Martinez v Morfe

44 SCRA 22 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Immunity from Arrest under the 1935
Constitution

Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public
document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised
Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the Constitutional Convention was still in
session. They now assail the validity of their arrest. They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they
are immune from arrest because the charges upon which they were arrested are within the immunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional immunity of
senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in
going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the
case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach
of peace”. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any
special statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of
the Constitution.

NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any
committee thereof.

People v Quijada

PEOPLE v QUIJADA (259 SCRA 191) July 24, 1996 G.R. 115008-09 The killing of a person with the use of
an unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicide or murder but rather, by
express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. When an
accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from
one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.
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People v Beltran (1985) case digest

G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing;
MANUEL PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-
appellants.
RELOVA, J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder
with direct assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto
Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo"
(Vulva of your mother).

They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went
to the house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done
about it.

When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous
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discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor also suffered injuries.
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I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a
policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to
maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For
the double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

PEOPLE v DOLLANTES (151 SCRA 592) June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639 When a barangay Captain is in the act of
trying to pacify a person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances
within the barangay and if in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who
thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in
authority.

ALBERTO v. DE LA CRUZ

98 SCRA 406 (1980)Concepcion, J. / alo

SUBJECT MATTER:

Public Disorders > Delivering Prisoners from Jail

CASE SUMMARY:

Orbita was prosecuted for violating Art. 156 of the RPC by helping Denaque, a prisoner, to escape while
working on the guesthouse of the provincial jailer, Gov. Cledera. During trial, counsel filed a motion to
include the names of Gov. Cledera and Lt.Esmeralda, Assistant Provincial Warden, in the criminal charge
against Orbita, believing that the two also helped and connivedin the escape of the prisoner.
Respondent judge directed the petitioner (fiscal) to conduct further investigation. Petitioner foundno
cause to charge Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda. However, upon filing of Orbita of an MR, the
respondent judge ruledotherwise and ordered the inclusion of the names of the two in the criminal
charges. Petitioner filed for recourse. The SC heldthat Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda cannot be
prosecuted under Art. 156 of the RPC since offenders under this article is usuallycommitted by an
outsider who removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. Since Gov. Cledera
asgovernor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot
be prosecuted for the escapeof Denaque under Article 156 of the RPC. Also, the two cannot be
prosecuted under Art. 223 of the RPC since in order to beguilty under this article, it is necessary that the
public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner underhis custody or charge.
Petition granted.

DOCTRINES:

Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in
any jail orpenal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape.
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In order to be guilty under Art. 223 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer had
consented to, orconnived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the
escape of a prisoner on the partof the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of
the crime of faithlessness in the custody of theprisoner.

FACTS:

Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, escaped while working at the Guest House of
Governor Cledera(Provincial Jailer) on September 12, 1968

The Governor’s residence at that time is being rented by the province and its maintenance and upkeep
is shouldered by

the province of Camarines Sur

The detainee worked at the Governor’s residence by virtue of an order of the Governor which

was implemented by Lt.Esmeralda (Assistant Provincial Warden). It was the accused, Eligio Orbita
(Provincial Guard), himself who handpicked

the group of prisoners to work at the Governor’s residence on September 12, 1968

Neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying
and guarding thedetainee from the jail to the residence of the governor

In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Orbita, was prosecuted for the
crime ofInfidelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code

In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination of Esmeralda, the
defense broughtforth and confronted the witness with a note purportedly written by Gov. Armando
Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda tosend five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house.
Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could notremember who handed the note for him; that he was
not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein andthat he was not preszent when the
note was made and signed by Gov. Cledera.

Believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Esmeralda and
that Cledera andEsmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which that accused Eligio Orbita had
been charged, the defense counselfiled a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so
as to include Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda asdefendants therein.

The respondent Judge, Hon. Rafael Dela Cruz, directed the office of Edmundo Alberto (Fiscal), within 15
days fromdate, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of
Article 156 in relation to
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Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine once and for all whether the
Governor as jailer ofthe Province and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the
circumstances of Denaque's escape from judicialcustody.

Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that
"after conducting areinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts
and law involved, no prima facie caseagainst Governor Cledera and Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot
be charged.

On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying "that the
Order of thisHonorable Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to
reinvestigate this case, on thebasis of the evidence already adduce during the trial of this case, he be
ordered to amend the information on to includeCledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that
their inclusion is warranted.

Respondent Judge ruled to let the charges be so amended by including in the information the author
or writer of thesaid note containing orders and the person or persons who carried out the said orders
considering the provisions ofArticle 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code.

The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the motion was denied on
February 18, 1970.Hence, the instant recourse.

ISSUE/S
1.WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under Article 156 of
the Revised PenalCode
NO)
2.WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under Article 223 of
the Revised PenalCode
NO)

HOLDING:

1.NO.

Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in
any jailor penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take
away a person from theplace of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person
released. To help in the escape of aPerson confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished
that person with the material means such as a file,ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his
escape.The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any
person therein confinedor helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge
of the prisoner, he is liable forinfidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223
of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov.Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is
the assistant provincial warden, they cannot beprosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
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2.NO.
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In order to be guilty under Art. 223 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer had
consented to, orconnived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the
escape of a prisoner on the partof the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of
the crime of faithlessness in the custody of theprisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of
guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has notviolated the law and is not guilty of the
crime.For sure no connivance in the escape of Denaque from the custody of the accused Orbita can be
deduced from the noteof Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house,
it appearing that the notes does notmention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest
house; and that it was the accused Orbita who picked themen to compose the work party.Neither is
there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised
PenalCode. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by
reason of hisnegligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non- performance of
duty.

DISPOSITIVE:

The orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First
Instance ofCamarines Sur, entitled: The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused
are hereby annulled and set aside.The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Without costs

ADELAIDA TANEGA vs. HON. JUDGE MASAKAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner Adelaida Tanega appealed her conviction of the crime of slander to the City Court of
Quezon City. Found guilty once again by the CFI, she was sentenced to suffer 20 days of arresto menor.
The CA affirmed her conviction. The City Court of Quezon City directed that the execution of the
sentence be set for 27 January 1965. On petitionerâs motion, execution was deferred to 12 February
1965 at 8:30 am. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to appear prompting Respondent
Judge Masakayan to issue warrants for her arrest but the former was never arrested. More than a year
later, Petitioner moved to quash the warrants on the ground of prescription of penalty but such plea
was rejected and Respondent Judge issued another warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty has prescribed.

HELD/DECISION: No. The penalty has not prescribed. Petition dismissed. RATIO: By Article 92 of the
Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of
prescription of penalties â so the succeeding Article 93 provides â "shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Under Art. 157 of the RPC, the elements of
evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking". For
prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit
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should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a
convict who â sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment â was thereafter never placed in
confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.

Torres v Gonzales

152 SCRA 272 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Pardon – Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple
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crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the
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cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue
before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating
the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as
they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not
afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against
him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article
159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
“having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and
is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

TORRES v GONZALES (152 SCRA 272) A convict granted conditional pardon with an undertaking that he
would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” who is recommitted should be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged
before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code defines a distinct and substantive felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the prescribed penalty.
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PEOPLE v DIOSO October 23, 1964 G.R. L-38346-47 When the accused is a quasi-recidivist, having
committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense, the maximum penalty
prescribed by law for murder is death, regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstance such as voluntary surrender and plea of guilty or the complete absence
thereof.

PEOPLE vs. DE LEON, G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926

Criminal Case Digest:

Digested Cases

Facts: Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente
Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or intimidation against
persons nor force upon things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one
with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage and
black spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.

Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, on the theft of
Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and
was sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and one
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day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in
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both cases. The accused appealed from this judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being
arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly by
agreement of the parties approved by the court.

Issue: WON the defendant-appellant committed two crimes of theft.

Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in
the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental
circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here
for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the
same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because
there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging to another on
one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only one crime of theft; and fact that
the things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be
punished separately.

PEOPLE v KONG LEON (48 O.G. 664) The making of false coins of a foreign country is punishable under
Article 163, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code even if said country has withdrawn the coins from
circulation therein.

Del Rosario v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961

Facts: Accused showed complainant Philippine one-peso bills and induced complainant to believe that
the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine
treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered and
changed. By virtue of the inducement, the accused succeeded in obtaining from complainant P1,700.00
for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the
Philippines. Issue: Whether possession of the altered one-peso bills constitute a violation of Article 168.
Held: Yes. The possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of “the figures, letters, words
or signs contained” in which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they
were used by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable
under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code

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