Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
No. 16-1558
Lawrence Peikes
Counsel of Record
Jeffrey R. Babbin
WIGGIN AND DANA LLP
Two Stamford Plaza
281 Tresser Boulevard
Stamford, CT 06901
(203) 363-7609
lpeikes@wiggin.com
jbabbin@wiggin.com
DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS
26.1:
this case:
i
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ii
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Seattle University
Seton Hall University
Siena College
St. Bonaventure University
St. Francis College
St. John's University
St. Peter's University
Stetson University
Temple University
University of Dayton
University of Delaware
University of Denver
University of Detroit Mercy
University of Evansville
University of Miami
University of New Hampshire (University System of New Hampshire)
University of Notre Dame
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh
University of Portland
University of Rhode Island
University of Richmond
University of Tulsa
Valparaiso University
Vanderbilt University
Villanova University
Wagner College
Wofford College
Xavier University
Yale University
have appeared for the parties in this case (including proceedings in the
iii
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corporations, if any; and ii) list any publicly held company that owns
/s/Alan L. McLaughlin
Alan L. McLaughlin
Counsel of Record
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
111 Monument Circle, Suite 702
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: 317.287.3600
Fax: (317) 636-0712
amclaughlin@littler.com
iv
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/s/William F. Allen
William F. Allen
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
815 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 842-3400
Fax: (202) 842-0011
ballen@littler.com
/s/Donald S. Prophete
Donald S. Prophete
COSTANGY BROOKS SMITH &
PROPHETE LLP
2600 Grand Blvd, Suite 750
Kansas City, MO 64108
Tel: (816) 329-5930
Fax: (816) 472-6401
dprophete@constangy.com
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1. The full name of every party that the attorney represents in this
appeared for the party in this case (including proceedings in the district
the party in this court: Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
corporations, if any; and ii) list any publicly held company that owns
vi
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1. The full name of every party that the attorney represents in this
appeared for the party in this case (including proceedings in the district
corporations, if any; and ii) list any publicly held company that owns
vii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 66
RULE 32 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................... 67
PROOF OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 68
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ....... 41
Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) .................. 13
Alexander v. Stratus Building Solutions, No. 4:14 CV 921 CDP, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 164194, *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24, 2014) ........................................ 59
Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) ........................... 63
Ambrosia Land Investments, LLC. v. Peabody Coal Co., 521 F.3d 778, 781
(7th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................. 37
Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 804 (2016) ....................................................... 17, 18, 57, 64
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................... 13, 14, 17, 18, 22
Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir.
1992) ................................................................................................................ 28
Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) ...... 25, 36
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................... 14, 17, 22
Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 409 (7th Cir. 2005).......................................... 6
Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) ....................................... 34, 50
Blanchar v. Standard Insurance Co., 736 F. 3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2013) ...... 58
Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 462 (7th Cir. 2010) .......................... 63
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) ........................................... 13
Brower v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1998) .... 57
Brown v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 755 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2014) ....... 21, 24
Callahan v. City of Chicago, 813 F.3d 658, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2667 (7th
Cir. 2016)............................................................................................... 7, 25, 32
Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) .... 19
Charleston v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 741 F.3d 769 (7th Cir.
2013) .............................................................................................. 12, 13, 14, 65
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-70 (2012). 44
Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 125 Mich. App. 35, 42-44 (1983) ................ 55
Colorado Seminary (University of Denver) v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n., 570 F.2d 320, 321 (10th Cir. 1978) .................................................... 56
Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1996) ............................ 26
Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1982) .... 35
Doyle v. City of New York, 91 F. Supp. 3d 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ................ 26, 58
Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC, 739 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 2014) ................. 40
Emanuel v. Rolling in the Dough, Inc. No. 10 C 2270, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
166206, *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2012) ....................................................... 21
Equity in Athletics, Inc., v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 681 (W.D. Va.
2009) ................................................................................................................ 56
xi
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Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 390 (2008) ............................. 40
Freeman v. Key Largo Volunteer Fire & Rescue Dep’t, 494 Fed. Appx. 940,
944 (11th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................. 57, 61
Fuss v. State, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55699, at *14-19 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 9,
2006) ................................................................................................................ 61
G&S Holdings LLC v. Continental Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2012)
......................................................................................................................... 63
Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05 Civ. 3351 (SHS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69491,
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) ......................................................................... 56
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015), as
amended, 811 F.3d 528 (2016) ......................................... 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256-57 (2006) ............................................. 41
Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013)....... 63
Guevara v. INS, No. 90-1476, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 219 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6,
1992) ................................................................................................................ 58
Hallak v. L3 Communications Corp., 490 Fed. Appx. 2 (9th Cir. 2012) ......... 57
Hallisey v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 99-CIV-3785 (KTD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12964, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2006) ............................................................. 21
Han v. United Continental Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2014) . 13, 60
Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) ........................................... 9
Karr v. Strong Dectective Agency, Inc., 787 F.2d 1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1986) . 24
Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 440 Mass. 195 (Mass. 2003) .............. 55
Kellar v. Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 2011) .......................... 15
Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletics Ass’n, 15 F. Supp. 2d 740,
759 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ........................................................................ 6, 51-52
Kim v. Park, No. 08 CV 5499, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51591, *6 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
June 16, 2009) ................................................................................................. 40
Korellas v. Ohio State Univ., 121 Ohio Misc.2d 16 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2002) .......... 56
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) ...... 34
Leavell v. Illinois Dep’t of Nat. Res., 600 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2010) ......... 66
Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank, 138 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.1943 ) ....................... 37
Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2015) ......................... 46
Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2006) ..................................... 57
Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp., 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981)30, 52, 53
McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletics Ass’n., 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th
Cir. 1988)......................................................................................................... 28
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209, 1210 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) ........... 34
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012) . 14
Miller v. Advanced Studies, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ............. 58
Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1275 n.65 (11th Cir.
2008) ................................................................................................................ 41
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National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) .......
28, 33
NCAA v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 863, 865-70 (Tex. 2005) .......................................... 56
New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 1715, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................. 41
Newman v. Advanced Tech. Innovation Corp., 749 F.3d 33, 35, 37 (1st Cir.
2014) ................................................................................................................ 41
Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) ......... 51
Northwestern Univ., 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 17, 2015) ......... 51
Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635 (11th Cir. 1986) ......................................... 14
Pethinaidu Veluchamy v. FDIC, 706 F.3d 810, 820 (7th Cir. 2013) ............... 64
Pocono Invitational Sports Camp v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (E.D.
Pa. 2004)....................................................................................................... 9-10
Purdham v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2011) ...... 21
Reich v. Miss Paula’s Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1194 (6th Cir. 1994) ...... 40
Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993).. 34
Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173
(Ind. 1983) ....................................................................................................... 54
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)......................... 23
Rutherford v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 707 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 2013) .......... 64
Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. Ariz. 1981)
......................................................................................................................... 56
Schaefer v. Walker Bros. Enters., Inc., No. 10 CV 6366, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
177157, *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2014) ............................................................... 40
Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1209, 1212 (11th Cir.
2015) ................................................................................................................ 34
Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) .... 15, 23, 24, 25
Sehie v. City of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2005) ......................... 15-16
Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2009) . 64, 66
Shepard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 102 Cal. App. 4th 837, 845 (Cal. App.
2002) ................................................................................................................ 30
Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Found., 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001)
......................................................................................................................... 12
Solis v. Intern. Detective & Protective Serv., Ltd., 819 F. Supp. 2d 740, (N.D.
Ill. 2011) ..................................................................................................... 14-15
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7053, at *19 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1978) ........................................................... 46
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm’n, 135 Colo. 570 (1957) . 55
Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 2007) .............................. 23, 24
Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590
(1944) ......................................................................................... 8, 16, 23, 28, 62
Tomlinson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 164 F. Supp. 353, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1958) . 9
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Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295, 301 (1985)
.............................................................................................................. 22-23, 27
U.S. v. Brown Univ., 772 F. Supp. 241, 241-42 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ....................... 9
Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665, 675-76 (7th Cir.
2010) ................................................................................................................ 40
Vanskike v. Peters, 724 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992) ..... 8, 23, 25, 26, 27, 32, 36, 57
Waldrep v. Texas Employers Ins. Assoc., 21 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. App. 2000)
......................................................................................................................... 55
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) .. 10, 11, 21, 24, 32
Warren v. Stone, 958 F.2d 1419, 1424 (7th Cir. 1992) ..................................... 59
White v. Classic Dining Acquisition Corp., No. 1:11-cv-712-JMS-MJD, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52215, *6 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2012) .................................. 14
Yi v. Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2007) ........ 40, 44, 45
Statutes and Regulations
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ................................................................................................... 1
29 C.F.R. § 785.7 (26 Fed. Reg. 190, Jan. 11, 1961, as amended at 76 Fed.
Reg. 18859, Apr. 5, 2011) ............................................................. 12, 16, 18, 36
29 U.S.C. § 201 ..................................................................................................... 3
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) .............................................................................................. 15
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) .......................................................................................... 15
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) ........................................................................................ 15, 39
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ............................................................................................ 1, 3
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 ............................................................................................ 1
Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) .............................................................. 11
DOL Field Operations Handbook (“FOH”) ................................................passim
FOH § 10b03(e) ..................................................................... 7, 39, 43, 46, 47, 50
FOH § 10b09(a) .................................................................................................. 15
FOH § 10b24(a) .......................................................................... 28, 38, 39, 42, 52
FOH § 10b24(b) ................................................................................ 27, 33, 38, 39
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extracurricular ........................ 42
http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/internship ................................ 32
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
american_english/extracurricular ................................................................. 43
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/extracurricular .......................................... 42
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/internship .................................................. 32
http://www.upenn.edu/recreation/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SCC-
Handbook-14-15.pdf ....................................................................................... 49
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Complaint purporting to state a claim for relief under the Fair Labor
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). (A. 4-27; R. 119).1 On February 16, 2016,
(A. 28-46; R. 238). That same day, the District Court entered final
March 14, 2016, within the thirty days specified in Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the
interscholastic athletics.
sufficient to raise a plausible claim under the FLSA that two Penn
attend and thus fails to establish Article III standing against such
defendants.
team during the relevant time period. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 34, 68, 76 (A.
2
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26-27, 34-35. 81, 83-84 (A. 13, 23-24; R. 119). Berger and Hennig allege
that the “crux” of their Amended Complaint “is the different, and better,
NCAA Division I Member Schools.” Id. at ¶¶ 12, 40 (A. 10, 14; R. 119).
The Amended Complaint does not allege that Appellee NCAA or the
who did not attend their particular schools. See Feb. 16, 2016 Entry on
3
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Motions to Dismiss and Related Motions at 4-5 (A. 32-33; R. 238) (“Slip
Op.”) (also available at 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18194); Am. Compl. ¶¶
brief), the Jackson Lewis group (30 Defendant schools), the Ogletree
standing to sue the NCAA or schools that they did not attend; and (2)
failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the FLSA because they
had not alleged any facts supporting their allegation that their athletic-
related activities were actually “work” or that any other school or the
the FLSA. Littler/Constangy Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4, 7-25 (R. 183). The
4
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original Named Plaintiff and putative class members.3 Id. at 4 (R. 183);
see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 59-67 (A. 10, 19-21; R. 119).
Dismiss. (A. 28-45; R. 238). First, the District Court dismissed without
prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants other than Penn for
Complaint is that the Plaintiffs are alleging that they are employees of
only Penn, not the other Defendants.” Slip Op. at 5. (A. 32; R. 238).
between Penn and Berger and Hennig and the Department of Labor’s
the FLSA. Id. at 18 (A. 45; R. 238). The District Court also held that
5
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favor. Id.; see also (R. 239). Finally, the District Court granted the
paragraphs 11 and 59-67 because they were irrelevant. Slip Op. at 2 (A.
29; R. 238).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
difficulty.” Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 409 (7th Cir. 2005). Berger
“employees” under the FLSA. See Pls.’ Opp. to Mots. to Dismiss at 4 (A.
are not employees, as has every state and federal court to have
n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“[n]o federal court has defied common sense by
6
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relationship under the FLSA and does not constitute “work.” See DOL
prisoners are not employees and taxi cab drivers are not employed by
813 F.3d 658, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2667 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting
7
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meaning of that term under the FLSA. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807. It is
under the FLSA absent “work,” a term the Supreme Court long ago
employer, and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the
employer and his business.” Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). Here, Berger and
Hennig did not plead any facts in their Amended Complaint to support
their conclusory allegations that they performed “work” for Penn or any
8
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Faced with both their failure and inability to plead the elements of
that they should be paid the federal minimum wage because they spent
more time and effort on their training and competition than student
and dormitories. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-52 (A. 17; R. 119); Appellants’
9
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group of students.
Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). In contrast, student work-
10
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interns, they are not engaged in “practical training” related to their job
or career. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (an intern is
between Penn and its student-athletes. Slip Op. at 8-9, 15 (A. 35-36, 42;
R. 238).
of Penn, it need not reach the issue of whether Berger and Hennig had
standing to sue the NCAA or other schools that they attended. But on
that issue, Berger and Hennig fail to allege a plausible claim that the
NCAA and schools they did not attend were their joint employers. That
11
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primarily for the benefit of” these entities. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.7. In
other words, joint employment requires that the subject activities are
“work” for each joint employer. However, Berger and Hennig cannot
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Found., 244 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2001). “An appellate court may
record, even if different from the grounds relied upon by the district
12
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ARGUMENT
The Court must “take as true all facts alleged in the complaint”
favor. Han v. United Continental Holdings, Inc., 762 F.3d 598, 600 (7th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Viewing the facts in this light, dismissal
plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). “To state a claim for relief, a complaint must provide more than
legal statements.’” Charleston, 741 F.3d at 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). “A complaint must
F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014). “[A] plausible claim must include ‘factual
content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable inference
13
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that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Charleston, 741
Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Apr. 13, 2012); see also Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635 (11th Cir.
14
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performed “work” for which they were not properly compensated. Kellar
v. Summit Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2011). As this Court
203(g).” Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 n.5 (7th
“the meaning of the term ‘work’ is not defined by the Act.” Sehie v. City
15
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of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court and the DOL have made clear, however, that “work”
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business.’” 29 C.F.R. § 785.7 (26 Fed. Reg. 190, Jan. 11, 1961, as
Iron, & R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 598); see also Sehie, 432 F.3d at 751.
may be granted that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It
activities engaged in by Berger and Hennig were “work” and that the
but these allegations cannot satisfy even the liberal pleading standard
of Rule 8(a)(2). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8, 56, 68-79, 85 (A. 7, 9, 18, 22-24;
16
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proffer such facts in the District Court, Berger and Hennig made the
7 (A.8; R. 119); see also Pls.’ Opp. at 1-2 (A. 47-48; R. 212). However,
under clear Supreme Court precedent set forth in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
957, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 804 (2016), the
certain entities constitute a joint employer for the purpose of civil rights
litigation.” Plaintiffs did not “include any facts describing the ‘economic
defendants were their employer. Id. “Without any facts to support their
17
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plausibly satisfy the Tennessee Coal definition of “work.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678; see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39, 42, 68-69, 76-77, 85 (A. 14-15, 22-24; R.
119); cf. Ash, 791 F.3d at 961 (complaint “failed to set forth any facts to
members of the Student Athlete Collective” (Am. Compl., ¶ 39) (A. 14;
18
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R. 119), they do not allege that their own time spent on track and field-
related activities was “pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit
of” the NCAA, Penn, or any other of the Division I Member schools that
they did not attend. See Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 598
(emphasis added).
Nor could they plausibly allege such facts. Indeed, Berger and
6 See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th
Cir. 1984) (“However, it is axiomatic that the complaint may not be
amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss. Similarly,
consideration of a motion to dismiss is limited to the pleadings. Thus, it
may have been questionable for the district court to have relied on the
plaintiffs’ briefs to embellish the conclusory allegations of the
complaint.”) (citations omitted).
19
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Berger and Hennig further fail to allege that their activities were
Indeed, it would be absurd to allege that the NCAA or any of the schools
competitions.
participants choose to put into it.” See Slip Op. at 16 (footnote omitted)
20
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(A. 43; R. 238). This observation is fully consistent with the Supreme
his services for less than the prescribed minimum wage.” 330 U.S. at
2270, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166206, *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2012)
Hennig have not alleged and cannot plausibly allege that they
8 See Brown v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 755 F.3d 154, 166 (2d
Cir. 2014) (assessing volunteer status using “an objectively reasonable
expectation of compensation”); Purdham v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd.,
637 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2011) (“we review the objective facts
surrounding the services performed to determine whether the totality of
the circumstances establish volunteer status, or whether, instead, the
facts and circumstances, objectively viewed, are rationally indicative of
employee status”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
21
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when they joined the Penn Women’s Track and Field team. Indeed, it is
undisputed that, at the time they joined the team, Berger and Hennig
were fully aware that they would not be paid for their participation.
Track and Field roster.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 76 (A. 23-24; R. 119). Absent
such facts, this Court cannot “infer more than the mere possibility of
While the Supreme Court has stated that the term “employee” as
term “does have its limits” and those limits must be defined in
22
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Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295, 301 (1985); Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807.
technical label” and that “courts must examine the ‘economic reality’” of
the relationship. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808 (citations omitted); see also
activity.”) (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730
(1947)).
guide the analysis. Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807); see also Tennessee Coal, Iron
& R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 598 (“we cannot assume that Congress here was
23
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Steelman, 473 F.3d at 129; see, e.g., Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152
F.2d 1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1986) (three factors to consider for existence of
joint employer relationship); see also Brown, 755 F.3d at 167 (Second
24
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situations.”); Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 142
sense for the particular situation at hand. See, e.g., Callahan, 2016 U.S.
F.2d at 809 (rejecting four-factor test used by other courts of appeal for
prisoner FLSA cases where the issue was not which entity was an
where the relationship between parties did not “stem from any
consideration”).
25
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application of a multi-factor test can cause a court to miss the forest for
the trees” and “in those cases, the economic reality test must be applied
Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1996) and citing Vanskike, 974
F.2d at 809-10).
It is not surprising that Berger and Hennig have not pleaded and
cannot plead facts showing that they performed “work” for Penn. As the
26
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student-athletes. Slip Op. at 6 (A. 33; R. 238); see Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (A. 8;
be paid. See Am. Compl. ¶ 4 (quoting FOH § 10b24(b) (Oct. 20, 1993))
rather whether Congress intended for the FLSA to apply to them.” Slip
Op. at 6 (footnote omitted) (A. 33; R. 238); see also Tony & Susan Alamo
27
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are not part of an overall educational program” and they “receive some
Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) (citation omitted); see also
Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th
(5th Cir. 1988) (“The goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with
28
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in School and College, 11 The Sch. Rev. 95, 95 (1903) (“The principal
Students can learn as many lessons about leadership and life from a
29
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the FLSA, nor works as a waiver of FLSA rights. See id. at 13-16.
on the Penn Women’s Track and Field team, the true “economic reality”
e.g., Shepard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 102 Cal. App. 4th 837, 845
30
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Berger and Hennig principally argue that the District Court did
not apply the proper test for determining “student employee status”
under the FLSA, as enunciated last year by the Second Circuit in Glatt
v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015), as
amended, 811 F.3d 528 (2016). Appellants’ Br. at 6. Berger and Hennig
Court, the District Court should have resorted to the Second Circuit’s
the FLSA. Id. at 11-12. This contention illustrates the danger of trying
31
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e.g., Callahan, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2667, at *8-9; Vanskike, 974 F.2d
at 809.
the Supreme Court decision the DOL Fact Sheet seeks to interpret,
32
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example, Berger and Hennig fail to explain how the student work-study
campus restaurant. See FOH §10b24(b) (R. 183-2). The same holds true
33
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status “in an educational setting.” Slip Op. at 8 (A. 35; R. 238). 11 Rather,
34
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similarly expressly limited the Glatt “primary beneficiary” test and non-
settings. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536 n.2 (“Like the parties and amici, we
immutable factors that applies to all interns in all situations, and there
is certainly not one test that applies equally to interns and student
35
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such as that used in Glatt that “fail[s] to capture the true nature of the
(quoting Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809) (A. 42; R. 238). Indeed, in Glatt, the
between the intern and the employer.” Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536; see also
activity is “work” does not depend on the level of exertion. See 29 C.F.R.
36
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proper attire.
square peg into a round hole. It simply defies common sense to apply
economic reality of the situation and the DOL’s position on the issue
37
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NCAA athletic team at Penn does not make them employees of Penn for
enforcing the FLSA. In connection with its oversight of the FLSA, the
DOL has issued its Field Operations Handbook that, among other
Complaint, Berger and Hennig relied on the FOH. See Am. Compl. ¶ 4
n.1 (citing FOH § 10b24(b)) (A. 8; R. 119). This reliance is most curious
are not employees under the FLSA and that their participation in
only “student run Club Sports” cannot withstand serious scrutiny. See
38
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FOH §10b03(e) (emphases added). Thus, the same DOL source that
39
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Am. Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 390 (2008)). The Seventh
Circuit and district courts within the Circuit have repeatedly cited the
Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC, 739 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 2014); Yi v.
Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2007).;
Schaefer v. Walker Bros. Enters., Inc., No. 10 CV 6366, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 177157, *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2014) (stating “Courts give
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51591, *6 n.2 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2009) (“Although not
40
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statutory scheme the Secretary of Labor [is] charged with enforcing and
Labor had acquired over time with respect to the complexities of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256-57
(2006).14
41
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(Appellants’ Br. at 18). This argument requires writing the phrase “club
sports” into the FOH guidance. 15 However, when read in whole, Chapter
42
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or (2) the DOL silently rescinded that guidance in 2010 with DOL Fact
Sheet #71 (whose factors long have been included in the FOH, presently
Section 10b24; and (3) in the more than 20 years since, has never
43
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employees for FLSA purposes is the fact that the existence of thousands
and yet the Department of Labor has not taken any action to apply the
FLSA to them.”) (citing Yi, 480 F.3d at 510-11 (A. 43; R. 238); id. at 18
(“Given the popularity of NCAA regulated sports, the DOL could not
infer that if the DOL did not mean to include those athletes, but was
2156, 2166-70 (2012), the Supreme Court recognized that DOL inaction
not unlawful. Here, DOL inaction is consistent with the view that
expressed in the FOH. See id. at 2168 (“While it may be ‘possible for an
44
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the Department did not think the industry’s practice was unlawful.”)
founded. See Appellants Br. at 25. The District Court’s inference is more
than reasonable when coupled with the DOL’s Handbook that expressly
it is well known that NCAA Division I student-athletes are not paid for
Berger and Hennig argue that “it stands to reason that this
45
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application of Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 703 (7th
Cir. 2015). In Love, this Court stated, “the employer’s right to control is
employer.” The Title VII test for an indirect employer where there is no
doubt that “work” is being performed and there is at least one employer
United States, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7053, at *19 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22,
In the District Court, Berger and Hennig also argued that the
indisputable, this Court need not resolve any of these disputes because
46
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Indeed, as the District Court stated, “[i]f variables like staff oversight,
have said so” in FOH Section 10b03(e). Slip Op. at 17 n.14 (A. 44; R.
238).
activities.” Pls.’ Opp. at 6 (A. 52; R. 212). The qualifier “most” means
47
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Berger and Hennig did not and cannot allege that every participant in a
activity to be excluded from “work.” Indeed, “club sports” would also fail
participation is primarily for the benefit of the school. See id. at 7 (A.
48
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19 In the District Court, Berger and Hennig relied upon student club
information publicly available on Penn’s website (see Pls.’ Opp. at 6, 8)
(A. 52, 54; R. 212), but they failed to disclose to the District Court other
relevant information available on the same website that refuted their
“facts” and argument. In reply, Appellees referenced Penn’s “Sports
Club Council Handbook,” which provides for extensive University
administration, supervision, and regulation of Penn club sports,
including myriad rules and procedures governing member eligibility,
obtaining coaches, payment of officials, club sponsorships, compliance
with University standards of conduct (including use of alcohol and
tobacco products, gambling, unsportsmanlike conduct, and hazing),
facility reservations and use, equipment purchases, storage, and
inventory lists, membership dues, fundraising, financial accounts,
appropriate and inappropriate expenditures, purchasing and
reimbursement procedures, use of social media, head injuries, travel,
and publicity and promotion. See Littler/Constangy Reply at 15 n.14 (R.
215). This Sports Club Council Handbook is presently available at
http://www.upenn.edu/recreation/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SCC-
Handbook-14-15.pdf (last accessed June 3, 2016).
Plainly, student-run club sports at Penn do not operate without
University rules and regulations, as well as significant financial and
operational supervision. Any suggestion that club sports operate free of
such supervision and control at any university would not be credible.
Further, while club sports plainly offer leadership and
developmental opportunities for student participants, so too do
intercollegiate NCAA sports.
49
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require” the listed activities. See Pls.’ Opp. at 7 (A. 53; R. 212); FOH §
10b03(e) (R. 183-2). Indeed, in Blair, 420 F.3d at 829, the Eighth Circuit
activities were not “work” under the Tennessee Coal primary benefit
test even though the “chores” at issue were required by the boarding
is. See Appellants’ Br. at 21. Further, the absence of a timesheet would
reason why this Court should not ascribe the plain and most logical
50
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is fully consistent with state and federal decisions in both the FLSA and
other contexts involving federal and state law. 20 See, e.g., Kemether, 15
51
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F. Supp. 2d at 759 n.11 (“[n]o federal court has defied common sense by
athletic association.”).
not employees within the meaning of the FLSA, a ruling that the DOL
Id. at 1326, 1327. Berger and Hennig make a similar argument here.
See, e.g., Am. Compl., ¶ 21 (“The NCAA has entered into multi-billion
Id. at *12-13.
52
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The Tenth Circuit found that the DOL’s position “ignore[d] not
only the broad educational purpose of this private liberal arts college,
program,” and that “the total program [] must be considered within the
full educational context.” Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d at 1327. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that “the mere fact that the College may have
derived some economic value from the RA program does not override
‘employee’ issue,” and noted that “RA’s did not displace other employees
whom the College would otherwise have been required to hire.” Id.
received financial aid” and held that they were not “employees” under
53
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N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983), the Supreme Court of Indiana rejected a
54
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tort after he was punched in a game by one of the school’s players. The
55
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covering state employees. See Korellas v. Ohio State Univ., 121 Ohio
56
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motion concerning FLSA coverage. 974 F.2d at 807. Other courts have
See, e.g., Ash, 799 F.3d at 961-62 (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of
Dep’t, 494 Fed. Appx. 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of
Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1998)
57
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No. 90-1476, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 219 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 1992)
(reported as table case at 954 F.2d 733) (affirming district court’s Rule
exchange for dismissal of minor criminal charges in state court were not
covered employees under FLSA). The three cases cited by Berger and
736 F. 3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2013), refers to whether the FLSA
Berger and Hennig, Miller v. Advanced Studies, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1196
(N.D. Ill. 1986), is a Title VII case, not an FLSA case, pre-dates
58
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v. Stratus Building Solutions, No. 4:14 CV 921 CDP, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 164194, *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24, 2014), is a Title VII and Age
In any event, in Warren v. Stone, 958 F.2d 1419, 1424 (7th Cir.
Section 1983 due process claims by two public defender office employees
state, not the county, and thus were not subject to the county
disciplinary policy that was the foundation of the property interest for
their due process claims. Notably, in his dissent, Circuit Judge Coffey
urged that the plaintiffs were county employees, but never suggested
requires, as the District Court did here (Slip Op. at 5) (A. 32; R. 238), to
59
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“take as true all facts alleged in the complaint” and “draw all
F.3d at 600. Here, Berger and Hennig have utterly failed to plead
sufficient facts that, taken as true and with all reasonable inferences
fully joins the arguments set forth by the Jackson Lewis group of
60
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“employer” under the FLSA in order for liability to attach. See, e.g.,
and joint employer). In other words, even under a joint employer theory,
Berger and Hennig must still prove that they performed “work” for each
Berger and Hennig have failed to allege facts supporting the Tennessee
Coal elements of “work” with respect to the NCAA and Appellee schools
that they did not attend. Further, Berger and Hennig cannot plausibly
allege that the NCAA or any Appellee school that they did not attend
NCAA and Appellee schools that they did not attend should also be
entered.
61
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62
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such facts in their Reply Brief or seek leave to amend their Amended
Complaint, this Court should reject such effort. See, e.g., Goodpaster v.
City of Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding
697 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have repeatedly held that a
court.”); Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011)
dismiss); see also Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 462 (7th Cir.
under the FLSA, this concession is fatal and requires affirmance of the
63
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if the appellant did not move the district court for leave to amend the
complaint. See Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505,
513 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Rutherford v. Judge & Dolph, Ltd., 707
F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 2013); Pethinaidu Veluchamy v. FDIC, 706 F.3d
Here, Berger and Hennig did not seek leave to amend while the
Dismiss were granted, Berger and Hennig made no effort in the District
first sought leave to amend in their opening appellate brief and only “to
rested on their Amended Complaint and did so at their peril. See Ash,
799 F.3d at 963-64 (finding district court did not abuse discretion in
64
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amend at any time before the district court ruled on the motion to
dismiss. Instead, they chose to rest on their original complaint, and did
The request by Berger and Hennig for amendment is too late, and
in any event, would be futile for two reasons: (1) if Penn is not their
employer (an issue on which they have not requested leave to amend),
then no other Appellee can possibly be their joint employer; and (2) they
cannot plausibly allege that the NCAA or any other Division I member
the Penn women’s track and field team and thus cannot establish that
65
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798, 808 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice because she “ha[d] not suggested any way that
she might amend her pleading to cure the deficiency”); Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 578 F.3d at 513 (finding no reversible error where district court
did not permit plaintiff to replead because “any amendment would have
been futile”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in the District Court’s opinion,
Appellees respectfully request that the Court affirm the District Court’s
66
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32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
s/Alan L. McLaughlin
Alan L. McLaughlin
67
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PROOF OF SERVICE
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify
that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that
s/Alan L. McLaughlin
Alan L. McLaughlin
68