NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent
G.R. No. 211917
February 27, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Fineza engaged in a business venture with Petitioners where the former would buy any
foreclosed jewelries from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop which in turn be sold for profit by Norma. The
business venture was initially successful until FIneza discovered that Petitioners were engaged
on the same business. To wind up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena
Gamaro would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when
Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were
dishonored because the account of the Gamaros had been closed. To settle the matter, Fineza
asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her possession but the latter
failed to do so. The RTC rendered judgement holding Norma guilty beyong reasonable doubt
which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of a crime charged in the
Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein

Held: Yes. It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of the
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint
and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. The Court agreed
with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that Fineza
entrusted the possession of the jewelry to petitioner. The CA observed that the prosecution duly
proved petitioner's misappropriation by showing that she failed to return the diamond ring upon
demand. That misappropriation took place was strengthened when petitioner Norma Gamaro
informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the terms of their
business agreement.
PABLO AND PABLINA MARCELO-MENDOZA, Petitioners vs. PEROXIDE PHILS., INC., herein
represented by ROBERT R. NAVERA, Respondent
G.R. No. 203492
April 24, 2017
REYES, J.:

Facts: In an ejectment case against Peroxide Phils., Inc. petitioners were able to obtain a
favorable decision. Pablo was declared as the highest bidder in the public aution. Aggrieved,
third-party claimant filed a complaint to declare void the sheriffs sale and Certificate of Sale with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. The writ of
preliminary injunction was issued which was questioned by Pablo but was sustained by the Court.
The subject property was ordered to be padlocked. The RTC issued an Omnibus order granting
the petitioners' motion to remove padlock on the gate of the subject property which was
reversed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts do not have legal basis in ordering that the subject
property be turned over to PPI and the same be padlocked pending trial of the main case since
petitioners are the registered owner of the same.

Held: No. PPI was able to sufficiently establish that it had a right over the properties which should
be protected while being litigated. PPI' s claimed ownership over the improvements erected
and/or introduced in the subject property was then being violated by the petitioners who had
started entering the premises and started dismantling the improvements and machineries
thereon. Worse, the petitioners even opened the subject property as a resort with swimming
pools to the public for a fee and had portions of the buildings inside the premises rented to
several businesses. If not lawfully stopped, such acts of the petitioners would certainly cause
irreparable damage to PPI and other claimants. As owner of the improvements and machineries
inside the subject property, PPI has the right to be protected. Hence, the issuance by the lower
courts of the WPI and the order to padlock and re-padlock the subject property to enjoin the
petitioners from disposing the properties of PPI was warranted.
WILLIAM ANGIDAN SIY, Petitioner vs. ALVIN TOMLIN, Respondent
G.R. No. 205998
April 24, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Siy entrusted his 2007 Ford Range Rover to Mr. Ong who owned a second-hand car selling
business, as the latter promised a prospective buyer to the said vehicle. Since Mr. Ong failed to
remit the proceeds of the sale and the vehicle has been transferred to Mr. Chua then to Tomlin,
Siy filed for the issuance of a writ of replevin in the RTC of Quezon City. The writ was granted but
was revoked by the Court of Appeals. Tomlin argued that he is already the registered owner of
the said vehicle and caused the registration of the sale. Siy contended that he is still entitled to
both the possession and ownership of the vehicle.

Issue: Whether or not Siy is entitled to the relief granted by the Writ of Replevin.

Held: No, he is not entitled anymore. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly
show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully
detains the same. In this case, Siy admitted having executed a blank deed of sale and gave it to
Mr. Ong. As Mr. Ong served as Siy’s agent in the transaction, Mr. Ong validly transferred and
effected the sale of the vehicle to Mr. Chua, and thereafter to Tomlin. Since Ong was able to sell
the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof at the time the writ
was applied. He is not anymore entitled to the possession of the vehicle. Together with his
ownership, petitioner also lost his right of possession over the vehicle.
MANUEL L. BAUTISTA, SPOUSES ANGEL SAHAGUN and CARMELITA BAUTISTA, and ANIANO L.
BAUTISTA vs MARGARITO L. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 202088
March 8, 2017
PERALTA, J.

Facts: Bautista siblings established a lending business through a common fund from the proceeds
of the sale of a parcel of coconut land they inherited from their mother Consorcia Lantin Bautista.
Amelia V. Mendoza (Amelia) obtained a loan in the amount of P690,000.00 from Florencia, and
secured the same with a real estate mortgage over a 25,518-square-meter parcel of land she
owned situated at Barangay Sta. Monica, San Pablo City, denominated as Lot 2, Plan Psu-45117
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2371 (Sta. Monica property). Hence,
additional loan was obtained by the borrower. Amelia allegedly sold the subject property to
Margarito through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan for ₱500,000.00 and, likewise, cancelled the
₱l,085,000.00 loan through another "Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.

Issue: Whether or not motion received or served through a private courier service valid.

Held: Yes. The Rules provide that pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered
mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of
mailing is the date of receipt.

Though filing of pleadings thru a private courier is not prohibited by the Rules, it is established in
jurisprudence that the date of actual receipt of pleadings by the court is deemed the date of filing
of such pleadings, and not the date of delivery thereof to a private letter-forwarding agency.
Records reveal that respondent received a copy of the Decision on February 23, 2009. In an Order
dated March 5, 2009, the trial court acknowledged that it received the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent on March 4, 2009, or on the 9th day, which is still within the
reglementary period.

The RTC gave petitioners 15 days from notice to file a comment on the motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent. Petitioners filed its Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on March
12, 2009. In their Opposition, petitioners pointed the defect in the service of the motion when
the same was delivered through LBC, a private courier. They also alleged therein that the motion
should be denied as it would prejudice their rights. From the foregoing, the RTC gave petitioners
the opportunity to be heard, and sufficient time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose
the same. It was not even alleged nor proven that the motion for reconsideration was filed out
of time. Considering the circumstances, the purpose of the service of the motion was
substantially complied with. The Rules should be liberally construed as long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place
TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA, Petitioner vs. ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 224022

June 28, 2017

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: Petitioner bought a parcel of land from his parents but unknown to him, his father
leased the subject land to respondent for a period of 8 years. Petitioner allowed the lease to
subsist while respondent paid the rent diligently however, respondent stopped paying the lease
when petitioner’s father died. Respondent alleged that it was willing to pay but was confused
to whom the payment should be given as several heirs of the deceased demand the lease
payment and cosigned an aggregate amount with the RTC. Notwithstanding, petitioner
demanded the respondent to pay its obligation, claiming that the cosigned amount was
insufficient to cover the obligation plus interest and to vacate the premises. The MTCC ruled in
favor of the petitioner which was reversed and set aside by the RTC as affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner could eject respondent from the subject land as the latter fully
complied with its obligation to pay monthly rent thru consignation.

Ruling: Yes. For an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first,
initially, the defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease
contract; second, such possession eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation
of the provisions of the said lease contract or the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee
remained in possession of the leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor
enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate
and that the suit is brought within one (1) year from the last demand. In this case all the first,
third ad fourth requisite were clearly satisfied. As to the second requisite, the respondent's
consignation covers monthly rentals only for the period of February 2007 to March 2011 which
is two (2) whole months short of what was being demanded by petitioner (February 2007 to May
2011). It clearly shows that the second requisite was also satisfied.
RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUY AMIN, and EILEEN G. GATARIN, Petitioners vs.
JACINTO G. FLORES and MAXIMO G. FLORES, represented by RAMON G. FLORES,
Respondents
G.R. No. 202189
April 25, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.;
Facts: Respondents, who claim ownership on the subject land, filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession against petitioners. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents ordering the defendants
to vacate the property and pay attorney’s fees and litigation expenses which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners insist that there is no demand to vacate the subject property, and
the lack of such demand renders the action against them premature.
Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of cause of action or prematurity.

Held: No. Petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit, but on pure technicality. They have
failed to show that they have a substantial defense to respondents' claim. While it is true that
the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the
swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that the rules
of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its
frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would
subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair tria.ls and expedite justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Considering that there was substantial
compliance, a liberal interpretation of procedural rules in this case is more in keeping with the
constitutional mandate to secure social justice.
SANTOS-YLLANA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner vs.
SPOUSES RICARDO DEANG and FLORENTINA DEANG, Respondents

G.R. No. 190043

June 21, 2017

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: Petitioner

is the winning party in an ejectment case against respondent where the court ruled based on a
Compromise Agreement executed by the parties. Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of the
Decision due to Florentina' s failure to comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement.
Respondents objected claiming that the amount due to petitioner had already been paid in full
but the MTC uphold the Writ of Execution, hence the sheriff implemented the writ and padlocked
respondents' stall. Aggrieved by the implementation of the Writ of Execution, respondents filed
a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Injunctive Relief against petitioner and Sheriffs Sicat
and Pangan before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents which was upheld by the
CA with modifications.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is joint and solidary liable with the sheriffs for having enforced

the writ of execution with undue haste and without giving respondents the required prior notice
and reasonable time to vacate the subject stall.

Held: No. The joint and solidary liability of petitioner has no factual and legal basis. A civil
complaint for damages necessarily alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or
omission that would serve as basis for the award of damages. It is undisputed that petitioner
succeeded in securing a favorable judgment in the ejectment case; therefore, it was well within
its right to move for the execution of the MTC's Decision pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. The rule allows for the immediate execution of judgment in the event that judgment is
rendered against the defendant in an unlawful detainer or forcible entry case, provided that
certain conditions are met. Upon electing to exercise its right under Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner’s move to execute the MTC judgment enjoys the disputable presumption
under Sec. 3(ff), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that it obeyed the applicable law and
rules in doing so. As such it is incumbent upon the respondent to overcome presumption and to
prove that petitioner abused its rights and willfully intended to inflict damage upon them before
they can claim damages from the former.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE,
JR., Petitioner vs. BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL,
Respondent
G.R. No. 194199
March 22, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.:
Facts: The Province of Camarines Sur donated a parcel of land to (CASTEA). The Deed of Donation
included an automatic revocation clause which states that the donee shall use the subject land
for the construction of a building to be owned and used only by the donee in connection with its
functions under its charter and by-laws and shall not sell, mortgage or encumber the property
donated. About 30 years later, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the
donated property for a period of 20 years. Petitioner revoked its donation through a Deed of
Revocation of Donation asserting that CASTEA violated the conditions of the Deed of Donation
when it leased the property to Bodega and filed an action of unlawful detainer against the latter.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the right to the actual physical possession of the property
in dispute.
Held: Yes. When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the Deed of
Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted to Petitioner. The records show that
CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner
validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this
revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of judicial intervention.Under Article
428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and possessor of the
thing in order to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of
Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions
stated in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of
the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the
property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property leased, he
or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out. None exists in this case. Bodega
finds no basis for its continued possession of the property.
SPOUSES ELVIRA ALCANTARA AND EDWIN ALCANTARA, Petitioners vs. SPOUSES FLORANTE
BELEN AND ZENAIDA ANANIAS, THE PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA,
and THE CITY ASSESSOR OF SAN PABLO CITY, Respondents

G.R. No. 200204

April 25, 2017
SERENO, J.:
Facts: Spouses Alcantara filed a Complaint against Spouses Belen for the quieting of title,
reconveyance of possession, and accounting of harvest with damages over Lot 16932. The Sps.
Alcantara claimed that they are the registered owners of the land which was inherited from their
mother while respondents alleged that they bought the property from its prior owners. The RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioners and concluded that respondents were claiming Lot No. 16931, a
property different from Lot No. 16932. The CA however ruled in favor of respondents on the basis
of their Tax Declarations and the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa notwithstanding the TCT
of Spouses Alcantara.
Issue: Whether a certificate of title may be sufficiently defeated by tax declarations and deeds of
sale.
Held: No. Based on established jurisprudence, the Court rule that the certificate of title of
petitioners is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their ownership of the property. The
irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses Belen cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of Spouses
Alcantara, as it is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. In Cureg v. Intermediate
Appellate Court the Court held that:
As against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not
conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of
title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner. vs. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY
OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL
COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 213948

April 18, 2017

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: DMCI acquired a parcel of land in Manila which was earmarked for the construction of
DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project. The City Council of Manila issued a Resolution
enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-
PDI citing among others, that the Torre de Manila Condominium will dwarf the statue of our hero,
and ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point. The
KOR filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining I order, and later a permanent
injunction, which the Court resolved to treat the petition as one for mandamus, against the
construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the can Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project

Held: No. Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. The Rules on Civil Procedure are
clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the
officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a
clear legal right to the performance of such act.

In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule
for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the
building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal
duty on the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, "the
standards set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre
de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the
boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not pap: of the
Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1095," and the Torre de Manila
area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I.
Diokno. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a
cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure."
 ANGELES CITY, Petitioner vs. ANGELES CITY ELECTRIC CORPORATION and RTC
G.R. No. 166134
June 29, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: AEC was granted a legislative electric franchise in Angeles City. PD 55 was enacted which
reduced the franchise tax of electric franchise holders. Later under the LGC, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Angeles City enacted a Tax Ordinance (RRCAC). A petition seeking the reduction
of the tax rates and a review of the provisions of the RRCAC was filed by MACCI of which AEC is
a member. The City Treasurer issued a Notice of Assessment to AEC for payment of business tax,
license fee and other charges which the later protested. The City Treasurer levied on the real
properties of AEC and published for auction sale which prompted AEC to file an Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which was
granted by the RTC.

Issue: Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Angeles City and its City Treasurer from levying, selling, and disposing the properties of
AEC

Held: No. As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of
the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except where there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a
ground for certiorari, it must be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of taxes applies
only to national internal revenue taxes, and not to local taxes.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner vs. DKS INTERNATIONAL, INC and MICHAEL DY,
Respondents
G.R. No. 179161
January 22, 2010

Del Castillo, J.:

Facts: The Philippine Government and PNB entered into a Contract of Lease over a parcel of land.
DKS applied for sublease of a portion of the subject property but the Land Management Bureau
denied the petitioner’s request to sublease so it was not implemented. Petitioner alleged that
DKS forcibly and unlawfully took over possession of the subject property which prompted the
former to file a case for forcible entry against the latter. The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner
and issued a Writ of Execution with break open order which was affirmed by the RTC.
Respondents filed before the RTC an Urgent Motion to Recall Writ and the Command to Sheriff
With Comment which was granted considering that Land Management Bureau is now in physical
possession of the subject property and not DKS.

Issue: Whether or not the order to recall the writ of execution with break open was proper

Held: Yes, the recall was proper. By virtue of the Decisions of the MeTC and the RTC which both
ruled in favor of petitioner in the subject forcible entry case, petitioner was indeed, as a matter
of right, entitled to a writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution with break open in the dispositive portion of
its March 10, 2004 Decision. But before said writ could be implemented, inescapable material
facts and circumstances were brought to the attention of the RTC. The respondents had already
surrendered possession of the subject premises to the government. Clearly, the portion of the
Decision ordering respondents to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender
possession thereof to petitioner has become impossible to implement.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and LORNA CILLAN-SILVERIO, Petitioners, vs. RICARDO S. SILVERIO,
JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 186589
July 18, 2014

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: In the intestate proceedings of their late mother, Nelia questioned the appointment of his
brother, Ricardo Jr., as the new administrator in place of his father Ricardo Sr. before the CA. The
CA granted Nelia’s petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Ricardo Jr. filed with the
Court an "Appeal under Rule 45 and/or Certiorari seeking the reversal of the said resolution and
sent letters to petitioners demanding Ricardo Sr. to cease and desist desist from 1) exercising the
rights of a stockholder in PDC; 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting
withthird persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records. Hence
petitioners filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt before the CA which was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court on the validity of an
Injunction issued by the CA preclude the latter from adjucating the question of whether
supervening acts committed by one of the parties in the CA case constitutes indirect contempt
based on the Principle of Respect for Hierarchy of Courts

Held: The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a pending case
does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. However, at this point, this Court cannot grant petitioners’ plea to
resolve the merits of their petition for indirect contempt; it is the CA that should properly try the
same. Aside from the fact that the CA is the court against which the alleged contempt was
committed, a hearing is required in resolving a charge for indirect contempt.
A hearing is required in order to resolve a charge of indirect contempt; the respondent to the
charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone.