Geronimo v Santos
Topic: Documentary Evidence
Doctrine: A record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interested parties.
Facts:
(1) Karen Santos (res), claiming to be the only child of deceased sps Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo, filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of
possession against Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, brothers of Rufino.
(2) She alleged that with the death of her parents, the subject property consisting of ½
of the parcel of land located in Bulacan and belonging to her parents was passed on
to her by intestacy.
(3) Lately, she discovered that Geronimo brothers executed a document entitled
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman, declaring themselves as the only heirs of the
deceased sps and adjudicating themselves the subject property. She prayed that said
document be annulled and the land transferred to her.
(4) Geronimo brothers alleged:
a. Sps deceased were childless for 13 years before taking respondent in as their
ward; she being in truth the child of Caridad’s sister.
b. The birth certificate was simulated as it was registered in Ilocos—the couple
never lived there, and that Cardidad never filed any maternity leave during her
service as a teacher.
c. Respondent’s open and continuous possession of status of a legitimate child is
only secondary evidence to the birth certificate herself. And such secondary
evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under FC 172 because the said
provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of
filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an
action for annulment of document and recovery of possession.
(5) RTC: Respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth certificate as was duly
established by the birth certificate presented in evidence. RTC dismissed the claim
that the birth certificate appeared to have been tampered, and relied on its prima
facie presumption of veracity and regularity for failure of petitioner to explain how
the erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent.
- CA: Affirmed. Although the CA found that there was no evidence that Caridad
gave birth respondent on a specific date, and that the birth certificate does not
qualify as the valid registration of birth certificate in the civil register as
envisioned by law1 because it was signed by one Emma Daño, who was not
identified as either parent, physician or midwife. Nonetheless, it relied on FC
172, which allows the introduction and admission of secondary evidence to
1Act 3753 provides for the declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or in
default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of birth in the civil register.
prove one’s legitimate filiation via open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child. This was proven thru the ff:
- Respondent was allowed to bear the family name “Geronimo”
- Deceased sps supported her and her education
- She was the beneficiary of the GSIS burial benefits of Caridad
- Caridad applied for and was appointed her legal guardian
- She and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of Rufino’s estate as legal
heirs
Hence, respondent is entitled to the property left to the exclusion of the Geronimo
brothers.
Issue: W/N both courts erred in admitting secondary evidence notwithstanding the
existence of a primary evidence of birth certificate. (YES)
Held:
(1) Petitioner is correct that secondary proof (proof of legitimacy or illegitimacy under
the FC) should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove
filiation of a child. The legitimacy of a child cannot be contested by any way of defense
or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. However, what
petitioner failed to recognize is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions
where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue. In the case herein, the
filiation of a child, respondent, is not at issue. It does not apply to cases, such as the
one herein, that do not impugn the legitimacy of a child. Petitioner does not claim
that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased sps. What petitioner
alleges is that respondent is not the child of a deceased sps AT ALL.
(2) Even if both courts were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof
admissible under FC 172 in this action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession, all proof still points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child
of the deceased sps. Hence, the ruling of both courts is based on a misapprehension
of facts.
- A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it
was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of
respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of broth
of respondent, April 6, 1872, and the name of the informant, Emma Daño, were
both superimposed on the document.
- Aside from the superimpositions, the corroborating testimony of Reyes
(representative of NSO) further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth
and signature of informant are alterations on the birth certificate which
rendered the document questionable.
 - Even respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities
on her own birth certificate. The irregularities overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate:
o Identity of Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed therein, remains
unknown.
o Testimony of the legal consultant of Dept of Education proved that Caridad
did not have any maternity leave during her service as elementary school
teacher
o Corroborated by a certification from the school superintendent that she did
not file any maternity leave
o No testimonial or documentary evidence was offered to prove Caridad ever
had a pregnancy
o Based on respondent’s birth certificate, she was born when Cardidad was
already 40 years old
o No hospital records of Caridad’s delivery
o Respondent was the sole witness for herself

In sum: Concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts does not
sufficiently establish the one crucial fact: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
sps.

Fallo: GRANTED.