PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) VS.

PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police and that
they informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their proposed
demonstration.

The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after learning the about the
planned mass. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union,
explaining further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

Company informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who without previous leave
of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed.

Another meeting was convoked Company. It reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, those from
the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would
be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of
the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause
of their Collective Bargaining

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied
by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA
2. Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing its employees

RULING:

1. No. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and
to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate
not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage
but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
 appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as
for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed.

2. Company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on its part to
permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) workers from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid
or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
 ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI,
petitioners,
 vs.
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the
ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual
of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess
weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988
to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to
remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.
Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to
comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check
dates, which he did not report to.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain
his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a
period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated
“effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature
of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain
of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the
issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of
his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal
of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is
a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline.
Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that
“[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is
yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies
his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is
solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his
actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause,
is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c),
and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin
is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy
is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport
its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most
particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards
of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is
flight safety.

Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social
justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct.
Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 699 Gr No. 107383, February 20, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. That
petitioner accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982, petitioner went to the
clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medicine, without the consent of the latter.
That on the same date mentioned, petitioner opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband
and took 157 documents and papers consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use
as evidence in a case for legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action
below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The
RTC, decided in favor of private respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of
properties described and ordering petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay
him nominal and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore,
petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The
only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III,
1987 Constitution) Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art.III,1987 Constitution) A
person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law
ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court)PETITION DENIED
Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council

FACTS:

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and
overbreadh doctrines?

RULING:

No.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that
the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN
TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and
BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee.
Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-
appellants.
 Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(in Sp. Proc. No. 20037) denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus
and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James
Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao
alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are
as follows:.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-
named petitioners before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S.
dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from
the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the
same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose
Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the
Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the
Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI,
U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase
of U.S. dollars.1
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of
said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board.
Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00,
herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty.
On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss
the charges presented against them in the Deportation Board for the reason,
among others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation
of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain
such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the
Board of February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition
for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition was given due course in
our resolution of July 7, 1953, but made returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the lower
court as Special Proceeding No. 20037.
At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each,
a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the
respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425
against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or
prohibition proceedings.
On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original
petition, maintaining among others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent
of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners
and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee
Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he
was found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actually offer
money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that the latter may
abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the
purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said
petitioner was involved.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding
the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his
power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the
stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and
interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the
deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's
temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the
theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested
alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the
petitioners instituted the present appeal. .
It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released
on bail, but before the charges filed against them were actually investigated,
petitioners-appellant raised the question of jurisdiction of the Deportation
Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and now
before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport
aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the
ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the
Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be
exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the
Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and
expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37).
With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to
delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration
Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws
relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion,
deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-
nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall
continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above
reads:.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign
power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded
from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or
his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated.
In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself
or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine
the opposing witnesses."
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not
expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens,
unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under
Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be
observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a
procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which
provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the
Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in
the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the chief Executive has
been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions.2
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable
alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the
Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is
invested with power to deport, still he may do so only upon the grounds
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other,
as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be
deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the
unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive. This contention is not without
merit, considering that whenever the legislature believes a certain act or
conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it invariably enacts a law to that
effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to
those originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
justifying deportation of an alien, as well as other laws which provide
deportation as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation
thereof.
Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in
effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in
violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic sabotage — which
is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503
amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The
President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after
investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may
be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by
said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first executive
order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494,
July 26, 1934), constituting a board to take action on complaints against
foreigners, to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon
created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens
charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein
provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the
Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized
agent of the President.
This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the
President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with it
the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same
may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board. 1awphîl.nèt

Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike

Commonwealth Act No. 613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was
specifically granted authority, among others, to make arrests, fails to provide
the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection with such
investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time,
saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947,
providing —
For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the
Deportation Board created under Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4,
1947, and facilitating the execution of the order of deportation whenever the
President decides the case against the respondent. I, Manuel Roxas,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond
with the Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such
conditions as he may prescribe. .
xxx xxx xxx
Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure
appearance of the alien under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of
the respondent.
It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the
Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board
was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the
Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the
alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation
unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under
such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, upon whose authority the President's power to deport is predicated,
does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But the Solicitor
General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive
acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation granted him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the
foreigner charged as undesirable.
In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be
secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following
language:.
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of
Rights, Philippine Constitution).
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case
of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not
the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is
placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is
declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally
applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable
innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically
provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be
issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc.,
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement —
"to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do
not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence,
under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the
Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of
arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even
doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority
other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution
does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative
warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause
against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an
administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the
order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an
executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as
then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable
only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to
carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of
contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as
already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order
of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of
the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable
that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive
order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance
of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order
of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in
this proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on
whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for
purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation
has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether,
conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest
of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the
Deportation Board.
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual
demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to
determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the
liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as
well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant
may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant
dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which
requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words,
the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to
the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect
that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the
exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an
implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by
the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or
limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life
and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the
guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a
delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as
inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and
freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.
We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan
Sin v. Deportation Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated,
however, that the power of arrest was not squarely raised in that proceeding,
but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that the
President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against
him did not constitute ground for deportation. .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951,
insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon
the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared
illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent
Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to
such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote.
 Reyes,
J.B.L., J., took no part.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al.

G.R. No. 178552 : October 5, 2010

FACTS:

Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA
9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various
petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except
that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper

POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting

requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1)
it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3)
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist

fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably
invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build."
They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding
such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and the
implementation of RA 9372.

POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand"
are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited
acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws.
A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for
being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against
them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners
contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful
demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting
the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses

on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails
some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal
acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a
deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative
lobbying in Congress.
Petitions Dismissed
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN CASE DIGEST
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:

On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding probable
cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has committed the offense
of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder).
The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it
dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of
the accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly: ‘combination’,
‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to question the validity of RA
7080.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder
leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power
of Congress to classify it as such.

RULE:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of a
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

ANALYSIS:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of general terms
or the failure to define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law
provides some comprehensible guide as to what would render those subject to the said law liable to
its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does
not apply to laws that merely consist of imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating the guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec.
4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime is a misconception.
Rather than proving each and every criminal act done, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.
3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative declaration in RA
No. 7659 (which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.

CONCLUSION:

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
 Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335
February 2014

Facts: The consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of R.A. 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use
of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information
and facility of communication. However, all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a
number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. The
government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish
their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. Meanwhile, petitioners claim that the means
adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order
into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. Pending
hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended
the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

Issues: Whether or not the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as the provisions that would enable the
government to track down and penalize violators are constitutional:

a. Section 4 (a) (1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4 (a) (3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4 (a) (6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4 (b) (3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4 (c) (1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4 (c) (2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4 (c) (3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4 (c) (4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26 (a) on CICC's Powers and Functions.
Whether or not Articles 353,354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code on the crime of libel is
constitutional

Ruling:

a. Section 4(a)(1) is valid and constitutional. The strict scrutiny standard is not applicable since
freedom of speech is not what is punished but only the access of a computer system without
 right. Besides, the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client according to
their agreement.
b. Section 4(a)(3) is valid and constitutional. It does not encroach on any freedom under the
overbreadth doctrine. It simply punishes a form of vandalism on computer data, electronic
document or electronic data message. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer
systems and private documents.
c. Section 4(a)(6) is valid and constitutional. The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for
acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
d. Section 4(b)(3) is valid and constitutional. The press has nothing to fear since a special
circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required in this section.
e. Section 4(c)(1) is valid and constitutional. Engaging in sexual acts privately through internet
connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to
eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
f. Section 4(c)(2) is valid and constitutional. The intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative. There is also a rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable.
g. Section 4(c)(3) is void and unconstitutional. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
h. Section 4(c)(4) on online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of
the post but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and
react to it. The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. They are a
world apart in terms of quickness of the readers’ reaction to defamatory statements posted in
cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the
speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.
i. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes is
valid and constitutional only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but void and unconstitutional
with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
j. Section 6 is valid and constitutional. It merely makes commission of existing crimes through the
internet a qualifying circumstance. In using technology, the offender often evades identification
and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. This creates a basis for higher
penalties for cybercrimes.
k. Section 7 is void and unconstitutional only in respect to (1) Online libel charged under both
Section 4(c)(4) of R. A. 10175 and Article 353 of the RPC, and (2) Online child pornography
charged under both Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. 10175 and R.A. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography
Act of 2009 because of double jeopardy. The Court resolves to leave the determination of the
correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
l. Section 8 is valid and constitutional. It is the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe a
measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes.
m. Section 12 is void and unconstitutional. The supposed limitation is no limitation at all since it is
the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
 choosing whatever specified communication they want. This threatens the right of individuals to
privacy.
n. Section 13 is valid and constitutional. The data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such
orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of
the same.
o. Section 14 is valid and constitutional. It envisions only the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.
p. Section 15 is valid and constitutional. It does not supersede existing search and seizure rules
but merely supplements them. It does not pose any threat on the rights of the person from
whom they were taken.
q. Section 17 is valid and constitutional. It does not deprive the user’s right against deprivation of
property without due process of law because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right
to require the service provider to have a copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage
system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer. He could also
request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
r. Section 19 is void and unconstitutional which authorizes the DOJ to restrict or block access to
suspected Computer Data. It is in violation of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of
expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
s. Section 20 is valid and constitutional in so far as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which
are not struck down by Court. There must be judicial determination of guilt, during which
defense and justifications for non-compliance done knowingly or wilfully may be raised.
t. Section 24 is valid and constitutional. The formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent
with the policy of law to prevent and combat cyber offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.
u. Section 26(a) is valid and constitutional. For the same reason in the preceding number, the
policy adopted is in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.

Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel are valid and constitutional.