELLANA, TERESITA
J. AVENTURADO, EMOLYN E. AZURIN, EDITHA BACHAR, GLORIA M.
BACONG, GERONIMO BADULIS, JR., GLADIOLA M. BAGADIONG,
AMELIA G. BALAIS, FEDERICO A. BALANON, RODRIGO BALILLA,
JOFFER L. BALLESTEROS, TERESITA P. BALMES, ANITA B. BAURA,
CRISANTO A. BAURA, JR., SERVIN BAUTISTA, GABINO BELLEZA,
FLORENCIA P. BENOSA, DANNY BERCHES, HERNANI BERNAL,
ELVIRA V. BERSABE, ISMAEL C. BOCO, MARCIAL BENJAMIN
BUNGOLAN, FELY A. BOSTON, ANGEL A. BRAVO, RAUL BRITANICO,
LILITA G. BROCES, EDUARDO S. GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA C. CAABAY,
MICHAEL B. CABALDA, SIROLAN B. CABE, CESAR B. CABRERA,
BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN, JR., VERONA J. CALAMANAN, ADELAIDA
B. CALOOY, ROBERT F. CALUGAY, JUANITO CALVEZ, NECITA M.
CAMANGONAN, SATURNINO Y. CAMANGONAN, JUAN G. CANLAS,
FRANCISCA D. CANUEL, ARTURO D. CANUELA, EVELYN CANUELA,
JESUS CANUELA, NELIA D. CANUELA, AVELINO C. CAPARAS,
RICARDO R. CARINGAL, MA. LOURDES CASIMIRO, ARCADIO I. CASIS,
DANIEL C. CASIS, ELENA C. CASIS, ROBERTO S. CASTILLO, FEIPE P.
CASUNCAD, JUANITO A. CATOR, RENATO CATOR, JONAS R. CHECA,
RENE A. CILINDRO, ELWIN B. CINCO, ROSALINDA CIPRIANO, JOSE
MARIE CLOMA, MARJORIE COLLADO, ELVETA C. COMSTI, ALLAN
ANTONIO C. CONDA, APOLONIO V. CRUZ, FE C. CRUZ, FLORDELIZA
CRUZ, LEODEGARIO CUEVAS, OLIVER CUEVAS, REMEDIOS CUEVAS,
GLORIA T. DACANAY, MARIBEL DAMIAN, MARY ANNE C. DE
CASTRO, CESAR S. DE CHAVEZ, ANICET F. DE GUZMAN, AURELIO
DE GUZMAN, JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, RUBY B. DE GUZMAN, BERNARD
DE LARA, ALFONSO S. DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON, RESTITUTO C. DE
LEON, EDWIN L. DEVERA, HAROLD T. DE VERA, CESAR M. DE VEYRA,
ANACLETO C. DEL MUNDO, ALFONSO P. DELA CRUZ, JR., EMERITA
M. DELA CRUZ, HELEN T. DELA CRUZ, RIZALYN C. DELA CRUZ,
SERVILLANO R. DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA FUENTE, WILFREDO C.
DELA FUENTE, ARNOLD DELGADO, JAIME DELOS REYES, MANUEL T.
DEPANES, ANTONIO DEQUINA, ROLANDO D. DESTACAMENTO,
MARIETA L. DETERA, PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, RAUL S. DIMALANTA,
WENCESLAO DIZON, EDWIN G. DOMINGO, MELANIO O. DONES, JR.,
ESTELITO DOROSAN, ISAURO DOROSAN, JR., CHARLIE M. DULAY,
ESTEBAN DULAY JR., SATURNINO DULAY, MA. AIDA C. DUROY,
RIZAL P. ECHECHE, GASPAR G. ESCOBAR, GASPAR T. ESCOBAR,
ALICIA S. ESGUERRA, JACKSON I. ESPERO, LILIA ESTOPAGE, DIGNA
G. EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FALLESGON, ROQUE M. FAMILARA,
JERRY FARINAS, NIEVA FARINAS, NARCELYN FELIPE, ERNESTO H.
FELIX, MARIANNE V. FERNANDEZ, ALVIN LUCIO M. FERNANDO,
ALFREDO V. FERRER, NOEL V. FERRER, ELENA G. FETIZA,
AUGUSTUS C. FLORES, SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE, MA. LUISA
FRANCISCO, EDWARD FRANCO, HELENITA EVELYN FRANCO, NOE
FREOLO, EDUARDO VICTORIO FREYRA, EDITHA P. FRIGILLANA,
TEOFILO D. FRONDA, ESTER M. FRONTERAS, HELENA GADDI,
ROBERTO D. GADDI, FELISA C. GALARAGA, ELLEN GRACE R.
GALISTE, RESTITUTO G. GALO, MAXIMO V. GARCIA, JAIME M.
GATAN, MARIO GUERRERO, ANTONIO GUINSING, JR., ANGELINA P.
GUTIERREZ, AURELIO P. GUTIERREZ, HERMINIO O. GUTIERREZ,
NELIA C. HALCON, LOURDES V. HERNANDEZ, DIONISIO S. INCIONG,
MARIO Z. JANDUMON, RICARTE JAVELOSA, ADONIS S. JAVIER,
ANGELO JAVIER, LOUELLA G. JIMENEZ, LYNDA JIMENEZ, NONITA
JORDAN, ROLANDO LACANDASO, ELIZABETH C. LACSAMANA,
BERNARD LANUZA, PATRICIO B. LANUZA, SALVIO B. LASERNA,
FLORINIO B. LAZO, RODOLFO M. LEE, BEATRIZ D. LEGASPI, AMOR
M. LIM, JAIME D. LOMABAO, REGINA LOPEZ, REBE M. LOZANO,
DANILO N. LUCAS, EDEL LUPOS, CESAR LUCERO, SL MIRA,
PATERNO M. MABASA, RAMON V. MACABUHAY, EDITA M.
MACALALAD, DIGNA V. MACAPAGAL, LOUIE MADRID, POSALITO
MAESTRO, ENRIQUE S. MAGLANQUE, WENCESLAO MAGO, ERNESTO
A. MALICAD, MA. SOCORRO A. MALLARE, CLARO JOSE C. MANIPON,
ELEAZAR C. MANDARING, ELVIRA MARANAN, GERARDO MARCIANO,
SALVADOR MARTIN, ELENITA MARTINEZ, CRISOSTOMO V.
MASANGKAY, MAXIMO MATURAN, CONCHITA J. MEDINA,
LAMBERTO R. MELAD, EDUARDO MELEGRITO, (ATTY.) ADORACIO
MENDOZA, ARLENE MENDOZA, BERNARDO N. MENDOZA, LUIS C.
MENDOZA, TITA M. MENDOZA, GINA MAY P. MERCADO, TERESITA
L. MIDEL, JULIET M. MIGUEL, VIRGINIA B. MILANO, CONRADO
MIRANDA, LIDA R. MIRANDA, LEOCADIO MOLINA, ALEJANDRO M.
MONTERO, JR., BENJAMIN J. MONZON, ELSA Y. MULA, PERFECTO
NACAR, JOEL A. NATIVIDAD, RUBEN C. NATIVIDAD, GLENN
MARCELO C. NOBLE, NICASIO NOGUERAS, LIWAYWAY A. NUNEZ,
ESTELA V. OSORIO, ELIZA PABELICO, ERNANI BERNAL PADILLA,
JESUS M. PADILLA, GERARD A. PANGILINAN, OLYMPIA V.
PARFILES, ELMER PASCUA, ISABEL PASCUAL, MA. ISABEL M.
PASCUAL, MELODIE PASCUAL, SALVADOR L. PATA, PETRONILA
PAZ, JOSEFA B. PELIAS, NESTOR PENA, ROLANDO PENA, RENE
PERALTA, JOSUE L. PEREZ, SIMEON T. PERMEJO, ALFREDO
PERUCHO, REY V. PERUCHO, RENALDO J. POBLETE, RAMON D.
QUEBRAL, ROLENDO C. QUEMADO, EDNA V. RAGILES, ALVIN C.
RAMOS, EMERITO RAMOS, MAMERTO RESUBAL, ANGELA P.
REVILLA, ALICE REYES, DAISY M. RICAFORT, WILFREDO RICAFORT,
RAMONCITO L. RIVERA, REYNALDO RODELAS, FLORO RODRIGUEZ,
LILIAN A. ROLLAN, ROMUALDO AGUILOS, ANGELO A. ROMULO,
JOSE N. RONAN TIMOSHENKO RONQUILO, NENITA A. ROQUE,
BENJAMIN R. ROSALDO, FIDEL ROVIRA, LIBERTY RUBIN, LIBERTY L.
RUBIN, MA SALLY P. SAGRAGAO, REINHOLD PERFECTO M. SALAS,
VIRGILIO SALAS, ALEJANDRO B. SALONGA
EDWIN B. SANTELICES, EMMANUEL A. SANTOS, FELIPE B. SANTOS,

LETICIA C. SANTOS, ADRIANO R. SARIAN, MA. CORAZON E.
SERVANDO, RODOLFO SESPENE, FERNANDO G. SOJANA, EXPEDITO
SORIA, NORMA G. SORIANO, RONALD G. STO. TOMAS, LUCIO R.
SUYAT, JOYCELYN F. TAAL, BARBARA BABSI I. TABACO DELIA S.
TALITE, ANUNSACION E. TAN, MARIETTA N. TAN, HERMINIO G.
TAQUIQUI, EDGARDO L. TOLENTINO, MARCELINA M. TONDO
ANIANO D. TORRES, SALVADOR D. TORRES, BEATRIZ L. TRINIDAD
RICARDO P. UGALE, ALICIA S. UMEREZ, VIRGILIO B. URBANO
JOSEPHINE R. UYACO, RIZALINO N. UYACO, LOYOLA M. VALDEZ,
JEFFREY VAZQUEZ, RODOLFO L. VELASCO, JR., JOSELITO G.
VELASQUEZ, EVELYN A. VIDAD, VICTORINO M. VILLAGRACIA, ARIEL
VILLANUEVA, CLARISSA G. VILLANUEVA, JOCELYN C. VILLANUEVA,
WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, RICARDO VILLARBA, TITO S. VILLARIN,
CARMELITA B. YALONG, ROBERTO A. YAZON, LUCILLE Y. ABAD,
SILVESTRE L. ABAYA, ELIGIO L. ABRIGANA, ANGELINA O. ABRIL,
LORENA AFRICA, INOCENCIO A. AGRON, CRISTINA P. AGUILAR,
ARLEAN L. ALAMARES, ADORACION L. ALEJANDRINO, RUTH B.
ALICER, ROSALINA V. ALMONEDA, ALFREDO ALVAREZ, ISABEL M.
AMISCARAY, OSROXSON L. AMPARO, ANGEL B. ANDEN, CAROLINA
M. ANORES, THELMA P. ARTIFICIO, ANTONIO A. ASADA, JR., MA.
LUZ M. ASCANO, APOLINAR B. ASENCION, EDWIN AZANON,
ERLINDA M. BAGUE, ANGELINA R. BALAGTAS, RENATO T. BANAGA,
VALENTIN BARCENAL, ADELAIDA C. BARRIDA, BENJAMIN P.
FATOLINA, MARCELO BAUTISTA, SIMPLICIO BAYRON, CORAZON C.
BERNIDO, GLENDA P. BILOG, ALAN M. BORRAS, TERESA L. BORRAS,
EVANGELISTA BORROMEO, BEVERLY R. BRIONES, NESTOR J.
BUGADISAN, ADELINA DM. BULOS, SYLVIA S. BUSINE, EVANGELINE
M. CABATUANDO, EDUARDO T. CABILDO, ELIZABETH P. CABILDO,
EMMANUEL P. CAJIPE, JOSE N. CALAYCAY, VIRGINIA S. CALIX,
LOPITO CALUAG, EMMA L. CANCINO, ESPERANZA I. CANCIO,
BUENAVENTURA E. CANSINO, PERCIDITA T. CANSINO, GRACE M.
CARLOS, PATRICIA ANDREA V. CARRILLO, SOLEDAD S. CASTANEDA
MARILYN K. CASTILLO, JEAN M. CASYAO, JUSTINA S. CERBOLLES,
MARIA LUCIA C. COBAR, AVELINO COLOMA, ANA ELENA L.
CONJARES, ALVARO CORDERO, ESTRELLA B. CORTEZ, DANILO A.
CUYCO, RUBEN DACOCO, ROSITA R. DAROY, DENIA A DATO-ON,
PABLO DE CASTRO, MARIO M. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN,
AZUCENA C. DE VERA, CECILIA M. DE VERA, LOUIE A. DE VERA,
NATHANIEL B. DE VERA, SALVACION O. DEAN, SOLIDAD Z. DEL
CASTILLO, ADELAIDA Q. DEL ROSARIO, ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, FE
M. DELA CRUZ, IMELDA S. DELFIN, DANILO D. DIAZ, FE R. DISCAYA,
EMERANCIANA B. DURAN, JAVIER M. EDUARDO, ELIXA ENRIQUEZ,
SOFRONIO ENRIQUEZ, LUZ V. ESGUERRA, JAIME B. ESTEBAN,
MERIAM F. FABRIGAS, LOURDES G. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES R.
FONTANILLA, ROBERTO FONTANILLA, REY M. GABRIEL, RICARDO L.
GALLARDO, CORAZON M. GARCIA, NARDO Q. GARCIA, TEOFILO Y.
GARCIA, TEOFILO Y. GARCIA, IRENEO GERILLA, NOEL B. GERILLA,
ALFONSO GRAFIA, JUANA S. GREGORIO, LEONARDO G. GUMASING,
LUZVIMINDA M. IGNACIO, RESTITUTO B. ILAGAN, ABELARDO A.
INOVERO, DOMINGO P. JACINTO, REYNALDO P. JACINTO, GLENDA
S. JAVIER, GLORIA JIMENEZ, REYNALDO S. JIMENEZ, JESULITO B.
JUNIO, JULIETA JUSON, JOCELYN S. LAGARDE, ALICIA F.
LAGUNZAD, LUNINGNING M. LANSANGAN, LUVIMINA G. LANUZA,
AVELINA G. LAPADE, DOLORES M. LAZO, RHODORA LEONIN,
TEOFILO V. LEONIN, JR, LEONARDO S. LEOPANDO, LAURA F. LEYVA,
CRISANTO LIMEN, ROEL LOTERINA, PABLITO MAAT, RUBY LIZA J.
MAGLALANG, WILFREDO MAGSAMBOL, HILARION E. MAMARIL,
MILA A. MANALO BENJAMIN F, MANDINGUIADO, AURELIO
MANINGAS, ANGELES MARCELO, EDITHA A. MARCELO, VERONICA
J. MARCELO, RONNIE MARCOS, REYNALDO R. MARIANO JOHNNY R.
MARIN, BENEDICTO E. MARISFOSQUE JOHN M. MARQUEZ
ALEJANDRO J. MATEO, JOHNYLEN V. MELENDEZ, JORGE
MENDOZA, JULIETA C. MENDOZA, LUCY MENDOZA, QUIRINO M.
MENDOZA, MYLENE M. MOLO, NELIA M. MONTILLA, DEMETRIO A.
MOOG, ERLINDA NATERA, JOSEFINA G. NATERA, NICANOR P.
NICOLAS, CARL M. NOHAY, VIDAL T. OLANDA, JOSEFINA J.
OMANDAM, CELIA M. OPRENARIO, NORMA L. PABLO SAMUEL D.
PABLO LAMBERTO E. PALAD, FRANCISCO A. PANCHO, ROMEO
PARADERO, VANGELINE K. PARAMI, RENATO H. PECHO, REYNALDO
V. PEDREGOSA, CECILIA T. PEREZ, MARY AGNES PEREZ,
CHRISTINA A. PETRACHE, FEDERICO L. PINEDA, JR., LAURA R.
PINEDA, MYRNA E. PIQUERO, EDGARDO E. POBLETE, DIOSDADO A.
QUIAMBAO, BERNARDINO H. QUIZON, BOGAR G. RACHO, MANNY G.
RAMA, ANGELITO F RAMOS, AURORA D. RAPADAS, ANTONIO E.
REFRE, ROSALINO B. REJAS, ESTRELLA D. RELUNIA, EDILBERTO A.
REMENTILLA, SOTERO RESILVA, ROLANDO Y. REYES, GERARDO M.
ROBLES, MARISSA ROBLES, CRISPINA M. ROSALES, BERNADETTE
C. SABLAN, CESAR M. SALABIT, MA. TERESITA A. SALABIT, ARTURO
F. SALIH, VIRGILIO R. SANTIAGO, FLORA L. SANTOS, GABRIEL
SANTOS JR., IBARRA S. SANTOS, JULIETA E. SEGUIS, ROSALIE
SEMANA, ELVIRA SOMBRION, RODRIGO TABIOS, ESTELLITA U.
TABORA, ANGILEO P. TAGUIBAO, CARLITO G. TAMBOOM, MERRIAN
DC. TANGONAN, RICARDO TEMPLONUEVO, ANTONIO E. TIONG,
MITOS M. TOLENTINO, LUZ G. USMAN, FLORANTE M. VALDERAMA
BALDOMERO VALENZUELA, ANA MARIA S. VELUZ, ERNESTO S.
VENTURA, CRISOL P. VILLANUEVA, PORTIA T. VILLEGAS, ARMINDA
F. VINAS, MAGNO B. YOSHISAKI, MA. TERESA YULO-NAZAREA,
BRAHIM T. ABAS, RAUL G. ABIQUE, LEZA A. ACORDA, ADELIA F.
AGUILAR, REYNALDO P. ALLANCES, BERNADETTE M. ANGCO,
CLARISSA C. ARIDA, LEONITA D. BAETIONG, EDNA R. BARLIS,
SONIA R. BARLIS, BERNA A. BONDOC, NANETTE BORJA, CORAZON
S. BUSTAMANTE, VICTORIA ORMIN R. CABRAL, WILLIE A.
CANDELARIO, ARLINA G.A. CANTADA, ARACELI CANTRE, JERRY
CAPULONG, JEANNIE C. CASAURAN, REBERTO CO, EMERLINDA N.
DACARA, TERESITA T. DAVID, ELENIDA DEL ROSARIO, MANUEL
DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DIAZ, LERMA DIMAYUGA, BERNARDITA M.
DUNGO, ANTONIO P. FAJARDO CHARLES C. FORONDA, AURORA V.
GALVEZ, DAVINA CLEOFE GONZALES, NICK D. GUILLERMO,
REBECCA P. GUTIERREZ, JOSEFINA P. HIPOLITO, EVELYN R.
INCIONG, IMMACULADA F. LA ROSA, ANABELLA C. LABORTE,
NAPOLEON R. LAPUZ, AMY LECCIONES, SAMUEL LIBOON, DEAN R.
LOPEZ, MYLEEN Z. LUZ MERLINA G. MABUTOL, ALBERT A.
MAGALANG, ROMANA B. MAGAT, VICTORIA MALIHAN, JAIME
MALLARE, REMY MAMON, ELVIRA T. MANALO, ANDRES G.
MANUELE, EVALINDA MERCADO, MA. GERARDA MERILO, FATIMA
MOLINA, JOSEPHINE L. MONILLA, EDWIN ROMEL N. NAVALUNA,
PERSEVERANDA-FE OTICO, FELIX A. PASCUA JR., MARINELA T.
PASCUA, ALBERTO C. PECHO, TERESITA PERALTA, ELVIRA D.
PIMENTEL, CRISTINA S. PIZARRO, ISAGANI R. POTES, HARRY R.
QUIAOIT, LINDA A. QUIOCSON, SOLON C. RATIVO, MARCELINO R.
RIVERA, JANE G. RODRIGO, DAMIAN P. RUBIO, ESPERANZA A.
SAJUL, ELVIRA L. SALVANI, MARICHU SANTIBANEZ, VIRGILIO G.
SANTOS, GERI GERONIMO, R. SANEZ, REBECCA E. SARACHO, MA.
CECILIA B. STA INES, PEDE SUMILDE, JESSIE TANOLA, ROMEO T.
TARRAY, DOLORES F. TOLENTINO, GRACIOLO DS. TORRE, EDGARDO
TORRES, ENRICA I. TUMBAGAHAN, MA. LOURDES P. VARGAS,
RENATO VENGCO GRACE L. ALMERO, JUANITA P. ARSOLON,
LETECIA M. CENDANA, ELIZABETH A. CHUA, MABEL C. CRISPARIL,
MANUEL T. ESCASURA, JUANITA G. FERNANDEZ, VIRGILIO O.
FERRER, DELIA P. GEDALA, LAURO M. HERMOSURA, NATIVIDAD V.
IGAYA, ROSABEL T. JOSUE, EVELYN V. LLAMAS, ANNIE LOMIBAO,
ARLINE LUNA, BRILLA P. MALAMUG, ADELINDA L. MANALILI,
ROMUALDO S. MERCENE, JANET MIRANDA, LYDIA NUQUE,
FRUCTUOSA R. OBAY, CATALINA G. PRESTOZA, ROLANDO P.
RANES, JULIETA RIVERA, LOURDES T. SELLEZA, JESUSA A.
VELASCO, YOLANDA A. VERDIJO, JOSE VIDAL, FLORA ABADIN,
ROMMEL D. ABAN, ALLEN M. ABLANG, NORMA N. AGIR, RODRIGO
AGIR III, MARDONIO M. ALCANTARA, ROSALINDA ANGER, DANILO T.
ANONUEVA, REMEDIOS M. ANONUEVO, BONIFACIO APOLONIO,
MARIO G. AQUINO, MA. CHONA ARISTOTELES, DICK G. BACUNO
NILDA C. BALAMONG, ARTHUR M. BALATBAT, FLORANTE G.
BONGALON, CEPRIANA S. BORJA, CRISANTO BRUSAS, RUFINO M.
BUSTAMANTE, MELICITA CAPULONG, AMADEO G. CARDINO,
BONIFACIO CARLING, LULU C. CORALES, JIMMY J. CRISOLOGO,
CELIA J. CRUZ, NOEL C. CRUZ NORBERTO G. CRUZ, AMBROSIO
DAGUPAN, MA. THERESA M. DATU, JAIAME C. DE GUZMAN,
ROLAND A. DE JESUS, MONA LISA F. DE OCAMPO; SONIA C.
DIMACULANGAN, LAUREANA C. ESTOROQUE, PABLITO ESTOROQUE
JR., MARIO M. ESTRELLA, ANGEL FERNANDEZ, ZENAIDA P.
FERNANDEZ, EVELYN C. FLORES, VERONICA T. GARCIA, JOSE M.
GATONGAY, ARIEL A. HIMOC, BONNIE P. LISING LOTA S. LIZARDA,
RUFINA LOPEZ, EDGARDO K. MAGNO, RODELIO M. MALICAD,
ZENAIDA MALLETE, MARILYN V. MANGEURRA, CONSTANCIO
MARIROSQUI, HIDELISA P. MARQUEZ, ROSARIO J. MENDOZA, ELISA
N. MOLA, NILO A. NERA, JUSTO NEYRA, JR., ANACLETA P. NILLO,
RIBOMAJAL A. OBA, RODOLFO N. ORTIZ, MARITES O. PADOR, MA.
VICTORIA P. PAELMO, MA. JANET PASCUA, ROMEO C.
PASCUBILLO, ESTELITO PENA, JOSIE S. PEREZ, ZENAIDA T.
RABAYA, JOSEFINA D. RAMOS, JENNIE P. SALVADOR, RODOLFO S.
SANTOS, LORETA C. TABAS, RAMONITO TALABUCON, PATRICIA N.
TALAMISAN, JULIE N. TANGUILIG, NUNILON R. TANGUILIG,
DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO, CLYDIE TORRES, ABRAHAM R.
VILLANUEVA, AGNES VINUMA, LUZ ANACTA, EDUARDO
BALLESTEROS, RUBY BAUTISTA, ELIZALDE BERANIA, CHARLITA
BONGALON, ESTER CADANO, ALMA CRISTINA COLLADO, EVELINDA
CORONEL, BRIGIDA CORPUS, HILARIA DEZA, LUCIA DIAGCO,
CRISTINA ESGUERRA, EDNA ESQUILLO, RHODORA ESTRELLA,
CECILIA FRANCISCO, EMELLINA GAMBA, MARCELA GARCIA, DIVINA
GATMAITAN, ASUNCION GERVACIO, MA. ASUNCION
LAQUINDANUM, LYLEEN LIBAN, ZAIDA LIBAN, BERNANDINO
MANOSO, MARITESS PABLO, ANITA PANER, EDERLINA RABE, JOSE
RABE, ROSALIA REBULLANTE, ROBERTO SABELLA, JUDITH
SADALIA, CIELITA SARMIENTO, LUTHER VILLAMIN, ANITA A. AALA,
MARILOU L. ABARRO, PORFIRIO L. ALCACHUPAS, ISABEL V.
ARANZAZU, ROSIE L. ARENAS, CLARO S. ASTOVEZA, SUSAN C.
BONDOC, DOMINGO BRAVO, MARIANITO Z. CAJUCOM, SOFIA T.
CAMPOS, SONI G. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. COMIE, ADELINA G.
CORTIGUERRA, VIRGINIA DE. SAGUN, DANIEL DELOS SANTOS, NIDA
C. DILAN, SELFA C. FERNANDEZ, LIGAYA G. GARCIA, MARLYN A.
GARCIA, SONIA B. IBANEZ, BONIFACIO S. LABANGCO, SR., JEAN
LADIA, PERLA G. LORENZO, VIRGINIA B. LUNA, EDNA C. MABULAY,
MARILI T. MALASAGA, MELE T. MALASAGA, MA. TERESA E. MAPILI,
DAVID P. MARIANO, FRISCA P. MAYAMAYA, MARLENE S. MELARPIS,
ROLAND P. MENDOZA, VENER C. MERANA, LAMBERTA N. MERENA
FELISA G. NARCIDA, NORMA M. NORIEL, FRANCISCO PANGAN,
APOLONIO C. SALANGA, JR., CARLOS E. SANCHEZ, SOFREMEO F.
SANTIAGO JR., LUISA L. SANTOS, SOFIA S. SOLACITO, GENOFREDO
S. SOLMARIN, VIOLETA G. SORIANO, JUAN STA ANA, SANNY B.
SULIBA, CARMELITA P. TAMARGO, ANTONIO P. TULLAS, JR.,
VIOLETA A. VELA, CHONA C. ZAMORA, MA. THERESA P.
EMPAYNADO, MABEL GRASPARIL, EDMUND RAUL KAABAY, JR.,
MAGIN LABANGUIS, REY B. SELLEZA, PERCIVAL VALDEZ, NORMA C.
VASQUEZ, JUDY ABLAN, MARIBEL M. ALCANTARA, ANGELITA C.
AUKAY, MARLENE M. BADILLA, DOMINADOR L. BIGSOT, ABRAHAM
D. CABALSE, EUFRECINA T. EUSEBIO, MARLON Q. GA, JOCELYN P.
ILUSTRE, PERCIDA G. NORTON, GODOFREDO RAMONES, ELISEO A.
VILLASTIQUI, ELY R. YRA, VIRGINIA D. CADAVIS, CONSOLACION
CAYABYAB, PATROCINIA A. DIMAGUILA, JOLIZA O. ENCISA, LUCILA
M. FELIX, SALVACION T. GALLEGO, ELVIRA GEALON, WILMA T.
LAGRIMAS, REMEDIOS B. LIBERATO, JAIME MADAMBA, BERNICE R.
MANALATA, VILMA S. PALMES, EMPERATRIZ R. PIOQUID, LIGAYA R.
SAMSON, ROSALIE M. SANCHEZ, MARCEBENI D. TALABUCON, LILIA
C. TAMAYO, MERCELINA A. TUBALLA, ELDA Y. ZURBITO, ROWENA
ANDAYA, JACINTA B. ANONUEVO, BEATRIZ N. BELEN, TERENCIO
CADUYAC, RAMON C. DELA FUENTA, MIGUEL C. FERNANDEZ,
DOLOR MORADA, CLEMENCIO C. PAJARILLO, ELENILA PASCUAL,
TERESITA ADA, MARIO AQUINO, ROLANO BAGUNU, MARGIE I.
BALLESTEROS, ROMULOS BELTRAN, ANTONIO CORIA, EDWIN DELA
CRUZ, YOLANDA DELA CRUZ, ERLINDA ESTRELLA, AURELIO
GUERRERO, MANUEL H. HIZOLA, RUBEN A. MAGTIBAY, NICOLAS
MASANGKAY, FRACTUOSA R. OBAY, LIGAYA PASCUAL, NECETE
PASTORFIDE, TRANQUILINO PUNZALAN, MYRNA P. SUNIO,
ARMANDO VILLAFLOR, MARIANO VILLANUEVA, REMEDIOS
ANONUEVO, RIBOMAPIL CLOA, MARINA COLLANTES, ERLINDA
DIMAPAWI, HEDELISA MARQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA PAELMO,
ILUMINADA SABORRIDO, DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO, MA. VICTORIA
ABRERA, ALFREDO AGACETA, JR., WILFREDO ANONUEVO, VERGILIO
BAGTAS, ROBERTO BERNAL, LORETO BOQUIREN, RAMIR BUIZA,
CELSO BULADO, NOEL CASTELO, WILLIAM DELA CRUZ, GRACIA
DIAZ, ROBERT ENCISO, ANTONIO FAJARDO, ROMEO GIANAN,
JOYCELYN GOCO, JOSE GONZALES, TEMOTEO IDEA, EMMIE
IGNACIO, MA. VICTORIA LANDICHO, MARCIANO MANIEGO, CECILIA
MERCADO, REGULO QUEJADA, ARNEL ROMERO, MANUEL SABATER,
NELIA SANTOS, AMELIA DULCE SUPETRAN, ERNESTO J. ANDRES,
LIBRADO S. GESALTA, LORNA JEAN H. PALAD, PABLO SALIGAN,
ZENY DE GUZMAN, LORETO GALLER, EMMALYN C. TRIA, SEVILIO D.
DAVID, PASENCIA A. VOTACION, LEONIDO J. AMANTE, ALMA M.
SACOPLA, MARIETA CABREROS, EUGENIO O. DIAZ, JR.,
GUENDOLYN C. BAMBALAN, GUYETO CABADING, MA. THERESA
ENRIQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA V. DE CASTRO, BENJAMIN DEVERA,
JAIME OBAR, RAUL VARELA, STEPHEN C. ACEBEDO, ELEUTERIO
AGBAY, ALMA G. ALMONEDA, ANTONIO S. ARELLANO, FILIPINAS G.
ATACADOR, MARIA M. ATIENZA, MAGAMPON Q. BABISTA,
HERMINILDA S. BALDEMOR, ANGELITA I. BALIGAD, EDUARDO J.
BANAWA, CARLOS P. BASILIO, ALEJANDRO T. BATUHAN, ROLANDO
BELANO, MARIVIC BERNARDO, ADALIA A. BISCOCHO, NATIVIDAD B.
BITOON, VICTORIA P. BORAC, M. BURCE JR., YOLANDA M.
BUSTAMANTE, PACITA C. CABANSAG, GEMMA P. CAGUÑA, EDITHA
T. CAPISTRANO, LOPE O. CARIÑO JR., EDUARDO M. CARPIO,
EDUARDO CAVIZO, ROSALINA C. CERNADILLA, ERNESTO C. CORPUZ
JR., RENAN M. CRUZADO, CRISTINA T. DE MESA, DANIEL C. DIAZ,
DIOSDADO DOCTOR, ADELAIDA C. DUAD, INOCENCIA A. DUMLAO,
JAIME D. DYSUANGCO, BENJAMIN A. EMANUEL, MARIO EPAN, JR.,
VIRGINIA G. ESCOBAR, JOSEFINA P. ESPERAS, ERLYN C. EZPELETA,
ARNEL F. FERAREZA, AMELIA A. FINO, DOMINGO FRANCISCO,
TIMOTEO GAMIT, CRISTETA GARCIA, MILAGROS GERONIMO,
GINALYN GONZALES, QUINCHITA J. GRICALDA, RAFAEL JARILLA,
JR., VALE JOSE EXEQUIEL, JR., LUZ P. LAGUNERA, ROGELIO M.
LAPUS, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, PATRICIA MALIHAN, GLORIA
MANALANSAN, EVANGELINE MARCELINO, JOYCE J. MARCIANO,
ELIZABETH Y. MATIBAG, CESAR D. MEMORACION, SALVACION R.
NOVINO, MARTINO B. OSITE, ELIZABETH PACUBAS, SATURNINO S.
PACUBAS JR., SERAPIO S. PAHIGDANA, LEMELIE PASCUA, ALMA A.
PASCUAL, ARNOLD T. PASIA, JAIME PEDROCHE, MARILOU L.
PERALTA, HOMOBNUS PIDO II, ALFREDO G. PUNO, MARIVIC S.
QUIDES, MYRNA QUIPIT, PAULINO R. RECONDO, NELLIE REGINIO,
JOSE V. REYES, CHERRY B. RIVERA, SUSANA T. ROBOSA, YOLANDA
RODRIGUEZ, DIANA A. ROMERO, REY S. ROSALES, LUCIO G.
SANTIAGO, JOBINO S. SEVALLA, ULYSSES J. SIGATON, SUSAN T.
SOLOMON, LUZVIMINDA B. TABLATE, ROWENA R. TESTON,
ERLINDA TOLENTINO, JOSEFINA G. URRUTIA, LILIBETH L. VELOSO,
OSCAR VENTURA, JOSE VICTORIA, JR., ARNOLD N. VILLADOS, NOE
L. ZETA, EUGENIO ESGUERRA, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, DANIEL GARAS,
MA. LEONORA PADILLA, MAXIMIANO RAMOS, VILLELA REYNALDO,
ANGELICA SAJONA, ROSARIO SANTOS, ANGELITA L. CRUZ, EDWIN
A. LLAGAS, LUCILA SEVILLA, MERCEDES D. AGALOOS, VICENTA V.
ANONUEVO, DALISAY S. AVELLANA, GERARDO BERNAL, LILIBETH L.
CANDONITA, FLORNIDO P. CASTRO, WILFREDO CINCO, LINO N.
DIMAPILIS, TITA P. DUEÑAS, WILFREDO C. ECAMINO, MYRNA D.
HABAGA, MARY JUNE F. MAYCA, NENITA G. MONTOYA, EDITHA N.
RECTRA, RICHARD G. SANDI, ROBERTO D. SHEAN, JUSTINA Q.
UMALI, VIOLETA B. VALERIO, TELESFORO R. VILLAMAR, DANILO N.
VILLANUEVA, EUGENIO U. VILLANUEVA, EFREN R. WAKA, MARIO W.
ALBAN, EFREN AÑONUEVO, VICENTA V. AÑONUEVO, ROSALINDA C.
ANGEL, VIOLETA A. BUAGAN, ELENITA D. CABUEÑOS, FLORIAN S.
CANTOS, LOPE M. CARIÑO SR., ROLANDO G. CLEMENTE, AREJOLA
P. CORAZON, ANTONIO D. CORIA, VIRGINIA I. DELOS SANTOS, LILY
S. DEROCA, ERLINDA A. DIMAPAWI, RANDOLPH DISCIPULO, TITA P.
DUEÑAS, ERMIE B. DAGDAGAN, CORAZON Y. FERNANDEZ, NIDA G.
GUARINO, GLENN HERALDO, ESTELA B. HERMOSURA, ADORACION
U. HERNANDEZ, GONZALO IMPERIAL, DOLORES S. LA GUARDIA,
PERCIVAL LADUB, AGNES H LAGON, TERESA M. MAÑALAC,
ISAGANI V. MANALILI, CONSTANCIO F. MARISFOSQUI, VIRGINIA A.
MELCHOR, RONALDO J. MIRANDA, FRANCIS M. MIRTO, EDWIN M.
MOJARES, ELISA D. MOLA, BENJAMIN MORTOS, CLEMENCIO A.
PAJARILLO, LAURO J. PANERIO, ELENITA G. PASCUAL, EXZER R.
RABANG, EMILIO RAMOS, VICENTE A. REGODON, ANDREA H.
REYES, MA CORAZON V. STA ANA, ZENAIDA P. STO. DOMINGO,
ILUMINADA S. TALABUCON, ANNIE E. TANTOY, MARLOU D.
VAQUILAR, NOEL B. VELASQUEZ, NANCY V. VILLAPANDO, ELISA B.
VILLAR, BELOISIE M. ALMAZAN, GLADYS B. BOQUIREN, ELIZABETH
CARIÑO, LIZ CARPIO, LORMELYN E. CLAUDIO, JOSE CORTEZ,
ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, NORBERTO A. DEL ROSARIO, VILMA C.
ELPA, OTTO E. ESPILOY, ALLAN L. LEUTERIO, EMMANUELITA D.
MENDOZA, NICANOR E. MENDOZA, CONCEPCION C. OCAMPO,
CARMELITA M. PASSE, JOSE SALVADOR PASSE JR, MORENO M.
PENALBA, ELVIRA P. PIMENTEL, VIRGINIA V. QUIMO, NAP ROQUE,
CESAR S. SIADOR JR., ILUMINADA SORIA, JULITO G. TANGALIN,
GREGORIO A. TOMILLOSO, FELICISIMO I. VICENCIO, RICARDO D.
VICENTINO, RODOLFO ARELLANO, MYRNA R. CORTEZ, EMMA N.
CRUZ, CONCEPCION C. CUNANAN, NELSON ITLIONG, RESTITUTO S.
MAGPANTAY, CATHERINE F. MANALANSAN, HENRY B.
MANDOCDOC, ISIDORO MONTOYA JR, ANDREA A. RAMOS, ARSENIA
E. SAN DIEGO, VILMA SANTIANO, PETRA T. TABUCOL, BRIGIDA T.
TACUBOY, MARILOU A. TIBOR, CORAZON R. VALDEZ, NESTOR U.
VENTURILLO, MARILYN ACOB, EMMA AGOT, DENCIO R. DADIS, MA.
AVA DATA, NORLIE N. DAVID, IRENE S. DELA CRUZ, NESTOR T.
GUERREN, GUILLERMA LAGUMBAY, ANNA LEAH MELEGRITO, EDITO
MISTA, BELEN C. NUNEZ, ESTELA B. SARMIENTO, FRANCISCO TY,
CYNTHIA L. AUSTRIA, CORITA M. BARTOLO, AMELIA L. FLORES,
PRISCILA M. MOLINA, CORAZON P. PEREZ, MANOLITA L. VELASCO,
ANTONIO E. VELOIRA, OFELIA B. VELOIRA, MEMORY FABIAN,
ROSARIO MENESES, JULIANA M. ABEN, REMEDIOS F. BONIFACIO,
MA. THERESA M. ENRIQUEZ, OFELIA B. MENDOZA, LILY T. REYES,
NARCISA B. SESE, MA. THERESA M. VILLARUEL, JOHN R. ALMAZAN,
DOLORES C. VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, ADGARDO CORPUZ,
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, CONSOLACION B. CACULITAN, NORA Y.
CALIJA, YVONNE V. CARABEO, AIDA C. CORPUZ, ROSA P. DORADO,
MINDA C. DUAD, CECILIA B. HIWATIG, RITA CRISTINA V. LAPUS,
CASILDA C. MAROHOM, CLEMENCIA A. MARQUEZ, MAXIMA
MATIBAG, EMELITA R MENDOZA, CRISNATA S. MONTRESCLAROS,
TERESITA L. OBIAS, CHONA R. PASTORFIDE, MERLY H. PATUNGAN,
ALNA U. PINEDA, ANGELITO T. PINEDA, VILMA G. QUIAMBAO,
ESTELITA T. RAGASA, LUZVIMINDA L. RAMOS, NERISSA B.
RAPANUT, CARMENCITA S. SANCHEZ, ELSA M. SIGUE, ROWENA L.
TEJADA, MYRNA M. TORREGOZA, LERMA AQUINO, CORNELIA M.
ARANETA, FERDINAND BANGCUA, REYNALDO BARBADILLO,
ALFREDO A. CLAVERIA, DAN JORGE CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DAQUIGAN,
REBECCA C. DE VERA, ERLINDA B. DIZON, MARILYN P. ESTADILLA,
CATALINA G. GARINGARAO, MYRNA MALINAO, SILVESTRE C.
MANGAWANG, FLORENCIO C. NAVALED, NOEL D. OBRA, NELIO T.
PAGLINAWAN, ANA MARIE PASCUAL, ARTURO R. PRENDOL, OTELLA
O. SANCHEZ, REYNALDO TEJADA, CRISANTO BADENHOP, JEAN C.
BORROMEO, ANA MARIA C. BUESING, MARIA TERESA CHAVEZ, GIL
F. FERAREZA, MARITES L. GALVEZ, MIGUEL B. JIMENEZ JR.,
RODANTE JOCSON, MICHAEL A. JOSE, ARNEL H. LUZ, ARNEL C.
MATREO, EDUARDA P. MERCADO, BENEDICTO P. MURILLO, MINDA
A. OSORIO, GLEN Q. PASTORFIDE, ISMAEL S. RUIZ, FE B. SENDIN,
HENRY P. SORIANO, JOYCE SORIANO, FLORENCE V. VELASQUEZ,
PRUDENCIO M. VENTURA, ROY ALAN D. VIANZON, LORETO H
VILLAS JR., CELESARIA C. ZACARIAS, GEORGE P. ABAYA,
ELIZABETH E. AMOR, LORNA ASIS, IMELDA J. BALLON, LILIA M.
BALTAZAR, AURORA I. BELEN, ELSA B. BURGOS, CORAZON D.
CALAMNO, FLORENCIO L. CARANDANG, CYNTHIA V. CARPIO,
ADAMELIA DE ONON, AMPARO L. DE RAMA, LUVIMIN L. DELA CRUZ,
VIOLETA R. GARCIA, PERLA P. MUÑOZ, PAULINA D. PAGUINTO,
JOEL PAJARILLO, ENCARMILA PANGANIBAN, ERLINDA M.
PARRENO, MA. SALVACION M. PEREZ, ALBINA L. PINEDA,
RAYMOND SANTIAGO, BRIGIDO G. SISON, REMEGIO SULLEZA,
TRAZON E. TUSCANO, MYRA B. VILLANUEVA, HENRY ABONETALLA,
MARILYN BABAAN, ELISA A. BERE, JUANITO J. BOLISAY, NORMA S.
CABALLA, ELMER CALLOPE, ELPIDIO T. DE LARA, AGNES G. DE
LEON, GERARDO R. ESPIRITU, ONOFRE P. LAXAMANA, ANSELMO
LEGASPI, CONSUELO MAGAYANES, DELEON L. MAROHOM, MARIO
MELGAR, CHOLITA R. ORTEGA, MODESTA S. PADUADA, PATRIA C.
PATRICIO, LORETA N. RAMIREZ, TERESITA C. SAN JUAN,
FELICISIMA SUMAGUE, SOLAIMAN TAWA, VICTOR TOLENTINO,
ANGELITO M. VALENZUELA, DIOSDADO VELARDE, ROBERTO M.
BASCO, JESUS B. CRUZ JR., JOSEPHINE ESTRADA, LUCIA L.
ESTRADA, LIGAYA C. EULOGIO, LEONARD FALLER, DANILO J.
GALAGNARA, MA. LOURDES P. GOROBIA, JUAN ILARDE, ISMAEL R.
JOSE, RICARDO P. MACALINO JR., ROPERTO MANALO, VIOLETA A.
MARIANO, NOBLEZA C. MERINO, PILAR C. MIGALANG, ALEJANDRO
S. MINGOY, DANILO D. PONZALAN, SERGIO TAMAYO, VIRGILIO V.
URGEL, GLORIA VILLAMAR, JULIETA ACHICO, FREDDIE P. AGAZETA,
PEDRO AGONIAS, ALBERTO G. ALBERTO, CRISTINA ALTOAR,
SALVADOR BACANI, LEONIDA BALINGAW, IMELDA BAUZON,
VIRGILIO BELGIRA, GAUDENCIA CABACUNGAN, LEONORA DAVID,
VIRGILIO D. ESTRADA, CORSINO GLORY, PRECIOSO A. LABUGUEN,
BENJAMIN LACESTE, ROSITA MACARANAS, FELIX MAURILLO,
JOVENCIO PERALTA, RUBEN R. PRENDOL, CORNELIO RETUTA,
JERRY RETUTA, BENEDICTO P. RIVERA, CORNELIO TABLANTE,
LEONILA VERGARA, LAMBERTO VILLAFUERTE, OFELIA B. AYSON,
EDITA M. BALANZA, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, OFELIA L. BUENO,
CARMELITA G. CAJIPO, TERESITA C. CANLAS, ROMEO C. ESTEBAL,
IBANA FALLAR, ANASTACIO M. FLORES JR., DEMOSTHENES
GOTHIS, MENCHELITA M. GUCILA, EDMUNDO C. LAGRIMA, ALLAN
C. LEONCIO, MARVIN M. MORALES, DIGNA Z. OBSTACULO,
CORNELIO O. PERALTA, CARLITO B. POMBO, MARIETA R. RED,
TRINIDAD A. TALARO, ADELA T. TONGCO, REGINA B. VILLADOS,
JESSICA R. ALMAZAN PERFECTO U. ALMAZAN, BERARDO BADERE,
GENOVEVA A. BIGORNIA, NATIVIDAD J. BOCAL, LORNA CABADING,
EFREN E. CAWALING, AVELINA T. DURAN, ROMEO A. FELIPE,
CORAZON GARAPAN, ANITA B IBARDOLASA, MARCIAL M. JACOBIA,
JOSE V. JARTEL, PIDO LOUISA, BASILIO H. MORENO, CARONIA L.
MURCIA, NONILA T. OMANA, AIDA P. PANGANIBAN, SUSAN CULANE
PAZ, ANITA Q. PEREYRA, MAMERTO C. PESTON JR., ROLANDO S.
RABE, VILMA SANSORONA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, LUZVIMINDA O.
YAGAYA, JULIET S. AYENTO, DIGNO D. AYSON, NORENA R. CIASICO,
JOVENCIA L. FERNANDEZ, EMILIANO P. KEMPIS, EUFROCINA B.
QUIJANO, SIXTO E. TOLENTINO JR., AMPARO P. ABAYA, CRISTINA
M. ARINGO, LEONILO WILLOU M. BERANO, JOEY B. CASTILLO,
BERNARDO CLARION, MATIAS V. CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DELGACO,
ERLINDA B. DIZON, SENECIO D. FESTIN, FLORENTINA C. VALENCIA,
SARAH ABUNGAN, JUPITER C. ALMAZAN, OFELIA BIRON, MAMERTO
C. BOLIVAR, BIENVENIDO R. CINCO, METEDIO ESTRADA JR.,
GINALYN GONZALES, ANTONIO M. LACHICA, NEMESIO
RABAJANTE, NELZON TENIOSO, HERMENEGILDO URRUTIA JR.,
VIOLETA C. VALDEZ, CRISANTO VAQUILAR, JOFRE B. ALTAREJOS,
EDGARDO L. BALDEDARA, RAUL SAUDE G. BECARES, RAMON R.
BOADO, MELCHOR R. BORLON, GEMMA CARINO, GEORGE M.
CARPIO, CARMELITA S. CUNANAN, ONESIMO A. DE CASTRO,
PURIFICACION R. DE GUZMAN, LEOPOLDO S. J. DE JESUS,
JOCELYN R. DELA CRUZ, DOMINGO U. ESGUERRA, VIRGINIA R.
ESTRELLA, OFELIA A HERNANDEZ, TRINIDAD JAVIER EUGENIA L.
LAGMAY, ANGELITA E. LIBIRAN, ARSENIO R. LIBIRAN, CARLOS M.
LOPE, RODOLFO A LOPEZ, CELSO MAALIW, ROMUALDO E.
MENDOZA, CRISPULO A. OCAMPO, ANGELITA OLOG, EVANGELINE
O. OPO, MAXIMO L. PEREZ, JOSE PONPONILLA, SIXTO P. RIVAS,
LYDIA C. ROMERO, CATALINA F. SIGATON, JESUS S. VIJIGA, MYRA
K. VILLAPANDO, GALICANO I. NER, OSCAR R. LAVIN, ESTEBAN S.
CARAG, GRACE M. VILLACRUSIS, JULIETA C. BONDAD, NILDA S.
LINING, LUCY GRACE C. BURGOS, MARIFE CHARO N. DOMINGO, MA.
VICTORIA P. DA ROZA, NILDA CATALAN, RAUL T. ORTEGA, EWARDO
R. JOSON, PRUDENCIO M. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO L. CONDE,
ARNEL M. ZURITA, EDISON A. CALAOUR, VICTOR C. CANTOR,
CARMELITA M. QUIRINO, AMBROSIO ESTABILLO, ESPERANZA B.
DALUSON, ALBERTO M. MADRILEJOS, ROLANDO C. MANALO,
RODOLFO R. RANCES, PHILIP A. PICHAY, REYNALDO C. ALAMPAY,
RENE E. FAJARDO, CELSO A. AGUILAR, REMEDIOS E. ABING,
JOSEFINA M. GAWARAN, FRANCISCO S PANGANIBAN , petitioners, vs .
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON.
CARLITO R ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine
Nuclear Research Institute , respondents.
[G.R. No. 110642. September 11, 1998.]
BERNARDO BALGOS, NICOMEDES C. AGBADA, EUFRONIO R. ALANO,

JR., ERNIE S. ALINO, CORNELIO A. ARTIENDA, CARY L. ASANA,
TRANQUILINO ATIENZA, JR., JONATHAN A. AZUCENA, ROY M.
BARCERO, CLARITA S. BELONIO, WILFREDO E. CABEZON, CANDIDO
A. CABRIDO, JR., AMELITA B. CALER, DAREF MARCELINO M. CANET,
RONALD CANTONG, ALEJANDRO J. CATIPAY, JR., HERMINIA COLAR,
ELIZABETH A. DAYTO, SALOME G. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA ESTRADA,
AURORA M. FIGUEROA, MA ANGELITA A. GADDI, RIO L. GULAPO,
MA. THERESA M. GUMABON, ANTONIO A. GUNAY, GERARD
HURTADO, ARIEL ILAGAN, WILMAR L. INFANTE, FLORECER M.
LEACHON, ANNA MA. VICTORIA LELINA, LIZA NONETTE A. MAÑIBO,
EUGENIO P. MANUEL, EDUARDO A. MENGUITO, ERIC AGAPITO
NATIVIDAD, LEONIDES N. NAVEA, MA PERPETUA OCAMPO,
REDENTOR B. PACANO, ALMOND C. PALABRICA, ELMER T. PASCUA,
CRISTY CRISTETA A. RAMOS, HENRY B. RELLOSA, ROWENA M.
RODANILLA, JOSEPH SALVADOR, CARMELLE GEORGINA SIENA,
CRECENCIANO I. SUAN, CESAR TAN, CECILIA T. VARGAS, GIL NOEL
VILLANUEVA, ANALYN S. VISTA, BENITO YU, JR., EDUARDO AKIATE,
EARTHA G. ALINO, TERESITA ANASTACIO, JOSELITO O. AVERION,
ELINO BAGOSO, FERDINAND B. BARBERO, ELSA J. BAUTISTA,
ELMER CALDERON, FRANCIS CAMELLO, RENE CANARES, RODELIO
B. CARATING, JULIETA S. CONSTANTINO, EASTER LIZA CUETO,
NANCY V. CUETO, MARIFE DELOS REYES, JERWYN L. DEMETRIO,
EDUARDO DIOKNO, MARGARET T. ESTANISLAO, MA. ARLENE M.
EVANGELISTA, SALVADOR A. FABULA, IRENE P. GERPACIO, ALMA
GONZALES, RICHMOND GONZALES, BENIE E. ILAGAN, OSCAR
JALALON, JOSEFINA JONAS, ELEANOR M. LIGANOR, FLORDELIZA
MALLARI, ROSARIO MAÑACAP, JOSE A. MANANGHAYA, JULIET R.
MANGUERRA, GLENN A. MANILA, ANGELITA C. MARCIA, CECILIA
MARQUESES, GINA MARZAN, RICHARD M. MOJICA, JOSEFINA
MORALES, SANTIAGO MOSQUEDA, MELCHITO B. NOCEDA,
SEGUNDO PACARDO, SONNY PACUNLA, ALEXANDER PANO, MA
ENQUITA PANOTES, ROMMEL M. PARCASIO, IAN A. PEDALIZO,
ROSANA PERMALINO, EVELYN PITOGO, LOLITA POLIQUIT,
LOURDES REGALA, MARIBEL REYES, JOVETTE TENORIO, HIDALGO
TOLENTINO, LUISITO TRINIDAD, MA. BLANCA A. VALDEAVILLA,
EDGARDO YBURAN, ROWENA ABELLANA, ARTURO ACOBA,
PALMAREN AGACIA, FLORENTINO AGUSTIN, JAIME ALAN,
EDUARDO ALBERTO, MACARIO ANACAN, HENRY APOLINARES,
EVELYN AUSAN, REBECCA BACUS, MARYLOU BARATANG, LORENZO
BERMILLO, LIGAYA BOBIS, MA. TERESA BOLOFER, ERNESTO
BRAMPIO, FLORA CABLIN, HENRY CACAYAN, LILIA CALICA, MA.
ANA CASUPANG, CHARITO CAUTON, ARMELYN Y. CLEMENTE,
ROOSBELT CREENCIA, FRANCISCO CRUZ, MARCELO DAYO,
MARITES DE LEON, JANE DELA CRUZ, EDGARDO DELOS SANTOS,
IMELDA DELOS SANTOS, RODEL DELOS SANTOS, ELISA DIZON,
SUSAN DUMOT, JOVEN ESPINELI, LEANDRO EVANGELISTA,
EVANGELINE FERRER, NESTOR FRANCISCO, CESARIO GEMINO,
LAURO G. HERNANDEZ, RACHEL HILARIO, MIGUEL IRACTA, OBEN
LABONETE, JAIME LADANGA, ISIDRO LEGAN, ELMIE MADRIAGA,
DIOSDADO MANALUS, OSCAR MANOIS, CRISTINA MEDRANO, LILIAN
MILLAN, GLICERIO MONTALLA, MADELEINE NAVARCE, MA. ANA
ORQUIZA, PINKY PADILLA, LUZ BRENDA PAGLINAWAN, PURISIMA
PAJARO, JOSEPHINE PASION, JOCELYN RAMOS, DOMINGO
RODULFO, DELIA SADIASA, VIRGINIA SALILI, GETULIO SAN JUAN,
FLORFINA SANCHEZ, LEOLITA SIASI, GLORIA TEJADA, FRANCIS
TORRES, ERNESTO VALMEO, WILFREDO VELASCO, EPIFANIA VILLA
JUAN, RAFAEL ACENA, ELMER ADRAQUE, EDITHA AIZON, RIZALDY
ALBERTO, RAMON ALOBBA, ALAN ANIDA, BERTOLIO ARELLANO,
VERONICA AVILA, MAY BABARAN, JOAQUIN BANZALI, MARILYN
CAACO, ROSE NELIE CABATLAO, JUANITA CALONGE, NILDA
CAPANPANGAN, CECILIA CAPUNO, TRINIDAD CARLOS, SALVACION
CAS, AMADO CREUS, PEDRO DAILEG, VIRGINIA DAILEG, NELITA DE
GUZMAN, ROWENA DE GUZMAN, ALMA ARRO DEL ROSARIO,
AMELYN ANG, BERNADETTE ESPINOSA, ESTRELITA FIDER,
REYNALDO GABALLO, NOEMI GABATO, ELMER GABAYA,
MARIBELLE GAON, LILIA GONZALES, CARISA GOSO, ROMEO
HERNANDEZ, MYRNA JOVELLANA, RONALDO LIM, GREGORIO
LLANES, ROBERTO MABUTI, DANILO MACANSANTOS, CRISOSTOMO
MAMORBOR, MA. CONCEPCION MANZO, ROBERT MARGES, ANDRE
JOHN MARTINEZ, EUFRONIO MOJICA, HENRY MOJICA, LILIAN
MONJE, MA. RAYSOLYN NATIVIDAD, LAMBERTO NERI, NICANDRO
OBEDENCIO, LISETTE ORENSE, LEA PARDE, JEFFREY PAYNOR, EVA
PUGAY, GODOFREDO RAMOS, CRISPINA RAYO, CECILIA RITO,
SALVACION RITUAL, CRISTINA SANGALANG, ELVIRA SEGOVIA,
RENE STA. MARIA, GENOVEVA TULLAO, GLORIA URRIZA,
RESTITUTO VEJERANO, RAUL VILLACORTE, ZENYBEL VILLEGAS,
ZARAH YAP, PHILIP YASAY, TRINIDAD ACERON, FLORENTINO C.
AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO ANGUE, CESAR ATIENZA, CARLOTA
AUSTRIA, JOVITA AUSTRIA, VICTORIA BAHALLA, ALLAN
BATUSBATUSAN, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, SONNY BILBAO, GINA
BRUGADA, AMELIA CABRERA, FRANCIA CAMUA, RENATO
CARRASCAL, RUSELL CASTRO, EDUARDO CAUSAREN, NELSON
CONCEPCION, MYRNA CORILLA, ROSALIA FLORA COSTALES,
NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO DE LUNA,
LUCIANA DELA CRUZ, JR., VENER DILIG, YOLANDA DINO, REMEGIO
DIWA, EDWIN DOGOMEO, MANUEL ELLANO, MITHI ENCIO,
REYNALDO ESPINO, DAVID ESPIRITU, EMILIANA GAMIT, ENRICO
HERNANDEZ, DORIS JAVATE, ALICIA JIMENEZ, ELEAZAR LOPEZ,
MA. SUSANA MARIANO, RONALDO MARAVILLA, PETER MAURICIO,
ANITA OBRERO, ARLENE OLEA, ROEL PARDE, MELCHOR PEREZ,
ROGER PRINCIPE, PRIMA PUJANTE, LILIA RAFAEL, AMELIA RALA,
ANTONIO RIVERA, LIWAYWAY RONSARIO, ERLINDA SALCEDO,
OFELIA SANGALANG, LUZVIMINDA SANTOS, EDESIA SEVILLEJA,
NANETTE SUSA, NEIL VALENTON, FILIPINA VENTIGAN, MA. IDA
VILLARALVO, ADELINE ABANCE, RAUL ACOSTA, MA. CECILIA
ADAOAG, GLEN BABANTUGAN, REMIGIO BACUS, PANTALEON
BADION, JIMMY BAJADO, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, JULIE CABALLERO,
FRANCISCO CADAJAS, EDITHA CASIBANG, NORMAN CONDE, MENA
CREUS, MARY CRUZ, MACARIO DE GUZMAN, LUPO DE LUNA,
RODOLFO DOMINGO, EMILIA EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FAUSTINO,
ALICIA DELA CRUZ FERNANDEZ, IAN FEROLINO, GIL GALAN,
ANALIZA GARIBAY, JESUS GARRIDO, FLORENCIO GATCHALIAN,
CONSORIO GERONES, VERONICA GULAFO, ALMA HERMINIA, PAUL
RODERICK HOFELINA, IDA JACA, ENRIQUE JACSON, NENEVEH
LAPUZ, ROLANDO LEAL, MILLER MANILA, DESALE MANZANO,
ROLANDO MARAON, MARIANO MARIANO, RODELIO MENORIA,
ROMEO MERIDA, JOSEFINA MONJARDIN, NILO PARDE, EMMANUEL
PASCO, NONITA QUITO, GLEN RANCE, BONIFACIO RENOBLAS,
JESUS REYES, JOSE REYES, RIZAL REYLES, JUAN ROQUE, NENITA
SALGADO, GAUDENCIO SALONGA, GALLARDO TOLENTINO,
ALBERTO TRINIDAD, MA. FELISA VARGAS, ROGELIO VAZQUEZ,
WILLIAM VEJERANO, ELIZABETH VILLANUEVA, VIRGINIA
VILLARUEL, SERGIO YEBAN, EVELYN M. ALONSO, MIE ARCA,
ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, CATHERINE BATUSBATUSAN, IRENEA
CARANDANG, LOURDES CARLENGGA, MA. ANNA F. CASUPANG,
ROSALIA FLORA O. COSTALES, ELSA DIZON, HENRY ESPINELI,
JOVEN ESPINELI, RICHARD FELIX, MA. CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ,
RENATO C. FERNANDO, LYDIA A. FULGOSINO, RENATO GONZALES,
BONIFACIO JOGNO, OSCAR MANAOIS, JULITA MOJICA, ANGELINA
MOYA, LUISITO NACO, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, SUSAN PRIANES,
EDMOND PRINCIPE, TERESA A. RAMOS, ROBERTO REYES,
MARTINET ROBLE, GRETA SALVIEJO, PEPITO SAMSON, SALVADOR
SOLIVEN, JOSE F. SUMINISTRADO, ADELINA TRINIDAD, LUCITO
AMISCARAY, FRANK JAIME AQUINO, MARIO BAISA, ALTAIR
BAUTISTA, TEODORO R. BERSABE, MODESTO L. BORJA (DR.),
EUGENIA A. BRIONES, CONRADO S. COMIA, BLESILDA C.
CONCEPCION, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS A. DE GUZMAN,
EUFRACIO V. DE LUNA, LUCIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., REYNALDO
ESPINO, DAVID F. ESPIRITU, EDUARDO FERUELO, JORGE Y. LILLO,
RONALDO I. MARAVILLA, CONRADO A. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA,
NOE NAMBATAC, LARRY P. PINERA, BENEDICTO M. QUITAIN,
ERIBERTO L. RODRIGUEZ, FEDERICO SABADO, JR., OSCAR C.
SALONGA, OSCAR C. SANGANBAYAN, FERIOLA M. SERRANO,
ANDRES P. SEVILLEJA, FELICIDAD T. ZAMORA, ARIEL ARENAS,
LOUIE CRISMO, ALBERTO DE GUZMAN, GIDEON DE LUNA,
JUNIBERT DE SAGUN, ANGELICA ECITO, CLARON ESPESO,
PORFERIO ESPINA, LEVIN GABUTAN, NORMAN GALLEMIT,
DIOSDADO JOSE, ANSELMA JUNIO, MILA LAGRIMAS, NOEMI
LASPINAS, SINFROSA PASCUA, RENATO POLIDO, ROMY RAGMA,
ROEL REYES, MARIBEL SANTOS, EVELYN SERISOLA, RAIDA V.
ALEGRE, MINDA A. AMON, GREGORIO P. ANTOLIN, JR., LUZ B.
ARVIZO, ANDRES F. BAES, JR., ALEJANDRO R. BALOLOY, BERNARDO
B. BAYANGOS, NORA S. BOQUIREN, ELMER B. BORRE, EDUARDO A.
BRION, JAIME C. CABANDE, DELIA A. CALIXTO, REYNALDO
CAMACHO, ROSALINA M. CARRION, ROGELIO N. CONCEPCION,
FARLEY O. CONDE, BIENVENIDO L. DE GUZMAN, CONRADO C. DE
JESUS, CORAZON T. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA G. DILOY, ASUNCION A.
DIMAGUILA, ONOFRE DOLAR, JR., SERGIO S. ENRIQUEZ, CORAZON
P. ESPINO, SILVINO M. FELLO, COLITA J. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO G.
GOLDING, RENATO G. GONZALES, ELIZABETH M. HERNANDO,
LILIAN T. HURTADO, GLORIA C. MACASAET, ERIC N. MARASIGAN,
MARINA P. MARGES, NORMA M. MAURICIO, GINA P. NILO, JANET G.
OPERARIO, JULIANA J. ORDOÑA, BERNARDO B. PASCUA, ELIODORA
D. RAMOS, EVELYN C. RAMOS, PERFECTO O. REYES, VICENTE V.
ROBLES, FLORENCIO A. ROJALES, CORAZON B. ROSALES, TEOTIMO
L. ROTERSOS, ELIZABETH C. SADORRA, FE D. SALIWAN, MOISES T.
SANCHEZ, ESTER S. SANTOS, RUFINO L. SANTOS, EMILIANO M.
SIBOLBORO, BAYANI V. VILLANUEVA, ERNESTO G. ALMENDRAL,
TERESITA AVISO, CLARITA BACATIO, ALFONSO G. BAUTISTA,
NARDA A. BLASCO, LUNINGNING J. BONDOC, JOSE B. BURA, ODON
CAPANGPANGAN, VIRGILIO A. CASTAÑEDA, MARIO B. COLLADO,
ARSENIO L. CALONGE, LUISITO F. COSTELO, OSCAR F. COSTELO,
NILO A. CRUCENA, ARTURO A. DAYOT, SUNNY A. DE GUZMAN,
WILFREDO B. DELA CRUZ, JULIETA G. ESPENELI, CECILIA C.
ESTRADA, PERFECTO P. EVANGELISTA, MAGDALENA Q. FAVIS,
CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENE D. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES S.
GALANTA, RAYMUNDO G. GALANTA, REDENTOR S. GATUS, JOSE G.
GERPACIO, ARNULFO B. GESITE, CLEOFE C. GONZALES, BELLA V.
HERNANDO, CARMELITA B. INCILLO, LIGAYA H. ISON, AIDA T.
LATOZA, DEOGRACIAS R. MAGTALAS, FLORENCIO G.
MANANGHAYA, MAMERTO F. MARTINEZ, NESTOR T. MERJILLA,
ALEJANDRO G. MICOSA, PABLO M. MONTALLA, EDGAR P.
NATIVIDAD, QUERUBIN A. NAVERO, HENRY E. NOCEDA, NOEMI M.
PASCUAL, BERNA G. PASTOR, MADONNA H. PEÑALBA, CRISTY C.
PERLADO, DOMINCIANO D. RAMOS, JR., LEO RETAMAR, TERESITA
V. RETAMAR, ANDRES ARIEL B. REYES, JOSE D. RONDAL, MILAGROS
F. ROSALES, OSCAR C. SALONGA, EDNA L. SAMAR, ANTONIO SAN
ANDRES, MANUEL S. SANDOVAL, SHIRLEY A. SANTOS, MANUEL S.
STA ANA, NESTOR M. TICSON, LORENZO M. TOMAS, REYNALDO R.
VILLANUEVA, MARIO E. VINLUAN, LOLITA C. AGUSTIN,
CRISOSTOMO B. ALCALDE, DIGNA R. ALLAG, MERLYNA F. ATIL,
ELISA AYO, JULITA M. AYUYAO, VICTORCITO V. BABIERRA, AMELIA
A. BANGALAN, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA, ERLINDA D. BAUTISTA, CELSO
R. BERSABE, APOLINARIO P. CARANDANG, VIOLETA E. CASTAÑEDA,
JOSEFINA L. CREENCIA, ROGELIO CREENCIA, ESPERANZA V.
DACANAY, LEONARDO M. DE LEON, LEONORA P. DE LEON, LUCIANO
C. DELA CRUZ, AURORA B. DELOS SANTOS, ROMEO P. DELOS
SANTOS, DAISY T. ELICANO, MARCIANA B. ENRIQUEZ, NATIVIDAD
P. ESCOBAR, VIRGINCITO G. ESTOCONING, REDEMCION B. GRIFAL,
CELIA C. GROSPE, LORNA L. GULAFO, VIRGINIA S. HILARIO, ARNIE
C. ILAN, ELISA N. LADANGA, IGMIDIO B. LAPIS, ULYSIS M. LATOZA,
BEATRIZ C. MAGNO, JOSE D. MANGUERRA, MA TERESA T. MANUEL,
SERAFIN B. MATAWARAN, CONRADO A. MERCADO, RAFAEL A.
MONTE, VENERANDO F. NABOA, CLEOTILDE M. NICOLAS, ELSIE V.
OBRERO, MAXIMINA OMANITO, EMILIO M. OSALVO, JOEY V.
PADILLA, MARCELINA J. PALIS, REYNALDO G. PALIS, PERLA
PANGANIBAN, WILLIE C. PERLATA, IRENEO B. RAMAT, PERLITA M.
RAMOS, EDGARDO R. REYES, JOSEPH B. ROJALES, LEOGARDA T.
RUBITE, JACQUELINE A. SABINO, ANITA M. SALANDANAN,
MEDARDO P. SALVADOR, WILFREDO B. SANIDAD, IMELDA E.
SANTOS, LEONARDO A. SEMANA, CARLOS P. SERRANO, FLORENCIO
C. STA. MARIA, RAMON P. ULIBAS, GAVINO ISAGANI P. URRIZA,
PETRONILLA T. VALENZUELA, SALVADOR F. VILLAREY, AMY O.
YAMBOT, FELIX N. ALBANO, RICARDO C. ALEGRID, ARIEL G.
ALMEDA, JULITA V. AÑONUEVO, ULDARICO A. ANDAL, JAIME S.
ANTONIO, REYNALDO P. BAJAR, BERNARDO D. BALGOS, JOSELITO
N. BANGAWAN, LEOVIGILIO R. BANTIQUE, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA,
ERNESTO BELO, LUZ C. CABAMONGAN, ANDRES B. CALIMUTAN,
MARCELO S. CRISOSTOMO, AGNEZ CRUZ, BERNARDINA I. DAGUIO,
ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, MARCELINO P. DE LEON, CARMEN P. DEL
ROSARIO, EDIZA A. DIAZ, TEODORICO C. ERNI, JULIANA M.
FAJARDO, TEORODICO M. FAJARDO, LEOVENILDA A. FERNANDEZ,
EDWIN M. GALLARITA, CONSTANCIA R. GANTIOQUI, EUGENIA G.
GARCIA, JOSE G. HAPAN, NORA B. INCIONG, LALAINE JAVINEZ,
GERMAN M. JONAS, BELTHA B. LANDICHO, ERLINDA LOVERIZA,
CLARITA J. MAESTRADO, JOSELITO MAGNO, EDUARDO B.
MALAPITAN, EDUARDO A. MANZANO, NAPTHALI Q. MAYUGA,
REMEDIOS B. MILLER, AMELIA R. MORENO, PONCIANO L. MURILLO,
JOSEPHINE L. NANA, ISABEL D. NASIS, MERCEDES V. OCAMPO,
GODOFREDO R. ODEJAR, TERESITA OLMELLA, GERMAN L. OMAÑA,
CECILIA B. ORLANES, BELINA P. PAJARITO, LUCINDA S. PANGCO,
JAIME PASCUAL, TERESITA S. PERLADO, VILMA M. QUIMSON,
CESAR H. RAMOS, ROMEO L. SACDALAN, CRISTINA M. SANDOVAL,
TERESITA S. SANDOVAL, FELICIANA A. SANTIAGO, LORNA F.
SANTOS, LUZDIVINA R. SISON, CRESENCIO O. SOLANO, NELSON B.
STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. TAJON, FE P.
VADIL, ARTHUR O. ACHA, DANILO E. ADRIATICO, MERLYN ALDABA,
ARNALDO B. ALVAREZ, REYNALDA T. AMADA, NELSON ANGELES,
FRANCISCO A. BAYALAS, TEODORO R. BERSABE, ELSA C. BORJA,
MODESTO L. BORJA, EDUARDO O. BREGANZA, EUGENIA A.
BRIONES, EDMUNDO P. BUSTILLO, RENATO S. CABRERA, MARINA N.
CAMACHO, OSCAR O. CARPIO, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, SAMUEL
M. CONTRERAS, CORAZON J. CORPUZ, YOLANDA S. COSTELO,
RAMON S. ENRIQUEZ, MERCEDES S. FERNANDO, JOSE ANTONIO
GUATLO, MARUJA JARABEJO, RAUL M. LAURENA, TERESITA D.
LIZARDO, RODOLFO L. LUCAS, CESAR M. MAGADIA, RICARTE A.
MELCHOR, JOSIE P. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA, AURORA N.
NOROMBABA, WILMA G. NOTA, REYNALDO O. PEREGRINO,
SALVACION L. PLANAS, ROGELIO L. PUMARAS, NARCISA D. RAMIS,
ROSEMELINDA R. REFORMA, ROBERTO R. REYES, LOLITA M.
RONDON, SONIA M. SALGUERO, NORBERTO SALILI, NATIVIDAD M.
SALONGA, ROSEMARIE C. SISON, VICTOR J. VILLANUEVA,
ARMANDO ARCAMO, BELINDA CABALLA, TERESITA DIVAD, PEPITO
ESPENILLI, BERCELIZA FAJARDO, NELIA GULAPO, CHRISTINE
MANAGBANAG, REYNALDO MANAGBANAG, LUIS MENDOZA, OSCAR
OSTING, EDGARDO REYES, DINO VELASQUEZ, MA. CECILIA O. DELA
PEÑA, ILUMINADA POJAS, NORA ABAYA, MARIETTA S. ABCEJO,
VICTORIA E. ABELLA, FILOMENA L. ABEN, MA. VICTORIA D.
ABESAMIS, NITA D. ABID, VERONICA ABIERO, RONELLO ABILA,
DANILO ABON, EVA ABON, EVA FE J. ABRAHAM, EDGAR A. ABRIOL,
RUBY I. ABRIOL, REMEDIOS ACASIO, ROMEO L. ACEDO, RIZALINA M
ACORDA, SUSAN B. AGAPITO, RODOLFO T. AGONCILLO,
MARGARITA N. AGOOT, MARIA H. AGOOT, ELIZABETH AGPAOA,
AVELINO AGUINALDO, JOSE R. AJON, LOURDES ALAG, LUZVIMINDA
ALBAO, LUCITA ALEGRE, EXPEDITA S. ALEJON, MELENIDA
ALMAZAN, MANUEL T. ALMOGUERRA, CAROLINA J. ALVIAR, ELVIRA
D. AMA, JOHN AMARRA, BENEDICTO ARABIT, AURORA M.
ANCHETA, RAYMUNDO ANDAY, ERIC J. ANONAS, ROSEMARIE N.
ANTEGRO, CARMENCITA APELO (DR.), ESTER AQUINO, ALEX
AQUITAÑA, EDUARDO ARCA, NANCY I. ARCANGEL, CRISPINO ARIAS,
GAUDENCIO ARIAS, ESTHERLINA D. ARIFALO, ALICIA C. ARJONA-
LAYSON, RODRIGO L. ARMENIO, ABELARDO E ARNAO, ROSALINDA
M. ARVESU, JOSEPHINE B. ASAS, MA. WYNNE A. ASTUDILLO,
VICTOR C. ATIENZA, DAVID AVANTE, LUISITO AVANTE, ANITA C.
AVILLA, HERNANDO F. AVILLA, EUSTAQUIO AWITAN, ERNESTO
BACOLOR, EFREN BACONAWA, MYRNA D. BALDECAÑAS, JUANA
BALOTRO, LORY C. BANGALISAN, GERMELINA T. BAOY, ELVIRA
BARREDA, DOLORES BAUTISTA, NIEVES V. BAUTISTA, RENATO
BAUTISTA, MELINDA A. BAYOT, EDNA T. BEGINO, BELLA C. BELOY,
CAROLYN C. BENIGNO, CALIXTA C. BERBA, JOSE C. BERNAL, LILIA
B. BERNAL, CALIXTO BERNARDO, DANTE C. BERNARDO, ERNESTO
BERNARDO, RENATO BERNARDO, MELENCIO BERNARDO, ONOFRE
S. BONIGFACIO, JOCELYN B. BOREJON, EDWARD S. BRIONES,
ROSALINDA R. BUADO, ERNESTO BUENAFLOR, FELIX BUTUHAN,
CECILLO CABUANG, GILDA CABUANG, WILFREDO CABUANG,
ROLANDO A. CAMBA, RONNIE CAPILI, AURORA CAPIRAL, MARILOU
CAPUNO, LEONCIO CARAAN, ESTELITA R. CARANDANG, REMIA B.
CARPIO, EDUARDO CASTELLANO, LOLITA A. CASTILLO, BELLA U.
CATACUTAN, CARINA P. CATIMBANG, MAURO CAYETA, CRISANTO
P. CEREZO, FELICIANO CONCEPCION, VIVIAN D. CONCEPCION,
RODANTE CONSTANTE, ADELA B. CONTRERAS, JOSEFINA A.
CONTRERAS, ANAMARIE P. CORONEL, CRISOSTOMO A. CORTEZ,
ERLINDA CORTEZ, JOSEPH ALAN D. COSTALES, ROSARIO M.
COSTALES, RUBINA O. CRESENCIO, ANTONIO CRISTOBAL,
BALGAMEL C. CROOC, VIRGINIA CRUZ, LEONILO A. DABBAY,
ROGELIO V. DACULLA, AZUCENA DAMANG, LINO I. DANTE, ERLINDA
N. DAUZ, KAREN ROSE C. DAZO, DOLORES T. DE GUZMAN, MARISSA
DE GUZMAN, MYRILOU DE GUZMAN, NATALIA C. DE GUZMAN,
REDEDIOS DE JESUS, EMELINA C. DE LEON, ANGELES DE MAYO,
VICTORIA B. DEL PRADO, CESAR M. DELA CRUZ, ESTENELY M. DELA
CRUZ, JOSE K. S. DELA CRUZ, NICANOR S. DELA CRUZ, EDUARDO
DELA TORNE, REYNALDO DELOS SANTOS, VERONICA DELOS
SANTOS, EVELYN DELOS TRINOS, GLICERIA DERROTA, GERMAN
DIAZ, AUGUSTO DIMAMENT, MEDIATRIX DIRECTO, ROMULO S.
DIRECTO, JR., STELLA DOCENA, RODOLFO DOMDOM, JACQUELINE
DONESA, ALFREDO DUCUSIN, PETRONILO B. DUMANGAS, LORNA D.
EBIO, GILBERT R. EGAÑA, ROBERT EGAÑA, ROMULO ELAMPARO,
MARLENE ENRIQUEZ, NICERATA ERMITA, LOURDES R. ERSANDO,
HERMINIO ESCALONA, NESTOR B. ESCANDOR, PEDRO ESCREZA,
MARILOU B. ESCUREL, TERESITA G. ESPOCIA, MARINA M. ESTACIO,
NANETHA ESTANTE, ELSIE ESTOPACE, MALANIE M. ESTOLE,
RODOLFO C. ESTRELLA, RICA EVASCO, LIWANAG C. FELICIANO,
EDNA A. FELIPE, EVA FEMENTIRA, BERNARDINO FERIDO, JR.,
PURIFICACION C. FERRER, FRANCISCO FETALBERO, LUCIA FLORES,
MA. GRACIA D. FLORES, NILO FRANCISCO (DR.), ZENAIDA F.
FRANCISCO, MANOLITA Z. GAERLAN, EDITHA S. GOLLA, ANTONIO
A. GANNABAN, CARLOS GARCIA, CORAZON A. GARCIA, JULIE G.
GARCIA, LIZA S. GAYAS, EVAN R. GERONIMO, BONIFACIO GODOY,
ARLENE GONZALES, HILDENCE B. GONZALES, ILUMINADA B.
GONZALES, GRACE L. GUILLERMO, BENJAMIN C. GUTIERREZ,
RODOLFO GUTIERREZ, ALEJANDRINO HADUCA, MARILYN P.
HERNANDEZ, NILDA HERNANDEZ, FREDERICO HIFE, ERQUITA
HORCA, LORETO HUMARANG, REBECCA M. IBAROLA, MELINDA O.
IGNACIO, FRANCIA ILAO, AURORA C. INDICO, DIANA INOCENCIO,
ALICIA M. IRANGA, DEOGRACIAS JAVIER, NELLY A. JIAO, CHARITO
GIMENO, DIDETTE M. JOCO, LOLITA JUNIO, LEWELLIE R.
KAMPITAN, ESTRELLITA KARGANILLA, GREGORIO LACSA, JR.,
ANTONIO LANDRITO, LETICIA R. LANDRITO, ANDRES LANGIT,
MAXIMA R. LAPUZ, ANICIA LAUREL, FLORENCIA B. LAURENCIANO,
MARCELINO E. LEGASPI, MARIO T. LEGASPI, FIDEL LIBAO, IMELDA
LIBERATO, ANITA LIBRADO, LILIA G. LIWANAG, EDEN P. LLANES,
ANTONIO C. LOPEZ, CERELINO LOPEZ, EMELINA A. LOPEZ,
VIRGILIO LORENZO, FLORO MAGO, JR., ZENAIDA MADERA,
MELCHOR MAGNAYE, ARLENE B. MAGPANTAY, FERMINA
MAGPANTAY, MAGNO MALABANAN, PABLO B. MALABANAN, LUISA
MALALOAN, MERCIA MALLARI, RICARDO MALLARI, RONALDO
MALLARI, RUSTICO MALLARI, ANGELI MALONZO, PEDRO M.
MANAIG, FLORITA S. MANGABAT, NEMESIA C. MANGABAT,
MANOLITO M. AVANTE, BERNARDO S. MANUEL, CECILIA MANUEL,
ROBERTO MANUEL, CLARIBEL MANZANO, PABLO MARASIGAN,
PEÑAFRANCIA H. MARASIGAN, RHODORA MARASIGAN, ANNABELLE
F. MARBELLA, FLORENCIO MARCIAL, HERMINIO D. MARCIAL,
RICARDO F. MARERO, JUANITO R. MARTIN, JR., BALTAZAR MATEO,
ROSALINDA P. MATEO, ESTELA MAYO, SOCORRO G. MERCADO,
AVELINO G. MILLORA, APOLINAR MIMIS, NORMA MIMIS, AL
MINAÑO, CONSUELO MIRANDA, LEONARDO MIRANDA, REBECCA R.
MIRANDA, LILIA B. MOSLARES, MARLYN MULATO, MA. VICTORIA L.
MUNN, SHA KHATAK, LEONCIA N. NABONG, AMELIA A. NACIONAL,
FLORENCIO R. NAGAÑO, JOEY N. NAPIZA, MARION NAPIZA,
ZENAIDA NATIVIDAD, ABELO NAVARRO, NICETAS S. NICOLAS,
VICENTE M. NIM, JUAN NIOLAR, LYDIA E. NONES, MARILOU W.
NUESTRO, CLEOTILDE D. OLAYRES, SUSAN R. OLID, AMELITA A.
OLIVAS, BIENVENIDO L. OPEÑA, FRANCISCA S. ORELLANO,
CONSTANCIA ORLANDA, GUELLERMO ORTICIO, BONIFACIO
ORTILLANO, ANGEL PABLO, EDUARDO PABLO, GENEROSO PACLITA,
RAYMUNDO PADILLA, NANIE L. PALABAY, ANGELINA N. PALOS,
ALAN B. PANCHO, MELITA PANCHO, ESTRELLA C. PANGANIBAN,
GINA C. PANGANIBAN, LERMA V. PANGANIBAN, PEDRO A.
PANGANIBAN, RITO PARTOSA, CYNTHIA PASADILLA, PRISCILLA E.
PASCUA, JOCELYN C. PASCUAL, REBECCA PASCUAL, FLORENCIO
PASTULERO, GERMAN PATNONGON, VENANCIO PATRICIO,
CARLEEN R. PERALTA, MARITON T. PEREZ, IMELDA D. PILLAS,
RICARDO B. PINAY-AN, JUDITH A. PLATERO, EMILY J. POLON,
BILLYADONA B. PONCE, RAUL R. PONSECA, RAMY PRADO,
BERNADEL M. PRIVADO, FERNANDO S. PRONUEVO, CARMELITA C.
PUTOLINO, NORA QUINTOS, EDNA D. RAGUINDIN, JULIAN D.
RAGUINDIN, ANACLETA G. RAMILO, FRUTO RAMOS, JULIETA
RAMOS, ROMEO R. RAMOS, SABINA RAYMUNDO, FE BIEN R.
REALON, ALFREDO RECTRA, IRENEO REGIDOR, RACHEL C. REGIDOR,
ALICE REYES, ELIZABETH L. REYES, FLORDELIZA REYES, DOLORES
E. RICAFRANCA, MANUEL RICARDO, ROBERTA L. RIGUER, GRETEL F.
RIVERA, EFREN ROBLES, PROCESO RODRIGUEZ, REMEDIOS F.
RONATO, EDEN ROSON, LEOPOLDO U. ROXAS, MOISES SADURA.,
SR., MOISES A. SADURAL, JR., VALENTIN SADURAL, JOSEFINA A.
SAGUN, RUBY F. SAHAGUN, MAURA M. SALIBA, GERLIE SALVA,
LEONCIO SALUDARES, AVELINA M. SAMIANO, REYNALDO A.
SAMIANO, JAIME G. SAN PABLO, VERONIDIA G. SAN PABLO,
BARTOLOME SANCHEZ, JOSEPHINE L. SANDOVAL, EDA SANOPO,
ELIZA C. SANTIAGO, JOEL G. SANTIAGO, TIMOTEO SANTIAGO,
CONCEPCION W. SANTOS, FELIXBERTO SANTOS, JR., JOSEFINA C.
SANTOS, MARCELINO SANTOS, RODOLFO SANTOS, CESARIO
SANTOSAN, JUMELLE G. SARABIA, JOSEPHINE SARMIENTO,
OFELIA SARMIENTO, AURORA C. SAVELLANO, SALLY SERRANO,
RODOLFO R. SIBALUCA, MARINA SILVESTRE, BASILISA C. SISON,
EDUARDO N. SISON, SYLVANA R. SISON, ESTER SOBREMONTE,
JAIME SOBREMONTE, ALFREDO SORIANO, JR., JULIA PAULA M.
SORIANO, CARMEN STA. AGATA, DOMINGA SUBA, TETERIO SUÑER,
JEROME SUPLIDO, LINA A. TABUÑAR, FERMIN TACAZON, LORENZO
TALATALA, ADORA V. TAN, NELCY L. TAÑEDO, MILAGROSA T.
TANALGO, ALBERTO C. TANCHANCO, MELECIO TARIFE, ROSARIO K.
TATLONGHARI, RUFINA B. TAYAG, HERMINIA A. TECSON, PAPA
TENGCO, LOURDES L. TEVES, CRESENCIANA R. TIMBOL, NOLI N.
TIONG, VIRGINIA B. TIONG, LILIA TIONGSON, MA. ASUNCION N.
TIONGSON, JOSEPHINE TOLENTINO, BENJAMIN TORRENTE, OSCAR
TORRES, SONIA M. TRINIDAD, RIZALINA TROPA, CRISTINA TUAZON,
HOMER E. TUAZON, RICARDO TUBUNGBAMA, HYDEE N. TUYAY,
MERCY URRUTIA, LARNE VALCARCEL, EMILIANO B. VALDEZ, JR.,
REMEDIOS S. VALDEZ, JOSIE VARGAS, FELINO VELASQUEZ, (DR.),
PEDRO A. VELASQUEZ, RAFAEL A. VELEZ, SYLVIA I. VERGARA,
BLESILDA VERIN, ADRIANO VICTORIO, JR., DOMINADOR VICTORIO,
EMILY E. VICTORIO, GLORIA VIDA, LOURDES M. VILLAFLOR,
ALBERTO A. VILLAFLORES, LEONIDO Z. VILLAFLORES, ALICE
VILLALOBOS, CATHERINE P. VILLANUEVA, EDWIN G. VILLANUEVA,
TERESITA S. VILLARIAZA, FREDERICO G. VILLARTA, EDGAR
VINCULADO, ZENAIDA C. VINCULADO, EDITHA VITALICIA, AVELINO
C. VIVO, ARLENE V. VYTIACO, MILAGROS WABE, RODOLFO
WENCESLAO, A. WONGSUWAN, HERMINIA V. YALUNG, LAARNI
ZAMORA, MARY ANN R. ZEPEDA, FERNANDO SQ. LATI, M. SIRIOS,
JOEL BOREJON, CONCHITA PUBLICO, AGRIPINA BRIONES, MILTON
SACRO, LOLITA RAZON, CONSOLACION GUERRA, ANDRES ARAÑO,
MARCELINO JUSTO, ROSALES REGINIO, PEDRO RUBALA, BENJO
BONIFACIO, ANGEL MATEO, EDUARDO QUE, MODESTA M. ANDAYA,
ANTONIETTA M. APALISOK, VIENNA E. BELTRAN, LORENZO N.
BRIANA, CRISELDA L. CASTILLO, JUANITO B. CHAN, JR., ORLANDO
S. CUYUGAN, ZORAIDA F. DE GUZMAN, VITO F. DEL FIERRO, JR.,
RELITA A. ROSA, HERMINIA S. DELOS REYES, BEATRIZ C. DIZON,
SUSAN A. FORONDA, MARY ANN P. FRANCO, ROMULO M. GARCIA,
JOVITA M. GONZALES, REBECCA O. JOSE, MARCIA B. LANUZA,
ALBERTO G. LEGASPI, ANGELINA A. MABUNGA, CONSUELO B.
MANGUBAT, ILUMINADA G. MAPAYE, AMELIA V. MARCELO,
GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, LOURDES IRENE N. MIÑOZA, EULOGIO M.
MONTEALTO, MARIO P. MUECO, LUCILDA L. PADAUAN, EDGARDO V.
SAN JUAN, MA. FATIMA S. SENGCO, CAROLYN O. TABANGCURA,
MARIETA U. TIBAYAN, MARIETA E. TUGADE , petitioners, vs . HON.
GODOFREDO N. ALCASID, JR., in his official capacity as the Director
of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management, HON. ROMEO N.
ALCASID, in his official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry, and HON. PEDRO O. OCAMPO, in his official
capacity as the Executive Director of the Livestock Development
Council , respondents.
[G.R. No. 111494. September 11, 1998.]
DIONELO D. IBABAO, ELVIRA F. SIMON, AURORA M. CRISTOBAL,

ONOFRE T. SUBA, NELITA DIAZ, ERNESTO NUVAL, ENRIQUE LACSA,
SABINA DIAZ, MAGTANGGOL SANTIAGO, VALENTIN TANZUACO,
ANGELITO TABORA, LOIDA CAINGLIT, ALBERTO SANTIAGO III,
HOSPICIO C. MAHILUM, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., PABLO RABINO,
LORETO GANIR, MODESTO DAYON, GLICERIA TUAZON, HONOLITA
ALMONTE, RAQUEL RAMOS, ADORACION C. JASTILLANA, RICARDO
ESGUERRA, JONATHAN DICKSON, ROBERTO TIONGSON,
BIENVENIDO RICAFRENTE, ALFREDO TAYAG, ROLANDO
CAJANDING, AMELITO GOLLOSO, REYNALDO RONQUILLO, LEONCIO
LEGASPI, REYNALDO DELA CRUZ, NICANOR LLAMAS, MARIANO
ODHOY, LORETO GANIR, TERESITA MALLA, ORBETA GUERRERO,
HILARION LAGUA, PABLO ABAD, ALBERTO LAPERAL, JR., CLARITA
ULANDAY, TERESITA LOPEZ, CRESENCIA MALONZO, NATIVIDAD
LAGUA, JERICARDO MONDRAGON, FILOMENA GANTE, JESUSA
WAJI, LEONORA SIGNE, MARILOU ROSANA, JOSEFINA FRANCISCO,
MARIA AFRICA MENDIORO, SEVERO BALANE, JR., TEODORO
JOCSON, MARISSA ALBALADEJO, FLORA CASEM, MILAGROS
FLORADA, TOMASA CARANDANG, MERLY REPANI, SUSAN GARCIA,
BENJAMIN NUNEZ ANA MARIE ARENAS, ROMUALDO POL, JULITA
LAVARO, HERMINIO MAHILUM, AMIANA ABELLA, ADELAIDA
ALCISTO, RIZALINA M. LEGASTO, MILAGROS LEDESMA, LORNA P.
ANACLETO, AUGUSTO T. REGIO, CYNTHIA P. ISAAC, FELIPE
ALBANO, ROSALINA Q. DE LA CRUZ, MITZI C. FERNANDEZ, RUSSEL
DIAZ, VALENTINO MACASAET, SALVADOR DELFINO, MAXIMO
ESGUERRA, JR., JUNELITA PACIO, ERNESTO TUZON, VIOLA
MARIANO, LUTGARDA SEBASTIAN, MARCO PEREZ, ISABELO
MACABUGAO, FRANCISCO FABRO, ERLINDA CLAVO, DOMINGO
JOCSON, ENECITAS TABORADA, LUISA TUASON, ROSALIO BAZ, JR.,
LUZVIMINDA SALDUA, TEODORA OAMINAL, LEONOR BRINGAS,
DAISY LADRA, MERCEDES SANGREO, ZENAIDA MUNON, ANTONIO
AMURAO, PERCIVAL ECITO, SYLVIA MON, LOURDES MANGASI,
BENIGNO MAGNO, ZOILO AQUINO, ROSARIE ARREZA, PILAR
FONTELAR, FLOR ABELLA, MERCEDITA BANTAYA, PACIENCIA
FIGUEROA, HILDA BALLO, MAURICIO BALLO, RODOLFO C. PINTO,
CESAR GUERRERO, VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS, ALICE CORDERO,
MYRNA ABILAR, ROSA BASSIG, ADORACION OBINQUE, AMELITA
MAGBAGO, MACARIA ANDRADE, CONSUELO BALTAZAR, ELIZABETH
VIANA, ROSARIO RAGAZA, JOSEFINO MONDRAGON, CONRADO
GANIR, FILIPINA GOJAR, EMILIA BARRAMEDA, CIRILA LEYVA,
FREDA ROXAS, CORAZON DE LA CRUZ, ROSITA CALVELO, ROSARIO
LIZARDO, CRISTINA NUQUI, FELICISIMA MAXINO, JACINTO
ARUCAN, JR., LORETA DE GUZMAN, LEONORA DE LEON, LYDIA
AGUILING, DALISAY MONEDA, LOURDES LIZA, PAZ LADERAS, EFREN
LUNA, EVELYN CABUS, ESTER CONCEPCION, ARIEL BAUTISTA,
FRANCIA AMAQUI, FRANCISCA BIANES, PAZ LUCERO, ERLINDA
ESPINOSA, TERESITA CATACUTAN, REGINO OGSIMER, ESTRELLA
ORENSE, MARYLOU VILLAREAL, ALMA DICKSON, NATIVIDAD RAZO,
ALICIA SUALOG, ERLINDA ARALAR, REDENTOR GATUS, FORTUNATO
CABEZAS, CECILIA REYES, AURORA REYES, BARTOLOME
SANTIAGO, JESUS DELA TORRE, CONSOLACION SEVILLA, HENRY
LUGAYAN, ANGELES GALERA, REUBEN A. GANADEN, JULITA
ABULON, LINA SANTOS, GLORIA C. BERGADO, ANSELMA S.
LEGASPI, LEONORA RIVERA, EDITHA MALOLOS, JESUS SANCHEZ,
ALBERTO MOLERO, DOMINGO TUAZON, JR., SOFIA S. BASA,
SUSANA EDIC, FELIPE ELEDA, ARMANDO LANDAYAN, RICARDO
MAR, JR., AUGUSTO SANTOS, ARSENIA AREVALO, ERLINDA
ABUEVA, VIRGILIO SANTOS, GAUDENCIO BADIOLA, JR., MODESTA
ANGELES, RENATO GUTIERREZ, LUCERNA ICAPIN, MARLENE
CALANGIAN, NEMENCIO AREVALO, NENITA DE GUZMAN, LOURDES
PALO, MANUEL CABRERA, BENJAMIN MAGAT, ERNESTO REYES,
EUGENE SANGALANG, ARMANDO ALCAZAR, JOSELITO
MAGHIRANG, ROMEO DIETA, ROFER ESQUIRRES, DONATO
ALMARINEZ, MELITA CONSULTA, RENATO VILLAFRANCA, LEONCIO
ALVAREZ, MANUEL SOTOMAYOR, LEOVELITO CATALLA,
APOLINARIO GICOS, FLORIDA ARBOLEDA, ROMEO PORNOBI,
CANDIDO SOTOMAYOR, GREGORIO BARRION, CARMELA EUBION,
DANILO NAGPALA, ANGELITO VALDEZ, LEONARDO SAN JUAN,
CLAUDIO RESMA, CESAR GALERA, DANTE AMURAO, FLORDELIZA DE
JESUS, EULENIA FERNANDO, BENEVERT FERNANDO, AQUILINO
RONQUILLO, MONA NARVAZ, VIVIAN NEBRES, ALBERTO NUNEZ,
MARINA DUMOL, ARCADIO ISON, NORMA BORJA REYMUNDO
NEBRES, ALEX MOLE, NALDA TANADA, ARMANDO VILLANUEVA,
NIDA BALANE, ROSALIND SANTOS, NILA MITRA MEDRANO,
ELIZABETH BAUN, ALFREDO VILLATUYA, ROY GARCIA, AVELINA
BIERNES RODOLFO ASIS, ARTEMIO GINES, AURITA CASTILLO,
HOMERTO RIOMALOS, ALICIA DELOS SANTOS, GRACE DE VEYRA,
SALUD R. GANADEN, LOLITA SUIZO, ERLINDA PICHAY, NELIA TIEL,
DORIS FRIAS, JOSIE SAN PEDRO, JOHNNY ICONAR, AURORA
ROCABO, ALICIA BORROMEO, RAMIR MASAYDA, JUANITA AMURAO,
BELINDA SAN DIEGO, SIMEONA REGIDOR, JOSEFINA GENESERA,
PATRICIA AQUINO, EDWYN ALESNA, HECTOR BAUN, DANILO
LUCERO, PURITA DELA PENA, FELIONOR ELESERIO, AUGUSTO
HERNANDEZ, LINA ZULUETA, PHOEBE LAQUINDANUM, ELMER
ALBA, MYRNA RAMOS, EFIPANIO ABAYA, LUZVIMINDA MATIGNAS,
GUILLERMO AQUINO, JR., RICARDO VERSOZA, NELSON FRANCISCO,
EDUARDO BUTAC, ADORADO CAINGLIT, ROLANDO SIKAT, THELMO
MAGSUMBOL, ELOISA UZON, JUSTONATO PENIANO, PEDRO
NATIVIDAD, DOMINGO ASUNCION, NARCISO GARCIA, RESTITUTO
SANCHEZ, HELEN IBARRA, ALFREDO DUCANTE, ARMANDO
MARTINEZ, GLORIA PASCO, EMMA MARFORI, RICARDO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO MORALES, EDUARDO TOLENTINO, TITO DELA CRUZ,
REGINALD GONZALES, JOSE PACLIBARE, JOSELITO SONGA,
VIRGILIO LEOPANDO, LEVITA ZAPANTA, FELIPA LOPEZ, ELPIDIO
MENDOZA, EDMUNDO EDROSO, DOMINGO CATALLA, VERGEL
BIADO, DIEGO BUTAC, PROSPERO PASTORAL, CESAR AMINES,
REGINO OPORTO, JR., ARMANDO LAGUIDAO, REYGALDINE
RAMIREZ, SEVERINO ESCOBAR, JR., BERNABE GONZALES, MAXIMO
GATDULA, ALEMAR SABATIN, BONIFACIO GANDULLAS, MARCELINO
TACADAO, SEVERINO BARICANOSA, PACIFICO FRANCISCO,
EDUARDO SALCEDO, RODOLFO SINGH, FLORENCIO SERANILLO,
ELPIDIO MACABALOS, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOSE LACTAO, JULITA
FADRIGUELA, PERFECTO GUERRERO, JR., EDITHO DEMDAM, ROMEO
B. DE SAGUN, VIOLETA RAMOS, VIRGINIA LOPEZ, CARMENCITA
TOCINO, SALVADOR NIERRAS, MARILYN BERNALDO, CELIA
BUSQUE, JOSE CALDERON, AMADO ANONUEVO, LEODEGARIO
CAWALING, CELSO IGANCIO, MARCIAL CAGUICLA, CRISPIN DELA
CRUZ, GIL FERRER, FARIDA BATOLOS, MARGIE KILAKIL, EMMA
BOROMEO, HERMINIO LEYVA, ROGELIO BERNABE, OSCAR
BANDIOLA, MELCHOR TAYAMEN, RUBEN REYES, ANGELITA
SALGUET, JOEDOCIEL DANTING, ALMA MENDOZA, RENATO
MENDOZA, FRANK QUIMSON, EVELYN ZAFRA, MELITONA PENADA,
BENICIO SINGQUENCO, NICANOR CRISOSTOMO, ROSEBELLA
JUMARAN, ABNER BUENAVENTURA, ADELAIDA PALMA, MARCELO
VALDEZ, LILIBETH AFAN, JOSE NAVIDAD, JUANITO BACANI,
ROGELIO LONGALONG, GLICERIO SANTOS, AMOR SANTOS, FE DE
JESUS, JAIME DE JESUS, JOSE VICTORIO, ENRIQUE MARQUEZ,
EDMUNDO GADUANG, WESLEY ROSARIO, ROLANDO MIRANDA,
WILHELMINA NATIVIDAD, JOSE NATIVIDAD, GUILLERMO OQUENDO,
CLETO RAFER, JR., LEDA G. HANDOG, CORAZON MANUBAY, ELADIO
GONZALES, JOY DELA CRUZ, ADAN DIAMANTE, ELADIO
VILLAMATER, GLORIA MATIAS, VIRGINIA S. LUYUN, FIDELITO
CALUPIG, RODOLFO JEREMIAS, JOSEPH BANDALA, CONCEPCION
JUICO, PRISCILLA ANGELES, ALFREDO SANTOS, JR., PROCOPIO
MACOLOR, AURELIA RABARA, DANILO SINGQUENCO, HARRIETO
CAMARINES, NAMNAMA JAVELLOSA, AMELIA S. MAALA, RAFAEL
RAMISCAL, FRANCISCO TABORDA, CATALINO REYES, NELSON
CALVELO, JOHN TABAY, BENJAMIN PINEDA , petitioners, vs . HON.
ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The
Department Of Agriculture and HON. GUILLERMO R. MORALES, in
his capacity as Director, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources , respondents.
[G.R. No. 112056. September 11, 1998.]
JUVY CLAVEL P. GACULA, ANDY R. RIVERA, LORENZO T. SUBARIA,

LEO J. BERNAL, CYNTHIA L. DE VEAS, AVELINA L. DIOCES, FE Y.
FELICIANO, THELMA A. GECOLEA, RODOLFO R. PANGAN, MAURA
JASMIN A. REYES, PENNY MARIE G. TAN, TERESITA V. CHAN, NENA
A. INOCENCIO, PELAGIA G. ABAYA, FELIX P. BERNARDINO, MA.
LUISA M. CALDITO, EDGARDO F. DE JESUS, PARALUMAN T. DELA
PAZ, RENATO F. GILERA, LEOVIGILDO G. MALZAN, CLARITA O.
OLANO, HERNAN Z. PEREZ, MILAGROS S. PILAPIL, GAUDENCIO L.
RAMOS, JR., ADORACION J. SANTIAGO, ANDREA O. TAMINA,
TRINIDAD N. TOLENTINO, CARMELITA F. ZAFRA, CARMELO P.
ABADILLA, EMMA L. LOGRONIO, CARMELITA B. AGPOON, ANTONIO
G. ARIZALA, DOHME C ARPON, RENATO A. BACLAGAN, MANOLITO
A. CUETO, REYNALDO G. CUSTODIO, ROBLETO M. GULOY, OLIMPIO
P. MARIBAO, JR., MANUEL V. MIRANDA, JOSE RANADA, JR., JESUS
R. REVIDAD, REX P. SEVILLA, FEDERICO D. SORIANO, BENEDICTO L.
STA. ANA, DANIEL S. TOLENTINO, WILFREDO G. VILLANUEVA,
GUILLERMO O. BALURAN, JOSE G. BATTUNG, MANOLITO J.
BERNAL, DELFIN R. BRAVO, PATRICK V. CALDITO, DANILO L.
CATIPUNAN, ANTONIO G. COSTOSA, ROLANDO S. EBERO, BENITO
W. GONZAGA, DIVINA S. LEANO, FREDDIE D. LESTINO, RAUL A.
LLAANZANA, JUANITO M. MANSANADEZ, IMELDA M. MIRANDA,
ROGELIO J. ORDONEZ, ESTEBAN M. PAREDES, ROMEO S. CARDOSO,
ROBERTO E. CASAYURAN, RAQUEL V. CATIPUNAN, MARCIANO F.
CRUZ, JULIEN C. DE TORRES, RAYMUNDO N. GABAY, CRISANTA B.
MALICDEM, GLENARDO A. MIJARES, EDA R. NOCON, ERNESTO Q.
OBRIQUE, ROMEO D. SISNERO, ANGELITO C. TALAGON, SOLEDAD S.
CRUZ, JOSELITA G. ENCISO, JOSE CARMELO N. LEANO, ROMEO S.
SILORIO, EDGARDO L. VIBAR, LOURDES F. ELARDE, ANGELINA E.
RACHO, ROMILDA DE ASIS, GLYCIDAS P. INIGO, CONCHITA M.
LACEDA, AUREA M. LUCAS, JOSE ROLANDO J. MANLULU, SERGIO R.
MANRIQUE, ELVIRA G. NAZARET, JOSELINE P. NIWANE, LYDIA J.
RUIZ, ALFREDO M. TORRES, CESAR A. AQUINO, MANUEL P.
BALATINSAYO, MONETTE B. CADIANG, RODRIGO O. ESTAMO,
ADELAIDA Y. FERRER, EDNA L. LOGRONIO, LEONARDO B.
PONFERRADA, SUSANA M. SANTOS, CONCHITINA Y. SEVILLA,
LIBERTY Z. VALLESTERO, LERMA G. VILLANUEVA, ESPERANZA J.
MERCADO, MA. BESSIE P. DIAMANTE, ROSARIO G. MAYRINA,
MAXIMINA D. SABINORIO, YOLANDA G. ZALDUA, MA. VICTORIA B.
ANGELES, NOLASCO K BALIBALOS, EDNA C. BAYUGA, MANUELITO
C. BONGABONG, GINA B. CRISOSTOMO, TERESITA N. CUNANAN,
FILIPINA G. DE MESA, LOIDA M. GARCIA, GODREY T. GOLLAYAN,
CYNTHIA B. LAGASCA, DIEMMA C. MUNDO, LEONOR S. PALMA,
DELFIN V. PILLE, PATRICIO G. REYES, JR., LOIDA M. VILLANUEVA,
EVA G. ZOSA, FELY C. ARANO, RUEL E. BADINAS, IMELDA F.
BARRACA, HELEN GRACE N. CRUZ, ERNESTO P. GIMAS, ALEX D.
GUARDIAN, BEHILDA L. HEZETA, JOCELYN D. NAGUIT, EDMUNDO A.
NUEVO, SOLOMON F. PAZ, LOURDES C. BALING, EMPERATRIZ N.
NEPOMUCENO, ROSAL C. GUARDIAN, REMEDIOS A. ANCHETA,
ROSEMARIE L. BOBIER, MA. ALICIA BONOAN, GEMMA V. BORJA,
ANELY BURGO, FINARDO G. CABILAO, ROSALIE F. DOBLES, EDNA E.
FRANCISCO, ANGELINA V. OPLEDA, MARITES K. RANESES, LIBERTY
D. RESTAN, ANNABEL ARRIETA, OSCAR B. BALAYAN, THELMA
BALAYAN, JESUSA A. CABILAO, ELISEO C. COPIAN, FERNANDO C.
DELA CRUZ, JESUS S. FAR, JOSE G. FUERTES, HANNIBAL A.
GALANG, RICARDO M. GALING II, ARNEL B. GARCIA, IRISH B.
MANJARES, MARITESS M. MARISTELA, SYLVIA S. RED, ARLENE M.
REYES, DELILAH H. SAMSON, FARAH D. SELGA, ERNESTINA Z.
SOLLOSO, HELEN URBANO, MARIVIC L. UY, OLIVIA A. UY, ROMEO S.
ZAFRA, CECILIA G. ALEMAN, JULIETA A. ALFEREZ, PERPETUA
BALIBALOS, MARILOU C. BANCUD, ARABECQUE T. BATILONG,
PORFIRIO R. BATUYONG, TONI BINALLA, AIDA E. BORINES, ELISIA
D. CLAVANO, ESTER R. EGAMINO, RAMIL R. EGAMINO, MARIAN L.
LOFRANCO, FLORESA T. MARANAN, CYMBELINE S. MARTINEZ,
LORELIE A. SUELO, MARLYN B. AMIGO, LINA A. ARANETA,
JOSEPHINE G. BANAAG, ROWENA CABANERO, IRENE O. DE
OCAMPO, LEAH C. EDADES, FILOMENA LA CORTE, MILAGROS P.
ORTICIO, MERLINDA C. SABIO, ADANIA SAKALURAN, PRISCILA M.
YBERA, DELIA G. CORPUZ, PILAR B. MUSCAT, LIGAYA M. ORGANO,
BARBARA LUZ R. PEREZ, NIMFA MARIA C. VIDAR, CRISTINO G.
BABIDA, NENITA G. CRUZ, MERLITA B. CRUZADO, AMELITA O.
DABBAN, EMMA C. DERICO, EMMANUEL M. LASAC, ARACELI V.
MALABANAN, MA. TERESA T. MONTALBO, LOLITA R. NOBIO,
GUILLERMO A. PINGOL, JR., JUDITH R. VILLEGAS, CONSOLACION O.
DELA CRUZ, ROSALINA J. DITAN, CARMEN I. MONARES, DOMINGO
O. JAVIER, JESUS B. REMEGIO, MARILOU S. REMEGIO, ELSA L.
MAGAT, RICARDO P. MASINSIN, SANDRA B. PANAHON, MARIETTA
T. FLOTILDES , petitioners, vs . HON. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in
her capacity as the Secretary of the Dept. of Social Welfare and
Development , respondent.
[G.R. No. 119597. September 11, 1998.]
ASSOCIATION OF DEDICATED EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILIPPINE

TOURISM AUTHORITY (ADEPT) , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON
AUDIT (COA) , respondent.
Padilla Jimenez Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In G.R. Nos. 109406, 111494 and 112056, petitioners are officials and employees of
several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the
year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. On January 19,
1993, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 29 authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and
reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of Adm. Order No. 268 enjoining the grant of
productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29
directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992
Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Sec. 1 hereof to
immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to
commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of the Order. In compliance therewith, the
heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction
from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments; to prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their
salaries or allowances, the petitioners came to this Court for relief. cdasia
In G.R. No. 119597, the petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (ADEPT), is an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism
Authority who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant
to RA 6971, otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990, but the bonus
was disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was prohibited under
Administrative Order No. 29. The disallowance of the bonus was finally brought on appeal
to the COA which denied the appeal. Hence, this petition.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS; GOVERNMENT-OWNED

AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS; GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS DISTINGUISHED
FROM PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS. — Government-owned and controlled corporations may
perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for
which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or
earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and
for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the
function is governmental. Powers classified as "proprietary" are those intended for private
advantage and benefit. aASEcH
2. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO BARGAIN; RULE. — After a careful study, the Court is
of the view, and so holds, that contrary to petitioner's interpretation, the government-
owned and controlled corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso (Bicameral Conference
Committee on Labor and Employment) had in mind were government-owned and
controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation law. This is so
because only workers in private corporations and government-owned and controlled
corporations, incorporated under the general corporation law, have the right to bargain
(collectively). Those in government corporations with special charter, which are subject to
Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively), except where the terms and
conditions of employment are not fixed by law. Their rights and duties are not comparable
with those in the private sector. "Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in
the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated
power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements." (Alliance of Government
Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1) (Emphasis Supplied). To
repeat, employees of government corporations created by special charters have neither
the right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively, as defined in the Labor Code. The
case of Social Security System Employees Association indicates the following remedy of
government workers not allowed to strike or bargain collectively, to wit: "Government
employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within
the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances,
the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts
and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands. " (supra, footnote 14, p. 698; emphasis supplied)
3. ID.; PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVES ACT OF 1990 (RA 6971); COVERS ONLY
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS PERFORMING PROPRIETARY
FUNCTIONS. — It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. The provisions of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to
include only government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions within its coverage.
4. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT INCLUDE EMPLOYEES OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY;
REASON THEREFOR. — It is evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter subject to Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, is
already within the scope of an incentives award system under Section 1, Rule X of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission
("Commission"). Since government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters do have an incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address
the same concern of officials and employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations incorporated under the general corporation law. All things studiedly
considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in the finding by
respondent Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the
promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the "power of
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment." In the case under
scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions
of RA 6971. ACEIac
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; FUNCTIONS. — In

establishing a Civil Service Commission, the 1987 Constitution delineated its function, as
follows: "The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It
shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs" (Section 3, Article IX, B, 1987 Constitution.) The
Commission handles personnel matters of the government. As the central personnel
agency of the Government, it is tasked to formulate and establish a system of incentives
and rewards for official and employees in the public sector, alike.
6. POLITICAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; PRESIDENT; POWER OF CONTROL. —
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive
departments — "The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." (Section 17, Article VII,
1987 Constitution). Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter." It has been held that "[t]he President can, by
virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise
this power motu propio without need of any appeal from any party." AaEDcS
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE ISSUANCE OF AO 25 LIMITING THE AMOUNT OF
INCENTIVE BENEFITS; REASONS. — When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount
of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive
benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO 29.
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization
among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the
equal payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their
employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby
resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In the view of the President,
respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised
a constitutionally-protected prerogative.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AN ENCROACHMENT UPON THE AUTHORITY OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TO GRANT BENEFITS TO GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL. — It
cannot be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission on
Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke
the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the
grant and amount thereof. Sound management and effective utilization of financial
resources of government are basically executive functions, not the Commission's.
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is
authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the
Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or
his duly empowered alter ego. Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of
incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it
to state that "[n]ot all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts
(United States of America vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)." The acts involved in this case are
governmental. Besides, the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the
incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or
enforceable obligation. HAIDcE
DECISION
PURISIMA , J : p
These are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and validity
of Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 on various grounds. LLpr
The facts in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are undisputed, to wit:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies
who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1
("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos
("President Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3
and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO
268"), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the
President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount
authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the
return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days
after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or
agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the
deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the
alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from
their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the
other consolidated cases. The petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the
Philippine Tourism Authority ("ADEPT"), is an association of employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority ("PTA") who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year
1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 ("RA 6971"), otherwise known as the Productivity
Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor
on the ground that it was "prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19,
1993." 6 The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal to the
Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the appeal in its Decision 7 of March 6, 1995,
ratiocinating, thus:
". . . Firstly, the provisions of RA #6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned, refer
to business enterprises including government owned and/or controlled
corporations performing proprietary functions.
Section 1a of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA #6971 classified such
coverage as:
"All business enterprises, with or without existing duly certified labor
organizations, including government owned and/or controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business
or profit and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired
in pursuance of a policy of the State enunciated in the Constitution, or by
law and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil
Service. (emphasis supplied)
The PTrA is a GOCC created in pursuance of a policy of the State. Section
9 of Presidential Decree No. 189 states that "To implement the policies and
program of the Department (Dept. of Tourism), there is hereby created a
Philippine Tourism Authority, . . . ." Likewise, Section 21 of the same decree
provides that "All officials and employees of the Authority, . . ., shall be
subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and the coverage of the
Wage and Position Classification Office."
Furthermore, although Supplemental Rules and Regulations implementing
R.A. #6971 was issued only on December 27, 1991, the law itself is clear
that it pertains to private business enterprises whose employees are
covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines, as mentioned in the
following provisions:
"Section 5. Labor Management Committee. . . . that at the request of
any party to the negotiation, the National Wages and Productivity
Commission of the Department of Labor and Employment shall provide
the necessary studies, . . . ."
"Section 8. Notification. — A business enterprise which adopts a

productivity incentive program shall submit copies of the same to the
National Wages and Productivity Commission and to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for their information and record."
"Section 9. Disputes and Grievances. — Whenever disputes, grievances,
or other matters arise from the interpretation or implementation of the
productivity incentive program, . . . may seek the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment for such purpose. . . ."
Therefore, considering the foregoing, the PTrA is within the "exclusion" provision
of the Implementing Rules of RA #6971 and so, it (PTrA) does not fall within its
coverage as being entitled to the productivity incentive bonus under RA #6971.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 29 which is the basis for the grant of the
productivity incentive bonus/benefits for CY 1992 also expressly provides
"prohibiting payments of similar benefits in future years unless duly authorized by
the President."
Thirdly, the disallowance of the Auditor, PTrA has already been resolved when this
Commission circularized thru COA Memorandum #92-758 dated April 3, 1992 the
Supplemental to Rules Implementing RA 6971 otherwise known as the
"Productivity Incentives Act of 1990." . . .
Lastly, considering the title of RA #6971, i.e. "An Act to encourage productivity
and maintain industrial peace by providing incentives to both labor and capital",
and its implementing rules and regulations prepared by the Department of Labor
and Employment and the Department of Finance, this Office concludes that said
law/regulation pertains to agencies in the private sector whose employees are
covered by the Labor Code."
With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the petition in G.R. No.
119597, to seek relief from the aforesaid decision of COA.
We will first resolve the issue on the applicability of RA 6971 to petitioner ADEPT in G.R.
No. 119597 before passing upon the constitutionality or validity of Administrative Orders
29 and 268.
Section 3 of RA 6971, reads:
"SEC. 3. Coverage. — This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or
without existing and duly recognized or certified labor organizations, including
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions.
It shall cover all employees and workers including casual, regular, supervisory and
managerial employees." (emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 10 8 of RA 6971, the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Finance

issued Supplemental Rules to Implement the said law, as follows:
"Section 1. Paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of the Rules Implementing RA
6971, shall be amended to read as follows:
Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor
organizations, including government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business or
profit or gain and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or acquired in
pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the Constitution or by law, and
those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. (emphasis
ours)
xxx xxx xxx"
Petitioner contends that the PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation

performing proprietary function, and therefore the Secretary of Labor and Employment and
Secretary of Finance exceeded their authority in issuing the aforestated Supplemental
Rules Implementing RA 6971.
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary
functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the
purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is
proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good
and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. 9 Powers
classified as "proprietary" are those intended for private advantage and benefit. 10
The PTA was established by Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 564 ("PD 564").
Its general purposes 1 1 are:
1. To implement the policies and programs of the Department of
Tourism ("Department");
2. To develop tourist zones;
3. To assist private enterprises in undertaking tourism projects;
4. To operate and maintain tourist facilities;
5. To assure land availability for private investors in hotels and other
tourist facilities;
6. To coordinate all tourism project plans and operations.
Its specific functions and powers 1 2 are:
1. Planning and development of tourism projects
a. To assist the Department make a comprehensive survey of the
physical and natural tourism resources of the Philippines; to
establish the order of priority for development of said areas; to
recommend to the President the proclamation of a tourist
zone; and to define and fix the boundaries of the zone;
b. To formulate a development plan for each zone;
c. To submit to the President through the National Economic and
Development Authority for review and approval all development
plans before the same are enforced or implemented;
d. To submit to the President an Annual Progress Report;
e. To assist the Department to determine the additional capacity
requirements for various tourist facilities and services; to
prepare a ten-year Tourism Priorities Plan; to update annually
the ten year Tourism Priorities Plan.
f. To gather, collate and analyze statistical data and other
pertinent information for the effective implementation of PD
564.
2. Acquisition and disposition of lands and other assets for tourist zone
purposes
a. To acquire possession and ownership of all lands transferred
to it from other government corporations and institutions and
any land having tourism potential and earmarked in the Tourism
Priorities Plans for intensive development into a tourist zone or
as a part thereof, subject to the approval of the President.
b. To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land within and without the tourist
zones for any of the following reasons: (a) consolidation of
lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of
land speculation in areas declared as tourist zones, (c)
acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection of water
shed areas and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for
any other purpose expressly authorized under PD 564.
c. For the purpose of providing land acquisition assistance to
registered tourism enterprises, to sell, subdivide, resell, lease,
sublease, rent out, or otherwise, to said registered tourism
enterprises under sufficiently soft terms for use specifically in
the development of hotels, recreational facilities, and other
tourist services.
d. To develop and/or subdivide any land in its name or undertake
condominium projects thereon, and sell subdivision lots or
condominium units to private persons for investment
purposes.
e. To take over or transfer to a registered tourism enterprise in
accordance with law any lease on foreshore areas within a
tourist zone or adjacent thereto, in cases said areas are not
being utilized in accordance with the PTA's approved zone
development plan and wherein the lessee concerned does not
agree to conform accordingly.
f. To arrange for the reclamation of any land adjacent to or
adjoining a tourist zone in coordination with appropriate
government agencies.

3. Infrastructure development for tourist zone purposes
a. To contract, supervise and pay for infrastructure works and civil
works within a tourist zone owned and operated by the PTA..
b. To coordinate with appropriate government agencies the
development of infrastructure requirements supporting a
tourist zone.
c. To take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake, spring,
or waterfall and to alter, straighten, obstruct or increase the
flow of water in streams.
4. Zone administration and control
a. To formulate and implement zoning regulations.
b. To determine and regulate the enterprises to be established
within a tourist zone.
c To ensure, through the proper authorities concerned, the
ecological preservation, maintenance and/or rehabilitation of
the common and the public areas within a tourist zone and the
environment thereof.
d. To identify and recommend to the President the preservation
and/or restoration of national monuments or preserves; to
arrange for the preservation and/or restoration of the same
with appropriate government agencies or with the private
sector or with the owners themselves of said tourist
attractions; and to identify and recommend to the appropriate
authorities concerned the declaration of tourist areas and
attractions as national monuments and preserves.
5. Project and investment promotions
a. To identify, develop, invest in, own, manage and operate such
projects as it may deem to be vital for recreation and rest but
not sufficiently attractive economically for private investment.
b. To construct hotel buildings and other tourist facilities within a
tourist zone and in turn lease such facilities to registered
tourism enterprises for operation, management and
maintenance.
c. To organize, finance, invest in, manage and operate wholly-
owned subsidiary corporations.
6. Direct assistance to registered enterprises
a. To administer the tax and other incentives granted to registered
enterprises.
b. To evaluate, approve and register or reject any and all tourism
projects or enterprises established within the tourist zones.

c. To grant medium and long-term loans and/or re-lend any funds
borrowed for the purpose to duly qualified registered tourism
enterprises.
d. To guarantee local and foreign borrowings of registered
enterprises.
e. To provide equity investments in the form of cash and/or land.
f. To extend technical, management and financial assistance to
tourism projects.
g. To identify, contact and assist in negotiations of suitable
partners for both local and foreign investors interested in
investment or participation in the tourism industry.
h. To assist registered enterprises and prospective investors to
have their papers processed with dispatch by government
offices.
7. Other powers and functions
a. To engage or retain the services of financial, management,
legal, technical, and/or project consultants from the private or
government sector.
b. To have the power to succeed by its corporate name.
c. To adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal.
d. To sue and be sued under its corporate name.
e. To enter into any contracts of any kind and description.
f. To own or possess personal and/or real property.
g. To make, adopt and enforce rules and regulations to execute its
powers, duties and functions.
h. To purchase, hold, and alienate shares of stock or bonds of any
corporation.
i. To collect fees or charges as may be imposed under PD 564.
j. To contract indebtedness and issue bonds.
k. To fix and collect rentals for the lease, use or occupancy of
lands, buildings, or other property owned or administered by
PTA..
l. To do any and all acts and things necessary to carry out the
purposes for which the PTA is created.
Categorized in light of the foregoing provisions of law in point, PTA's governmental
functions include the first, third, fourth, and sixth of the aforesaid general purposes. The
second 13 and fifth general purposes fall under its proprietary functions.
With respect to PTA's specific functions and powers, the first and fourth are governmental
in nature while the fifth specific functions and powers are proprietary in character. The
second, third, sixth, and seventh specific functions and powers can be considered partly-
governmental and partly-proprietary, considering that 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3(a), 6(c),
6(d), 6(e), 7(h), 7(j), and 7(k) are proprietary functions while 2(f), 3(b), 3(c), 6(a), 6(b), 6(f),
6(g), 6(h), 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(l) are governmental functions. The specific
functions and powers treated in 7(e) and 7(i) may be classified either as proprietary or
governmental, depending on the circumstances under which they are exercised or
performed.
The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally
geared towards the development and promotion in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it
is irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by its charter.
Reliance on the above analysis of the functions and powers of PTA does not suffice for the
determination of whether or not it is within the coverage of RA 6971. For us to resolve the
issues raised here solely on the basis of the classification of PTA's powers and functions
may lead to the rendition of judgment repugnant to the legislative intent and to established
doctrines, as well, such as on the prohibition against government workers to strike. 14
Under RA 6971, the workers have the right to strike.
To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the
legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that
may aid the Court in ruling on the right of officials and employees of PTA to receive
bonuses under RA 6971.
Petitioner cites an entry in the journal of the House of Representatives to buttress its
submission that PTA is within the coverage of RA 6971, to wit:
"Chairman Veloso: The intent of including government-owned and controlled
corporations within the coverage of the Act is the recognition of the principle that
when government goes into business, it (divests) itself of its immunity from suit
and goes down to the level of ordinary private enterprises and subjects itself to
the ordinary laws of the land just like ordinary private enterprises. Now, when
people work therefore in government-owned or controlled corporations, it is as if
they are also, just like in the private sector, entitled to all the benefits of all laws
that apply to workers in the private sector. In my view, even including the right to
organize, bargain . . ." VELOSO (Bicameral Conference Committee on Labor and
Employment, pp. 15-16)
After a careful study, the Court is of the view, and so holds, that contrary to petitioner's
interpretation, the government-owned and controlled corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso
had in mind were government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the
general corporation law. This is so because only workers in private corporations and
government-owned and controlled corporations, incorporated under the general
corporation law, have the right to bargain (collectively). Those in government corporations
with special charter, which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain
(collectively), except where the terms and conditions of employment are not fixed by law
15 . Their rights and duties are not comparable with those in the private sector.
"Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the
private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements." (Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1) (emphasis ours)
Government corporations may be created by special charters or by incorporation under
the general corporation law. Those created by special charters are governed by the Civil
Service Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by
the Labor Code. 16
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is gleanable from the
other provisions of the law. For instance, section 2 17 of said law envisions "industrial
peace and harmony" and "to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and capital;"
section 4 18 refers to "representatives of labor and management;" section 5 19 mentions of
"collective bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s);" section 6 20 relates to "existing
collective bargaining agreements," and "labor and management;" section 7 2 1 speaks of
"strike or lockout;" and section 9 22 purports to "seek the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment" and
"include the name(s) of the voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrator." All the
aforecited provisions of law apply only to private corporations and government-owned and
controlled corporations organized under the general corporation law. Only they have
collective bargaining agents, collective bargaining units, collective bargaining agreements,
and the right to strike or lockout.
To repeat, employees of government corporations created by special charters have neither
the right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively, as defined in the Labor Code. The
case of Social Security System Employees Association indicates the following remedy of
government workers not allowed to strike or bargain collectively, to wit:
"Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations,
either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not
fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to
the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands." (supra, footnote 14, p. 698; emphasis
ours)
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 2 3
The provisions of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to include only
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions within
its coverage.
Every statute must be construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. 2 4 We note Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of EO 292, which reads:
"SEC. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local,
including bureaus and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government
owned and controlled corporations with original charters, shall establish its own
Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives Award System in
accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the Commission for
approval. (emphasis ours)
It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with
original charter subject to Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, 2 5 is already within
the scope of an incentives award system under Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission ("Commission"). Since
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters do have an
incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address the same concern
of of cials and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations
incorporated under the general corporation law.
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in
the finding by respondent Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As
regards the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the
"power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute
is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment." 2 6 In the case
under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and
provisions of RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies to the
petitioner.
We now tackle the common issue posited by the consolidated petitions on the
constitutionality of AO 29 and AO 268.
Petitioners contend and argue, that:
I. AO 29 AND AO 268 ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF EO 292
AND, HENCE, NULL AND VOID.
II. AO 29 AND AO 268 UNLAWFULLY USURP THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY GRANTED SOLELY TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
III. THE FORCED REFUND OF INCENTIVE PAY IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPAIRMENT OF A CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION.
IV. ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY, THAT THE GRANT
OF PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVE BENEFITS WAS INVALID, THE SAME
SHOULD BE THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS DIRECTLY
RESPONSIBLE THEREFOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 9 OF AO
268.
Issued by the then President Corazon Aquino ("President Aquino") on July 25, 1987 in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the 1987 Constitution, 2 7 EO 292, or the
Administrative Code of 1987, provided for the following incentive award system:
"Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development Plans. — Each department or
agency shall prepare a career and personnel development plan which shall be
integrated into a national plan by the Commission. Such career and personnel
development plans which shall include provisions on merit promotions,
performance evaluation, in-service training, including overseas and local
scholarships and training grants, job rotation, suggestions and incentive award
systems, and such other provisions for employees' health, welfare, counseling,
recreation and similar services.
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. — There shall
be established a government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards
system which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards
as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the

Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by
their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government
operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public
interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment."
Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. — (1) It shall be the concern of the Commission
to provide leadership and assistance in developing employee relations programs
in the department or agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall take all proper steps toward the
creation of an atmosphere conducive to good supervisor-employee relations and
the improvement of employee morale."
Pursuant to the provision of Section 12(2), 28 Chapter 3, Book V of EO 292, the

Commission adopted and prescribed the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292 which, among others, provide:
"Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or local,
including bureaus and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government
approval."
"Sec. 2. The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness,

efficiency, integrity and productivity in the public service by recognizing and
rewarding officials and employees, individually or in groups, for their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishments, and other personal efforts which
contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement in government
operations, or for other extraordinary acts of services in the public interest.
xxx xxx xxx"
"Sec. 7. The incentive awards shall consist of, though not limited to, the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be given to an employee or group of
employees who has exceeded their targets or has incurred incremental
improvement over existing targets.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO 268 which granted "each official and
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of his one (1) month basic salary but in no case shall
such amount be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00)," 2 9 for those who have
rendered at least one year of service as of December 31, 1991. 3 0 Said AO carried the
prohibition, provided in Section 7 thereof, which reads:
"SEC. 7. The productivity incentive benefits herein authorized shall be granted
only for Calendar Year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including the
governing boards of government-owned or -controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are hereby strictly prohibited from authorizing/granting productivity
incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature for Calendar Year 1992
and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken
by the Office of the President in coordination with the Civil Service Commission
and the Department of Budget and Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary implementing guidelines for Executive Order No.
486 dated 8 November 1991 establishing a performance-based incentive system
for government-owned or -controlled corporations shall likewise be included in the
comprehensive study referred to in the preceding paragraph."
On January 19, 1993, President Ramos issued AO 29 which granted productivity incentive
benefits to government employees in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 1 for the
calendar year 1992 but reiterated the proscription under Section 7 of AO 268, thus:
"SEC. 2. The prohibition prescribed under Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 268 is hereby reiterated. Accordingly, all heads of government
offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as
well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited from
authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all similar forms
of allowances/benefits without prior approval and authorization via
Administrative Order by the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone found
violating any of the mandates in this Order, including all officials/employees and
the COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government office/agency found to have taken
part thereof, shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with the
applicable provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of
allowances/benefits and all forms of additional compensation usually paid
outside of the prescribed basic salary under R.A. No. 6758, the Salary
Standardization Law, that are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the matter
or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No. 486 dated November 8, 1991, as
amended by Executive Order No. 518 dated May 29, 1992, is hereby deferred until
a more comprehensive and equitable scheme for the grant of the benefits that
can be applied government-wide is formulated by the Department of Budget and
Management."
Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292 and since the latter is a law, it
prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268
encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt
measures to strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules,
regulations and standards governing the incentive awards system of the civil service.
The Court is not impressed with petitioners' submission. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in
the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments.
In establishing a Civil Service Commission, the 1987 Constitution delineated its function,
as follows: cdphil
"The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the

Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs." (Section
3, Article IX, B, 1987 Constitution)
The Commission handles personnel matters of the government. As the central

personnel agency of the Government, it is tasked to formulate and establish a system
of incentives and rewards for officials and employees in the public sector, alike.
The functions of the Commission have been decentralized to the different departments,
offices, and agencies of the government —
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall insure and promote the
Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, that the Civil Service Commission, as the central
personnel agency of the Government shall establish a career service, adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy in
the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability; that public office is a
public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people; and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the
corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such
functions can be effectively performed." (Section 1, Chapter I, Subtitle A, Title I, EO
292) (emphasis ours)
Speci cally, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System
has been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency —
"Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. — There shall
system which shall be administered under such rules, and regulations, and
standards as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agencies
interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment." (EO 292)
(emphasis ours)
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive
departments —
"The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." (Section 17, Article
VII, 1987 Constitution)
Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." 3 2 It has been held that "[t]he President can, by virtue of his
power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu
proprio without need of any appeal from any party." 3 3
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads
of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval from him,
and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just
exercising his power of control over executive departments. This is decisively clear from
the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO 29, to wit:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 268
"xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the productivity incentive benefits granted by the different agencies
are of varying amounts, causing dissension/demoralization on the part of those
who had received less and those who have not yet received any such benefit,
thereby defeating the purpose for which the same should be granted; and
WHEREAS, there exists the need to regulate the grant of the productivity incentive
benefits or other similar allowances in conformity with the policy on
standardization of compensation pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758;
xxx xxx xxx"
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 29
"xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, the faithful implementation of statutes, including the Administrative
Code of 1987 and all laws governing all forms of additional compensation and
personnel benefits is a Constitutional prerogative vested in the President of the
Philippines under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogative includes the determination of the rates,

the timing and schedule of payment, and final authority to commit limited
resources of government for the payment of personnel incentives, cash awards,
productivity bonus, and other forms of additional compensation and fringe
benefits;

WHEREAS, some government agencies have overlooked said Constitutional
prerogative and have unilaterally granted to their respective officials and
employees incentive awards;
WHEREAS, the Office of the President issued Administrative Order No. 268, dated
February 21, 1992, strictly prohibiting the grant of Productivity Incentive Bonus or
other allowances of similar nature for Calendar Year 1992 and future years
pending the issuance of the requisite authorization by the President;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding said prohibition some government offices/agencies

and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and financial institutions
have granted productivity incentive benefits in varying nomenclature and
amounts without the proper authorization/coordination with the Office of the
President;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of productivity incentive

benefits gave rise to discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel who have received less or have not received at all such
benefits;
xxx xxx xxx"
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of

productivity incentive bene ts and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The President was only
exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted
incentive bene ts to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Of ce of
the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In
the view of the President, respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so
acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-protected prerogative —
"The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of
his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to
dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit
then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President
cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-
Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission
on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not
revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated
the grant and amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are
basically executive functions, 34 not the Commission's. Implicit is this recognition in EO
292, which states:
"Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. — There shall
system which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards
as maybe promulgated by the Commission.
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is
interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment." (Chapter 5,
Subtitle A, Book V) (emphasis ours)
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is

authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the
Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or
his duly empowered alter ego.
Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that "[n]ot all
contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of
America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)" 35 The acts involved in this case are governmental.
Besides, the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or
benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
Commission on Elections, and Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are
not covered by the amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208
SCRA 133):
"As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that
their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.
"Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says
it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by
the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
"The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional
duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the
Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far
limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners
that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision."
Untenable is petitioners' contention that the herein respondents be held personally liable
for the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not
personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official duties. 3 6
Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties. 37 Absent any showing of bad faith or malice, there is likewise a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. 38
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the well-
entrenched doctrine that "in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality is to be preferred." 3 9
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance
the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners
have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant
facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such
incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients
and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such
benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are hereby
DISMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further deductions from the salaries and
allowances of petitioners are hereby ENJOINED.
In G.R. No. 119597, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on Audit is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. LLphil
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
Regalado, J ., on official leave.
Footnotes
1. The applicable provisions are contained in Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I of Book V:

"Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development Plans. — Each department or
agency shall prepare a career and personnel development plan which shall be
integrated into a national plan by the Commission. Such career and development plans
which shall include provisions on merit promotions, performance evaluation, in-service
training, including overseas and local scholarships and training grants, job rotation,
suggestions and incentive award systems, and such other provisions for employees'
health, welfare, counseling, recreation and similar services."
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. — There shall
be established a government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system
which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe
promulgated by the Commission.

Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to
incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate
officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions,
superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency,
economy, or other improvement of government operations or who perform such other
extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to,
their official employment."
2. "Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. — (1) It shall be the concern of the Commission to
provide leadership and assistance in developing employee relations programs in the
department or agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall take all proper steps toward the
creation of an atmosphere conducive to good supervisor-employee relations and the
improvement of employee morale."
The applicable provisions are contained in Sections 1, 2 and 7 (c) of Rule X:
"Sec. 1. Each department or agency of government, whether national or
local, including bureaus and agencies state colleges and universities, and government
approval."
"Sec. 2. The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness,
efficiency, integrity and productivity in the public service by recognizing and rewarding
officials and employees, individually or in groups, for their suggestions, inventions,
superior accomplishments, and other personal efforts which contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement in government operations, or for other
extraordinary acts of services in the public interest.
xxx xxx xxx"
3. Sec. 7. — The incentive awards shall consist of, though not limited to, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be given to an employee or group of
employees who has exceeded their targets or has incurred incremental improvement
over existing targets."
"SEC. 1. All agencies of the National Government, including government-
owned and/or -controlled corporations and government financial institutions, and local
government units are hereby authorized to grant productivity incentive benefits in the
maximum amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) each to their permanent
and full-time temporary and casual employees, including contractual personnel with
employment in the nature of regular employee, who have rendered at least one (1) year
of service in the Government as of December 31, 1992."
4. SEC. 2. The prohibition prescribed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 is
hereby reiterated. Accordingly, all heads of government offices/agencies, government-
owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are
hereby enjoined and prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits
or any and all similar forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval and
authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone
found violating any of the mandates in this Order, including all officials/employees and
the COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government office/agency found to have taken part
thereof, shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with the applicable
provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of
allowances/benefits and all forms of additional compensation usually paid outside of
the prescribed basic salary under R.A. No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, that
are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the matter or are not covered by any
legislative action are hereby revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No. 486 dated November 8, 1991, as
amended by Executive Order No. 518 dated May 29, 1992, is hereby deferred until a
more comprehensive and equitable scheme for the grant of the benefits that can be
applied government-wide is formulated by the Department of Budget and
Management."
5. "SEC. 7. The productivity incentive benefits herein authorized shall be granted only
for Calendar Year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including the governing
boards of government-owned or -controlled corporations and financial institutions, are
hereby strictly prohibited from authorizing/granting productivity incentive benefits or
other allowances of similar nature for Calendar Year 1992 and future years pending the
result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the President in
coordination with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Budget and
Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary implementing guidelines for Executive Order
No. 486 dated 8 November 1991 establishing a performance-based incentive system
for government-owned or -controlled corporations shall likewise be included in the
comprehensive study referred to in the preceding paragraph."
6. Rollo, G.R. No. 119597, p. 29.
7. Ibid, pp. 21-23.
8. SEC. 10. Rule Making Power — The Secretary of Labor and Employment and the
Secretary of Finance, after due notice and hearing, shall jointly promulgate and issue
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act such rules and regulations as are
necessary to carry out the provisions hereof."
9. Department of Public Services and Labor Unions v. the Court of Industrial Relations, 1
SCRA 319.
10. Words and Phrases, "Proprietary Function."
11. Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 564.
13. The full text of the second general purpose reads:
"(b) Develop tourist zones. — To promote the development into integrated
resort complexes of selected and well defined geographic areas with potential tourism
value, known otherwise as 'tourist zones', wherein optimum use of natural assets and
attractions as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited
resources of both government and private sector may be effected and realized in order
to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts. Such tourist zones shall
consist of substantially undeveloped areas the ownership of which may partially or
wholly acquired by the Authority or whose existing owners may choose to contribute
their property into a consortium or in a new corporation in which the Authority shall
participate, which in any case shall be under the control of the Authority as to the
manner of development to be undertaken within the zone."
14. Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA
686, 696.
"Considering that under the 1987 Constitution '[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charters' [Art. IX (B), Sec.
2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as government employees] and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 &
70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes."
15. Section 13, Executive Order No. 180.
16. Section 2 (1), Article IX, B. 1987 Constitution; PNOC-Energy Development Corporation v.
Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26; National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 134.
17. SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the declared policy of the State to encourage
higher levels of productivity, maintain industrial peace and harmony and promote the
principle or shared responsibility in the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
business enterprises to reasonable returns of investments and to expansion and growth,
and the accordingly to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and capital for
undertaking voluntary programs to ensure greater sharing by the workers in the fruits of
their labor."
18. "SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
b) "Labor-Management Committee" refers to a negotiating body in a business
enterprise composed of the representatives of labor and management created to
establish a productivity incentives program, and to settle disputes arising
therefrom in accordance with Section 9 hereof."
19. "SEC. 5. Labor-Management Committee. — a) . . .
b) In business enterprises with duly recognized or certified labor
organizations, the representatives of labor shall be those designated by the collective
bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s).
c) In business enterprises without duly recognized or certified labor
organizations, the representatives of labor shall be elected by at least a majority of all
rank-and-file employees who have rendered at least six (6) months of continuous
service."
20. "SEC. 6. Productivity Incentives Program. — a) . . .
b) Productivity agreements reached by the parties as provided in this Act
shall supplement existing collective bargaining agreements.
c) If, during the existence of the productivity incentives program or

agreement, the employees will join or form a union, such program or agreement may, in
addition to the terms and conditions agreed upon by labor and management, be
integrated in the collective bargaining agreement that may be entered into between
them."
21. "SEC. 7. Benefits and Tax Incentives. — a) . . .
b) Any strike or lockout arising from any violation of the productivity
incentives program shall suspend the effectivity thereof pending settlement of such
strike or lockout; Provided, That the business enterprise shall not be deemed to have
forfeited tax incentives accrued prior to the date of occurrence of such strike or lockout,
and the workers shall not be required to reimburse the productivity bonuses already
granted to them under the incentive program. Likewise, bonuses which have already
accrued before the strike or lockout shall be paid within six (6) months from their
accrual.
xxx xxx xxx"

22. "SEC. 9. Dispute and Grievances. — Whenever disputes, grievances, or other matters
arise from the interpretation or implementation of the productivity incentives program,
the labor-management committee shall meet to resolve the dispute, and may seek the
assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor
and Employment for such purpose. Any dispute which remains unresolved within twenty
(20) days from the time of its submission to the labor-management committee shall be
submitted for voluntary arbitration in line with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code,
as amended.
The productivity incentives program shall include the name(s) of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators previously chosen and agreed upon by the
labor-management committee."
23. Paras v. Commission on Elections, 264 SCRA 54.
24. Cabada v. Alunan III, 260 SCRA 838.
26. Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators, 33 SCRA 585.
27. Section 6, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution.
28. "SEC. 12. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
xxx xxx xxx"

29. Section 2, Administrative Order No. 268.
30. Section 1, Administrative Order No. 268.
31. Supra, footnote 3.

32. Mondano v. Silvosa, etc., et al., 97 Phil. 148.
33. Echeche v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 584, citing Oliveros-Torre v. Bayot, 58 SCRA
272, and Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., 118 Phil. 1468.
34. These are found in Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 whose applicable provisions
follow:
"SEC. 1 Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State that the

Department of Finance shall be primarily responsible for the sound and efficient
management of the financial resources of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities." (Title II)
"SEC. 1 Declaration of Policy. — The national budget shall be formulated
and implemented as an instrument of national development, reflective of national
objectives and plans; supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic
development plans and oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and
expected results, to ensure that the utilization of fund and operations of government
entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the context of a regionalized
governmental structure and within the totality of revenues and other receipts,
expenditures and borrowings of all levels of government-owned or -controlled
corporations."
35. M.H. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357.
36. Yulo v. Civil Service Commission, 219 SCRA 478, citing Mabutol v. Pascual, 124 SCRA
867.
37. Mendiola v. People, 207 SCRA 85.
38. Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, 234 SCRA 546; Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 471.
39. National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 666, citing Paredes
v. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City

Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA , petitioners, vs . MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget,
FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and
RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice , respondents.
Fidela Vargas, Leonardo S. Gonzales and Raul Gonzales for petitioners.

Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the
same being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates
from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act. They likewise
impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate
exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the
judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 not having been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a
pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that the attendant
abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their incumbents to cease from
holding o ce does not impair the independence of the judiciary and the security of
tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good performance and clean
records can be named anew in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity
of their service; that the provision granting the President authority to x the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test of undue
delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted therefor; that
the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be carried out in accordance with
the President's constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and
the judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional rights.
The petition was dismissed. Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee dissented in a
separate opinion; Justices Felix V. Makasiar and Venicio Escolin concurred with the
main opinion; Justice Hermogenes Concepcion concurred in the result; Justices
Antonio P. Barredo, Ramon C. Aquino, Ramon C. Fernandez, Juvenal K Guerrero,
Ameur na Melencio-Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta concurred in separate opinions;
Justices Vicente Abad-Santos and Efren I. Plana submitted separate concurring and
dissenting opinions.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; PARTIES; CAPACITY TO SUE;

PETITIONERS' LEGAL STANDING DEMONSTRATED. — The argument as to the lack of
standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de Ia Llana is concerned, he
certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937). Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." The other petitioners
as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any
personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a
separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975; "Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider
a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of
the public right dogma at an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying
on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: `The protection of private
right is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered
state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both
in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover,
petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to
sue has been amply demonstrated.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980;
ENACTMENT THEREOF IN ANSWER TO A PRESSING AND URGENT NEED; GOOD FAITH
OBSERVED IN ITS ENACTMENT. — The enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would
firstly, result in the attainment "of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary
consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes
introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the
rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the
present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." It may be
observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang
Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it
took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by
the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it become quite manifest how
lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of
arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized
its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature. cdasia
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTING ABOLITION OF COURTS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH DUE
RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE; VALIDITY OF ABOLITION OF
AN OFFICE, SETTLED RULE. — Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of
an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13,
1968, reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without
merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the
validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide.
It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbents. . . . And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never
to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits
of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. vs.
Provincial Governor, L-28614, Jan. 17, 1974, two earlier cases enunciating a similar
doctrine having preceded it. As with the offices in the other branches of the government,
so it is with the Judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that
element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the
lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent.
4 . ID.; ID; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF MAINTAINS UNIMPAIRED THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; TERMINATION BY VIRTUE OF THE ABOLITION OF
THE OFFICE DOES NOT IMPAIR SECURITY OF TENURE; SUPREME COURT TO BE
CONSULTED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE
JUDICIARY. — Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935
Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to
supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. "Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be,
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the o ce. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an o ce with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the stand-
point of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the o ce. Realistically, it is devoid of signi cance. He ceases to be a member of the
Judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court
could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to
preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those
predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one
which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters
into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO FIX THE COMPENSATION AND
ALLOWANCES OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES NOT AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; EXISTENCE OF A STANDARD TO AVOID THE TAINT OF UNDUE DELEGATION
CLEAR. — Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices
and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The
language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges,
Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in
Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1597." (Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The
existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of
non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to
make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statute in
all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24,
1970, "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at
the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repeal. A
standard thus de nes legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
speci es the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may
be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative o ce designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out speci cally. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO AMBIGUITY EXISTS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE REORGANIZATION
LAW. — Another objection based on the absence in the statute of what petitioners refer to
as a "de nite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical
language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty
(30) days from the date of the effectivity of this Act, a sta ng pattern for all courts
constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be
issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section." (Sec. 43,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The rst sentence of the next Section is even more categorical:
"The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an
Executive Order to be issued by the President." (Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129)
Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. In the meanwhile, the
existing Inferior Courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold o ce. "There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts
thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold o ce." No fear need be entertained by
incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their
being named anew, in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their
service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the
government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In
the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or
not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable.
Rather, it would be a rea rmation of the good faith that will characterize its
implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice
Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply
omissions in a law, a generalization quali ed as earlier shown by the principle that to save
a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean." (Cf, Roschen v. Ward, 279 US 337, 339 [1929])
LLjur
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL JUSTICES IN THE PREPARATION OF AN

ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION NOT OBJECTIONABLE; SUPREME COURT
DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH JUDICIAL REFORM. — On the morning of the hearing of the
petition, petitioners sought to disqualify the Chief Justice and Associate Justices Ramon
Aquino and Ameur na Melencio-Herrera because the rst named was the Chairman and
the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. The motion was
denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court
had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were
not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the
efforts of the legislative body. Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order,
to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly
studies. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over inferior
courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, either the
then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the
judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme
Court Review: "In the Twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a
leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the
development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit
institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot
avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." (Fish, William Howard
Taft and Charles Evan Hughes, 1975 Supreme Court Review 123)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OBSERVED. — It is a cardinal
article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with
rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public
o cials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own bene t but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak
in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." (Art. XIII, Sec. I) That is more
than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public o cial certain
rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and ful ll his responsibilities
more e ciently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure
judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges
can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their
judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and
the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting in uence of base or unworthy
motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a signi cance
transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their
welfare. The challenged legislation was thus subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny by
this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allows the erosion of that ideal
so firmly embedded in the national consciousness.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRESERVED DESPITE THE
REORGANIZATION OF INFERIOR COURTS. — At emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras
in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 57 O.G. 147(1955) "there is no surer guarantee of
judicial independence than the God-given character and tness of those appointed to the
Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a xed tenure of o ce during good behaviour, but if
they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another,
or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the Judiciary will
be nothing more than a myth or any empty ideal. Our judges, we are con dent, can be of
the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say
unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF WILL NOT RESULT IN
DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be
attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow
that the abolition In good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or
unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust
reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise
of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent
and e cient Judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it
been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justi ably
so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and
aspirations and to ful ll the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57
Phil. 600 (1932) said: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it
as strictly con ne its own sphere of in uence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional
system, this Court remains committed.
BARREDO, J ., concurring :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980
(BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129); JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION NOT CONTRARY TO THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY PRINCIPLE. — It being conceded that the power to
create or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a
pragmatic reality, that the tenure of the holder of an o ce must of necessity end when his
o ce no longer exists, We have no alternative than to hold that petitioners' invocation of
the independence-of-the-judiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing in the cases at
bar. To insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming, and not a
substantial and actual modi cation or alteration of the present judicial structure or
system, assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure
wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the Section in question
that said courts "are deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it most unmistakably
emphatic, that "incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Dura lex, sed lex.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION, AN URGENT NEED; TWO-FOLD
OBJECTIVES OF THE LAW ALIGNED WITH THE FOUNDATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
INDEPENDENCE OF THe JUDICIARY. — Judicial reorganization becomes urgent and
inevitable not alone because of structural inadequacies of the system or of the
cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but
also when it becomes evident that a good number of those occupying positions in the
judiciary, make a mockery of justice and take advantage of their o ce for sel sh personal
ends and yet, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing
laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that
its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, for the most ideal judicial system
with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of
justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and
sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay,
impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings
and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that be. I am certain that
Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa 129 encompasses both of these
objectives which indeed are aligned with the foundation of the principle of independence
of the judiciary. LLphil
3. ID.; CONSTITUTION; CHARTER TIMELESS EXCEPT FOR ADOPTION OF MEASURES

DURING VERY UNUSUAL INSTANCES; INTEGRITY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW
UNDIMINISHED THEREBY. — The Constitution is not just a cluster of high sounding
verbiages spelling purely idealism and nobility in the recognition of human dignity,
protection of individual liberties and providing security and promotion of the general
welfare under a government of laws. The fundamental law of the land is a living instrument
which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances. It is written
for all seasons, except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to
be contemplated by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal
way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in war, but even in peace grave
critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the
Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios," such inordinary problems justify
exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and
emergencies, the most constitutionally idealistic countries have, at one time or another,
under the pressure of pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic
measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent of
creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed, although
in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.
4. ID.; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTS IT SEEKS
TO PURSUE. — If indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness of this Court's
judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Sec. 44, I am
convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may not in
the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably
justi ed by its spirit and intent. The Charter is not just a construction of words to whose
literal ironclad meanings we must feel hidebound, without regard to every Constitution's
desirable inherent nature of adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that
the spirit and fundamental intent and objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas
Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the
transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue. While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually
easing out some justices and judges before the end of their respective constitutional
tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru
means that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA 129 DOES NOT RENDER MEANINGLESS THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; ABOLITION OF EXISTING COURTS ALLOWED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. — Notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the
Philippines is far from being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas
Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the
Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for those in authority to answer
the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks
more apparent than real. LibLex
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES TO THE BENCH WILL BE CAREFULLY

CONSIDERED. — By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional
conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more speci cally to the
President, its own constitutionally conferred power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the
Batasan Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold o ce,
leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see t to occupy the new courts.
Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their
respective o ces," or, as others would say they would be in fact removed. How the
President will make his choice is beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be
eased out even without being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given
the opportunity to be heard, the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep
public interest should serve as su cient assurance that when he ultimately acts, he will
faithfully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to every man," hence, he will equip
himself first with the fullest reliable information before he acts.
AQUINO, J ., concurring :
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF AND
PROHIBITION NOT THE PROPER REMEDY TO TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW;
NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY IN CASE AT BAR. — The petition should have been
dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and
prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law. The petition is
premature. No jurisdictional question is involved. There is no justiciable controversy
wherein the constitutionality of the law is in issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The
lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the constitutional angle.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES; PETITIONERS WITHOUT PERSONALITY TO ASSAIL THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW. — Seven of the eight
petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality
of the law even as taxpayers. The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge,
has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from his position.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION; BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 129; ENACTMENT THEREOF IN GOOD FAITH. — The Judiciary
Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose." In enacting the said law, the lawmaking body acted
within the scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.
GUERRERO, J ., concurring :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980;
OBJECTIVES. — The institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are clearly
conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legislation, namely:
(a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court,
thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A re-apportionment of jurisdiction geared towards
greater e ciency; (c) A simpli cation of procedures; and (d) The abolition of the inferior
courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the
Congress of the Philippines are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of justice and
thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in
the Explanatory Note, which is "to embody reforms in the structure, organization and
composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of improving the administration of justice, of
decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more complex problems on the
present and foreseeable future" cannot but "promote the welfare of society, since that is
the final cause of law." (Cardozo, the Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 66)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW CONSTITUTIONAL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GENERAL UTILITY
AND FUNCTIONAL VALUE. — From the standpoint of the general utility and functional value
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there should be no di culty, doubt or disbelief in its
legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is
undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets is too well-known
to be ignored as are the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the
need to look for devices and measures that are more practical, workable and economical.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF PRESUMED REGULAR AND DONE IN GOOD
FAITH. — In the light of the known evils and in rmities of the judicial system, it would be
absurd and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith
and honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed. The presumption of regularity is not con ned to the acts of the
individual o cers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or
bodies, and to acts of legislative bodies. Good faith is always to be presumed in the
absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be
otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high o ce as the duly-elected
representatives of the people.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS; SUPREME COURT CANNOT
INQUIRE INTO THE WISDOM OF THE LAW. — In Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968,
the Supreme Court held: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and
keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively
a legislative concern. The Courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . .
never inquire into the wisdom of the law." Chief Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe
decision writes in The Constitution of the Philippines that while "(i)t is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid," he adds that it is "useful to recall what was so clearly stated by
Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
re ect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the government.'" In any case, petitioners have
not shown an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on
record. I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42
of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more e cient vehicle of
"eliminating incompetent and un t Judges" as indicative of impermissible legislative
motive.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECURITY OF TENURE; NATURE AND CONCEPT OF A PUBLIC OFFICE. —
The Justices and judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are
expected to know the nature and concept of a public o ce. It is created for the purpose of
effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are for the common
good, and not the pro t, honor or private interest of any one man, family or class of men. In
our form of government, it is fundamental that public o ces are public trust, and that the
person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. In the
last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the State.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO VESTED INTEREST EXISTS IN AN OFFICE; JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENT TERMINATES WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE COURT. — There is no such
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an o ce, or even an absolute right to hold o ce.
Excepting constitutional o ces which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an o ce or its salary. When an o ce
is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but when created
by the State under the authority of the Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the
incumbent deprived of his o ce. Acceptance of a judicial appointment must be deemed
as adherence to the rule that "when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished
also. The Judge of such a court takes o ce with that encumbrance and knowledge. The
Judge's right to his full term and his full salary are not dependent alone upon his good
conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature may for the public good, in
ordaining and establishing the courts, from time to time consider his o ce unnecessary
and abolish it.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL AND RE-APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES UNDER THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT, A PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND PREROGATIVE. — The removal
from o ce of an incumbent is merely incidental to the valid act of abolition of the o ce as
demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people. The bad and the crooked
judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober judges should be reappointed
but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President who, I am certain, will act
according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath of
o ce "to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone."
There and then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the
desideratum of promoting the public good shall have been struck. cdtai
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW

TO BE ADOPTED. — The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the
Constitution. It may be the last bulwark of constitutional government. It must, however, be
remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as courts." (Missouri, K. & T. Co. vs. May, 194 U.S. 267,
270) The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on
the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled principle that "all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute" for
which reason it will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution "except in a clear
case." (People vs. Vera [1937], 65 Phil. 56).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE FUNCTIONAL UTILITY OF THE LAW
SUFFICIENT TO UPHOLD ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY. — I view the controversy presented as
a con ict of opinions on judicial independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the
law; on reorganization of the courts, whether abolition of o ce or removal therefrom; and
on delegation of legislative power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting
from the merits, the force and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and
precedents, I choose to stand on the social justi cation and the functional utility of the law
to uphold its constitutionality. In the light of contemporaneous events from which the New
Republic emerged and evolved new ideals of national growth and development, particularly
in law and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is
necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.
DE CASTRO, J ., concurring :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; CREATION AND ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, A
CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE LEGISLATURE. — A creation and organization of
courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to reorganize said courts, and in
the process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially different ones. To contend
otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional law that no irrepealable
laws shall be passed. dctai
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO CREATE STATUTORY COURTS INCLUDES THE POWER TO
ABOLISH THEM; JUDICIAL SECURITY OF TENURE NOT A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO THE
EXERCISE THEREOF. — The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the
primary authority from which would thereafter arise the security of tenure of those
appointed to perform the functions of said courts. In the natural order of things, therefore,
since the occasion to speak of security of tenure of judges arises only after the courts
have rst been brought into being, the right to security of tenure takes a secondary
position to the basic and primary power of creating the courts to provide for a fair and
strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority, deems it wise and
urgent to provide for a new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old
courts would conduce more to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its
standard, the matter involved is one of policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even
the Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere with. By this secondary position it
has to the primary power of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to
the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the exercise of that basic power of
creating the statutory courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to
abolish them in order to create new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing
one, and the resultant right of security of tenure of those appointed to said courts could
not bring about the exhaustion of that power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its
own laws, and that power can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a
fundamental precept of constitutional and representative government that no irrepealable
laws shall be passed.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980; AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT
SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE SECURITY OF
TENURE OF JUDGES. — The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no
more than the exercise of the power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of
the Republic. That power carries with it the duty and responsibility of providing the people
with the most effective and e cient system of administration of justice. This is by far of
more imperative and transcendental importance than the security of tenure of judges
which, admittedly, is one of the factors that would conduce to independence of the
judiciary — but rst of all, a good, e cient and effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in
these basic qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only for a judiciary
that can serve best the interest and welfare of the people which is the most primordial and
paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's faith has been eroded, a
condition which the security of tenure, in some instances, may even be contributory.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF SECURITY OF TENURE JUSTIFIED
BY THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. — When two interests con ict as what had given
rise to the present controversy — the duty of the legislature to provide society with a fair,
e cient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and the right of judges to security of
tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the former. One involves public
welfare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than the right of security of
tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more of a personal bene t to just a
few, as only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he conceives to be its
violation. Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this
concept which underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional
justi cation of the passage of the Act in question. That is, if a con ict between the primary
power of the legislature to create courts, and mere consequential bene t accorded to
judges and justices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer
falls to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation of the two apparently
con icting interests which, from the above disquisition, is not hard to nd. It is, without
doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right assessable by individuals
may be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general welfare. This is
demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable by
the entire people, not just be a handful in comparison, are made subject to the lawful
exercise of the police power of the State.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO
UNLAWFUL REMOVAL OF JUDGES. — The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the
Constitution gives to judicial o cials no more than a guarantee that their retirement age
as xed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The
equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the rst time because the
retirement age before then was provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it
comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional protection is the
aforequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition of o ce when done in good
faith, for removal implies the existence of the o ce, not when it is abolished. As has been
held, abolition of o ce for no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the
service, let alone when done in bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. The abolition of
the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as the title
of the law curtly but impressively announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so
branded. And whether by said reorganization, the present courts would be deemed
abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one for the sole
and exclusive determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by
the nature and extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider
them abolished. To give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of
the changes as to their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to
abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue
interference in the function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of
courts precisely to give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as may be
discovered therefrom.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE ABOLITION OF COURTS NOT PROPER.
— The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no judicial inquiry is
proper, except perhaps if that intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional repugnancy,
which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no occasion to speak of removal of
judges when the reorganization of the judiciary would result in the abolition of the courts
other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, the provision of the
Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of eight
justices does not come into the vortex of the instant controversy. Its possible violation by
the assalied statute cannot happen, and may, therefore, not constitute an argument
against the constitutionality of the law.cda
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARBITRARINESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW SUBJECT TO

JUDICIAL REDRESS. — Only in the implementation of the law may there possibly be a taint
of constitutional repugnancy, as when a judge of acknowledged honesty, industry and
competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness would thereby be committed,
but the abolition of the courts as declared by the law it not by itself or per se
unconstitutional. Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a
highly competent committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way
of improving the judiciary. If in its implementation any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can
always seek judicial redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security
of tenure with uncontrovestible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the
peculiar circumstances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is
unpardonable.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; DISMISSAL OF A PREMATURE
PETITION. — The petition should be dismissed for being premature. It asks this Court to
exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law unconstitutional when it
con icts with the fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 63 Phil. 36). This power has well-
defmed limits, for it can be exercised only when the following requisites are present, to wit:
(1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must
be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The
determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a nal
determination of the case. The petition does not present as actual controversy nor was it
filed by the proper parties.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS WITHOUT LEGAL PERSONALITY TO QUESTION THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW. — The main ground for
which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is assailed is that it
is violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The only persons who could
raise the question of constitutionality of the law, therefore, are the actual incumbents of
the courts who would be separated from the service upon the abolition of the courts
affected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their judicial security of
tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the
petitioners, has not been separated from the service. Nor is his separation already a
certainty, for he may be appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even
promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his tenure has been
terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has become
actual, not merely probable or hypothetical. The present petition may neither be allowed as
a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action to raise the question of constitutionality of
a statute only when no one else can more appropriately bring the suit to defend a right
exclusively belonging to him, and, therefore, would localize the actual injury to his person,
and to no other. For a "proper" party to invoke the power of judicial inquiry, as one of the
requisites in the exercise of such power, does not mean one having no better right, one
more personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in general. With the
incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suffer
direct and actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer
as "direct" and "actual" an injury as the judges and justices by the enforcement of the
assailed statute, from the right to bring the suit.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW OF 1980 NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — It would not be proper to declare the law void at this stage,
before it has even been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and all
those who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity,
and before any of the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for
a fact, certain and actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right
violated by what they could possibly contend to be unconstitutional enforcement of the
law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself. The writer is for giving the law a
chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular expectations for the
count to regain their highest level of e ciency and reputation for probity. Inevitably, this is
to be so since only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts affected be
declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is without any
court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then will
it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the incumbents
have been left out in the restructured judiciary.
cdphil
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION THAT UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE LAW SHOULD PREVAIL. — A law should, by all reasonable intendment and feasible
means, be saved from the doom of unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that
if a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would make it constitutional,
that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADEQUATE REMEDY IN LAW AVAILABLE TO THOSE WHO MAY BE
INJURED THEREBY. — While in the implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy
may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable
at the moment, the law itself is de nitely not unconstitutional. Any of the incumbent judges
who feel injured after the law shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law,
with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the bene ts envisioned by the law in the
discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the people — the administration of
justice — should not be sacri ced, as it would be, if the law is, as sought in the present
petition, declared void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly denied a right, at
best of doubtful character, for the claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable theory
that they have a vested right to a public office.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 NOT SELF-EXECUTORY;
REORGANIZATION LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM REPUBLIC ACT 1186. — The law in
question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its effectivity, certain judges and
justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what distinguishes the Act in
question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the case of Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 50
O.G. 147 which by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the
judges whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in
question, therefore, is not as exposed to the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as
R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the Constitution with its wise provision on how
a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be enforced
to the fullness of its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, identi ed with
public interest and general welfare, through a more e cient and effective judicial system
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF IMPROVING THE
JUDICIARY TIlE PREVAILING FACTOR IN UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
LAW. — The question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between protecting
some judges from possible separation, as the implementation of the law to achieve its
primary purpose of improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the interest of
the entire society through an honest, e cient and effective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable
that what is for the good of the people as a whole could have been meant by the
Constitution to be sacri ced for the sake of only a few. The greatest good for the greatest
number is an unwritten rule, more rm and enduring than any of the postulates spread in
our written Constitution.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW OF 1980;
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ABOLISH COURTS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE POWER TO
CREATE THEM. — It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create
courts ordinarily includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the
power to abolish courts is generally co-extensive with the power to create them. The
power to abolish was not intended to be quali ed by the permanence of tenure. (Opinion
of Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955],
citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134 Halsey vs. Gaines, 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to
hold o ce during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their o ce, does not deprive Congress of its
power to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior courts. (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735,
citing Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. O cer, 904-5). Judges of
those courts take office with that encumbrance and knowledge.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TENURE OF JUDGES AND TENURE OF COURTS DISTINGUISHED. —
Section 1, Article X refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government,
Section 7 of the same Article refers to the tenure of o ce of "individual" Judges (inclusive
of Justices of inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of o ce is a matter concerning the
individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by the clause that
the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of inferior courts.
3. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REORGANIZE COURTS NOT
HAMPERED BY THE SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE; JUDGES ARE ENTAILED TO
THEIR COURTS BUT COURTS ARE NOT ENTAILED TO THEIR JUDGES. — A legislature is not
bound to give security of tenure to courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire
judicial system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to the
wheels of progress and the imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To
hold that tenure of judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render
impotent the exercise of that power. Under Section 7, Article X, Judges are entailed to their
count, from which they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary
action for bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their judges, because
the power of the legislative to establish inferior court presupposes the power to abolish
those courts. If an inferior court is abolished, the judge presiding that court will necessarily
have to lose his position because the abolished court is not entailed to him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF TENURE OF JUDGES APPLIES
ONLY AS THEIR COURTS EXIST. — The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges
applies only as their Courts exist. As long as those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be
ousted without just cause; that is the client of the constitutional provision relative to
security of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the completion of the reorganization as
provided for in the Reorganization Act, the affected Courts "shall be deemed automatically
abolished." There being no Courts, there are no o ces for which tenure of Judges may be
claimed. By the abolition of those o ces, the rights to them are necessarily extinguished
(Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [(1954)].
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 AN ANSWER TO AN URGENT PUBLIC
NEED; GOOD FAITH IN THE ENACTMENT THEREOF PRESUMED. — The challenged law was
enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and pressing public need and
not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure of all Judges or legislating
them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should not be said of the Batasang
Pambansa that its power of abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an
unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981 su ciently complies with the bona de rule in the abolition of
public o ce. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its actuations must be accorded
a coordinate and co-equal branch of government, supreme within the limits of its own
sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing that the
Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to justify the
interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 109 Mass. 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R. 468;
State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pat. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16
5CRA 599 [[1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must
be balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and
Section 7 of Article X, the former is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is of more
importance to the welfare of the country than the tenure of o ce of an individual Judge. If
a Judge is removed without cause, there can be damage to the public welfare to some
extent, but maintenance of a Court that does not meet the requirement of progressive
Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO DISCIPLINE JUDGES. — Where the legislature
has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot post an obstacle to
the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal from
an existing judicial o ce, but not when that o ce is abolished. The reorganization of the
judicial system with the abolition of certain courts is not an exercise of the power to
discipline the Judges of the abolished courts. prLL
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABOLITION OF COURTS NOT A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
— The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public o ce
cannot be regarded as the "property" of the incumbent. A pubily o ce is not a contract
(Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [[1925]). A public o ce is a public trust (Section 1, Article
XIII, 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russel, 166 Mast.
14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA 253 cited also in Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The o cers are the servants of the people and not their rulers
(22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public o cers and Election
Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that there is no removal from o ce but
abolition of the office itself.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 ENACTED IN THE PURSUIT OF
DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS WITHIN THE JUDICIARY. — The questioned statute is in keeping
with major reforms in other departments of government. "The thrust is on development." It
is "the rst major reorganization after four generations." It does not provide for a
piecemeal change, which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and does not just
scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved
administration of justice, the "attainment of more e ciency in the disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not send to the proper
meting out of justice." These aims are policy matters of necessity in the pursuit of
developmental goals within the judiciary.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOVATIVE FEATURES CONTAINED IN THE REORGANIZATION LAW. —
There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves: (a) the confusing and
illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been entirely eliminated;
(b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from; a
record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now
to be transasitted; (c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference
of ndings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution
of decisions in appealed cases; (d) Section 42 provides for a monthly longevity pay
equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for Justices and Judges of the courts herein
created for each ve years of continuous, e cient, and meritorious service rendered in the
Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge
concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next
in rank. Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach the top, where unfortunately there is
not enough room for all, may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the salary
scale of those above him depending on his length of service.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARDS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LAW. — While the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be
administered should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of
Commrs., 239 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility of an
unconstitutional exercise of power the following safeguards are recommended and/or
expected to be undertaken: (a) the President can be expected to indicate a reasonable
time frame for the completion of the reorganization provided for in the Act and the
issuance of the corresponding implementing order; (b) appointments and their effectivity
should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the President of
the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the
smooth and continuous functioning of the judicial machinery; and (c) the services of those
not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the Committee on
Judicial Reorganization.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; STAFFING PATTERN; NAMES OF JUDGES TO BE EXCLUDED
THEREFROM; EXECUTIVE CHOICE TO BE RESPECTED. — Justice Herrera disagrees with
the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the sta ng pattern be made to include the
names of Judges. The sta ng pattern for Judges it already clearly and explicitly provided
in the law itself which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in their hierarchical
order. Furthermore, to include she superior positions of Judges would depart from the
traditional concept of a sta ng pattern, which refers more to personnel organization and
corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally objectionable in
that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically executive in nature
(Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the Philippines vs. Springer,
50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be deprived of, nor be limited in, the full use of
his discretion in the appointment of persons to any public o ce. Nothing should so trench
upon executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial designation.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW APPOINTMENTS TO STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. —
Reliance can be placed on the good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon
considerations of "e ciency, integrity, length of service and other relevant factors," shall
be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial system in the interest of public
service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed, and that appointees will be
evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men and women who will
keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.cdasia
ERICTA, J ., concurring :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW;
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO CREATE COURTS INCLUDES THE POWER TO ABOLISH THE
SAME. — The constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts
inferior to the Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created
by law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an o ce includes the power to abolish
the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317; Maca vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND ABOLITION OF OFFICE,
DISTINGUISHED. — Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a
public o cer or employee but an abolition of his o ce. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil.
903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. O ce of the President, 78 SCRA 334,
362). A distinction should be made between removal from o ce and abolition of an o ce.
Removal implies that the o ce subsists after ouster, while, in abolition, the o ce no
longer exists thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to exercise the rights and
duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS PASSES THE TEST OF GOOD
FAITH. — The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior
to the Supreme Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 31
O.G. 147) What is only needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. It need
only be shown that said abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona de
reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC WELFARE TO PREVAIL OVER THE INDIVIDUAL INTEREST OF
JUDGES. — In the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely
affected. But in a con ict between public interest and the individual interest of some
Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENTS TO THE NEW COURTS, A PRESIDENTIAL
PREROGATIVE. — The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new
courts. The power of appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The
implementation of the law should be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and
statesmanship of the President.
ABAD SANTOS, J ., concurring and dissenting :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW OF 1980
(BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129); LAW NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — I agree with the learned
Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT
BE REQUIRED OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW. — It has
already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional in rmity
because the abolition of certain judicial o ces was done in good faith. This being the
case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to ll the
newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to
accord its views the fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an
invasion of executive territory which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit
suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional implementation of the questioned
legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
PLANA, J ., concurring and dissenting :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW; POWER TO CREATE
COURTS INCLUDES THE POWER TO ABOLISH OR REPLACE THEM; BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 129 ENACTED IN GOOD FAITH. — As the lawmaking body has the power to create
inferior courts and de ne, prescribe and apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to
abolish or replace them with other courts at long as the act is done in good faith and not
for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. Good faith has thus become the
crucial issue in the case at bar.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT NOT OBLIGED TO CONSULT WITH THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW. — The President is under no obligation to consult
with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal
advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give
advisory opinions (Bacolod-Murcia Planters' Assoc., Inc. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., 30
SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the President.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING OF COMPENSATION AND ALLOWANCES FOR MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIARY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNDUE DELEGATION UNTO THE PRESIDENT OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE 1973
CONSTITUTION. — Under the Old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of
legislative and executive powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative power. Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental
powers could be negated via unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973
Constitution has however radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a
commingling or fusion of executive and legislative powers in the hands of the same group
of o cials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative process, and members
of the Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The Prime Minister indeed must
come from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly
insisting on the principle of non-delegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the
Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has signi cantly
eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has retained
some provisions of the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-
delegation, this time perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby
correspondingly reduce the incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to
avert the abdication thereof.
TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW OF 1980
(BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.129); RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS; EXPRESS
GUARANTY OF SECURITY OF TENURE OVERRIDES THE IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF
REMOVING JUDGES BY LEGISLATION. — The reasoning that the express guaranty of
tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behaviour unless removed from o ce
after hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy
years must override the implied authority of removing by legislation the judges has been
further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new provisions of the 1973
Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme
Court (Art. X, Sec. 6, 1973 Constitution) and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively the
power to discipline judges of inferior courts, and, by a vote of at least eight members,
order their dismissal, which power was formerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief
Executive. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION RULES OUT OUSTER OF JUDGES BY
LEGISLATION BY VESTING IN THE SUPREME COURT THE POWER TO REMOVE AND
DISCIPLINE JUDGES. — If the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong
doubts against the removal of incumbent judges through legislative action by abolition of
their courts, then they would have so clearly provided for such form of removal in the 1973
Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster of
judges by legislative action by vesting exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of
discipline and removal of judges of all inferior courts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION ACT DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
EXISTING COURTS. — The questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms
with more speci c delineation of jurisdiction but they do not change the basic structure of
the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts
are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian
Relations are all restructured and redesigned to be known by the common name of
Regional Trial Courts with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively
criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform
cases and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest
of a speedy and e cient administration of justice" (Sec. 23, B.P. Blg. 129) and the Court of
Appeals is restructured and redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an
increase in the number of Appellate Justices from the present 43 to 30 but with a
reduction of the number of divisions from 13 (composed of 3 Justices each) to 10
(composed of 3 members each) such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at
the appellate level in the important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers
of facts.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "NEWCOURTS" SUBSTANTIALLY THE "OLD COURTS" WITH ONLY A
CHANGE OF NAME. — Justice Teehankee views that the candid admission by the Chief
Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he entertained doubts as to whether the
intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new tribunal" is equally applicable to all the
other mentioned courts provided for in the challenged Act as "new courts." And the best
proof of this is the plain and simple transitory provision in Section 44 thereof that upon the
President's declaration of completion of the reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall
"be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
o ce"), "(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate
Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records,
equipment, property and the necessary personnel," together with the "applicable
appropriations." This could not have been possible without a speci cation and
enumeration of what speci c cases of the "old courts " would be transferred to the
particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not been manifestly and substantially the
"old courts" with a change of name — or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his
rst view, now discarded, in his separate opinion; "just a renaming, and not a substantial
and actual modi cation or alteration of the present judicial structure or system" or "a
rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABOLITION OF COURTS AND CONSEQUENT OUSTER OF INCUMBENT
JUDGES FROM OFFICE; GUARANTY OF TENURE OF JUDGES ESSENTIAL FOR A FREE AND
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY; REORGANIZATION SHOULD ALLOW THE INCUMBENTS TO
REMAIN IN OFFICE UNLESS REMOVED FOR CAUSE. — The good faith in the enactment of
the challenged Act must need be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power
to abolish courts as implied from the power to establish them with the express
constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which is essential for a free and
independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that indispensable for the
maintenance of the Rule of Law is free and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and
enforce it without fear or favor — "free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and
incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous in uence of the
political powers that be," to quote again from Justice Barredo's separate opinion. Hence,
my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon in the
case of Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-1790, Jan. 18, 1933, as restated by the
Philippine Association of Law Professors headed by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion that "any reorganization should at least allow the incumbents of the existing
courts to remain in o ce (the appropriate counterpart "new courts') unless they are
removed for cause."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE EXTENDS TO THE ENTIRE COURT
SYSTEM; VIEWS OF AMICI CURIAE THEREON. — Former U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortes in her
memorandum as amicus curiae stated "for the judiciary whose independence is not only
eroded but is in grave danger of being completely destroyed, judicial independence is not a
guarantee intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and
is even more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because there are more of them and
they operate closest to the people," and "particularly under the present form of modi ed
parliamentary government with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in
certain areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the
performance of which its independence assumes an even more vital importance." The
extensive memoranda led by Dean Cortes and other amici curiae such as former Senator
Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent further
destruction of judicial independence," former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, President of the
Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's adoption of the
Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the
interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution"
and that the judges' security of tenure guaranty should not be "rendered meaningless and
inoperative" former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, president of the Philippine Lawyers'
Association who submits that the total abolition of all courts below the Supreme Court
(except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the
incumbent Justices and Judges violates the independence of the judiciary, their security of
tenure and right to due process guaranteed them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M.
Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the Philippines who invokes the
Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1939, that "The principles of unremovability of
the Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a retiring age uted by statute
is reached, is an important safeguard of the Rule of Law" have greatly helped in fortifying
my views.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION
RENDERED NUGATORY JUDGES' SECURITY OF TENURE; RESTORATION OF GUARANTY;
AN URGENT NEED FOR A FREE AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY. — The judges' security of
tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution which
granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and replace all judges and
o cials (as against the limited one-year period for the exercise of such power granted
President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth). Upon the declaration of martial law in September, 1972, justices and
judges of all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their
resignation. There is listed a total of 33 judges who were replaced or whose resignations
were accepted by the President during the period from September, 1972 to April, 1976.
The power to replace even the judges appointed after the effectivity on January 17, 1973
Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the President in the pending case of Tapucar vs.
Famador, G.R. No. 53467 led on March 27, 1980 notwithstanding the held view that such
post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the
cited Transitory Provision, . . . . And now comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial
positions (and thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope.
The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure
of judges, which is essential for a free and independent judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of
the power of the sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his
Ocampo majority opinion. cdasia
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TO BE PRESERVED ESPECIALLY IN

VIEW OF THE EXISTING STRONG TIES BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENTS. — In Fortun vs. Labang, 104 SCRA 607 (May 27, 1981), it was stressed
that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision.over
the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the
judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion
between the executive and the legislative branches," with the further observation that
"many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded."
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MOVE TO RID THE JUDICIARY OF INCOMPETENT AND CORRUPT
JUDGES; DUE PROCESS MUST BE OBSERVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PURGE.
— Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills
demand drastic cures" thus; "Drastic, yes — but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does
not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing
him. The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence; they will
not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course could only
breed more perversity in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule
have bred more subversion." Finally, as stated by the 1975 Integrated Bar of the
Philippines 2nd House of Delegates, "It would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are
called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves. Observance of procedural
due process in the separation of mis ts from the Judiciary is the right way to attain a
laudible objective."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGES TO BE REMOVED ONLY AFTER A FAIR
HEARING. — As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the
cardinal principles of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend
themselves against the accusations made against them and not to be subjected to
harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal
authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their
constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and non-impairment of the independence of
the judiciary and the proper exercise of the constitutional power exclusively vested in the
Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after fair hearing.
11. .ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS POWER OF
DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL OF ALL JUDGES OF INFERIOR COURTS. — Judges of inferior
courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such reorganization on the
basis of con dential adverse reports as to their performance, competence or integrity,
save those who may voluntarily resign from o ce upon being confronted with such
reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without due process or
hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a number of honest and
competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to
be basket cases have remained in the service. The power of discipline and dismissal of
judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals down, has been vested by the 1973
Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be
left to clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation of the aggrieved
parties and after due process and hearing.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCUMBENT JUDGES TO BE RETAINED IN THE "NEW
COURTS". — The constitutional confrontation and con ict may well be avoided by holding
that since the changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change
the nature and functions of the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the
"abolished old court" but provide for procedural changes xed delineation of jurisdiction
and increases in the number of courts for a more effective and e cient disposition of
court cases, the incumbent judges' guaranteed security of tenure require that they be
retained in the corresponding "new courts."
DECISION
FERNANDO , C .J : p
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive
or legislative act in an appropriate case, has to resolve the crucial issue of the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly
characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative
power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored
principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this
constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
shall hold o ce during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their o ce. The Supreme Court shall have the
power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order
their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants
of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justi es a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded. cdphil
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for
prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to x the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly
Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid
justi cation for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate
exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the Independence of the
judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was
likewise led on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After
the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and
respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter
submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
this petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all
the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the
exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it
is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as
Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9
The other petitioners as members of the bar and o cers of the court cannot be
considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is
relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections: 1 0 "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most
what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to
conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping
public o cials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely,
without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and
public interests are, both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of
the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as
taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat
from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed
by the very decision of People vs. Vera where the doctrine was rst fully discussed, if we
act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents,
however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v.
Frothingham, with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared
in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford
any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the
language of a bygone era, even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly
pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has
definitely been lowered." 1 1
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts.
Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
antecedents. They have laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for
the truth. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized. 1 2 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A, dated
September 5 of that year. It clearly speci ed the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee
shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within
seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President su cient options for the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special
Courts, but excluding the Sandiganbayan." 1 3 On October 17, 1980, a Report was
submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph:
"The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It
expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and
means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the
judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial
measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no
delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that
the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that
there be a greater e ciency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those
of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their
rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way
the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to
those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that
the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting
point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme
Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court
of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court
management as well as training of judges for more e cient administration does not
su ce. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial system. It is worth
noting that it will be the rst of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June
16, 1901." 1 4 It went on to say: "It does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of
this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and
delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long
inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and
are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judiciary has not proved
inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to
the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likely to be quite novel. The need for an innovative
approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly
on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only
thus may there be continued national progress." 1 5 After which comes: "To be less
abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so.
All efforts are geared to its realization." Nor, unlike in the past, was it to be "considered as
simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP)." 1 6 For the
New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the
sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities,
the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 1 7 This process of modernization
and change compels the government to extend its eld of activity and its scope of
operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor
elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and
protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented" 1 8
There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely
affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not
go that far, suits may be led concerning their interpretation and application. . . . There
could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would
not, even so, result in their prompt nal disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the
policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to
progress in development." 1 9 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is
the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity.
Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the
leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973
Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has continued." 2 0 It is
understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of
population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called
upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a
crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to
act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not
hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in
the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 2 1 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed
out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most
thorough after four generations. 2 2 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act enacted in
June of 1901, 2 3 amended in a signi cant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth.
There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of
a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly." 2 4 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of
ve Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 2 5 Two
years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 2 6 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 2 7 the Municipal Courts, at
present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit
Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been
continuously increased. 2 8 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty- ve
members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fteen divisions. 2 9
Special courts were likewise created. The rst was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 3 0
next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 3 1 and then in the same year a Court of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 3 2 subsequently followed by the
creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 3 3 In 1967, Circuit
Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same quali cations, rank,
compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 3 4
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the
basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as
above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions,
this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report
with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment
of more e ciency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of
procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out of justice. In consultation with, and
upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt
that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to
con ne the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate
adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction
in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been
translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 3 5 In accordance with the
parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter,
Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa
recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed
Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in
accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the
aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the
government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were
adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which the
bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The
hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar
who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon
the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 3 6 The
sponsor stressed that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would result in the attainment "of
more e ciency in the disposal of cases [and] the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts" expected to follow from the dockets being less clogged, with the
structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and
the revision of the rules of procedure, [being] designated to suit the court system to the
exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
3 7 It may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the
Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite
obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act
was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes
quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by
the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an o ce within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no in rmity. The
ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 3 8 reiterated such a doctrine: "We
nd this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of
petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their o ces.
This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid
abolition of o ces is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . . And, of course,
if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold o ce. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the
rule that the abolition of an o ce does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is
the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." 3 9 The
above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 4 0 two
earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 4 1 As with the o ces in the
other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the
abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more
apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 4 2 cannot be
any clearer. In this quo warranto proceeding, petitioner claimed that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to the o ce of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The Judicial Reorganization Act of 1936, 4 3 a year after the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, amended the Administrative Code to organize courts
of original jurisdiction likewise called, as was the case before, Courts of First Instance.
Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of one such court. Thereafter, he
received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new
legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of the then National
Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position. This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence in the result of Justice Laurel,
to repeat, rea rms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith as the test of the
validity of an act abolishing an inferior court, and this too with due recognition of the
security of tenure guarantee. Thus: "I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in
so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and
establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and
Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion ows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the
National Assembly the power to de ne, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is
admitted that Section 9 of the same Article of the Constitution provides for the security of
tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same Article
of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle
will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner
vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed., 937)" 4 4 Justice Laurel continued: "I am not
insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move
deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all
judges. But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the
one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the
application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial
and that xity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and
emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional
provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of
reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case
of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until
then. I am satis ed that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
ful llment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and
that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure
of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the
power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater
necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government
than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine
Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision
providing for the vacation by the judges of their o ces whereas in the case of
Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be
resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 4 5
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the abovecited opinion of Justice
Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 4 6 on the reorganization of the
Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 4 7 on the reorganization of all branches of the
government, including the courts of rst instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First
Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed
out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of rst instance was
provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an
entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional, such conclusion owing
"from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions." 4 8 The challenged statute creates an
intermediate appellate court, 4 9 regional trial courts, 5 0 metropolitan trial courts of the
national capital region, 5 1 and other metropolitan trial courts, 5 2 municipal trial courts in
cities, 5 3 as well as in municipalities, 5 4 and municipal circuit trial courts. 5 5 There is even
less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the
Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate
response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could
be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Enage 5 6 this Court, in a unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda cuestion que el recurrido
plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido
el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurrente a acuparlo y a cobrar el
salario correspondiente. McCulley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de
desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su
facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 5 7 Nonetheless,
such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the
Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace of
court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se
le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 5 8 The present case
is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute
was not within the bounds of legislative authority. cdasia
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however,
to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all embracing
scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, 5 9 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on
such cherished ideal. The rst paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads:
Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First
Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the
Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon
such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold o ce." 6 0 There is all the more reason then why
this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the
security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous in uences, is
thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more
clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935
Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist,
President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Constitutional Convention stressed such a concept
in his closing address. The 1935 Constitution, he stated, provided for "an Executive power
which, subject to the scalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know
how to govern, but will actually govern, with a rm and steady hand, unembarrassed by
vexatious interferences by other departments, by unholy alliances with this and that social
group." 6 1 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 6 2
The 1981 Amendments embody the same philosophy, this notwithstanding that once
again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 6 3 "obtains not through express provision but by actual
division." 6 4 The President, under Article VII, "shall be the head of state and chief executive
of the Republic of the Philippines." 6 5 Moreover, all the powers he possessed under the
1935 Constitution are vested in him anew "unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 6 6 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 6 7 As originally framed, the 1973
Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 6 8 In
addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government to exercise
the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet. 6 9 Clearly, a modi ed
parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this
Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 7 0 could state: "The adoption
of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter
its essentially presidential character." 7 1 The retention, however, of the position of the
Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the
regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen
other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly
indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now operative. 7 2 What is
equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments.
It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in
a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang, 7 3 it was
stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 7 4
8. To be more speci c, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior
courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges
Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935
Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to
supervise administratively inferior courts. 7 5 Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 7 6 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 7 7 Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the o ce. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent o ce. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an o ce with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the o ce. Realistically, it is devoid of signi cance. He ceases
to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court
does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive
to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is
to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view
it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 7 8 There is an obvious way
to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to
avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 7 9 promulgated
last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could
have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no
ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they
must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers
vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It
commends itself for approval." 8 0 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The
Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically
provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 8 1 It is true there is no such
provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive
Order contemplated under its Section 44. 8 2 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand
the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 8 3
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile
or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be speci c, the Batasang Pambansa is
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to
abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of o ce of
their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable
from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It
is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from
acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been
well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot,
whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in
the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 8 4 It is well to recall another classic
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its a rmation of such a view,
moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous: "The
classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison,
or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by
Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments' not only because 'the
great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide elds of black and white'
but also because 'even the more speci c of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 8 5 This too from Justice Tuazon,
likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is
well-nigh unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The
constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental
functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental
coordination." 8 6 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in
constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them,
where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a
case of power against power. That we should avoid. LLjur
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no di culty. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to x the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to
have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite
clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in
letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1597." 8 7 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic
postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the
test being the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 8 8 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus de nes legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and speci es the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative o ce
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
speci cally. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole." 8 9 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments
under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and e ciency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early
as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 9 0 He warned
against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed
legislation." 9 1 Further on this point from the same opinion: "The spectre of the non-
delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or
legislative chambers." 9 2 Another objection based on the absence in the statute of what
petitioners refer to as a "de nite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They
ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the
President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a sta ng
pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 9 3 The rst sentence of the next Section is even more categorical:
Executive Order to be issued by the President." 9 4 Certainly, petitioners cannot be heard to
argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. 9 5 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue
functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold o ce." 9 6 There is
no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to
hold o ce." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of
performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 9 7 in legal contemplation,
without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 9 8 It is equally reasonable to
assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice,
or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases, a little
more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a
rea rmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive.
There is pertinence of this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance to the
generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization
quali ed as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there
is no canon against using common sense in consuming laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 9 9 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw?
11. In the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners
sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameur na
Melencio-Herrera disquali ed because the rst-named was the Chairman and the other
two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion
was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the
Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They
were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product
of the efforts of the legislative body. 1 0 0 Their work was limited, as set forth in the
Executive Order, to submitting alternative plans for reorganization. That is more in the
nature of scholarly studies. That they undertook. There could be no possible objection to
such activity. Even since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the
recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the
Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 1 0 1 consulted members of the
Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite
this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century
the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety
of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among
them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate
reform." 1 0 2 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement
in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at
the state level as well." 1 0 3
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who
are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
through public o cials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers.
Those they exercise not for their own bene t but for the body politic. The Constitution
does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public o ce is a public trust." 1 0 4 That is
more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public o cial
certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and ful ll his
responsibilities more e ciently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure
provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward
consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
in uence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a signi cance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed,
it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation was thus subjected to the most
rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allows the
erosion of that ideal so rmly embedded in the national consciousness. There is this
further thought to consider. Independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in
one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v.
Secretary of Justice, 1 0 5 "there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the
God-given character and tness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be
guaranteed a xed tenure of o ce during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as
allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the
wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more
than a myth or an empty ideal. Our judges, we are con dent, can be of the type of Lord
Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as
herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 1 0 6 That is to recall one of the greatest
Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his o ce made clear that he would not just blindly
obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in
the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano. 1 0 7
The ponencia of Justice Malcolm identi ed good judges with "men who have a mastery of
the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted
to perform the duties of the o ce undeterred by outside in uence, and who are
independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to
the other two departments of government." 1 0 8 There is no reason to assume that the
failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious
consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good
faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with
independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there
be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power
vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and e cient judiciary is
something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justi ably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to
ful ll the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom
as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Company, 1 0 9 a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly con ne its
own sphere of in uence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act." 1 1 0 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown,
this petition is dismissed. No costs. cdasia
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J ., concurs in the result, the abolition being in good faith.
Fernandez, J ., concurs provided that in the task of implementation by the Executive as far
as the present Justices and judges who may be separated from their service, it would be in
accordance with the tenets of constitutionalism if this Court be consulted and that its view
be respected.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO , J ., concurring :
I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its part.
The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of
the Act which reads as follows:
"SEC. 44. Transitory provisions . — The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian
Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function
as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization
provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall
cease to hold o ce. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to
the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent
functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel.
"The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate

courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary
from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act."
It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that
"upon the declaration (by the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has
been completed), the said courts (meaning, the Court of Appeals and all other lower
courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold o ce" trenches on all the
constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, such as the
security of tenure of its members (Section 7, Article X of the Philippine Constitution of
1973), the prerogative of the Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and
the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the Supreme Court "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
dismissal." (Section 7, Id.)
On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44, the
Batasan did nothing more than to exercise the authority conferred upon it by Section 1 of
the same Article of the Constitution which provides that "(T)he Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." In
other words, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the
law (of the legislature), it follows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or
reorganize them even if in so doing, it might result in the cessation from o ce of the
incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective constitutionally- xed tenures.
Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed
plenary.
Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task
is either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's power of abolition and
reorganization with, on the other, the security of tenure of members of the judiciary and the
Supreme Court's authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the
power of the Supreme Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the other. I
believe, however, that such a manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us only
confuses and compounds the task We are called upon to perform. For how can there be a
satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a judge to continue as
such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that
the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he should in
some way be allowed to continue to function as judge until his constitutional tenure
expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would then have the absurd spectacle
of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district
court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional judges or of
judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the Constitution. The
other suggestion that the incumbent of the abolished court should be deemed appointed
to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive the appointing
authority, the President, of the power to make his own choices and would, furthermore,
amount to an appointment by legislation, which is a constitutional anachronism. More on
this point later. cdasia
Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact
and in law, the structure of judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially
different from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, hence the courts now
existing are actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or
feel bound to determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or that of this
Court, should be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the power to create
or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or at least a
pragmatic reality, that the tenure of the holder of an o ce must of necessity end when his
o ce no longer exists, as I see it, We have no alternative than to hold that petitioners'
invocation of the independence-of-the-judiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing in
the cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to
insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming, and not a substantial and
actual modi cation or alteration of the present judicial structure or system, assuming a
close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being
explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question that said courts "are
deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it most unmistakably emphatic, that "the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold o ce." Dura lex, sed lex. As a matter of fact, I
cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined
legislative intent about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on
championing the cause of the independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the
constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in
any reorganization ordained by the parliament? My answer is simple. Practically all the
Members of the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general
reorganization but abolition — in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling of
the old structure but a total demolition thereof to be followed by the building of a new and
different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I should
appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the eyes of many
justices and judges, members of the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of
the judicial independence, but understandably, I should not be, as I am not, disposed to
play such a role virtually at the expense not only of my distinguished colleagues but of the
Batasang Pambansa that framed the law and, most of all, the President who signed and,
therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely sure that my position is
formidable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not
certain of, as I shall demonstrate anon.
To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us
cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakable and indubitably de nite
either way. None of the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the
Members of the Court during the deliberations, such as Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3 Zandueta,
4 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to
certainty of correctness.
Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and
beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa
129 explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the
Supreme Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing the independence of the
judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the law
unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of my
learned colleagues was something I could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering and
thinking deeper about all relevant factors, I have come to the conviction that at least on
this day and hour there are justi able grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try how it will
operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and the
Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people from a
fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our country.
Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy. The
improved national discipline, so evident during the earlier days of martial law, has declined
at a quite discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgent reforms in
their respective elds. And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear,
among their gripes, which as a matter of fact is common to all of them, is that about the
deterioration in the quality of performance of the judges manning our courts and the slow
and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure,
something that may not necessarily be related to lack of independence of the judiciary. It
has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility of the men
sitting in the courts in some parts of the country. And what is worse, while in the
communities concerned, the malady is known to factually exist and is actually graver and
widespread, very few, if any, individuals or even associations and organized groups, truly
incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal
evidence to come out and le the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court. And I
am not yet referring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but nevertheless
just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should actually be
formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible for the Court to
dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to
attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has
to observe in each and every such administrative case, all of which are time consuming.
Verily, under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justi cation for the
patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in
our judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.
Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable
not alone because of structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness
and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also when it
becomes evident that a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a
mockery of justice and take advantage of their o ce for sel sh personal ends and yet, as
already explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under
existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of the present situation in our
judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just
indicated, for the most ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot
satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein
possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion
to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and
corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures
of the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa
129 encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the foundation
of the principle of independence of the judiciary.
LLphil
The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint
of the unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to
say, to all of us, the Members of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of
tenure and removal-only-by the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment of the
independence of the judiciary, which is one of the bedrocks and, therefore, of the essence
in any "democracy under a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality," (Preamble of the
1973 Constitution), are priceless and should be defended, most of all by the Supreme
Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually endowed to each of Us. Withal,
we are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to place
the person of the judge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that
they are essentially part and parcel of what is required of an independent judiciary where
judges can decide cases and do justice to everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We
nd Ourselves face to face with a situation in our judiciary which is of emergency
proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enforced under
such circumstance seem to be di cult, aside from being controversial. And so, in a real
sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning
pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more practical approach,
which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.
My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages
spelling purely idealism and nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of
individual liberties and providing security and promotion of the general welfare under a
government of laws. With all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law of
the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of
obtaining circumstances. It is written for all seasons, except for very unusual instances
that human ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by its language even if read in
its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in
peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to
extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes
remedios," such in ordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so, history records
that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally idealistic
countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations,
adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of
their Charters, to the extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the same
had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained
undiminished and unimpaired.
The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach.
When martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously shouted
not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the required factual bases
contemplated in the Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution, but more, that
he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent of said clause by
utilizing his martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and preserve and
defend the integrity and security of the state but to establish a New Society. The critics
contended that martial law is only for national security, not for the imposition of national
discipline under a New Society.
Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in
this jurisdiction, this concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by this
Court. I, for one, accepted such a construction because I rmly believe that to impose
martial law for the sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without
coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising
is utter folly, for the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.
I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the light of this Court's
doctrines about the imposition of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this
concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the
correctness of this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional,
particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today
calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the
Constitution but indubitably justi ed by its spirit and intent. As I have earlier indicated, the
Charter is not just a construction, of words to whose literal ironclad meanings we must
feel hidebound, without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature of
adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental
intent and objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such
adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks
to pursue. While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and
judges before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual
administrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of
the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.LLpr
Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa 129, aside
from what has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence,
also preempts, in some of its provisions, the primary rule-making power of the Supreme
Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of my colleagues, I
would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. After all,
the legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of
the Constitution of 1973) so much so, that I doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or
modify any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman of the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, for one reason or another, principally the
lack of a clear consensus as to what some of my colleagues consider very radical
proposals voiced by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated long
enough in making our procedural rules more practical and more conducive to speedier
disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with substantial justice.
So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of
the Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring and
misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not
only are We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being performed
expeditiously, but that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have
precluded Us from being more expeditious and speedy.
I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not
combined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose
its faith and con dence in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the
Court could look with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all and sundry to
know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the
Philippines is far from being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas
Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the
Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for those in authority to answer
the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks
more apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be
dimming with tears of disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have
chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their fervent prayers
that some other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence may dictate to another
constitutional convention to write the guarantees of judicial independence with ink of
deeper hue and words that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the
line of demarcation between the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner that in His
In nite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial justice for our people, free, not
only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of
interference and insiduous in uence of the political powers that be. Presently, I am
constrained from going along with any other view than that the Constitution allows
abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the elimination of any incumbent
judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office. cdasia
I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters
about the choice that will ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the
judiciary in the course of the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the
Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the
Batasang Pambansa, and more speci cally to the President, its own constitutionally
conferred power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of
them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold o ce, leaving it to the President to appoint
those whom he may see t to occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be
appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their respective o ces," or, as others
would say they would be in fact removed. How the President will make his choices is
beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out even without being duly
informed of the reason therefor, much less being given the opportunity to be heard, the
past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest should serve as
su cient assurance that when he ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn
oath "to do justice to every man," hence, he will equip himself rst with the fullest reliable
information before he acts. This is not only my individual faith founded on my personal
acquaintances with the character and sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I
dare say this is the faith of the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises
and emergencies, with justice to all, with malice towards none. I am certain, the President
will deal with each and every individual to be affected by this reorganization with the best
light that God will give him every moment he acts in each individual case as it comes for
his decision.
AQUINO , J ., concurring :
I concur in the result. The petitioners led this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition
"to declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129)
unconstitutional."
The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to
grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the
constitutionality of the law. The petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is
involved.
There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in issue.
It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the
constitutional angle.
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the
constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers.
The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 led a petition for
declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum, De
la Llana vs. Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being
removed from his position.

The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose." As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting the
said law, the lawmaking body acted within the scope of its constitutional powers and
prerogatives.
GUERRERO , J ., concurring :
I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of

the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my
personal convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case, for
whatever they may be worth. llcd
The legal basis of the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having been
exhaustively discussed and decisively justi ed by him, a highly-respected expert and
authority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the same
cases and precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite differently,
not through the classic methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but following what
the well-known jurist, Dean Pound, said that "the most signi cant advance in the modern
science of law is the change from the analytical to the functional attitude." 1 And in
pursuing this direction, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling that "another guide to
the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy, and for this the
court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was
pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." 2
I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the
law are clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the
legislation, namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate
Appellate Court, thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A re-apportionment of jurisdiction
geared towards greater e ciency; (c) a Simpli cation of procedures; and (d) The abolition
of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and other statutes, as approved
by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of
justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the purpose of the Act as
further stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to embody reforms in the structure,
organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of improving the
administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more
complex problems on the present and forseeable future" cannot but "promote the welfare
of society, since that is the final cause of law." 4
Hence, from the standpoint of the general utility and functional value of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, there should be no di culty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and
constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The
notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets is too well-known to be ignored as
are the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for
devices and measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5
From the gures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351,943 in 1977; 404,686 in
1978; 426,911 in 1979; 441,332 in 1980; and 450,063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 the
congested character of court dockets rising year after year is staggering and enormous,
looming like a legal monster.
But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to
have Justices and Judges who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent
and e cient. The general clamor that the prestige of the Judiciary today has deteriorated
and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual basis.
Records in the Supreme Court attest to the un tness and incompetence, corruption and
immorality of many dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total
number of Justices and Judges against whom administrative charges have been led for
various offenses, misconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 322 . Of this total,
8 are Justices of the Court of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Court Judges, 8
Car Judges, 1 Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146
Municipal Judges.
The Supreme Court had found 1 0 2 of them guilty and punished them with either
suspension, admonition, reprimand or ne. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI
Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal
Judges. cdasia
Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And
these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.
Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from
the ling of the charge to the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings
were terminated after seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be
disposed of, only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases are being
filed by victims of judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.
Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many
who have been castigated and censured in nal judgments of the Supreme Court upon
appeal or review of the decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices
and Judges. To cite a few cases, Our decisions have categorically pronounced
respondents' actuations, thus: "deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7 ; "everything
was irregular and violative of all pertinent and applicable rules. The whole proceedings
looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the judge to
aunt the law and every norm of propriety and procedure" 8 ; "there was a deliberate failure
of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court" 9 ; "It is
unfortunate that respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, or misinterpreted, those
controlling provisions and doctrines" 1 0 ; "The failure of the respondent Municipal Judge to
yield obedience to authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and of respondent Court
of First Instance Judge and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was
called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981. For peremptorily dismissing the third party
complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was 'well-taken' and respondent
Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his tribe vanish." 1 1 In one case, We
noted "There is here something unusual, but far from palliating the gravity of the error
incurred, it merely exacerbated it. . . . it did render the due process requirement nugatory,
for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an idle form, a useless ceremony." 12
It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and o cially rebuked but to allow these Judges
and their ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the
Judiciary. It is to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not found time to exercise its
power and authority in the premises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted
against them. We have a list of these crooked Judges whose actuations have been found
to be patently wrong and manifestly indefensible. There ought to be no objection or
compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will
take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.
Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils,
abuses and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of
the people in the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some members of the Court felt that
these revelations would be like washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public
and official records, nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.
In the light of these known evils and in rmities of the judicial system, it would be absurd
and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and
honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that o cial duty has been
regularly performed. 1 3 The presumption of regularity is not con ned to the acts of the
individual o cers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or
bodies. and to acts of legislative bodies. 1 4 Good faith is always to be presumed in the
absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be
otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high o ce as the duly-elected
representatives of the people. LLjur
It is conceded that the abolition of an o ce is legal if attendant with good faith. 1 5 The
question of good faith then is the crux of the con ict at bar. Good faith in the enactment of
the law does not refer to the wisdom of the measure, the propriety of the Act, or to its
expediency. The questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz: Why
abolish all the courts? Why legislate out the judges? Why not amend the Rules of Court
only? Is abolition of all courts the proper remedy to weed out corrupt and mis ts in our
Judiciary? — may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That
is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 1 6 The Courts "are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 1 7 Chief Justice
Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid," 1 8 he adds that it is "useful to recall what was so clearly
stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must re ect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.'" 1 9 in any
case, petitioners have not shown an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual
foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship
speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be
a more e cient vehicle of "eliminating incompetent and un t Judges" as indicative of
impermissible legislative motive. 2 0
It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will eradicate
hopefully or at least minimize the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will
result in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the
lower courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition of o ce or removal from
o ce, the end-result is the same — termination of the services of these incumbents.
Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.
The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are
expected to know the nature and concept of a public o ce. It is created for the purpose of
effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are for the common
good, and not the pro t, honor or private interest of any one man, family or class of men. In
our form of government, it is fundamental that public o ces are public trust, and that the
person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 2 1 In
the last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the State. 2 2
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an o ce, or even an absolute
right to hold o ce. Excepting constitutional o ces which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an o ce or its
salary. When an o ce is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the
legislature, but when created by the State under the authority of the Constitution, it may be
abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived of his o ce. 2 3 Acceptance of a judicial
appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule that "when the court is abolished,
any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of such a court takes o ce with that
encumbrance and knowledge." 2 4 "The Judge's right to his full term and his full salary are
not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the
legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, from time to
time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25
The removal from o ce of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of
abolition of the o ce as demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people.
The bad and the crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober
Judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President
who, I am certain, will act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance
with his solemn oath of o ce "to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to everyone . . ." There and then the proper balance between the desire to preserve
private interest and the desideratum of promoting the public good shall have been struck.
26
The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last
bulwark of constitutional government. 2 7 It must, however, be remembered 'that
legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as courts." 2 8 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute" for which reason it will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution "except
in a clear case." 29
Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a con ict of opinions — on judicial
independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the
courts, whether abolition of o ce or removal therefrom; and on delegation of legislative
power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force
and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand
on the social justi cation and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality.
In the light of the contemporaneous events from which the New Republic emerged and
evolved new ideals of national growth and development, particularly in law and
government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justify
as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment. cdasia
This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to a x my imprimatur
and affirmance to the law, hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.
ABAD SANTOS , J ., concurring and dissenting :
I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is
not unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by
embellishing my concurrence lest I be accused of bringing coal to Newcastle. Accordingly,
I will simply vote to dismiss the petition.
However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:
". . . In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded the fullest consideration. There would be no plausibility then to
the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred."
It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional in rmity
because the abolition of certain judicial o ces was done in good faith. This being the
case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to ll the
newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to
accord its views the fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an
invasion of executive territory which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit
suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional implementation of the questioned
legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
DE CASTRO , J ., concurring :
I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.

May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my
brethren in the judiciary as not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their
security of tenure which is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality of the
law, than by way of giving added force or support to the main opinion so well-written by
Our learned Chief Justice in his usual scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a
discussion that the assailed statute is not unconstitutional without having to suggest how
it may be implemented in order that it could stand the most rigid test of constitutionality,
for in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act of the President in whose
wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust in how he would ful ll his sworn
duties to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do justice to every man.
Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional
ground that petitioners have not ful lled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of
its power of judicial inquiry — the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
I
The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the
power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or
substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of
constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from
which would thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perform the
functions of said courts. In the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to
speak of security of tenure of judges arises only after the courts have rst been brought
into being, the right to security of tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and
primary power of creating the courts to provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If the
legislature, in the exercise of its authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for a new
set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts would conduce more
to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is
one of policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot
inquire, much less interfere with. By this secondary position it has to the primary power of
the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incumbents should not
be a legal impediment to the exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory courts
which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create new
ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security
of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion of that
power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never
be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental precept of constitutional
and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of
legislative intent. It involves the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which
generally concerns policy in the formation of which the courts have no say. Initially, when
the legislature creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the necessity of
respecting the security of tenure of judges who are not yet there. This inherent character of
fullness and plenitude of the power to create and abolish courts does not change when
that same power is once more exercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. Which only
goes to show that when done in good faith and motivated solely by the good and the well-
being of the people, the exercise of the power is not meant to be restricted, curtailed,
much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security of tenure.
The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of
the power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described
above. That power carries with it the duty and responsibility of providing the people with
the most effective and e cient system of administration of justice. This is by far of more
imperative and transcendental importance than the security of tenure of judges which,
admittedly, is one of the factors that would conduce to independence of the judiciary — but
rst of all, a good, e cient and effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic
qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only for a judiciary that can
serve best the interest and welfare of the people which in the most primordial and
paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's faith has been eroded, a
condition which the security of tenure, in some instances, may even be contributory. LLphil
In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have
been motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial
machinery that would best serve their interest and welfare, in its belief that the present
machinery is falling short of that measure of public service. It should, likewise, be
presumed that it has been led to this low estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the
present set-up of the judiciary after informing itself, with the facilities at its command,
such as the power of legislative investigation, of the actual condition of the courts,
particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith and con dence of the
public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the keenly
perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this more or less extensive
slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be laid on no other than neither of the two
components of a court — the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings of the
courts, or the persons executing or applying them — or both.
When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy — the duty of
the legislature to provide society with a fair, e cient and effective judicial system, on one
hand, and the right of judges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity
yield to the former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly and on a greater
magnitude than the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily
discernible, more of a personal bene t to just a few, as indeed only the judge affected
could seek judicial redress of what he conceives to be its violation.
Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this concept which
underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justi cation of the
passage of the Act in question. That is, if a con ict between the primary power of the
legislature to create courts, and mere consequential bene t accorded to judges and
justices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see,
or, at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation of the two apparently con icting
interests which, from the above disquisition, is not hard to nd. It is, without doubt, in the
essence of the exercise of police power that a right assertable by individuals may be
infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general welfare. This is
demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable by
the entire people, not just by a handful in comparison, are made subject to the lawful
exercise of the police power of the State.
Viewed, therefore, from the abovementioned perspective, the general revamp of the
judiciary involving both its components — the court as an o ce or institution, and the
judges and justices that man them — should not nd any legal obstacle in the security of
tenure of judges. This security, after all, is no more than as provided for all other o cials
and employees in the civil service of the government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the
Constitution which provides:
"No o cer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law."
The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial o cials no
more than a guarantee that their retirement age as xed in the Constitution shall not be
alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution
was inserted for the rst time because the retirement age before then was provided
merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it comes to their removal or suspension, what
gives them constitutional protection is the aforequoted provision which does not
contemplate abolition of o ce when done in good faith, for removal implies the existence
of the o ce, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held, abolition of o ce for
no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the service, let alone when done in
bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 The abolition of the courts as declared in the
Act as a result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as the Title of the law curtly but
impressively announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded. And
whether by said reorganization, the present courts would be deemed abolished, as the law
expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one for the sole and exclusive
determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by the nature and
extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them abolished. To
give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of the changes as to
their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish them, or to
declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue interference in the
function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of courts precisely to
give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as may be discovered
therefrom. LibLex
From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not
effectively be abolished by the Act in question. It might be to arrogate power for Us to say
that the changes the law brings to the present judicial system, do not su ce for this Court
to give effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. Where would the agrarian courts,
the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by the law?
Are they not abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such merger, and
by the other changes introduced by the law, would make said courts different from the
present Courts of First Instance which, as a consequence, may then be considered
abolished? Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in
the judicial machinery would necessarily affect the entire system.
The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special
courts just mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only super cial or
"cosmetic" as this term has been used so often in the oral argument. Without the new law,
these courts will remain xed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course
of time, the need for their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed
conditions, where they are needed at present at a certain place, the need for them may be
somewhere else in later years, if maximum bene t at the least expense is to be achieved,
as always should be a most desirable goal and objective of government.
Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no
judicial inquiry, is proper, except perhaps if that intent is so palpably tainted with
constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no
occasion, as earlier intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization of
the judiciary would result in the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and
the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme
Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of eight justices does not come into the vortex of
the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the assailed statute cannot happen, and
may, therefore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality of the law.
Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly
indorsed the judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the
appointing power should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its
reorganization pursuant to the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well
re ect the favorable reaction of the public in general to what the Act aims to achieve in the
name of good and clean government. The present judicial incumbents, who have not in any
way, by their acts and behavior while in o ce, tarnished the good image that the judiciary
should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension that what they are entitled to under
the Constitution by way of security of tenure will be denied them, considering the publicly
known aim and purpose of the massive judicial revamp, specially as cherished with deep
concern by the President who initiated the move when he created the Judiciary
Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate judicial reforms.
If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible effect
of impairing the security of tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following facts to
consider:
1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in
o ce until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial o cials, no
security of tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real
sense, only a hold-over tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with
admirable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness
will be his sole guide in implementing the law.
2. As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President,
and he should feel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may
rightfully claim to maintain their o cial standing and integrity. They need have no fear of
being ignored for no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of
nobility of heart.
From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law
may there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy, as when a judge of
acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of
arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by
the law is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.
Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent
committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the
judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can always seek
judicial redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure with
uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar
circumstances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is
unpardonable.
II
This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice
Aquino. The petition asks this Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to
declare a law unconstitutional when it con icts with the fundamental law (People vs. Vera,
65 Phil. 56). This power has well-de ned limits, for it can be exercised only when the
following requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do
so at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The determination of the constitutionality of the
statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case.
I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it led
by the proper parties. LexLib
The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 is assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The
only persons who could raise the question of constitutionality of the law are, therefore, the
actual incumbents of the courts who would be separated from the service upon the
abolition of the courts affected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that
their judicial security of tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only
judge among the petitioners, has not been separated from the service. Nor is his
separation already a certainty, for he may be appointed to the court equivalent to his
present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his
tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that
has become actual, not merely probable or hypothetical.
The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an
action to raise the question of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can
more appropriately bring the suit to defend a right exclusively belonging to him, and,
therefore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a "proper
party" to invoke the power of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of such
power, does not mean one having no better right, one more personalized, than what he has
as a member of the public in general. With the incumbent judges undoubtedly being the
ones under petitioners' theory, who would suffer direct and actual injury, they should
exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer as "direct" and "actual" an injury as
the judges and justices by the enforcement of the assailed statute, from the right to bring
the suit.
The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that
only after the fate of the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually
separated or not, would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly
continues their existence until all the new courts have been lled up with new
appointments, or at least such number as would be equal to the number of actual
incumbents, and they are the very courts to which they may lay claim to the right to
continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of them has thereby been made
certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, may there possibly be a violation
of the security of tenure; as contended, that would give rise to an "actual controversy" in
which the "proper party" can be no other than the judges who feel aggrieved by their non-
appointment to the new courts.
It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even
been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and all those who helped by
their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of the
proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact, certain and
actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they
could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that
is unconstitutional unto itself.
I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse
great popular expectations for the courts to regain their highest level of e ciency had
reputation for probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is fully
implemented will all the courts affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an
interregnum when the country is without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of
Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then will it be known whether an actual controversy
would arise because any of the incumbents have been left out in the restructured judiciary.
There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law,
conformably to the conditions requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry
which by their stringent character, together with the constitutional prescription of a
comparatively higher vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of
government that a law should, by all reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved
from the doom of unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a law is
susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would make it constitutional that
interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the
implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a
categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is
definitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the law
shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be
proper. But surely, the bene ts envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic
duties of government to the people — the administration of justice — should not be
sacri ced, as it would be, if the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared void right
now, on the claim of a few being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for
the claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a
public office.
Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its
effectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is
what distinguishes the Act in question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case, 5
which by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the judges whose
positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question, therefore, is
not as exposed to the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet
by the operation of the Constitution with its wise provision on how a law may be declared
unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness of its
intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, identi ed with public interest and
general welfare, through a more e cient and effective judicial system as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.
Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken
down, on the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in
violation of their security of tenure. The law does not directly operate with that effect. It is
in how the law would be implemented that this feared eventuality may or may not occur.
We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation if We do so at this stage. This
would be an injudicious act done in reckless disregard of the safeguards built around a law
to defend it when its constitutionality is attacked; rst , the presumption that a law is
constitutional; second, when a law is susceptible to two interpretations one that would
make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former should be adopted; and third,
the Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be declared unconstitutional
except on the vote of at least ten (10) members of the Supreme Court, more than what is
required for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This is not to mention the stringent
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all
designed to save the law from the dire fate of unconstitutionality. cdphil
To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between
protecting some judges from possible separation, as the implementation of the law to
achieve its primary purpose of improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the
interest of the entire society through an honest, e cient and effective judiciary. For, it is
unthinkable that what is for the good of the people as a whole could have been meant by
the Constitution to be sacri ced for the sake of only a few. The greatest good for the
greatest number is an unwritten rule, more rm and enduring than any of the postulates
spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main theme of this separate
opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and a time-honored maxim: "Salus populi
est suprema lex."
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J ., concurring :
There is unquali ed adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition led in this case.
If I am writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in
regards to the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, of
the Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts by
law. Section 7 of the same Article reads:
"SEC. 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
shall hold o ce during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their o ce. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members, order their dismissal."
There should be no conflict between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.
1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts
ordinarily includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to
abolish Courts is generally coextensive with the power to create them. The power to
abolish was not intended to be quali ed by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing
McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs. Gaines, 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold
o ce during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or become incapacitated
to discharge the duties of their o ce, does not deprive Congress of its power to abolish,
organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta
vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. O cer, 904-5). Judges of those Courts take
office with that encumbrance and knowledge.
"The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it.
When the court is abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of
such court takes o ce with that encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin,
45 Ala. 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698, State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So
283, et al."
The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is
undisputed. At the same time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be
abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only
safeguard to the independence of the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of the
Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public mind that
there are those who have abused the prerogatives of their judicial position knowing that
they are untouchables by virtue of the permanence of their tenure?
b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts.
Section 1 heretofore mentioned refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of
Government. Section 7 quoted above refers to the tenure of o ce of "individual" Judges
(inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of o ce is a matter
concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by
the clause that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of inferior
Courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In
fact, the entire judicial system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of
change, woe to the wheels of progress and the imperatives of growth in the development
of the Judiciary. To hold that tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative power to
reorganize is to render impotent the exercise of that power.
It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, from
which they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for
bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power
of the legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those
Courts. If an inferior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily
have to lose his position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.
c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist.
As long as those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the
extent of the constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upon
declaration of the completion of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization
Act, the affected Courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished." There being no Courts,
there are no o ces for which tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition of those
o ces, the rights to them are necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil.
903 [1954]).
2. I am satis ed that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in
response to an urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting
adversely the security of tenure of all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment of
judicial independence. It should not be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of
abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to
defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981
su ciently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition of public o ce, as clearly
explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its actuations
must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government, supreme within the
limits of its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing
that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to justify
the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R. 468;
State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16
SCRA 599 [1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it, must be
balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and
Section 7, supra, the former is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is of more importance
to the welfare of the country than the tenure of o ce of an individual Judge. If a Judge is
removed without cause, there can be damage to the public welfare to some extent, but
maintenance of a Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive Government,
can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by
the present Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline
Judges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8 members, order their dismissal."
Absent the Court, it would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court's power to discipline.
Thus, where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline
cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only
when there is removal from an existing judicial o ce, but not when that o ce is abolished.
The reorganization of the judicial system with the abolition of certain Courts is not an
exercise of the power to discipline the Judges of the abolished Courts.
It is of signi cance to note that the power of dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the
1973 Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline
and the power to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may well be
asked: does the grant of the power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme Court
deprive the executive of the power of removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation
of powers in our government to state that the Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss
with the executive power of removal? For is not the power of removal basically executive in
nature, as an incident to the power of appointment, which is the prerogative of the Chief
Executive alone? As in the case of appointments, Section 5(6), Article X of the Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its o cials and employees. However, is not
this power shared with the power of appointment of the executive who appoints some of
the Court o cials? These questions could lend themselves to an in-depth study in the
proper case.
4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public o ce
cannot be regarded as the "property" of the incumbent. A public o ce is not a contract
(Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925]). A public o ce is a public trust (Section 1, Article
XIII, 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russel, 166
Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA 253 cited also in Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The o cers are the servants of the people and not their rulers
(22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public O cers and Election
Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that there is no removal from o ce but
abolition of the office itself.
5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of
government. "The thrust is on development." It is "the rst major reorganization after four
generations." It does not provide for a piecemeal change, which could be ineffective. It
goes to the roots and does not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main
objectives are an improved administration of justice, the "attainment of more e ciency in
the disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do
not tend to the proper meting out of justice." These aims are policy matters of necessity in
the pursuit of developmental goals within the Judiciary.
6. The Reorganization Act reorganizes the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme
Court, which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages
institutional reforms in the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names of the
Courts. The facts herein are dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732 [1954])
where the position of Justice of the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely
changed to Municipal Judge after the municipality of Tacloban was converted into a city
with its own charter.
Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:
The Intermediate Appellate Court
This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fteen (15), ve members
composing each division, and a majority vote of three members being needed for a
decision. This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning two
other members to compose a "division of ve." It also allows exibility in that any three
members of a division, arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision. LLjur
Now provided for is specialization into four (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal
Cases Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions. The specialization is expected to
contribute to the expeditious disposal of cases.
The Court has been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme
Court where numerous such cases are filed daily.
It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all nal judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or award of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution.
The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away with the
delays attendant to the remand of cases to the lower trial Courts.
Regional Trial Courts
There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and
Batasang Pambansa Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.
A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his o cial station. This ensures mobility since a
Judge may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional
limitation of six months. Additionally, it can remedy temporary inequalities of caseloads in
trial Courts.
Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts
would try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in
which case, they remain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. Special procedures and
technical rules governing special Courts will continue to remain applicable in Branches
assigned those special cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts
There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The
appointment of Judges would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court, although a Judge may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded
by the exigencies of the service.
The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies
only to cases of traffic violations.
Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall exibility. They can also be
circuitized with those in cities not forming part of metropolitan areas.
One notable change between the old and the new set-up is that Judges of these Courts will
now be Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely
designated by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal
Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:
a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between the trial Courts
have been entirely eliminated.
b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is
now to be transmitted.
c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of ndings of
fact and conclusions of law as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from,
is also provided for. This will expedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases.
d) Section 42 provides for "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly
basic pay for Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each ve years of
continuous, e cient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no
case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank." Thus, Justices and Judges
who may not reach the top, where unfortunately there is not enough room for all, may have
the satisfaction of at least approximating the salary scale of those above him depending
on his length of service.
8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be
administered should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of
Commrs., 292 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility of an
unconstitutional exercise of power the following safeguards are recommended and/or
expected to be undertaken:
a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the
completion of the reorganization provided for in the Act and the issuance of the
corresponding implementing Order.
b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as
possible, to the declaration by the President of the completion of the reorganization under
Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the smooth and continuous functioning of the judicial
machinery. cdasia
c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as

recommended by the Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).
9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to
submit to the President within thirty (30) days from the date of nality of its Decision the
staffing pattern for all Courts required by Section 43.
I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the
sta ng pattern be made to include the names of Judges. The sta ng pattern for Judges
is already clearly and explicitly provided in the law itself which enumerates the various
Judges and Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior
positions of Judges would depart from the traditional concept of a sta ng pattern, which
refers more to personnel organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It
is also constitutionally objectionable in that it would interfere with the prerogative of
appointment intrinsically executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966];
Government of the Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be
deprived of, nor be limited in, the full use of his discretion in the appointment of persons to
any public o ce. Nothing should so trench upon executive choice as to be, in effect,
judicial designation.
10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon
motion led by petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of
which I was privileged to be a member, con ned its work to the recommendation of
options and guidelines in the task of reorganization. The Committee had no part
whatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. In fact, some of
its recommendations like the circuitization or regionalization of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary, the con nement of the jurisdiction of
the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the adoption of the
system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries of having a Court of
general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed of in the final Act.
11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed
on the good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of "e ciency,
integrity, length of service and other relevant factors," shall be appointed to a strengthened
and revitalized judicial system in the interest of public service; that appointments will not
be unduly delayed: and that appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and
impartiality in the men and women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.
ERICTA , J ., concurring :
I concur in the view that Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not
violate the principle of security of tenure of Judges.
The constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to
the Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by law.
No law is irrepealable. The power to create an o ce includes the power to abolish the
same. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142). prLL
Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public o cer or

employee but an abolition of his o ce. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs.
Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. O ce of the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A
distinction should be made between removal from o ce and abolition of an o ce.
Removal implies that the o ce subsists after ouster, while, in abolition, the o ce no
longer exists thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to exercise the rights and
duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147)
What is only needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. It need only be
shown that said abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona de reorganization.
(Urgelio vs. Osmeña, supra)
It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization composed of four (4) distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the members of the
Batasang Pambansa whose combined efforts after a careful study and deliberation
resulted to the enactment of a bill now signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In
his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C. Puno declared the objectives of the Judiciary
Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the attainment of more e ciency in the
disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of decisions by the courts that will
result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the exigencies
of present day Philippine Society and of the foreseeable future.
Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely
affected. But in a con ict between public interest and the individual interest of some
Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of
appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law
should be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship of the President. llcd
PLANA , J ., concurring and dissenting :
As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and de ne, prescribe and
apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other
courts as long as the act is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an
unconstitutional end. Good faith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done
in the main opinion, it is manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its
enactment. On this basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief Justice,
qualified only by the following observations:
1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. — I believe the President is under no
obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called
upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has said, it
cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod-Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the
President.
In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court
with the function of giving advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution, however, did
not see fit to adopt the proposal.
If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129 and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question
of procedure), I believe the President would be free to follow or disregard the advice; but,
in either case, there would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld
in one case or stricken down in the other.
2. Undue delegation of legislative powers. —
The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the
ground that a provision thereof (regarding xing of compensation and allowances for
members of the Judiciary) constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of
legislative power.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or
guidelines for the implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation
inoffensive. I would like to add however some observations on the doctrine of undue
delegation of legislative power.
Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and
executive powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of
legislative power. Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental powers could be
negated via unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however
radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of
executive and legislative powers in the hands of the same group of o cials. Cabinet
members play a leading role in the legislative process, and members of the Batasan
actively discharge executive functions. The Prime Minister indeed must come from its
ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly upholding the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive Department.
In a very real sense, the present Constitution has signi cantly eroded the hoary doctrine of
non-delegation of legislative power, although it has retained some provisions of the old
Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this time perhaps
not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the
incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.
"In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by
law authorize the President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment." (Art. VIII, Sec.
15.)
"The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to x within
speci ed limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts." [Ibid., Sec. 17(2).]
TEEHANKEE , J ., dissenting :
Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted
the Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 by its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member
Sandiganbayan 1 and the three-member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by the
President of the completion of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said
courts "automatically abolished" en masse and "the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
o ce." 2 The total abolition involves a total of 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180
incumbent judges (and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982 and the Act would effect an
increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial positions to be lled by new
appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference due to enactments of the
Batasan, I regretably nd myself unable to join the ranks of my esteemed colleagues in the
majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dismiss the petition,
for the following main considerations and reasons: —
1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the
leading 1955 case of Ocampo 3 who fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally
required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare
unconstitutional and invalid Section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18
judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent
judges from o ce as against the contrary vote of a minority of 4 Justices (namely, then
Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical
situation that the last three named Justices voted for the validity of the Act as a remedial
measure that abolished said positions without permanent station which subjected them to
a rigodon de jueces without the consent of the Supreme Court, which they considered as
"repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative of an express prohibitory provision of
the 1935 Constitution — while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would go
with the majority that "Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post without
allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."
2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate
opinion — "(T)he [adverse] outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from o ce of
the ten petitioners who were presiding different Courts of First Instance, some as judges-
at-large, others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186
abolishing the positions of judges-at-large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the
speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has further weakened the
usually weak judicial department because of its 'innovative' requirement of a 2/3 majority
vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never in our history
has such a number of judges of rst instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through
judicial reorganization.'"
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges
"during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their o ce" 4 must prevail over the implied constitutional authority
to abolish courts and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure
bears repeating, thus:
"A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express
guaranty or positive de nition of their term of o ce, the respondents rely on
implied authority to abolish courts and the positions of the respective judges.
Accurately stated, respondents' defense rests on a second inference deduced
from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress has express
power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish courts and the
positions of judges of such abolished courts ( rst inference); and therefore
(second inference) Congress likewise has power to eject the judges holding such
positions.
"Resultant juridical situation: The implied authority invoked by respondents
collides with the express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which shall
prevail? Obviously the express guaranty must override the implied authority.
'Implications can never be permitted to contradict the expressed intent or to
defeat its purpose.'. . .
xxx xxx xxx
"But the collision may be-should be-avoided, and both sections given validity, if
one be considered a proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the
Constitution the Congress may abolish existing courts, provided it does not
thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take effect upon
termination of their incumbency. The fundamental provisions on the matter are
thereby 'coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his
concurring opinion in Zandueta v. De la Costa. To bring about the reconciliations
is the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, p. 6)" 5
3. This reasoning that the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges
during good behavior unless removed from o ce after hearing and due process or upon
reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy years must override the implied
authority of removing by legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed
beyond doubt by the new provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the
administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel from the Chief Executive
through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme
Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissa l," 7 which power was formerly lodged by the Judiciary
Act in the Chief Executive.
As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934
Constitutional Convention "frowned on removal of judges of rst instance through
abolition of their o ces or reorganization," citing Professor Jose Aruego's observation
that the security of judges' tenure provision was intended to "help secure the
independence of the judiciary" in that "during good behaviour, they may not be legislated
out of office by the lawmaking body nor removed by the Chief Executive for any reason and
under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in office until they reach the age
of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their o ce. (Aruego,
the Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, pp. 718-719)" He further cited Aruego's
report that a proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition against transfers of
judges to another district without the approval of the Supreme Court 8 "should not be
applicable to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the amendment
was defeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow, therefore,
having vetoed the transfer of judges thru a reorganization, the Convention evidently could
not have permitted the removal of judges thru re-organization." cdasia
Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the
least in the light of the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent
judges through legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they would have so
clearly provided for such form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as
already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by
vesting exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of discipline and removal of judges of
all inferior courts.
4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon
that abolition of the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect
manner of removing the petitioners-judges" while the "positions [that] were eliminated . . .
were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges" applies with greater
force in the case at bar which involves an unprecendented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it
reorganization, or legislation or removal or abolition, this law disregards the constitutional
assurance that these judges, once appointed, shall hold o ce during good behaviour . . .
unless incapacitated and until retirement].
"The abolition of their o ces was merely an indirect manner of removing these
petitioners. Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges of rst
instance, district judges, judges-at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296). After
the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions of judges of rst
instance. There was no reduction-there was increase-in the number of judges, nor
in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges
were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of
judges; or if you please, there was a mere change of designation from 'Cadastral
Judge or Judge-at-Large' to 'district judge.' Hence it should be ruled that as their
positions had not been 'abolished' de facto, but actually retained with another
name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R.
No. L-7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not permissible to effect the removal of one
judge thru the expediency of abolishing his-o ce even as the o ce with same
power is created with another name. (Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118
Tenn. 391, Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R., p. 211) in this view of the picture, we believe,
Congress could have, and should have-as suggested by Secretary Tuazon during
the hearings in Congress-directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the present
judges-at-large and cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such
districts as may be xed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments;' or by the Secretary of Justice, as originally proposed by Senator
Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar was done before, and it
would not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's prerogative of
appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary
before the passage of the act, and the provision may be construed in the light of
mere change of official designation plus increase in salary."
5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms
with more speci c delineation of jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority
opinion, but they do not change the basic structure of the existing courts. The present
Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and
redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan
Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts,
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian Relations are all
restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of Regional Trial Courts
with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile
and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases .. and/or such other
special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and
e cient administration of justice" 1 0 and the Court of Appeals is restructured and
redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of
Appellate Justices from the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the number of
divisions from 15 (composed of 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed of 5 members each)
such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the
important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers of facts. Cdpr
In my view, the "candid admission" by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he
entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new
tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other abovementioned courts provided for in
the challenged Act as "new courts." And the best proof of this is the plain and simple
transitory provision in Section 44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of
completion of the reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold o ce"). "(T)he cases pending in
the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this
Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary
personnel," together with the "applicable appropriations." This could not have been
possible without a speci cation and enumeration of what speci c cases of the "old
courts" would be transferred to the particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not
been manifestly and substantially the "old courts" with a change of name-or as described
by Justice Barredo to have been his rst view, now discarded, in his separate opinion: "just
a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modi cation or alteration of the present
judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodeling of the old structure." 11
6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts
and consequent ouster of the incumbent judges from o ce as expounded by the late
eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case of
Zandueta 1 2 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of
petitioner Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment of office. 1 3 Realistically viewed from the
basis of the established legal presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes
(unless set aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme Court) and of good
faith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate
on the good or bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be
imprudent and improper and declare that "the legislative power of reorganization (is)
sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose." The good faith in the enactment of
the challenged Act must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative
power to abolish courts as implied from the power to establish them with the express
constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which is essential for a free and
independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that indispensable for the
maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and
enforce it without fear or favor — "free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and
incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous in uence of the
political powers that be," to quote again from Justice Barredo's separate concurring
opinion. 1 4 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice
Bengzon in the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law
Professors headed by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization
should at least allow the incumbents of the existing courts to remain in o ce [the
appropriate counterpart 'new courts'] unless they are removed for cause."
7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants"
as stressed by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his majority opinion in Ocampo is based
on the judiciary's status as a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, whereas the
long line of Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish o ces refers to
o cers or employees in the executive branch of government and "the underlying
consideration must be borne in mind that Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to
the Executive Department and because the President approved the law, no question or
encroachment by one branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged." 1 5 This is not
a matter of personal privilege for the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by former U.P.
Law Dean Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, "for the judiciary whose
independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger of being completely destroyed."
Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial independence is not a guarantee intended for the
Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even more vital to the
courts at the lowest levels because there are more of them and they operate closest to the
people, "and" (P)articularly under the present form of modi ed parliamentary government
with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in certain areas merging, the
judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the performance of which its
independence assumes an even more vital importance." cdasia
The extensive memoranda led by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae, such as former
Senator Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent
further destruction of judicial independence," former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president
of the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's adoption of the
Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the elementary rule in the
interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution"
and that the judges' security of tenure guaranty should not be "rendered meaningless and
inoperative" former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, president of the Philippine Lawyers'
Association who submit that the total abolition of all courts below the Supreme Court
(except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the
incumbent Justices and Judges "violates the independence of the judiciary, their security
of tenure and right to due process guaranteed them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M.
Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the Philippines who invokes the
Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1959, that "The principles of unremovability of
the Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a retiring age xed by statute
is reached, is an important safeguard of the Rule of Law" have greatly helped in fortifying
my views.
8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee
on Judicial Reorganization that "(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may
recommend to meet the worldwide problem of congested court dockets, and to improve
judicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the
judiciary as the weakest branch of government, yet called upon to safeguard the people's
rights and protect them from oppression, o cial and otherwise, are entitled to security of
tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though the lower courts may be reshu ed
or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of the Constitution guaranteeing their
security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the judiciary should be respected,
and they should be retained in the new courts."
In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned
provisions of the Act the "absolutist sense which they appear to have at rst blush" thus: "
(T)o accept legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to future
court abolitions in the guise of reorganization. At this stage of our political development,
the process of embarking upon a modi ed parliamentary system may well usher in a
situation where despite guarantees of judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or
any alliance that can command a majority vote may periodically undertake complete
reorganization and remove judges, thus making of the judiciary a veritable straw in the
political wind," and "(F)uthermore, what can result in the modi ed parliamentary system
from the close working relationship between executive and legislature is made manifest in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the sweeping revamp provided were to be carried out the
President would appoint all of the justices and judges of the courts affected and the whole
membership in the judiciary from the highest to the lowest courts would be his
appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation like this that the
Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the chairman and
members of the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed
independence."
9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of
the 1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to
remove and replace all judges and o cials 1 6 (as against the limited one-year period for
the exercise of such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth). Upon the declaration of martial law in
September, 1972, justices and judges of all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been
required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total of 53 judges who were
replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period from
September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed after the
effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the
President in the pending case of Tapucar vs . Famador 1 7 notwithstanding the generally
held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the
Replacement Clause of the cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge
appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City, Branch I, invoked his constitutional security of tenure and questioned the
appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him, although he
had not been removed or otherwise dismissed from his position nor had he resigned
thereform. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain from
discharging the functions of the questioned o ce.) And now comes this total abolition of
1,663 judicial positions (and thousands of personnel positions) unprecedented in its
sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with the restoration of the
security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a free and independent judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary,
possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief
Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:
"Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke? Or judges, who, in his place,
would have answered 'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, afraid of
ouster thru a judiciary reshu e, would rather serve the interest of the party in
power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?
"As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler with
judges precariously occupying their o cial seats? Judges performing their duties
under the sword of Damocles of future judicial reorganizations?"
10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally
apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is
likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in
a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 1 8 it was
stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches,'" 1 9 with the further
observation that "many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded." In the
cited case of Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief Justice for the Court), the Court
issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint
led with respondent scal Labang by "disgruntled members of the bar with a record of
losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty of censure on each and
everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the "unseemly haste" with which they led
the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or oppressive
exercise of state authority." The Court marked the "violation of the cardinal principles of
fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was not heard; he
was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation. There was, on the
part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the Integrated Bar
stressing that precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which traditionally cannot
defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,'" and
that such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and humiliation . . . can diminish
public confidence in the courts." LLjur
11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the
course of committee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second
reading in the Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and corrupt judges
and to restore con dence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant
subject of headlines and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council
reportedly screening and conducting "integrity tests" as to new applicants and the
incumbent judges 2 0 and seeking "con dential information on corrupt and incompetent
judges to help the government purge the judiciary." 2 1 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was
quoted as saying that "'there will be a purge of the corrupt and the mis ts' when the
Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law by President Marcos and implemented in
coordination with the Supreme Court." 2 2 The public respondents' answer sidesteps the
issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a fair hearing and due process and
submits that "no term of o ce is sacrosanct when demanded before the altar of the
public good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety gripping the judiciary as the
Ministry of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information 'on the performance
of the judges and on the quali cations of those slated to take over the positions of the
incompetent, the ine cient or those involved in irregularities.' As stated in an editorial,
'Somehow, the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the
judges to mental torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will fall on them.
Worse, the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into seeking
the help of people claiming to have influence with the powers that be." 23
But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is
there hard evidence on this. The only gures given in the course of the committee hearings
were to the effect that out of some 1,700 members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were
of the undesirable category, i.e. mis t, incompetent or corrupt. (Barredo, J., before the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980)," and that
"(I)f this be the case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial
o ces becomes an arbitrary act, the effect of which is to assert the power to remove all
the incumbents guilty or innocent without due process of law." Nor would it be of any avail
to beg the question and assert that due process is not available in mass abolitions of
courts.
Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate
concurrence to twin objectives of getting rid of "structural inadequacies of the system or
of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force"
and of "a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary (who) make a
mockery of justice and take advantage of their o ce for personal ends." He adds that "it is
my personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has
to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most ideal judicial system
with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of
justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence and
sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay,
impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption, including the usual importunings
and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that be," 2 4 and invokes the
adage of "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity of the Act. Cdphil
Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills
demand drastic cures" thus: "Drastic, yes — but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does
not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing
him. The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence; they will
not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course could only
breed more perversity in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule
have bred more subversion."
12. Finally, as stated by the 1975 Integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of
Delegates, "It would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due
process cannot count it on themselves. Observance of procedural due process in the
separation of misfits from the Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective."
As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal
principles of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend
themselves against the accusations made against them and not to be subjected to
harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal
authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their
constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and non-impairment of the independence of
the judiciary and the proper exercise of the constitutional power exclusively vested in the
Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after fair hearing.
In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization that —
Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such
reorganization on the basis of con dential adverse reports as to their performance,
competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign from o ce upon being
confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without
due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a number of
honest and competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally
believed to be basket cases have remained in the service; and
The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the
judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint and
with the cooperation of the aggrieved parties and after due process and hearing. cdasia
The constitutional confrontation and con ict may well be avoided by holding that since the
changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and
functions of the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old courts"
but provide for procedural changes, xed delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the
number of courts for a more effective and e cient disposition of court cases, the
incumbent judges' guaranteed security of tenure require that they be retained in the
corresponding "new courts."
Footnotes
1. Article X, Section 1, first sentence of the Constitution reads: "The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law."
2. Cf. Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 (1921) and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3. Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
4. It may be mentioned in passing that petitioners ignored the fact that an action for
declaratory relief should be filed in a Court of First Instance and apparently are unaware
that there is no such proceeding known in constitutional law to declare an act
unconstitutional. So it has been authoritatively ruled even prior to the 1935 Constitution,
and much more so after its effectivity and that of the present Constitution. That is the
concept of judicial review as known in the Philippines, a principle that goes back to the
epochal decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
This court, then, as do lower courts, has the duty and the power to declare an act
unconstitutional but only as an incident to its function of deciding cases. Cf. Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
5. Gualberto J. de la Llana is the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the City Court of
Olongapo. The other petitioners are all members of the Philippine bar.
6. He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno.
7. The amici curiae who argued were Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, President, Philippine
Constitution Association; Dean Irene Cortes, former Dean, U.P. College of Law; Atty.
Bellaflor Angara Castillo, President, U.P. Women Lawyers Circle; Atty. Paz Veto Planas,
President, Women Lawyers Association; Atty. Raul Roco, Executive Vice-President,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; Atty. Enrique Syguia, President, Philippine Bar
Association; Atty. Rafael G. Suntay, for the Trial Lawyers Association; and Senator Jose
W. Diokno submitted memoranda. Atty. Raul Gonzales entered his appearance for
petitioner and argued by way of rebuttal. Atty. Ambrosio Padilla likewise submitted a
memorandum, which the Court allowed to stay in the records.
8. 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
9. Ibid, 89.
10. L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.
11. Ibid., 308.
12. Executive Order No. 611. The writer of this opinion was designated as Chairman, and
Minister Ricardo C. Puno as Co-Chairman. Two members of the Court, Justices Ramon
C. Aquino and Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as well as a former member, retired
Justice Felix Q. Antonio, were named to such body. Deputy Minister of Justice Jesus
Borromeo completed the membership.
13. Executive Order No. 619-A.
14. Report of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, 5-6.
15. Ibid, 7.
16. Ibid, citing the President's foreword to The Philippine Development Plan, 2.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 8. The last sentence of this portion of the Report reads: "That is to achieve the
democratization and humanization of justice in what has been felicitously referred to by
the First Lady as a 'compassionate society.'"
19. Ibid, 8-9.
20. Ibid, 9-10.
21. Ibid, 10.
22. Ibid.
23. Act No. 136. Cf. Act No. 2347 and 4007.
24. Commonwealth Act No. 3.
25. Ibid, Sec. 3, Under Commonwealth Act No. 259, the membership of the Court of Appeals
was increased to fifteen, with one Presiding Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
Three divisions were created, five members in each division. The Act was approved on
April 7, 1938. In 1945 after the liberation of the Philippines, it was abolished by Executive
Order No. 37 of President Sergio Osmeña exercising his emergency power under
Commonwealth Act No. 671. It was established anew under Republic 52, which took
effect on October 4, 1946.
26. Republic Act No. 296.
27. Section 53 of this Act provided: "In addition to the District Judges mentioned in Section
forty-nine hereof, there shall also be appointed eighteen Judges-at-large and fifteen
Cadastral Judges who shall not be assigned permanently to any judicial district; and
who shall render duty in such district or province as may from time to time, be
designated by the Department Head." This Section was repealed by Republic Act No.
1186 (1954).
28. Cf. Republic Act No. 520 (1968) and Presidential Decree No. 289 (1973).
29. Presidential Decree No. 1482.
30. Republic Act No. 1125 (1954).
31. Republic Act No. 1267. It was amended by Presidential Decree No. 946 (1976).
32. Republic Act No. 1404. Subsequently, two more branches were added under
Presidential Decree No. 1439 (1978).
33. Republic Act Nos. 4834 and 4836. In 1978, there was a Presidential Decree providing
for Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts in thirteen provinces and twenty-seven other
cities.
34. Republic Act No. 5179.
35. Explanatory Note, 5-6.
36. Sponsorship Speech of Minister Puno, Volume Four, Third Regular Session, 1980-81,
2013.
37. Ibid.
38. L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998.
39. Ibid, 1003. Prior to such decision, the following cases had reaffirmed such a principle
Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 (1954); Rodriguez v. Montinola, 94 Phil. 964 (1954);
Gacho v. Osmeña Jr., 103 Phil. 837 (1958); Briones v. Osmeña Jr., 105 Phil 588 (1958);
Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 111 Phil. 249 (1961); Facundo v. Hon. Pabalan, 114 Phil. 307
(1962), Alipio v. Rodriguez, 119 Phil. 59 (1963); Llanto v. Dimaporo, 123 Phil. 413 (1966);
Ocampo v. Duque, 123 Phil. 842 (1966); Guillergan v. Ganzon, 123 Phil. 1102 (1966);
Abanilla v. Ticao, L-22271, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 652; Cariño v. ACCFA, L-19808, Sept.
29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; De la Maza v. Ochave, L-22336, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 142,
Arao v. Luspo, L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722.
40. L-28614, January 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 34.
41. Enciso v. Remo, L-23670, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580; Roque v. Ericta, L-30244,
September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 156. Cf. City of Basilan v. Hechanova, L-23841, August 30,
1974, 58 SCRA 711.
42. 66 Phil. 615 (1938).
43. Commonwealth Act No. 145.

44. Ibid, 626.
45. Ibid, 626-627.
46. It likewise abolished the Court of Land Registration (1914).
47. 1932.
48. 66 Phil. 615, 626.
49. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Sections 3-12. It may be stated that the writer of this opinion
as the Chairman of the Committee on Reorganization, was for the establishment either
of (1) a court of general jurisdiction with an appellate as well as a trial division patterned
after that of the system of judicature found in the United Kingdom and in many
Commonwealth countries or, in the alternative, (2) of a circuit court of appeals. The
Committee accepted such proposals and incorporated them in the guidelines. Candor
compels the admission that he entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court
of appeals provided for is a new tribunal. It could be considered though as part of an
integrated scheme for the judicial reorganization as contemplated by the Batasang
Pambansa.
50. Ibid, Sections 13-24.
51. Ibid, Section 27.
56. 94 Phil. 732 (1954).
57. Ibid, 734-735.
58. Ibid, 735.
59. According to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 2: "The reorganization herein provided
shall include the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the
City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts."
60. Ibid, Section 44. Its last sentence reads: "The cases pending in the old Courts shall be
transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the
pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel."
61. Hayden, The Philippines 67 (1945).
62. 67 Phil. 62 (1939).

63. 63 Phil. 139.
64. Ibid, 156.
65. Article VII, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution.
66. Section 16 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows: "All powers vested in
the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land
which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are
hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
67. Section 1, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.
68. Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution, in its original form.
69. According to Article IX, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution prior to its being amended
last year: "The Executive power shall be exercised by the Prime Minister with the
assistance of the Cabinet. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, shall consist of
the heads of ministries as provided by law. The Prime Minister shall be the head of the
Government."
70. G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981.
71. Ibid, 4. That characterization is in accordance with the Anglo-American concept of the
distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. In the work of President
Marcos entitled, Marcos: Notes for the Cancun Summit 1981, the Conference appears to
have adopted such a distinction. Countries with the presidential systems sent their
presidents: C. Bendjedid of Algeria; A. Sattar of Bangladesh; J.B. de Oliviera Figuereido
of Brazil; F. Mitterand of France; A. Cheng of Guyana; H. Boigny of Ivory Coast; Lopez
Portillo of Mexico; A.S. Shagari of Nigeria; Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines; J.K.
Nyerere of Tanzania; R. Reagan of the United States; L. Herrera Campins of Venezuela; S.
Kraigher of Yugoslavia. Likewise, countries under the parliamentary system sent their
Prime Ministers: P.E. Trudeau of Canada; Zhao Ziyang of China; M.H. Thatcher of the
United Kingdom; I. Gandhi of India; Z. Zuzuki of Japan; N.O.T. Falldin of Sweden. While
called Chancellors, B. Kreisky of Austria and H. Schmidt of Germany hold such a
position. Crown Prince Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia does not fall under either
category.
72. Article IX, Sections 1 and 3 of the amended Constitution. Section 3 reads in full: "There
shall be an Executive Committee to be designated by the President, composed of the
Prime Minister as Chairman, and not more than fourteen other members, at least half of
whom shall be Members of the Batasang Pambansa. The Executive Committee shall
assist the President in the exercise of his powers and functions and in the performance
of his duties as he may prescribe."
73. L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607.
74. Ibid, 615.
75. Article X, Section 6, provides: "The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof."
76. Article X, Section 7.
77. According to Section 67 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended: "No District Judge
shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless
sufficient cause shall exist, in the judgment of the Supreme Court, involving serious
misconduct or inefficiency, for the removal of said judge from office after the proper
proceedings." Cf. Section 97 as to removal of municipal judges also by the President. Cf.
People v. Linsangan, 62 Phil. 646 (1935); De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950);
Martinez v. Morfe, L-34022, March 24, 1972, 44 SCRA 22, and Pamil v. Teleron, L-34854,
November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 413.
78. Cf. Ginsburg, Judicial Repair of Legislation, 28 Cleveland State Law Review, 301-304
(1979).
79. G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982.
80. Ibid, 12.
81. Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 537 (1974).
82. Tañada v. Cuenco 103 Phil. 1051 (1957) lends itself to the view that in the
interpretation of the fundamental law, the literal language is not necessarily controlling,
if thereby a constitutional objection could be plausibly raised.
83. The memoranda submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Bar
Association, the Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines, the U.P. Women
Lawyers Circle, the Philippine Women Lawyers Association, and the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association of the Philippines were for dismissing the petition. The Philippine
Lawyers Association was for granting the petition. Amicus curiae Lorenzo Sumulong,
President of the Philippine Constitution Association, speaking on his own behalf, was of
a similar mind. Amicus curiae Dean Irene Cortes, former Dean of the U.P. College of Law,
was for dismissing the petition, while amicus curiae Jose W. Diokno was for granting it.
A memorandum allowed to stay in the records by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was
for granting it. The Court acknowledges the aid it received from the memoranda
submitted.
84. 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936).

85. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 73-74 (1939). The quotation from Justice Holmes came from
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189, 211 (1928). He and
Justice Brandeis dissented, upholding the contention of the Filipino leaders that the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represented of the then
Philippine Legislature could sit in a Board of Control with power to vote government
shares in corporations owned or controlled by it. The majority sustained the opposite
view, thus giving the then American Governor-General such prerogative.
86. Arnault v. Pecson, 87 Phil. 418, 426 (1950).

87. Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
88. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481. Cf. Agustin v. Edu, L-49112, February 2, 1979,
88 SCRA 195.
89. Ibid, 497.
90. G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981, 10.
91. Ibid, 11.
92. Ibid.
93. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, section 43.
95. Article VII, Section 16 of the Amended Constitution provides: "All powers vested in the
President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which
are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are
hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
Article VII, Section 10, par. (1) of the Constitution reads: "The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all
local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."
96. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 44.
97. This Court is ready with such a list to be furnished the President.
98. In the language of par. XI of the Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization: "The
services of those not separated shall be deemed uninterrupted. In such cases, efficiency,
integrity, length of service and other relevant factors shall be considered."
99. Cf. Roschen v. Ward, 279 US 337, 339 (1929).
100. From the standpoint of the writer of this opinion, as earlier noted, the assailed
legislation did not go far enough. It is certainly much more, to use the Lasswellian
phrase of being a "reverent modification of small particulars." For some it could be
characterized as a dose of conservation and a dash or innovation. That is, however, no
argument against its validity which, to repeat, is solely a question of power as far as this
Court is concerned.
101. Former Senators Salvador H. Laurel and Jose W. Diokno.
102. Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evan Hughes, 1975 Supreme Court Review
123.
103. Ibid. Cf. Bickel, Mr. Taft Rehabilitates the Court, 79 Yale Law Journal 1 (1969).
104. Article XIII, Section 1, first sentence of the Constitution reads: "Public office is a public
trust."
105. 57 O.G. 147 (1955).
106. Ibid. 153. The per curiam minute resolution of the Court reads as follows: "In Ocampo
et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice et al., G.R. No. L-7910, the petition was denied, without
costs, due to insufficient votes to invalidate Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1186. Chief
Justice Paras, and Justices Padilla, Reyes (A) and Labrador voted to uphold that
particular section; Justices Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Hugo, Bautista, Concepcion
and Reyes, J.B.L., believe it is unconstitutional." At 147, Republic Act No. 1186, which
took effect on June 19,1954, abolished the positions of Judges-at-Large and Cadastral
Judges. There was a vigorous dissent from Justice Bengzon relying on certain American
State Supreme Court decisions notably from Indiana and Pennsylvania, but as noted in
the opinion of Justice Labrador, they could not be considered as applicable in view of
the difference in constitutional provisions. From Justices Montemayor and Bautista also
came separate opinions as to its unconstitutionality.
107. 41 Phil. 322 (1921).
108. Ibid, 333.

109. 57 Phil. 600 (1932).
110. Ibid, 605. The reference should now be to the Constitution, rather than an Organic Act
of an unincorporated American territory as the Philippines then was.
BARREDO , J., concurring:
1. And I am not fond of borrowing ideas from supposed legal acumen of alien judicial
figures no matter their recognized reputation.
2. Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 330.
3. G.R. No. L-7910, January 18, 1955, 51 O.G. 147.
4. Zandueta vs. De la Cuesta, 66 Phil. 615.

5. Brillo vs. Mejia, 94 Phil. 732.
GUERRERO, J., concurring:
1. See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 73.
2. Church of the Holy Trinity vs. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, cited in Willoughby On the Constitution
of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 61.
3. Explanatory Note, Cabinet Bill No. 42 which became Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
4. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 66.
5. Chief Justice Castro, The Bar and the Congested Dockets, p. 5.
6. See Report of the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Also Report of
Court Administrator.
7. See L-37399, May 29, 1974, 57 SCRA 123.
8. See L-30355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450.
9. See L-46542, July 21, 1975, 84 SCRA 198, 203.
10. See L-49995, April 8, 1981.
11. See G.R. No. 54452, July 20, 1981.
12. See L-36161, December 19, 1973.

13. Rule 131, Section 5(m), Revised Rules of Court.
14. 31 C.J.S. 810.
15. Cruz vs. Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998; Bendanillo, Sr. vs.
Provincial Governor, L-28614, January 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 34; Enciso vs. Remo, L-23670,
Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580; Roque vs. Ericta, L-30244, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 156.
16. Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450.
17. Ibid.
18. Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, p. 48.
19. Ibid., p. 46.

20. Journal of the Batasan, Third Regular Session, Feb. 3, 1981, p. 12.
21. Brown vs. Russel, 166 Mass. 14, cited in Gonzales, Administrative Law, Law on Public
Officers and Election Law, 2nd ed., p. 148.
22. 42 Am. Jur. 881.
23. Ibid.
24. Cherokee, County vs. Savage, 32 So. 2nd 803.
25. McCulley vs. State. 53 S.W. 134.
26. Answer of Solicitor General, par. 22, p. 29.
27. Laurel, con., Zandueta vs. de la Cuesta (1938), 66 Phil. 615.

28. Missouri, K. & T. Co. vs. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270; People vs. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 173,
cited in Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 90.
29. People vs. Vera (1937), 65 Phil. 56, See Chief Justice Fernando, The Power of Judicial
Review p. 110.
1. Constitution of the Philippines by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 1977 Edition, p.
177.
2. Roque vs. Ericta, 53 SCRA 156; Abanilla vs. Ticao, 17 SCRA 652; Cruz vs. Primicias, Jr.,
23 SCRA 998; Ocampo vs. Duque, 16 SCRA 962; Briones vs. Osmeña, 104 Phil. 588;
Urgelio vs. Osmeña, Jr., 9 SCRA 317; Gacho vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 208.
3. Delivered on Law Day, September 19, 1981 before the Philippine Bar Association.
4. Cf. G R. No. 58184, Free Telephone Workers Union vs. The Honorable Minister of Labor
and Employment, promulgated on October 30, 1981.
5. Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 50 O.G. 147.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1. With three vacancies.
2. Section 44, B.P. Blg. 129.
3. Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-1790, Jan. 18, 1955; 51 O.G. 147.
4. Art. X, section 7, 1973 Constitution, as amended (Art. VIII, Sec. 9, 1935 Constitution).
5. Cited in Chief Justice Fernando's The Constitution, p. 376; emphasis copied.
6. Art. X, Sec. 6, 1973 Constitution.
7. Idem. Art. X, Sec. 7.
8. Art. VIII, Sec. 7, 1935 Constitution.
9. Aruego, Framing of the Phil. Constitution, Vol. I, p. 513.
10. Sec. 23, B.P. Blg. 129.
10-a. At p. 16, fn. 50.

11. At p. 3 thereof.
12. Zandueta vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 615 (1935).
13. See the Chief Justice opinion, pp. 14-15.
14. At p. 8 thereof.
15. Citing Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515.
16. Art. XVII, Sec. 9-10.

17. G.R. No. 53467 filed on March 27, 1980.
18. 104 SCRA 607 (March 27, 1981).

19. Main opinion at p. 21.
20. Phil. Daily Express issue of Aug. 24, 1981.
21. Times Journal issue of Aug. 16, 1981.
22. Evening Post issue of Aug. 11, 1981.
23. Metropolitan papers of Aug. 8, 1980. Times Journal editorial of Aug. 31, 1980.
24. At p. 5.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1051. May 19, 1903.]

THE UNITED STATES , complainant-appellee, vs . FRED L. DORR ET AL. ,

F .G. Waite for appellants.

1. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITION; GOVERNMENT DEFINED. — The term

We do not understand that it is claimed that the defendants succeeded in establishing at

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956.]

LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO , plaintiffs-appellees,

Valentin C. Gutierrez for appellees.

1. POLITICAL LAW; TERM "GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of

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[G.R. No. L-45710. October 3, 1985.]

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ACTING DIRECTOR

. . ." (p. 46, rec.).

Hence, this instant petition by the Central Bank.

The rule of indivisibility of the mortgage as outlined by Article 2089 above-quoted

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. L-27275. November 18, 1967.]

C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION , plaintiff-appellee, vs. NATIONAL

The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.

1. STATUTES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REP. ACT 912; MEANING OF TERM

THE MANILA AND SUBURBS WATERWORKS SYSTEM —

"(b) On the second supplemental complaint ordering the issuance of a

"(c) On the third supplemental complaint making permanent the preliminary

From the decision, NAWASA appealed to this Court.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

And the foregoing testimony relative to the "non-availability" of appellee's products in

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1. Commonwealth Act No. 138, Nov. 7, 1936.

2. Citing NAWASA vs. NAWASA Consolidated Unions, et al., L-18938.

5. T.S.N., June 27, 1966, pp. 54-55.

9. Id., Vol. III, sec. 5812, p. 94.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. Nos. L-49705-09. February 8, 1979.]

TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED

[G.R. Nos. L-49717-21.]

LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

Of the Ruling of the Court

1. Roldan, Ernesto (KB) 225,674

2. Valdez, Estanislao (KBL) 217,789

3. Dimaporo, Abdullah (KBL) 199,244

4. Tocao, Sergio (KB) 199,062

5. Badoy, Anacleto (KBL) 198,956

6. Amparo, Jesus (KBL) 184,764

7. Pangandaman, Sambolayan (KBL) 183,646

8. Sinsuat, Datu Blah (KBL) 182,457

9. Baga, Tomas (KBL) 171,656

10. Aratuc, Tomatic (KB) 165,795

11. Mandangan, Linang (KB) 165,032

12. Diaz, Ciscolario (KB) 159,977

13 Tamula, Fred (KB) 153,734

15. Guro, Mangontawar (KB) 139,386

16. Loma, Nemesio (KB) 107,455

17. Macapeges, Malamama (Independent) 101,350

(Votes of the independent candidates who actually were not in contention

On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were modified:

"VALDEZ, Estanislao 436,069

DIMAPORO, Abdullah 429,961

PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan 408,106

SINSUAT, Blah 403,445

AMPARO, Jesus 399,997

MANDANGAN, Linang 387,026