Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUCCESSION
General Conclusions:
a. It is a mode of acquisition
b. The subject matters are properties, rights and obligations
c. Transmission happens at death
d. Disposition may be governed by will (testamentary) or by operation of law
(legal or intestate)
It is a derivative mode of acquisition based on Art. 712 of the New Civil Code
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted
by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
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2. not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy;
3. intransmissible;
4. not impossible.
Human corpse is not property, and it cannot be disposed by virtue of will. But
human organs can be donated or be disposed of in a will as governed by R.A. 7170
(Organ Donation Act of 1991)
Under R.A. 7170, however, the recipients and the purposes for the legacy
are limited. Sec. 6 provides:
Section 6. Persons Who May Become Legatees or Donees. - The following persons
may become legatees or donees of human bodies or parts thereof for any of the
purposes stated hereunder:
(a) Any hospital, physician or surgeon - For medical or dental education, research,
advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation;
(b) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university - For education,
research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy;
(c) Any organ bank storage facility - For medical or dental education, research,
therapy, or transplantation; and
Under R.A. 7170, prior probate of the will is not required for the legacy of
the organ to be given effect. If the will is not probated, or if declared
invalid, the legacy, to the extent that it was executed in good faith, is
nevertheless valid and effective.
- Under Article 781, after the death of the decedent, the heir acquires the
inherited property including all accessories and accessions accruing
thereto from the moment of death. These accessions or income from
the properties accruing after death actually belong to the heir not as an
heir but as an owner as incidents of ownership.
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that properties acquired after the will is made shall be included in the
inheritance. Other exceptions are Art. 836 and 930 of the New Civil
Code.
Art. 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will has the effect of
republishing the will as modified by the codicil.
Art. 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void,
if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the
thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will,
afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, [G.R. No. 113899.
October 13, 1999.]
HELD: A policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or
succession to any person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and
such person may recover it whatever the insured might have recovered, the
widow of the decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer,
Grepalife.
However, by way of exception, there are also patrimonial rights that are
extinguished by death such as:
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8. A deposit is extinguished, in case of a gratuitous deposit, upon the
death of either the depositor or the depositary (Art. 1995).
INOCENCIO vs. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE (G.R. No. 201787, September 25, 2013)
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that lease contracts, by their nature, are not
personal. The general rule, therefore, is lease contracts survive the death of the
parties and continue to bind the heirs except if the contract states otherwise. In Sui
Man Hui Chan v. Court of Appeals, we held that: “A lease contract is not essentially
personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are transmissible to
the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of
law.
In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any
transmission of rights, but its very terms and conditions explicitly provided for the
transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to their respective heirs and
successors. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a party does not
excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the deceased.
Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other
party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.” Section 6 of the
lease contract provides that “[t]his contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of
the lessor is obtained in writing.” Section 6 refers to transfers inter vivos and not
transmissions mortis causa. What Section 6 seeks to avoid is for the lessee to
substitute a third party in place of the lessee without the lessor’s consent.
A prior contract to sell made by the decedent during his lifetime prevails over a
subsequent contract of sale made by the administrator without probate court
approval. It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to sell and does not
immediately convey ownership. Frank Liu’s contract to sell became valid and
effective upon its execution and bound the estate to convey the property upon full
payment of the consideration.
Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado
and Jesus, filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return"
of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an
accounting of the produce of the land and that the share or money equivalent due
the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs
P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. During the pendency in court of
said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason. Alvarez died but he was adjudged to pay the monetary value of the
properties to Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus. The heirs of Alvarez complained that the liability arising from
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the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after
his death.
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Prior to death, the heirs only have an inchoate right or an expectancy.
Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the husband. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim
who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for
the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek
the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely
had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What
she could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo
they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived
them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's
share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof,
one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in
1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime,
Maximo Aldon died.
Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the lands
by acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon
barred by the statute of limitations?
As to the second question, the children's cause of action accrued from the death
of their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil
Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within the period.
Upon the death of the decedent, the rights of the heirs become vested.
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Held: The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are
complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and
rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession,
which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted.
1) Actual death
2) Presumed death
a. Ordinary presumption - after 10 years or 5 years if the person disappeared
after the age of 75 years old (Article 390, NCC)
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M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the
contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on
a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the
vessel's arrival in Manila.
HELD: It is undisputed that the Company received 3 radio messages from Capt.
Lucero. There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the
loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing
facts are sufficient to lead to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that
the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on
presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the
rule of preponderance of evidence. Where there are facts, known or knowable,
from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in,
and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. Thus, the complaint of Mrs.
Lucero was dismissed and instead, she should receive the death benefits.
Freak Succession – this is a case of succession which takes place without the
triggering effect of death. This contemplates the delivery of presumptive
legitime prior to the death of the person who is supposed to pay such, on the
occasion of annulment of marriage and declaration of nullity of marriage.
1) Succession Inter Vivos – transfer of ownership takes effect during the lifetime
of the giver; governed by the law on donations.
2) Succession Mortis Causa – transfer of ownership takes effect upon or after the
death of the giver; governed by the law on succession.
ARTICLE 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the
rules established in the Title on Succession.
Cases:
“That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the
DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said
DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the
DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR;
but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.”
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HELD: The above disposition is in the nature of a donation mortis causa. The
distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is
inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by
Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the
rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form
of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and
cannot transfer ownership. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis
causa are the following:
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no
other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of
the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. More
importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die
before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further
force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
Furthermore, the deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the
donation as mortis causa.
VILLANUEVA vs. SPOUSES BRANOCO (G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011)
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, sued
respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents) to recover a 3,492
square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property). Petitioner
claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro
Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in
August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon
after acquiring it. In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over
the Property through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to
whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation
(Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full:
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That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of
the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba,
subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby depose
and say:
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan
Arcillas, we begot children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA,
and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty
which I suffered while our children were still young; and because my
husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution separated
us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what
happened to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty,
obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the
love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land
located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878
declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in
favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns
together with all the improvements existing thereon, which parcel of
land is more or less described and bounded as follows:
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao;
South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by Public land; 2. It has
an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is
planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an
assessed value of P240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of
EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the
concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that
ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above
described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since
May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but
will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
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We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez
upon its execution or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles
distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
Further –
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act
may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter
vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is “to take effect
at the death of the donor” are not controlling criteria; such
statements are to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
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or part of the inheritance, petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the
Deed’s text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the
Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to “give one [half] x x x of the
produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.” Thus, the Deed’s stipulation
that “the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise,” taking into
account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title.
forementioned parcels”] the donor meant nothing else than that
she reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels
of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to
dispose of them freely. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was
unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the
donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while
also true of devises, nevertheless “corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x
[inter vivos] transfers.” Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to
Rodrigo’s statement of “love and affection” for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled as “mortis causa”
dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the
transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle that “the designation of the
donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is
‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to
be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the
real intent of the transferor.” Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are
resolved to favor inter vivos transfers “to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of
the property subject of the deed.”
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to
Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in
interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at
naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid
mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels
against licensing such practice.
Art. 778. Succession may be: (1) Testamentary; (2) Legal or intestate; or (3) Mixed.
Intestate Succession -
ARTICLE 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
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(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only
with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the
inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in
this Code.
Mixed Succession – Is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law
(Art. 780).
Heirs may be compulsory or forced (like children, wife, who cannot be deprived
of their inheritance unless for causes provided by law. They are entitled to
legitime.
Even if there is no will, they will still inherit by operation of law, in which case,
they are called legal or intestate heirs).
Voluntary, testamentary or testate (like friends, strangers, who are not related to
the decedent. Can inherit only if named or designated in the will. Without a
will, they will not inherit). Or those who receive property by way of devise or
legacy (even if relative).
Legatees succeed to particular or specific personal property; Devisees succeed to
particular or specific real property
Distinctions
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WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN HEIRS ON
ONE HAND AND LEGATEES AND DEVISEES ON THE OTHER HAND?
A. Wills
Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to
take effect after his death.
1. Personal – will making is the act of the testator, and testamentary power cannot
be delegated. A will is supposed to be confidential, hence, wills are not
considered as public documents even if notarized.
Principle:
Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in
whole or in part of the discretion of a third person, or accomplished
through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney.
Art. 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such
manner that another person has to determine whether or not it is to be
operative.
EXCEPTION:
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Art. 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of
specific property or sums of money that he may leave in general to
specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the persons,
institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be
given or applied.
Example: I leave all my properties to the top 5 of the 2011 bar exam and X will
determine how much will be the share of each – valid
What if I leave all my properties to A, B, C, D, and E, the top 5 of the 2011 bar
exam and X will determine how much will be the share of each – void
because there is naming. The top 5 of the 2011 bar exam is mere a
qualifier
What if I hereby leave such sum of money as Z shall determine to support the
top 5 of the 2011 bar exam? – void because no specific property or sum
of money has been designated by the testator. The determination of
the amount cannot be delegated.
What if I hereby leave P1M to support the top 5 of the 2011 bar exam to be
apportioned to the topnotchers in such amount as Z shall determine? –
valid because what is delegated to Z is merely the manner of
distribution or apportionment of the amount previously specified by
the testator.
2. Animus Testandi – there must be intent to make a will and the testator should
know that the purpose of the will is to dispose of his properties mortis causa.
Persons with unsound mind cannot execute wills because they do not know the
character of the testamentary act.
3. Statutory – will-making is merely a privilege, not an inherent right. The law can
withhold testamentary power. Hence, will must be subordinated to law and
public policy (Herreros vs. Gil [88 Phil 260])
5. Unilateral – the testator cannot condition the making of the will upon the consent
or act of another. Hence bilateral dispositions, like a disposicion captatoria, are
prohibited.
6. Capacity – the testator must have testamentary capacity (of sound mind and at
least 18 years old)
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7. Freedom from Vitiated Consent – the presence of vitiated consent is a cause for
the disallowance of a will.
8. Revocable – testator can revoke his will anytime during his lifetime, even if
already probated. A will is essentially ambulatory.
9. Individual – a will must be the act of only one person. Hence, joint wills are not
allowed.
11. Mortis Causa – a will becomes effective only upon death of the testator.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the
same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate.
HELD: The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4,
1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the
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will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably
to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit
of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to
the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will. Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. versus
Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-
established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975)
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for
the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written
in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of
the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute
owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and
(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied
out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV). Then, in paragraph V of the will she
stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my
properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that
part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the
conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr. opposed the probate of the will on the grounds
of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and
alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from
the testatrix.
HELD: The probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973, it gave effect to the surviving husband's
conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate. The rule is that
"the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in
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the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the
provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if
they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the
testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to
the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873). The statement of the testatrix that she owned
the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she
was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso. But that illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that
the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code.
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her
six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half
conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as
envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be
paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a
period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided
during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years
from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating
the co-ownership.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended
to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will.
It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art.
170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate,
such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated. In the
instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. Save in an extreme case where the will on its
face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the
formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory. To
give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal
law in the matter of testaments. Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An
interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will.
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and
that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the
will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.
In the will of the testator he bequeathed in favor of his wife 1/2 of certain
properties for her “use and possession while alive and she does not contract a
18
second marriage otherwise, the properties shall pass to the testator’s
grandniece.” It was contended that the title to the properties became absolutely
vested in the estate of the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she
never remarried.
HELD: The grandniece is entitled to the properties for the plain intent of the
testator was to invest his widow only with a lifetime usufruct subject to the
condition that if she remarried, her rights would thereupon cease even during
her lifetime. It would have been different, had he given her full ownership
because not having remarried, the grandniece could not inherit from her. This is
in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal
heir together with the testator’s brother. If the testator had intended to impose as
sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words “use and possession
while alive” would have been unnecessary, since she could only remarry during
her own lifetime.
Appellant filed an action against appelles that the latter employ the former as
tenant during his lifetime on parcels of land bequeathed to the appellees. The
lower court ruled that the provisions of the will relied upon by the appellant
merely amount to a suggestion to appelles, who, though morally bound, are not
legally compelled to follow said suggestion because the word pahintulutan
employed with reference to the working of appellant on the lands only means to
permit or to allow but not to direct appellees to appoint appellant as tenant.
HELD: Lower court is wrong. The real import of the wish of the testatrix for her
will contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from the
words preceding the word pahintulutan which say: Dapat din naman malaman
ng dalawa kong tagapagmana … na sila ay may dapat tungkulin o gampanan gaya
ng sumusunod…” The words tungkulin o gampanan mean to do or to carry out as
a mandate or directive, and having reference to the word pahintulutan, can
convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon the appellees.
19
2. Patent or Extrinsic ambiguity – an ambiguity that is apparent on the face of
the will itself. You discover this by merely looking at the will. Example: I
hereby bequeath all my money to some of my students. Hence, from the will
itself, it is not clear how many students are intended.
Yes, except oral evidence or parol evidence pertaining to the supposed oral
declarations of the testator. This would not be allowed because this may open
the door to fraud. Anybody may claim that he/she heard the testator said
something. But other oral evidence may be allowed as an exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule under Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court.
A. Formal or extrinsic validity – refers to the forms and solemnities that must be
complied with in order to make the will valid. Forms such as the type of
instrument (depending whether notarial or holographic will), capacity of the
testator, qualifications of witnesses. Extrinsic Validity may be seen from 2
viewpoints. Time and Place (country)
- extrinsic validity of will depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time the will is made. The extrinsic validity of will is measured against
the law in force at the time of will making, not at time of death, not at time of
probate.
- Reason: The testator cannot possibly know, and is not expected to know the
laws that will govern in the future. Hence, it is sufficient that he follows the
laws in force at the time that he makes his will.
20
law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling
factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated
January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father
Sancho Abadia.
HELD: The formal validity of a will depends upon the observance of the law
in force at the time it is made, not by the law in force at the time of the
testator’s death, or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate, or when the petition is decided by the court. Consequently, the
validity of a will is not affected by the subsequent amendment of the law with
respect to formalities after the execution of the will, whether before or after
the death of the testator. Where a will was void for failure to observe certain
formalities under the law then in force, a subsequent law lessening or
dispensing with said formalities cannot be applied so as to validate the void
will. Thus, the fact that the New Civil Code allows a holographic will does
not validate one made before its effectivity and void under the prevailing
law.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ABAJA (G.R. NO.
147145, JANUARY 31, 2005)
Abada executed his notarial will on 4 June 1932 but he died when the New
Civil Code took effect. The will was not acknowledged before a notary
public. Is the will valid?
HELD: YES. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the
Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which
governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not
necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abada’s will does not
require acknowledgment before a notary public.
21
D. Testator is an alien who executes will abroad: Observe
1. law of the place of his residence or domicile – art. 816
2. law of his own country or nationality – art. 816
3. Philippine Law (NCC) – art. 816
4. law of the place where will is executed – art. 17
Example: T an American citizen who has his residence in Japan and who executes
a will in Germany
- The law at the time of the death of the testator or when the succession opens
because it is at that time when the rights are transmitted to the heirs, devisees
or legatees. Clear in the transitory provision of the Civil Code in Art. 2263
and under Art. 774
- Law applicable is the national law of the decedent under Article 16 of the
New Civil Code.
22
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
MICIANO vs. BRIMO (50 PHIL 867, G.R. NO. L-22595, NOVEMBER 1, 1927)
With respect to foreign law on the formalities of wills: In the absence of proof
to the contrary, it is presumed that foreign laws on the formalities of wills are
the same as those prescribed under Philippine Laws. This is the Doctrine of
Processual Presumption.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
things, provides the following:
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines.
Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle. On July 29,
1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to
probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which
named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.
23
was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel,
Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor,
who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator. Atty.
Ancheta filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being
apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and
Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash. The project of partition was granted and
approved by the trial court. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in the
second petition also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while
3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
Candelaria on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to Candelaria, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to Candelaria.
Atty. Ancheta contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his
duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing
of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of
Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine
laws. Atty. Ancheta also imputes knowledge on the part of Candelaria with
regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already
apprised Candelaria of the contents of the will and how the estate will be
divided. Candelaria argues that Atty. Ancheta’s breach of his fiduciary duty
as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud.
According to Candelaria, Atty. Ancheta was duty-bound to follow the
express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of
Maryland cannot stand because Atty. Ancheta is a senior partner in a
prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
24
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;
however, Atty. Ancheta, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was
duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland. Atty. Ancheta admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the
law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the
presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and
totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that
there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.
Atty. Ancheta insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in
good faith. The Court cannot accept his protestation. How can Atty. Ancheta
honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate
of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore
that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. Atty.
Ancheta is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff
and a large library." He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable
law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary
administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed
on him faithfully. Unfortunately, he failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
If the conflicts rules under the national law of the deceased refer the matter to
the law of the domicile and the foreigner was domiciled in the Philippines at
the moment of death, Philippine courts will have to apply the Philippine
internal law on succession. This is the Doctrine of Renvoi which is the
referring back to the forum of the problem.
WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES WHEN PHILIPPINE LAWS MAY STILL APPLY
INSOFAR AS THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF A FOREIGN
NATIONAL IS CONCERNED?
Hence:
25
1. one suffering under civil interdiction is allowed to make a will because civil
interdiction only prohibits disposition of property inter vivos.
2. spendthrifts or prodigals under guardianship are not disqualified provided at
least 18 years and of sound mind.
Soundness of mind must exist at the time of execution of will, not required to be
of sound mind before or after execution of will – Dorotheo vs. CA (320 SCRA 12,
[1999]) - Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely
executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and
that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and
that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
A. Testator must know the nature of the estate to be disposed of – must have a
sufficient recollection of his properties and comprehend their kind, character,
and quality in general.
B. Testator must know the proper objects of his bounty – must be aware of those
persons who would naturally be supposed to have claim upon him;
C. Testator must know the character of the testamentary act – must understand that
he is executing an instrument which will dispose of his property upon his death
and which he may revoke anytime.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s
Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at
the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence
of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it
was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to
be her Will.
RULING:
A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and
the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause
explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although
they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature
of said act. Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was “magulyan” or
forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise
claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only
“magulyan” but was actually suffering from paranoia. We agree with the position of the
CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound
so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
26
unsound mind. In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that
Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand,
we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of
Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
“The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.” More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the
Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Furthermore, we are
convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the
CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the
nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the
customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how
she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2)
children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not
included therein as devisee.
27
CITE INSTANCES WHEN THE TESTATOR WAS CONSIDERED OF
UNSOUND MIND?
- Lack of memory and understanding and pre-senile dementia: Albornoz vs.
Albornoz (71 Phil 414)
- State of unconsciousness
- Excitement or stress: if cannot recall intelligently extent of his property, etc.
- Partial insanity; insane delusions: hallucination; belief in things which do not
exist
- Religious delusion
- Drunkennes or drug addiction
- Idiocy – congenital intellectual deficiency
- Comatose stage
- State of delirium
1. Must be in writing;
2. Must be in a language or dialect known to the testator;
3. Subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction;
4. Attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another;
5. Must be signed on the left margin by the testator or the person requested by him
to write his name, and by the instrumental witnesses on each and every page
thereof, except the last;
6. All the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each page;
7. There must be an attestation clause;
8. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public.
28
Nuncupative wills – wills orally made by the testator in contemplation of death
and before competent witnesses; NOT RECOGNIZED.
LANGUAGE
- Testator need not be proficient in the language used. It is sufficient that he can
make known his testamentary act through the language used.
- Presumption: knew the language in which the will is written unless the contrary
is proven.
- Hence:
1. No statutory requirement that the will should allege that the language used
therein is understood by the testator (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil 429)
2. No need to state in the attestation clause that the will is written in the language
known to the testator
3. That the will is in the language known to the testator can be proved by
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE or even by oral evidence
4. If executed in the language of the locality where testator lives, there is a
presumption that testator knows it.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ABAJA (G.R. NO.
147145, January 31, 2005)
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (“Toray”) died
sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children. On 13
September 1968, Alipio filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Eulogio and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
Caponong, as well as the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and
Toray opposed the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether
the will of Abada is written in a language known to Abada;
2. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of
Abada.
HELD: Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one
discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such
29
defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this
issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the
motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal.
We agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not
apply in probate proceedings. Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble’s
contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in the
will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.
This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-
Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among
others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will
and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that
Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish
language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish
language.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JAVELLANA vs. JAVELLANA (106 Phil 1973)
Where there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in the
attestation clause that the testator knew the language in which the will was
written, proof thereof may be established by evidence aliunde. Although lack
of such evidence may be cured by presumption of knowledge of the language
or dialect used in the will, no such presumption can arise where, as in the
case at bar, the will was executed in Spanish, while the testator was a Visayan
residing in San Juan, Rizal at the time of his death.
- With respect to attesting witnesses, they need not know the language used in the
body of the will, only in the attestation clause. If do not know the language in
the attestation clause, may be cured by explanation or interpretation.
- Testator need not also know the language in the attestation clause.
30
1. Not an essential requirement for a notarial will. Will not vitiate the will.
Necessary to know only when there are more than 1 will to determine which is
the last will. Date may be established by extrinsic evidence.
2. Required in holographic wills
Some other person: Anybody may sign for the testator, even one of the subscribing
witnesses (Barut vs. Cagacungan, 21 Phil 461) – as long as there are more than 3 as
implied in the case of In Re Will of Tan Duico (45 Phil 807) when it said: “that the
testator or the person acting in his stead as well as the 3 witnesses sign on the left
margin on each page or sheet. Note: In the case of Barut there were 4 witnesses.
In the presence: it is not necessary that testator actually sees the signing as long as he
can do so if he wants to without any physical obstruction. Or if the testator is blind,
it is enough that he could have felt it.
Under the express direction: Must be expressly authorized. The testator shall, by
word of mouth or action (nodding of head), clearly indicate to the proxy a desire to
have his name signed to the instrument. The testator’s mere knowledge or consent
that his name was being signed for him, or his acquiescence in such an act, or a mere
implied assent to the signing by another person is not sufficient to meet the
requirement of express direction. Approval must precede, not succeed the act of
signing.
31
(information) or e-document. E-signatures are affixed pursuant to transactions
and contracts. E-signature is not a handwritten signature that is scanned or
graphically imprinted on the e-document
- The act of witnessing the testator and the witnesses sign the will.
Attestation Subscription
Credible witnesses: have all the qualifications imposed by law. Must be able or
competent to testify. They are the attesting or subscribing witnesses.
32
GONZALES vs. CA (90 SCRA 183)
"Credible witnesses" mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts
from or upon hearsay. In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an
instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821,
Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and
arises from the belief and conclusion of the court that said witness is telling the
truth. It is not necessary to introduce prior and independent proof of the fact that the
witnesses are "credible witnesses", that is, that they have a good standing in the
community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
c. Subscribing and attesting witnesses are called instrumental witnesses because
they take part in the execution of an instrument or writing.
d. Attesting witnesses must be the same marginal witnesses, otherwise, will is void.
e. Purpose of marginal signature is for identification of the pages used and thus
prevent fraud. Purpose is served if signed on the right, top, left, bottom margins:
Nayve vs. Mojal, (47 Phil 152)
33
than 3 witnesses, it is as if he is no longer counted as an attesting witness because
his presence as a witness is already a surplusage.
Compulsory heir who is also an attesting witness: Can still get the legitime.
Disqualified only with respect to the free portion given in excess of their legitime.
In the presence with respect to the witnesses does not necessarily require actually
seeing, but possibility of seeing or sensing without any physical obstruction.
Generally Accepted Tests of Presence (Jaboneta vs. Gustillo, 55 Phil 541) :
2.Test of Vision
3.Test of Position
4.Test of Mental Apprehension
5.Test of Available Senses
- Does not matter that witnesses signed ahead of or after the testator as long as
signing is sufficiently contemporaneous and made on one occasion (same time
and place) and as part of one single transaction (Gabriel vs. Mateo, 51 Phil 216).
- Purpose of requiring presence: to avoid fraudulent substitution of the will; and
to make it more difficult the invention of false testimony by the witnesses since
they may be the witnesses of one another.
34
- the signatures of the testator and the witnesses on each and every page of the
will at the left margin
The original of the will consisted of 5 pages but while signed at the end of each
and every page, it did not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses
on page 3 thereof, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of
the signing although the duplicate copy was signed by the testatrix and the
attesting witnesses in each and every page.
HELD: The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize
the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the
identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to
the full observance of the statutory requisites.
35
WHAT IS AN ATTESTATION CLAUSE?
- That clause of an ordinary or notarial will wherein the witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them, and the manner of the execution of
the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the
fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
observed.
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ (G.R. No. 189984,
November 12, 2012)
36
While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including
the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, it was observed
that the will has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion.
RULING:
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which
the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in
the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The
statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that
it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot
be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence '. On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the
application of Article 809, to wit: x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding
those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all
the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized.
All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total
number and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings.
TABOADA vs. ROSAL (118 SCRA 195, G.R. NO. L-36033, November 5, 1982)
The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will.
This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only
two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier
stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions
is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina
dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two
pages including this page."
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ABAJA (G.R. NO. 147145,
January 31, 2005)
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause.
Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of
pages on which the will is written. The allegation has no merit. The phrase
which means “in the left margin of each and every one of the two pages
consisting of the same” shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are
numbered correlatively with the letters “ONE” and “TWO” as can be gleaned
from the phrase “las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras “UNO” y
“DOS.”
37
2. THE FACT THAT THE TESTATOR SIGNED THE WILL AND EVERY PAGE
THEREOF, OR CAUSED SOME OTHER PERSON TO WRITE HIS NAME, UNDER
HIS EXPRESS DIRECTION (ONLY);
- Garcia vs. Lacuesta (90 Phil 489): A lawyer wrote the name of testator Antero
Mercado. Testator placed a cross after his name. Because the cross was not the
customary signature of testator, the will is deemed to have been signed by the
lawyer for the testator. Hence, attestation must state that will is signed by
another under express direction of testator.
- Payad vs. Tolentino (62 Phil 848): not required to state that another person was
requested by testator to sign for him because will is thumbmarked by testator
- Need not state that the person caused by the testator to sign signed in the
testator’s presence (Jallores vs. Interino, L-42463)
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ABAJA (G.R. NO. 147145,
January 31, 2005)
1. Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state
expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of
three witnesses. The English translation of the first sentence of the attestation
clause reads: “Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last
will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our
presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same.”
The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page
in the presence of the witnesses.
38
3. Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly
state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is
not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient
if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause
fulfills what the law expects of it. The last part of the attestation clause states “en
testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del
testador.” In English, this means “in its witness, every one of us also signed in
our presence and of the testator.” This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the
will in the presence of one another and of the testator.
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. Is
the will valid?
HELD: No. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-
hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments before the notary public. Cagro v. Cagro is
material on this point. As in this case, “the signatures of the three witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.” While three
(3) Justices considered the signature requirement had been substantially complied
with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the
attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805
particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each
page of the will, from the requisite that the will be “attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses].” The respective intents behind these two classes of
signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of
every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they
are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation
clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the
disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will.
Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate
these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case
signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page
containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental
witnesses’ signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the
attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the
testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and
that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
40
Maynila.” By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares
to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the
same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not
hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to
by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the
document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case,
the notary public averred that he himself “signed and notarized” the document.
Possibly though, the word “ninotario” or “notarized” encompasses the signing of
and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would
involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is
that the will be “acknowledged”, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The
will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own
free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-
important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.
The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain
of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate
in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of
the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of
certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she
had designated in the will. It may not have been said before, but we can assert
the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally
defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which
includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985,
Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation. In March 1986,
Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen
Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986,
they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the
previous Contract to Sell. On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig,
Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On
the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa
41
in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of
Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.
RULING:
A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the
validity of wills, “otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.”
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied. The purported
attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the
number of pages on which the deed was written. Even granting that the
Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not
prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged
in one statement. That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are
embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve
different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring
before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other
hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the
manner of its execution. Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged
the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is
not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution of
a decedent’s will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of
Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement
of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
No. Because:
6. He cannot acknowledge document before himself. He cannot split his
personality into 2. Case: Cruz vs. Villasor (November 26, 1973)
7. Function of notary public is to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. Function would be defeated if he were one of the attesting
witnesses because by then he would be interested in sustaining the validity of
the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act.
42
ARTICLE 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read
the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and
communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof.
ARTICLE 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once,
by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom
the will is acknowledged.
43
difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final
disposition of one's worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and
untidy written instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have
escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the purported
will and had done so. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to
the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not
in accordance with his wishes. Where as in the 1960 will there is nothing in the
record to show that the requisites of Art. 808 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
that "if the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice," have not been
complied with, the said 1960 will suffer from infirmity that affects its due
execution.
1. Generally formalities in the execution of wills are strictly construed: Abangan vs.
Abangan (40 Phil 476)
2. Purpose: To close doors against fraud, bad faith, to avoid substitution, to
guarantee authenticity of wills.
3. Compare with Article 788 on liberal interpretation. Art. 788 talks about liberal
interpretation of doubts in the dispositions. Interpretation of body or contents of
will should not extend to the manner of execution or formalities.
4. But will should not be so literally interpreted as to penalize the testator who was
without fault where the purpose of the law is sufficiently attained
44
protecting against fraud or really defective execution. Also discussed in Caneda
vs. CA (222 SCRA 781)
Hence, the rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself: Eg. Whether the pages are
consecutively numbered, whether the signatures appear in each and every page,
whether there are 3 subscribing witnesses, etc.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA vs. ABAJA (G.R. NO. 147145,
JANUARY 31, 2005)
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it
open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and
where to stop; they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing
details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the
will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to
determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This
clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire
results.
Taboada vs. Rosal
Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 784) – Actually talks “3 pages and he has signed the
same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature, and on
the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of
each and all of us.” Void. Omits the statement that witnesses signed each and
every page in the presence of each other. Article 809 can be applied where the
defect can be cured and supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom.
Entirely written
Must be wholly autographic or handwritten by testator himself
Purpose: efficient guaranty against all falsifications or alterations in the will.
Easier to forge the signature of testator than forge the whole text of will.
Mechanical drafting cannot be entrusted to third person. But a third person may
draft a will and the testator may just copy the draft made by the third person.
Will partly or wholly printed, typewritten, computerized is void. Even if only
the date is typewritten, will is void.
What if not handwritten? If testator has no hands, he can write by mouth or foot
as long as the writing is done by testator himself
No attestation required. If there is any, a mere surplusage. If attestation is
typewritten, still surplusage because attestation is strictly not part of will.
45
Date of Will
Purpose: (1) to provide against contingencies as that of 2 competing wills
executed on same day or different dates – the will executed on the later date is
considered as truly expressing last will; (2) to determine whether or not testator
became insane on the day when will is made; (3) to determine if will is valid
because there is a point in history wherein holographic wills are not allowed.
Gen. Rule: should include the day, month and year
What if date is indicated by implication? Eg. Christmas day of 2003. Case: Roxas
vs. De Jesus, Jr. (Jan. 28, 1985) – will was allowed even if Feb 1961 because the
contingencies guarded against are not present.
Where should date appear? Anywhere. Eg. Top, bottom, body, signature, etc.
Case: Labrador vs. CA (180 SCRA 120)
Signature
Law says Full signature. Ideally, full first name and family name
But if the customary signature is a pseudonym or initial of first/lastname name
and full first name/surname, also allowed as long as it is the full customary
signature
But all initials are not allowed.
Thumbmark not allowed because it is not the handwriting of testator.
Time of signing: Signing may be done on a date subsequent to the execution of
will
Location of signature: at the end of will as evident in Art. 812
Can be made by a blind testator as long as qualified
46
- Reason: To prevent fraud. The execution of will is a personal act of the testator so
it is but natural and logical that he alone can authenticate whatever correction
may be found in the will.
- Without authentication: Gen. Rule: Will is valid. Insertions, etc. considered as not
made. Exception: where insertions, etc. affect the essence of the will as when
there is intent to revoke, then whole will is invalidated. Examples:
1. Kalaw vs. Relova (132 SCRA 237) – there was only one substantial provision
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another heir. The
alteration had no full signature. Held: whole will void because nothing
remains in the will after the alteration invalidated.
47
is a separate will of each testator. Upon the wife’s death, the joint will presented
for probate must be examined and adjudicated de novo (anew).
Even if the laws of other countries (Argentina, Brazil, France, Mexico) allow joint
wills and the will is executed in these countries, still, if it is a Filipino who
executes the same, will is still void.
2. In the Philippines – valid under art. 817 if executed according to the law of
their country which allows joint wills. But may be argued that void by reason
of public policy that should prevail over Art. 817.
WHAT IS A CODICIL?
- In order that a codicil may be effective, it shall be executed as in the case of a will
(Art. 826)
- A notarial codicil may be supplemented by a holographic codicil and vice versa
- In case of conflict between the will and the codicil, the codicil prevails because it
expresses the latest desires of the testator
(1) The document or paper referred to in the will must be in existence at the time
of the execution of the will;
(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the same, stating among other
things the number of pages thereof;
(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the document or paper
referred to therein; and
(4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every page,
except in case of voluminous books of account or inventories.
48
- follow Philippine laws regardless of domicile or nationality of the testator.
49
If a will is void as to form due to non-observance of formalities, the only way
to revive the will is by express republication or republication by re-
execution. Meaning, the will must be executed anew, this time, complying
with the formalities.
If a will is void but not as to form, such as when the testator had no
testamentary capacity at the time it was executed, or the will was revoked,
republication can be effected by re-execution or also by implied
republication or republication by reference. Here, there is no need to copy
the entire provisions of the old will. Mere reference made in the new will or
codicil to the existence of the old will, suffices.
– Preterition annuls the institution of heirs. But if the preterited heir dies
ahead of the testator, the institution is revived without prejudice to the right
of representation.
WHAT IS “ PROBATE”?
“Probate” is a special proceeding to establish the validity of a will.
1. PROBATE IS MANDATORY
MANINANG vs. CA (114 SCRA 478) – because public policy requires it for
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
VDA. DE KILAYKO vs. JUDGE TENGCO [G.R. NO. L-45425. MARCH 27,
1992.]
Until probated, a will cannot be used or given in evidence as the foundation of a
right or title to real or personal property. Thus, the rule is that there can be no
valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated, but this rule
presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.
50
vacate the subject lot upon demand. However, despite written notice and demand
by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to
vacate the subject lot and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam were constrained to institute the action for ejectment. In her
Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta Umengan specifically denied the material
allegations in the complaint. She countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed
away, the subject lot was inherited by her six children by her first and second
marriages through intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly had a pro
indiviso share of 1/6 of the subject lot.
It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan,
purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject lot of his siblings Maria and Sado.
Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan
and her husband. Also on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject
lot to her daughter Vicenta Umengan. According to Vicenta Umengan, the children
of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband (Rosendo and Trinidad Lasam) own only
2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for ejectment be
dismissed and that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed
the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the
newly discovered last will and testament (entitled Testamento Abierto) purportedly
executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son,
Rosendo Lasam, thus:
x x x my share 1/5th (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered
on the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South, by Calle Aguinaldo; to
the East, by Calle P. Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso;
on the property which is my share stands a house of light materials
where I presently reside; this 1/5th (one-fifth) share of my inheritance
from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and also the
aforementioned house of light material x x x
The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over the
subject lot on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan
hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances. Citing jurisprudence
and Article 1080 of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and
that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should prevail. It
observed that the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as
required by law; nonetheless, the institution of a probate proceeding was not barred
by prescription. With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by
Isabel Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the siblings Abdon, Sado,
Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein. Consequently, they
could not convey to Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of
who was entitled to possession of the subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengan’s possession thereof was
by mere tolerance.
RULING:
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: “[a] will is essentially
ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real
51
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.’”
52
merely a provisional ruling thereon for the sole purpose of determining
who is entitled to possession de facto.
IN RE ESTATE OF PILAPIL (72 Phil 545) – the right to ask probate does not
prescribe.
Exceptions:
MORALES vs. OLONDRIZ, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 198994; February 3, 2016)
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither
instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being
disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires that the
omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or
advances on his legitime.
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir
from the testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall
annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar
as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any
devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result
in total intestacy.
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an
53
heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a
compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's
omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present
evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime
from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates,
effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the
RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to
proceed intestate because of preterition.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is
limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only
determine the will's formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not
inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.
When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's
preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the
total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The
decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void.
The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error -
much less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed
intestate.
ARANAS vs. MERCADO, ET AL. (G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014)
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes executed a notarized will wherein she devised,
among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan
(Mangulabnan). The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong) was in the
will appointed as the executor. During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a
petition for the probate of her will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128. By Order of January 11,
1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
54
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying the devise in her will in
this wise:
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title
to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of the
codicil which modified the testator’s will. Mangulabnan thus filed an “action for
partition” against Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija
(the partition case). The trial court rendered a decision in the partition case ordering
the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to deliver the copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089 and holding further that in view of the
case cited by the plaintiff himself, the partition is without prejudice to the probate of
the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court.
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a
petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix (Sp. Proc. No. 218). On February 7,
1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the
cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-215750
was issued in his name. Mangulabnan later sold to herein the Camayas Lot No. 288-
A by a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991. TCT No. NT-215750 was thus
cancelled and TCT No. NT-216446 was issued in the name of the Camayas.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the
codicil to probate and disposing as follows:
55
and residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R.
Patulandong Linsangan of legal age, Filipino, widow and residing at
San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia R. Patulandong
Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and residing at San Lorenzo,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan with
full personal circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5)
each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes dated
June 27, 1973.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and
void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale;
and
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of the
codicil.
RULING:
xxx
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession
of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion
of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the
effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law,
petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.
As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in
effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by law;
56
and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal
presumption that the transfer was lawful.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was
not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was
“without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the prevailing
parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners’
titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas’
claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption
that the transfer was lawful.
VDE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 128781, August 6, 2002)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the
aggrieved party are expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
“The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action.
“All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as
to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”i[24]
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intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in
the inventory of the estate of the decedent.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals that the order of
exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it
did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is
that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but
such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
“We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the
probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to collation was a
supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case which
merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of
the testator’s estate. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that
early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the
order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
“Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether
Mrs. Rustia’s Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be
raised later or may not be raised at all. How those issues should be
resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the
adjudication of this appeal.
ROMERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012)
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that
in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests
are allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their
action. In the case of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda.
de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court
held:
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A court which takes cognizance of testate or
intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein
or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased,
although such a determination is not final or ultimate in
nature, and without prejudice to the right of interested
parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the
ownership or existence of the right or credit.
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the
case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a
separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership,
but the determination of which particular properties should be included in the
inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the properties
alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents and,
therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these
real properties identified seem to be the same real properties that form part of the
inventory of the estate in the intestate proceedings.
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they
also seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim,
they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence form part of their
inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots are the paraphernal
properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio subsequently
redeemed.
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distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the
persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an
action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the
mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this
end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce
proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the
heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are
before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters
and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so
long as no interests of third parties are affected.
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To
date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating the
shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently rule on whether
the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court
that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs,
after the debts of the estate have been paid.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a)
who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c)
the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
the exclusive property of the deceased spouse. Further, the extent of Antonio's
estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement
as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are
matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of
an ordinary civil action.
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RULING:
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from
an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a
petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC
and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting
the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer
for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature
of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
ATILANO MERCADO vs. SANTOS (66 Phil 216) - After final judgment on
the probate, proponent was prosecuted for allegedly having presented a
forged will. The case for forgery could not prosper because judgment on
probate was conclusive as to the due execution of the will.
LEVISTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. L-29184 JANUARY 30, 1989)
The petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with Rosa
del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic
will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property was
bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contingent fee would
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be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the
probate of the will. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del
Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due
to "conflicting interest.” On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional Services."
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-
legatee, filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del
Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De
Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit
all the properties left by the decedent. Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the
court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity
were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's
signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva. The petitioner appealed
contending that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a
creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code he has a right
to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her
favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent attorney's fees.
The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to
this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir.
Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will.
Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency
did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Furthermore, Article
1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of
the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the
decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is
nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. Petitioner was not a party to the
probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of
the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for
a prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, One who is only indirectly
interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:
“... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that
thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate
a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by
the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would
entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.)”
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Uncontested
- testimony of one subscribing - testimony of one witness who
witness knows the signature and
handwriting of testator
- expert testimony may be resorted
to.
Contested
- all the subscribing witnesses and - at least 3 who knows signature and
the notary public must testify handwriting
- if insane, dead, absent in the Phils., - expert testimony
testify against due execution, do
not remember having attested, or
of doubtful credibility, testimony of
other witnesses may be allowed
- In the case of Azaola vs. Singson, not mandatory because no witnesses are
required during execution of holographic wills, hence, it is obvious that the
existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualification is a matter beyond
the control of the proponent of will. Mandatory only in notarial wills because at
least 3 witnesses are required during the execution of will.
- BUT in the case of Codoy vs. Calugay (312 SCRA 333 [1999]), 3 witnesses are
mandatory in contested holographic wills. Reasons:
A. word “shall” connotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion
B. To prevent the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who, for their
benefit, will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. Since the
possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will cannot be
eliminated, if the will is contested, at least 3 of the required witnesses should
declare that the holographic will is in the handwriting and signature of
testator.
In case of notarial wills: YES. Even if there is no copy of the will, the will may still be
probated if its contents are clearly and distinctly proved by at least 2 credible
witnesses.
In case of holographic wills: NO. In holographic wills, there is no guaranty of the truth
and veracity of the will from the mere testimony of witnesses because these
witnesses are not present during the execution of the will. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since,
from the document itself, it could be demonstrated whether or not it is in the hands
of the testator himself. Witnesses may be mistaken in their opinion as to the
handwriting of the testator or they may deliberately lie. Oppositors may present
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contradictory evidence, such as testimonies of other expert witnesses or other
witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the testator, or writings or
letters in the handwriting and signature of the testator. In view of such
contradictory evidence, the court may use its own visual sense and decide in the face
of the document, whether is has indeed been written by the testator.
Thus, if the will is holographic, there must at least be a copy. Otherwise, the will
cannot be admitted to probate.
Photostatic copy of holographic will may be probated. Carbon copy also allowed.
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution. Petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first
be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated
here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the
country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such
wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in
such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws,
(c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate
procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e)
the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
RULING:
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of
their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named
in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. Our rules
require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of
death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he
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left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate
of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established. Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught
with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the
probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since
our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the
will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
ARTICLE 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with (Arts. 804-
809);
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at
the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats (Arts. 1334 and 1335);
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part
of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud (must refer to the nature
of the instrument or its contents);
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. (n)
* Add: If the will was expressly revoked.
- the grounds are exclusive. No other grounds can serve to disallow will
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personal properties, including my savings account bank book in USA which is in the
possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and
bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte; 4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C.
Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will that said
executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the
USA; 2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the
testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law; 3. Will was not executed
and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were not
complied with; 4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the
alleged execution he being in an advance sate of senility; 5. Will was executed
under duress, or the influence of fear or threats; 6. Will was procured by undue
and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents
and/or assistants; and/or 7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick,
and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto;’
HELD: Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the
execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are
indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is
the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the
three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was “highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her
young life [to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was]
thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,” thus
casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will.
Moreover, it supposedly “defies human reason, logic and common experience” for
an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will
and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud “is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense,
by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is
misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes,
or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would
not have made.
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts
to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no
evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years
his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who
were the ones who had taken “the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his
twilight years.”
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not
even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion.” More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
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three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the
testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA
that “the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the
instrumental witnesses.”
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a “grand conspiracy” in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the
three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due
execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.
- It is when the testator institutes some heirs individually and others collectively as
when he says, "I designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of C," those
collectively designated shall be considered as individually instituted, unless it
clearly appears that the intention of the testator was otherwise.
WHAT IS PRETERITION?
- It is the omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, which, as a consequence, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
- Compulsory heirs who are in the direct line, specifically ascendants and
descendants, ad infinitum, and adopted children. The spouse cannot claim
preterition because she is not a relative in the direct line (Acain vs. IAC [155 SCRA
100]).
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WHAT IS THE OMISSION THAT RESULTS IN PRETERITION?
1. The person is not an heir, not a devisee, not a legatee, thus, receives nothing
by will (Aznar vs. Duncan [17 SCRA 590]);
- the institution of heirs is annulled. Hence, distribute the estate in accordance with
the rules on legal succession. But the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Types of Substitution
A. Simple substitution (direct substitution), which may be:
1. Vulgar - the testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish,
or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
2. Brief - two or more persons may be substituted for one
3. Compendious - one substitute for two or more heirs.
4. Reciprocal – the instituted heirs are also the substitutes of each other.
- the impossibility may be relative or absolute and either will result in the deletion
of the condition
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- Effect if impossible condition is attached to an obligation or contract: Both the
condition and the obligation/contract are void (Art. 1183 NCC)
- Reason: In Succession, condition is merely a mere accessory, not a consideration
because the real consideration is the generosity or liberality of testator. In
obligations, the consideration is no longer liberality. The condition becomes part
of the consideration thus, the impossibility of the condition goes into the
consideration of the contract.
* Rules of interpretation:
1. When there is doubt if it is a mode or condition: construed as modal following
the principle that testamentary dispositions are acts of liberality
2. When there is doubt as to the existence of a modal institution: not considered as a
mode but merely as a suggestion or discussion which the heir may or may not
follow, in keeping with the nature of testamentary dispositions as acts of
liberality. For a statement to be considered as a mode, it must have coercive or
obligatory force
HELD:
Not a case of simple substitution. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
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renunciation. The Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall
be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Not a conditional institution. It is clear that the testatrix intended that the lot be
inherited by Dr. Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver sugar
to Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr.
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent
on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case
of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
WHAT IS “LEGITIME”?
Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called
compulsory heirs.
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In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
UYGUANGCO versus COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989)
"The issue before the Court is not the status of the private
respondent, who has been excluded from the family and
inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is
whether he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate
child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence
of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.
Xxx
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In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until
1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has
been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his
father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma,
a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea
Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he
has shared in the profits of the copra business of the
Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a
director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the
addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by
the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's
estate.
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The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics
supplied.)
- The process by which an ascendant who inherits by operation of law from his
descendant which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged by law to reserve such
property for the benefit of third degree relatives who belong to the line from
which the property came from;
- Purpose: to prevent the accidental transfer of property/wealth from one line
to another line.
1. Origin
- The person from whom the reservable property comes from.
- Either an ascendant or (half) brother or sister of the prepositus
2. Prepositus
- Person to whom the origin transfers the property gratuitously
- The arbiter of the reserva because the prepositus may alienate or destroy the
property and thus prevent the existence of the reserve
3. Reservor (Reservatario)
- Ascendant of the prepositus
- The transfer to the reservoir must be by operation of law, either as legitime or
by intestacy
- The absolute owner of the property subject to the resolutory condition of
existence of the 3rd degree relatives of the prepositus upon the reservor’s death.
`
4. Reservees (Reservista)
- Belonging to the same line of the family as that of the origin
- Related to the prepositus in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree.
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reservable property subject to as resolutory condition - his death – by virtue of
which, the property shall be transferred to relatives of the prepositus within the
third degree (reservees). In effect, there is a double resolutory condition – (1) death
of the reservoir; and (2) the survival of the reservees upon the death of the reservor.
MENDOZA, ET. AL. vs. DELOS SANTOS (G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013)
RULING:
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not
applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise
that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From
thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and
Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned
only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission
occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does
not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal
character of the property. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties
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and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came.
Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from
Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an
ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus.
Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral
relative. Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin
as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the
third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right
to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of
the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
WHAT IS DISINHERITANCE?
- The manner by which a compulsory heir is deprived of his legitime, for causes
expressly stated by law.
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WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR A VALID DISINHERITANCE?
1. It should be embodied in a VALID WILL;
2. It must be made EXPRESSLY;
3. It should be for a LEGAL CAUSE;
4. It should be for a TRUE CAUSE;
5. It should be for an EXISTING CAUSE;
6. It should be TOTAL OR COMPLETE;
7. It should be STATED IN THE WILL;
8. The heir should be IDENTIFIED;
9. The will must not have been REVOKED.
Grounds: Arts. 919 (child or descendant), 920 (parent or ascendant) , 921 (spouse)
.... Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution
of heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also
"annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
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such part or interest, unless the testator expressly declares that he
gives the thing in its entirety.
b. If the testator does not own the thing devised or bequeathed but the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him - the
legacy or devise is void, but subsequent acquisition of the thing by the
testator makes the legacy or devise effective.
c. If the testator does not own the thing devised or bequeathed and the
testator knew that he did not own the thing – legacy or devise is valid.
d. The thing devised or bequeathed belonged to the legatee or devisee at
the time of the execution of the will – legacy or devise is void.
e. The thing devised or bequeathed was acquired by the legatee or
devisee after the execution of the will - if the legatee or devisee
acquired it gratuitously, he can claim nothing by virtue of the legacy or
devise; but if it has been acquired by onerous title he can demand
reimbursement from the heir or the estate.
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6. Collateral relatives up to the 5th degree of consanguinity;
7. State
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Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio
III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses
Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is
an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Upon the death of Cristina, Federico adopted Emilio
III. During the intestate proceeding over Cristina’s estate, Federico sought
appointment as administrator thereof. Later on, he nominated Emilio III to act as
administrator.
The Court of Appeals (CA) zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of
Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the
latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that
Emilio III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged
upon the latter’s appointment as administrator of the decedent’s estate, cannot be
appointed as the administrator of the decedent’s estate for the following reasons:
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars
the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from
inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate.
HELD: We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in
the administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses
over several undisputed facts and circumstances:
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the
actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio
III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
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4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with
that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership,
albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated;
and
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from
the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that "under the law,
[Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal
reasoning – Emilio III’s nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and
rendered inoperative by reason of Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable to the case
at bar.
Note:
Legitimate Children exclude parents, brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces
Children (legitimate or illegitimate) concur with surviving spouse
Illegitimate children exclude illegitimate parents, brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces (Art. 988 and 1003)
Parents exclude brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces
Parents concur with surviving spouse
Surviving spouse concurs with, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces
Surviving spouse
- must be legitimate (legally married)
- must not be the guilty party in case of legal separation because she becomes
disqualified to inherit (Art. 1002)
- Decree of legal separation is required for the spouse to be disqualified. But if
he/she gave cause for legal separation only, this is a ground for disinheritance
- Reconciliation erases the ground for disinheritance. Also puts aside the effects of
legal separation.
- In testamentary succession, if the spouse is the only survivor, the share varies if
the marriage was celebrated in articulo mortis. In legal succession, the spouse
gets the entire estate whether or not the marriage was celebrated in articulo
mortis.
- If the spouse survives with legitimate parents and adopted child, treat the
adopted child as illegitimate. Reason: The adopted child will not exclude
legitimate parents (Del Rosario vs. Conanan, March 30, 1977)
Collateral Relatives
-nearer excludes the farther
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-Brothers and sisters. Those in full blood inherit in equal shares, those in the half
blood inherit half of that in the full blood.
-In the collateral line, right of representation is only up to nephews and nieces. In
the direct line, no limit
-between aunts/uncles and nephews/nieces, who are preferred? Nephews and
nieces because they come first in the order of succession and are in the descending
line
-Collaterals are only up to the 5th civil degree. In the direct line, no limit
Summary:
1. Nearer excludes the farther subject to right of representation (eg. Children vs.
grandchildren)
2. If same degree, direct line is preferred over the collateral line (eg. Grandchildren
vs. brothers/sisters
3. If both in the direct line, descending favored over ascending, except illegitimate
descendants (eg. Parents vs. children)
4. If both in collateral, descending favored over ascending (eg. Aunts/uncles vs.
nephews/nieces
State
-succeeds in default of all heirs in the direct line and collaterals up to 5th civil degree
-Caduciary rights: refer to the right of the estate to claim thru escheat proceedings
the properties of decedents who are not survived by any heirs.
-Escheat Proceedings: Process by which state acquires. Rule 91 of the Rules of Court
WHAT IS ACCRETION?
- is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or
cannot receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or
incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees.
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- Two or more persons called to the same inheritance or same portion, pro-
indiviso. Meaning, undivided
- Words ½ for each, in equal shares, though designate aliquot parts, do not exclude
right of accretion as long as the specific part is not identified as to make each heir
the exclusive owner of a determinate property (art. 1017). Same if ¼ to A ¾ to B.
- Eg. ½ to A and same to B in my lot in ma-a. But if the north to B and south to A,
no accretion
- Money or fungible goods. Share must not be earmarked. Eg. My cash in my
vault, to A, B,and C. But if my cash in Metro bank to A, in UCPB to B, no
accretion
- among compulsory heirs, accretion takes place only in free portion. If part
repudiated is legitime, co-heirs inherit in own right, not by accretion (art. 1021)
Legal Succession
Vacancy caused by:
1. Repudiation (share always accrues to the others-Art. 1018)
2. incapacity (subject to representation)
Predecease no accretion because there is really no vacant portion and survivors
inherit in their own right or by representation. But effect is the same.
Eg. T died without will but one of his 3 children renounced his inheritance. Share
shall accrue to the 2 children
When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation (per stirpes), if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions (per capita).
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In case of grandchildren of the decedent, they always inherit by right of
representation (per stirpes) even if all the children of the decedent are deceased.
C repudiates
Relative – cannot inherit only from certain persons or certain properties but can
inherit from other persons or certain properties
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Reason: to safeguard the rights of the heirs who may be defrauded by the sinister
and undue influence which may be exercised by some priests or ministers over a
dying man
Will must be made DURING last illness for it is there that undue influence could
have been exercised. Not BEFORE because undue influence does not yet exist
NOR AFTER because no longer subject to undue influence.
Will must be made AFTER confession, not BEFORE because before confession,
no undue influence yet.
Hence, during last illness and after confession. Confession need not be the last.
Eg. Very sick man. Priests may say during confession, you will soon die from
your illness. If you will not give to me, you will go to hell.”
Last illness is one of which the testator died, OR the one immediately preceding
it (like died of accident)
Note: if the testator did not die from last illness, but from other causes, the death
must immediately follow the confession during last illness such that testator had
no opportunity to revoke the will. Thus if testator became ill in 1990 and
confessed then made a will in 1990 making priest an heir, then gets well in 1991
and did not become ill since then and subsequently died in an accident in 2003,
there is sufficient opportunity to revoke.
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree,
the church, order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to which such
priest or minister may belong
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Final Accounts – given to the court when guardianship is removed, or when he
resigns, or when no need for guardianship to continue
If guardian is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, brother or sister, the provision
is valid. Hence, if guardian is first cousin, nephews, nieces, etc. – VOID. Reason:
Affection, not influence is the underlying reason
Unlike the priest, the relatives of the guardian are not disqualified.
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or
children, or any one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the
testator during his last illness.
Will must be made during last illness and after care had commenced.
Took care – continuing or regular, not isolated
If physician or nurse, etc. relative, still disqualified because the law is silent
unlike case of guardian. BUT can still get their legitime and qualified to inherit
by intestacy.
Art. 739
1. Testator and recipient guilty of adultery or concubinage – guilt may be proved
by preponderance of evidence. No need for criminal conviction.
2. Between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof
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(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the
testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless the
authorities have already taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to cases
wherein, according to law, there is no obligation to make an accusation
full age – 21 years old
knowledge of VIOLENT DEATH – caused by crime
there is obligation to make accusation: Under Spanish Law page 561 Paras,
certain persons are exempted from making accusations. In Phils, no one is
obliged to make accusations
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator
spouse guilty him/herself is not incapacitated
but ground for disinheritance (given cause for legal separation)
if decree of legal separation is granted, guilty spouse becomes disqualified to
inherit
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should
cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will, or
from revoking one already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's
will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent.
Condonation:
1. If the testator already knew the cause of unworthiness at the time of will-making,
the mere fact of institution or giving legacy or devise is an IMPLIED
CONDONATION
- knowledge at time of will making is not enough. Testator must give something in
the will to the disqualified heir in order that there may be condonation
- the will made must be valid or not revoked in order that there may be implied
condonation
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like in disinheritance, the excluded person shall not enjoy the usufruct and
administration of the inherited property of his/her children
(B) Tacit – results from acts by which the intention to accept is necessarily implied,
or which one would have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir. (art. 1049)
(C) Presumed – If heir, devisee or legatee does not accept or repudiate within 30
days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate (Art. 1057)
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Imperial vs. CA, [G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999.
Leoncio sold his land to his natural son, petitioner but it was alleged that the sale
was in fact a donation. 2 years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground that he was deceived
into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement. Pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died,
leaving only two heirs —his natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. In
1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it
was he who moved for execution of judgment. Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died
single and without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo. Four years
after, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa.
Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance
and Recovery of Possession" seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
alleging that the conveyance of said property impaired the legitime of Victor
Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. As argued by petitioner,
when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation.
However, instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be
substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the
compromise judgment therein. Thus, Victor was deemed to have renounced his
legitime.
WHAT IS COLLATION?
Question of collation arises only if there are donations inter vivos made by the
decedent and there are compulsory heirs surviving.
3 concepts of Collation:
1. Mathematical Process – the imaginary addition or fictitious reunion of property
donated by the testator inter vivos with the properties left at the time of his death.
2. Imputation – donations inter vivos made to compulsory heirs are considered as
advances to their legitimes;
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3. Actual Reduction or Abatement – actual reduction or bringing back of that
property donated by the testator during his lifetime to the hereditary estate if the
donations are found to be inofficious.
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes
P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N.
Pascual. During his lifetime, Angel donated to Amelia a parcel of land (the donated
property) located in Teresa Village, Makati. In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of
Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration," filed by respondents on
April 28, 2000, respondents alleged, inter alia, that the donated property located in
Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be
considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. Provisionally passing, however,
upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of
determining whether it formed part of the decedent's estate, the probate court found
the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized
documents.
RULING:
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is
no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the decedent left any
primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his
siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any
legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the
law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he
was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-
collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid,
is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of
the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not
subject to collation.
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (underscoring supplied)
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Case:
Vda. De Tupas, vs. RTC of Negros Occidental (October 3, 1986)
Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation
inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation.
The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the
donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to
collation. Collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. The
further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the
donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the
donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his
power to give. In order to find out whether a donation is inofficious or not, the rules
are:
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the
testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid
out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities,
giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were
made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total
thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective
compulsory heir.
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely
disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the
value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it
must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess
and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be
shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the sole compulsory heir of the deceased
Epifanio R. Tupas.
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donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition
against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt
the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061. The intention to
exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. The suggestion that there
was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the
free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the
question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue
is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and there was none.
WHAT IS PARTITION?
- Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its
value.
J.L.T. AGRO, INC. vs. BALANSAG (G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005)
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering 954 square meters,
known as Lot No. 63, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal
partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 5203. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an
action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled "Josefa
Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al." Milagros Donio, the second
wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the
case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the
properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement and
approving the same, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared a tract of land
known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don
Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were
given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property,"
the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The
remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession
over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement.
Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
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Partition of Real Estate dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63
was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose
Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of JLT
in 1979, spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday bought Lot No. 63
from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate dated
9 November 1983. At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of
absolute sale, spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday discovered that
the lot was already titled in the name of JLT. Thus, they failed to register the
deed. Consequently, as vendees of Lot No. 63, spouses Antonio Balansag and
Hilaria Cadayday filed a complaint before the RTC, seeking the declaration of
nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of JLT and the transfer of
the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages. According to the spouses, in
the Compromise Agreement, the future legitimes were determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; that Don Julian had no right to dispose
of or assign Lot No. 63 to JLT because he reserved the same for his heirs from the
second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement; and that the Supplemental
Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage.
RULING:
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has
to be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated
to Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from
their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would
correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In
other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be
adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor
children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children
Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.” (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be
determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court
agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos is relevant, where we defined future
inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at
the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside
the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no
contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to
the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
For the inheritance to be considered “future,” the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon
future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
following requisites concur:
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(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception
and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the
partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.
The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily
require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of
acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since
donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no
will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession).
Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be
given to each heir.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this
partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his
lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its
binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the
property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the
forced heirs.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second
marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was
but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at
the time nonexistent and might never exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63
in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian
retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be
challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already
been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly
transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled
that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed,
holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited
preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that
the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.
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Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa
defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him
at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the
properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from
inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory
heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not
giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting
him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition
where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there
was no total omission of a forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved
Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition
prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his
legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second
marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in
the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line.
Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is
unfounded.
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requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in
a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and
the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of
an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place,
nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition
to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The
requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience,
non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts
of the parties as among themselves.
And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code
apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other
but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is
renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance.
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Under Article 1119 of the New Civil Code, acts of possessory character executed in
virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available for the purposes of
possession.
Indeed, Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and considering
that Virgilio Santos was the ward of Isidra Santos ever since when Virgilio Santos
was still an infant, it was but natural that the Appellant did not interpose any
objection to the continued stay of Virgilio Santos and his family on the property and
even acquiesced thereto. Appellant must have assumed too, that his brother, the
Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to occupy the property and use the same for
the time being. Hence, such possession by Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos of the
property did not constitute a repudiation of the co-ownership by the Appellee Eliseo
Santos and of his privies for that matter. Penultimately, the action for partition is not
barred by laches. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be
barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property.
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6,
1984. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as
security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte
(Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-439(788). Rufo failed to pay his loan so the mortgaged property was foreclosed
and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction. On
November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the
Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More
than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a
Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the
name of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third
portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial
Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the
fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they
intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject
property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land
was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484 was issued in the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995,
respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they
were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to
surrender possession of the same to them. Petitioner insists that despite
respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed property was
already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the
property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a
contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the
parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by
“redeeming” or “repurchasing” the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner
contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a
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result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from
the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim
his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
RULING:
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the
estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs. The rights to
a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the
inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time
of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which
his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-
owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in
the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and
respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement
would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his
sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they
believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.
It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose
which it is intended to serve. Such intention is determined from the express terms of
their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts. Absurd and
illogical interpretations should also be avoided.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him
and his siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject
property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the
interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their
deceased father. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings
intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property
contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly
manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by
assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of
each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving
each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the
other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an
objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
97
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
BASILIO SANTIAGO (G.R. No. 179859, August 9, 2010)
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages-the first to Bibiana Lopez, the
second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife
bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon,
Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio
and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo
and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago. Basilio and his third
wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all
surnamed Santiago. After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter
by the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a petition for the probate of
Basilio's will. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma.
Pilar was appointed executrix.
"Xxx
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will," the probate court approved the will by
Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila
to register the certificates of title indicated therein. Accordingly, the titles to Lot
Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were
transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.
On October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate
court a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer
of Titles in the Names of all the heirs citing that the administration of Ma. Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago over the house and lot in Manila expired on
September 16, 1993. Consequently, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
should have ceased as such administrators way back on September 16, 1993 and
they should have transferred the above said titles to all the heirs of the decedent.
Opposing the motion, petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente argued that with the
approval of the Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the
Will, and with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties
involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated. The petitioners
objected to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044,
among those to be transferred to the heirs as it would contravene the testator's intent
that no one is to own the same.
RULING:
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Petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT
No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would
contravene the testator’s intent that no one is to own the same. The Court is not
persuaded. It is clear from Basilio’s will that he intended the house and lot in
Manila to be transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only, and
that the property be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition set by the
decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this
point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate court, viz:
xxxx
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Case:
Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. CA (March 7, 2000)
In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of ownership and
questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial
Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and
void for being simulated and fraudulently made.
First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on
participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated
and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true,
would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a]
partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the
persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the
person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of
bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed who
were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person.” In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not
render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them.
The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As
such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. He who denies its due execution has the burden of proving that
contrary to the recital in the Acknowledgment he never appeared before the notary
public and acknowledged the deed to be his voluntary act. Whoever alleges forgery
has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Private respondents failed to discharge
this burden of proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned deed stands.
HELD: The issue has been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte, where
the SC observed: "Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including
therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the intention of
the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or
reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said notice be made
in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient." In
the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) written
notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
100
manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written
notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and
its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not
having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive,
though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
Exception:
CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007)
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the
sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was
a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988,
petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property.
Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise
informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property
during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal
redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from
learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the
sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the sale
would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus
commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of
redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson.
The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson
sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12,
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1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it
is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.
Primary Structures Corp. vs. Sps. Valencia (G.R. No. 150060. August 19, 2003)
The thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondent
Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she
discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the
case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court. The written notice of
sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the
selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (150 SCRA 259), relied upon by petitioner in contending that actual
knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale, the Court made it
clear that it was not reversing the prevailing jurisprudence. The court simply
adopted an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of
this case. In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not
just days or months, after the consummation of the contracts of sale but more than
thirteen years after the sales were concluded.”
i
.
102