Sie sind auf Seite 1von 18

NOTES IN ELECTION LAW

Election
It is the means by which the people choose their officials for definite and fixed periods
and to whom they entrust, for the time being, as their representatives the exercise of the
powers of government. (Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 39 Phil. 258)

It is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It is the act of casting and receiving the ballots, counting them, and making the
return. (Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. 636)

Kinds of Election
Regular Election – It is one held for the selection of an officer after the expiration of the
full term of the former officer. It is an election recurring at stated times fixed by law. (
Black’s Law Dictionary)

Special Election – It is one held to supply a vacancy in office occurring before the
expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

Purposes of Election

 To secure secret balloting to voters, to the end that they may express their
choice of candidates without threats, violence, intimidation or corrupt motives
(Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521)
 To afford the people, through the qualified voters, a direct participation in the
affairs of the government, either in selecting who will be their public officials for e
definite period of time; or in deciding a certain question and/or issue of public
interest.

Initiative - The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to


propose and exact legislations through an election called for the purpose. (Sec. 3, R.A.
6735, The Initiative and Referendum Act -August 4, 1989)

Plebiscite – It is the statutory method whereby qualified voters pass upon various
public matters or issues submitted to them. (Planas vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 149)

Referendum – It refers to the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation


through an election called for the purpose. (Sec. 3, R.A. 67735)

Recall – It is the power exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit
against their local elective official for loss of confidence. (Section 69, Local Government
Code)
2
Right of Suffrage under the 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE V
Suffrage

“Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not


otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballotas well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to
vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote
under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.”

ARTICLE IV
Citizenship

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

HOW ELECTION LAWS ARE CONSTRUED

Generally, election laws must be liberally construed, resolving any doubt or


ambiguity in favor of upholding the citizen’s right to vote.

Provisions of law which are not essential to the conduct of a fair election will be
appreciated by courts as merely formal and directory, in order to achieve the primordial
objective of giving effect to the will of the electorate.
3

LAWS ON ELECTION

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code –
Promulgated on December 3, 1985, it is a codification of all previous statutes and
regulations pertaining to elections of public officers.

R.A. 6646 - The Electoral reform Law of 1987


R.A. 7166 – Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections on May, 1992
R.A. 7941 (Pary-List System Act)
R.A. 8199 (Voters’ Registration Act of 1996)
R.A. 8436 (Act Authorizing the COMELEC to Adopt an Automated Election System)
R.A. 9006 (Fair Elections Act)
R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
R.A. 9369 (Amended Automated Election Law)

RESIDENCE / DOMICILE

As used in election law, residence is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil 645)

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur:


(1) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) An intention to remain,there;
(3) An intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be an animus non
revertendi and animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicle of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The acts of the person must
conform to his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary, the
residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual ; and to the fact of
residence must be added the animus manendi. (Gallego vs. Verra, 73 Phil 453)

In prescribing residence as a qualification for the exercise of suffrage, the objective of


the law is to “exclude a stranger and a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of the community and not identified with the latter. (Faypon vs. Carino, 86 Phil.
294)

WHO ARE DISQUALIFIED TO VOTE

Under the Omnibus Election Code, the following persons shall not be qualified to
vote (Sec. 118, Omnibus Election Code):
4

1) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of
not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary
pardon; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this
paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence;

2) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or
tribunal or having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted
government, such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and
firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full
civil and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his
right to vote automatically after five years of service of sentence.

3) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

Registration in election law refers to the method prescribed for ascertaining the
electors who are qualified to cast votes. It is a means by which the government is able
to supervise and regulate the activities of various elements participating in an election.
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 31)

It is the obligation of every citizen qualified to vote to register and cast his vote
(Sec. 4, B.P. Blg 881)

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF VOTERS


(Under B.P. Blg. 881)

SECTION 138. Jusrisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. The


municipal and metropolitan trial courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters of inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their respective
municipalities or cities. Decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts may be
appealed directly by the aggrieved party to the proper regional trial court within five
days from receipt of notice thereof, otherwise said decision of the municipal or
metropolitan trial court shall become final and executory after said period. The regional
trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the time the appeal was
received and its decision shall be immediately final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained by the courts.
5

SECTION 139.Petition for inclusion of voters in the list. Any person whose
application for registration has been disapproved by the board of election inspectors or
whose name has been stricken out from the list may apply, within twenty days after
the last registration day, to the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court, for an order
directing the board of election inspectors to include or reinstate his name in the list,
together with the certificate of the board of election inspectors regarding his case and
proof of service of notice of his petition upon a member of the board of election
inspectors with indication of the time, place, and court before which the petition is to
be heard .

SECTION 142. Petition for exclusion of voters from the list. Any registered
voter in a city or municipality may apply at any time except during the period
beginning with the twenty-first day after the last registration day of any election up to
and including election day with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court, for the
exclusion of a voter from the list, giving the name and residence of the latter, the
precinct in which he is registered and the grounds for the challenge.

POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTION

Under Section 5 of Bp. Blg.881, the COMELEC, motu proprio or upon verified
petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing,shall postpone the
election when for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision.

SECTION 6. Failure of Election. - if an account of force majeure, violence,


terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any pooling place has not
been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election return, or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election.

ELECTION PERIOD

Election period shall commence 90 days before the day of election and shall end
30 days thereafter. (Sec. 3, BP Blg. 881)
6
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(Article IX-C of the Constitution)

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum , and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contest involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the Commission on Elections contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executor, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publications, political parties, organizations, or coalitions


which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program
of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered .Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold
and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to


political parties, organizations, coalitions or candidates related to elections
constitute interference in national affairs and, when accepted, shall be additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition
to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
7

(6) File , upon verified complaint, or in its own initiative , petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(5) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election


spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

(6) Recommend to the president the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(7) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

“Sec 3. The commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

“Sec 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision , agency, or instrumentality there for, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim
to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply , including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly ,
honest,, peaceful, and credible elections.

“Sec.5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of


election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.

“Sec.6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provision of this article.
8
“Sec.7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.

“Sec.8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-


list system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

“Sec.9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty
days thereafter.

“ Sec.10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination.

“Sec.11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the


expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives,
referenda, and recalls shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations
and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the
chairman of the Commission.”

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election , withdraw the same by submitting to
the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for
more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, be shall not be eligible for any of them. However ,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the person
who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office
for which he desires to be eligible and cancel to the certificate of candidacy for the
other office or offices. (Sec. 74, OEC)

A certificate of candidacy is the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole


world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It is statement of a
person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy
9

for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political
party to which he belongs to nay, and his post office address for all election purposes
being as well-stated.

A person who runs for an elective office but did not file a certificate of
candidacy at all is not candidate. And a certificate of candidacy filed out of time
or beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in
law, a candidate.

The mandatory provisions of law notwithstanding, the requirements on the signing,


swearing and information required to be stated in the certificate of candidacy may be
regarded only as directory, if only to give effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even
if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain the required
data, the election of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground, They
may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate.
[Cal lado vs. Alonzo, 15 SCRA 562 (1965)].

SUBSTITUTION
(Section 77, OEC)

If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to and certified by, the same political may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.

The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected not later than mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the
entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Withdrawal of certificate, required for substitution.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under
oath. A withdrawal of candidacy which is not under oath is not a valid withdrawal and
generally produces no legal effect, and for all legal intents and purposes there is no
withdrawal and he remains a candidate. The exception to this general rule is when the
10

withdrawal, which is not under oath, is actually made and accepted by the election
registrar, as a result of which a substitute candidate files his certificate of candidacy in
his place and receives the winning number of votes. For to give no legal affect to the
withdrawal because it is not under oath is to pay homage to technically, nullify the
candidacy of the substitute candidate, and frustrate the will of the electorate.

A valid certificate of candidacy is required for substitution.

The candidate to be substituted must have a valid certificate of candidacy. A candidate


whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be
substituted by another belonging to the same political party.

DISQUALIFICATION
(Sec. 68, OEC)

Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is


declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having:
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;

(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

(b) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v and cc, sub-paragraph
6
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office.

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country


shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Section 12 of the OEC provides for additional ground for disqualification:

“ Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or


incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
11
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.”

Petition to disqualify a candidate

Disqualification refers to the certain acts committed or being suffered by the


candidate which the law makes them as grounds for disqualification to run for an
elective position. These acts may either be subsisting at the time the file their
certificates of candidacy, such as conviction of crime involving moral turpitude , or the
commission of certain election offenses during the election campaign as provided for in
Sec.68 of the OEC.

It has been held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates for
the commission of election offenses is limited to those enumerated in Sec.68 of the
Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of the COMELEC jurisdiction.
(Codilla v. De Venecia, 179 SCAD 58 [2002]).

Who may file - any citizen of voting age, duly registered political aprty, organization or
coalition of political parties.
Where to file – Law Department of COMELEC
When to file – any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.

Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

“SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor during the
pendency thereof, order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

In Domino vs. COMELEC, 310 SCRA 546, it was held:

“ It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. In every election, the people’s choice is the paramount consideration and
their expressed will must, at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.”
p. 12

The reason given for this ruling is that, the votes given by the majority of the
voters are presumed to have been cast in the belief that such candidate is qualified
(However, finality of the disqualification case came only after the election).

PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL


A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
(Section 78, OEC)

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of


candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false. The petition
may be filed anytime not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided , after notice and hearing , not later than
fifteen days before election.

The material misrepresentations refers to the qualifications for elective office.


This includes false statement in the certificate of candidacy as to age, residency,
citizenship, being registered voter and any other legal qualifications necessary to run for
an elective office. Aside from the requirement of materiality, it must also be made with
the deliberate intention to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible.

Case: Ty-Delgado vs. HRET and Pichay (January 26, 2016. G.R. No. 219603)

Having been convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, Pichay is


disqualified to run for public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. His
disqualification under Section 12 of the OEC is a material fact involving eligibility of a
candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC.

Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of five
years from his service of sentence. Pichay was deemed to have served his sentence
when he paid the fine on February 17, 2011. Hence, the five-year period shall end only
on February 16, 2016. Thus, Pichay made a false material representation as to his
eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy on October 9, 2012 for the 2013
elections.

Case: Eleazar Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698 , December 1, 2009

In its Decision dated December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court, speaking thru
Justice Nachura granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso
p. 13

in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, on the
ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court found that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as
opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The pertinent portion of Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

"For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of
the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.

On the other hand, the thrust of COMELEC’s opposition to the petition is


summed up as follows:

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than
the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry
of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.

On Motion for Reconsideration, the Supreme Court speaking thru Chief


Justice Puno rendered its Decision dated February 22, 2010 reversing the earlier
ruling of December 1, 2009, stating among others:

The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to
continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office
notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
p. 14

(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and members of the
military in partisan political activity;

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord
differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential
treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes
of the law;

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. cralaw

In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to


Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among
others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the
Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast,
since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be
operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section
14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to
both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy
created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and
significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the
contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
failed muster. We ruled:

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
p. 15

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging
in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote.
Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect
to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and
all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
p. 16

The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our
assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents,"
mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is
one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of
the Judicial Process.

PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

Case: ROSALINDA PINERA VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009.

Petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of the town of
Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
which prohibits premature campaigning. The Supreme Court considered the motorcade
of Pinera’s supporters a day before the start of the campaign period as an act of
premature campaigning.

Also in this case, the Supreme Court took pain in discussing the following
material points:

First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly


provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate,
or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity, except during the campaign period." Very simply, premature
campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.

For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code prohibits is 'an election campaign or partisan political activity' by a
'candidate' 'outside' of the campaign period,"41 is clearly erroneous.

Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or
partisan political activity in the following manner:

SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:

xxx

(c) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office which shall include:
p. 17

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons


for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or


against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or


oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the
filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet
officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC,
already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming
elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of
promoting his/her intended candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy,
his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing
of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as
a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC
before the campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said
period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case,
there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose disqualification
may be sought, to begin with.42

Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the
offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the
pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender
may freely carry out the same with impunity.
p. 18

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her
becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already
commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as
election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given
effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially
becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts,
constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the
other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in
promoting his/her candidacy.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of


Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary
and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

The laudable and exemplary intention behind the prohibition against premature
campaigning, as declared in Chavez v. Commission on Elections,43 is to level the
playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between the popular
or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other,
by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. The intention for prohibiting premature
campaigning, as explained in Chavez, could not have been significantly altered or
affected by Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, the avowed
purpose of which is to carry-on the automation of the election system. Whether the
election would be held under the manual or the automated system, the need for
prohibiting premature campaigning - to level the playing field between the popular or
rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other,
by allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period - remains.

We cannot stress strongly enough that premature campaigning is a pernicious act that
is continuously threatening to undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections in our
country, no matter how great or small the acts constituting the same are. The choice as
to who among the candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public
office should not be swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some
individuals who are able to spend resources to promote their candidacies in advance of
the period slated for campaign activities.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen