Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
JACQUES GIRARD
HARALD GRUBER
*^ί^Α
EUROPEAN INVESTMENTBANK
Telecommunications Network Development and Investment in the European
Union
Principal points
Sector developments
The telecommunications service industry is growing very rapidly, wiith average annual growth rates of
10% during the last five years. These growth rates should continue for the next five years. This increase
of activity is a result of the interaction of technological improvements (micro-electronics, optical fibres)
and institutional changes (liberalisation). Technological advances in micro-electronics and the
development of optical fibre cables have dramatically increased the processing capacity of
telecommunications networks. The Plain Old Telephone System (POTS) is becoming an interconnected
information processing system and the basic building stone of the information society. It has become
evident that only widespread liberalisation (i.e. privatisation and opening up to competition) would carry
the right incentives for modernisation of what used to be profitable but sleepy state monopolies.
The number of lines in the EU fixed telecommunications network reached some 180 million by end 1995,
or 48 lines per 100 inhabitants. In addition, there were 19 million mobile telephone subscribers.
Teledensity, the sum of fixed and mobile lines, has therefore reached 53 access paths per 100
inhabitants. Even though universal service seems to be achieved, i.e. neariy every household is
equipped with a telephone, there are still large differences across EU-countries in terms of penetration
and modernisation of the networks. In any case, the main source of growth in the future will not come
from an increased subscriber base, but from increased services that will be feasible on a modernised
network.
In 1995 the telecommunications service market amounted to ECU 143 billion, of which ECU 17 billion
(12% of the total) came from the mobile sector. The latter is expected to exhibit very high growth i.e.
some 15 to 20% per year, over the next 5 years, and could represent up to 25% of the total revenue by
the year 2000.
Investments
The expansion and modernisation of the fixed network has required huge investments, which have
peaked during the years 1990-1994. In 1995, operators in the EU-countries invested ECU 31 billion, or
some 25% of their turnover. For the years 1996-2000, some ECU 87bn will be invested by télécoms
operators to complete the expansion and modernisation of the fixed network in the EU.
The mobile telephone sector alone is expected to invest about 31 bn ECU for the years 1996-2000. This
would bring the penetration rate of mobile telephones in the EU from 5.6% in 1995 to 17.2% in 2000. In
some countries, investment in the mobile sector would be equivalent to, and may even exceed, the
investment made for the fixed network. Moreover, as more and more players enter this industry and this
sector converges with other sectors (e.g. computer, broadcasting, consumer electronics), the traditional
public operators' investments will represent a declining fraction of the total investment requirements of
the sector. The investment of these players is more dispersed and difficult to assess for the time being,
but it is likely to be large.
Huge price decreases for telecommunications services have been observed as a result of technological
advances and liberalisation. This has also affected the tariff setting, which used to be based on cross-
subsidisation. Local calls and monthly rentals were cheap compared to the cost of providing these
services. Long distance and international calls provided the subsidies for local calls and line rentals. This
distorted pricing system, where tariffs did not reflect costs, turned out to be inefficient and not sustainable
in a competitive environment. Liberalisation would attract competition in long distance and international
calls, driving down prices. To compensate for this, prices for local calls and rentals have to increase.
Liberalisation therefore means "re-balancing" of tariffs, i.e. bringing them closer to cost. The practice
has shown that even though local tariffs have increased, long distance and international tariffs have
decreased by much more, so that in the end the adjustment led to widespread net benefits to the user.
Cross-country comparison shows that cross-subsidisation is particulariy evident on long distance and
intemational calls. Countries with higher tariffs on these segments include Austria, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Greece, Germany, Ireland and France. Operators in these countries will be more vulnerable to
competition when the telecommunication markets start to be liberalised in 1998. Countries which have
already opened up to competition (such as the UK and Sweden) are close to re-balancing their tariff
structure and eliminating cross-subsidisation between different types of calls. "Non-competitive"
countries still have to undertake considerable price cuts on long distance and international calls.
Apart from the example of pioneering countries such as the UK and Sweden, the driving force behind
liberalisation and dismantling of state monopolies has been the European Commission. The process is
one of stages, but with accelerating speed. January 1998 is the deadline for complete liberalisation in
most countries, including voice services. For mobile telecommunications, liberalisation already began in
January 1996.
Impact on operators
The direct impact on the profits of incumbent operators as a result of liberalisation is strong, even though
this may sometimes be overstated. Assuming a typical 70% gross margin on lost revenues, potential
loss of profits would lie between 15 to 30% of present operating profits in static terms. The experience of
liberalised markets, shows that a tough regulatory environment may have an effect on the performance
of the incumbent operators that is similar to that of competition. Moreover, full infrastructure liberalisation
will have a dramatic effect on investment cost and the prices of leased lines, and this will amplify the
impact of services competition on the incumbent operators. Last, but not least, technology improvement
in the form of digital transmission, fibre optics, micro-electronics and wireless telephony has lowered the
barriers of entry and is probably the most important factor in challenging the incumbent operator's
monopoly.
To succeed in liberalised markets, public operators have to increase labour productivity. Most European
operators now have labour productivity targets of 350 lines per employee for telephony services, against
current levels of 200 to 250. Because an increase in the number of lines will be limited, this requires in
many cases extensive shedding of staff with public operators, which presents a problem in most
countries. Experience, however, shows that employment generated by the telecommunications sector
through new services, more than outweighs the staff reduction by the public operator.
Telecommunications Network Development and Investment in the European
Union
Table of Contents
Page
1. Introduction 4
2. The Market S
5. Tariffs 10
5.1. Fixed network tariffs 10
5.2. Mobile network tariffs 11
5.3. Leased lines 11
5.4. Tariff trends and rebalancing in the EU 11
6. Regulatory framework 12
6.1. Community regulations for liberalisation 13
6.2. Implications for tariffs and universal service 13
ANNEXES
1. Introduction
The Bank has significantly financed the telecommunications sector in the EU. Financing
amounted to some 2bn ECU per year over the period 1990-95, or about 5% of the yeariy 35bn ECU
telecommunications investment in the Union. Up to now, the financing was mainly devoted to
investment programmes by the monopoly operator with good security, occasionally guaranteed by the
public sector. However, as a result of technological changes, widespread liberalisation and the
emergence of new competitors, the sector is undergoing profound changes which will also affect Bank
lending. There will certainly be increased opportunities for lending, but there will also be more risk.
From an eligibility point of view, the Bank's financing of projects in the telecommunications
sector are justified by their contribution in improving communication links within and outside Europe and
in providing the basic infrastructure for an "information society". As a result, the international
competitiveness of the European market would be improved. Support for new, private, initiatives in
particular would strengthen the European-wide process of liberalisation and reduce the non-innovative
role of established monopolies. This is at the very heart of the current EU policy of the sector.
This sector review illustrates the main features of the market and how these are about to change.
It also tries to highlight new financing opportunities that may arise as a result, as well as the increased
risks.
2. The market
The telecommunications service industry is growing very rapidly, with average annual growth
rates of 10% during the last five years. In 1995 the telecommunications service market amounted to
ECU 143 billion, of which ECU 17 billion (12% of the total) came from the mobile sector (Figure 1).
These high growth rates for the industry should continue also for the next five years. In particular mobile
communications is expected to exhibit growth rates in the order of 15 to 20% per year, over the next 5
years, and could represent up to 25% of the total telecommunications service market by the year 2000.
, , Mobile . ..
telecommunications
12%
4-
This increased growth in the service market is a result of the interaction of technological
improvements (micro-electronics, optical fibres) and institutional changes (liberalisation). Technological
advances in micro-electronics and the development of optical fibre cables have dramatically increased
the processing capacity of telecommunications networks. The Plain Old Telephone System (POTS) is
becoming an interconnected information processing system and the basic building stone of the
information society. It has become evident that only widespread liberalisation (i.e. privatisation and
opening up to competition) would carry the right incentives for modernisation of what used to be
profitable but sleepy state monopolies.
Figure 2. Telephone penetration rates (lines per 100 inhabitants) in the EU in 1995
Source: ITU
Source: ITU
3.4. Digitisation
The full benefits of the innovations in the communication and information technologies will only
accrue if all ways to send, receive and manage information are feasible with a single telecommunication
infrastructure. The key condition for these developments, as far as public operators are concerned, is
the digitisation of the network. In 1995, basically three fourths of the EU network was digitised. Since
the late 1980's a number of EU-countries have boosted their rate of digitisation. In 1995 the EU
(weighted) average ratio of digital mainlines was 74 per cent, against 32 per cent in 1989. However,
there is quite a large heterogeneity in digitisation across countries (Figure 4). France and the
Netheriands have been the initial pace setters with digitisation, with the United Kingdom and Sweden
closely behind. These countries have already reached full digitisation, or will have done so within next
year. All other countries are expected to have a fully digitised network within the year 2000, or shortly
afterwards.
-6
Figure 4. Digitisation rates (% of total lines) of the fixed network in the EU in 1995
Another reason for this period of booming investment is the large expenditure for additional
modern (digital) mainlines. About 85 million digital mainlines were added by the 15 EU-countries from
1990 to 1995. Some of these lines were for new customers, but most were upgrading the lines of existing
customers. The EU-countries upgraded the lines of 53 million existing customers between 1990 and
1995, while some 32 million new customers were connected to the network: for every new customer
there were 1.7 digital upgrades for the lines of existing customers. This trend of increasing digitisation
accelerated over the period, with a ratio of 1.2 to 1 over 1990-1992 and of 2.3 to 1 over 1993-1995. This
means that investment is increasingly geared towards modernisation rather than expansion.
The costs associated with installing a fixed telecommunications network are dominated by the
requirement to bury cable in the ground. As a result, the cost for a new digital line is lower when an
existing (analogue) line is replaced compared to adding a new connection which involves additional local
area network costs. This fact is illustrated by figure 6, which shows the cost for a new digital line against
the proportion of replacement in total new lines: there is a trend of the cost to be lower the higher the
proportion of replacement of analogue lines. However, some countries exhibit a bias toward higher or
lower than expected unit cost per line: Germany and Austria are considerably above average, whereas
the United Kingdom is considerably below average. This may well reflect the role that competition
between operators and suppliers has played in stimulating cost effectiveness.
8-
Figure 6. Cost of an additional digital line and replacement rate in total new lines
(Average 1992-1994)
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It should be noted that any resource which allows a company to reduce this investment cost (for
example, existence of easily accessiblerightsof way, ducts, poles or overhead electricity cables which
may make the installation of fibre easier and much less costly) is of strategic relevance when it comes to
becoming a new competitor in the market. For this reason utility companies, such as electricity, gas,
railways and water, are already involved in the preparation of providing alternative local loop
infrastructures.
The underlying assumption is thiat by ttie year 2000 all existing lines should be digitised. Moreover, universal sen/ice entails that
each household should tie supplied with a fixed telephone line. For the cost estimate, an average cost of 3000 ECU Is taken for
the cost of a new line and 1500 ECU for digitisation of an existing line.
telephones has generally been underestimated. As a result of the rapid growth seen over the past two
years, simple extrapolations may however induce overestimation of the potential for mobile
communications. One can try to model penetration rates with a logistic diffusion function (the "S" curve).
In this case the adoption of a mobile phone by the different agents is modelled in a similar way as
diseases spread in biology. In other words, the flow of the adopters is related to the stock of existing
adopters. At the beginning there is an acceleration in the adoption rate and then a decline once the
population approaches saturation point.
The penetration rates according to a logistic function for the different EU countries have thus
been estimated (see annex table 3). One can notice that there is quite a different starting point between
countries. There will also be differences in the year 2000. Total penetration rate in the EU is expected to
increase from 5.6% in 1995 to 17.2% in 2000. This would imply that there are some 44 m new
subscribers to mobile telecommunications. Assuming an average investment cost of 700 ECU per
subscriber, the cumulative investment cost is 31 bn ECU by the year 2000.
In a number of countries, investment in the mobile sector would thus be of neariy the same
magnitude as the investments for the fixed network. In the case of the UK investment in mobiles could
be even higher than for fixed telecommunications.
The results should be interpreted with much caution, given the huge degree of uncertainty which
surrounds the projections by country of the cellular market, as well as the rough methodology used to
estimate the investment cost. In particular for certain small countries (Luxembourg, Greece) the figures
projecting investment in the cellular market are likely to be overestimated. However, on a EU global
level, these projections seem plausible. They show that the mobile sector has a major investment
potential in the near future, not to mention the longer term.
5. Tariffs
The market for telecommunications services used to have a highly distorted price system, i.e.
tariffs did not reflect the underiying cost of services provided. Typical international and long distance call
prices were significantly above cost and local tariffs and rental charges below cost; in other words, the
former were cross-subsidising the latter. This system was typically regulated by the government with the
aim of ensuring universal service. This was politically appealing because it shifted the financial burden
mainly to customers with high willingness to pay (i.e. companies and wealthy persons). However, from an
economic point of view, it was inefficient. It became clear that this scenario could not withstand a
competitive environment: the competitors would enter the high price/profit services market and push
down the prices, therefore local tariffs and rental charges would have to increase to cover costs as the
scope for cross-subsidisation would be reduced. A so called tariff re-balancing would therefore set in.
This section outlines the evolution of tariffs in the EU and outlines expected effects of competition.
For business users, the Northern European countries, including Denmark, Finland, the
Netheriands and Sweden, continue to offer the lowest prices by far, as annex table 4 shows. These
countries have recently significantly liberalised their telecommunications market, while on the other hand
the most expensive countries for business users, such as Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, Germany, Ireland
and Portugal, have retained monopoly provision of most of the télécoms services: the average annual
spending by a business user in Austria is some three times the amount paid in Sweden or in the
Netheriands. The tariff basket for residential users reflects a similar ranking of the EU-countries to the
business basket.
10
The tariff baskets for residential and business users are highly correlated and depend to a large
extent on the prevailing market structure. The importance of market structure becomes even stronger
when it comes to international tariff comparisons. Countries which have allowed competition in the sector
are the least expensive countries for an international basket based on a fixed distribution of calls among
adjacent countries and other EU-countries, the USA and Asia. While the OECD generally undertakes
tariff comparisons in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), we have used current exchange rates,
which provide more accurate information on the cost to the consumer and is also the reference for
competitors such as call-back operators. These call-back services were pioneered in the United States
where suppliers took advantage of competitive rates to offer US prices to overseas customers abroad
where local carriers charge much higher prices.
The trend toward lower international tariffs has thus been further stimulated by call-back
operators. For a business traveller or tourist, the exchange rate with their home country is thus a more
relevant measure of the cost of an international call than the purchasing power parity of the local
currency. Countries like Austria, Italy, Portugal and Spain, with expensive international tariff baskets,
appear to be very vulnerable to competition from call-back services. Also, countries with relatively strong
currencies such as Germany, the Netheriands and France, appear similariy attractive for call-back
customers. On the other hand, countries with relatively inexpensive charges or in some cases weaker
currencies, such as Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Sweden and the UK, would seem to be attractive hubbing
sites for call-back operators.
Lower prices are themselves making mobile services affordable for a greater number of users.
At the same time, there is a trend toward the convergence of fixed and mobile network capabilities in the
form of cordless and cellular telecommunication. The gap between a basket of fixed and mobile services
is narrowing especially in those countries where mobile telecommunications is subject to more
competition and is therefore developing fast.
-11
However, these gains for the users were not evenly spread throughout the EU. Hereafter we
differentiate countries according to the status competition, and we distinguish a group of "competitive"
countries with effective competition among operators (i.e. Denmark, Finland, the Netheriands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom) and another group of "non-competitive" countries (i.e. the remaining countries
of the EU) where competition among operators is weak or non existent. Several key trends emerge:
• The cost of average baskets decreased in competitive countries by an amount equivalent or greater
than the decrease observed in non-competitive markets. This trend affects both the business and
residential baskets, in contrast to eariier fears that residential customers could be penalised by the
liberalisation of the sector. Moreover, the average tariff level of the baskets in competitive countries
remains much lower than in non-competitive countries. This indicates that further drastic price cuts
are likely to occur in non-competitive countries.
• Re-balancing between usage charges and fixed charges is occurring at a much faster rate in
competitive countries. In other words, these countries have been lowering the contribution of usage
charges relative to fixed charges such as rental and connection fees.
• While fixed charges are higher on average in competitive countries, usage charges are much lower
and are reduced at a faster rate than in non-competitive countries. This suggests that non-
competitive countries are very far from having significantly re-balanced their tariff structures.
• Concerning the pricing of geographical distance in calls, one can observe that public operators in
competitive markets have reduced tariffs at a relatively faster rate than in non-competitive markets,
and implementing the greatest reductions (in relative terms) over shorter distances (see figure 7). As
a result, the proportion between local and long distance rates is in the order of 1 to 3 in competitive
countries, while it is of 1 to around 10 in non-competitive countries: this gives an idea of the order of
magnitude for the future price cuts, especially on long distance calls, that one may expect after
liberalisation in 1998.
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* "Competitive countries": Denmark, Finland, the Netheriands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
"Non-competitive countries": all other EU countries.
6. Regulatory framework
12
However, over the last 15 years, advances in technology, which have reduced the cost and
increased the functionality of telecom networks and services, and the realisation through experience of
liberalised mari^ets that monopoly provision could be an inefficient way to serve users, have called into
question the relevance of the prevailing regulatory regime. The experience made with liberalisation of
telecommunications in a few countries (such as the US, the UK and Sweden) has demonstrated that
competition is feasible and could produce a demand-led and market-driven telecommunications sector.
At the same time this would also lead to more innovation in services, a broadening customer choice, an
increase in investment and a reduction of costs and prices. These potential benefits led individual
governments and the European Commission to initiate wide-ranging reform programmes with the
objective of ending the monopoly provision of telecommunications services.
13
information. In orderte meet the 1998 liberalisation deadline, most Member States have already started
to re-balance national tariffs, involving lower prices for international and long-distance calls and
consequently higher charges for local calls and basic connections. This tariff re-balancing is as such
closely linked to the issue of universal service.
The Commission's Communication (COM (93) 543) establishes the key elements of the policy of
providing universal service for telecommunication in the Union. This defines the scope of universal
service (i.e. a basic voice telephony service and a network access supporting it, as well as fax and low
speed data access), the methodology to be followed for costing universal service (i.e. a "net cost"
approach), and the possible funding mechanisms to share any identifiable burden associated with the
provision of universal service (i.e. compensations may not be required for minimal burden; a national
universal service fund may be established; a system of supplementary charges may be requested from
market players by the incumbent operator). The document recognises that competition would improve
service quality, bring down prices and extend penetration. However, at the same time affordability is
essential to ensure that service will be genuinely universal. Flexible and targeted tariffs should play an
important role, as concerns affordability for all users.
Against this background it is clear that, unless radical efficiency gains and growth of value added
services are achieved, public companies could face financial problems. They therefore have to adopt
consistent investment strategies along with new managerial and commercial practices, while they need
to accelerate their tariff re-balancing to minimise the impact of competition.
14
Liberalisation cannot be considered alone. All operators face challenges in their home markets
from a combination of liberalisation, regulation and technology. In liberalised countries, regulators control
prices to protect customers from undue price increases. The experience from the UK and Swedish
markets shows that a tough regulatory environment for prices had a similar impact on the performance of
the incumbent operators than competition, even at a relatively late stage of competitive entry. Price
caps2, now in place in almost all EU countries thus constitute an important signal of the speed at which
the operators are forced to re-balance their tariffs: this is low in already liberalised countries, where costs
are close to tariffs, with a CPI minus 0 to 3% per year up to 1998 in Netheriands, Sweden and Denmark,
but as high as CPI minus 5 to 8% in France, Gemriany, Italy or Spain.
While price caps are determined domestically, price comparisons with other European countries
are becoming an increasingly important factor for service providers. It is worth here insisting again on the
difference between competition on the network and competition between networks. With competition on
the network the new entrants have to lease transmission capacity from the incumbent. With competition
between networi^s, new entrants may choose either to use existing alternative networks, those owned by
utilities or cable television companies, or completely new infrastructure construction. In the first case, it is
obvious that high rental charges for leased lines will limit the effectiveness of competition in services.
It was shown eariier in the less liberalised countries (in particular Austria, Italy, Germany, France
and Spain) that the average tariff for a leased line from the incumbent is some 2 to 3 times higher than in
the liberalised countries of the EU, and neariy 10 times the corresponding US tariff. Full infrastructure
liberalisation, as expected by the Commission, would have a dramatic effect not only on the prices of
leased lines, but more importantly would eventually amplify the impact of service competition on the
incumbent operators.
Last but not least, technology in the form of digital transmission, fibre optics, micro-electronics
and wireless telephony, is probably the most effective factor undermining the position of the incumbent
monopoly operator. It makes it not only cheaper for new competitors to enter the market, it also reduces
the profit margin in liberalised markets. Something similar has happened in the computer industry, where
large companies like IBM and Digital Equipment were forced into restructuring as prices fell faster than
overheads. To the extent that telecom switches are now simply large computers, they are subject to the
same price decline, with eventually similar effects on the télécoms sector.
The responses available to the incumbent operators to the threat of competition are a mix of the
basic strategies:
(i) to become a global service provider, focusing primarily on large and multinational customers to
protect the domestic market and grow abroad (e.g. BT);
(ii) to expand in multimedia, focusing primarily on residential customers, with a view to developing in
cable television and new interactive services (Deutsche Telekom and Teledanmark have particular
opportunities given their cable-TV ownership);
(iii) to become a developing country operator, taking stakes in Eastern Europe (Telia, Teledanmark,
Deutsche Telekom) or Latin America (Telefonica, France Telecom);
Price caps formula imposed a celling on the evolution of a télécoms teriff basket, by reference to the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), reduced by an efficiency factor of X%, i.e. "CPI minus X%".
15
(iv) to establish mobile businesses domestically and abroad, building up a portfolio of stakes in
developed and developing countries.
All these strategies are expensive, putting pressure on the strong cash-flow generation of
existing operators' businesses, not only in the short term but also in the medium term: BT and the
Scandinavian télécoms operators are already sustaining start-up losses abroad on an upward trend.
These strategies have also resulted in a web of international cross-holdings and alliances. The forces
driving companies towards partnerships are the perception that no operator has all the skills in-house to
tackle the new market-place; that it is now a necessity to operate on a pan-European level and that risks
are better mitigated through diversification.
16-
Infrastructure costs, which used to constitute the higher percentage of total costs for mobile
communication costs, are becoming proportionally much less with the introduction of large up-front
licence payments. Operators are also under regulatory pressure to build out rapidly after the high up-front
investment of infrastructure purchases. At the same time mobile switches are becoming more 'intelligent'
and modular in design and, as a result, contribute to reducing long-term replacement costs, since
switches can be upgraded rather than changed out, thus keeping costs to the minimum. Such changes
have radically transformed network economics in the mobile industry to the extent that national networks
are being built in months rather than decades, offering a level of expansion and interconnection of
networks never met before, with phenomenal social and economic implications.
The risks of mobile operations depend on the prospect for future growth of the market, and the
ability of the company to maintain its projected share. Market growth has, up to now, been systematically
underestimated. But one should bear in mind that penetration rates have not reached a level supposed to
correspond to a "mass market" size in most countries. This is estimated to be in the order of 10-12%,
which corresponds to the 'professional' share of the market. Only in a few countries, notably Sweden,
Finland and Denmark, are those rates now significantly above this level. In other words, while the speed
at which the market develops may be underestimated, it remains to be seen whether conditions are met
in a specific country for the penetration rate to reach the mass market threshold. Given higher and higher
up-front fees, this situation is associated with very significant risks for new mobile projects.
17
ANNEX
TABLE 1
TABLE 2
lines to be digitised
(In m lines)
lines for universal service
(in m lines)
cost for digitalisation cost for new lines
(ECU bn) (ECU bn) ^^U
Austria 1.69 0.06 2.53 0.19 2.72
Belgium 1.50 0.36 2.25 1.07 3.33
Denmark 1.31 0.00 1.96 0.00 1.96
Finland 0.57 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.85
France 1.60 0.00 2.40 0.00 2.40
Germany 18.77 1.83 28.15 5.50 33.66
Greece 3.42 0.15 5.12 0.44 5.56
Ireland 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.78 1.17
Italy 5.70 0.59 8.56 1.78 10.34
Luxembourg 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
Netheriands 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.17 1.17
Portugal 1.16 0.40 1.73 1.20 2.93
Spain 6.27 0.63 9.40 1.90 11.30
Sweden 0.72 0.00 1.08 0.00 1.08
United kingdom 2.94 0.67 4.42 2.01 6.43
TOTAL EU 15 45.91 5.35 68.87 16.05 84.91
Source: PJ estimates
18
ANNEX
TABLE 3
Source: PJ estimates
TABLE 4
(Values express the average annual spending by user, in ECU at current exchange rates)
-19
ANNEX
TABLE 5
TABLE 6
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 TOTAL % of loans % of inv. Total Inv.
Belgium 0 0% 0.0% 4609
Denmark 114 116 61 107 50 46 494 5% 22.1% 2230
Germany 49 98 492 521 1160 11% 1.5% 74857
Greece 51 237 53 341 3% 11.0% 3099
Spain 401 577 660 294 6 539 2477 23% 11.4% 21738
France 0 0% 0.0% 27825
Ireland 46 33 46 31 32 188 2% 14.8% 1258
Italy 723 590 738 768 628 247 3694 35% 11.1% 33363
Luxembourg 29 31 60 1% 18.0% 330
Netheriands 0 0% 0.0% 8420
Portugal 83 173 268 200 724 7% 18.9% 3828
United Kingdom 148 127 152 609 1036 10% 4.9% 20943
Austria 74 74 1% 1.1% 6765
Finland 0 0% 0.0% 2863
Sweden 0 0% 0.0% 5588
Other 135 203 89 427 4% 0.0% 0
Total 1650 1897 1991 2095 2157 885 10675 100% 4.9% 217716
20-
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