31. G.R. No.
L-45824 June 19, 1985 On March 10, 1976, a majority of petitioner's
VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION, petitioner,
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNION FOR METAL, WORKERS, DMG,
INC., PEOPLE'S CAR, INC., KARBAYAN INC., and
RTC TRADING, INC., respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioner.
William D. Dichoso for respondent DMG, Inc.
Abraham B. Drapiza for private respondent.
CUEVAS, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the Resolutions
dated January 25, 1977 and March 14, 1977 of the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
On April 25. 1977, however, a Supplemental
Petition was filed seeking the issuance of —
(1) A preliminary mandatory injunction
commanding respondents to return to petitioner
the union dues amounting to about P55,000.00
lawfully pertaining to it but illegally levied upon,
collected and handed over by respondent Bureau,
acting through the NLRC sheriff, to respondent
Associated Labor Union for Metal workers, with the
collusion of respondents DMG, Inc., Karbayan, Inc.
and RTC Machineries, Inc.;
(2) A preliminary restraining order prohibiting
respondents from making further delivery to
respondent Associated Labor Union for Metal
workers of Union dues collected or to be collected
through check-off from the wages of petitioner's
members by respondents, DMG, Inc., Karbayan,
Inc., RTC Machineries, Inc., and People's Car, Inc.,
under or by virtue of the questioned writ of
execution issued by respondent Bureau, dated
April 4, 1977.
Petitioner was once affiliated with the Associated
Labor Union for Metal Workers (ALUMETAL for
short). On August 1, 1975, both unions, using the
name Volkschel Labor Union Associated Labor
Union for Metal Workers, jointly entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with respondent
companies. One of the subjects dealt with is the
payment of union dues which is provided for in
Section 3, Article 1, of the CBA, which reads:
Section 3. CHECK-OFF. — The COMPANY
agrees to make payroll deductions not softener
than twice a month of UNION membership dues
and such special assessments fees or fines as may
be duly authorized by the UNION, provided that
the same is covered by the individual check-off
authorization of the UNION members. All said
deductions shall be promptly transmitted within
five (5) days by the COMPANY to the UNION
Treasurer. The COMPANY shall prepare two (2)
checks. One (1) check will be under the name of
the local union as their local fund including local
special assessment funds and the other check will
be for the ALU Regional Office regarding the
remittance of the UNION dues deduction.
members decided to disaffiliate from respondent
federation in order to operate on its own as an
independent labor group pursuant to Article 241
(formerly Article 240) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Incumbent affiliates of existing federations or
national unions may disaffiliate only for the
purpose of joining a federation or national union in
the industry or region in which it properly belongs
or for the purpose of operating as an independent
labor group.
Accordingly, a resolution was adopted and signed
by petitioner's members revoking their check-off
authorization in favor of ALUMETAL and notices
thereof were served on ALUMETAL and respondent
companies.
Confronted with the predicament of whether or not
to continue deducting from employees' wages and
remitting union dues to respondent, ALUMETAL
which wrote respondent companies advising them
to continue deducting union dues and remitting
them to said federation, respondent companies
sought the legal opinion of the respondent Bureau
as regards the controversy between the two unions.
On November 11, 1976, Med-Arbiter George A.
Eduvalla of respondent Bureau rendered a
Resolution which in effect found the disaffiliation
legal but at the same time gave the opinion that,
petitioner's members should continue paying their
dues to ALUMETAL in the concept of agency fees. 1
From the said Resolution, of the Med-Arbiter both
petitioner and respondent ALUMETAL appealed to
the Director of respondent Bureau. Petitioner'
contended that the Med-Arbiter's opinion to the
effect that petitioner's members remained obligated
to pay dues to respondent ALUMETAL was
inconsistent with the dispositive finding that
petitioner's disaffiliation from ALUMETAL was
valid. ALUMETAL, on the other hand, assailed the
Resolution in question asserting that the
disaffiliation should have been declared contrary to
law.
On January 25, 1977, respondent Bureau, through
its Acting Director, Francisco L. Estrella,
REVERSED the Med-Arbiter's Resolution., and
declared that the Bureau recognized "the
continued affiliation of Volkschel Labor Union with
the Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers." 2
Petitioner appealed the Acting Director's Resolution
to the Secretary of Labor know Minister of Labor
and Employment) who, treating the appeal as a
Motion for Reconsideration referred the same back
to respondent Bureau On March 14, 1977, the
Bureau denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
Meanwhile, on April 4, 1977, on motion of
ALUMETAL, the then Acting Secretary of Labor,
Amado Gat Inciong, issued a of execution
commanding the Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission to enforce and execute the
order of January 25, 1977, which has become final
and executory. 3 Pursuant thereto, the NLRC
Sheriff enforced and implemented the Order of
January 25, 1977, as a result of which respondent
companies turned over and handed to respondent
federation the union dues and other assessments
in accordance with the check-off provision of the
CBA,
From the pleadings filed and arguments of counsel,
the following issues present themselves for this
Court's resolution.
I individual check-off authorization of petitioner's
Is petitioner union's disaffiliation from respondent
federation valid?
II
Do respondent companies have the right to effect
union dues collections despite revocation by the
employees of the check-off authorization? and
III
Is respondent federation entitled to union dues
payments from petitioner union's members
notwithstanding their disaffiliation from said
federation?
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its
mother union is well-settled. In previous cases, it
has been repeatedly held that a local union, being
a separate and voluntary association, is free to
serve the interest of all its members including the
freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances
warrant. 4 This right is consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association
(Article IV, Section 7, Philippine Constitution).
Petitioner contends that the disaffiliation was not
due to any opportunists motives on its part. Rather
it was prompted by the federation's deliberate and
habitual dereliction of duties as mother federation
towards petitioner union. Employees' grievances
were allegedly left unattended to by respondent
federation to the detriment of the employees' rights
and interests.
In reversing the Med-Arbiter's resolution,
respondent Bureau declared: the Department of
Labor is set on a task to restructure the labor
movement to the end that the workers will unite
themselves along industry lines. Carried to its
complete fruition, only one union for every
industry will remain to bargain collectively for the
workers. The clear policy therefore even now is to
conjoin workers and worker groups, not to
dismember them. 5 This policy is commendable.
However, we must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate of protecting labor and the
workers' right to self-organization. In the
implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations, the workingman's welfare should be
the primordial and paramount consideration. In
the case at bar, it would go against the spirit of the
labor law to restrict petitioner's right to self-
organization due to the existence of the CBA. We
agree with the Med-Arbiter's opinion that "A
disaffiliation does not disturb the enforceability
and administration of a collective agreement; it
does not occasion a change of administrators of the
contract nor even an amendment of the provisions
thereof." 6 But nowhere in the record does it
appear that the contract entered into by the
petitioner and ALUMETAL prohibits the withdrawal
of the former from the latter.
This now brings us to the second issue. Under
Section 3, Article I, of the CBA, the obligation of
the respondent companies to deduct and remit
dues to ALUMETAL is conditioned on the
members, In other words, ALUMETAL is entitled to
receive the dues from respondent companies as
long as petitioner union is affiliated with it and
respondent companies are authorized by their
employees (members of petitioner union) to deduct
union dues. Without said affiliation, the employer
has no link to the mother union. The obligation of
an employee to pay union dues is coterminous
with his affiliation or membership. "The employees'
check-off authorization, even if declared
irrevocable, is good only as long as they remain
members of the union concerned." 7 A contract
between an employer and the parent organization
as bargaining agent for the employees is
terminated by the disaffiliation of the local of which
the employees are members. 8 Respondent
companies therefore were wrong in continuing the
check-off in favor of respondent federation since
they were duly notified of the disaffiliation and of
petitioner's members having already rescinded
their check-off authorization.
With the view we take on those two issues, we find
no necessity in dwelling further on the last issue.
Suffice it to state that respondent federation is not
entitled to union dues payments from petitioner's
members. "A local union which has validly
withdrawn from its affiliation with the parent
association and which continues to represent the
employees of an employer is entitled to the check-
off dues under a collective bargaining contract." 9
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Bureau of
Labor Relations of January 25, 1977 and March
14, 1977 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ALUMETAL is ordered to return to
petitioner union all the union dues enforced and
collected through the NLRC Sheriff by virtue of the
writ of execution dated April 4, 1977 issued by
respondent Bureau.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
32. [G.R. No. 127374. January 31, 2002]
PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC., MARILES C.
ROMULO and FRANCISCO DAKILA, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER EMERSON TUMANON,
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU) SEPTEMBER (now UNIFIED
PAFLU) and SERAFIN AYROSO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127431. January 31, 2002]
PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS AND WORKERS
ASSOCIATION-NCW, MACARIO CABANIAS,
PEPITO RODILLAS, SHARON CASTILLO, DANILO
CARBONEL, MANUEL EDA, ROLANDO FELIX,
JOCELYN FRONDA, RICARDO LUMBA, JOSEPH
MARISOL, NERISA MORTEL, TEOFILO QUIRONG,
LEONARDO REYES, MANUEL CADIENTE and
HERMINIA RIOSA, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU)
SEPTEMBER (now UNIFIED PAFLU) and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
SECOND DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking to set
aside the 31 July 1996 Decision[2] of the National
Labor Relations Commission affirming the 30 June
1995 Decision of the Labor Arbiter holding
petitioners Philippine Skylanders, Inc., Mariles C.
Romulo[3] and Francisco Dakila as well as the
elected officers of the Philippine Skylanders
Employees and Workers Association-PAFLU[4]
guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to
pay private respondent Philippine Association of
Free Labor Union (PAFLU) September[5]
P150,000.00 as damages. Petitioners likewise seek
the reversal of the 31 October 1996 Resolution of
the NLRC denying their Motion for
Reconsideration.
In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders
Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor union
affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU) September (PAFLU), won in
the certification election conducted among the
rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders,
Inc. (PSI). Its rival union, Philippine Skylanders
Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU)
immediately protested the result of the election
before the Secretary of Labor.
Several months later, pending settlement of the
controversy, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of
disaffiliation citing as reason PAFLU's supposed
deliberate and habitual dereliction of duty toward
its members. Attached to the notice was a copy of
the resolution adopted and signed by the officers
and members of PSEA authorizing their local union
to disaffiliate from its mother federation.
PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the
National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed its
name to Philippine Skylanders Employees
Association - National Congress of Workers (PSEA-
NCW), and to maintain continuity within the
organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-
PAFLU to continue occupying their positions as
elected officers in the newly-forged PSEA-NCW.
On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with PSI which
was immediately registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment.
Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA's shift of
allegiance, PAFLU Secretary General Serafin
Ayroso wrote Mariles C. Romulo requesting a copy
of PSI's audited financial statement. Ayroso
explained that with the dismissal of PSEA-WATUs
election protest the time was ripe for the parties to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement.
On 30 July 1994 PSI through its personnel
manager Francisco Dakila denied the request
citing as reason PSEA's disaffiliation from PAFLU
and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.
Agitated by PSI's recognition of PSEA-NCW, PAFLU
through Serafin Ayroso filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice against PSI, its president Mariles
Romulo and personnel manager Francisco Dakila.
PAFLU alleged that aside from PSIs refusal to
bargain collectively with its workers, the company
through its president and personnel manager, was
also liable for interfering with its employees' union
activities.[6]
Two (2) days later or on 6 October 1994 Ayroso
filed another complaint in behalf of PAFLU for
unfair labor practice against Francisco Dakila.
Through Ayroso PAFLU claimed that Dakila was
present in PSEA's organizational meeting thereby
confirming his illicit participation in union
activities. Ayroso added that the members of the
local union had unwittingly fallen into the
manipulative machinations of PSI and were lured
into endorsing a collective bargaining agreement
which was detrimental to their interests.[7] The
two (2) complaints were thereafter consolidated.
On 1 February 1995 PAFLU amended its complaint
by including the elected officers of PSEA-PAFLU as
additional party respondents. PAFLU averred that
the local officers of PSEA-PAFLU, namely Macario
Cabanias, Pepito Rodillas, Sharon Castillo, Danilo
Carbonel, Manuel Eda, Rolando Felix, Jocelyn
Fronda, Ricardo Lumba, Joseph Mirasol, Nerisa
Mortel, Teofilo Quirong, Leonardo Reyes, Manuel
Cadiente, and Herminia Riosa, were equally guilty
of unfair labor practice since they brazenly allowed
themselves to be manipulated and influenced by
petitioner Francisco Dakila.[8]
PSI, its president Mariles C. Romulo, and its
personnel manager Dakila moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the issue of
disaffiliation was an inter-union conflict which lay
beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. On the
other hand, PSEA-NCW took the cudgels for its
officers who were being sued in their capacities as
former officers of PSEA-PAFLU and asserted that
since PSEA was no longer affiliated with PAFLU,
Ayroso or PAFLU for that matter had no
personality to file the instant complaint. In support
of this assertion, PSEA-NCW submitted in evidence
a Katunayan signed by 111 out of 120 rank and
file employees of PSI disauthorizing Ayroso or
PAFLU from instituting any action in their behalf.
[9]
In a Decision rendered on 30 June 1995 the Labor
Arbiter declared PSEA's disaffiliation from PAFLU
invalid and held PSI, PSEA-PAFLU and their
respective officers guilty of unfair labor practice.
The Decision explained that despite PSEA-PAFLU's
status as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of PSI's rank and file employees, the company
knowingly sanctioned and confederated with
Dakila in actively assisting a rival union. This,
according to the Labor Arbiter, was a classic case
of interference for which PSI could be held
responsible. As PSEA-NCW's personality was not
accorded recognition, its collective bargaining
agreement with PSI was struck down for being
invalid. Ayroso's legal personality to file the
complaint was sustained on the ratiocination that
under the Labor Code no petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained outside of the sixty (60)-day
period immediately before the expiry date of such
five (5)-year term of the collective bargaining
agreement that the parties may enter into.
Accordingly, judgment was rendered ordering PSI,
PSEA-PAFLU and their officers to pay PAFLU
P150,000.00 in damages.[10]
PSI, PSEA and their respective officers appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
But the NLRC upheld the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter and conjectured that since an election
protest questioning PSEA-PAFLU's certification as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent was
pending resolution before the Secretary of Labor,
PSEA could not validly separate from PAFLU, join
another national federation and subsequently
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
its employer-company.[11]
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration
but both motions were denied. Hence, these
petitions for certiorari filed by PSI and PSEA-NCW
together with their respective officers pleading for a
reversal of the NLRC's Decision which they claimed
to have been rendered in excess of jurisdiction. In
due time, both petitions were consolidated.
In these petitions, petitioner PSEA together with its
officers argued that by virtue of their disaffiliation
PAFLU as a mere agent had no authority to
represent them before any proceedings. They
further asserted that being an independent labor
union PSEA may freely serve the interest of all its
members and readily disaffiliate from its mother
federation when circumstances so warrant. This
right, they averred, was consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.
[12]
For their part, petitioners PSI, Romulo and Dakila
alleged that their decision to bargain collectively
with PSEA-NCW was actuated, to a large extent, by
PAFLU's behavior. Having heard no objections or
protestations from PAFLU relative to PSEA's
disaffiliation, they reckoned that PSEA's
subsequent association with NSW was done bona
fide.[13]
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu
of Comment recommending that both petitions be
granted. In his Manifestation, the Solicitor General
argued against the Labor Arbiter's assumption of
jurisdiction citing the following as reasons: first,
there was no employer-employee relationship
between complainant Ayroso and PSI over which
the Labor Arbiter could rightfully assert his
jurisdiction; second, since the case involved a
dispute between PAFLU as mother federation and
PSEA as local union, the controversy fell within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations; and
lastly, the relationship of principal-agent between
PAFLU and PSEA had been severed by the local
union through the lawful exercise of its right of
disaffiliation.[14]
Stripped of non-essentials, the fundamental issue
tapers down to the legitimacy of PSEA's
disaffiliation. To be more precise, may PSEA, which
is an independent and separate local union, validly
disaffiliate from PAFLU pending the settlement of
an election protest questioning its status as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of PSI's rank
and file employees?
At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of
disaffiliation is an inter-union conflict the
jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor
Arbiter.[15] Nonetheless, with due recognition of
this fact, we deem it proper to settle the
controversy at this instance since to remand the
case to the BLR would only mean intolerable delay
for the parties.
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its
mother federation is not a novel thesis unillumined
by case law. In the landmark case of Liberty Cotton
Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.
[16] we upheld the right of local unions to separate
from their mother federation on the ground that as
separate and voluntary associations, local unions
do not owe their creation and existence to the
national federation to which they are affiliated but,
instead, to the will of their members. The sole
essence of affiliation is to increase, by collective
action, the common bargaining power of local
unions for the effective enhancement and
protection of their interests. Admittedly, there are
times when without succor and support local
unions may find it hard, unaided by other support
groups, to secure justice for themselves.
Yet the local unions remain the basic units of
association, free to serve their own interests
subject to the restraints imposed by the
constitution and by-laws of the national federation,
and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the
terms laid down in the agreement which brought
such affiliation into existence.
Such dictum has been punctiliously followed since
then.[17]
Upon an application of the aforecited principle to
the issue at hand, the impropriety of the
questioned Decisions becomes clearly apparent.
There is nothing shown in the records nor is it
claimed by PAFLU that the local union was
expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the
federation nor were there any conditions imposed
for a valid breakaway. As such, the pendency of an
election protest involving both the mother
federation and the local union did not constitute a
bar to a valid disaffiliation. Neither was it disputed
by PAFLU that 111 signatories out of the 120
members of the local union, or an equivalent of
92.5% of the total union membership supported
the claim of disaffiliation and had in fact
disauthorized PAFLU from instituting any
complaint in their behalf. Surely, this is not a case
where one (1) or two (2) members of the local union
decided to disaffiliate from the mother federation,
but it is a case where almost all local union
members decided to disaffiliate.
It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into
a collective bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW.
As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU,
there would be no restrictions which could validly
hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW
and entering into a collective bargaining agreement
in behalf of its members.
There is a further consideration that likewise
argues for the granting of the petitions. It stands
unchallenged that PAFLU instituted the complaint
for unfair labor practice against the wishes of
workers whose interests it was supposedly
protecting. The mere act of disaffiliation did not
divest PSEA of its own personality; neither did it
give PAFLU the license to act independently of the
local union. Recreant to its mission, PAFLU cannot
simply ignore the demands of the local chapter and
decide for its welfare. PAFLU might have forgotten
that as an agent it could only act in representation
of and in accordance with the interests of the local
union. The complaint then for unfair labor practice
lodged by PAFLU against PSI, PSEA and their
respective officers, having been filed by a party
which has no legal personality to institute the
complaint, should have been dismissed at the first
instance for failure to state a cause of action.
Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the
claims of a local union as against those of a
national federation, those of the former must be
preferred. Parenthetically though, the desires of
the mother federation to protect its locals are not
altogether to be shunned. It will however be to err
greatly against the Constitution if the desires of the
federation would be favored over those of its
members. That, at any rate, is the policy of the law.
For if it were otherwise, instead of protection, there
would be disregard and neglect of the lowly
workingmen.
WHEREFORE, the petitions of Philippine
Skylanders, Inc. and of Philippine Skylanders and
Workers Association-NCW, together with their
respective officers, are GRANTED. The Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission of 31
July 1996 affirming the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter of 30 June 1995 holding petitioners
Philippine Skylanders and Workers Association-
NCW, Philippine Skylanders, Inc. and their
respective officers, guilty of unfair labor practice
and ordering them to pay damages to private
respondent Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU) September (now UNIFIED PAFLU)
as well as the Resolution of 31 October 1996
denying reconsideration is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
33. G.R. No. L-41955 December 29, 1977
ELISCO-ELIROL LABOR UNION (NAFLU) and its
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, petitioners
vs.
CARMELO NORIEL, in his capacity as Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, ELIZALDE STEEL
CONSOLIDATED, INC. and NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU),
respondents.
Villaluz, Villaluz & Villaluz, Padilla Law Offices and
Rizalindo V. Diaz for petitioners.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
Assistant Solicitor Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Ramon A. Barcelona respondent Director.
Rolando M. Olalia for respondent Union (NAFLU).
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside respondent director's
appealed resolution and rules in accordance with
the prevailing law and settled jurisprudence that
the petitioner union consisting of the members-
employees of respondent corporation is the
principal party to the collective bargaining
agreement (rather than the respondent mother
union which is merely its agent) and is therefore
entitled to be recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative entitled to administer
and enforce the collective bargaining agreement
with the employer corporation.
The undisputed antecedent facts which gave rise to
the present petition are stated in the petition as
follows:
2. That sometime on February 1974,
petitioner-Elisco Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU),
negotiated and executed a collective bargaining
agreement with respondent-Elizalde Steel
Consolidated, Inc.1
3. That upon verification by individual
petitioners at the Registration division, Bureau of
Labor Relations, Department of Labor, the Elisco-
Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU), the contracting party
in said collective bargaining agreement, was not
then registered and therefore not entitled to the
benefits and privileges embodied in said collective
bargaining agreement; thus on March 3, 1975, the
member of petitioner-appellant union in a general
membership meeting decided in a resolution to
register their union to protect and preserve the
integrity and inviolability of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Elisco-Elirol
Labor Union (NAFLU) and the Elizalde Steel
Consolidated, Inc.
4. That said resolution of the members of
petitioner-appellant union was passed upon by the
officers and members of the Board of Directors on
May 20, 1975, at a special meeting called for the
purpose, resolution No. 6, s. 1975 was approved
requesting the Acting Directors, Registration
Division, Bureau of Labor Relations, to register the
union Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU).
5. That by virtue of resolution No. 6,
Petitioner-appellant union applied for registration
with the Bureau of Labor Relations, hence on May
28, 1975, Certificate of Registration No. 8511-IP
was issued by said Office.
6. That with the issuance of the certificate of
registration petitioner-appellant acquired a
personality separate and distinct from any other
labor union.
7. That steps were taken by petitioner-
appellant to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement as the principal party to the same
representing the workers covered by such
agreement immediately after the issuance of the
certificate of registration.
8. That on June 10, 1975, at a special meeting
called for the purpose, the general membership of
petitioner union decided that their mother union,
the National Federation of Labor Unions, can no
longer safeguard the rights of its members insofar
as working conditions and other terms of
employment are concerned and that the interest
and welfare of petitioner can be served best if it will
stay independent and disaffiliated from said
mother union, hence, the general membership
adopted a resolution to disaffiliate from the
National Federation of Labor Unions.

9. That on June 11, 1975, petitioner, acting
through its President Hilario Riza informed
respondents of said disaffiliation by means of a
letter, and subsequently requested respondents to
recognize petitioner as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees thereof.
10. That respondent without any justifiable
reason refused and continues to refuse to
recognize petitioner as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees, and,
now actually dismissed the petitioner union's
officers and board members.2 In this connection, a
complaint for unfair labor practice was filed by
petitioners against respondents for the latter's
refusal to bargain collectively with petitioner,
which complaint is presently docketed as Case No.
LR-RO4-6-1662.
11. That by virtue of said refusal of respondent
company to recognize petitioner as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees, petitioners filed a petition before the
Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor on
July 2, 1975, with Case No. LR-861 against
respondents Elizalde Steel Consolidated, Inc. and
the National Federation of Labor Unions be ordered
to stop from presenting itself as the collective
bargaining agent and pursuant thereto, a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
be issued.
12. That on August 19, 1975. the Bureau of
Labor Relations, through Med-Arbiter Reynaldo B.
Carta, before whom the case was beard, issued an
Order dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
On appeal to respondent Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, said respondent issued his
Resolution of October 30, 1975 affirming the
dismissal of petitioner-union's petition as follows:
On February, 1974 the members of the petitioner
union who were then yet affiliated with the
National Association of Free Labor Union
negotiated and executed with the respondent
company a collective bargaining agreement with
expiry date in November, 1976.
On May 28, 1975, after the same members, by
valid resolution of the Board of directors and
approved by the general membership, have formed
themselves into an i t organization and applied for
registration as a union, a certificate of registration
was issued by the Department of Labor. And on
June 10, 1975 again by a valid resolution the same
members disaffiliated with the NAFLU.
The issue for resolution is —
Which of the two unions should be recognized as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees and ultimately recognized to
administer and supervise the enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Petitioner-union contends that it having the
necessary interest and being the real party must
be the sole union to be recognized and given
authority to bargain with the company.
Setting aside jurisprudence and the collective
bargaining agreement of the parties, the appellant
is correct. For to grant to the former mother union
(NAFLU) the authority to administer and enforce
their collective bargaining agreement without
presumably any members in the bargaining unit is
quite absurd. But to transfer also the authority to
the newly formed union although the members of
the same were the same members who composed
then the local chapter of the mother union is also
in violation of the CBA particularly article IV which
is the union security clause, wherein it is a
condition for a continued employment in the
company to maintain membership in the Union.
Theoretically therefore, when the employees
disaffiliated from the mother union and formed
themselves into a new union, their status as
employees was also terminated. As such they could
not therefore absolutely and legally claim that they
still comprise the majority of the bargaining unit.
Secondly, to vest, upon the new union the
authority to bargain is in violation of the whole
CBA, under the theory that when the mother union
(NAFLU) entered and executed the same in its
separate and distinct personality aside from the
people composing the same. In fine, the CBA then
was executed by and between the company and the
(NAFLU) with the latter as an entity having its own
capacity and personality different from the
members composing the same.
Lastly, to preserve and avoid unstability and
disorder in the labor movement as correctly ruled
by the med-arbiter, the status quo should be
preserved, there being no compelling reason to
alter the same.3
Hence, the petition at bar. We find the petition to
be clearly meritorious and reverse the appealed
resolution.
1. Respondent director correctly perceived in
his Resolution that "to grant to the former mother
union (NAFLU) the authority to administer and
enforce their collective bargaining agreement
without presumably any members in the
bargaining unit is quite absurd" but fell unto the
grave error of holding that "When the employees
disaffiliated from the mother union and formed
themselves into a new union, their status as
employees was also terminated."
His error was in not perceiving that the employees
and members of the local union did not form a new
union but merely registered the local union as was
their right. Petitioner Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-
NAFLU, consisting of employees and members of
the local union was the principal party to the
agreement. NAFLU as the "mother union" in
participation in the execution of the bargaining
agreement with respondent company acted merely
as agent of the local union, which remained the
basic unit of the association existing principally
and freely to serve the common interest of all its
members, including the freedom to disaffiliated
when the circumstances so warranted as in the
present case.
2. Contrary to respondent director's
misimpression, our jurisprudence fully supports
'petitioner's stand. In Liberty Cotton Mills Workers
Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.4 , the Court
expressly cited and affirmed the basic principle
that "(T)he locals are separate and distinct units
primarily designed to secure and maintain an
equality of bargaining power between the employer
and their employee-members in the economic
struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort
of labor and capital; and the association of the
locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in
furtherance of the same end. These associations
are consensual entities capable of entering into
such legal relations with their members. The
essential purpose was the affirmation of the local
unions into a common enterprise to increase by
collective action the common bargaining power in
respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet
the locals remained the basic units of association,
free to serve their own and the common interest of
all, subject to the restraints imposed by the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and
free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual
welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement
which brought it into existence."
Corollarily, the "substitutionary" doctrine likewise
fully supports petitioner's stand. Petitioner union
to whom the employees owe their allegiance has
from the beginning expressly avowed that it "does
not intend to change and/or amend the provisions
of the present collective bargaining agreement but
only to be given the chance to enforce the same
since there is a shift of allegiance in the majority of
the employees at respondent company." As was
stressed by the Court in Benguet Consolidated Inc.
vs. BCI Employees & W Union-PAFLU5 —
... This principle, formulated by the NLRB as its
initial compromise solution to the problem facing it
when there occurs a shift in employees' union
allegiance after the execution of a bargaining
contract with their employer, merely states that
even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining
agreement executed between employer and
employees thru their agent, the employees can
change said agent but the contract continues to
bind then up to its expiration date. They may
bargain however for the shortening of said
expiration date.
In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the
only consideration involved as the employees'
interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The
agent's interest never entered the picture. In fact,
the justification for said doctrine was:
... that the majority of the employees, as an entity
under the statute, is the true party in interest to
the contract, holding rights through the agency of
the union representative. Thus, any exclusive
interest claimed by the agent is defeasible at the
will of the principal.
3. It need only be mentioned finally that the
Secretary of Labor in his decision of April 23, 1976
and order of January 10, 1977 denying
reconsideration in the sister unfair labor practice
case and ordering respondent corporation to
immediately lift the suspension and reinstate the
complainant officers and board members of
petitioner union6 has likewise adhered to the
foregoing basic principles and settled
jurisprudence in contrast to respondent director
(as well as therein respondent NLRC which
similarly adhered to the archaic and illogical view
that the officers and board members of petitioner
local union committed an "act of disloyalty" in
disaffiliating from the mother union when
practically all its members had so voted to
disaffiliate and the mother union [as mere agent]
no longer had any local union or members to
represent), ruling that "(G)ranting arguendo that
the disaffiliation from the NAFLU is a legal cause
for expulsion and dismissal, it could not detract
from the fact that only 13 individual complainants
out of almost 700 members who disaffiliated, were
singled out for expulsion and recommended for
dismissal. The actuation of NAFLU conclusively
constitute discrimination. Since the suspension of
the complainants was effected at the instance of
NAFLU, it should be held liable to the payment of
back wages."
The Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo
B. Zamora has likewise dismissed as untenable in
a similar case respondents' views that "such
maintenance of membership" clause be distorted
as "intended for the security of the union rather
than the security of tenure for the workers", ruling
that "(W)hat is paramount, as it is expressly and
explicitly emphasize in an exacting language under
the New Constitution, is the security of tenure of
the workers, not the security of the union. To
impress, therefore, such "maintenance of
membership" — which is intended for the security
of the union rather than the security of tenure of
the workers — as a bar to employees' changing
their affiliation is not only to infringe on the
constitutional right of freedom of association, but
also to trample upon the constitutional right of
workers to security of tenure and to render
meaningless whatever "adequate social services"
the State may establish or maintain in the field of
employment "to guarantee the enjoyment by the
people of a decent standard of living."7
It is expected that with this decision, any
suspension or lay-off of the complainants officers
and board members or employees of petitioner
union arising from the respondents' misconception
of the clearly applicable principles and
jurisprudence upholding the primacy of the
employees and their freely chosen local union as
the true party in interest to the collective
bargaining agreement will be forthwith rectified
and set aside.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the
appealed resolution is set aside and petitioner local
union is declared to be the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees of
respondent corporation entitled to administer and
enforce any subsisting collective bargaining
agreement with said employer corporation. This
decision shall be immediately executory upon its
promulgation.
34. G.R. No. 113856 September 7, 1998
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM
MANUFACTURING UNITED WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (SMTFM-UWP), its officers and
members, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
HON. JOSE G. DE VERA and TOP FORM
MANUFACTURING PHIL., INC., respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether
or not an employer committed an unfair labor
practice by bargaining in bad faith and
discriminating against its employees. The charge
arose from the employer's refusal to grant across-
the-board increases to its employees in
implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 of the
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board
of the National Capital Region (RTWPB-NCR). Such
refusal was aggravated by the fact that prior to the
issuance of said wage orders, the employer
allegedly promised at the collective bargaining
conferences to implement any government-
mandated wage increases on an across-the-board
basis.
Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form
Manufacturing — United Workers of the
Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective
bargaining representative of all regular rank and
file employees of private respondent Top Form
Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. At the collective
bargaining negotiation held at the Milky Way
Restaurant in Makati, Metro Manila on February
27, 1990, the parties agreed to discuss unresolved
economic issues. According to the minutes of the
meeting, Article VII of the collective bargaining
agreement was discussed. The following appear in
said Minutes:
Art. VII, Wages
Sect. 1. — Defer —
Sect. 2. Status quo
Sec. 3. Union proposed that any future wage
increase given by the government should be
implemented by the company across-the-board or
non-conditional.
Management requested the union to retain this
provision since their sincerity was already proven
when the P25.00 wage increase was granted
across-the-board. The union acknowledges
management's sincerity but they are worried that
in case there is a new set of management, they can
just show their CBA. The union decided to defer
this provision. 1
In their joint affidavit dated January 30, 1992, 2
union members Salve L. Barnes, Eulisa Mendoza,
Lourdes Barbero and Concesa Ibañez affirmed that
at the subsequent collective bargaining
negotiations, the union insisted on the
incorporation in the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) of the union proposal on
"automatic across-the-board wage increase." They
added that:
11. On the strength of the representation of the
negotiating panel of the company and the above
undertaking/promise made by its negotiating
panel, our union agreed to drop said proposal
relying on the undertakings made by the officials of
the company who negotiated with us, namely, Mr.
William Reynolds, Mr. Samuel Wong and Mrs.
Remedios Felizardo. Also, in the past years, the
company has granted to us government mandated
wage increases on across-the-board basis.
On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued
Wage Order No. 01 granting an increase of P17.00
per day in the salary of workers. This was followed
by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990
providing for a P12.00 daily increase in salary.
As expected, the union requested the
implementation of said wage orders. However, they
demanded that the increase be on an across-the-
board basis. Private respondent refused to accede
to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme
of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.
Thus, private respondent granted the P17.00
increase under Wage Order No. 01 to
workers/employees receiving salary of P125.00 per
day and below. The P12.00 increase mandated by
Wage Order No. 02 was granted to those receiving
the salary of P140.00 per day and below. For
employees receiving salary higher than P125.00 or
P140.00 per day, private respondent granted an
escalated increase ranging from P6.99 to P14.30
and from P6.00 to P10.00, respectively. 3
On October 24, 1991, the union, through its legal
counsel, wrote private respondent a letter
demanding that it should "fulfill its pledge of
sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-
board wage increases (sic) to all employees under
the wage orders." The union reiterated that it had
agreed to "retain the old provision of CBA" on the
strength of private respondent's "promise and
assurance" of an across-the-board salary increase
should the government mandate salary increases.
4 Several conferences between the parties
notwithstanding, private respondent adamantly
maintained its position on the salary increases it
had granted that were purportedly designed to
avoid wage distortion.
Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the
NCR NLRC alleging that private respondent's act of
"reneging on its undertaking/promise clearly
constitutes act of unfair labor practice through
bargaining in bad faith." It charged private
respondent with acts of unfair labor practices or
violation of Article 247 of the Labor Code, as
amended, specifically "bargaining in bad faith,"
and prayed that it be awarded actual, moral and
exemplary damages.5 In its position paper, the
union added that it was charging private
respondent with "violation of Article 100 of the
Labor Code." 6
Private respondent, on the other hand, contended
that in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02,
it had avoided "the existence of a wage distortion"
that would arise from such implementation. It
emphasized that only "after a reasonable length of
time from the implementation" of the wage orders
"that the union surprisingly raised the question
that the company should have implemented said
wage orders on an across-the-board basis." It
asserted that there was no agreement to the effect
that future wage increases mandated by the
government should be implemented on an across-
the-board basis. Otherwise, that agreement would
have been incorporated and expressly stipulated in
the CBA. It quoted the provision of the CBA that
reflects the parties' intention to "fully set forth"
therein all their agreements that had been arrived
at after negotiations that gave the parties
"unlimited right and opportunity to make demands
and proposals with respect to any subject or
matter not removed by law from the area of
collective bargaining." The same CBA provided that
during its effectivity, the parties "each voluntarily
and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees
that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain
collectively, with respect to any subject or matter
not specifically referred to or covered by this
Agreement, even though such subject or matter
may not have been within the knowledge or
contemplation of either or both of the parties at the
time they negotiated or signed this Agreement." 7
On March 11, 1992, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. 8 He considered two main issues in
the case: (a) whether or not respondents are guilty
of unfair labor practice, and (b) whether or not the
respondents are liable to implement Wage Orders
Nos. 01 and 02 on an across-the-board basis.
Finding no basis to rule in the affirmative on both
issues, he explained as follows:
The charge of bargaining in bad faith that the
complainant union attributes to the respondents is
bereft of any certitude inasmuch as based on the
complainant union's own admission, the latter
vacillated on its own proposal to adopt an across-
the-board stand or future wage increases. In fact,
the union acknowledges the management's
sincerity when the latter allegedly implemented
Republic Act 6727 on an across-the-board basis.
That such union proposal was not adopted in the
existing CBA was due to the fact that it was the
union itself which decided for its deferment. It is,
therefore, misleading to claim that the
management undertook/promised to implement
future wage increases on an across-the-board
basis when as the evidence shows it was the union
who asked for the deferment of its own proposal to
that effect.
The alleged discrimination in the implementation
of the subject wage orders does not inspire belief at
all where the wage orders themselves do not allow
the grant of wage increases on an across-the-board
basis. That there were employees who were granted
the full extent of the increase authorized and some
others who received less and still others who did
not receive any increase at all, would not ripen into
what the complainants termed as discrimination.
That the implementation of the subject wage orders
resulted into an uneven implementation of wage
increases is justified under the law to prevent any
wage distortion. What the respondents did under
the circumstances in order to deter an eventual
wage distortion without any arbitral proceedings is
certainly commendable.
The alleged violation of Article 100 of the Labor
Code, as amended, as well as Article XVII, Section
7 of the existing CBA as herein earlier quoted is
likewise found by this Branch to have no basis in
fact and in law. No benefits or privileges previously
enjoyed by the employees were withdrawn as a
result of the implementation of the subject orders.
Likewise, the alleged company practice of
implementing wage increases declared by the
government on an across-the-board basis has not
been duly established by the complainants'
evidence. The complainants asserted that the
company implemented Republic Act No. 6727
which granted a wage increase of P25.00 effective
July 1, 1989 on an across-the-board basis.
Granting that the same is true, such isolated single
act that respondents adopted would definitely not
ripen into a company practice. It has been said
that "a sparrow or two returning to Capistrano
does not a summer make."
Finally, on the second issue of whether or not the
employees of the respondents are entitled to an
across-the-board wage increase pursuant to Wage
Orders Nos. 01 and 02, in the face of the above
discussion as well as our finding that the
respondents correctly applied the law on wage
increases, this Branch rules in the negative.
Likewise, for want of factual basis and under the
circumstances where our findings above are
adverse to the complainants, their prayer for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees may
not be granted.
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the NLRC that,
in turn, promulgated the assailed Resolution of
April 29, 1993 9 dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit. Still dissatisfied, petitioner sought
reconsideration which, however, was denied by the
NLRC in the Resolution dated January 17, 1994.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari
contending that:
-A-
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GROSSLY ERRED IN
NOT DECLARING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
GUILTY OF ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE LATTER HAS
BARGAINED IN BAD FAITH WITH THE UNION
AND HAS VIOLATED THE CBA WHICH IT
EXECUTED WITH THE HEREIN PETITIONER
UNION.
-B-
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT DECLARING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF ACTS OF
DISCRIMINATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
NCR WAGE ORDER NOS. 01 AND 02.
-C-
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
GUILTY OF HAVING VIOLATED SECTION 4,
ARTICLE XVII OF THE EXISTING CBA.
-D-
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT DECLARING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
GUILTY OF HAVING VIOLATED ARTICLE 100 OF
THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS
AMENDED.
-E-
ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HAVE CORRECTLY
RULED THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES,
THEY COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT
DISTORTION IN THE WAGE STRUCTURE OF THE
RESPONDENT COMPANY.

-F-
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ERRED IN NOT
AWARDING TO THE PETITIONERS HEREIN
ACTUAL, MORAL, AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
As the Court sees it, the pivotal issues in this
petition can be reduced into two, to wit: (a)
whether or not private respondent committed an
unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant across-
the-board wage increases in implementing Wage
Orders Nos. 01 and 02, and (b) whether or not
there was a significant wage distortion of the wage
structure in private respondent as a result of the
manner by which said wage orders were
implemented.
With respect to the first issue, petitioner union
anchors its arguments on the alleged commitment
of private respondent to grant an automatic
across-the-board wage increase in the event that a
statutory or legislated wage increase is
promulgated. It cites as basis therefor, the
aforequoted portion of the Minutes of the collective
bargaining negotiation on February 27, 1990
regarding wages, arguing additionally that said
Minutes forms part of the entire agreement
between the parties.
The basic premise of this argument is definitely
untenable. To start with, if there was indeed a
promise or undertaking on the part of private
respondent to obligate itself to grant an automatic
across-the-board wage increase, petitioner union
should have requested or demanded that such
"promise or undertaking" be incorporated in the
CBA. After all, petitioner union has the means
under the law to compel private respondent to
incorporate this specific economic proposal in the
CBA. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor
Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty
includes "executing a contract incorporating such
agreements if requested by either party." Petitioner
union's assertion that it had insisted on the
incorporation of the same proposal may have a
factual basis considering the allegations in the
aforementioned joint affidavit of its members.
However, Article 252 also states that the duty to
bargain "does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or make any concession." Thus, petitioner
union may not validly claim that the proposal
embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms
part of the CBA that it finally entered into with
private respondent.
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties
10 — the collective bargaining representative and
the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA is
mandated by the expressed policy to give
protection to labor. 11 In the same vein, CBA
provisions should be "construed liberally rather
than narrowly and technically, and the courts
must place a practical and realistic construction
upon it, giving due consideration to the context in
which it is negotiated and purpose which it is
intended to serve." 12 This is founded on the
dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but
one impressed with public interest. 13 It goes
without saying, however, that only provisions
embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and
complied with. Where a proposal raised by a
contracting party does not find print in the CBA,
14 it is not a part thereof and the proponent has
no claim whatsoever to its implementation.
Hence, petitioner union's contention that the
Minutes of the collective bargaining negotiation
meeting forms part of the entire agreement is
pointless. The Minutes reflects the proceedings and
discussions undertaken in the process of
bargaining for worker benefits in the same way
that the minutes of court proceedings show what
transpired therein. 15 At the negotiations, it is but
natural for both management and labor to adopt
positions or make demands and offer proposals
and counter-proposals. However, nothing is
considered final until the parties have reached an
agreement. In fact, one of management's usual
negotiation strategies is to ". . . agree tentatively as
you go along with the understanding that nothing
is binding until the entire agreement is reached."
16 If indeed private respondent promised to
continue with the practice of granting across-the-
board salary increases ordered by the government,
such promise could only be demandable in law if
incorporated in the CBA.
Moreover, by making such promise, private
respondent may not be considered in bad faith or
at the very least, resorting to the scheme of
feigning to undertake the negotiation proceedings
through empty promises. As earlier stated,
petitioner union had, under the law, the right and
the opportunity to insist on the foreseeable
fulfillment of the private respondent's promise by
demanding its incorporation in the CBA. Because
the proposal was never embodied in the CBA, the
promise has remained just that, a promise, the
implementation of which cannot be validly
demanded under the law.
Petitioner's reliance on this Court's
pronouncements 17 in Kiok Loy v. NLRC 18 is,
therefore, misplaced. In that case, the employer
refused to bargain with the collective bargaining
representative, ignoring all notices for negotiations
and requests for counter proposals that the union
had to resort to conciliation proceedings. In that
case, the Court opined that "(a) Company's refusal
to make counter-proposal, if considered in relation
to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad
faith and this is specially true where the Union's
request for a counter-proposal is left unanswered."
Considering the facts of that case, the Court
concluded that the company was "unwilling to
negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union."
19
In the case at bench, however, petitioner union
does not deny that discussion on its proposal that
all government-mandated salary increases should
be on an across-the-board basis was "deferred,"
purportedly because it relied upon the
"undertaking" of the negotiating panel of private
respondent. 20 Neither does petitioner union deny
the fact that "there is no provision of the 1990 CBA
containing a stipulation that the company will
grant across-the-board to its employees the
mandated wage increase." They simply assert that
private respondent committed "acts of unfair labor
practices by virtue of its contractual commitment
made during the collective bargaining process." 21
The mere fact, however, that the proposal in
question was not included in the CBA indicates
that no contractual commitment thereon was ever
made by private respondent as no agreement had
been arrived at by the parties. Thus:
Obviously the purpose of collective bargaining is
the reaching of an agreement resulting in a
contract binding on the parties; but the failure to
reach an agreement after negotiations continued
for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of
good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a
collective bargaining contract, but they do not
compel one. The duty to bargain does not include
the obligation to reach an agreement. . . . 32
With the execution of the CBA, bad faith
bargaining can no longer be imputed upon any of
the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA are
supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily
incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a
case where private respondent exhibited an
indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining
because the negotiations were not the unilateral
activity of petitioner union. The CBA is proof
enough that private respondent exerted
"reasonable effort at good faith bargaining." 23
Indeed, the adamant insistence on a bargaining
position to the point where the negotiations reach
an impasse does not establish bad faith. Neither
can bad faith be inferred from a party's insistence
on the inclusion of a particular substantive
provision unless it concerns trivial matters or is
obviously intolerable. 24
The question as to what are mandatory and what
are merely permissive subjects of collective
bargaining is of significance on the right of a party
to insist on his position to the point of stalemate. A
party may refuse to enter into a collective
bargaining contract unless it includes a desired
provision as to a matter which is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining; but a refusal to
contract unless the agreement covers a matter
which is not a mandatory subject is in substance a
refusal to bargain about matters which are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and it
is no answer to the charge of refusal to bargain in
good faith that the insistence on the disputed
clause was not the sole cause of the failure to agree
or that agreement was not reached with respect to
other disputed clauses. 25
On account of the importance of the economic
issue proposed by petitioner union, it could have
refused to bargain and to enter into a CBA with
private respondent. On the other hand, private
respondent's firm stand against the proposal did
not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It had
the right "to insist on (its) position to the point of
stalemate." On the part of petitioner union, the
importance of its proposal dawned on it only after
the wage orders were issued after the CBA had
been entered into. Indeed, from the facts of this
case, the charge of bad faith bargaining on the part
of private respondent was nothing but a belated
reaction to the implementation of the wage orders
that private respondent made in accordance with
law. In other words, petitioner union harbored the
notion that its members and the other employees
could have had a better deal in terms of wage
increases had it relentlessly pursued the
incorporation in the CBA of its proposal. The
inevitable conclusion is that private respondent did
not commit the unfair labor practices of bargaining
in bad faith and discriminating against its
employees for implementing the wage orders
pursuant to law.
The Court likewise finds unmeritorious petitioner
union's contention that by its failure to grant
across-the-board wage increases, private
respondent violated the provisions of Section 5,
Article VII of the existing CBA 26 as well as Article
100 of the Labor Code. The CBA provision states:
Sec. 5. The COMPANY agrees to comply with all the
applicable provisions of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and all other laws,
decrees, orders, instructions, jurisprudence, rules
and regulations affecting labor.
Art. 100 of the Labor Code on prohibition against
elimination or diminution of benefits provides that
"(n)othing in this Book shall be construed to
eliminate or in any way diminish supplements, or
other employee benefits being enjoyed at the time
of promulgation of this Code."
We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
no benefits or privileges previously enjoyed by
petitioner union and the other employees were
withdrawn as a result of the manner by which
private respondent implemented the wage orders.
Granted that private respondent had granted an
across-the-board increase pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6727, that single instance may not be
considered an established company practice.
Petitioner union's argument in this regard is
actually tied up with its claim that the
implementation of Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 by
private respondent resulted in wage distortion.
The issue of whether or not a wage distortion exists
is a question of
fact 27 that is within the jurisdiction of the quasi-
judicial tribunals below. Factual findings of
administrative agencies are accorded respect and
even finality in this Court if they are supported by
substantial evidence. 28 Thus, in Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court
said:
The issue of whether or not a wage distortion exists
as a consequence of the grant of a wage increase to
certain employees, we agree, is, by and large, a
question of fact the determination of which is the
statutory function of the NLRC. Judicial review of
labor cases, we may add, does not go beyond the
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the labor officials' findings rest. As such, the
factual findings of the NLRC are generally accorded
not only respect but also finality provided that its
decisions are supported by substantial evidence
and devoid of any taint of unfairness or
arbitrariness. When, however, the members of the
same labor tribunal are not in accord on those
aspects of a case, as in this case, this Court is well
cautioned not to be as so conscious in passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence, let alone the
conclusions derived
therefrom. 29
Unlike in above-cited case where the Decision of
the NLRC was not unanimous, the NLRC Decision
in this case which was penned by the dissenter in
that case, Presiding Commissioner Edna Bonto-
Perez unanimously ruled that no wage distortions
marred private respondent's implementation of the
wage orders. The NLRC said:
On the issue of wage distortion, we are satisfied
that there was a meaningful implementation of
Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02. This debunks the
claim that there was wage distortion as could be
shown by the itemized wages implementation
quoted above. It should be noted that this
itemization has not been successfully traversed by
the appellants. . . . . 30
The NLRC then quoted the labor arbiter's ruling on
wage distortion.
We find no reason to depart from the conclusions
of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC. It is
apropos to note, moreover, that petitioner's
contention on the issue of wage distortion and the
resulting allegation of discrimination against the
private respondent's employees are anchored on its
dubious position that private respondent's promise
to grant an across-the-board increase in
government-mandated salary benefits reflected in
the Minutes of the negotiation is an enforceable
part of the CBA.
In the resolution of labor cases, this Court has
always been guided by the State policy enshrined
in the Constitution that the rights of workers and
the promotion of their welfare shall be protected.
31 The Court is likewise guided by the goal of
attaining industrial peace by the proper application
of the law. It cannot favor one party, be it labor or
management, in arriving at a just solution to a
controversy if the party has no valid support to its
claims. It is not within this Court's power to rule
beyond the ambit of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED and the questioned
Resolutions of the NLRC AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
35.
PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI),
Petitioner,
- versus
ANACLETO L. TAECA, GEREMIAS S. TATO, JAIME
N. CAMPOS, MARTINIANO A. MAGAYON, JOSEPH
B. BALGOA, MANUEL G. ABUCAY, MOISES M.
ALBARAN, MARGARITO G. ALICANTE, JERRY
ROMEO T. AVILA, LORENZO D. CANON, RAUL P.
DUERO, DANILO Y. ILAN, MANUEL M. MATURAN,
JR., LUISITO R. POPERA, CLEMENTINO C.
QUIMAN, ROBERTO Q. SILOT, CHARLITO D.
SINDAY, REMBERT B. SUZON ALLAN J.
TRIMIDAL, and NAMAPRI-SPFL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 160828
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 9, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision[1] dated July 25, 2003 and
Resolution[2] dated October 23, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71760, setting aside
the Resolutions dated October 8, 2001[3] and April
29, 2002[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC CA No. M-006309-2001 and
reinstating the Decision[5] dated March 16, 2001
of the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On February 13, 2001, respondents Anacleto
Taeca, Loreto Uriarte, Joseph Balgoa, Jaime
Campos, Geremias Tato, Martiniano Magayon,
Manuel Abucay and fourteen (14) others filed a
Complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal and money claims against petitioner
PICOP Resources, Incorporated (PRI), Wilfredo
Fuentes (in his capacity as PRI's Vice
President/Resident Manager), Atty. Romero Boniel
(in his capacity as PRI's Manager of Legal/Labor),
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL),
Atty. Wilbur T. Fuentes (in his capacity as
Secretary General of SPFL), Pascasio Trugillo (in
his capacity as Local President of Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.- SPFL
[NAMAPRI-SPFL]) and Atty. Proculo Fuentes, Jr.[6]
(in his capacity as National President of SPFL).
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees
of PRI and bona fide members of Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation
of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective
bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner PRI.
PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years
from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000.
The CBA contained the following union security
provisions:
Article II- Union Security and Check-Off
Section 6. Maintenance of membership.
6.1 All employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at
the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall,
as a condition of continued employment by the
COMPANY, maintain their membership in the
UNION in good standing during the effectivity of
this AGREEMENT.
6.2 Any employee who may hereinafter be
employed to occupy a position covered by the
bargaining unit shall be advised by the COMPANY
that they are required to file an application for
membership with the UNION within thirty (30)
days from the date his appointment shall have
been made regular.
6.3 The COMPANY, upon the written request of the
UNION and after compliance with the requirements
of the New Labor Code, shall give notice of
termination of services of any employee who shall
fail to fulfill the condition provided in Section 6.1
and 6.2 of this Article, but it assumes no obligation
to discharge any employee if it has reasonable
grounds to believe either that membership in the
UNION was not available to the employee on the
same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than voluntary
resignation or non-payment of regular union dues.
Separation under the Section is understood to be
for cause, consequently, the dismissed employee is
not entitled to separation benefits provided under
the New Labor Code and in this AGREEMENT.[7]
On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes (Atty.
Fuentes) sent a letter to the management of PRI
demanding the termination of employees who
allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the
Petition for Certification Election of the Federation
of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity
of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of
campaigning for and signing the petition for
certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty
and a valid basis for termination for a cause in
accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and
the terms and conditions of the CBA, specifically
Article II, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security
Clause.
In a letter dated May 23, 2000, Mr. Pascasio
Trugillo requested the management of PRI to
investigate those union members who signed the
Petition for Certification Election of FFW during the
existence of their CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL, likewise,
furnished PRI with machine copy of the
authorization letters dated March 19, 20 and 21,
2000, which contained the names and signatures
of employees.
Acting on the May 16 and May 23, 2000 letters of
the NAMAPRI-SPFL, Atty. Romero A. Boniel issued
a memorandum addressed to the concerned
employees to explain in writing within 72 hours
why their employment should not be terminated
due to acts of disloyalty as alleged by their Union.
Within the period from May 26 to June 2, 2000, a
number of employees who were served explanation
memorandum submitted their explanation, while
some did not.
In a letter dated June 2, 2000, Atty. Boniel
endorsed the explanation letters of the employees
to Atty. Fuentes for evaluation and final disposition
in accordance with the CBA.
After evaluation, in a letter dated July 12, 2000,
Atty. Fuentes advised the management of PRI that
the Union found the member's explanations to be
unsatisfactory. He reiterated the demand for
termination, but only of 46 member-employees,
including respondents.
On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of
termination for causes to the 31 out of the 46
employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be
terminated on the ground of acts of disloyalty
committed against it when respondents allegedly
supported and signed the Petition for Certification
Election of FFW before the freedom period during
the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated October
21, 2000 was also served on the Department of
Labor and Employment Office (DOLE), Caraga
Region.
Respondents then accused PRI of Unfair Labor
Practice punishable under Article 248 (a), (b), (c),
(d) and (e) of the Labor Code, while Atty. Fuentes
and Wilbur T. Fuentes and Pascasio Trujillo were
accused of violating Article 248 (a) and (b) of the
Labor Code.
Respondents alleged that none of them ever
withdrew their membership from NAMAPRI-SPFL
or submitted to PRI any union dues and check-off
disauthorizations against NAMAPRI-SPFL. They
claimed that they continue to remain on record as
bona fide members of NAMAPRI-SPFL. They
pointed out that a patent manifestation of ones
disloyalty would have been the explicit resignation
or withdrawal of membership from the Union
accompanied by an advice to management to
discontinue union dues and check-off deductions.
They insisted that mere affixation of signature on
such authorization to file a petition for certification
election was not per se an act of disloyalty. They
claimed that while it may be true that they signed
the said authorization before the start of the
freedom period, the petition of FFW was only filed
with the DOLE on May 18, 2000, or 58 days after
the start of the freedom period.
Respondents maintained that their acts of signing
the authorization signifying support to the filing of
a Petition for Certification Election of FFW was
merely prompted by their desire to have a
certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of PRI with hopes of a CBA negotiation
in due time; and not to cause the downfall of
NAMAPRI-SPFL.
Furthermore, respondents contended that there
was lack of procedural due process. Both the letter
dated May 16, 2000 of Atty. Fuentes and the
follow-up letter dated May 23, 2000 of Trujillo
addressed to PRI did not mention their names.
Respondents stressed that NAMAPRI-SPFL merely
requested PRI to investigate union members who
supported the Petition for Certification Election of
FFW. Respondents claimed that they should have
been summoned individually, confronted with the
accusation and investigated accordingly and from
where the Union may base its findings of disloyalty
and, thereafter, recommend to management the
termination for causes.
Respondents, likewise, argued that at the time
NAMAPRI-SPFL demanded their termination, it was
no longer the bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file workers of PRI, because the CBA had
already expired on May 22, 2000. Hence, there
could be no justification in PRIs act of dismissing
respondents due to acts of disloyalty.
Respondents asserted that the act of PRI, Wilfredo
Fuentes and Atty. Boniel in giving in to the wishes
of the Union in discharging them on the ground of
disloyalty to the Union amounted to interference
with, restraint or coercion of respondents exercise
of their right to self-organization. The act indirectly
required petitioners to support and maintain their
membership with NAMAPRI-SPFL as a condition
for their continued employment. The acts of
NAMAPRI-SPFL, Atty. Fuentes and Trujillo
amounted to actual restraint and coercion of the
petitioners in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization and constituted acts of unfair labor
practice.
In a Decision[8] dated March 16, 2001, the Labor
Arbiter declared the respondents dismissal to be
illegal and ordered PRI to reinstate respondents to
their former or equivalent positions without loss of
seniority rights and to jointly and solidarily pay
their backwages. The dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby entered:
1. Declaring complainants dismissal
illegal; and
2. Ordering respondents Picop
Resources Inc. (PRI) and NAMAPRI-SPFL to
reinstate complainants to their former or
equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights
and to jointly and solidarily pay their backwages in
the total amount of P420,339.30 as shown in the
said Annex A plus damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 each, or a total of P210,000.00 and
attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total
monetary award.
SO ORDERED.[9]
PRI and NAMAPRI-SPFL appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter; thus,
declaring the dismissal of respondents from
employment as legal.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied on April 29, 2001 for lack of merit.
Unsatisfied, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals and sought the nullification of the
Resolution of the NLRC dated October 8, 2001
which reversed the Decision dated March 16. 2001
of Labor Arbiter and the Resolution dated April 29,
2002, which denied respondents motion for
reconsideration.
On July 25, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the assailed Resolutions of the NLRC
and reinstated the Decision dated March 16, 2001
of the Labor Arbiter.
Thus, before this Court, PRI, as petitioner, raised
the following issues:
I
WHETHER AN EXISTING COLLECTIVELY (sic)
BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) CAN BE GIVEN
ITS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT IN ALL ITS TERMS
AND CONDITION INCLUDING ITS UNION
SECURITY CLAUSE, EVEN BEYOND THE 5-YEAR
PERIOD WHEN NO NEW CBA HAS YET BEEN
ENTERED INTO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN HONEST ERROR IN THE
INTERPRETATION AND/OR CONCLUSION OF
LAW FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65, REVISED RULES OF COURT.
[10]
We will first delve on the technical issue raised.
PRI perceived a patent error in the mode of appeal
elected by respondents for the purpose of assailing
the decision of the NLRC. It claimed that
assuming that the NLRC erred in its judgment on
the legal issues, its error, if any, is not tantamount
to abuse of discretion falling within the ambit of
Rule 65.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC
decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has
been settled as early as in our decision in St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission.[11] This Court held that the proper
vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
and that this action should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the
hierarchy of courts.[12] Moreover, it is already
settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902[10]
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the
Court of Appeals pursuant to the exercise of its
original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari is
specifically given the power to pass upon the
evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual
issues. [13]
We now come to the main issue of whether there
was just cause to terminate the employment of
respondents.
PRI argued that the dismissal of the respondents
was valid and legal. It claimed to have acted in
good faith at the instance of the incumbent union
pursuant to the Union Security Clause of the CBA.
Citing Article 253 of the Labor Code,[14] PRI
contends that as parties to the CBA, they are
enjoined to keep the status quo and continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing CBA during the 60-day period and/or until
a new agreement is reached by the parties.
Petitioner's argument is untenable.
Union security" is a generic term, which is applied
to and comprehends "closed shop," union shop,"
"maintenance of membership," or any other form of
agreement which imposes upon employees the
obligation to acquire or retain union membership
as a condition affecting employment. There is
union shop when all new regular employees are
required to join the union within a certain period
as a condition for their continued employment.
There is maintenance of membership shop when
employees, who are union members as of the
effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter
become members, must maintain union
membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred
out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is
terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may
be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement
between the employer and his employees or their
representatives, no person may be employed in any
or certain agreed departments of the enterprise
unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration
of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of
which the employees in interest are a part.[15]
However, in terminating the employment of an
employee by enforcing the union security clause,
the employer needs to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the
union is requesting for the enforcement of the
union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there
is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the
union to expel the employee from the union. These
requisites constitute just cause for terminating an
employee based on the union security provision of
the CBA.[16]
As to the first requisite, there is no question that
the CBA between PRI and respondents included a
union security clause, specifically, a maintenance
of membership as stipulated in Sections 6 of
Article II, Union Security and Check-Off. Following
the same provision, PRI, upon written request from
the Union, can indeed terminate the employment
of the employee who failed to maintain its good
standing as a union member.
Secondly, it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-
SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in
their letters dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to
terminate the employment of respondents due to
their acts of disloyalty to the Union.
However, as to the third requisite, we find that
there is no sufficient evidence to support the
decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the
respondents.
PRI alleged that respondents were terminated from
employment based on the alleged acts of disloyalty
they committed when they signed an authorization
for the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a
Petition for Certification Election among all rank-
and-file employees of PRI. It contends that the acts
of respondents are a violation of the Union Security
Clause, as provided in their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
We are unconvinced.
We are in consonance with the Court of Appeals
when it held that the mere signing of the
authorization in support of the Petition for
Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and
21, or before the freedom period, is not sufficient
ground to terminate the employment of
respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was
actually filed during the freedom period. Nothing in
the records would show that respondents failed to
maintain their membership in good standing in the
Union. Respondents did not resign or withdraw
their membership from the Union to which they
belong. Respondents continued to pay their union
dues and never joined the FFW.
Significantly, petitioner's act of dismissing
respondents stemmed from the latter's act of
signing an authorization letter to file a petition for
certification election as they signed it outside the
freedom period. However, we are constrained to
believe that an authorization letter to file a petition
for certification election is different from an actual
Petition for Certification Election. Likewise, as per
records, it was clear that the actual Petition for
Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May
18, 2000.[17] Thus, it was within the ambit of the
freedom period which commenced from March 21,
2000 until May 21, 2000. Strictly speaking, what is
prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification
election outside the 60-day freedom period.[18]
This is not the situation in this case. If at all, the
signing of the authorization to file a certification
election was merely preparatory to the filing of the
petition for certification election, or an exercise of
respondents right to self-organization.
Moreover, PRI anchored their decision to terminate
respondents employment on Article 253 of the
Labor Code which states that it shall be the duty of
both parties to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties. It claimed that they are still bound by the
Union Security Clause of the CBA even after the
expiration of the CBA; hence, the need to terminate
the employment of respondents.
Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced.
The provision of Article 256 of the Labor Code is
particularly enlightening. It reads:
Article 256. Representation issue in organized
establishments. - In organized establishments,
when a verified petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed
before the Department of Labor and Employment
within the sixty-day period before the expiration of
a collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order an election by secret
ballot when the verified petition is supported by
the written consent of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit to
ascertain the will of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid
election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in
the unit must have cast their votes. The labor
union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast
shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all the workers in the unit. When an election
which provides for three or more choices results in
no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes
cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between
the labor unions receiving the two highest number
of votes: Provided, That the total number of votes
for all contending unions is at least fifty per cent
(50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the
employer shall continue to recognize the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no
petition for certification election is filed.[19]
Applying the same provision, it can be said that
while it is incumbent for the employer to continue
to recognize the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent even after the expiration of the
freedom period, they could only do so when no
petition for certification election was filed. The
reason is, with a pending petition for certification,
any such agreement entered into by management
with a labor organization is fraught with the risk
that such a labor union may not be chosen
thereafter as the collective bargaining
representative.[20] The provision for status quo is
conditioned on the fact that no certification
election was filed during the freedom period. Any
other view would render nugatory the clear
statutory policy to favor certification election as the
means of ascertaining the true expression of the
will of the workers as to which labor organization
would represent them.[21]
In the instant case, four (4) petitions were filed as
early as May 12, 2000. In fact, a petition for
certification election was already ordered by the
Med-Arbiter of DOLE Caraga Region on August 23,
2000.[22] Therefore, following Article 256, at the
expiration of the freedom period, PRI's obligation to
recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as the incumbent
bargaining agent does not hold true when petitions
for certification election were filed, as in this case.
Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which
provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the
economic provisions of the CBA, and does not
include representational aspect of the CBA. An
existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a
petition for certification election. When there is a
representational issue, the status quo provision in
so far as the need to await the creation of a new
agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create
an absurd situation where the union members will
be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the
union security clause existing under the CBA and,
thereafter, support another union when filing a
petition for certification election. If we apply it,
there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever
the employees exercise their right to self-
organization. The holding of a certification election
is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented,[23] or compromised.
Time and again, we have ruled that we adhere to
the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers.
Their freedom to choose who should be their
bargaining representative is of paramount
importance. The fact that there already exists a
bargaining representative in the unit concerned is
of no moment as long as the petition for
certification election was filed within the freedom
period. What is imperative is that by such a
petition for certification election the employees are
given the opportunity to make known of who shall
have the right to represent them thereafter. Not
only some, but all of them should have the right to
do so. What is equally important is that everyone
be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit
concerned.[24]
We will emphasize anew that the power to dismiss
is a normal prerogative of the employer. This,
however, is not without limitations. The employer
is bound to exercise caution in terminating the
services of his employees especially so when it is
made upon the request of a labor union pursuant
to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals
must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process
must be observed in dismissing an employee,
because it affects not only his position but also his
means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore,
respect and protect the rights of their employees,
which include the right to labor.[25]
An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled
to the twin reliefs of full backwages and
reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable,
separation pay is awarded to the employee. In
awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed
employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to
be awarded shall be equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service. Under Republic Act
No. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed
are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the
time of their actual reinstatement. But if
reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages
shall be computed from the time of their illegal
termination up to the finality of the decision.
Moreover, respondents, having been compelled to
litigate in order to seek redress for their illegal
dismissal, are entitled to the award of attorneys
fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 25, 2003 and the Resolution
dated October 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71760, which set aside the
Resolutions dated October 8, 2001 and April 29,
2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC CA No. M-006309-2001, are AFFIRMED
accordingly. Respondents are hereby awarded full
backwages and other allowances, without
qualifications and diminutions, computed from the
time they were illegally dismissed up to the time
they are actually reinstated. Let this case be
remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper
computation of the full backwages due
respondents, in accordance with Article 279 of the
Labor Code, as expeditiously as possible.
SO ORDERED.
36. [G.R. No. 124224. March 17, 2000]
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER SUPPLY COMPANY, CO.,
INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, MUSIB M. BUAT, LEON G.
GONZAGA, JR., ET AL., NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR, MARIANO AKILIT and 350 OTHERS,
respondents. Juris sc
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
May the term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) as to its economic provisions be extended
beyond the term expressly stipulated therein, and,
in the absence of a new CBA, even beyond the
three-year period provided by law? Are employees
hired after the stipulated term of a CBA entitled to
the benefits provided thereunder?
These are the issues at the heart of the instant
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order filed by petitioner New Pacific
Timber & Supply Company, Incorporated against
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
et al. and the National Federation of Labor, et al.
The antecedent facts, as found by the NLRC, are as
follows:
The National Federation of Labor (NFL, for brevity)
was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the regular rank-and-file
employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as petitioner Company).[1]
As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment for the employees in
the bargaining unit which it represented. However,
the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by
petitioner Company, so that the former was
prompted to file a complaint for unfair labor
practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of
refusal to bargain collectively.[2]Misj uris
On March 31, 1987, then Executive Labor Arbiter
Hakim S. Abdulwahid issued an order declaring (a)
herein petitioner Company guilty of ULP; and (b)
the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the
CBA between the regular rank-and-file employees
in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company.[3]
Petitioner Company appealed the above order to
the NLRC. On November 15, 1989, the NLRC
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack
of merit. A motion for reconsideration thereof was,
likewise, denied in a Resolution, dated November
12, 1990.[4]
Unsatisfied, petitioner Company filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court. But the Court dismissed
said petition in a Resolution, dated January 21,
1991.[5]
Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded
to the arbitration branch of origin for the execution
of Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid's Order, dated March
31, 1987, granting monetary benefits consisting of
wage increases, housing allowances, bonuses, etc.
to the regular rank-and-file employees. Following a
series of conferences to thresh out the details of
computation, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo S. Villena
issued an Order, dated October 18, 1993, directing
petitioner Company to pay the 142 employees
entitled to the aforesaid benefits the respective
amounts due them under the CBA. Petitioner
Company complied; and, the corresponding
quitclaims were executed. The case was considered
closed following NFL's manifestation that it will no
longer appeal the October 18, 1993 Order of Labor
Arbiter Villena.[6]Jj lex
However, notwithstanding such manifestation, a
"Petition for Relief" was filed in behalf of 186 of the
private respondents "Mariano J. Akilit and 350
others" on May 12, 1994. In their petition, they
claimed that they were wrongfully excluded from
enjoying the benefits under the CBA since the
agreement with NFL and petitioner Company
limited the CBA's implementation to only the 142
rank-and-file employees enumerated. They claimed
that NFL's misrepresentations had precluded them
from appealing their exclusion.[7]
Treating the petition for relief as an appeal, the
NLRC entertained the same. On August 4, 1994,
said commission issued a resolution[8] declaring
that the 186 excluded employees "form part and
parcel of the then existing rank-and-file bargaining
unit" and were, therefore, entitled to the benefits
under the CBA. The NLRC held, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and
the Order of the Labor arbiter dated October 18,
1993 is hereby Set Aside and Vacated. In lieu
hereof, a new Order is hereby issued directing
respondent New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc.
to pay all its regular rank-and-file workers their
wage differentials and other benefits arising from
the decreed CBA as explained above, within ten
(10) days from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner Company filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution.
Meanwhile, four separate groups of the private
respondents, including the original 186 who had
filed the "Petition for Relief" filed individual money
claims, docketed as NLRC Cases Nos. M-001991-
94 to M-001994-94, before the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC, Cagayan de Oro City. However, Labor
Arbiter Villena dismissed these cases in Orders,
dated March 11, 1994; April 13, 1994; March 9,
1994; and, May 10, 1994. The employees appealed
the respective dismissal of their complaints to the
NLRC. The latter consolidated these appeals with
the aforementioned motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner Company. New miso
On February 29, 1996, the NLRC issued a
resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
reconsideration of respondent is Denied for lack of
merit and the Resolution of this Commission dated
August 4, 1994 Sustained. The separate orders of
the Labor Arbiter dated March 11, 1994, April 13,
1994, March 9, 1994 and May 10, 1994,
respectively, in NLRC Cases Nos. M-001991-94 to
M-001994-94 are Set Aside and Vacated for lack of
legal bases.
Conformably, respondent New Pacific Timber and
Supply Co., Inc. is hereby directed to pay
individual complainants their CBA benefits in the
aggregate amount of P13,559,510.37, the detailed
computation thereof is contained in Annex "A"
which forms an integral part of this resolution,
plus ten (10%) percent thereof as Attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioner
Company raises the following issues: Acct mis
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ALLOWING
THE "PETITION FOR RELIEF" TO PROSPER.

II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MARIANO AKILIT AND
350 OTHERS ARE ENTITLED TO BENEFITS
UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THEY
WERE NOT EMPLOYED BY THE PETITIONER
MUCH LESS WERE THEY MEMBERS OF THE
BARGAINING UNIT DURING THE TERM OF THE
CBA. Mis act
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING FACTUAL
FINDINGS WITHOUT BASIS.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTIONS OF THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTIONS ARE DEFECTIVE AND/OR
REVEAL THE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
COMMITTED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT.[11]
Petitioner Company contends that a "Petition for
Relief" is not the proper mode of seeking a review of
a decision rendered by the arbitration branch of
the NLRC.[12] According to the petitioner, nowhere
in the Labor Code or in the NLRC Rules of
Procedure is there such a pleading. Rather, the
remedy of a party aggrieved by an unfavorable
ruling of the labor arbiter is to appeal said
judgment to the NLRC.[13]
Petitioner asseverates that even assuming that the
NLRC correctly treated the petition for relief as an
appeal, still, it should not have allowed the same to
prosper, because the petition was filed several
months after the ten-day reglementary period for
filing an appeal had expired; and, therefore, it
failed to comply with the requirements of an appeal
under the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of
Procedure.
Petitioner Company further contends that in filing
separate complaints and/or money claims at the
arbitration level in spite of their pending petition
for relief and in spite of the final order, dated
October 18, 1993, in NLRC Case No.RAB-IX-0334-
82, the private respondents were in fact forum-
shopping, an act which is proscribed as trifling
with the courts and abusing their practices. S djad
Anent the second issue, petitioner argues that the
private respondents are not entitled to the benefits
under the CBA because employees hired after the
term of a CBA are not parties to the agreement,
and therefore, may not claim benefits thereunder,
even if they subsequently become members of the
bargaining unit.
As for the term of the CBA, petitioner maintains
that Article 253 of the Labor Code refers to the
continuation in full force and effect of the previous
CBA's terms and conditions. By necessity, it could
not possibly refer to terms and conditions which,
as expressly stipulated, ceased to have force and
effect.[14]
According to petitioner, the provision on wage
increase in the 1981 to 1984 CBA between
petitioner Company and NFL provided for yearly
wage increases. Logically, these provisions ended
in the year 1984 - the last year that the economic
provisions of the CBA were, pursuant to contract
and law, effective. Petitioner claims that there is no
contractual basis for the grant of CBA benefits
such as wage increases in 1985 and subsequent
years, since the CBA stipulates only the increases
for the years 1981 to 1984.
Moreover, petitioner alleges that it was through no
fault of theirs that no new CBA was entered
pending appeal of the decision in NLRC Case No.
RAB-IX-0334-82.
Finally, petitioner Company claims that it was
never given the opportunity to submit a counter-
computation of the benefits supposedly due the
private respondents. Instead, the NLRC allegedly
relied on the self-serving computations of private
respondents. Sppedsc
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC, when it entertained the petition for relief
filed by the private respondents and treated it as
an appeal. even if it was filed beyond the
reglementary period for filing an appeal. Ordinarily,
once a judgment has become final and executory,
it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified.
However, a careful scrutiny of the facts and
circumstances of the instant case warrants
liberality in the application of technical rules and
procedure. It would be a greater injustice to
deprive the concerned employees of the monetary
benefits rightly due them because of a
circumstance over which they had no control. As
stated above, private respondents, in their petition
for relief, claimed that they were wrongfully
excluded from the list of those entitled to the CBA
benefits by their union, NFL, without their
knowledge; and, because they were under the
impression that they were ably represented, they
were not able to appeal their case on time. C alrsc
The Supreme Court has allowed appeals from
decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if
filed beyond the reglementary period, in the
interest of justice.[15] Moreover, under Article 218
(c) of the Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the
exercise of its appellate powers, "correct, amend or
waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in
substance or in form." Further, Article 221 of the
same provides that: "In any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process. x x x"[16]
Anent the issue of whether or not the term of an
existing CBA, particularly as to its economic
provisions, can be extended beyond the period
stipulated therein, and even beyond the three-year
period prescribed by law, in the absence of a new
agreement, Article 253 of the Labor Code explicitly
provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. - When
there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty
to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither
party shall terminate nor modify such agreement
during its lifetime. However, either party can serve
a written notice to terminate or modify the
agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its
expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties
to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a
new agreement is reached by the parties.
(Underlining supplied. )
It is clear from the above provision of law that until
a new Collective Bargaining Agreement has been
executed by and between the parties, they are
duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement. The law does not provide
for any exception nor qualification as to which of
the economic provisions of the existing agreement
are to retain force and effect; therefore, it must be
understood as encompassing all the terms and
conditions in the said agreement. Sccal r
In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered
into by and between petitioner Company and NFL
pending appeal of the decision in NLRC Case No.
RAB-IX-0334-82; nor were any of the economic
provisions and/or terms and conditions pertaining
to monetary benefits in the existing agreement
modified or altered. Therefore, the existing CBA in
its entirety, continues to have legal effect.
In a recent case, the Court had occassion to rule
that Articles 253 and 253-A[17] mandate the
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement during the 60-day period prior
to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. Consequently,
the automatic renewal clause provided for by the
law, which is deemed incorporated in all CBA's,
provides the reason why the new CBA can only be
given a prospective effect.[18]Calrsp ped
In the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation vs.
Federation of Free Workers, et.al,[19] this Court
reiterated the rule that although a CBA has
expired, it continues to have legal effects as
between the parties until a new CBA has been
entered into. It is the duty of both parties to the
CBA to keep the status quo, and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties.[20]
To rule otherwise, i.e., that the economic
provisions of the existing CBA in the instant case
ceased to have force and effect in the year 1984,
would be to create a gap during which no
agreement would govern, from the time the old
contract expired to the time a new agreement shall
have been entered into. For if, as contended by the
petitioner, the economic provisions of the existing
CBA were to have no legal effect, what agreement
as to wage increases and other monetary benefits
would govern at all? None, it would seem, if we are
to follow the logic of petitioner Company.
Consequently, the employees from the year 1985
onwards would be deprived of a substantial
amount of monetary benefits which they could
have enjoyed had the terms and conditions of the
CBA remained in force and effect. Such a situation
runs contrary to the very intent and purpose of
Articles 253 and 253-A of the Labor Code which is
to curb labor unrest and to promote industrial
peace, as can be gleaned from the discussions of
the legislators leading to the passage of said laws,
thus:
HON. CHAIRMAN HERRERA: Pag nag-survey tayo
sa mga unyon, ganoon ang mangyayari. And I
think our responsibility here is to create a legal
framework to promote industrial peace and to
develop responsible and fair labor movement.
HON. CHAIRMAN VELOSO: In other words, the
longer the period of the effectivity.... Sce dp
xxx
HON. CHAIRMAN VELOSO: (continuing).... in other
words, the longer period of effectivity of the CBA,
the better for industrial peace.
xxx.[21]
Having established that the CBA between
petitioner Company and NFL remained in full force
and effect even beyond the stipulated term, in the
absence of a new agreement; and, therefore, that
the economic provisions such as wage increases
continued to have legal effect, we are now faced
with the question of who are entitled to the benefits
provided thereunder.
Petitioner Company insists that the rank-and-file
employees hired after the term of the CBA inspite
of their subsequent membership in the bargaining
unit, are not parties to the agreement, and
certainly may not claim the benefits thereunder.
We do not agree. In a long line of cases, this Court
has held that when a collective bargaining contract
is entered into by the union representing the
employees and the employer, even the non-member
employees are entitled to the benefits of the
contract. To accord its benefits only to members of
the union without any valid reason would
constitute undue discrimination against
nonmembers.[22] It is even conceded, that a
laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into
between the company and the union of which he is
a member at the time of the conclusion of the
agreement, after he has resigned from said union.
[23]Edp sc
In the same vein, the benefits under the CBA in the
instant case should be extended to those
employees who only became such after the year
1984. To exclude them would constitute undue
discrimination and deprive them of monetary
benefits they would otherwise be entitled to under
a new collective bargaining contract to which they
would have been parties. Since in this particular
case, no new agreement had been entered into
after the CBA's stipulated term, it is only fair and
just that the employees hired thereafter be
included in the existing CBA. This is in consonance
with our ruling that the terms and conditions of a
collective bargaining agreement continue to have
force and effect beyond the stipulated term when
no new agreement is executed by and between the
parties to avoid or prevent the situation where no
collective bargaining agreement at all would govern
between the employer company and its employees.
Anent the other issues raised by petitioner
Company, the Court finds that these pertain to
questions of fact that have already been passed
upon by the NLRC. It is axiomatic that, the factual
findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission, which have acquired expertise
because its jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are accorded respect and finality by the
Supreme Court, when these are supported by
substantial evidence. A perusal of the assailed
resolution reveals that the same was reached on
the basis of the required quantum of evidence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
37. G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986
KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and
style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents.
Ablan and Associates for petitioner.
Abdulcadir T. Ibrahim for private respondent.
CUEVAS, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
July 20, 1979 which found petitioner Sweden Ice
Cream guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified
refusal to bargain, in violation of par. (g) of Article
2492 of the New Labor Code, 3 and declared the
draft proposal of the Union for a collective
bargaining agreement as the governing collective
bargaining agreement between the employees and
the management.
The pertinent background facts are as follows:
In a certification election held on October 3, 1978,
the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for
short), a legitimate late labor federation, won and
was subsequently certified in a resolution dated
November 29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor
Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant (Company for short). The Company's
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution
was denied on January 25, 1978.
Thereafter, and more specifically on December 7,
1978, the Union furnished 4 the Company with
two copies of its proposed collective bargaining
agreement. At the same time, it requested the
Company for its counter proposals. Eliciting no
response to the aforesaid request, the Union again
wrote the Company reiterating its request for
collective bargaining negotiations and for the
Company to furnish them with its counter
proposals. Both requests were ignored and
remained unacted upon by the Company.
Left with no other alternative in its attempt to
bring the Company to the bargaining table, the
Union, on February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of
Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
on ground of unresolved economic issues in
collective bargaining. 5
Conciliation proceedings then followed during the
thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all
attempts towards an amicable settlement failed,
prompting the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify
the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as
amended. The labor arbiter, Andres Fidelino, to
whom the case was assigned, set the initial hearing
for April 29, 1979. For failure however, of the
parties to submit their respective position papers
as required, the said hearing was cancelled and
reset to another date. Meanwhile, the Union
submitted its position paper. The Company did
not, and instead requested for a resetting which
was granted. The Company was directed anew to
submit its financial statements for the years 1976,
1977, and 1978.
The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to
the withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record,
Atty. Rodolfo dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty.
Fortunato Panganiban formally entered his
appearance as counsel for the Company only to
request for another postponement allegedly for the
purpose of acquainting himself with the case.
Meanwhile, the Company submitted its position
paper on May 28, 1979.
When the case was called for hearing on June 4,
1979 as scheduled, the Company's representative,
Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined,
failed to appear. Atty. Panganiban then requested
for another postponement which the labor arbiter
denied. He also ruled that the Company has
waived its right to present further evidence and,
therefore, considered the case submitted for
resolution.
On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino
submitted its report to the National Labor
Relations Commission. On July 20, 1979, the
National Labor Relations Commission rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden Ice Cream
is hereby declared guilty of unjustified refusal to
bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now
Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. Further, the
draft proposal for a collective bargaining agreement
(Exh. "E ") hereto attached and made an integral
part of this decision, sent by the Union (Private
respondent) to the respondent (petitioner herein)
and which is hereby found to be reasonable under
the premises, is hereby declared to be the collective
agreement which should govern the relationship
between the parties herein.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner now comes before Us assailing the
aforesaid decision contending that the National
Labor Relations Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
rendering the challenged decision. On August 4,
1980, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Upon motion of the petitioner, however, the
Resolution of dismissal was reconsidered and the
petition was given due course in a Resolution
dated April 1, 1981.
Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to
procedural due process has been violated when it
was precluded from presenting further evidence in
support of its stand and when its request for
further postponement was denied. Petitioner
further contends that the National Labor Relations
Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for
refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the
evidence considering that it was only on May 24,
1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy
of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement
and it was only then that they came to know of the
Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by
the National Labor Relations Commission is
unreasonable and lacks legal basis.
The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its
dismissal is in order.
Collective bargaining which is defined as
negotiations towards a collective agreement,6 is
one of the democratic frameworks under the New
Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation
between labor and management and to create a
climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a
mutual responsibility of the employer and the
Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So
much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages,
hours of work, and all other terms and conditions
of employment including proposals for adjusting
any grievance or question arising under such an
agreement and executing a contract incorporating
such agreement, if requested by either party.
While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to
bargain, the employer, however, is not under any
legal duty to initiate contract negotiation.7 The
mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion
only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession
of the status of majority representation of the
employees' representative in accordance with any
of the means of selection or designation provided
for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority
representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under
Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all
of which preconditions are undisputedly present in
the instant case.
From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in
relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no
doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain
against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of
which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and
failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor
Code — to bargain in good faith.
We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's
pronouncement that petitioner Company is
GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been
indubitably established that (1) respondent Union
was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a
definite request to bargain, accompanied with a
copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to the Company not only once but
twice which were left unanswered and unacted
upon; and (3) the Company made no counter
proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively
indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. 8 A
Company's refusal to make counter proposal if
considered in relation to the entire bargaining
process, may indicate bad faith and this is
specially true where the Union's request for a
counter proposal is left unanswered. 9 Even during
the period of compulsory arbitration before the
NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and
attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of
postponements, non-appearance at the hearing
conducted, and undue delay in submitting its
financial statements, lead to no other conclusion
except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach
an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at
any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to
discuss freely and fully the claims and demands
set forth by the Union much less justify its
opposition thereto. 10
The case at bar is not a case of first impression, for
in the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs.
Herald Publications 11 the rule had been laid down
that "unfair labor practice is committed when it is
shown that the respondent employer, after having
been served with a written bargaining proposal by
the petitioning Union, did not even bother to
submit an answer or reply to the said proposal
This doctrine was reiterated anew in Bradman vs.
Court of Industrial Relations 12 wherein it was
further ruled that "while the law does not compel
the parties to reach an agreement, it does
contemplate that both parties will approach the
negotiation with an open mind and make a
reasonable effort to reach a common ground of
agreement
As a last-ditch attempt to effect a reversal of the
decision sought to be reviewed, petitioner
capitalizes on the issue of due process claiming,
that it was denied the right to be heard and
present its side when the Labor Arbiter denied the
Company's motion for further postponement.
Petitioner's aforesaid submittal failed to impress
Us. Considering the various postponements
granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due
process appeared totally bereft of any legal and
factual support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner
had not even honored respondent Union with any
reply to the latter's successive letters, all geared
towards bringing the Company to the bargaining
table. It did not even bother to furnish or serve the
Union with its counter proposal despite persistent
requests made therefor. Certainly, the moves and
overall behavior of petitioner-company were in total
derogation of the policy enshrined in the New
Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting
settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court
is not prepared to affix its imprimatur to such an
illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers.
Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's
stand that the Collective Bargaining Agreement
which was approved and adopted by the NLRC is a
total nullity for it lacks the company's consent,
much less its argument that once the Collective
Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the
Company will face the prospect of closing down
because it has to pay a staggering amount of
economic benefits to the Union that will equal if
not exceed its capital. Such a stand and the
evidence in support thereof should have been
presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the
proper forum for the purpose.
We agree with the pronouncement that it is not
obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy
to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of
the other. But an erring party should not be
tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to
schemes feigning negotiations by going through
empty gestures.13 More so, as in the instant case,
where the intervention of the National Labor
Relations Commission was properly sought for
after conciliation efforts undertaken by the BLR
failed. The instant case being a certified one, it
must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the
mandate of P.D. 873, as amended, which
authorizes the said body to determine the
reasonableness of the terms and conditions of
employment embodied in any Collective Bargaining
Agreement. To that extent, utmost deference to its
findings of reasonableness of any Collective
Bargaining Agreement as the governing agreement
by the employees and management must be
accorded due respect by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
The temporary restraining order issued on August
27, 1980, is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
38. G.R. No. 91915
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari for being
violative of the "constitutional right of employees to
self-organization which includes the right to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for purposes of collective bargaining,"[1]
are the Orders of May 23, 1989 and January 17,
1990 issued by then Secretary of Labor and
Employment Franklin M. Drilon and Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment Dionisio D. de
la Serna, respectively.
Culled from the records are the following facts
which led to the filing of the instant petition:
On September 6, 1984, Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C.
Elorcha certified the Divine Word University
Employees Union (DWUEU) as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word
University (University for brevity). On March 7,
1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining
proposals. On March 26, 1985, the University
replied and requested a preliminary conference to
be held on May 28, 1985. However, two days before
the scheduled conference or on May 26, 1985,
DWUEU's resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido
Urminita (or Urmeneta) wrote a letter addressed to
the University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA
proposals. Consequently, the preliminary
conference was cancelled.[2]
After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988,
DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the
Associated Labor Union,[3] requested a conference
with the University for the purpose of continuing
the collective bargaining negotiations.[4] Not
having heard from the University, DWUEU-ALU
sent a follow-up letter on March 23, 1988
reiterating its request for a conference and warning
the University against committing acts of
interference through its various meetings with both
the academic and non-academic employees
regarding their union affiliation and activities.
Despite the letter, the University persisted in
maintaining silence.
On April 25, 1988, DWUEU-ALU filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment a notice of
strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and
unfair labor practice acts, specifically, refusal to
bargain, discrimination and coercion on (sic)
employees.[5] The conferences which were held
after the filing of the notice of strike led to the
conclusion of an agreement between the University
and DWUEU-ALU on May 10, 1988 with the
following terms:
"1. Union will submit their (sic) CBA proposals on
Friday, May 13, 1988 for whatever action
management will take.
2. Union and management agrees (sic) to sit down
and determine (sic) the number of employees that
will represent their bargaining unit.
3. Conciliation proceedings is (sic) temporarily
suspended until the parties inform this office of
further development.
4. The issues of discrimination: re Ms. Colinayo
and Ms. Cinco Flores is settled.
5. Issue (sic) on coercion and refusal to bargain
shall be subject of continuing dialogue.
6. Atty. Jacinto shall be given 10 days notice in the
next conciliation meeting."[6]
However, it turned out that an hour before the May
10, 1988 agreement was concluded, the University
had filed a petition for certification election with
the Region VIII office of the Department of Labor
and Employment.[7]
On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-
ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its
collective bargaining proposals. These were ignored
by the University. Thereafter, through the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of
Region VIII, marathon conciliation conferences
were conducted but to no avail. Hence, on August
25, 1988, then Secretary of Labor Franklin M.
Drilon, exercising his powers under Art. 263(g) of
the Labor Code, issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directing all
striking workers to report back to work within
twenty-four (24) hours and the management to
accept them back under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage.
The Secretary also designated the NCMB to hear
the case and to submit its report thereon.[8]
On the same day, Med-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado,
acting on the University's petition for certification
election, issued an Order directing the conduct of a
certification election to be participated in by
DWUEU-ALU and "no union," after he found the
petition to be "well-supported in fact and in law."[9]
Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with
the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion seeking to
enjoin Milado from further acting on the matter of
the certification election. On September 20, 1988,
the Labor Secretary granted said motion and
directed Milado to hold in abeyance any and all
certification election proceedings at the University
pending the resolution of the labor dispute.[10] The
Labor Secretary's Order, predicated on his
extraordinary powers under Art. 263 (g) of the
Labor Code, conformed with this Court's
Resolution of October 29, 1987 in the Bulletin
Today cases (G.R. Nos. 79276 and 79883) where
the issue of strong disagreement among the parties
on the question of representation was deemed
subsumed in the labor dispute certified for
compulsory arbitration. The Secretary added:
"Underscoring the necessity to conform with this
settled doctrine is the fact that the dispute over
which this Office assumed jurisdiction arose from
the alleged continued refusal by the University to
negotiate a CBA with the Union despite the latter's
certification as exclusive bargaining agent in 1984.
Necessarily related thereto is the representativity
issue raised by the University in its certification
election petition. The resolution of these issues in
one proceeding is, in the words of the Supreme
Court, 'meet and proper in view of the very special
circumstances obtaining in this case, and will
prevent split jurisdiction and that multiplicity of
proceedings which the law abhors' (24 December
1987 [should be December 17, 1987] resolution of
the Supreme Court in the Bulletin Today cases,
supra).
Moreover, to allow a certification election to
proceed at this point in time might further rupture
the already strained labor-management relations
pervading at the University. The assumption order
issued by this Office merely served as a temporary
bond to hold together such a fragile relationship.
More importantly, the projected election hastily
decreed would preempt the proper resolution of the
issues raised and pursued so zealously by the
employees that prompted them to stage their
strike."[11]
The NCMB of Region VIII conducted hearings on
the case from October 17-18, 1988. On October
26, 1988, the Divine Word University Independent
Faculty and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which
was registered earlier that day, filed a motion for
intervention alleging that it had "at least 20% of
the rank and file employees" of the University.[12]
Exercising once again his extraordinary powers
under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary
consolidated "the entire labor dispute including all
incidents arising therefrom, or necessarily related
thereto" in his Order of May 23, 1989[13] and the
following cases were "subsumed or consolidated to
the labor dispute": the petition for certification
election docketed as MED-ARB-Case No. 5-04-88,
the DWUEU's complaint docketed as NLRC Case
No. 8-0321-88, and the University's complaint
docketed as NLRC Case No. 8-0323-88. Thus, in
said Order of May 23, 1989, the Secretary of Labor
resolved these issues: "(1) whether there was
refusal to bargain and an impasse in bargaining;
(2) whether the complaints for unfair labor
practices against each other filed by both parties,
including the legality of the strike with the NLRC,
which later on was subsumed by the assumption
Order, are with merits; and, (3) whether or not the
certification election can be passed upon by this
Office."
On the first issue, the Secretary of Labor said:
"It is a matter of record that when the Union filed
its Notice of Strike (Exh. A) two of the issues it
raised were bargaining deadlock and refusal to
bargain. It is also worth mentioning that the CBA
proposals by the Union were submitted on March
7, 1985 (Exh. 9) after Med-Arbiter Bienvenido
Elorcha issued a certification election Order dated
September 6, 1984 (Exh. 4). An examination of the
CBA proposals submitted by the Union to the
University showed there was (sic) some
negotiations that has (sic) taken place as indicated
on the handwritten notations made in the CBA
proposal (Exh. F). The said proposals include
among others, union scope, union recognition,
union security, union rights, job security, practices
and privileges, terms and conditions of work, leave
of absence, hours of work, compensation salary
and wages, workers' rights and safety, workers'
education, retirement longevity pay, strike and
lockouts and grievance machinery.
The said CBA proposals were indorsed by DWU
President to Atty. Generosa R. Jacinto, Divine
Word University legal counsel together with a copy
of the Union CBA proposals. The submission of the
CBA proposals and the reply letter of the DWU
counsel, dated March 26, 1985 to the Union
indicated that the CBA negotiations process was
set into motion. DWU's counsel even suggested
that the preliminary conference between the union
and the university be scheduled on 28 May 1985 at
2:30 P.M. which unfortunately did not take place
due to the alleged withdrawal of the CBA
proposals.
Undeniably, the Union and the DWU have not been
able to conclude a CBA since its certification on 6
September 1984 by then Med-Arbiter Bienvenido
Elorcha. But the non-conclusion of a CBA within
one year, as in this case, does not automatically
authorize the holding of a certification election
when it appears that a bargaining deadlock issue
has been submitted to conciliation by the certified
bargaining agent. The records show that the Notice
of Strike was filed by the Union on 25 April 1988,
citing bargaining deadlock as one of the grounds
(Annex '1'), while the Petition for Certification
Election was filed by the DWU on 10 May 1988.
The filing of the notice of strike was precipitated by
the University's act of not replying to the Union's
letters of March 11 and March 23, 1988.
This being the case, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of
the Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies
and we quote:
'Sec. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement submitted in accordance
with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election may be filed at any time.
However, no certification election may be held
within one year from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be
entertained it (sic) before the filing of a petition for
certification election, a bargaining deadlock to
which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent
is a party has been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid
notice of strike or lockout.'
Clearly, a bargaining deadlock exists and as a
matter of fact this is being conciliated by the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board at the
time the University filed its Petition for Certification
Election on 10 May 1988. In fact the deadlock
remained unresolved and was in fact mutually
agreed upon to be conciliated further by the NCMB
as per items 1 and 5 of the 'Agreement' (Exhibit
'L').
The aforequoted rule clearly barred the Med-
Arbiter from further entertaining the petition for
certification election. Furthermore, the various
communications sent to the University by the
Union prior to the filing of the notice of strike was
enough opportunity for the former to raise the
issue of representation if it really casts doubt to
the majority status of the Union. More importantly,
if DWU indeed doubted the status of the union,
how come it entered into an agreement with the
latter on May 10, 1988. Apparently, the move to
file the petition on the same day was an
afterthought on the part of the University which
this Office considers as fatal."[14]
The same Order dismissed not only the case filed
by DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor practice on the
ground of the union's failure to prove the
commission of the unfair labor practice acts
specifically complained of (NLRC Case No. 8-0321-
88) but also the complaint filed by the University
for unfair labor practices and illegal strike for
"obvious lack of merit brought about by its utter
failure to submit evidence" (NLRC Case No. 8-
0323-88).
Citing the Bulletin Today cases, the said Order
pronounced as untenable the University's claim
that the assumption Order earlier issued by the
Office of the Secretary of Labor merely held in
abeyance the holding of a certification election and
that the representation issue was not deemed
consolidated by virtue of the said assumption
Order. Accordingly, the Order has this dispositive
portion:
"WHEREFORE, ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the Divine Word University of
Tacloban and the Divine Word University
Employees Union are hereby directed to enter into
a collective bargaining agreement by adopting the
Union's CBA proposals sent to the DWU President
on 19 May 1988 (Exhibit '6'). DWU is hereby
warned that any unwarranted delay in the
execution of the collective bargaining agreement
will be construed as an unfair labor practice act.
Moreover, the petition for certification election filed
by the University is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit and the Order of Med-Arbiter Rodolfo Milado
set aside. Likewise, NLRC CASES Nos. 8-0321-88
and 8-0323 filed by the Union and the DWU,
respectively, are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."[15]
The University filed a motion for the
reconsideration of said Order. It was opposed by
the DWUEU-ALU. However, since on May 5, 1989
the DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike
charging the University with violation of the
return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and
unfair labor practices such as dismissal of union
officers, coercion of employees and illegal
suspension,[16] the Office of the Secretary called
for a series of conciliation and mediation
conferences between the parties. At the July 5,
1989 conference, the University agreed to submit
its proposals on how to settle amicably the labor
dispute on or before July 17, 1989.
On said date, however, the University failed to
appear. Instead, its representative phoned in a
request for the resetting of the conference
purportedly because its Board of Directors had
failed to muster a quorum. Hence, after so
informing ALU's Eastern Visayas Vice-President,
the conference was rescheduled for July 19, 1989.
The University once again failed to appear.
In view of the University's intransigence, the
DWUEU-ALU pursued its second notice of strike
on November 24, 1989. Four days later, the
University filed with the Office of the Secretary of
Labor a motion praying that said Office assume
jurisdiction over the dispute or certify the same to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration on the ground
that the strike affected not only the University but
also its other academic and non-academic
employees, the students and their parents. On
December 4, 1989, the Office of the Secretary of
Labor received a Resolution passed by the students
of the University urging said Office's assumption of
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the earliest
resolution of the case.
Consequently, on December 29, 1989, Secretary
Drilon issued an Order reiterating the August 25,
1988 Order which assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute. He ordered all striking workers to
return to work within 24 hours and the University
to accept them back under the same terms and
conditions of employment; deemed the issues
raised in the May 5, 1989 notice of strike as
"subsumed in this case"; ordered the Director of
Regional Office No. VIII to hear the issues raised in
said notice of strike and to submit his findings and
recommendations within ten days from submission
of the case by the parties, and enjoined the parties
to cease and desist from any act that may
"aggravate the employer-employee relationship."
On January 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of Labor
Dionisio L. de la Serna, "dismissed" for lack of
merit the University's motion for reconsideration
and affirmed the Order of May 23, 1989. He noted
the fact that the March 7, 1985 collective
bargaining proposals of the DWUEU had not been
validly withdrawn as the union's vice-president
had resigned and the withdrawal was signed only
by three of the eight members of the Executive
Board of said union. Granting that the withdrawal
was valid, the Acting Secretary believed that it did
not "exculpate the University from the duty to
bargain with the Union" because the collective
bargaining processes had been "set in motion from
the time the CBA proposals was (sic) received by
the University until the impasse took place on
account of its failure to reply to the Union's letters
pursuing its CBA proposals dated March 11 and
23, 1988."
On the University's assertion that no negotiations
took place insofar as the March 7, 1985 collective
bargaining proposals are concerned, the Acting
Secretary found that:
"x x x. The records indicate otherwise. Conciliation
meetings were conducted precisely to discuss the
CBA proposals the Union submitted to the
University on March 7, 1985. As a matter of fact,
the University admitted the existence of the
deadlock when a provision was incorporated in the
agreement it signed on May 10, 1988 with the
Union which reads:
'a. That on the matter of Bargaining Deadlock -
1. Union will submit their (renewed) CBA proposals
on Friday May 13, 1988 for whatever action
management will take.
2. Union and Management agree to sit down and
determine the number of employees that will
represent (constitute) their bargaining unit;
x x x.'
On account of the deadlock regarding the March 7,
1985 CBA proposals, it was agreed that the Union
submit a renewed CBA proposal which it did on
May 19, 1988. The records indicate that no
response was made by the University. The
uncooperative posture of the University to respond
and continue with the negotiations could very well
be explained when one (1) hour prior to the start of
the conciliation on May 10, 1988, the University
filed a Petition for Certification with (sic) Regional
Office. The surreptitious filing of the petition and at
the same time cunningly entering into an
agreement which required the Union to submit a
renewed CBA proposal, is patently negotiating in
bad faith. The University should have candidly and
timely raised the issue of representation, if it
believed that such issue was valid, not by entering
into an agreement. The May 10, 1988 Agreement
only served to falsely heighten the expectations of
the Union and this Office that a mutually
acceptable settlement of the dispute was in the
offing. This Office cannot tolerate such actuations
by the University."[17]
The Acting Secretary then concluded that for
reneging on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and for
its "reluctance and subscription to legal delay," the
University should be "declared in default." He also
maintained that since under the circumstances the
University cannot claim deprivation of due process,
the Office of the Secretary of Labor may rightfully
impose the Union's May 19, 1988 collective
bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio. On
the University's contention that the motion for
intervention of the DWU-IFEU was not resolved,
the Acting Secretary ruled that said motion was in
effect denied when the petition for certification
election filed by the University was dismissed in
the Order of May 23, 1989.
Hence, the University had recourse to instant
petition.
In its petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed on February 9, 1990,
the University raises as grounds therefor the
following:
"A. Respondent Secretary committed grave and
patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing his order dated 17 January
1990 finally denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in the face of the order dated 29
December 1989 and subsequent acts of DOLE
official subsuming the second notice of strike with
the first notice of strike.
B. In the absence of a certified CBA and there
having been no certification election held in
petitioner unit for more than five (5) years, a
certification election is mandatory.
C. Respondent Secretary committed grave and
patent abuse of discretion in issuing his orders
dated 23 May 1989 and 17 January 1990
disregarding evidence on record, provisions of law
and established jurisprudence.
D. Petitioner was denied due process."[18]
Citing the dispositive portion of the December 29,
1989 Order of the Secretary of Labor which states
that the issues raised in the May 5, 1989 notice of
strike "are ordered subsumed in this case" and
elaborating on the meaning of the word "subsume,"
i.e., "to include within a larger class, group, order,
etc.,"[19] the petitioner University argues that the
Secretary of Labor "cannot resolve petitioner's and
(intervenor) DWU-IFEU's motions for
reconsideration (in the NS. 1) of the Order dated 23
May 1989 until the proceedings in the subsumed
NS. 2 are terminated." It opines that since the
Regional Director is an extension of the Secretary
of Labor, the latter should have waited for the
recommendation of the former on the issues in
notices of strike nos. 1 and 2 before the he issued
the Order of January 17, 1990.
We agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor's
observation that the motion for intervention had in
effect been denied by the dismissal of the petition
for certification election in the May 23, 1989 Order.
The sub silencio treatment of the motion for
intervention in said Order does not mean that the
motion was overlooked. It only means, as shown by
the findings of facts in the same Order, that there
was no necessity for the holding of a certification
election wherein the DWU-IFEU could participate.
In this regard, petitioner's undue interest in the
resolution of the DWU-IFEU's motion for
intervention becomes significant since a
certification election is the sole concern of
employees except where the employer itself has to
file a petition for certification election. But once an
employer has filed said petition, as the petitioner
did in this case, its active role ceases and it
becomes a mere bystander. Any uncalled-for
concern on the part of the employer may give rise
to the suspicion that it is batting for a company
union.[20]
Petitioner's contention that the Acting Secretary of
Labor should have deferred the issuance of the
Order of January 17, 1990 until after his receipt of
the Regional Director's recommendation on the
notices of strike is, under the circumstances,
untenable. Ideally, a single decision or order
should settle all controversies resulting from a
labor dispute. This is in consonance with the
principle of avoiding multiplicity of suits. However,
the exigencies of a case may also demand that
some matters be threshed out and resolved ahead
of the others. Any contrary interpretation of the
Secretary of Labor's powers under Art. 263(g) of the
Labor Code on this matter would only result in
confusion and delay in the resolution of the
manageable aspects of the labor dispute.
In this case, resolution of the motion for
reconsideration at the earliest possible time was
urgently needed to set at rest the issues regarding
the first notice of strike, the certification election
and the unfair labor practice cases filed by the
University and the DWUEU-ALU. The nature of the
business of the University demanded immediate
and effective action on the part of the respondent
public officials. Otherwise, not only the contending
parties in the dispute would be adversely affected
but more importantly, the studentry and their
parents. It should be emphasized that on January
17, 1990, the second notice of strike could not
have been resolved as yet considering that at that
time, Regional Director Teddy S. Cabeltes was still
conducting the conference between the parties in
pursuance of the directive in the Order of
December 19, 1989. The Secretary, or for that
matter, the Acting Secretary, could not have
intended the efforts of the Regional Director to be
inutile or fruitless. Thus, when he set aside the
issues raised in the second notice of strike, the
Acting Secretary was acting in accordance with the
exigencies of the circumstances of the case. Hardly
can it be said to be an abuse of his discretion.
On the issue of whether or not a certification
election should have been ordered by the Secretary
of Labor, pertinent are the following respective
provisions of the Labor Code and Rule V, Book V of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
same Code:
"ART. 258. When an employer may file petition. -
When requested to bargain collectively, an
employer may petition the Bureau for an election.
If there is no existing certified collective bargaining
agreement in the unit, the Bureau shall, after
hearing, order a certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within
twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election
within twenty (20) days in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of Labor.
Sec. 3. When to file. - In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election may be filed at any time.
However, no certification election may be held
within one year from the date of issuance of a final
certification election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained if, before
the filing of a petition for certification election, a
bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of valid notice of strike or
lockout. (Underscoring supplied)
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly
registered in accordance with Article 231 of the
Code, a petition for certification election or a
motion for intervention can only be entertained
within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
such agreement."
These provisions make it plain that in the absence
of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer
who is requested to bargain collectively may file a
petition for certification election any time except
upon a clear showing that one of these two
instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one
year from the date of issuance of a final
certification election result or (b) when a
bargaining deadlock had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the
subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
While there is no question that the petition for
certification election was filed by the herein
petitioner after almost four years from the time of
the certification election and, therefore, there is no
question as to the timeliness of the petition, the
problem appears to lie in the fact that the
Secretary of Labor had found that a bargaining
deadlock exists.
A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of
things producing entire stoppage: a state of
inaction or of neutralization caused by the
opposition of persons or of factions (as in
government or a voting body): standstill."[21] There
is a deadlock when there is a "complete blocking or
stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
opposed forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or
legislature."[22] The word is synonymous with the
word impasse[23] which, within the meaning of the
American federal labor laws, "presupposes
reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which,
despite noble intentions, does not conclude in
agreement between the parties."[24]
A thorough study of the records reveals that there
was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining"
specially on the part of the University. Its
indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining
inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to
arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that
unilateral moves were being undertaken only by
the DWUEU-ALU, there was no "counteraction" of
forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective
bargaining should be initiated by the union, there
is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the
employer to respond in some manner to such acts.
This is clear from the provisions of the Labor Code
Art. 250(a) of which states:
"ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The
following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement,
it shall serve a written notice upon the other party
with a statement of its proposals. The other party
shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such notice.
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such
notice and reply, either party may request for a
conference which shall begin not later than ten
(10) calendar days from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall
intervene upon request of either or both parties or
at its own initiative and immediately call the
parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall
have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall
be the duty of the parties to participate fully and
promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board
may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the
Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any
act which may disrupt or impede the early
settlement of the disputes; and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle
disputes amicably and encourage the parties to
submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator."
Considering the procedure outlined above, the
Court cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was
not entirely blameless in the matter of the delay in
the bargaining process. While it is true that as
early as March 7, 1985, said union had submitted
its collective bargaining proposals and that, its
subsequent withdrawal by the DWUEU vice-
president being unauthorized and therefore
ineffective, the same proposals could be considered
as subsisting, the fact remains that said union
remained passive for three years. The records do
not show that during this three-year period, it
exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining
as a means of attaining better terms of
employment.
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the
same union, through the ALU Director for
Operations, requested an "initial conference" for
the purpose of collective bargaining.[25] That the
DWUEU abandoned its collective bargaining
proposals prior to its affiliation with ALU is further
confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May
10, 1988 agreement with the University, said
Union bound itself to submit a new set of
proposals on May 13, 1988. Under the
circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988
may as well be considered the written notice to
bargain referred to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of
the Labor Code, which thereby set into motion the
machinery for collective bargaining, as in fact, on
May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU submitted its
collective bargaining proposals.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule
that there has been a deadlock or an impasse in
the collective bargaining process. As the Court
earlier observed, there has not been a "reasonable
effort at good faith bargaining" on the part of the
University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all
possible avenues for the conclusion of an
agreement, the record is replete with evidence on
the University's reluctance and thinly disguised
refusal to bargain with the duly certified
bargaining agent, such that the inescapable
conclusion is that the University evidently had no
intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the
Court recognizes that technically, the University
has the right to file the petition for certification
election as there was no bargaining deadlock to
speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein
assailed Orders be annulled would put an
unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.
Bad faith on the part of the University is further
exemplified by the fact that an hour before the
start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it
surreptitiously filed the petition for certification
election. And yet during said conference, it
committed itself to "sit down" with the Union.
Obviously, the University tried to preempt the
conference which would have legally foreclosed its
right to file the petition for certification election. In
so doing, the University failed to act in accordance
with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the
meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith."
Moreover, by filing the petition for certification
election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-
ALU, the University violated the mandate of Art. 19
of the Civil Code that "(e) very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
Moreover, the University's unscrupulous attitude
towards the DWUEU-ALU is also betrayed by its
belated questioning of the status of the said union.
The communications between them afforded the
University ample opportunity to raise the issue of
representation if indeed it was doubtful of the
DWUEU-ALU's status as a majority union, but it
failed to do so. On the other hand, in the
agreement of May 10, 1988, the University even
agreed "to sit down and determine the number of
employees that will represent their bargaining
unit." This clearly indicates that the University
recognized the DWUEU-ALU as the bargaining
representative of the employees and is, therefore,
estopped from questioning the majority status of
the said union.
Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-
ALU's proposals may not be unilaterally imposed
on it on the ground that a collective bargaining
agreement is a contract wherein the consent of
both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit. A
similar argument had already been disregarded in
the case of Kiok Loy v. NLRC,[26] where we upheld
the order of the NLRC declaring the union's draft
CBA proposal as the collective agreement which
should govern the relationship between the parties.
Kiok Loy v. NLRC is applicable in the instant case
considering that the facts therein have also been
indubitably established in this case. These factors
are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining
agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain and
submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and
(c) the University made no counter proposal
whatsoever. As we said in Kiak Loy, "[a] company's
refusal to make counter proposal if considered in
relation to the entire bargaining process, may
indicate bad faith and this is especially true where
the Union's request for a counter proposal is left
unanswered."[27] Moreover, the Court added in the
same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side
of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or
agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring
party should not be tolerated and allowed with
impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations
by going through empty gestures."[28]
That being the case, the petitioner may not validly
assert that its consent should be a primordial
consideration in the bargaining process. By its
acts, no less than its inaction which bespeak its
insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it could
have asserted as an employer. We, therefore, find it
superfluous to discuss the two other contentions
in its petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
39. [G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004]
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING
CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION
(GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the
decision[1] dated July 19, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, which earlier
reversed the decision[2] dated January 30, 1998 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC Case No. V-0112-94.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-
Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation
(GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all
members of private respondent General Milling
Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for
brevity), a duly certified bargaining agent.
On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which
included the issue of representation effective for a
term of three years. The CBA was effective for three
years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it
would expire on November 30, 1991.
On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration
of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA,
with a request that a counter-proposal be
submitted within ten (10) days.
As early as October 1991, however, GMC had
received collective and individual letters from
workers who stated that they had withdrawn from
their union membership, on grounds of religious
affiliation and personal differences. Believing that
the union no longer had standing to negotiate a
CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the
unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor
Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was
no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer
existed, but that management was nonetheless
always willing to dialogue with them on matters of
common concern and was open to suggestions on
how the company may improve its operations.
In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated
December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive
disaffiliation or resignation from the union and
submitted a manifesto, signed by its members,
stating that they had not withdrawn from the
union.
On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia
Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of
incompetence. The union protested and requested
GMC to submit the matter to the grievance
procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however,
advised the union to refer to our letter dated
December 16, 1991.[3]
Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint
against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division,
Cebu City. The complaint alleged unfair labor
practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to
bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right
to self-organization; and (3) discrimination. The
labor arbiter dismissed the case with the
recommendation that a petition for certification
election be held to determine if the union still
enjoyed the support of the workers.
The union appealed to the NLRC.
On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor
arbiters decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor
Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,[4] which
fixed the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, the NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the
CBA draft that the union proposed for a period of
two (2) years beginning December 1, 1991, the date
when the original CBA ended, to November 30,
1993. The NLRC also ordered GMC to pay the
attorneys fees.[5]
In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the
effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a
CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, is five (5) years which, in the case of
GMC-Independent Labor Union was from
December 1, 1988 to November 30, 1993. All other
provisions of the CBA are to be renegotiated not
later than three (3) years after its execution. Thus,
the NLRC held that respondent union remained as
the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to
renegotiate the economic provisions of the CBA.
Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC
not to enter into negotiation with the union.
The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters
of withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of
its members from February to June 1993
confirmed the pressure exerted by GMC on its
employees to resign from the union. Thus, the
NLRC also found GMC guilty of unfair labor
practice for interfering with the right of its
employees to self-organization.
With respect to the unions claim of discrimination,
the NLRC found the claim unsupported by
substantial evidence.
On GMCs motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set
aside its decision of January 30, 1998, through a
resolution dated October 6, 1998. It found GMCs
doubts as to the status of the union justified and
the allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the
unions members to resign unfounded. Hence, the
union filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. For failure of the union to attach the
required copies of pleadings and other documents
and material portions of the record to support the
allegations in its petition, the CA dismissed the
petition on February 9, 1999. The same petition
was subsequently filed by the union, this time with
the necessary documents. In its resolution dated
April 26, 1999, the appellate court treated the
refiled petition as a motion for reconsideration and
gave the petition due course.
On July 19, 2000, the appellate court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The NLRC Resolution of October 6, 1998 is hereby
SET ASIDE, and its decision of January 30, 1998
is, except with respect to the award of attorneys
fees which is hereby deleted, REINSTATED.[6]
A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed
by GMC, but in a resolution dated October 26,
2000, the CA denied it for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari alleging
that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VIOLATED
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE THAT NO DECISION
SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT
EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING
OF SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE NLRC
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT.[7]
Thus, in the instant case, the principal issue for
our determination is whether or not the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1)
finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for
violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or
interfering with the right of its employees to self-
organization, and (2) imposing upon GMC the draft
CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin
from the expiration of the original CBA.
On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement
that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of
five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be
entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five
year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than
three (3) years after its execution....
The law mandates that the representation
provision of a CBA should last for five years. The
relation between labor and management should be
undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year.
Hence, it is indisputable that when the union
requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms
of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the
certified collective bargaining agent of the workers,
because it was seeking said renegotiation within
five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA
on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was
also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period
from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just
before the last day of said period. It was obvious
that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to
negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing
to send a counter-proposal to the union and to
bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA,
the company committed an unfair labor practice
under Article 248 of the Labor Code, which
provides that:
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It
shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of
the following unfair labor practice:
...
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as
prescribed by this Code;
...
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the
meaning of the phrase duty to bargain collectively,
thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.
The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement....
We have held that the crucial question whether or
not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain
in good faith typically turn$ on the facts of the
individual case.[8] There is no per se test of good
faith in bargaining.[9] Good faith or bad faith is an
inference to be drawn from the facts.[10] The effect
of an employers or a unions actions individually is
not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the
impact of all such occasions or actions, considered
as a whole.[11]
Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are
required to perform their mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good
faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within
three (3) years from the effectivity of the original
CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252.
What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by
questioning the existence of the union and the
status of its membership to prevent any
negotiation.
It bears stressing that the procedure in collective
bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory
because of the basic interest of the state in
ensuring lasting industrial peace. Thus:
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The
following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement,
it shall serve a written notice upon the other party
with a statement of its proposals. The other party
shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such notice.
(Underscoring supplied.)
GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the union is indicative of
its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the
union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer
represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it
turned out to be utterly baseless.
We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-
proposal to the unions proposal for CBA
negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where
the employer did not even bother to submit an
answer to the bargaining proposals of the union,
there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain
collectively.[12]
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to
submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC
violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it
liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the Court
of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the
circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.
Did GMC interfere with the employees right to self-
organization? The CA found that the letters
between February to June 1993 by 13 union
members signifying their resignation from the
union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure
on its employees. The records show that GMC
presented these letters to prove that the union no
longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact
that the resignations of the union members
occurred during the pendency of the case before
the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts
to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union.
We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed
letters of resignation from the union members
indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of
its employees to self-organization. Thus, we hold
that the appellate court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair
labor practice for interfering with the right of its
employees to self-organization.
Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion
when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed
by the union for two years commencing from the
expiration of the original CBA?
The Code provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. ....It shall
be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo
and to continue in full force and effect the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement during
the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date]
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties. (Underscoring supplied.)
The provision mandates the parties to keep the
status quo while they are still in the process of
working out their respective proposal and counter
proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA
already exists, its provision shall continue to
govern the relationship between the parties, until a
new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily
presupposes that all other things are equal. That
is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith.
However, when one of the parties abuses this grace
period by purposely delaying the bargaining
process, a departure from the general rule is
warranted.
In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,[13] we found that petitioner
therein, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to
submit any counter proposal to the CBA proposed
by its employees certified bargaining agent. We
ruled that the former had thereby lost its right to
bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA.
Thus, we did not hesitate to impose on the erring
company the CBA proposed by its employees union
- lock, stock and barrel. Our findings in Kiok Loy
are similar to the facts in the present case, to wit:
petitioner Companys approach and attitude
stalling the negotiation by a series of
postponements, non-appearance at the hearing
conducted, and undue delay in submitting its
financial statements, lead to no other conclusion
except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach
an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at
any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to
discuss freely and fully the claims and demands
set forth by the Union much less justify its
objection thereto.[14]
Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs.
Secretary of Labor and Employment,[15] petitioner
therein, Divine Word University of Tacloban,
refused to perform its duty to bargain collectively.
Thus, we upheld the unilateral imposition on the
university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word
University Employees Union. We said further:
That being the said case, the petitioner may not
validly assert that its consent should be a
primordial consideration in the bargaining process.
By its acts, no less than its action which bespeak
its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it
could have asserted as an employer.[16]
Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the
instant case, it would be unfair to the union and
its members if the terms and conditions contained
in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on
GMCs employees for the remaining two (2) years of
the CBAs duration. We are not inclined to gratify
GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it
resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations.
Since it was GMC which violated the duty to
bargain collectively, based on Kiok Loy and Divine
Word University of Tacloban, it had lost its
statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms
and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the
union.
We carefully note, however, that as strictly
distinguished from the facts of this case, there was
no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok
Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban.
Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this
case the rationale of the doctrine in the said two
cases. To rule otherwise would be to allow GMC to
have its cake and eat it too.
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory
upon either side of a labor controversy to
precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the
other. But an erring party should not be allowed to
resort with impunity to schemes feigning
negotiations by going through empty gestures.[17]
Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the
draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the
interests of equity and fair play were properly
served and both parties regained equal footing,
which was lost when GMC thwarted the
negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.
The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of
the NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft
CBA proposed by the union should not be
disturbed since they are supported by substantial
evidence. On this score, we see no cogent reason to
rule otherwise. Hence, we hold that the Court of
Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
imposed on GMC, after it had committed unfair
labor practice, the draft CBA proposed by the
union for the remaining two (2) years of the
duration of the original CBA. Fairness, equity, and
social justice are best served in this case by
sustaining the appellate courts decision on this
issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed decision dated July 19, 2000, and the
resolution dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
40. [G.R. No. 113907. February 28, 2000]
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP), ITS
PRESIDENT BEDA MAGDALENA VILLANUEVA,
MARIO DAGANIO, DONATO GUERRERO BELLA P.
SANCHEZ, ELENA TOBIS, RHODA TAMAYO,
LIWAYWAY MALLILIN, ELOISA SANTOS,
DOMINADOR REBULLO, JOSE IRLAND, TEOFILA
QUEJADA, VICENTE SAMONTINA, FELICITAS
DURIAN, ANTONIO POLDO, ANGELINA TUGNA,
SALVADOR PENALOSA, LUZVIMINDA TUBIG,
ILUMINADA RIVERA, ROMULO SUMILANG,
NENITA BARBELONIA, LEVI BASILIA, RICARDO
PALAGA, MERCY ROBLES, LEODEGARIO GARIN,
DOMINGO ECLARINAL, MELCHOR GALLARDO,
MARCELO GARIN, ROSALINA BAUTISTA, MARY
ANN TALIGATOS, ALEJANDRO SANTOS, ANTONIO
FRAGA, LUZ GAPULTOS, MAGDALENA URSUA,
EUGENIO ORDAN, LIGAYA MANALO, PEPITO
DELA PAZ, PERLITA DIMAQUIAT, MYRNA
VASQUEZ, FLORENTINA SAMPAGA, ARACELI
FRAGA, MAXIMINA FAUSTINO, MARINA TAN,
OLIGARIO LOMO, PRECILA EUSEBIO, SUSAN
ABOGANO, CAROLINA MANINANG, GINA
GLIFONIA, OSCAR SOTTO, CELEDONA
MALIGAYA, EFREN VELASQUEZ, DELIA ANOVER,
JOSEPHINE TALIMORO, MAGDALENA TABOR,
NARCISA SARMIENTO, SUSAN MACASIEB,
FELICIDAD SISON, PRICELA CARTA, MILA
MACAHILIG, CORAZON NUNALA, VISITACION
ELAMBRE, ELIZABETH INOFRE, VIOLETA BARTE,
LUZVIMINDA VILLOSA, NORMA SALVADOR,
ELIZABETH BOGATE, MERLYN BALBOA,
EUFRECINA SARMIENTO, SIMPLICIA BORLEO,
MATERNIDAD DAVID, LAILA JOP, POTENCIANA
CULALA, LUCIVITA NAVARRO, ROLANDO BOTIN,
AMELITA MAGALONA, AGNES CENA, NOLI
BARTOLAY, DANTE AQUINO, HERMINIA RILLON,
CANDIDA APARIJADO, LYDIA JIMENEZ,
ELIZABETH ANOCHE, ALDA MURO, TERESA
VILLANUEVA, TERESITA RECUENCO, ELIZA
SERRANO, ESTELLA POLINAR, GERTRUDES
NUNEZ, FELIPE BADIOLA, ROSLYN FERNANDEZ,
OSCAR PAGUTA, NATIVIDAD BALIWAS,
ELIZABETH BARCIBAL, CYNTHIA ESTELLER,
TEODORA SANTOS, ALICIA PILAR, MILA PATENO,
GLORIA CATRIZ, MILA MACAHILIG, ADELAIDA DE
LEON, ROSENDO EDILO, ARSENIA ESPIRITU,
NUMERIANO CABRERA, CONCEPSION ARRIOLA,
PAULINA DIMAPASOK, ANGELA SANGCO,
PRESILA ARIAS, ZENAIDA NUNES, EDITHA
IGNACIO, ROSA GUIRON, TERESITA CANETA,
ALICIA ARRO, TEOFILO RUWETAS, CARLING
AGCAOILI, ROSA NOLASCO, GERLIE PALALON,
CLAUDIO DIRAS, LETICIA ALBOS, AURORA
ALUBOG, LOLITA ACALEN, GREGORIO ALIVIO,
GUILLERMO ANICETA, ANGELIE ANDRADA,
SUSAN ANGELES, ISABELITA AURIN, MANUELA
AVELINA, CARLING AGCAOILI, TERESITA ALANO,
LOLITA AURIN, EMMABETH ARCIAGA,
CRESENCIA ACUNA, LUZVMINDA ABINES,
FLORENCIA ADALID, OLIVIA AGUSTIN,
EVANGELINE ALCORAN, ROSALINA ALFERES,
LORNA AMANTE, FLORENTINA AMBITO, JULIETA
AMANONCO, CARMEN AMARILLO, JOSEFINA
AMBAGAN, ZENAIDA ANAYA, MARIA ANGLO,
EDITHA ANTA ZO, MARY JANE ANTE, ANDREA
AQUINO, ROWENA ARABIT, MARIETA ARAGON,
REBECCA ARCENA, LYDIA ARCIDO, FERNANDO
ARENAS, GREGORIO ARGUELLES, EDITHA
ARRIOLA, EMMA ATIENZA, EMMA ATIENZA,
TEODY ATIENZA, ELIZABETH AUSTRIA, DIOSA
AZARES, SOLIDA AZAINA, MILAGROS BUAG,
MARIA BANADERA, EDNALYN BRAGA, OFELIA
BITANGA, FREDISMINDA BUGUIS, VIOLETA
BALLESTEROS, ROSARIO BALLADJAY, BETTY
BORIO, ROMANA BAUTISTA, SUSARA BRAVO,
LILIA BAHINGTING, ENIETA BALDOZA, DAMIANA
BANGCORE, HERMINIA BARIL, PETRONA
BARRIOS, MILAGROS BARRAMEDA, PERLA
BAUTISTA, CLARITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINA
BAUTISTA, ADELINA BELGA, CONSOLACION
BENAS, MARIA BEREZO, MERCEDES BEREBER,
VIOLETA BISCOCHO, ERNESTO BRIONES,
ALVINA BROSOTO, AGUSTINA BUNYI, CARMEN
BUGNOT, ERLINDA BUENAFLOR, LITA BAQUIN,
CONSEJO BABOL, CRISANTA BACOLOD, CELIA
DE BACTAT, MAZIMA BAGA, ELENA BALADAD,
ROSARIO BALADJAY, AMALIA BALAGTAS, ANITA
BALAGTAS, MARIA BALAKIT, RUFINA BALATAN,
REBECCA BALDERAMA, AMELIA BALLESTER,
BELEN BARQUIO, BERNANDITA BASILIDES,
HELEN BATO, HELEN BAUTISTA, ROMANA
BAUTISTA, ALMEDA BAYTA, AVELINA BELAYON,
NORMA DE BELEN, THELMA DE BELEN,
JOCELYN BELTRAN, ELENA BENITEZ, VIRGINIA
BERNARDINO, MERLINA BINUYAG, LINA BINUYA,
BLESILDA BISNAR, SHIRLEY BOLIVAR,
CRESENTACION MEDLO, JOCELYN BONIFACIO,
AMELIA BORBE, AMALIA BOROMEO, ZENAIDA
BRAVO, RODRIGO BEULDA, TERESITA MENDEZ,
ELENA CAMAN, LALIANE CANDELARIA, MARRY
CARUJANO, REVELINA CORANES, MARITESS
CABRERA, JUSTINA CLAZADA, APOLONIA DELA
CRUZ, VICTORIA CRUZ, JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ,
MARITESS CATANGHAL, EDNA CRUZ, LUCIA DE
CASTRO, JOSIE CARIASO, OFELIA CERVANTES,
MEDITA CORTADO, AMALIA CASAJEROS, LUCINA
CASTILIO, EMMA CARPIO, ANACORITA CABALES,
YOLANDA CAMO, MILA CAMAZUELA, ANITA
CANTO, ESTELA CANCERAN, FEMENCIA CANCIO,
CYNTHIA CAPALAD, MERLE CASTILLO, JESUSA
CASTRO, CECILIA CASTILLO, SILVERITA
CASTRODES, VIVIAN CELLANO, NORMA CELINO,
TERESITA CELSO, GLORIA COLINA, EFIPANIA
CONSTANTINO, SALVACION CONSULTA, MEDITA
CORTADO, AIDA CRUZ, MARISSA DELA CRUZ,
EDITO CORCILLES, JELYNE CRUZ, ROSA
CORPOS, ROSITA CUGONA, ELSIE CABELLES,
EMMA CADUT, VICTORIA CALANZA, BARBARA
CALATA, IMELDA CALDERON, CRISTINA
CALIDGUID, EMMALINDA CAMALON, MARIA
CAMERINO, CARMENCITA CAMPO, CONNIE
CANEZO, LOURDES CAPANANG, MA. MILAGROS
CAPILI, MYRNA T. CAPIRAL, FLOR SAMPAGA,
SUSAN B. CARINO, ROSARIO CARIZON, VIRGINIA
DEL CARMEN, EMMA CARPIO, PRESCILA CARTA,
FE CASERO, LUZ DE CASTRO, ANNA
CATARONGAN, JOSEFINA CASTISIMO, JOY
MANALO, EMMIE CAWALING, JOVITA CARA,
MARINA CERBITO, MARY CAREJANO, ESTELA R.
CHAVEZ, CONCEPCION PARAJA, GINA CLAUDIO,
FLORDELIZA CORALES, EDITO CORCIELER,
ROSA C. CORROS, AMELIA CRUZ, JELYNE CRUZ,
WILFREDO DELA CRUZ, REINA CUEVAS,
MARILOU DEJECES, JOSEPHINE DESACULA,
EDITHA DEE, EDITHA DIAZ, VIRGIE DOMONDON,
CELSA DOROPAW, VIOLETA DUMELINA,
MARIBEL DIMATATAC, ELBERTO DAGANIO,
LETECIA DAGOHOY, DINDO DALUZ, ANGELITA
DANTES, GLORIA DAYO, LUCIA DE CASTRO,
CARLITA DE GUZMAN, CARMEN DELA CRUZ,
MERCY DE LEON, MARY DELOS REYES,
MARIETA DEPILO, MATILDE DIBLAS, JULIETA
DIMAYUGA, TEODORA DIMAYUGA, YOLANDA
DOMDOM, LUCITA DONATO, NELMA DORADO,
RITA DORADO, SUSAN DUNTON, HERMINIA SAN
ESTEBAN, AMALI EUGENIO, OLIVIA EUSOYA,
ERNESTO ESCOBIN, EVELYN ESCUREL, LYDIA
ESCOBIN, VICENTE E. ELOIDA, ELENA EGAR,
GLORIA ERENO, NORMA ESPIRIDION, ARSENIA
ESPIRITU, AURORA ESTACIO, DEMETRIA
ESTONELO, MILAGROS FONSEGA, LYDIA
FLORENTINO, JULIA FARABIER, TRINIDAD
FATALLA, IMELDA FLORES, JESSINA FRANCO,
MA. CRISTINA FRIJAS, ESPECTACION FERRER,
BERDENA FLORES, LEONILA FRANCISCO,
BERNARDA FAUSTINO, DOLORES FACUNDO,
CRESTITA FAMILARAN, EMELITA FIGUERAS, MA.
VIRGINIA FLORENDO, AURORA FRANCISCO, MA.
JESUSA FRANCISCO, NENITA FUENTES,
MARILOU GOLINGAN, JUANITA GUERRERO,
LYDIA GUEVARRA, SOCORRO GONZAGA,
PATRICIA GOMEO, ROSALINDA GALAPIN,
CARMELITA GALVEZ, TERESA GLE, SONIA
GONZALES, PRIMITA GOMEZ, THERESA GALUA,
JOSEFINA GELUA, BRENDA GONZAGA, FLORA
GALLARDO, LUCINDA GRACILLA, VICTORIA
GOZUM, NENITA GAMAO, EDNA GARCIA, DANILO
GARCIA, ROSARIO GIRAY, ARACELI GOMEZ,
JOEMARIE GONZAGA, NELIA GONZAGA, MARY
GRANCE GOZON, CARMEN GONZALES, MERLITA
GREGORIO, HERMINIA GONZALES, CARLITA DE
GUZMAN, MODESTA GABRENTINA, EDITHA
GADDI, SALVACIO GALIAS, MERLINDA GALIDO,
MELINDA GAMIT, JULIETA GARCIA, EMELITA
GAVINO, CHARITO GILLIA, GENERA GONEDA,
CRESTITA GONZALES, HERMINIA GONZALES,
FRANCISCA GUILING, JULIAN HERNANDEZ,
GLECERIA HERRADURA, SUSANA HIPOLITO,
NERISSA HAZ, SUSAN HERNAEZ, APOLONIA
ISON, SUSAN IBARRA, LUDIVINA IGNACIO,
CHOLITA INFANTE, JULIETA ITURRIOS, ANITA
IBO, MIRASOL INGALLA, JULIO JARDINIANO,
MERLITA JULAO, JULIETA JULIAN, MARIBETH
DE JOSE, JOSEPHINE JENER, IMELDA JATAP,
JULIETA JAVIER, SALOME JAVIER, VICTORIA
JAVIER, SALVACION JOMOLO, EDNA JARNE,
LYDIA JIMENEZ, TERESITA DE JUAN, MARILYN
LUARCA, ROSITA LOSITO, ROSALINA LUMAYAG,
LORNA LARGA, CRESTETA DE LEON, ZENAIDA
LEGASPI, ADELAIDA LEON, IMELDA DE LEON,
MELITINA LUMABI, LYDIA LUMABI, ASUNCION
LUMACANG, REGINA LAPIADRIO, MELANIA
LUBUGUAN, EVANGELINE LACAP, PELAGIA
LACSI, LORNA LAGUI, VIRGIE LAITAN, VIRGINIA
LEE, CRESTELITA DE LEON, FELICISIMA
LEONERO, DIOSA LOPE, ANGELITA LOPEZ,
TERESITA LORICA, JUANITA MENDIETA,
JUANITA MARANQUEZ, JANET MALIFERO, INAS
MORADOS, MELANIE MANING, LUCENA
MABANGLO, CLARITA MEJIA, IRENE MENDOZA,
LILIA MORTA, VIGINIA MARAY, CHARITO
MASINAHON, FILMA MALAYA, LILIA MORTA,
VIRGINIA MARAY, CHARITO MASINAHON, FILMA
MALAYA, LILIA MORTA, ROSITA MATIBAG,
LORENZA MLINA, SABINA DEL MUNDO, EDITHA
MUYCO, NARCISA MABEZA, MA. FE
MACATANGAY, CONCEPCION MAGDARAOG,
IMELDA MAHIYA, ELSA MALLARI, LIGAYA
MANAHAN, SOLEDA MANLAPAS, VIRGINIA MAPA,
JOSEI MARCOS, LIBRADA MARQUEZ, VIRGINIA
MAZA, JULIANITA MENDIETA, EDILBERTA
MENDOZA, IRENE MERCADO, HELEN MEROY,
CRISTINA MEJARES, CECILIA MILLET, EMELITA
MINON, JOSEPHINE MIRANA, PERLITA MIRANO,
EVANGELINE MISBAL, ELEANOR MORALES,
TERESITA MORILLA, LYDIA NUDO, MYRIAM
NAVAL, CAROLINA NOLIA, ALICIA NUNEZ,
MAGDALENA NAGUIDA, ELSA NICOL, LILIA
NACIONALES, MA. LIZA MABO, REMEDIOS
NIEVES, MARGARITA NUYLAN, TERESITA
NIEVES, PORFERIA NARAG, RHODORA NUCASA,
CORAZON OCRAY, LILIA OLIMPO, VERONA
OVERENCIA, FERMIN OSENA, FLORENCIA
OLIVAROS, SOLEDAD OBEAS, NARISSA
OLIVEROS, PELAGIA ORTEGA, SUSAN ORTEGA,
CRISTINA PRENCIPE, PURITA PENGSON,
REBECCA PACERAN, EDNA PARINA, MARIETA
PINAT, EPIFANIA PAJERLAN, ROSALINA PASIBE,
CECILIA DELA PAZ, LORETA PENA, APOLONIA
PALCONIT, FRANCISCO PAGUIO, LYDIA
PAMINTAHON, ELSIE PACALDO, TERESITA
PADILLA, MYRNA PINEDA, MERCEIDTA PEREZ,
NOVENA PORLUCAS, TERESITA PODPOD,
ADORACION PORNOBI, ALICIA PERILLO, HELEN
JOY PENDAL, LOURDES PACHECO, LUZVIMINDA
PAGALA, LORETA PAGAPULAN, FRANCISCO
PAGUIO, PRISCO PALACA, FLORA PAMINTUAN,
NOEMI PARISALES, JOSEPHINE PATRICIO,
CRISTINA PE BENITO, ANGELA PECO, ANGELITA
PENA, ESTER PENONES, NORMA PEREZ, MAURA
PERSEVERANCIA, MARINA PETILLA, JOSIE PIA,
ZULVILITA PIODO, REBECCA PACERAN, CLARITA
POLICARPIO, MAXIMO POTENTO, PORFIRIO
POTENTO, FLORDELIZA PUMARAS, FERNANDO
QUEVEDO, JULIANA QUINDOZA, CHARITO
QUIROZ, CARMELITA ROSINO, RODELIA
RAYONDOYON, FLORENCIA RAGOS, REBECCA
ROSALES, ROSALYN RIVERO, FRANCISCO RUIZ,
FRANCIA ROSERO, EMELY RUBIO, EDILBERTO
RUIO, JUANA RUBY, RAQUEL REYES, MERCY
ROBLES, ESTELA RELANO, ROSITA REYES
NIMFA RENDON, EPIFANIO RAMIRO, MURIEL
REALCO, BERNARDITA RED, LEONITA RODIL,
BENITA REBOLA, DELMA REGALARIO, LENY
REDILLAS, JULIETA DELA ROSA, FELICITAS
DELA ROSA, SUSAN RAFALLO, ELENA RONDINA,
NORMA RACELIS, JOSEPHINE RAGEL,
ESPERANZA RAMIREZ, LUZVIMINDA RANADA,
CRISTINA RAPINSAN, JOCELYN RED, ORLANDO
REYES, TERESITA REYES, ANGELITA ROBERTO,
DELIA ROCHA, EDLTRUDES ROMERO, MELECIA
ROSALES, ZENAIDA ROTAO, BELEN RUBIS, FE
RUEDA, SYLVIA SONGCAYAWON, CRISTINA
SANANO, NERCISA SARMIENTO, HELEN SIBAL,
ESTELITA SANTOS, NORMA SILVESTRE, DARLITA
SINGSON, EUFROCINA SARMIENTO, MYRNA
SAMSON, EMERLINA SADIA, LORNA SALAZAR,
AVELINA SALVADOR, NACIFORA SALAZAR, TITA
SEUS, MARIFE SANTOS, GRACIA SARMIENTO,
ANGELITA SUMANGIL, ELIZABETH SICAT, MA.
VICTORIA SIDELA, ANALITA SALVADOR,
MARITES SANTOS, VIRGINIA SANTOS, THELMA
SARONG, NILDA SAYAT, FANCITA SEGUNDO,
FYNAIDA SAGUI, EDITHA SALAZAR, EDNA
SALZAR, EMMA SALENDARIO, SOLEDAD CRESENCIA BAJO, BERNADITA BASILID,
SAMSON, EDNA SAN DIEGO, TERESITA SAN MELINDA BEATO, YOLANDA BATANES, EDITHA
GABRIEL, GERTRUDES SAN JOSE, EGLECERIA BORILLA, ANITA BAS, ELSA CALIPUNDAN, MARIA
OSANCHEZ, ESTRELLA SANCHEZ, CECILIA CAMERINO, VIRGINIA CAMPOSANO, MILAGROS
DELOS SANTOS, LUISA SEGOVIA, JOCELYN CAPILI, CARINA CARINO, EUFEMIA CASIHAN,
SENDING ELENA SONGALIA, FELICITAS NENITA CASTRO, FLORENCIA CASUBUAN,
SORIANO, OFELIA TIBAYAN, AIDA TIRNIDA, GIRLIE CENTENO, MARIANITA CHIQUITO,
MONICA TIBAYAN, CRISTETA TAMBARAN, IMELDA DELA CRUZ, TEODOSIA CONG, TEOFILA
GLORIA TACDA, NENVINA, FELINA TEVES, CARACOL, TERESITA CANTA, IRENEA CUNANAN,
ANTONINA DELA TORRE, MAXIMA TANILON, JULITA CANDILOSAS, VIOLETA CIERES,
NENA TABAT, ZOSIMA TOLOSA, MARITA MILAGROS DELA CRUZ, FLOREPES CAPULONG,
TENOSO, IMELDA TANIO, LUZ TANIO, CARMENCITA CAMPO, MARILYN CARILLO, RUTH
EVANGELINE TAYO, JOSEFINA TINGTING, DELA CRUZ, RITA CIJAS, LYDIA CASTOR, VIRGIE
ARSENIA TISOY, MAGDALENA TRAJANO, CALUBAD, EMELITA CABERA, CRISTETA CRUZ,
JOSEFINA UBALDE, GINA UMALI, IRMA ERLINDA COGADAS, IMELDA CALDERON, SUSIE
VALENZUELA, FELY VALDEZ, PAULINA VALEZ, LUZ CEZAR, ESTELA CHAVEZ, NORMA
ROSELITA VALLENTE, LOURDES VELASCO, AIDA CABRERA, ELDA DAGATAN, LEONISA
VILLA, FRANCISCA VILLARITO, ZENAIDA DIMACUNA, ERNA DUGTONG, FLORDELISA
VISMONTE, DELIA VILLAMIEL, NENITA VASQUEZ, DIGMA, VIRGILIO DADIOS, LOLITA DAGTA,
JOCELYN VILLASIS, FERMARGARITA VARGAS, ADELAIDA DORADO, CELSA DATUMANONG,
CELIA VALLE, MILA CONCEPCION VIRAY, VIRGINIA DOCTOLERO, EDNA SAN DIEGO,
DOMINGA VALDEZ, LUZVIMINDA VOCINA, JULIETA DANG, JULIETA DORANTINAO, LOLITA
MADELINE VIVERO, RUFINA VELASCO, AUREA DAGANO, JUDITH DIAZ, MARIA ENICANE,
VIDALEON, GLORIA DEL VALLE, THELMA MARITA ESCARDE, ENRIMITA ESMAYOR,
VALLOYAS, CYNTHIA DELA VEGA, ADELA ROSARIO EPIRITU, REMEDIOS EMBOLTORIO,
VILLAGOMEZ, TERESITA VINLUAN, EUFEMIA IRENE ESTUITA, TERESITA ERESE, ERMELINDA
VITAN, GLORIA VILLAFLORES, EDORACION ELEZO, MARIA ESTAREJA, MERLITA ESQUERRA,
VALDEZ, ANGELITA VALDEZ, ILUMINADA YOLANDA FELICITAS, FRUTO FRANCIA, MARTHA
VALENCI, MYRNA VASQUEZ, EVELYN FRUTO, LILIA FLORES, SALVACION FORTALESA,
VEJERAMO, TEODORA VELASQUEZ, EDAN JUDITH FAJARDO, SUSANA FERNANDO, EDWIN
VILLANUEVA, PURITA VILLASENOR, SALVADOR FRANCISCO, NENITA GREGORY, ROSA CAMILO,
WILSON, EMELINA YU, ADELFA YU, ANA MARIVIC GERRARDO, CHARITA GOREMBALEM,
ABRIGUE, VIRGINIA ADOBAS, VICTORIA NORMA GRANDE, DOLORES GUTIERREZ,
ANTIPUESTO, MERCEDITA CASTILLO, JOCELYN CHARLIE GARCIA, LUZ GALVEZ, ADELAIDA
CASTRO, CREMENIA DELA CRUZ, JOSEPHINE GAMILLA, LUZ GAPULTOS, ERLINDA GARCIA,
IGNACIO, MELITA ILILANGOS, LIGAYA LUMAYAT, HELEN GARCIA, ERLINDA GAUDIA, FRANCISCA
DELIA LUMBES, ROSITA LIBRADO, DELIA GUILING, MINTA HERRERA, ASUNCION HONOA,
LAGRAMADA, GEMMA MAGPANTAY, EMILY JUAN HERNANDEZ, LUCERIA ANNA MAE
MENDOZA, FIDELA PANGANIBAN, LEONOR HERNANDEZ, JULIANA HERNANDEZ, EDITHA
RIZALDO, ILUMINDA RIVERA, DIVINA IGNACIO, ANITA INOCENCIO, EULALIA INSORIO,
SAMBAYAN, ELMERITA SOLAYAO, NANCY ESTELITA IRLANDA, MILAGROS IGNACIO, LINDA
SAMALA, JOSIE SUMARAN, LUZVIMINDA ABINES, JABONILLO, ADELIMA JAEL, ROWENA JARABJO,
ALMA ACOL, ROBERTO ADRIATICO, GLORIA ROBERT JAVILINAR, CLARITA JOSE,
AGUINALDO, ROSARIO ALEYO, CRISTETA CARMENCITA JUNDEZ, SOFIA LALUCIS, GLORIA
ALEJANDRO, LILIA ALMOGUERA, CARMEN LABITORIA, ANGELITA LODES, ERLINDA
AMARILLO, TRINIDAD ARDANIEL, CERINA LATOGA, EVELYN LEGASPI, ROMEO LIMCHOCO,
AVENTAJADO, ZENAIDA AVAYA, LOLITA ARABIS, JESUS LARA, ESTRELLA DE LUNA, LORETA
MARIA ARSENIA, SOFIA AGUINALDO, SALVE LAREZA, JOSEPHINE ALSCO, MERCY DE LEON,
ABAD, JOSEFINA AMBANGAN EMILIA AQUINO, CONSOLACION LIBAO, MARILYN LIWAG,
JOSEFINA AQUINO, JULIANA AUSAN, TERESITA LIZAZO, LILIA MACAPAGAL,
AMERCIANA ACOSTA, CONCEPCION ALEROZA, SALVACION MACAREZA, AMALIA MADO,
DIANA ADOVOS, FELY ADVINCULA, SEOMINTA TERESITA MADRIAGA, JOVITA MAGNAYE, JEAN
ARIAS, JOSEPHINE ARCEDE, NORMA AMISTOSO, MALABAD, FRANCISCA MENDOZA, NELCITA
PRESENTACION ALONOS, EMMA ATIENZA, MANGANTANG, TERESITA NELLA, GENEROZA
LEONIDA AQUINO, ANITA ARILLON, ADELAIDA MERCADO, CRISTETA MOJANA, BERNARDA
ARELLANO, NORMA AMISTOSO, JOSEPHINE MONGADO, LYDIA MIRANDA, ELISA
ARCEDE, SEMIONITA ARIAS, JOSEFINA BANTUG, MADRILEJOS, LOIDA MAGSINO, AMELIA MALTO,
LOLITA BARTE, HERMINIA BASCO, MARGARITA JULITA MAHIBA, MYRNA MAYORES, LUISA
BOTARDO, RUFINO BUGNOT, LOLITA BUSTILLO, MARAIG, FLORENCIA MARAIG, EMMA MONZON,
ISABEL BALAKIT, ROSARIO BARRERO, TESSIE IMELDA MAGDANGAN, VICTORIA MARTIN,
BALBOS, NORMA BENISANO, GUILLERMA NOEMI MANGUILLO, BASILIZA MEDINA,
BRUGES, BERNADETTE BARTOLOME, SHIRLEY VICTORIO MERCADO, ESTELA MAYPA, EMILIA
BELMONTE, MERONA BELZA, AZUCENA MENDOZA, LINA MAGPANTAY, FELICIANA
BERNALES, JOSE BASCO, NIMPHA BANTOG, MANLOLO, ELENA MANACOP, WILMA MORENO,
BENILDA BUBAN, REGINA BUBAN, SALOME JUANA MENDOZA, EVELYN DEL MUNDO, ROSIE
BARRAMEDA, IRENE BISCO, FELICITAS MATUTINA, MATILDE MANALO, TERESITA
BAUTISTA, VIOLETA BURA, LINA BINUYA, MENDEZ, FELIPINA MAGONCIA, MARIA
BIBIANA BAARDE, ELSA BAES, ANASTACIA MANZANO, LIGAYA MANALO, LETICIA MARCHA,
BELONZO, SONIA BENOYO, ELIZABETH MARINA MANDIGMA, LETICIA MANDASOC,
BACUNGAN, PATRICIA BARRAMEDA, ERLINDA PRESCILLA MARTINEZ, JULIA MENDOZA, PACITA
BARCELONA, EMMA BANICO, APOLONIA BUNAO, MAGALLANES, ANGELINA MARJES, SHIRLEY
LUCITA BOLEA, PACIFICA BARCELONA, EDITHA MELIGRITO, IRENE MERCADO, ELISA
BASIJAN, RENITA BADAMA, ELENA BALADAD, MAATUBANG, MARCELINA NICOLAS, AGUSTINA
NICOLAS, ROSA NOLASCO, WILMA NILAYE, NORMA RACELIS, LEONOR RIZALDO, JOSIE
VIOLETA ORACION, ANGELA OSTAYA, JUANITA SUMASAR, NANCY SAMALA, EMERLITA
OSAYOS, MAGDALENA OCAMPO, MARDIANA SOLAYAO, MERCEDITA SAMANIEGO, BLANDINA
OCTA, ROSELA OPAO, LIBRADA OCAMPO, SIMBULAN, JOCELYN SENDING, LUISITA
YOLANDA OLIVER, MARCIA ORLANDA, TABERRERO, TERESITA TIBAR, ESTERLINA
PAGDUNAN, RITA PABILONA, MYRA PALACA, VALDEZ, GLORIA VEJERANO, ILUMINADA
BETHLEHEM PALINES, GINA PALIGAR, NORMA VALENCIA, MERLITA DELA VEGA, VIRGIE
PALIGAR, DELMA PEREZ, CLAUDIA PRADO, LAITAN, JULIET VILLARAMA, LUISISTA OCAMPO,
JULIE PUTONG, LUDIVINA PAGSALINGAN, NARIO ANDRES, ANSELMA TULFO, GLORIA
MERLYN PANALIGAN, VIOLETA PANAMBITAN, MATEO, FLANIA MENDOZA, CONNIE CANGO,
NOREN PAR, ERLINDA PARAGAS, MILA PARINO, EDITHA SALAZAR, MYRNA DELOS SANTOS,
REBECCA PENAFLOR, IMELDA PENAMORA, TERESITA SERGIO, CHARITO GILLA,
JERMICILLIN PERALTA, REBECCA PIAPES, FLORENTINA HERNAEZ, BERNARDINO VIRGINIA,
EDITHA PILAR, MAROBETH PILLADO, DIOSCORO AMPO ANACORITA, SYLVIA POASADAS,
PIMENTEL, AURORA LAS PINAS, EVANGELINA ESTRELLA ESPIRITU, CONCORDIA LUZURIAGA,
PINON, MA. NITA PONDOC, MA. MERCEDES MARINA CERBITO, EMMA REYES, NOEMI
PODPOD, ANGELITO PANDEZ, LIGAYA PIGTAIN, PENISALES, CLARITA POLICARPIO, BELEN
LEONILA QUIAMBAO, ELENA QUINO, MARITESS BANGUIO, HERMINIA ADVINCULA, LILIA MORTA,
QUIJANO, CHOLITA REBUENO, LOLITA REYES, REGINA LAPIDARIO, LORNA LARGA, TERESITA
JOCELYN RAMOS, ROSITA RAMIREZ, ELINORA VINLUAN, MARITA TENOSO, NILDS SAYAT,
RAMOS, ISABEL RAMOS, ANNABELLE THELMA SARONG, DELMA REGALIS, SUSAN
RESURRECCION, EMMA REYES, ALILY ROXAS, RAFAULO, ELENA RONDINA, MYRNA PIENDA,
MARY GRACE DELOS REYES, JOCELYN DEL VIOLETA DUMELINA, FLORENCIA ADALID, FILMA
ROSARIO, JOSEFINA RABUSA, ANGELITA MELAYA, ERLINDA DE BAUTISTA, MATILDE DE
ROTAIRO, SAMCETA ROSETA, EDERLINA RUIZ, BLAS, DOLORES FACUNDO, REBECCA LEDAMA,
ZENAIDA ROSARIO, BENITA REBOLA, ROSITA MA. FE MACATANGAY, EMELITA MINON, NORMA
REVILLA, ROSITA SANTOS, ROWENA SALAZAR, PAGUIO, ELIZA VASQUEZ, GLORIA VILLARINO,
EMILYN SARMIENTO, ANA SENIS, ELOISA MA. JESUS FRANCISCO, TERESITA GURPIDO,
SANTOS, NARCISA SONGLIAD, ELMA SONGALIA, LIGAYA MANALO, FE PINEDA, MIRIAM OCMAR,
AMPARA SABIO, JESSIE SANCHEZ, VIVIAN LUISA SEGOVIA, TEODY ATIENZA, SOLEDA
SAMILO, GLORIA SUMALINOG, ROSALINA DELOS AZCURE, CARMEN DELA CRUZ, DMETRIA
SANTOS, MARIETA SOMBRERO, HELEN ESTONELO, MA. FLORIDA LOAZNO, IMELDA
SERRETARIO, TEODORO SULIT, BELLA MAHIYA, EDILBERTA MENDOZA, SYLVIA
SONGUINES, LINDA SARANTAN, ESTELLA POSADAS, SUSANA ORTEGA, JOSEPHINE D.
SALABAR, MILAGROS SISON, GLORIA TALIDAGA, TALIMORO, TERESITA LORECA, ARSENIA TISOY,
CECILIA TEODORO, ROMILLA TUAZON, AMELITA LIGAYA MANALO, TERESITA GURPIO, FE PINEDA,
TABULAO, MACARIA TORRES, LUTGARDA TUSI, and MARIA JESUS FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs.
ESTELLA TORREJOS, VICTORIA TAN, MERLITA HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NATIONAL LABOR
DELA VEGA, WEVINA ORENCIA, REMEDIOS RELATIONS COMMISSION, M. GREENFIELD (B),
BALECHA, TERESITA TIBAR, LACHICA LEONORA, INC., SAUL TAWIL, CARLOS T. JAVELOSA,
JULITA YBUT, JOSEFINA ZABALA, WINNIE RENATO C. PUANGCO, WINCEL LIGOT,
ZALDARIAGA, BENHUR ANTENERO, MARCELINA MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR.,
ANTENERO, ANTONINA ALAPAN, EDITHA GERVACIO CASILLANO, LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY.
ANTOZO, ROWENA ARABIT, ANDRA AQUINO, GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO
TERESITA ANGULO, MARIA ANGLO, MYRNA CABRERA, GAUDENCIO RACHO, SANTIAGO
ALBOS, ELENITA AUSTRIA, ANNA ABRIGUE, IBANEZ, AND RODRIGO AGUILING, respondents.
VIRGINIA ADOBAS, VICTORIA ANTIPUESTO,
REMEDIOS BOLECHE, MACARIA BARRIOS, DECISION
THELMA BELEN, ESTELLA BARRETTO, JOCELYN
CHAVEZ, VIRGINIA CAPISTRANO, BENEDICTA PURISIMA, J.:
CINCO, YOLLY CATPANG, REINA CUEVAS,
VICTORIA CALANZA, FE CASERO, ROBERTA At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
CATALBAS, LOURDES CAPANANG, CLEMENCIA the Revised Rules of Court to annul the decision of
CRUZ, JOCELYN COSTO, MERCEDITA CASTILLO, the National Labor Relations Commission in an
EDITHA DEE, LUCITA DONATO, NORMA unfair labor practice case instituted by a local
ESPIRIDION, LORETA FERNANDEZ, AURORA union against its employer company and the
FRANCISCO, VILMA FAJARDO, MODESTA officers of its national federation.
GABRENTINA, TERESITA GABRIEL, SALVACION
GAMBOA, JOSEPHINE IGNACIO, SUSAN IBARRA, The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga
ESPERANZA JABSON, OSCAR JAMBARO, Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., (B) (MSMG),
ROSANNA JARDIN, CORAZON JALOCON, hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an
ZENAIDA LEGASPI, DELLA LAGRAMADA, ROSITA affiliate of the private respondent, United Lumber
LIBRANDO, LIGAYA LUMAYOT, DELIA LUMBIS, and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP),
LEONORA LANCHICA, RELAGIA LACSI, JOSEFINA referred to as the "federation". The collective
LUMBO, VIOLETA DE LUNA, EVELYN MADRID, bargaining agreement between MSMG and M.
TERESITA MORILLA, GEMMA MAGPANTAY, Greenfield, Inc. names the parties as follows:
EMILY MENDOZA, IRENEA MEDINA, NARCISA
MABEZA, ROSANNA MEDINA, DELIA MARTINEZ, "This agreement made and entered into by and
ROSARIO MAG-ISA, EDITHA MENDOZA, between:
EDILBERTA MENDOZA, FIDELA PANGANIBAN,
OFELIA PANGANIBAN, AZUCENA POSTGO, M. GREENFIELD, INC. (B) a corporation duly
LOURDES PACHECO, LILIA PADILLA, MARISSA organized in accordance with the laws of the
PEREZ, FLORDELIZA PUMARES, LUZ REYES, Republic of the Philippines with office address at
Km. 14, Merville Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila,
represented in this act by its General manager, Mr.
Carlos T. Javelosa, hereinafter referred to as the
Company;
-and-
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
SA M. GREENFIELD (B) (MSMG)/UNITED
LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULGWP), a legitimate labor
organization with address at Suite 404, Trinity
Building, T.M. Kalaw Street, Manila, represented in
this act by a Negotiating Committee headed by its
National President, Mr. Godofredo Paceno, Sr.,
referred to in this Agreement as the UNION."[1]
The CBA includes, among others, the following
pertinent provisions:
Article II-Union Security
Section 1. Coverage and Scope. All employees who
are covered by this Agreement and presently
members of the UNION shall remain members of
the UNION for the duration of this Agreement as a
condition precedent to continued employment with
the COMPANY.
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
Section 4. Dismissal. Any such employee
mentioned in Section 2 hereof, who fails to
maintain his membership in the UNION for non-
payment of UNION dues, for resignation and for
violation of UNIONs Constitution and By-Laws and
any new employee as defined in Section 2 of this
Article shall upon written notice of such failure to
join or to maintain membership in the UNION and
upon written recommendation to the COMPANY by
the UNION, be dismissed from the employment by
the COMPANY; provided, however, that the UNION
shall hold the COMPANY free and blameless from
any and all liabilities that may arise should the
dismissed employee question, in any manner, his
dismissal; provided, further that the matter of the
employees dismissal under this Article may be
submitted as a grievance under Article XIII and,
provided, finally, that no such written
recommendation shall be made upon the
COMPANY nor shall COMPANY be compelled to act
upon any such recommendation within the period
of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of this
Agreement conformably to law."
Article IX
Section 4. Program Fund - The Company shall
provide the amount of P10, 000.00 a month for a
continuing labor education program which shall be
remitted to the Federation x x x."[2]
On September 12, 1986, a local union election was
held under the auspices of the ULGWP wherein the
herein petitioner, Beda Magdalena Villanueva, and
the other union officers were proclaimed as
winners. Minutes of the said election were duly
filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations on
September 29, 1986.
On March 21, 1987, a Petition for Impeachment
was filed with the national federation ULGWP by
the defeated candidates in the aforementioned
election.
On June 16, 1987, the federation conducted an
audit of the local union funds. The investigation
did not yield any unfavorable result and the local
union officers were cleared of the charges of
anomaly in the custody, handling and disposition
of the union funds.
The 14 defeated candidates filed a Petition for
Impeachment/Expulsion of the local union officers
with the DOLE NCR on November 5, 1987,
docketed as NCR-OD-M-11-780-87. However, the
same was dismissed on March 2, 1988, by Med-
Arbiter Renato Parungo for failure to substantiate
the charges and to present evidence in support of
the allegations.
On April 17, 1988, the local union held a general
membership meeting at the Caruncho Complex in
Pasig. Several union members failed to attend the
meeting, prompting the Executive Board to create a
committee tasked to investigate the non-
attendance of several union members in the said
assembly, pursuant to Sections 4 and 5, Article V
of the Constitution and By-Laws of the union,
which read:
"Seksyon 4. Ang mga kinukusang hindi pagdalo o
hindi paglahok sa lahat ng hakbangin ng unyon ng
sinumang kasapi o pinuno ay maaaring maging
sanhi ng pagtitiwalag o pagpapataw ng multa ng
hindi hihigit sa P50.00 sa bawat araw na
nagkulang.
Seksyon 5. Ang sinumang dadalo na aalis ng hindi
pa natatapos ang pulong ay ituturing na pagliban
at maparusahan ito ng alinsunod sa Article V,
Seksyong 4 ng Saligang Batas na ito. Sino mang
kasapi o pisyales na mahuli and dating sa takdang
oras ng di lalampas sa isang oras ay magmumulta
ng P25.00 at babawasin sa sahod sa pamamagitan
ng salary deduction at higit sa isang oras ng
pagdating ng huli ay ituturing na pagliban.[3]
On June 27, 1988, the local union wrote
respondent company a letter requesting it to
deduct the union fines from the wages/salaries of
those union members who failed to attend the
general membership meeting. A portion of the said
letter stated:
"xxx xxx xxx
In connection with Section 4 Article II of our
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement, please
deduct the amount of P50.00 from each of the
union members named in said annexes on the
payroll of July 2-8, 1988 as fine for their failure to
attend said general membership meeting."[4]
In a Memorandum dated July 3, 1988, the
Secretary General of the national federation,
Godofredo Paceo, Jr. disapproved the resolution of
the local union imposing the P50.00 fine. The
union officers protested such action by the
Federation in a Reply dated July 4, 1988.
On July 11, 1988, the Federation wrote respondent
company a letter advising the latter not to deduct
the fifty-peso fine from the salaries of the union
members requesting that:
" x x x any and all future representations by MSMG
affecting a number of members be first cleared
from the federation before corresponding action by
the Company."[5]
The following day, respondent company sent a
reply to petitioner unions request in a letter,
stating that it cannot deduct fines from the
employees salary without going against certain
laws. The company suggested that the union refer
the matter to the proper government office for
resolution in order to avoid placing the company in
the middle of the issue.
The imposition of P50.00 fine became the subject
of bitter disagreement between the Federation and
the local union culminating in the latters
declaration of general autonomy from the former
through Resolution No. 10 passed by the local
executive board and ratified by the general
membership on July 16, 1988.
In retaliation, the national federation asked
respondent company to stop the remittance of the
local unions share in the education funds effective
August 1988. This was objected to by the local
union which demanded that the education fund be
remitted to it in full.
The company was thus constrained to file a
Complaint for Interpleader with a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Med-Arbitration Branch
of the Department of Labor and Employment,
docketed as Case No. OD-M-8-435-88. This was
resolved on October 28, 1988, by Med-Arbiter
Anastacio Bactin in an Order, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
ordered:
1. That the United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines (ULGWP) through its local union
officers shall administer the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA).
2. That petitioner company shall remit the
P10,000.00 monthly labor education program fund
to the ULGWP subject to the condition that it shall
use the said amount for its intended purpose.
3. That the Treasurer of the MSMG shall be
authorized to collect from the 356 union members
the amount of P50.00 as penalty for their failure to
attend the general membership assembly on April
17, 1988.
However, if the MSMG Officers could present the
individual written authorizations of the 356 union
members, then the company is obliged to deduct
from the salaries of the 356 union members the
P50.00 fine."[6]
On appeal, Director Pura-Ferrer Calleja issued a
Resolution dated February 7, 1989, which modified
in part the earlier disposition, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
portion is hereby modified to the extent that the
company should remit the amount of five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) of the P10,000.00 monthly labor
education program fund to ULGWP and the other
P5,000.00 to MSMG, both unions to use the same
for its intended purpose."[7]
Meanwhile, on September 2, 1988, several local
unions (Top Form, M. Greenfield, Grosby, Triumph
International, General Milling, and Vander Hons
chapters) filed a Petition for Audit and
Examination of the federation and education funds
of ULGWP which was granted by Med-Arbiter
Rasidali Abdullah on December 25, 1988 in an
Order which directed the audit and examination of
the books of account of ULGWP.
On September 30, 1988, the officials of ULGWP
called a Special National Executive Board Meeting
at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte where a Resolution
was passed placing the MSMG under trusteeship
and appointing respondent Cesar Clarete as
administrator.
On October 27, 1988, the said administrator wrote
the respondent company informing the latter of its
designation of a certain Alfredo Kalingking as local
union president and "disauthorizing" the
incumbent union officers from representing the
employees. This action by the national federation
was protested by the petitioners in a letter to
respondent company dated November 11, 1988.
On November 13, 1988, the petitioner union
officers received identical letters from the
administrator requiring them to explain within 72
hours why they should not be removed from their
office and expelled from union membership.
On November 26, 1988, petitioners replied:
(a) Questioning the validity of the alleged National
Executive Board Resolution placing their union
under trusteeship;
(b) Justifying the action of their union in declaring
a general autonomy from ULGWP due to the latters
inability to give proper educational, organizational
and legal services to its affiliates and the pendency
of the audit of the federation funds;
(c) Advising that their union did not commit any
act of disloyalty as it has remained an affiliate of
ULGWP;
(d) Giving ULGWP a period of five (5) days to cease
and desist from further committing acts of
coercion, intimidation and harrassment.[8]
However, as early as November 21, 1988, the
officers were expelled from the ULGWP. The
termination letter read:
"Effective today, November 21, 1988, you are
hereby expelled from UNITED LUMBER AND
GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ULGWP) for committing acts of disloyalty and/or
acts inimical to the interest and violative to the
Constitution and by-laws of your federation.
You failed and/or refused to offer an explanation
inspite of the time granted to you.
Since you are no longer a member of good
standing, ULGWP is constrained to recommend for
your termination from your employment, and
provided in Article II Section 4, known as UNION
SECURITY, in the Collective Bargaining
agreement."[9]
On the same day, the federation advised
respondent company of the expulsion of the 30
union officers and demanded their separation from
employment pursuant to the Union Security
Clause in their collective bargaining agreement.
This demand was reiterated twice, through letters
dated February 21 and March 4, 1989,
respectively, to respondent company.
Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
to compel the company to effect the immediate
termination of the expelled union officers.
On March 7, 1989, under the pressure of a
threatened strike, respondent company terminated
the 30 union officers from employment, serving
them identical copies of the termination letter
reproduced below:
We received a demand letter dated 21 November
1988 from the United Lumber and General
Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP) demanding for
your dismissal from employment pursuant to the
provisions of Article II, Section 4 of the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In the said
demand letter, ULGWP informed us that as of
November 21, 1988, you were expelled from the
said federation "for committing acts of disloyalty
and/or acts inimical to the interest of ULGWP and
violative to its Constitution and By-laws
particularly Article V, Section 6, 9, and 12, Article
XIII, Section 8."
In subsequent letters dated 21 February and 4
March 1989, the ULGWP reiterated its demand for
your dismissal, pointing out that notwithstanding
your expulsion from the federation, you have
continued in your employment with the company
in violation of Sec. 1 and 4 of Article II of our CBA,
and of existing provisions of law.
In view thereof, we are left with no alternative but
to comply with the provisions of the Union Security
Clause of our CBA. Accordingly, we hereby serve
notice upon you that we are dismissing you from
your employment with M. Greenfield, Inc.,
pursuant to Sections 1 and 4, Article II of the CBA
effective immediately."[10]
On that same day, the expelled union officers
assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily
brought out of the company premises by the
companys security guards. Likewise, those
assigned to the second shift were not allowed to
report for work. This provoked some of the
members of the local union to demonstrate their
protest for the dismissal of the said union officers.
Some union members left their work posts and
walked out of the company premises.
On the other hand, the Federation, having
achieved its objective, withdrew the Notice of Strike
filed with the NCMB.
On March 8, 1989, the petitioners filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB, DOLE, Manila, docketed as
Case No. NCMB-NCR-NS-03-216-89, alleging the
following grounds for the strike:
(a) Discrimination
(b) Interference in union activities
(c) Mass dismissal of union officers and shop
stewards
(d) Threats, coercion and intimidation
(e) Union busting
The following day, March 9, 1989, a strike vote
referendum was conducted and out of 2, 103 union
members who cast their votes, 2,086 members
voted to declare a strike.
On March 10, 1989, the thirty (30) dismissed
union officers filed an urgent petition, docketed as
Case No. NCMB-NCR-NS-03-216-89, with the
Offfice of the Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment praying for the suspension of the
effects of their termination from employment.
However, the petition was dismissed by then
Secretary Franklin Drilon on April 11, 1989, the
pertinent portion of which stated as follows:
"At this point in time, it is clear that the dispute at
M. Greenfield is purely an intra-union matter. No
mass lay-off is evident as the terminations have
been limited to those allegedly leading the
secessionist group leaving MSMG-ULGWP to form
a union under the KMU. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding no sufficient jurisdiction to
warrant the exercise of our extraordinary authority
under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended, the instant Petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."[11]
On March 13 and 14, 1989, a total of 78 union
shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension by respondent company. This
prompted the union members to again stage a
walk-out and resulted in the official declaration of
strike at around 3:30 in the afternoon of March 14,
1989. The strike was attended with violence, force
and intimidation on both sides resulting to
physical injuries to several employees, both
striking and non-striking, and damage to company
properties.
The employees who participated in the strike and
allegedly figured in the violent incident were placed
under preventive suspension by respondent
company. The company also sent return-to-work
notices to the home addresses of the striking
employees thrice successively, on March 27, April
8 and April 31, 1989, respectively. However,
respondent company admitted that only 261
employees were eventually accepted back to work.
Those who did not respond to the return-to-work
notice were sent termination letters dated May 17,
1989, reproduced below:
M. Greenfield Inc., (B)
Km. 14, Merville Rd., Paraaque, M.M.
May 17, 1989
xxx
On March 14, 1989, without justifiable cause and
without due notice, you left your work assignment
at the prejudice of the Companys operations. On
March 27, April 11, and April 21, 1989, we sent
you notices to report to the Company. Inspite of
your receipt of said notices, we have not heard
from you up to this date.
Accordingly, for your failure to report, it is
construed that you have effectively abandoned
your employment and the Company is, therefore,
constrained to dismiss you for said cause.
Very truly yours,
M. GREENFIELD, INC., (B)
By:
WENZEL STEPHEN LIGOT
Asst. HRD Manager"[12]
On August 7, 1989, the petitioners filed a verified
complaint with the Arbitration Branch, National
Capital Region, DOLE, Manila, docketed as Case
No. NCR-00-09-04199-89, charging private
respondents of unfair labor practice which consists
of union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, interference in union activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion,
violence, and oppresion.
After the filing of the complaint, the lease contracts
on the respondent companys office and factory at
Merville Subdivision, Paraaque expired and were
not renewed. Upon demand of the owners of the
premises, the company was compelled to vacate its
office and factory.
Thereafter, the company transferred its
administration and account/client servicing
department at AFP-RSBS Industrial Park in
Taguig, Metro Manila. For failure to find a suitable
place in Metro Manila for relocation of its factory
and manufacturing operations, the company was
constrained to move the said departments to
Tacloban, Leyte. Hence, on April 16, 1990,
respondent company accordingly notified its
employees of a temporary shutdown. in operations.
Employees who were interested in relocating to
Tacloban were advised to enlist on or before April
23, 1990.
The complaint for unfair labor practice was
assigned to Labor Arbiter Manuel Asuncion but
was thereafter reassigned to Labor Arbiter
Cresencio Ramos when respondents moved to
inhibit him from acting on the case.
On December 15, 1992, finding the termination to
be valid in compliance with the union security
clause of the collective bargaining agreement,
Labor Arbiter Cresencio Ramos dismissed the
complaint.
Petitioners then appealed to the NLRC. During its
pendency, Commissioner Romeo Putong retired
from the service, leaving only two commissioners,
Commissioner Vicente Veloso III and Hon.
Chairman Bartolome Carale in the First Division.
When Commissioner Veloso inhibited himself from
the case, Commissioner Joaquin Tanodra of the
Third Division was temporarily designated to sit in
the First Division for the proper disposition of the
case.
The First Division affirmed the Labor Arbiters
disposition. With the denial of their motion for
reconsideration on January 28, 1994, petitioners
elevated the case to this Court, attributing grave
abuse of discretion to public respondent NLRC in:
I. UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE UNION
OFFICERS BY RESPONDENT COMPANY AS
VALID;
II. HOLDING THAT THE STRIKE STAGED BYTHE
PETITIONERS AS ILLEGAL;
III. HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
EMPLOYEES WERE DEEMED TO HAVE
ABANDONED THEIR WORK AND HENCE,
VALIDLY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENT
COMPANY; AND
IV. NOT FINDING RESPONDENT COMPANY AND
RESPONDENT FEDERATION OFFICERS GUILTY
OF ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
Notwithstanding the several issues raised by the
petitioners and respondents in the voluminous
pleadings presented before the NLRC and this
Court, they revolve around and proceed from the
issue of whether or not respondent company was
justified in dismissing petitioner employees merely
upon the labor federations demand for the
enforcement of the union security clause embodied
in their collective bargaining agreement.
Before delving into the main issue, the procedural
flaw pointed out by the petitioners should first be
resolved.
Petitioners contend that the decision rendered by
the First Division of the NLRC is not valid because
Commissioner Tanodra, who is from the Third
Division, did not have any lawful authority to sit,
much less write the ponencia, on a case pending
before the First Division. It is claimed that a
commissioner from one division of the NLRC
cannot be assigned or temporarily designated to
another division because each division is assigned
a particular territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the
decision rendered did not have any legal effect at
all for being irregularly issued.
Petitioners argument is misplaced. Article 213 of
the Labor Code in enumerating the powers of the
Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Commission provides that:
"The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners of a
division shall be necessary for the pronouncement
of a judgment or resolution. Whenever the required
membership in a division is not complete and the
concurrence of two (2) commissioners to arrive at a
judgment or resolution cannot be obtained, the
Chairman shall designate such number of
additional Commissioners from the other divisions
as may be necessary."
It must be remembered that during the pendency
of the case in the First Division of the NLRC, one of
the three commissioners, Commissioner Romeo
Putong, retired, leaving Chairman Bartolome
Carale and Commissioner Vicente Veloso III.
Subsequently, Commissioner Veloso inhibited
himself from the case because the counsel for the
petitioners was his former classmate in law school.
The First Division was thus left with only one
commissioner. Since the law requires the
concurrence of two commisioners to arrive at a
judgment or resolution, the Commission was
constrained to temporarily designate a clause of the CBA which is the law between the
commissioner from another division to complete
the First Division. There is nothing irregular at all
in such a temporary designation for the law
empowers the Chairman to make temporary
assignments whenever the required concurrence is
not met. The law does not say that a commissioner
from the first division cannot be temporarily
assigned to the second or third division to fill the
gap or vice versa. The territorial divisions do not
confer exclusive jurisdiction to each division and
are merely designed for administrative efficiency.
Going into the merits of the case, the court finds
that the Complaint for unfair labor practice filed by
the petitioners against respondent company which
charges union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, interference in union activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion,
violence, and oppression actually proceeds from
one main issue which is the termination of several
employees by respondent company upon the
demand of the labor federation pursuant to the
union security clause embodied in their collective
bargaining agreement.
Petitioners contend that their dismissal from work
was effected in an arbitrary, hasty, capricious and
illegal manner because it was undertaken by the
respondent company without any prior
administrative investigation; that, had respondent
company conducted prior independent
investigation it would have found that their
expulsion from the union was unlawful similarly
for lack of prior administrative investigation; that
the federation cannot recommend the dismissal of
the union officers because it was not a principal
party to the collective bargaining agreement
between the company and the union; that public
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
when they declared petitioners dismissals as valid
and the union strike as illegal and in not declaring
that respondents were guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Private respondents, on the other hand, maintain
that the thirty dismissed employees who were
former officers of the federation have no cause of
action against the company, the termination of
their employment having been made upon the
demand of the federation pursuant to the union
security clause of the CBA; the expelled officers of
the local union were accorded due process of law
prior to their expulsion from their federation; that
the strike conducted by the petitioners was illegal
for noncompliance with the requirements; that the
employees who participated in the illegal strike and
in the commission of violence thereof were validly
terminated from work; that petitioners were
deemed to have abandoned their employment when
they did not respond to the three return to work
notices sent to them; that petitioner labor union
has no legal personality to file and prosecute the
case for and on behalf of the individual employees
as the right to do so is personal to the latter; and
that, the officers of respondent company cannot be
liable because as mere corporate officers, they
acted within the scope of their authority.
Public respondent, through the Labor Arbiter,
ruled that the dismissed union officers were validly
and legally terminated because the dismissal was
effected in compliance with the union security
parties. And this was affimed by the Commission
on appeal. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter declared
that notwithstanding the lack of a prior
administrative investigation by respondent
company, under the union security clause
provision in the CBA, the company cannot look
into the legality or illegality of the recommendation
to dismiss by the union nd the obligation to
dismiss is ministerial on the part of the company.
[13]
This ruling of the NLRC is erroneous. Although this
Court has ruled that union security clauses
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement
may be validly enforced and that dismissals
pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does
not erode the fundamental requirement of due
process. The reason behind the enforcement of
union security clauses which is the sanctity and
inviolability of contracts[14] cannot override ones
right to due process.
In the case of Cario vs. National Labor Relations
Commission,[15] this Court pronounced that while
the company, under a maintenance of membership
provision of the collective bargaining agreement, is
bound to dismiss any employee expelled by the
union for disloyalty upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and
summarily. The company acts in bad faith in
dismissing a worker without giving him the benefit
of a hearing.
"The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of
the employer. However, this is not without
limitation. The employer is bound to exercise
caution in terminating the services of his
employees especially so when it is made upon the
request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, xxx. Dismissals must not
be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be
observed in dismissing an employee because it
affects not only his position but also his means of
livelihood. Employers should respect and protect
the rights of their employees, which include the
right to labor."
In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union
officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly
commiting acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the
interest of ULGWP and in violation of its
Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the
federation, the company terminated the petitioners
without conducting a separate and independent
investigation. Respondent company did not inquire
into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not
the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the
same. Relying merely upon the federations
allegations, respondent company terminated
petitioners from employment when a separate
inquiry could have revealed if the federation had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the
union officers. Respondent companys allegation
that petitioners were accorded due process is
belied by the termination letters received by the
petitioners which state that the dismissal shall be
immediately effective.
As held in the aforecited case of Cario, "the right of
an employee to be informed of the charges against
him and to reasonable opportunity to present his
side in a controversy with either the company or
his own union is not wiped away by a union
security clause or a union shop clause in a
collective bargaining agreement. An employee is
entitled to be protected not only from a company
which disregards his rights but also from his own
union the leadership of which could yield to the
temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from
membership and mere dismissal from his job."
While respondent company may validly dismiss the
employees expelled by the union for disloyalty
under the union security clause of the collective
bargaining agreement upon the recommendation
by the union, this dismissal should not be done
hastily and summarily thereby eroding the
employees right to due process, self-organization
and security of tenure. The enforcement of union
security clauses is authorized by law provided
such enforcement is not characterized by
arbitrariness, and always with due process.[16]
Even on the assumption that the federation had
valid grounds to expell the union officers, due
process requires that these union officers be
accorded a separate hearing by respondent
company.
In its decision, public respondent also declared
that if complainants (herein petitioners) have any
recourse in law, their right of action is against the
federation and not against the company or its
officers, relying on the findings of the Labor
Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner
union officers by the federation is a purely intra-
union matter.
Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is
true that the issue of expulsion of the local union
officers is originally between the local union and
the federation, hence, intra-union in character, the
issue was later on converted into a termination
dispute when the company dismissed the
petitioners from work without the benefit of a
separate notice and hearing. As a matter of fact,
the records reveal that the the termination was
effective on the same day that the the termination
notice was served on the petitioners.
In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union
vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.[17], the Court held
the company liable for the payment of backwages
for having acted in bad faith in effecting the
dismissal of the employees.
"xxx Bad faith on the part of the respondent
company may be gleaned from the fact that the
petitioner workers were dismissed hastily and
summarily. At best, it was guilty of a tortious act,
for which it must assume solidary liability, since it
apparently chose to summarily dismiss the
workers at the unions instance secure in the
unions contractual undertaking that the union
would hold it free from any liability arising from
such dismissal."
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal
was at the instance of the federation and that it
undertook to hold the company free from any
liability resulting from such a dismissal, the
company may still be held liable if it was remiss in
its duty to accord the would-be dismissed
employees their right to be heard on the matter.
Anent petitioners contention that the federation
was not a principal party to the collective
bargaining agreement between the company and
the union, suffice it to say that the matter was
already ruled upon in the Interpleader case filed by
respondent company. Med-Arbiter Anastacio
Bactin thus ruled:
After a careful examination of the facts and
evidences presented by the parties, this Officer
hereby renders its decision as follows:
1.) It appears on record that in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which took effect on
July 1, 1986, the contracting parties are M.
Greenfield, Inc. (B) and Malayang Samahan ng Mga
Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc. (B)
(MSMG)/United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines (ULGWP). However, MSMG was not
yet a registered labor organization at the time of
the signing of the CBA. Hence, the union referred
to in the CBA is the ULGWP."[18]
Likewise on appeal, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja
put the issue to rest as follows:
It is undisputed that ULGWP is the certified sole
and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all the
regular rank-and-file workers of the company, M.
Greenfield, Inc. (pages 31-32 of the records).
It has been established also that the company and
ULGWP signed a 3-year collective bargaining
agreement effective July 1, 1986 up to June 30,
1989.[19]
Although the issue of whether or not the federation
had reasonable grounds to expel the petitioner
union officers is properly within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, being an intra-union conflict, this Court
deems it justifiable that such issue be nonetheless
ruled upon, as the Labor Arbiter did, for to remand
the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations would
be to intolerably delay the case.
The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner union
officers were justifiably expelled from the federation
for committing acts of disloyalty when it
"undertook to disaffiliate from the federation by
charging ULGWP with failure to provide any legal,
educational or organizational support to the local.
x x x and declared autonomy, wherein they
prohibit the federation from interfering in any
internal and external affairs of the local union."[20]
It is well-settled that findings of facts of the NLRC
are entitled to great respect and are generally
binding on this Court, but it is equally well-settled
that the Court will not uphold erroneous
conclusions of the NLRC as when the Court finds
insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to
support those factual findings. The same holds
true when it is perceived that far too much is
concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or
incomplete facts appearing of record.[21]
In its decision, the Labor Arbiter declared that the
act of disaffiliation and declaration of autonomy by
the local union was part of its "plan to take over
the respondent federation." This is purely
conjecture and speculation on the part of public
respondent, totally unsupported by the evidence.
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its
mother union or declare its autonomy. A local
union, being a separate and voluntary association,
is free to serve the interests of all its members
including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its
autonomy from the federation to which it belongs
when circumstances warrant, in accordance with
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association.[22]
The purpose of affiliation by a local union with a
mother union or a federation
"xxx is to increase by collective action the
bargaining power in respect of the terms and
conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the
basic units of association, free to serve their own
and the common interest of all, subject to the
restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-
Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce
the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms
laid down in the agreement which brought it into
existence."[23]
Thus, a local union which has affiliated itself with
a federation is free to sever such affiliation anytime
and such disaffiliation cannot be considered
disloyalty. In the absence of specific provisions in
the federations constitution prohibiting
disaffiliation or the declaration of autonomy of a
local union, a local may dissociate with its parent
union.[24]
The evidence on hand does not show that there is
such a provision in ULGWPs constitution.
Respondents reliance upon Article V, Section 6, of
the federations constitution is not right because
said section, in fact, bolsters the petitioner unions
claim of its right to declare autonomy:
Section 6. The autonomy of a local union affiliated
with ULGWP shall be respected insofar as it
pertains to its internal affairs, except as provided
elsewhere in this Constitution.
There is no disloyalty to speak of, neither is there
any violation of the federations constitution
because there is nothing in the said constitution
which specifically prohibits disaffiliation or
declaration of autonomy. Hence, there cannot be
any valid dismissal because Article II, Section 4 of
the union security clause in the CBA limits the
dismissal to only three (3) grounds, to wit: failure
to maintain membership in the union (1) for non-
payment of union dues, (2) for resignation; and (3)
for violation of the unions Constitution and By-
Laws.
To support the finding of disloyalty, the Labor
Arbiter gave weight to the fact that on February 26,
1989, the petitioners declared as vacant all the
responsible positions of ULGWP, filled these
vacancies through an election and filed a petition
for the registration of UWP as a national
federation. It should be pointed out, however, that
these occurred after the federation had already
expelled the union officers. The expulsion was
effective November 21, 1988. Therefore, the act of
establishing a different federation, entirely separate
from the federation which expelled them, is but a
normal retaliatory reaction to their expulsion.
With regard to the issue of the legality or illegality
of the strike, the Labor Arbiter held that the strike
was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was
based on an intra-union dispute which cannot
properly be the subject of a strike, the right to
strike being limited to cases of bargaining
deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made
in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in
the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence,
force and intimidation upon the persons of the
company officials, other employees reporting for
work and third persons having legitimate business
with the company, resulting to serious physical
injuries to several employees and damage to
company property.
On the submission that the strike was illegal for
being grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is,
the intra-union conflict between the federation and
the local union, it bears reiterating that when
respondent company dismissed the union officers,
the issue was transformed into a termination
dispute and brought respondent company into the
picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in
dismissing them upon request by the federation,
respondent company was guilty of unfair labor
pratice in that it violated the petitioners right to
self-organization. The strike was staged to protest
respondent companys act of dismissing the union
officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor
practice are subsequently found out to be untrue,
the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.
[25]
Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the
strike illegal is due to the existence of a no strike
no lockout provision in the CBA. Again, such a
ruling is erroneous. A no strike, no lock out
provision can only be invoked when the strike is
economic in nature, i.e. to force wage or other
concessions from the employer which he is not
required by law to grant.[26] Such a provision
cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike
which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was
the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again,
whether or not there was indeed unfair labor
practice does not affect the strike.
On the allegation of violence committed in the
course of the strike, it must be remembered that
the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that
"the parties are agreed that there were violent
incidents x x x resulting to injuries to both sides,
the union and management."[27] The evidence on
record show that the violence cannot be attributed
to the striking employees alone for the company
itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers.
With violence committed on both sides, the
management and the employees, such violence
cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as
illegal.
With respect to the dismissal of individual
petitioners, the Labor Arbiter declared that their
refusal to heed respondents recall to work notice is
a clear indication that they were no longer
interested in continuing their employment and is
deemed abandonment. It is admitted that three
return to work notices were sent by respondent
company to the striking employees on March 27,
April 11, and April 21, 1989 and that 261
employees who responded to the notice were
admittted back to work.
However, jurisprudence holds that for
abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1)
that the employee must have failed to report for
work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have
been a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship manifested by some overt
acts.[28] Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the
part of the employee to go back to his work post
amd resume his employment must be established.
Absence must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore.[29] And
the burden of proof to show that there was
unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the
employer.
In the present case, respondents failed to prove
that there was a clear intention on the part of the
striking employees to sever their employer-
employee relationship. Although admittedly the
company sent three return to work notices to
them, it has not been substantially proven that
these notices were actually sent and received by
the employees. As a matter of fact, some employees
deny that they ever received such notices. Others
alleged that they were refused entry to the
company premises by the security guards and were
advised to secure a clearance from ULGWP and to
sign a waiver. Some employees who responded to
the notice were allegedly told to wait for further
notice from respondent company as there was lack
of work.
Furthermore, this Court has ruled that an
employee who took steps to protest his lay-off
cannot be said to have abandoned his work.[30]
The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is
inconsistent with the allegation of abandonment.
In the case under consideration, the petitioners
did, in fact, file a complaint when they were
refused reinstatement by respondent company.
Anent public respondents finding that there was
no unfair labor practice on the part of respondent
company and federation officers, the Court
sustains the same. As earlier discussed, union
security clauses in collective bargaining
agreements, if freely and voluntarily entered into,
are valid and binding. Corrolarily, dismissals
pursuant to union security clauses are valid and
legal subject only to the requirement of due
process, that is, notice and hearing prior to
dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by
the company pursuant to a labor unions demand
in accordance with a union security agreement
does not constitute unfair labor practice.[31]
However, the dismissal was invalidated in this case
because of respondent companys failure to accord
petitioners with due process, that is, notice and
hearing prior to their termination. Also, said
dismissal was invalidated because the reason
relied upon by respondent Federation was not
valid. Nonetheless, the dismissal still does not
constitute unfair labor practice.
Lastly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds,
that respondent company officials cannot be held
personally liable for damages on account of the
employees dismissal because the employer
corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from its officers who merely acted as its agents.
It has come to the attention of this Court that the
30-day prior notice requirement for the dismissal
of employees has been repeatedly violated and the
sanction imposed for such violation enunciated in
Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC[32] has become an
ineffective deterrent. Thus, the Court recently
promulgated a decision to reinforce and make more
effective the requirement of notice and hearing, a
procedure that must be observed before
termination of employment can be legally effected.
In Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC and Isetann
Department Store (G.R. No. 117040, January 27,
2000), the Court ruled that an employee who is
dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized
cause but without prior notice of his termination,
is entitled to full backwages from the time he was
terminated until the decision in his case becomes
final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in
case the dismissal was without just or valid cause,
the backwages shall be computed from the time of
his dismissal until his actual reinstatement. In the
case at bar, where the requirement of notice and
hearing was not complied with, the aforecited
doctrine laid down in the Serrano case applies.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the
decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the respondent
company is hereby ordered to immediately
reinstate the petitioners to their respective
positions. Should reinstatement be not feasible,
respondent company shall pay separation pay of
one month salary for every year of service. Since
petitioners were terminated without the requisite
written notice at least 30 days prior to their
termination, following the recent ruling in the case
of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Isetann Department Store, the
respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full
backwages to petitioner-employees while the
Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to
petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon
its instigation. Since the dismissal of petitioners
was without cause, backwages shall be computed
from the time the herein petitioner employees and
union officers were dismissed until their actual
reinstatement. Should reinstatement be not
feasible, their backwages shall be computed from
the time petitioners were terminated until the
finality of this decision. Costs against the
respondent company.
SO ORDERED.