A.C. No.

2841 July 3, 2002

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY,
AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.

PER CURIAM:

"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is
the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader."1 These were the
eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he
laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, "many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public
servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and
a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the
benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a litigant's financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the
courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike."2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by his
disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted position as an officer
of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which has since been
pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who,
in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years,
Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty.
Samuel C. Occeña caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his
various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or
unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause for money or malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William C. Ogan,
his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as
executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and real estate in Cebu
City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and
speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been
terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.

Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed a project of
partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain portions. The
executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed
several motions praying that the estate's remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines
and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently
opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husband's attorney's fee
and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates
were not in her possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which
delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the orders of the probate
court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining
cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R
(December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the view to closing the
estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that the
prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the executor or administrator or the counsels for the
contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is
burdened with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorney's fee and the
longer the proceedings the bigger the attorney's fee."3

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña's claim for attorney's fee in the
amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to
the estate which, according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because
as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the securities were not in
her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in
her possession. To determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order
requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply
with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her to take possession of all
certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a
statement of their nature and their value." Again, she did not comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, appealed the
numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the
propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz
issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to "refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing
the court." The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and
one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton
County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the
probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the
sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her
report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for
lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court which is and would be
for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with what the trial court did. xxx

"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders he
should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and expeditiously determining the assets of the
estate to be ultimately distributed among the heirs."

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the orders of October 22,
1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which securities
were and were not in her possession and to give the reason therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court and fined P250.00 each for
disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both
were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On
January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this
incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute immediately among the heirs
all the shares of stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor
Service Co.; to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a written report to the
court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates
of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty. Occeña, did not comply
with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she should not be punished for contempt of court.
After several postponements at her instance and that of her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981.
But neither of them appeared, thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in
the performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for damages
(P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz,
charging him with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished the
executrix for indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance with the probate court's order of October 16,
1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeña's complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a
Resolution dated November 19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross
inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty.
Occeña to substantiate his charges during the investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty. Occeña and his wife filed
with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case NO. 14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged that they suffered
damages upon reading the judge's comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be groundless, Atty. Occeña further
delayed with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater harm to the other
heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.

From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court and the Court of
Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate proceedings, was also
harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while
pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for the
judge's inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an attorney
from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case
No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful
court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was
denied. Atty. Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to another 15
days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeña's
motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did not
comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary restraining order in G. R. No.
62453, "Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983,
this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on January
30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the hearing was reset
on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General
or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon
another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not
appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to
present evidence.4

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has "abused, misused and
overused the judicial system,"5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending 6 him from the practice of law for three (3)
years. The decision7 unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed with the Court of
Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate court directing
the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00
to be taken from the estate; and the order ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities
belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeña's refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher courts
unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.

II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed
persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions for damages which
were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a
letter-complaint charging the judge of the probate court with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The
complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative
complaint which was again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal charge which were found
to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement of the estate proceedings by
harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and
unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondent's propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and criminal suits,
harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure of self defense,
these judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have
been devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. Most, if not all of these
petitions, were determined to be groundless and without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

 Respondent violated his lawyer's oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of Rule 140, Section 6,
Revised Rules of Court, entitled "Charges Against Judges of First Instance," which reads as follows:

"Sec. 6. Confidential – Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential."

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z") filed by respondent
against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and confidential nature thereof three (3) times,
to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled
"Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604", questioning an
interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. "V") to which he attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of
his aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue
raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S.
Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an interlocutory order of the probate court, he
attached as Annex "C" thereof a true and complete copy of the said administrative complaint although not
relevant to the question therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan (Exh. "Y"), he also
attached as Annex "A" thereof a true and complete copy of said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even
if said administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the court, put to naught
one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal and professional reputation of judges from
the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57
Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI,
page 260). Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"), respondent alleged in
paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-1") that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña was held in contempt and
censured, "without any hearing," for not obeying the probate court's order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in the order of
February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why she should
not be cited for contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April 8, 1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on
June 23, 1980, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning (Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the
restraining order of the Court of Appeals (Exh. "Q"). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the
denial by the Supreme Court of the respondent's petition for review impugning the Court of Appeals' decision. As
stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"), copies of the order setting the hearing of the
contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on March
24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21,
1981), the court received executrix's motion for postponement of the hearing, which was denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. "R") was rendered holding the executrix in contempt and
penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged under oath in his letter-
complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. "Y") that "without prior notice
and without any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and
censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. "Y-2"; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979 (Exh. "C"), directing said
executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet
whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by
the estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they
stated in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued
"without hearing" and thus a violation of procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has
become final (Exh. "E"), confirmed this falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of
her right to be heard when the respondent judge issued the two orders in question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 1388 and Section 9, Rule 1399 of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge
Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full statement
of facts.10
On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña's motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing his decision of
November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order 11requiring
"the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty.
Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten
(10) days from notice."

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court's action on his decision suspending
Atty. Occeña.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to
Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and recommendation. After going over
the records, he recommended "that the temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the
decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a period of three
years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation
of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys."

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same being supported by
the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.12 His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.13 It must indicate the dubious
character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself and counsel.14 All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case against him which
was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a
quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occeña deliberately failed to appear and
answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty.
Occeña commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these
transgressions, he violated the lawyer's oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:

"I, ________________________,of ________________________,do

(place of birth)

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God."

As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings No. 423.
The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the
case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz
and Beldia who heard the case. For respondent's part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited
them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay "can only benefit the executor or administrator" and "the longer
the proceedings, the bigger the attorney's fees." But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occeña has caused a
mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest,
unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause
that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to
misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For
while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.15

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.16 A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 17 He must faithfully
perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. 18 Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the
moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed
the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his
profession,19 because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever
a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.20

Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the
ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing *, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People
of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de
Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against
her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant
refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee
bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent
was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining
witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: Account
Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the
check.[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa
and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S.
No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit
and violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue,
Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice. [4] However, it
was returned unserved with the notation Moved.[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest
address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against
her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case
was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of
deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for
the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented
for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a
check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and
constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. [8] Such an act constitutes gross
misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to
do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this
qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the
lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. [9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of
morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly
incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably
willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. [13] Her conduct not only underscores her
utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which
renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at
the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the
dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice
and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the
Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an
explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of
an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof.Let copies of this Decision be entered in her
record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
 EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015 ]

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment[1] filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit
relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue
embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of
Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

a. AAA,[2] who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had
personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to
Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition,
while still being romantically involved with CCC.[3]

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to
be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.[4]

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a
lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC).
However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal
counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine
Government.[3]

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of
KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota
Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself. [6]

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a Senate
inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious
land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights
Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave misconduct
or violation of the Revised Penal Code.[7]

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal the evidence
by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL
parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request, however, was refused by
the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry. [8]
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.[9]

Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San
Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in
"nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing
grades.[10]

The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order[11] dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to
file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,[12] respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in support of his defense.
Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that
petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a
mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.[13] He claims that the identities of the owners of the
e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly established.
Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant
consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),[14] stating that the allegations in the complaint were deemed
admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),[15] respondent simply denied all of complainant's accusations in the
petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." [16]

On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the case
for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,[17] which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a
Motion to Cancel Hearing,[18]praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously scheduled
hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner
Villadolid in his Order[19] dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's Manifestation[20] praying that
subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner
Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and
the respective subpoenas[21] were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,[22] praying that the
Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In
said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore eyes"
and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his
motion were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his
personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there
was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of
respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a
limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was denied and complainant was
allowed to present his witnesses.[23]

Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni
Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo
Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as
well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted by
complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email
messages which contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood
pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in
2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also
recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be
respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him
his students during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations with his
students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the
latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her
telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty.
Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as his
girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their testimonies
were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was terminated and the
parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was considered submitted for
report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments), [24] pertaining to
respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of
MTC, Paranaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled mandatory
conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with Comments),[25] submitting the
certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the
Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.[26] Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,[27]asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any
decision or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.[28]

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report, [29] finding that
there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code [30] and/or RA 3019[31] as reflected in the Senate
Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's
denials, complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support his allegations in
the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's assertion that
respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report,
complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this
adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's
claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while
still married to Jardiolin, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor
shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".[32]

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation:

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's gross
misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar. this
Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms
prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility."[33]

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution [34] adopting and approving, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent,
thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo
A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration [35] dated July 3, 2013, to which complainant
was required to submit his comment.[36]

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)[37] dated
August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an Order[38] dated August 27,
2013. On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).[39]

Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Leave[40] dated
September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition [41] dated September 20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.[42] Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on
November 11, 2014.[43]

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty.
Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.[44] Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.[45]

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of the Bar.
Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
decision should be against the party with the burden of proof according to the equipoise doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the
evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. [46]

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has been found
committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.

This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain
good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage
by maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by
the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.[47]

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after his
philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.[48] We ruled:

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day
for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of
his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law
invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not
limitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To
reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. [49]

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,[50] the Court disbarred respondent Atty.
Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render
a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We said:

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne
him a child.[51] (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant
was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently established. In his
answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the
supporting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper,
the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.[52] (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings that respondent violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft
and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be
investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein
attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment,
among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption
against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan.'' [53]

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce
additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving
averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied complainant's averments
for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this
Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly
had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant" s position of being not present in the
country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so,
he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him
not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that
Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he should be
disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention was more
so established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he took before
admission to the Bar, which states:

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; [will support its
Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; 1 will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any menial reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and
taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of
violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., on leave.