G.R. No.
88724 April 3, 1990 Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II,
Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed in the said case reads as
follows (p. 47, Rollo):
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior
complaint under oath by the offended party, accuses CEILITO
ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside
a boarding house at Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a
Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and
with threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her will and without her
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the
offense charged. After the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits
were formally offered and admitted, the prosecution rested its case.
Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and
instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-
60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused
CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335,
RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to
offset the same, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE
(12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S.
ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
1
On December 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and
the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape, and consequently,
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside
its December 29, 1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court,
considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp.
71-75, Rollo):
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student
at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant
was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her
boarding house. Her classmates had just brought her home from a
party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had
left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of
a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She
then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another
boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go
upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the first floor was
locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the back
door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm
wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to
her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid).
When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a
room. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered
complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her
head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, appellant
undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra,
pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He
made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his
order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position,
however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of
his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount
him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was
inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands
flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant
pursued her and climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the
room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her. She fled
to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about
eighteen meters in front of the boarding house, and knocked on the
door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and
knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the
building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on
the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took
off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they discovered what
happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the
boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw
somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend
appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern
Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined
complainant, issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states:
Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built, came in with
loose clothing with no under-clothes; appears in state of
shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- — Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast — Well developed, conical in shape with prominent
nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.
Back — Multiple pinpoint marks.
2
Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area
or over the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted
surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no
laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely
enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges
noted.
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses; and
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was
committed by the accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because
they "show remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility
amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor, truth and
validity." (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to
trivial inconsistencies which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the
witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of fabrication,
the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered
as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations
also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid
witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not
necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-
37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed
as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies
(Aportadera et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16,
1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details
would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity
(People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However,
one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the
testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his
penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. According to the accused,
this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances
is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of
the act." (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious had the
testimony of the victim ended there. The victim testified further that the
accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a
material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently
deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the
findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be
accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth
(People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor
the trial court's finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is
not much to be desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her
testimony before the court. Her answer to every question profounded
(sic), under all circumstances, are plain and straightforward. To the
Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the
immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated into
the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her; had
traversed illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear
and free from contradiction and her sincerity and candor, free from suspicion
(People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 487; People v.
Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People v.
Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in
this case did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly
on how the rape was committed. The victim's testimony from the time she
knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was
brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the
findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was
presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the
abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast,
multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck,
erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are
conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim
(pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was
fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the incident and the
conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe
enough to carry the weight of both accused and offended party
without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated. The
partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed,
and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape
complaints (People v. Torio, et al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126
SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):
3
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony
(opening) to the ground which was correctly estimated to be less than
eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened
individual being pursued. Common experience will tell us that in
occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings,
many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights
without being injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl,
like the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable
than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of her private parts
when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is
enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her
unless she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to
show that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982,
117 SCRA 312), We ruled that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her
having been rendered entirely naked by appellant and that even in
her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed to gain
sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All
these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have
occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she
narrated.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other
witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the non-
presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim.
Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be
presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity
(Tugbang v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People
v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for the non-presentation of the
medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim, the trial court stated
that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified
inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused
did not bother to contradict this statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first
assignment of error fall flat on its face. Some were not even substantiated
and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are convinced that the
accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really
calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction
for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was of the belief that there is no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus
convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor
General shares the same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of
the crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily
connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. —
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when
the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.1âwphi1 Our concern now is
whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. In
the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice
4
Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which
is readily understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after
beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented,
against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the
acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a
foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop
prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his
intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element
which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the
latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or
agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and
the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such
intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary
desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing
more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long
line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil.
980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666;
People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We
have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53
Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of
execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it
is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v.
Eriña 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated
rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision
inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.
Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No.
4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph,
for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the
opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision.
The Eriña case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include
the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the
genital organ of the victim, the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr.
Zamora when he "categorically declared that the findings in the vulva does
not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he tossed
back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was
penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate
(Exhibit "A") as interpreted by Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal
declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was penetration
or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for
rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony of the
offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People
v. Royeras People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the
people relied upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. The
testimony of the offended party is at variance with the medical
certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the
mind of the court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where
there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in
all respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the
testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the
medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical
certificate does not exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical
certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by
abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation)
and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of
the genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty
whether or not there was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim
positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially (pp. 302,
304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.
xxx xxx x x xQ What do you mean when you said comply, or
what act do you referred (sic) to, when you said comply?
5
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even
on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R.
No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-
43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-
37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's
testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the
prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the
scale in favor of the accused because after a thorough review of the records,
We find the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever
the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of
the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did not
declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the
death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but
instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R.
Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a single
indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713,
March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449,
November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May
31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as
well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y
BELLO, accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita[1]finally did away with frustrated
rape[2] and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in
our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another
emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering almost every
attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the
contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is that that concept may
send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity
bares itself, to better intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since
after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape
and punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then be
considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All
the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left
for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the
crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not
essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however
slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We
distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were
performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts.[3]The inference that may be derived therefrom is that
complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be
consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the
crime to its consummated stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by
requiring entry into the labiaor lips of the female organ, even if there be no
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for
consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female
organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external
genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,[4] the crucial doctrinal bottom
line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or
as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere
touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked
to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration,
however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the
lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed
amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape
has been committed either in its attempted or in its consummated stage;
otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite the
fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may seem,
6
irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for the accused - a
reclusive life that is not even perpetua but only temporal on one hand, and
the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another level,
if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but consummated rape, what
then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus
limited only to consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted
rape would no longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree
with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape
and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death,[5]hence
this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by RA 7659.[6]
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4
oclock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year
old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to
prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she
met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with
water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo
was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy
preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!"[7] prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo
Campuhan inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short
pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina.
Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed
him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed
Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and
shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who
were living within their compound, to chase the accused.[8]Seconds later,
Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They
held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by
their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his
misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No
evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal
officer on Crysthels body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5
cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He
maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of
Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to
run an errand for her.[9] He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing
mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position
that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped
him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself
from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help
from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted
Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the
threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but
Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he
reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him
instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised
his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the
relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to
the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27
May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme
penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral
damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma.
Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be given any
weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and
improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims
that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that
Crysthels younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just
downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as
possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within the
family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and
responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the
crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what
could be taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable
that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact
when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the
alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He
asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of
penetration of Crysthels private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony
of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to his knees
kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already
removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina." The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code.
Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the
penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years
old. We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge
took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential
ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of
the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
7
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.[10] But the act of touching should be
understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of
the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or
the pudendum.
In People v. De la Pea[11] we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape
even if the attackers penis merely touched the external portions of the female
genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect
penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an
erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit
into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was
consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused
repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all
likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on
the lips of her vulva,[12] or that the penis of the accused touched the middle
part of her vagina.[13] Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or
the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape.[14] As the labias, which are required to be
"touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with
the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence,
the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs
that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia
minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible
within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface.
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is
pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any
hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is
the labia minora.[15] Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated,[16] and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of
the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-
quoted "touching of the female organ,"[17] but has also progressed into being
described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum,"[18] or "the bombardment of the drawbridge."[19] But, to our
mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic
potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to
discharge its onus of proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate
Crysthels vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon
witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously
doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between
Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw upon entering her childrens
room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on
the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to
enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact
point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and
Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon
described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the
chest of the accused is pinning down the victim, while his
right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading
the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primos kneeling
position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage
point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided
Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis supposedly reaching
Crysthels external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris,
etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his movements
from Corazons sight, not to discount the fact that Primos right hand was
allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazons view. It is the
burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen
the sexual contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of
credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to
her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to
inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude
without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all
achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the
prosecution but to run roughshod over the constitutional right of the accused
to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked
intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving her the opportunity to
fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with mans instinct of self-
preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust even
when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been
discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the
8
normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazons presence
would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his
pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than
enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal his
evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's
answer to the question of the court -
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily
said, "No." Thus -
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir.[20]
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds
the question of whether rape in this case was consummated. It has
foreclosed the possibility of Primos penis penetrating her vagina, however
slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration,[21] obviously induced by a question propounded to her who could
not have been aware of the finer distinctions
between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to
attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as
underdeveloped as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly
sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the
accused touched her organ there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced
that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the
accused touched the middle portion of her vagina and entered the labia of
her pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo
made efforts to penetrate Crysthel.[22] Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint
that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection.[23] On the
contrary, Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his
right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to
penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primos penis having breached Crysthels
vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primos
advances by putting her legs close together;[24]consequently, she did not feel
any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to
her.[25] Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In
cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored
its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's
testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the
inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness,
or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.[26] None was shown in this case.
Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on
account of her tender age, the Court endeavors at the same time to harness
only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally
guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the
basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for
consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case
that there were no external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness
body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken
place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete
penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she
clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual
contact between the accused and the victim.[27]
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate,
both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the
testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the
medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous
results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the
accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to
accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin
line that separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly
disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only of
attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should
be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable
penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a minor
below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range
of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon
the accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the
range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of
which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its
periods.
9
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quofinding accused PRIMO
"SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him
to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight
(8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent
and unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience
that destroys not only her future but of the youth population as well, who in
the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland.
Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human
dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days
past 12 years, has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her
untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil act" of non-consensual sex
called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an
ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there
exist any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust
ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating
the horrible experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child
in the bloody hands of appellant, as such facts are ably supported by
evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on
November 20, 1953. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was
under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound
at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. But he
stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away
from the unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian
Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside
the compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While
they were playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside
the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31;
September 6, 1995, pp.17; 20-22).
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a
drinking spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was
already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out
with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store
fronting the compound, saw Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four times
catching birds inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the
afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's
store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to
his in-law's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding
changes on the trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was
near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met
appellant along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m.,
he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house
(TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's
store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none
left of it. She notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep
thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed
manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he
left and walked back to the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8;
12-14).
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was
missing. She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown
belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady
sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the
following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded
a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant
alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter
disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, l995; pp. 14-
17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma.
Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the
victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
10
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the
following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye,
lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral
aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5
cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area,
right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0
x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows,
right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm, forearms, left, posterior aspect,
lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right
antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect,
lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right,
lateral aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left,
dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial,
subpleural petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head
Injury, Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00
o'clock position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with
blood clots. (TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126).
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing.
According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the
apartment since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the
same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp.
6-11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of
appellant was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan
City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to
them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his
present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed
them that appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park,
Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the
house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty
white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified
by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found
inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of
appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic
tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a
pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's belongings. These items were
brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August 18,
1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed
to the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano
retrieved the victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995,
pp. 3-8; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in
Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela
Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face
to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was
not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as
his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21).
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an
Information which reads:2
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with
said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without her
consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named
accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as
a result of which, said victim died.
11
Contrary to law.3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further
sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code. (RPC), as amended,5 appellant insists that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against him is
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony
summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what
transpired as follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellant's
employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned
by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 o'clock
noon. Then he had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from
Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash
advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5).
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend,
opted to rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They
consumed one case of red horse beer. Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-
worker, fetched him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to Zaldy's house
and bought a bottle of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m.
After consuming the bottle of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of
gin from a nearby store. It was already 9 o'clock in the evening. While they
were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin
to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store
and proceeded to Isip's apartment. But because it was already closed, he
decided to sleep at the second floor of Isip's unfinished house. Around 10
o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the
body inside the room where appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up,
Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead
body of the child or they would kill him. He, however, refused to follow. Then,
he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead body
downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him
again, they would kill him. At 4 o'clock the following morning, he left the
compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan,
Batangas. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere
in Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer's plan to salvage him if he
would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared,
he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by
Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial
confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest
circumspection in the review thereof since "there can be no stake higher and
no penalty more severe . . . than the termination of a human life." 7 For life,
once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In order
therefore, that appellant's guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the
reasons why, as the records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant's
proffered excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the
commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof
does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules
on evidence8and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had
on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.10 Facts and
12
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence,
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may
surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to
prove appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. These
circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST — Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip,
owner of the unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic
tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of
June 26, 1995 is located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the
evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located
in front portion of the compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where the
unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That she noticed
the accused's hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in sigsagging
manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply.
That the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went
inside the compound.
SECOND — Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C. Suni, categorically testified
that on June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to
his in-laws house, he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road
leading to his in-law's residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the
unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria
Chan standing at the gate of the unfinished big house of Maria Isip between
8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD — Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house
where victim's body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused
Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the
morning of June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from
her to leave. That after finishing some work she asked him to do accused
Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to
return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the next morning.
That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in
Batangas on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH — Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney
driver plying the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian
St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry
Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on
June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of
the North Expressway.
FIFTH — Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big
house of Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the
incident. This is a clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the
said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic)
fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the
accused. The absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper motive
sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the
testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit.
(People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276,. 284; People
vs. Ali L-18512 October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH — Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after
having been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty.
Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his
statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused
Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed
to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to
the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos
Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150 SCRA 311). He did not even informed the
Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8,
1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That
his confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a
lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as
testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his
constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the
testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from
the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice
any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical
conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the cause of
death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that
he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko
siya, tapos tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos
ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the
statement. There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to
sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were
obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have
been motivated to concoct facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of
the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People
v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52
SCRA 71, People v. Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
13
SEVENTH — Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was
notable to enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already
closed and he proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and
slept. He said while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of
the victim and dumped it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the
two ordered him to have sex with the dead body but he refused. That the two
asked him to assist them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the
septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is unbelievable
and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not
in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that
night of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was
already closed. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he
(Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in
the room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry
Mahinay was sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver
upstairs only to be disposed/dump later in the septic tank located in the
ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in
the septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room
where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have
sex with the dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except it's conformity to
aver knowledge observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT — If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have
apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who
interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An
innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation
of crime as a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a precaution
against prejudicing himself. A person's silence therefore, particularly when it
is persistent will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (People vs.
Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH — The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his
consciousness of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the
incident and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7,
1995. 12
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:13
 1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape
with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious: and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed the
penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
14
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of
the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation. 14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a
crime against chastity,15although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No.
8353), rape has since been re-classified as a crime against persons under
Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a
complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress
with a woman by force and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape may
be committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent
becomes immaterial18not only because force is not an element of statutory
rape, 19 but the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is
below such age. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is
proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was
violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must
be proven but also the other element that the perpetrator's evil acts with the
offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat needs
to be established. Both elements are present in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was
adequately proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor
who conducted post mortem examination on the child's body:
Q: And after that what other parts or the victim did you examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 o'clock and
8:00 o'clock position and that the edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration? 22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration
of an organ. S: Hindi ko po alam.
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?
A: Adult male organ, sir.
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness? 23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na
A: I am very sure of that.20 iyong ni rape at pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ha ito?

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant S: Oho.

himself admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
S: Naka-isa po.
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay
na ginagawa, tapos dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto 25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng "NAKARAOS",
hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo maaari bang ipaliwanag mo ito?
niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte na katawan ng batang babae yung
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this iyong ari?
investigator's table. Subject evidence were part of evidences recovered at the
crime scene). S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.

17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae? 27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod
mong ginawa?
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang
babae?. 29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra na sinasabi mo?

S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas. S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.

20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari? 30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?

S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
kung anong petsa, basta araw ng Linggo.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
S: Natatakot po ako.
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.

15
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-
negra.
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN,
buhay pa ba siya o patay na?
S: Buhay pa po.
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.21
In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's
vagina; rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex
organ is enough to consummate the sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching
by the male's organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the
woman's private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was
indeed employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant's
own account, he pushed the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the
table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and
satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at
the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be
concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her
defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession,
which he, however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional
right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the records as well as the
testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his
constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As
testified to by the assisting lawyer:
Q — Will you please inform the Court what was that call
about?
16
A — We went to the station, police investigation together
with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by Police
Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to
confess of the crime of, I think, rape with homicide.
Q — And upon reaching the investigation room of
Valenzuela PNP who were the other person present?
A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and
other investigator inside the investigation room and the
parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
Q — And when you reached the investigation room do you
notice whether the accused already there?
A — The accused was already there.
Q — Was he alone?
A — He was alone, sir.
Q — So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold
Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did they tell you,
if any?
A — They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry
Mahinay would like to confess of the crime charged, sir.
Q — By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A — Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's Office.
Q — Was he also present at the start of the question and
answer period to the accused?
A — No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left
alone.
Q — But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the
question and answer period start?
A — If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in
the afternoon, sir.
Q — And when this question and answer period started,
what was the first thing that you did as assisting lawyer to
the accused?
A — First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the
constitution.
Q — What are those right?
A — That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the
right of a counsel of his own choice and that if he has no
counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has
the right to refuse to answer any question that would
incriminate him.
Q — Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of
accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether this
constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in
writing?
A — Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by
Police Officer Alabastro.
Q — I show to you this constitutional right which you said
were reduced into writing, will you be able to recognize the
same?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether
that is the same document you mentioned?
A — Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into
writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked
as our Exhibit A. proper.
Q — Do you recall after reducing into writing this
constitutional right of the accused whether you asked him
to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
17
A — I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer
Alabastro.
Q — But you were present?
A — I was then present when he signed.
Q — There is a signature in this constitutional right after
the enumeration, before and after there are two (2)
signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?
A — These were the same signatures signed in my presence,
sir.
Q — The signature of whom?
A — The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures
identified by my compañero be encircled and marked as
Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q — After you said that you apprised the accused of his
constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino, in local
dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A — Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his
statement.
Q — What was the reply?
A — He said "Opo".
Q — Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
A — It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q — In your presence?
A — In my presence, sir.
Q — And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the
question started?
 A — Yes, sir.
Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of
rights, were you present also when he signed this waiver?
A — Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q — Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
A — I had also explained to him, sir.
Q — In Filipino?
A — In Tagalog, sir.
Q — And there is also a signature after the waiver in
Filipino over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay,
"Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is that?
A — This is also signed in my presence.
Q — Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A — He signed in my presence, sir.
Q — And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The
first one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed and sworn to,
there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature?
A — This is my signature, sir.
Q — And immediately after your first signature is a
Certification that you have personally examined the
accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary
executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you recognize
the signature?
A — This is also my signature, sir.23(emphasis supplied).
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of
the victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the
words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey, 24
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself -
18
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
no test or the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous,
and is outside of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position
of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts.25 In this case, the trial court's findings,
conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on
appeal with the highest respect, 26 the same being supported by substantial
evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when
considered would have affected the outcome of this case27 or justify a
departure from the assessments and findings of the court below. The absence
of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive
exists. 28 Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who
testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is
correct. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
R.A. 7659 "when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death." This special complex crime is treated
by law in the same degree as qualified rape - that is, when any of the 7 (now
10) "attendant circumstances" enumerated in the law is alleged and proven,
in which instances, the penalty is death. In cases where any of those
circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot be
death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will
affect the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 53 of
the RPC However, if any of those circumstances proven but not alleged
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and
15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63 of
the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in
Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is
alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying
circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death - subject
to the usual proof of such circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by
law for the crime of "rape with homicide", the court has no option but to
apply the same "regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
that may have attended the commission of the crime"29 in accordance with
Article 63 of the RPC, as amended. 30 This case of rape with homicide carries
with it penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the
import of Article 47 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it
must be imposed under existing laws, except when the
guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years
of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case
by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not
obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which
cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death
penalty, appellant tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17
years and a few months old at the time he committed the rape and thus,
covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty person is
below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime. 31 Again,
the record rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to
be already more than 20 years of age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil
indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil indemnity
for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00).32 In addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code 33 in such amount as the
court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
damages. 35 The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering
provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is
"recognized that the victim's injury is inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages". 36Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape
carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was
attended by one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230
of the Civil Code38 after proof that the offended party is entitled to moral,
temperate and compensatory damages. 39 Under the circumstances of this
case, appellant is liable to the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the
evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court,
as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines
19
and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or
his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance
with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-
time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by
ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become
insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal
developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation
must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any;
Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that
anystatement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and
have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services
of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon
petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be
informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted
except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right
to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio,
letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-
government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that
he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right
to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him
from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he
may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case
may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court — although maintaining their adherence to the
separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 42 that R.A. No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional — nevertheless
submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the
award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to
P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83
of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-104954 December 13, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO FABRO Y ARQUIZA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
On April 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed the conviction of appellant
MARIO FABRO Y ARQUIZA for the rape of private complainant, REBECCA
SEGUANCIA. He now seeks his acquittal on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the Information, the prosecution detailed the commission of the rape by
appellant, as follows:
20
That on or about the 14th day of May, 1989, in Tamat, barangay
Trenchera, municipality of Tayug, province of Pangasinan, New
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused (appellant herein), by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Rebecca P.
Sequancia against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
At the time of the incident, private complainant was working for Reyval Lopez
as one of his five full-time, live-in maids. Among her co-workers was Janet
Fabro, appellant's wife. Appellant previously worked for Lopez, but was no
longer in his employ when the alleged rape took place.
As private complainant2 related it, her sad story began at around nine o'clock
in the evening of May 14, 1989, when Lopez sent her to buy band-aids at a
nearby store. Unable to make the purchase, she proceeded to the Alicia store
located within the premises of the Tayug public market.3 On her way, she
passed an Ihaw-Ihaw restaurant where she saw appellant. Without uttering a
word, he started to trail her. She asked him to stop following her, but her
words fell on deaf ears.4
Finding the Alicia store already closed, private complainant headed back
home to Lopez's house. Appellant suggested they go to his cousin to buy
band-aid. She ignored him. Suddenly, he grabbed her left hand and dragged
her for about eight (8) to ten (10) meters to a dark, deserted area. He kissed
her on the lips.5 She struggled,6 somehow managing to bite his hand. She
tried to escape, but he was able to grab and pull her back. He wrapped his
hands around her neck, as if to strangle her. It was then that she lost
consciousness. She could not remember how long she passed out.7
It took a gunshot of unknown origin to rouse private complainant back to
consciousness. She found herself lying on the ground with appellant by her
side, zipping up his pants.8 Her back and private parts hurt, and she
discovered sticky matter on her sexual organ. She also realized that her
pants were no longer on her. She silently located and put them back
on.9 Appellant fled when a good samaritan, one Jeffrey Cabrales, arrived. 10
Private respondent, accompanied by Cabrales, reached Lopez's residence at
around ten o'clock that same night.11 Immediately and tearfully,12 she
reported to Lopez her violation by appellant.13 That same night, Lopez
brought her to the police station, where she filed her complaint. 14 They
proceeded to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital (EPDH) where she
underwent a physical and internal examination conducted by Dr. Leo
Gerardo15 which yielded the following results:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
May 16, 1989 complainant was willing to completely give herself to him. They did not,
Date however, consummate their love-making. They merely spent the night kissing
each other. 21
83853 — 165
Record Number Appellant affirmed that a gunshot was fired that night while he was lying
with private complainant on the ground. Upon hearing the shot, they stood
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: up, and she looked for her slippers. It was then that Jeffrey Cabrales
appeared and accompanied private complainant home. Appellant also went
home. 22
According to the hospital REBECCA SEGUANCIA of Brgy. Toketec Tayug,
Pangasinan was examined/treated in this hospital on May 15, 1989 with the
following findings and/or diagnosis: On cross-examination, appellant admitted that, after he was charged with
rape, he sent a letter to Lopez and his common-law wife, asking for their
forgiveness. The letter reads as follows:
= Linear Abrasion, 5 cm. Anterior Aspect of (1) Elbow.
= Speculum/I.E. Findings:
— Vaginal orifice admits one finger with resistance. Dear Kuyang & Manang,
— Nulliparous introitus.
— Contussions at the lateral aspect (one at each side) of the Una ay hayaan niyo munang batiin ko kayo ng magandang umaga o hapon
labia minora. po sa inyo, at sana'y datnan kayo ng sulat kong ito na nasa mabuting
— No fresh hymenal lacerations. kalagayan.
— No vaginal lacerations.
= Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa requested. (see Kuyang & Manang, hindi ko po alam kong paano ko sisimulan ang sulat ko
attached result). sa inyo. Alam ko po na ako'y nagkasala sa inyo, at alam ko rin pong hindi
lang basta-basta kasalanan. Ito'y halos wala ng kapatawaran. Ngunit nandito
REMARKS: patient would need medical attendance and/or incapacitation po ako ngayon sapagkat tinanggap ko naman ang aking pagkakasala — sa
for . . . . days barring complications. katunayang ito ay hindi ko naman tinalikuran o tinakbuhan bagkos ay
hinintay ko po ang araw ng paghatol o pagkuha nila sa aking at taos puso't
(sgd) walang pagtutol na sumunod dahil alam kong ito ang nararapat. Sa
LEO GERARDO BAUTISTA, M.D., kasalukuyan ay heto na ako, nagtitiis subalit walang halong pagdaramdam.
Attending physician At sa totoo lang po Kuyang & Manang, alam nang Diyos kung paano ko
Lic. No. 61044 16 pinagsisisihan ito sa maniwala po kayo o hindi. Talaga pong hindi ko alam.
Wala po talaga ako sa sariling pag-iisip o katauhan kung bakit at pa'no ko
nagawa 'yon. Sila o siya pang itinuturing ko na mga kapatid lalo na sa inyo
The vaginal smear showed private complainant was negative for spermatozoa Kuyang & Manang na kahit noon pa ay nararamdaman ko ng kayo ang
(Exh. 2). The following day, she returned to the police station and gave her makapagbabago sa akin at heto nga po tinatanggap ko ang parusa. Naririto
formal statement and surrendered the denim pants and orange t-shirt she po ako nagtitiis alang-alang sa kapatawaran. Nagpapasalamat po ako ng taos
wore during the attack. 17 sa aking puso sa ginawa ninyong ito sa akin sapagkat iminulat niyo ako sa
aking mga kasalanan at itinuro sa tiyak na pagbabago. Nagbabago ako nang
The 21-year-old appellant offered a different version of what transpired on dahil sa inyo kayat Kuyang & Manang maraming-maraming salamat po sa
that fateful night of May 14, 1989. According to him, he was visiting his wife inyo. Alam ko pong hindi kayo maniniwala ngunit alam ng Diyos at balang
at Lopez's store when private complainant dropped by. She asked him to araw ito ay mapapatunayan niyo rin kaya't nagmamalik-tuhod po ako sa
accompany her to the public market. He was initially reluctant. Nonetheless, inyo na sana po ay patawarin niyo na po ako sa aking nagawang kasalanan.
he accommodated the request when his wife told him to go. 18
Kuyang & Manang bigyan niyo pa po ako ng isa pang pagkakataon upang
On their way to the market, appellant and private complainant took the road kami'y magbagong buhay. Alam ko po Kuyang may pamilya ka rin at mga
leading to the Ihaw-ihaw restaurant. When they got to the market, she told anak at naranasan niyo na rin po kong paano ang hirap at sakit ng mawalay
him "to go home because we have no more to buy."19 Instead, he proposed sa kanila. Matiis niyo po kaya Kuyang ang ganito lalo na nga't nasa
they go to his Ninong Jesus Divia. She agreed. On their way, he kissed and maselang kalagayan ang asawa mo ? Higit malapit na pong manganak,
started to undress her. She did not stop him, and even responded to his matiis mo kayang wala ka sa tabi niya? Nasisiyahan po ba kayong mawasak
amorous advances by embracing him.20 Appellant felt that private ang isang pamilya lalo na sa oras na kailangang-kailangang ka nila kaya't
21
luluhod po ako sa inyong harapan kung iyon ang paraan upang
mapatunayan ang aking pagsisisi at pagbabago. Nasa inyo ang buhay ko.
Pati na rin ang aking kalayaan ay nakasalalay po sa inyo. Kaya't Kuyang &
Manang sa ikatatahimik, ikabubuo at ikabubuti ng isang pamilyang hawak
mo, nagsusumamo po ako sa inyo na sana po ihulog mo na rin po sa amin
ang inyong awa at habag alang-alang sa ikakalaya at sa ikakatiwasay nito.
Kaya't maraming-maraming salamat sa inyong mag-asawa alang-alang sa
magiging anak ko at pamilya. Huwag niyo na rin po sanang ipagkait ang
isinasamba ko sa inyo lalung-lalo na ngayon higit nila akong kailangan dahil
malapit na pong manganak ang asawa ko. Alang-alang po sa kanila luluhod
at gagapang po ako sa harap ninyo kung iyon ang ibig niyo, makamit ko
lamang ang pagpatawad niyo alang-alang sa pamilya ko. Gagawin ko ang
lahat ipapangako ko po sa inyo dahil alam ko rin pong napamahal na sa inyo
ang asawa ko. Kumusta na rin po yong dalawang bata si Marc at Kim. Sana
naman malayo na sila ngayon sa mga sakit.
Sa inyo po ang aking buhay at kalayaang nakasalalay sa aking pamilya.
Nagsisisi na po ako ngayon at naririto isinasamba at hinihingi ang
pagpapatawad niyo ng dahil sa inyo nagbago ako. Kaya't maraming-
maraming salamat po sa inyo Kuyang & Manang.
Lubos na Gumagalang
humihingi ng tawad
Mario A. Fabro
He explained that he wrote the letter to his former employers because he was
being charged with a crime he did not commit. 23 He also denied any
romantic relationship between him and private complainant. Allegedly, they
were mere friends. 24
After trial, the RTC of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 52,25 convicted appellant
for the crime of rape, thus:
In resume, the Court hereby finds accused Mario Fabro y Arquiza, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt, and hereby sentences accused to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period, from 17 years, 4
months — 1 day to 20 years, but considering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby imposes the penalty of Prision Mayor — 10 years, 1 day to 20
years Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Finally, accused is hereby ordered to
pay the complainant Rebecca Seguancia the sum of P20,000.00 as moral
damages with cost de oficio.
Accused being detained for failure to post his bail bond at the provincial jail
in Lingayen, Pangasinan from the time of arrest on August 17, 1989 up to
the rendition of the decision, is entitled to a preventive imprisonment of 1
year, 4 months and 22 days to be credited to him and deductible from his
principal penalty.
SO ORDERED.
On April 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction, but
modified the trial court's judgment by imposing instead the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant now forwards the following —
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED (APPELLANT)
MARIO FABRO Y ARQUIZA DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO ESTABLISH THAT HE COMMITTED ACTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME
CHARGED AGAINST HIM.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCREASING THE
at PENALTY OF ACCUSED (APPELLANT) TO RECLUSION PERPETUA FROM
THAT IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH IS AN INDETERMINATE
PRISON TERM OF 10 YEARS AND 1 DAY OF PRISION MAYOR AS MINIMUM
TO 20 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
We cannot exculpate appellant. The evidence proved his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
To establish rape under Article 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, two
elements must be shown: that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
offended party; and that coitus was done through the use of force or
intimidation. This the prosecution was able to do in the case at bench.
The use of force by appellant on private complainant on the night of May 14,
1989 was set forth clearly in her testimony. She said that he grabbed his
hand and dragged her for about ten (10) meters. When he struggled with
him, he held her by the neck, choked her, and caused her to faint. Even
appellant admitted private complainant's unconsciousness in his direct
examination, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Ferrer —
Q When she (referring to private complainant) testified,
she stated that you strangled her by her neck and when
22
 you did that, she lost consciousness. What can you say
about that?
A No sir, I did not do that.
Q Likewise, when she lost consciousness, that is when
you unset her pants. What can you say about that?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to tell us that when she lost consciousness,
that is the time you unset her pants? Is that what you
mean?
Prosecutor Bince —
Leading, your Honor.
Court —
Reform your question.
Atty. Ferrer —
Q At what point and time did you unset the zipper of
complainant Rebecca? Is it during the time she was
unconscious or during the time she was conscious?
Witness —
A When she was still conscious, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 26
Also, Reyval Lopez testified that when private complainant arrived home that
night, her hair was in disarray and there were bruises on her arms.27Further,
her medical examination revealed that she had a linear abrasion on the
anterior aspect of her left elbow. All these establish the force and physical
violence exerted on private complainant by appellant.
Appellant, however, argues that the fact of sexual intercourse was
insufficiently established by the prosecution. He pounds on private
complainant's failure to give direct testimony on the matter, as well as the
result of her physical examination. We are not persuaded.
23
As we held in the case of People v. Palapal, 114 SCRA 783 (1982) —
It is but to be expected that if the sexual assault was
committed against the victim while the latter was in a state
of unconsciousness, she would not be able to testify on the
actual act of sexual intercourse. It is precisely when the
sexual intercourse is performed when the victim is
unconscious that the act constitutes the statutory offense of
rape (e)specially when, as in the instant case, the loss of
consciousness was the result of appellant's act of violence. . .
.
We likewise ruled in the recent case of People v. San Pedro, 218 SCRA 384
(1993), viz.:
. . . Of course, an unconscious woman will not know who is
raping her. If the defense theory were to be adopted, then it
would be impossible to convict any person who rapes an
unconscious woman, except only where a third person
witnesses the crime. Henceforth, the clever rapist would
simply knock his potential victim out of her senses before
actually raping her, to be later immunized from conviction
for insufficient identity.
In a situation like this, the identity of the rapist is
determined by the events preceding or following the victim's
loss of consciousness. . . .
In the same vein, a woman raped while unconscious will not be able to
narrate to the court her defloration during that state. Nonetheless, her
violation may be proved indirectly by other evidence.
In the case at bench, private complainant struggled with appellant until she
fainted. When she came to, she was aching, naked from the waist down, and
lying next to appellant who was zipping up his pants. She found her t-shirt
soiled, and upon the nest of her maidenhood lay sticky matter. All these
stand as mute testimony to her wicked fate at the hands of appellant while
she was unconscious.
Furthermore, the results of private complainant's physical examination does
not negate the commission of rape. While the doctor found no vaginal or
hymenal laceration or spermatozoa in her private parts, appellant's acquittal
does not follow. It is settled that neither complete penetration 28 nor
ejaculation29 is necessary to constitute rape. What is essential is that there
be penetration of the female organ, no matter how slight. 30
In the case at bench, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the "medico-
legal findings showed contusions on each side of the labia minora which
shows that an object was forced into the vaginal orifice. "31 The fact of such
incomplete penetration may be culled, as well, from the testimony of
appellant, when he declared to the court during direct examination that:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When she (referring to private complainant) opened
everything according to you, what do you mean by
that?
A That she will give, sir.
Q What is that?
A That she will give herself to me, sir.
Q Did she do that to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do next when she surrendered her
freedom to you ?
In addition, we note the ranting letter appellant wrote to Reyval Lopez and
his common-law wife showing his guilt. Most telling is that line where he
writes, "Wala po talaga ako sa sariling pag-iisip o katauhan kung bakit at
pa'no ko nagawa 'yon. Sila o siya pang itinuturing ko na mga kapatid. . ." (I
was not in my right mind that I did that to him/her or they who I consider
siblings.) In his testimony, appellant admitted that private complainant was
his barkada, his friend, and that he looked up to her like a sister. Clearly, he
was writing about the dastardly deed he committed against her. Indeed, he
could not offer any other sensible explanation for his letter.
Finally, the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the penalty imposed on
appellant by the trial court. As early as 1974,34 this Court has held that for
offenses on which the law prescribes the single, indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua, it is the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code,35 and not the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36which
applies.37 Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, "the crime of rape
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision,
dated April 24, 1992, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11030
convicting appellant MARIO FABRO Y ARGUIZA and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

A I used her, sir. G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Court — vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
Continue.
PER CURIAM:p
Atty. Ferrer —
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death
Q You said you used her, what do you mean by used penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is
her? concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a
death sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with
providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein accused-
A That it will not enter, sir. appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of
the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
xxx xxx xxx 32

Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated

By his own admission, appellant "used" private complainant, but "it will not September 7, 1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing
enter."33 Stated otherwise, he had coitus with private complainant, but his by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive
sexual organ would not enter hers completely. portion of which reads:

Clearly, appellant had sexual intercourse with private complainant through WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
the use of force. He was, thus, correctly convicted of rape by both the trial LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
court and the Court of Appeals. the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated

24
 by the fact that the same was commited by the accused who
is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as provided for
under RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa
Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.1
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the
crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of force
and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by
his counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-
General in his brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a
fifth-grader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of
five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively,
and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo
Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim
lives with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez
St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City
(pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking
after her three brothers in their house as her mother attended a
gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the
accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the
25
house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As soon as her brothers left, accused-
appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged
her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the
appellant, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made her
lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed
his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa.
Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's
organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While
appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered. "Masarap ba,
masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa,
masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant
continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant
threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had
happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by appellant,
Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid
of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs
(pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth
time and this usually took place when her mother was out of the
house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to
inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie,
Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the
Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she
suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she
executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied
to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical
examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during
the time when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first,
her mother was on her side. However, when appellant was detained,
her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo,
nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the
person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,3 the complainant was
described as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the
presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug.
22, 1995, pp. 8-9).4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She
asserted that the RAPE charge against the accused was only the
figment of her mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint
was forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn
statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE
was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot
situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio,
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's
paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to persuade
the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance
after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was
substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother.
That when her mother came to know about the affidavit of
desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of the
Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted
homicide as her husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted
to burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA and
Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the
Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by
accused and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by
Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her mother. That
Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot in
favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's accepting the fact
that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to
conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of
the complainant has a very strong motive in implicating him to the
crime of RAPE since she was interested to become the sole owner of a
property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA
Project. That he could not have committed the imputed crime
because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a
painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the
crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay
Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between
his work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the
condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a
document denominated "Contract of Services" duly accomplished
(see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual
organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said
female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the
imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the victim.
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and
lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old
victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-
appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as
inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the
extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into
the victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the
said victim. Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law
trumped-up a charge of drug pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to
a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment
of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan
26
Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it
was her wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong
motive of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in this heinous
crime because of her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of
property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated
at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid
cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from
his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter.
He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the
date and time of the alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that
she is the laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of
accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and
the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the
vacant lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private
parts. The masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra
Echegaray, the fourth and last witness for the defense. She stated
that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and
that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape.
Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute.
That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating
that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her
house.5
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a
reversal of the lower court's verdict through the following assignment of
errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE
FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED
LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO
THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED
COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT
DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
THAT ACCUSED WAS IN PARAÑAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE
IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT
SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death
penalty, requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances
relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in
evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused
though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the
prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this
Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant
notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely
concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the
NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution
witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa,
concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-appellant
shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her
favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and
Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the
records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant
would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion
Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So,
the live-in partners would have the property for their own.8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so
callous as to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case
against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the
disputed lot.9
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim
is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused. 10
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year
old Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted
by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's
narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry. 11 Once
again, we rule that:
. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the
rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight, for testimony
of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217
SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a
girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
27
parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v.
Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape
accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's
testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged
her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the
said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged
inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police
investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping
acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court
wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis from her
vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was
the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her
granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed
that she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her
house so as to tell her a secret.13 These alleged discrepancies merely pertain
to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he
dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no
significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the
accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever words were
uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's
evidence as a whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as
to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to
the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14
This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in
the narration of the witness do not detract from its essential
credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically
believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is
telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to he
expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an
incident with perfect or total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves
our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are
bereft of clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the
size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused
shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the
accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually
done so. 16 This Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's
self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case
of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs
capable of varying degrees of distensibility. The degree of
distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited
only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being
minor. The female reprodructive canal being capable of allowing
passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the
entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male reproductive
organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be
considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various
parts of he vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might
have expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within
the period when the incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At pp.
13-14, emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere
knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis
suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is
not required to sustain a conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-
legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa
on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as
narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-
appellant erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered
as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be
corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our
finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify
against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case,
uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded. 22More
importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even
weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as
perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to
do some painting job at the house of one Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro
Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of
the accused-appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.
28
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the
basis of the complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said
offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is
the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa
positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of Statutory
Rape. Her account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating
his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial
self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and
fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion
Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago,
are relevant and worth reiterating, thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the
offended parties are young and immature girls like the victim in this
case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its, part to
tend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be
wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority,
are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of
rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The
consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account It
may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the
fundamental law for such institution There is all the more reason
then for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe
penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly
remarked that with the advance in civilization, the disruption in
public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more
so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on
consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should even be more
marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death
Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the
penalty imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father,
stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother. 26 On direct examination, he admitted that before the
charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real
daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and
education. 27 The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the
accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her
grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the
cross-examination that she, the accused-appellant, and her five children,
including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate, even
if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this
disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous
crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-
appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within
the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as
"Papa" is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the
father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated
by the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and
perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral
ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to
succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it
inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant
face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127356 June 29, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DAVID SILVANO y HAYAG, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
It is not for humans to ravish what they produced. The rape committed by a
father against his own daughther regardless of whether it is done under the
cloak of parental discipline has no place in our society. That is why, it is
considered as a heinous felony meted with the supreme penalty of
termination of the assailant's life. For indeed those who lust must not last.
29
Once again the Court is saddled with another nightmare of lustful and
incestuous defloration committed by one from the victim expects protection.
The facts given credence by the trial court and quoted by both the
prosecution (with page reference) and the defense in their respective Briefs,
which are ably supported by evidence on record happened this wise: *
Sheryl Silvano is a beautiful mestiza (as may be shown in the pictures, Exhs.
"T" to "T-5"), and already 5'6" tall at her age of sixteen (16) years, having been
born on January 20, 1980. (Exhs. F and F-1) Her height have been inherited
from her parents as her father is 6'2" tall and her mother is a mestiza. She is
the legitimathe daughther of David Silvano y Hayag, the accused in this case,
and Shirley Ann G. Pedrosa, as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhs. "E"
& "E-1"). Sheryl is the eldest and the only girl with two brothers, namely:
John David, who was born on July 29, 1984 and Noel William, who was born
on April 16, 1986. (pp. 1-5, tsn, August 14, 1996).
On January 23, 1996 at 10:30 in the evening, while Sheryl was sleeping in
her room at the second floor of their house located at 134-C Scout Rallos
Street, Barangay Sacred Heart, Quezon City, ** she was awakened by her
father, the accused in this case. The accused then started scolding Sheryl for
her coming late. (pp. 6-7, tsn, ibid.) The accused who appeared tipsy, started
undressing Sheryl by lifting her T-shirt, as a form of punishment for her
coming home late, which punishment she has been experiencing from the
accused since she was 13 years old. After lifting Sheryl's T-shirt, as she was
not then wearing any bra, the accused started holding Sheryl's breast at the
same time kissing it. As Sheryl was practically leaning on the bed, the
accused dragged Sheryl at the edge of the bed of that she would be facing the
accused a little bit. The accused then knelt down on the floor and continued
holding the breasts of Sheryl with one hand while the other hand was
holding the private organ of Sheryl. Sheryl tried to prevent the accused from
doing what he was doing but the accused told Sheryl "you did something
wrong and I told you I would do that as a punishment to you" (p. 7,
tsn, ibid.). Despite the pleas of Sheryl, the accused continued kissing her
breasts. Afterwards, the accused pulled Sheryl at the side of the bed and the
accused removed her pair of short pants and panty. After removing the pair
of short pants and panty of Sheryl, the accused grasped the hips and waist of
Sheryl and pulled her towards him. Thereafter, when the accused was
already in between the thighs of Sheryl, the accused started kissing the
private organ of Sheryl, the accused was at the same time inserting his finger
into Sheryl's vagina (p. 8, tsn, ibid.). Thereafter, the accused stood up a bit,
pulled down his short pants and knelt down at the side of the bed. The
accused then got a hold of Sheryl's two feet and placed them on top of his
shoulders. The accused once again grasped the hips of Sheryl and pulled her
nearer to him. When Sheryl was pulled nearer to the accused, the accused
inserted his private organ into Sheryl's private organ. Although Sheryl tried
to free herself by pushing the shoulders of the accused with her two feet and
telling the accused to stop what he was doing to her, the accused, in order to
have a full grip, got hold of the legs of Sheryl and placed them in between the
arms of the accused (pp. 8-9, tsn, ibid). After inserting the accused's private
organ into the private organ of Sheryl, the accused performed a pumping
motion. Subsequently, the accused's private organ was removed from the
private organ of Sheryl and the accused rubbed his organ with the private
organ of Sheryl. Thereafter, Sheryl felt something cold which was a sticky
liquid emitted from the private organ of the accused and which the accused
scattered in between Sheryl's private organ and on her stomach. Later on,
the accused got a tissue paper and wiped the liquid-like substance. The
accused then put on his pair of pants and left the room (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid.).
The following morning, Sheryl went to school at Jose Abad Santos Memorial
School (JASMS) in Quezon City.
On February 12, Sheryl who could no longer bear the punishment in the
form of sexual abuse she had been getting from her father as in fact she was
first raped when she was thirteen (13) years of age, left their house at Scout
Rallos, Quezon City, and stayed at her maternal grandmother's house at
Scout Lozano, Quezon City. When she was asked to go back to her parents'
house and settle her difference with the accused, Sheryl confided to her
mother and grandmother the real reason why she did not like to go back to
their house. Thereupon, her mother and grandmother immediately sought
the assistance of General Hercules Cataluña, Chief of the Central Police
District Command, who happens to be married to a cousin of the mother of
Sheryl.1
Consequently, appellant was charged with rape by his own daughter to which
he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Prior to the presentation of evidence
for the prosecution, the complaint was amended without objection from
appellant, who when re-arraigned entered the same plea. The amended
complaint reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1996 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused who is the father of the
Complainant by means of force and intimidation, to wit: then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, undressing
the undersigned complainant who is under eightheen (18)
years of age and putting her legs on top of his shoulders, and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant against her will and without her consent.2
After the prosecution presenthed its case, appellant filed a motion for leave to
file demurrer to evidence on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, which motion, however, was denied by the lower court.
Appellant thus presented evidence for his defense. Thereafter, the lower court
rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the victim. The
dispositive portion of the decision a quo states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused David Silvano y
Hayag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and sentences him to suffer the penalty
30
of death and to pay the costs. The accused is hereby ordered
to indemnify the victim, Sheryl P. Silvano, the amount of
P50,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.3
Upon automatic appeal to this Court, 4 appellant assails his conviction by
insisting on his innocence. He denied the accusation arguing that the charge
leveled against him was a mere ploy of his wife and the latter's relatives for
the purpose of severing their marital relationship.
In the review of death cases, foremost in the mind of the Court is the heavy
penalty which an accused faces. Aware that life once taken, is like virginity
which once defiled, can never be restored,5 a thorough scrutiny of the case is
in order. Against the proffered excuses of appellant, however, and guided by
the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:6
a.) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
through innocent, to disprove;
b.) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
c.) The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.
the fundamental presumption of innocence7enjoyed by appellant was
overcome with the requisite quantum of proof in criminal cases and
his guilt sufficiently established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.8
The qualified rape of an underaged relative for which appellant was charged
is classified as a heinous crime and penalized under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Section 11, Republic Act (R.A.)
7659,9 which provides:
When and how rape is committed — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
 3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons; the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
2.) When the victim is under custody of the police or military
authorities;
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband,
parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third
degree of consanguinity;
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7)
years old;
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease;
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines of Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency;
31
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has suffered permanent physical mutilation. (emphasis
supplied) 10
In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of 1.) sexual congress 2.) with a woman 3.) by force and without
consent, 11 and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty, the
additional elements that 4.) the victims is under 18 years of age at the time of
the rape and 5.) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim, should also be alleged and proven. All such elements
are undisputedly present in this case. The victim herein at the age of sixteen
(16) years was subjected to forced sexual intercourse by appellant, as duly
shown in her testimony:
Q. While you were sleeping at 10:30 in the evening of
January 23, 1996, what happen? ***
ATTY. UMINGA:
Objection, your Honor, the question is misleading, "while you
were sleeping" it does not mean established that she was
sleeping.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A I was awakened by my father.
Q When your father woke you up, what happened?
A He was scolding me.
Q What did he say?
A He was asking me why I came home late. That I knew that
I had a punishment.
Q What else did you father do, if there was any aside from
scolding you?
A He was trying to undress me, particularly my shirt.
Q Was he able to undress you?
A Yes, he was able to lift up my shirt.
Q And then what happen?
A He was holding my breast and he was kissing my breast.
Q What else did he do?
A I was leaning on the bed, he dragged me on the side ways,
so that, I will be facing him a bit and then he knelt down on
the floor.
Q After he knelt down on the floor, what else did he do?
A He continued kissing and holding my breast, while he was
holding his other hand to my breast and he was kissing it,
he was holding my private organ his other hand.
Q And what were you wearing at that time?
A I was wearing t-shirt without bra.
Q And when he was holding your private organ, what
happened?
A I was trying to tell him, not to do this to me, but he
insisted and said that "you did something wrong, and I told
you that I would do that punishment to you" but I said that I
did not agree.
Q And then what did he do if any, after he was holding your
private part and he was holding and kissing your breast?
A He told me and he insisted that he would do that to me,
but I said "no please don't."
Q When you answered him stop, what did he do?
A He still continued kissing my breast and kissing my
private organ.
Q After that, what happened?
A He pulled me at the side of the bed.
Q When he pulled you at the side of the bed, what did your
father do?
32
A He undressed my shorts and panty.
Q After your father removed your shorts and panty, what
else did he do?
A He grasped me by my hips, he grasped me by my waist,
and he pulled me towards him.
Q And where was his position when he pulled you towards
him?
A He was at the side of the bed.
Q And in relation to you, where was he located?
A In between my things.
Q What did he do after that?
A He started kissing my private organ.
Q When he was kissing your private organ, what else did he
do?
A He was putting his finger inside my vagina hole or opening
and he continued kissing it.
Q After putting his finger inside your private organ, what else
did he do?
A He stood up a bit, he removed or lowered down his pants
and then he knelt down at the side of the bed.
Q After removing his pants, after lowering down his pants,
and kneeling down a bit, what did your father do?
A He got my two feet and placed him on top of his shoulder.
Q After putting your two feet on top his shoulder, what did
he do?
A He grasped me by my hips, he pulled me nearer to him
and he placed his organ inside my organ.
Q After the accused, your father, placed his organ inside A He placed his organ in my organ.
your organ, what else happen?
Q And was he able to put his organ inside your vagina?
COURT:
A Yes, then I felt pain.
Put on record that the witness is crying.
Q After that, what happen?
ATTY. MENDOZA: (to the witness)
A I tried again resisting him, moving again my two feet from
Q After your father put his organ inside your organ, what his grasp. I tried to get far from the edge of the bed, far from
else did he do? him.

A He just put his organ inside my organ. He was almost on Q And you were able to remove his arms from your legs?
top of me.
A No, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q So, what happen?
Q What about you, what did you do, when your father, the
accused in this case placed his organ inside your organ? A His organ removed from my organ, but he tried to put it
but since he can't.
A I was trying to remove to my two feet on top of his shoulder
I was pushing him by his shoulder with my two feet and I Q Since he can't, what did he do?
was telling him to "stop doing it to me."
A He placed his organ on top of my organ.
Q And what was the response of your father?
Q And then, what did he do?
A He kept on grasping my hips nearer to him.
A Rubbing it on top of my organ.
COURT: (to Atty. Mendoza)
Q And what were you saying in tagalog?
Go ahead.
A "kinikiskis po."
ATTY. MENDOZA: (to the witness)
Q And then, what did you do?
Q So, while you were trying to free yourself, and your father
continued grasping your hips closer to him, what else
happen? A And then, I still tried telling him "stop doing to me."

A I was able to remove my feet a bit but in order for me not Q You cannot free yourself from your father?
to break free, he placed my legs in between his arms and
both feet and then he gripped it. A No, sir.

Q When you were able to free your legs from the shoulder of Q And after that, he was rubbing his organ with your organ,
your father, he grabbed your legs and grasped it with his what happen?
arms, what happen?

33
A I felt cold, liquid-like substance on top of my organ and The victim's claim that she was ravished is corroborated by the
somewhere in between my stomach. medical findings of the physician who examined her, to wit:

Q And then, after that, what happen? GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL

A He got his shoe (should be tissue) and then he wiped it. Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pinkish brown
COURT: (to the witness) areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
Q Where did that fluid came from?
GENITAL:
A It came from his organ.
There is abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are
full, convex and coaptated with the pinskish brown labia
Q Did you see? minora presenting in between. On separating the same,
disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed
A Yes, your Honor. lacerations at 3, 7 and 9 o'clock positions. External vaginal
orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the
ATTY. MENDOZA: (to the witness) examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal
speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent
rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
Q Will you please tell to the Honorable Court whether the
place while your father was doing this to you was lighted?
CONCLUSION:
A Yes, sir.
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
Q What was the lighting?
There are no external signs of recent application of any form
of trauma at the time of examination.
A Fluorescent light.
REMARKS:
Q And who put the lights on?

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-

A He opened it. negative diplococci and for spermatozoa. (emphasis
supplied) 13
Q After that, what did your father do?
It is settled that carnal knowledge is consummated by the mere touching of
A He stood up and wore his underpants. the woman's labia of the pudendum by the male sex organ. 14 The briefest
contact of penile invasion is as serious as full penetration and thus, rapture
Q And where did he go? of the hymen is not required. 15 In addition, the absence of fresh lacerations
does not disprove rape. 16 Appellant could have been held liable for
"instrument or object rape" under R.A. 8353 when he inserted his tongue and
A He went out of the room. finger into her daughter's vaginal orifice. Luckily for him, at the time he
committed such act, "instrument or object rape" was not yet punishable.
Q And what did you do?
For his defense, appellant claims among others, that the victim offered only a
A I wore my underpants too then I covered my face with the token resistance when the alleged sexual acts were being done. Be that as it
pillow. (emphasis supplied) 12 may, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance cannot be construed as

34
a voluntary submission to appellant's desires. 17 It is enough if the
prosecution had proven that force or intimidation concurred in the
commission of the crime, as in this case. The law does not impose upon a
rape victim the burden of proving resistance. 18 Moreover, physical resistance
need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of
the fear for her life or personal safety. 19 The force, violence or intimidation in
rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of
the parties but also on their relationship with each other. 20 Herein victim is
only 16 years old, about 5'6" and weighs 128 lbs. as compared to her father
who is in his early 40's, about 6'2", weighs 210 lbs. 21 and a former
driver/messenger in the Italian embassy. 22Considering also that the
assailant is no less than the victim's own father who wields parental
influence over her person, the crime undoubtedly was committed with
facility. 23 The latter's moral ascendancy over the former substitutes for
violence or intimidation. 24 A woman at such young age like the victim herein
can only cower in fear and yield into submission. Rape is nothing more or
less than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps a woman
in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible for a victim
of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant. 25
Appellants contention that he could not have possibly raped her own
daughter in the room where the latter was sleeping on the night of the
incident considering that it was small, is not a reason to exculpate him from
his barbaric and prurient desires. There is also no merit in his assertion that
the victim's two younger brothers — one of whom is deaf — who were
sleeping in the same room, would have been awakened when she struggled
against the advances of appellant. Suffice it to say, however, that while the
brutish sexual assault on the victim was being committed under the cloak of
the night and disguised as a form of parental sanction, it is "not impossible
nor incredible for the members of the complaint's family to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened" 26 because rape can be committed in the
same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping. 27 His argument that it is "unusual" and improbable" for the rape to
occur at about 10:30 in the evening since people are not "yet soundly
sleep" 28 lacks merit. Evidence without argument is worth more than
arguments without evidence. In their union they are inseparable. 29 In any
case, as consistently ruled by the Court, lust is no respecter her of time and
place 30 and also of kinship. Non-consensual acts of sex can be done even in
places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadsides, in school
premises, in a house where there are other occupants, 31 and even in places
which to many, would appear unlikely and high risk venues for its
commission. 32 In any case, there is no rule that rape can be committed only
in seclusion. 33
Appellant alludes as "rather unusual" for him to rape his own daughter by
scolding her first, as it would certainly cause some noise. 34 This is no excuse
for a rapacious parent. Precisely, he scolded her to make a good pretext that
any noise created thereafter was nothing but part of the parental sanction
and discipline on an allegedly erring child and thus, distract, if not mislead,
35
possible assistance once he performs his evil instinct. Appellant likewise
argues that the rape is "implausible, improbable if not
impossible" 35considering that the series of acts allegedly lasted for about 40
minutes — 15 minutes for kissing and sucking her breast and nipples, 15
minutes for kissing her private parts and about 15 to 20 minutes for doing
the motion. This is a trivial matter which does not go into the "why's" and
"wherefore's" of the crime. 36 On the contrary, it strengthened rather than
diminished the victim's credibility 37 as they erased suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony. 38 Lust may be consummated in a matter of second or it could last
for hours depending on the parties and the circumstances. To the helpless
victim, every second of the monstrous act is transformed into a long period of
agony. Besides, it is too much to demand from the rape victim to keep track
of the exact duration of every humiliating act done to her to make an
accurate account of her traumatic experience. 39 Errorless testimony cannot
be expected of her 40 for she may not be able to remember and recount every
ugly detail of the harrowing experience and appalling outrage, especially so
since she might in fact be trying not to remember them, 41 as they are painful
to recall. 42 In any case, the undisputed fact remains that the copulation was
against the victim's will. If somewhere along the motion, she stopped
resisting, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the fear is still there or that
fatigue had intervened in her tenacity to fight the rapacity. A victim who cries
rape, more so if she a minor, almost always says all that is needed to signify
that the crime has been committed. 43 The intimate flow of revelations from a
daughter to a mother of a father's outrageous conduct impelled them to seek
assistance from their relatives including a police General. In turn, the latter
ordered his men to invite the appellant to the precinct without any warrant of
arrest, an illegal act which would all evidence obtained in violation of his
right against a warrantless arrest inadmissible. 44
Under R.A. No. 7438, the so-called "invitation" of a person in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed is a prohibited act for which
the inviting officer may be held liable. 45 Be that as it may, in accordance
with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 46 Appellant pleaded
without making such objection and the court has to call the attention of
appellant's counsel on whether he is going to challenge the validity of the
arrest. Despite his manifestation that he will do so, nothing was filed nor
initiated to that effect after probably realizing the futility of such action. In
addition thereto, appellant's failure to quash the information, his
participation in the trial and by presenting evidence in his behalf placed him
in estoppel to make such challenge. 47 He has patently waived any objection
or irregularities and is deemed as having submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. 48It should be noted that the legality of arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of court over the person of the accused. 49 Consequently,
it objections on such ground is waived, the illegality of the arrest is not
sufficient reason for setting aside an otherwise valid rendered after trial free,
from error. 50 The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings
void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when the facts on
the record point to the culpability of the accused. 51 In any case, appellant is
not herein convicted on the basis of whatever was illegally obtained by the
police out of the "invitation" but by the admissible proof presented by the
prosecution particularly the victim's credible testimony.
When charged before the court, appellant denied the accusation and prefaced
such denial with the assertion that he is giving her financial, material and
education support. With respect to his denial, it is inherently a weak defense
which cannot prevail over positive identifications. 52 It must be bettressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 53 Otherwise, the same
is self-serving and deserves no greater evidentiary value. 54 It should be noted
that affirmative testimony, like that of the victim's, is stronger than a
negative one. 55 His excuse regarding support is non-sequitur. The fact that
he supports her does not give him the license to rape her. It is his obligation
to give support to her daughter as provided in Article 195(2,3) as well as his
right and duty under Article 220(1) of the Family Code which expressly
provides: 56
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding Articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set
forth in the preceding Article:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children
Art. 220. The parents . . . shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To . . . support (emphasis supplied).
The victim testified that appellant told her that she will be punished for
coming home late at night and the punishment is to have sex with him. This
ratiocination is the product of a sick mind of an equally sick parent who does
not deserve to be such. It is clear from the provisions of Article 209 of the
Family Code that from the mere status of being a parent flows one's "natural
right and duty not only of the "caring for" and the "rearing of" their
unemancipated children but above all "the development of their moral,
mental, and physical character and well-being." Although the Family Code
recognizes the parents' rights and duties to "impose discipline" on the
unemancipated children; "supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others . . .; and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their . . . morals", 57 it does not authorize them to force their
offspring to copulate with them under the mask of discipline, or invade their
honor and violate their dignity nor does it give them the license to ravish the
product of their marital union. Appellant's way of punishment comes not in
the form of correction but of an insane sexual gratification. Sex with one's
own child is per se abhorrent and can never be justified as a from of
36
parental punishment. The practice of sexual exploitation of the youth in the
guise of disciplinary action is not a solution to juvenile curiosity which is part
of growing up. His gratification instills an unnamed trauma in the child's
innocent mind when she still cannot understand the meaning of sexual
behavior. 58 Moreover, instead of instructing and educating his own daughter
with "the right precept and good example", appellant provided her with
perversed and distorted "moral and spiritual guidance" 59 to the extent of
brainwash her that sex with one's father is nothing but a disciplinary
sanction and "part of sex education" 60 which the latter teaches her. Worse,
the daughter herein even entertained doubts as to the normality and
abnormality of her father's deplorable acts. 61 It is also appellant's duty
under the Family Code to give her "love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding." 62 Yet what she got was the humiliation
and the destruction of her life, good future and the very essence of her
existence.
Appellant further contends that her daughter's acts after the alleged rape,
such as going to school the next day, leaving their home after more than two
weeks had lapsed since the incident and reporting the same only when
confronted by her mother are inconsistent with the behavior of a rape victim.
The contention is without merit. The behavior and reaction of every person
cannot be predicted with accuracy. It is a time-honored precept that
"different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and
there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with
a strange or starting or frightful experience." 63 Not every rape victim can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of every one. 64 Some
may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility;
while others may openly welcome the intrusion. 65
The failure of the victim to immediately reveal his father's incestuous acts is
not indicative of fabricated charges. It should be noted that:
Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges
against their rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and
pain rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk
rapists making good their threats to kill or hurt their
victims. 66
The victims herein is in no case different. Her shame and genuine
fear of what appellant might do to her brothers had temporarily
sealed her lips. This is why she left their home, the scene of her
defilement where her appellant father resides and went to her
maternal grandmother's place. Only when confronted why she would
not come back to their house did she reveal the avalanche of shame
and degradation that had befallen her at that tender age of 16 years
from her very own father. It is not uncommon for a young girl at
such age to be intimidated into silence and conceal for sometime the
violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat against her
life. 67Silence is not an odd behavior of rape victims who do not
 always immediately go to the rooftop and denounce their
assailants. 68 This "natural reticence or aversion of the victims to
reveal the humiliation attaching to the crime" is a "stigma they will
have to bear indefinitely thereafter." 69The fear of these young victims
of reprisals upon them or their families easily cows them into
submission and silence. Worse, in incestuous rape, that fear which
compels non-revelation is further reinforced by the moral ascendancy
of the rapist over his ravished relative. 70 As the father of the victim,
appellant whom she called "Daddy" had assumed parental authority
over her during her formative years. Undisputedly, he exerts strong
moral influence over complainant. 71
The imputation by appellant of wrongful motive to his wife who allegedly
used their daughter as an instrument in concocting the rape just to sever
their marital ties is too shallow. It is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice especially if it will subject her to
embarrassment and even stigma. 72 No mother in her right mind would
subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a
prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement 73 or if the same
is not true. 74 In the same vein, a mother would not expose her daughter to
such an ignominy merely to end relationship with her husband or to retaliate
against him for his transgressions as a family man. 75 And it is unbelievable
for a daughter to charge her own father with rape at the expense of being
ridiculed. 76Accordingly, as the defense failed to prove that she was not so
moved and her testimony entitled to full faith and credit. 77
The contention that he cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of his
daughter with respect to the rape 78 easily crumbles in the light of the
doctrine that only two people are privy to the crime of rape and the
evaluation of the evidence presented ultimately resolves around the
credibility of complainant. 79 The trial court, giving full faith and credence to
the victim's testimony found it to be "logical, straightforward and candid
manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the
credibility of her testimony". 80 It even observed that she "shamelessly cried
as she was narrating the tragic experience" and her "stern demeanor evinces
the hatred she had for the accused". 81Notwithstanding that the victim's
testimony is uncorroborated, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof so long as it meets the test of credibility, 82 and the prosecution
is not bound to present witnesses other than the victim. 83
It is highly unlikely that the victim, a 16-year old high school student,
presumably a virgin, an innocent and unsophisticated girl, unexposed to the
ways of the world, would concoct a reprehensible story of defloration, no less
than against her own father, allow an examination of her private parts and
then subject herself to the rigors, trouble, inconvenience, ridicule and
scandal of a public trial, where she has to bare her harrowing and traumatic
experience, and be subjected to harassment, embarrassment and humiliation
during cross-examination, unless she was in fact raped and deeply motivated
by her sincere desire to do so solely to seek justice and obtain redress for the
37
unforgivable and wicked acts committed upon her. 84 This Court has
repeatedly ruled that no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that
she was ravished unless that is the truth for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor. 85
Complainant's tender age further lends to her credibility. 86 Thus:
Apparent from the Court's decisions in rape cases with the
offended parties being young and immature girls from the
ages of twelve to sixteen,
. . . is (the) considerable receptivity on the part of this
Tribunal to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling
experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay
bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did
expose them to. This is not to say that an uncritical
acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that
skepticism should be kept under control. 87
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Jurisprudential annals is replete with the rule that the findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts 88subject to
certain exceptions, 89 none of which, however, is attendant in this case. Trial
courts deal with live witnesses while appellate tribunals rely on the cold
pages of the written records. 90 In this case, the lower court's findings,
conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on
appeal with the highest respect, 91 the same being supported by substantial
evidence on record. No cogent reason was shown that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances which when
considered would have affected the result of this
case 92 or justify a departure from its assessments and findings. 93
Coming now to the award of damages. Under the latest jurisprudence, a
victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) but if the commission of the crime of rape is effectively qualified
by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed,
the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00). 94 In addition to such indemnity, the victim or
her heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral damages pursuant to
Article 2219 of the Civil Code 95 in such amount as the court deems just,
without the necessity for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 96 Civil
indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
damages. 97 The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering
provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is
"recognized that the victim's injury is inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages". 98Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape
carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof 99 other than the fact of the commission
of the
offense. 100 Rape victims whose age ranges between 13 to 19 years are
entitled to moral damages. 101 Under the circumstances of this case,
appellant is liable to the victim for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
With respect to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is proper.
Under Article 335 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659, this kind of
qualified rape when concurred in by any of the 7 102 qualifying circumstances
enumerated in the law carries the penalty of death, provided that such
circumstance is alleged and proven.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that appellant is the father of the
victim, a fact which he even admitted during his direct examination 103 and is
further corroborated by the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live Birth
which indicates appellant as her father. 104 Moreover, such admission is
sufficient to establish paternity without further proof. This is so because,
acts and declaration about pedigree which includes "relationship" is an
admissible hearsay under the rules. 105 Besides, appellant interposed no
objection to the victim's testimony when she positively identified the former
as the one who raped her on January 23, 1996. 106 Such relationship of
father-daughter in rape cases is considered an aggravating circumstance
under Article 15 of the RPC. 107
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by
law for the crime of rape "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent", the court has no option but to apply the same
"regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have
attended the commission of the crime" 108 in accordance with article 63 of the
RPC, as amended. 109 In similar per curiam cases, involving the rape by a
father of his minor daughter, the Court had imposed the penalty of
death. 110 The case at bench carries with it the penalty of death which is
mandatorily imposed by law 111 within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it
must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty
persons is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age
or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the
Supreme Court in required majority vote is not obtained for
the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the
penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.
38
In an apparent, but futile attempt to mislead this Court, appellant quoted the
amended complaint in its Brief underscoring the words "eighteen (18) years
of age" 112 but omitted the word "under" to show that the victim was already
at least 18 years old at the time of the rape. And, it is neither controverted
nor contested that the victim was below 18 years of age when her
father raped her on January 23, 1996. It can be easily verified from the
records that his daughter was born at about 5:30 a.m. on January 20, 1980
as shown in the latter's authenticated Certificate of Live Birth. 113 Simple
arithmetic would shown that on the day she was raped, only three days has
just lapsed since the victim celebrated her sixteen (16) birthday. Besides,
appellant did not object to the victim's testimony that she was 16 years
old. 114 The testimony of a person as to her age is admissible although
another hearsay, though she can have no personal knowledge of the date of
her birth, as all knowledge as to one's age is acquired from whatever is told
by the parents or relative 115 — and such testimony constitute an assertion of
family tradition. 116 It is not also unreasonable to conclude that such was her
age considering that her parents were married sometime in July,
1979 117 and that their first offspring, the victim herein, would probably be
born within the next year.
Four justice of the Court, however, have continued to maintain the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect
that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that appellant is ordered to pay his daughter P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, in addition to the moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded by
the trial court. The award of exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal
basis.
In accordance with Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified true
copies thereof, as well as the records of this case be forwarded without delay
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the clemency or
pardoning power.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188897 June 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
- versus -
IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE,
Appellant.
PERALTA, J.:
Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133 convicting him with three (3)
counts of Statutory Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No.
7610) and Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for
inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of his minor daughter,
AAA.[2]
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0254
against Ireno reads:
That on or about the month of December 1998 in the
City of Las Pias and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of influence
and moral ascendancy, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously insert his tongue and finger into the genital of his
daughter, [AAA], a minor then eight (8) years of age, against
her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special
aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority of the
private offended party, [AAA], being then only eight (8) years
of age and relationship of the said private offended party
with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua y Berce, the latter being
the biological father of the former.[3]
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0255[4] has the same accusatory
allegations while the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0256[5] and
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0257[6]are similarly worded, except for the date of the
39
commission of the crime and the age of AAA, which are December 2000 and
ten (10) years old, respectively.
The cases were later consolidated[7] and upon his arraignment, Ireno pleaded
not guilty to the four (4) counts of rape with which he was
charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, AAA; the
victims mother; and Dr. Melissa De Leon. The defense, on the other hand,
presented the lone testimony of the accused as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution established that in 1998, AAA and
her mother left their house in Candelaria, Quezon to spend
the Christmas with accused-appellant in Las Pias City. They
stayed in the house of a certain Lola Jean, the godmother in
the wedding of her parents, at Sta. Cecilia Subdivision, Las
Pias City.
AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon
while her younger brothers were playing outside the house
and her mother was not home. Accused-appellant entered
the room. He approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and
removed her shorts and panty. She tried to resist by putting
her clothes back on, but her fathers strength
prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant touched and
caressed her breasts. He licked her vagina then inserted his
finger into it.
In the evening of the same day, the accused-
appellant raped AAA again in the same manner and under
the same circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that
she was raped because accused-appellant threatened to kill
her mother by placing the latters body in a drum and have it
cemented if she would report the incidents. She returned to
Quezon with her mother before the end of the Christmas
season.
In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-
appellant for the third time when he went to Candelaria,
Quezon. In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent the
Yuletide season with accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las
Pias City. In a single day, AAA was raped for the fourth and
fifth time. While spending the afternoon inside her fathers
room at the car-wash station, he removed her shorts and
panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her
 vagina. Accused-appellant repeated the same sexual assault
shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report these incidents
for fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside
a drum.
On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe
abdominal pain which prompted her mother to take her
to GreggHospital in Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was transferred to
the Quezon MemorialHospital in Lucena City where Dr.
Melissa De Leon performed on her a physical
examination. The results revealed that there was a healed
superficial laceration at the 9 oclock position on the hymen
of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her
mother all the incidents of rape committed by accused-
appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAAs
mother took her to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya,
Quezon to file a complaint for rape against accused-
appellant. AAAs mother also took her to the office of the
National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where she
executed a sworn statement against accused-appellant.[8]
Evidence for the Defense
Accused-appellant denied committing the charges of
rape hurled against him.He claimed to be working in Las
Pias City while AAA, her mother and siblings where (sic) in
Sariaya, Quezon at the time the alleged rapes
occurred. While he admitted that there were times when AAA
and her mother would visit him in Las Pias City, he
nonetheless averred that they would leave on the same day
they arrived after he gives them money.
Accused-appellant asserted further that the charges
of rape against him were fabricated by AAAs mother, who
suspected him of having an affair with another woman in Las
Pias City.[9]
On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after finding the
evidence for the prosecution overwhelming against the accuseds defense of
denial and alibi, rendered a Decision[10] convicting Ireno with four (4) counts
of Rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
40
WHEREFORE, premises considered,there being
proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused IRENO
BONAAGUA, has committed four (4) counts of RAPE under
par. 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in relation to R.A. 7610, as charged, the Court
hereby pronounced him GUILTY and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each case and to
pay private complainant [AAA], the amount of Php50,000 for
each case, or a total of Php200,000, by way of civil indemnity
plus Php50,000 for each case or a total of Php200,000 as
moral damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA,
which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03133.
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision[12] affirming the
decision of the RTC with modifications on the imposable penalty in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, and finding Ireno guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, instead of Rape, in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0255, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254,
finding Ireno Bonaagua y Berce guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for each rape in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254,
03-0256 and 03-0257 and is ordered to pay AAA the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each
case, apart from the civil indemnity and moral damages
that have already been awarded by the trial court;
2. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, with
relationship as an aggravating circumstance. He is,
 accordingly, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium
periods and ordered to pay AAA the amount of
PhP15,000 as moral damages and a fine of
PhP15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[13]
In fine, the CA found Irenos defense of denial and alibi inherently
weak against the positive identification of AAA that he was the culprit of the
horrid deed. Thus, aside from modifying the imposable penalty in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC finding Ireno guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, however, after a diligent review of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, the CA only found Ireno guilty of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The CA
opined that since the prosecution failed to establish the act of insertion by
Ireno of his finger into the vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of
Acts of Lasciviousness, a crime which is necessarily included in the
Information filed against him in Criminal Case No. 03-0255.
Ireno now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution[14] dated December 16, 2009, the Court informed the
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire. In their respective Manifestations,[15] the parties waived the filing of
their supplemental briefs and, instead, adopted their respective briefs filed
before the CA.
Hence, Ireno raises the lone error:
I would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true. [19] A
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[16]
Simply put, Ireno maintains that the testimony of AAA was replete with
inconsistencies and was extremely unbelievable. Ireno insists that the
allegation that he inserted his tongue and finger into the genital of AAA was
manifestly incredible as the deed is physiologically impossible.Moreover, the
medical findings are grossly inconclusive to prove that AAA was raped, since
it only established that there was only one healed superficial laceration.
41
This Court, however, finds the arguments raised by Ireno
untenable. To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases,
the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation
of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[17]
After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the prosecution has
indubitably established that Ireno was the one who sexually assaulted
her. AAA categorically narrated that Ireno sexually abused her on several
occasions and even threatened AAA that he would kill her mother if she
would report the incidents.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape cases,
the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight
and respect because the judge had the direct opportunity to observe them on
the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not.Generally,
appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts assessment in this
regard, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked
some material facts of substance or value, or gravely abused its discretion.[18]
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended
parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to
lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her
private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention
the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and
been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the
desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against
her.[20] Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the
victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.[21]
Moreover, contrary to Irenos contention, the medical findings of Dr.
Melissa De Leon did not refute AAAs testimony of defilement, but instead
bolstered her claim. The RTC correctly concluded:
 It is true that Dr. Melissa De Leon, when called to
the witness stand to substantiate the same medical
certification, did not rule out the possibility that the
laceration might have been inflicted through some other
causes and that there could have been only one instance of
finger insertion into the vagina of private
complainant.However, it is equally true that Dr. De Leon also
did not rule out the possibility that finger insertion might
have been the cause of the laceration (pp. 7-12,
TSN, January 31, 2006). Dr. De Leon also clarified that only
one laceration may be inflicted although a finger is inserted
into the vagina on separate instances (pp. 19-
26, supra). According to Dr. De Leon, this instance depends
on the force exerted into the vagina and on whether or not
the hymen is membranous or firm and thick.A membranous
hymen is easily lacerated and so when a force is exerted into
it on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. A
thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated and so a force
exerted into it on several occasions may cause only one
laceration. Private complainant has thick and firm hymen
and this may explain why there is only (sic) laceration on her
hymen although she claimed her father inserted into her
vagina his finger several times (pp. 19-29, supra).
This non-categorical stance of Dr. De Leon is
nonetheless understandable because Dr. De Leon has no
personal knowledge of what actually happened to private
complainant that she (complainant) suffered hymenal
laceration. However, there is one thing very certain though in
the testimony of Dr. De Leon that she medically examined
[AAA], herein private complainant, because of the
information that [AAA] was sexually abused by her [AAAs]
own father (pp. 5-6, supra). And indeed, as already
discussed lengthily above, there is no reason to doubt the
veracity of AAAs allegation.[22]
The same conclusion was also arrived at by the CA, to wit:
While the medico-legal findings showed a single
healed superficial laceration on the hymen of AAA, Dr. De
Leon clarified that it is not impossible for a hymen to sustain
only one laceration despite the fact that a finger had been
inserted into the vagina on several accounts. This situation
may arise depending on the force extended into the vagina
42
and on whether or not the hymen of the victim is
membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen is
easily lacerated; thus, when a force is exerted into it on
several occasions, several lacerations may occur. On the
other hand, a thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated; a
force exerted into it on several occasions may cause only one
laceration. According to Dr. De Leon, AAA has thick and firm
hymen and this may explain why it has only one laceration
despite her claim that accused-appellant inserted his finger
inside her vagina several times.[23]
Even Irenos contention that the charges against him were merely
fabricated by his wife because she suspects that he is having an affair with
another woman deserves scant consideration. Aside from the fact that the
said allegation was not proved, it must be emphasized that no member of a
rape victims family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the
dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact committed, especially in
this case where the victim and the offender are relatives.[24] It is unnatural for
a mother to use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if it will
subject her child to embarrassment and lifelong stigma.[25]
Also, Ireno cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance stating
that AAA and her mother are no longer interested in pursuing the case filed
against him.
Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a
crime against persons.[26] Consequently, rape is no longer considered a
private crime or that which cannot be prosecuted, except upon a complaint
filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended party of the
offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offenders criminal
liability. Moreover, an Affidavit of Desistance even when construed as a
pardon in the erstwhile private crime of rape is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already been
instituted. To justify the dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions. [27] As correctly
concluded by the CA, the said affidavit was executed in connection with
another accusation of rape which Ireno committed against AAA in
Candelaria, Quezon and not the four cases of rape subject of this appeal. In
addition, AAAs mother testified that she executed the said affidavit to regain
custody of her children who were brought to Bicol by Irenos siblings.[28]
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with disfavor
on affidavits of desistance. As cited in People v. Alcazar,[29]the rationale for
this was extensively discussed in People v. Junio:[30]
 x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that
after going through the process of having the [appellant]
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the
person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating
her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish,
[the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare
that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s)
that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is
an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before the court of justice simply because the witness who
gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule [would] make a solemn trial a mockery
and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for
monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded
such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.[31]
Amidst the overwhelming evidence against him, Ireno offered
nothing but his bare denial of the accusations against him and that he was
someplace else when the dastardly acts were committed. No jurisprudence in
criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is
generally rejected.[32] It has been consistently held that denial and alibi are
the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not prevail over
complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive
and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a
bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[33] All said,
as found by the CA, the prosecution has convincingly proved and more than
sufficiently established that: (1) Ireno committed the accusations of Rape
Through Sexual Assault against AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0254, 03-
0256, and 03-0257; (2) that AAA was a minor when Ireno committed the
sexual assault against her;[34]and (3) that Ireno was the biological father of
AAA.[35]
Verily, in criminal cases, an examination of the entire records of a
case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as
an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being
the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment
appealed from.[36] Since the CA found Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness
43
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 03-0255 instead of
rape, the Court should thus determine whether the evidence presented by
the prosecution was sufficient to establish that the intentional touching of
the victim by Ireno constitutes lascivious conduct and whether the CA
imposed the appropriate penalties.
As aptly found by the CA:
A diligent review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution,
however, shows that accused-appellant cannot be held guilty as charged for
the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 03-0255. The prosecution failed to
establish insertion by accused-appellant of his finger into the vagina of AAA,
who testified on direct examination that accused-appellant touched my
private part and licked it but he did not insert his finger inside my
vagina. In fact, even the trial court asked AAA if accused-appellant inserted
his finger inside her vagina. She answered in the negative and averred that
he licked her vagina and touched her breasts. In reply to the prosecutions
query if accused-appellant did anything else aside from licking her organ, she
said he also touched it. During cross-examination, AAA testified that
accused-appellant merely touched her vagina but did not insert his finger.[37]
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines and
penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
-- Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.[38]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a
 child is abused for profit, but also where one through coercion,
intimidation or influence engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child.[39]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can
be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a
minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual
abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.[40]
Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the
following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.[41]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be established:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.[42]
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations [43] of R.A. No.
7610 defines Lascivious conduct as:
44
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person.[44]
,,
Undeniably, all the afore-stated elements are present in Criminal
Case No. 03-0255.Ireno committed lascivious acts against AAA by touching
her breasts and licking her vagina and the lascivious or lewd acts were
committed against AAA, who was 8 years old at the time as established by
her birth certificate.[45] Thus, the CA correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the
slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the
outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in
like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of
the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the
crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of
lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical
interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim
testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not
insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open
to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of
the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that
the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
Penalties and Award of Damages
Having found Ireno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape Through
Sexual Assault in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257 and
Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, We shall proceed to
determine the appropriate penalties imposable for each offense.
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual
assault is reclusion temporal if the rape is committed by any of the 10
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.[46] In
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, the
aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship are
present, considering that the rape was committed by a parent against his
minor child. Reclusion temporal ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under
the RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship which have been taken into account to raise the penalty
to reclusion temporal,[47] no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and
proven. Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period,[48] or
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by the Code which is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years.[49] Thus, Ireno should be meted the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
It must be clarified, however, that the reasoning expounded by the
Court in the recent case of People v. Armando Chingh y Parcia,[50] for
imposing upon the accused the higher penalty provided in Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, has no application in the case at bar. In the said
case, the Court, acknowledging the fact that to impose the lesser penalty
would be unfair to the child victim, meted upon the accused the higher
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period as provided in Section 5
(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, instead of the lesser penalty of prision
mayor prescribed by Article 266-B for rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The Court elucidated:
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at
the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the
above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly
prosecuted under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that
VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that
Armandos act of inserting his finger in VVVs private part
undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate
imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
45
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the
accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Art. 366
in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period than the one who commits Rape Through
Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision
mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be
sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353
to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of
RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be
applied when the victims are children or those persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
In the present case, the factual milieu was different since the
offender, Ireno, is the father of the minor victim. Hence, the offenses were
committed with the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship, attendant circumstances which were not present in
the Chingh case, which in turn, warrants the imposition of the higher penalty
of reclusion temporal prescribed by Article 266-B of the RPC. Considering
that the RPC already prescribes such penalty, the rationale of unfairness to
the child victim that Chingh wanted to correct is absent. Hence, there is no
more need to apply the penalty prescribed by R.A. No. 7610.
As to civil liabilities, the damages awarded in the form of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages, also in the
amount of P50,000.00, for each count of Rape must be both reduced
to P30,000.00, respectively, in line with current jurisprudence.[51] Also, the
amount of exemplary damages awarded in the amount of P25,000.00 must
be increased to P30,000.00 for each count of Rape.[52]
Criminal Case No. 03-0255
It is beyond cavil that when the sexual abuse was committed by
Ireno, AAA was only eight (8) years old. Hence, the provisions of R.A. No.
7610, or The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, should be applied.
Thus, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its
medium period which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. As the crime was committed by
the father of the offended party, the alternative circumstance of relationship
should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of
Lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating.[53] Therefore, Ireno should
be meted the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Moreover, the award in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages
and a fine in the amount of P15,000.00, is proper in line with current
jurisprudence.[54] However, civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of P20,000.00 should also be awarded.[55] In view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount of P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages should likewise be awarded.[56]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, IRENO
BONAAGUA y BERCE is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each
count. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of Qualified Rape Through Sexual Assault or a total
of P90,000.00 for each count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is
meted to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. In addition to moral damages and fine, he is likewise ordered to
pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish
and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and
the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or
inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to
maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and
wrong."1
46
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual
intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the
Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975.
They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put
up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that
her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3,
1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder
for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
issued a Joint Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less
serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate
criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC
respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No.
99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-
appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21,
1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an Order13dated
August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he
entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information15 averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted
in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a
Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true
dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7,
1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit.
The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal
informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not
guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith
ensued.
47
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her
daughters MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence,
depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father
was one of the laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.20 When
their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a
sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses -
trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the
rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with
the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the
rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as
fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the
disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks
sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other
hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in
Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred
residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons
stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places
regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in
Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On Wednesdays,
she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store
and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and
the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated
her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm.30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would
immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her
so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into
submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his
complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with
financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to
stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed
(sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a
good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and
the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites
of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them
were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children
went about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was
closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the
children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the
rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living
room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-
appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal
bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial
bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him
to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously
order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and
abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not
appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and
threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood
up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed
his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely
declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling
well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK
tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully
they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart
and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held
her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his
carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do
that to me because I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other
enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's
bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do
that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to
their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked
48
on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is
crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt,
partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family
trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to
cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door
again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door
wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs
because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top
of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked:
"Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to
Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her
mother get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up
her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their
breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the
accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the
knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the
trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's
hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned
against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way
out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as
to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he
forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then
locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing
the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their
supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he
already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the
children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided
to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing
the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who
responded that she preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed:
"Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be
paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away
after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he
became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out
of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our
bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to
tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama
because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant
who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J
because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave
the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they
subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the
creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant
forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she
begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen
and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her
hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the
accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out
of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you
deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the
masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO
scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie
window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged
its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother
crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what
happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast
and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well.
"62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a
land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she
brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18,
1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a
comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple
gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses
that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove
their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998.
He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling
com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch,
Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because
he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When
they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to
49
proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take
care of the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999
corroborated the above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the
accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he
and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of
com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-
appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat,
Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper
and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by
the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro
City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the
truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around
10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then
proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October
18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men
brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges
as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999.
The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for
their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account
showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a
month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly
₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her
rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-
appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on
October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and
KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to
get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-
tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK
had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it
was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She
prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she
went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the
accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but
were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant
came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the
military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government
employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told
him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them
about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on
November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette
player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum
down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the
player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket.
His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK
thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument,
OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant
because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the
accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths
thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the
separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-
appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter
obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version
proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the
spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses.
The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against
their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly
committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the
accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money
squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's
alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting
declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-
appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC
ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay
complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify
50
complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the
accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-
arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of
the victim herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was
able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under
R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using
force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical
examination did not negate the commission of the crime because a medical
certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are
husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse,
there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged
force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained
that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute
and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced
to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant
are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no
wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it
were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by
KKK when she stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his
husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for
grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering
that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about
four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision
read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the
Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective
supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion 81 dated September 4,
2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that
it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-
appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was
not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and
the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's
voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16,
1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police
authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in
KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices
of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and
'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's
chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by
forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's
chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's
property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such
treatment was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the
property of her father until she marries to become the property of her
husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the
owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were
synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon
marriage and the law denied her political power and status under the feudal
doctrine of coverture.89
51
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved,
allowing him to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar
concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She
had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write
a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England,
conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge
as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife
hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of
America (USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly
sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a
woman not his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as
"the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the
perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was
Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in
rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar
rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A
husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape
of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had
the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets
another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA
demanding for its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be
equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing
the application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living
apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires
such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of
separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the
Court of Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v.
Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape
and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted
in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to
sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital
exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is
untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not
consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily
integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and
absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been
viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x.
Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a
husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual
intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations,
not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the
common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and
that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long
been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or]
in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by
denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well
as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions.
Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from
prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired,
unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this
Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under
Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory,
52
albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a
husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in
case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he
forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the
CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of
discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of
promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to
condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to
pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other
appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against
women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify
or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines
enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution
specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The
Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted
principles of international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances,
viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender
equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in
Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person
and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to
the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd
paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or
the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term
"man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the
crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the
deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No.
53
6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as
'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the
consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape
under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265,
we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that
there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited
17 years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I
believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape.
Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife
from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill
expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval,
Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we
don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the
husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be
prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that
prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of
266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this
jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we
must provide for something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the
family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version
specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife
is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of
sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it
our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the
legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the
husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you
call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have
already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape,
there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House
version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate
version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee
report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion
perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is
marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in
favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years
imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual
assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x x.110(Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital
rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital
rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital
rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another
definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are the
lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I
mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains
she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:]
I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can
beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as
marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married
na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband
but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was
just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged
with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put
it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband
does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or
intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I
don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into
54
the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification
of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can
say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is
an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it
is understood that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F,
the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will
remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will
retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we
leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should
understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I
think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are
saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to
have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in
proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would
understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not
defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of
evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of
evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in
discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this
matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape
if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would
define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are
separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one
roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is
present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his
provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It
merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed
be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you
having been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't
really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined
presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything
to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if
indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or
whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her
will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the husband,
notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It does not
change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x
x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further
affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form
of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or
outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical
harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a
woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or
her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof,
55
forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage
in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other
forms of non-personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence
accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven
ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands while
eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable
implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the
two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges
for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the
victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife
unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and
treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for
determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the
ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between
husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied
consent theory evolved have already been superseded by modem global
principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for
human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the
CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society
and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such
measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights
over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with
him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was
Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The
Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a
species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women"
means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be
limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-
related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a
State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and
penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A
husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a
property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with
dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate
this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free
consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international
commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on
marital activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another
but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love,
that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is
unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
56
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a
husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in
order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation,
the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and
protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved
by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual
intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But
he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases
in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes
in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353
pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c)
marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The
single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not
distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without
a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates
against married rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it
withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress
equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in
rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A
marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control
her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully
wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over
and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality,
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination
and violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting
marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-
marital rape nor provide for different definition or elements for either, the
Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the
forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the
law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary
rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and
unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of
non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law
and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the
woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that
support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly
regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with
the established legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution
and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be
imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of
the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine
thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape
case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness,
courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the
victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the
testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in
view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their
deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination.
Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or
certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous
scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of
57
each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its
findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible
and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK
never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and
certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was
able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with
him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep
beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was
resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he
insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to
abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a
stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-
appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to
tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to
stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two
legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never
desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is
likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom
the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her
daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the
room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom.
When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant
got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant
further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as
patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter
proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her
short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still
aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I
cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-
appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her
hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying
himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what
you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential
element that must be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the
sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by
force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of
authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the
offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented. A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was Q So after that what else did he do?
wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of which were
established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no
testimony of KKK, viz: matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident: COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her
testimony.
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs
and rode on you and held your two hands?
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband,
do you remember what happened? A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is
aching."
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did you say that to your husband?
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I
warded off his hand. Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand? xxxx

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by A I shouted when I uttered that words.
touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
xxxx
Q So, what did you do after that?
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this
juncture the witness is sobbing)
xxxx
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic]
(Cross-Examination)
was tom.
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so
remove your panty?
strong.
A Yes, Sir.
xx xx

58
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because
according to you he normally do that if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I
don't want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also
remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and
pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
59
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand
sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what
did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted
on me and succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by
gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in
order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual
sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient
intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of the
felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral
authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the
bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with
him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and
the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into
submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their
conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she
consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-
appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in
the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of KKK
because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse
was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act
for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to
the person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when
consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her
aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the
accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she
refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK
should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught.
Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the
victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a
specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the
accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual
congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she
refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to
stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be
irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is
necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel
the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in
KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not
the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines
the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence
that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain to the
elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse
with a woman against her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v.
Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however, disparate
from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant
was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's
medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on
the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that
the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an
indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed
earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked
probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It
must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation,
thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of
the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and
OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but
on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the
circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape
incidents.
60
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's
narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me,
have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and
the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went
upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for
meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked
the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke
MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair
disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the
accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to
the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father
is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling
well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the
accused-appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an
argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered
her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even
in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then
stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly
crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the
accused-appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-
consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her
verbal and physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her
appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant
opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-
appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her
children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the
sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely
because they failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or
that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims
in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if
such delay is satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing
his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only
found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor
Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed
the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the
accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is
understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal
professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social
humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape
cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's
absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband
raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized
as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape,
the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family
had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought,
are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject
rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is
not fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the
witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit
since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross
examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally
considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to
testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire
belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy
evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in
the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated
October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the
accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the
accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that
approximately ₱3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These
61
pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK
could not account for the money deposited in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to
explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs
a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The
accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent
witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed,
despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters
neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by
presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court
finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to
confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has
even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand
are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a
desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-
appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and
thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In
sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK
is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with
fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as
defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual
intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This
admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion
thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and
unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or
rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he
was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within
its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the
geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the
place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more
importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a
fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates
of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The
accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at
the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be
traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even
less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any
time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs
criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive
identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters,
the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive
on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was
sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful
declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from
KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and
OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based
thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and
17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape,
meted upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in
relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted
of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of
₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof
other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered
moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that
rape took place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple
rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission,
62
the appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by
the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of
domestic violence, an award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is
imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence
to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place,
age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can
happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her
time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her
husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the
atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly
rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of
marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an
exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give
or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's
unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious
force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family
Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and
biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It
entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual
sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass
innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the
criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false
marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole.
He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the
query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As
Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that —
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will
cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right
or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to
taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to
his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted
to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants
their voice to be heard.
63
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to
attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof
and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail
the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He
states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected
by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible
by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of
law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election
or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the
common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater
is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen,
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
 privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not
claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent
to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the
concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody
of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it
is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
64
than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which
states, inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected
a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not
for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the
above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It
does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as
an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury
to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the
injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is
risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him
into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his
regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was
issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the
House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender
voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call
he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his
present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside
from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a
mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court
of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati
City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the
Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this
case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private
vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to
leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the
purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting
mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in
going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his
heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a
member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities
or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting
for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all
the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be
a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance
in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v.
Morfe:5
65
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified
by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force
except the dictates of their conscience of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded
them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event
come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering
that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should
not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the
prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous
of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such
an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the
judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each
and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that
the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to
discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1âwphi1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of
the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office
situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives
Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff
paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also
provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant
further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been
discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.
Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by
the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,
they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action.
They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws."6This simply means that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows
different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as
all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed
by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House
of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency
of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court
can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse
her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.8
66
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised
upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's
liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful
tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the restraint on
the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place
to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and
will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving
him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss
of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or
any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes
an individual's status in society.16 Prison officials have the difficult and often
thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as
well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-
entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require
the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other
right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR,1 Accused-Appellant.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"[T]he trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to
he highest respect absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
affect the result of the case."2
On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3,
2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73
finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
In three separate Informations,5 appellant was charged with rape committed
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there commit an act of
sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and
[inserting] the same into the genital orifice of "AAA,"6a minor who is six (6)
years of age, thereby causing the labia majora of the vagina of said minor to
suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there commit an act of
sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and
[inserting] the same into the anal orifice of "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years
of age, thereby causing the perianal region of the said anal orifice of said
minor to suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of] "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age; that on the
same occasion that the Accused raped said minor, the accused did, then and
there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette, against her will and
consent.
67
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.7 Pre-trial
conference was terminated upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits
ensued.
Factual Antecedents
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
The victim in these cases[,] "AAA[,]" testified that at noon time of April 8,
1999, she was x x x playing x x x with her playmates whereupon she
wandered by the house of accused which x x x was just below their house.
"AAA" clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing
shop owned by her father located in their house x x x and where accused was
employed. While "AAA" was at the house of accused, she claimed that her
genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said
accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same
accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself
on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal
knowledge [of] the then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN
Aug. 7, 2001, pp. 10-12.)
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughter’s birth certificate
(Exhibit "B") which stated that she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25,
2001, p. 4). On the other hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal
Officer who examined "AAA" identified his Medico-Legal Report (Exhibit "M")
and testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the
perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was possible that the said burns
were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victim’s skin.
Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of
the victim and that the same could have been done 24 hours from the time of
his examination which was also on April 8, 1999. (TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 11-
17)
"CCC" [aunt of "AAA"] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of
"AAA" in bringing the victim to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to
Camp Crame where a doctor also examined "AAA" and confirmed that the
latter was indeed a victim of rape. "CCC" testified that they then proceeded to
the Women’s [D]esk to file the instant complaint against the accused. (TSN
August 5, 2003 pp. 4-8)
On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him.
Accused presented his brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was
tending the store located at the house of accused when the latter supposedly
arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.]
of the same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as
the latter worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing
shop owned by the victim’s father. (TSN February 3, 2006 pp. 6-8)
When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the
testimony of his brother-in-law that it was impossible for him to have raped
"AAA" on the date and time stated in the information as his night shift work
schedule just would not permit such an incident to occur. Accused added
that he knew of no reason why the family of the private complainant would
pin the crime against him. (TSN Nov. 17, 2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAA’s" body,
the defense presented a supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary
Pabuayan. According to Mary, she was then 7 years old when she and two
other playmates together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit" the son of accused were
burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good Friday in
the year 1999. This Joel "Liit" supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently
burned the anal portion of "AAA’s" body. Mary’s exact words were to the effect
that "napatakan ang puwit ni "AAA"."8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of
three counts of rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is
found GUILTY of all offenses stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations
and is hereby sentenced to the following:
a) In Criminal Information # 99-16235 and Criminal Information #
99-16236, accused is to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of
imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum and is ordered to pay the victim
"AAA" civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00, moral damages of ₱30,000.00
and exemplary damages of ₱15,000.00 for each of the two Criminal
Informations.
b) In Criminal Information # 99-16237, accused is to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is ordered to pay the victim civil
indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱50,000.00 and
exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal
Informations.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal10 which was given due course by
the trial court in its Order11dated February 2, 2009.
68
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of
error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266-A PAR. 1 AND
ART. 267-B, PAR. 7 IN RELATION TO R.A. NO. 7610) DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.12
Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.1awp++i1 In particular,
appellant insisted that the trial court erred in finding "AAA’s" testimony
credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette
stick, was used in burning her private parts.13 Appellant argued that "AAA"
never showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety despite her alleged
traumatic experience.14Appellant also alleged that "CCC’s" testimony should
be disregarded as she was not even present when the rape incidents
happened.15 He opined that "CCC" influenced her niece, "AAA," to file the suit
against him which bespoke of ill-motive on her part. Appellant concluded
that these "inconsistencies and contradictions" are enough to set aside the
verdict of conviction imposed upon by the RTC.16
However, the CA gave short shrift to appellant’s arguments. The CA rendered
its Decision disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties
imposed, and to be read thus:
"1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from ten17 (8) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty
Thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand
pesos (₱30,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifteen Thousand pesos
(₱15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for each count of rape by
sexual assault; and
(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without
eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA Seventy-Five Thousand
pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand pesos
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and all the costs of suit."
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal19 which the CA gave due course in its Resolution20 of
January 6, 2011. In a Resolution21 dated June 15, 2011, this Court required
the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. In its Manifestation
and Motion,22 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court
that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already
exhaustively discussed and refuted all the arguments of the appellant in its
brief filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a Manifestation In Lieu of
Supplemental Brief23 praying that the case be deemed submitted for decision
based on the pleadings submitted.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two
counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of
authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above should be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person. (Emphases supplied)
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is
"termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years
of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
69
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years."24In this case,
the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape.
"AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made
her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of
"AAA," inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, "AAA" was only six years of age.
Her birth certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. "AAA’s"
testimony was corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to
have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt
for two counts of rape by sexual assault.1âwphi1 Records show that
appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAA’s" genital orifice causing her
labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit
cigarette stick into "AAA’s" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her
perianal region.
We agree with the CA that "AAA’s" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match,
rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen
her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is so inconsequential and does not
diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private
parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the
crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
person’s genital or anal orifice."25 In any event, "inconsistencies in a rape
victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape."26 We also held in People v. Piosang27 that –
"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA
could not have invented a horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellant’s argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or
anxiety considering her traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft
of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled that people react differently when
confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard behavioral
response when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may
show signs of stress; but others may act nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAA’s"
reaction does not in any way prove the innocence of appellant. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAA’s" reactions, it did not diminish
the fact that she was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.28
We also agree with the CA that "CCC’s" efforts to hale appellant to the court
should not be equated with ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find
"CCC’s" efforts to seek justice for her niece who was raped more in accord
with the norms of society. At any rate, even if we disregard "CCC’s"
testimony, appellant’s conviction would still stand. We agree with the
observation of the OSG that "CCC’s" "testimony actually had no great impact
on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed mainly of the fact that
she was the one who accompanied the mother of "AAA" in bringing "AAA" to
the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the
Women’s desk."29
On the other hand, appellant’s alibi and denial are weak defenses especially
when weighed against "AAA’s" positive identification of him as the malefactor.
Appellant did not even attempt to show that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact, he
admitted that he lived just four houses away from the house of "AAA". His
denial is also unsubstantiated hence the same is self-serving and deserves no
consideration or weight. The RTC properly disregarded the testimony of
Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellant’s brother-in-law, who claimed that appellant
was at his house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted,
his house is near the house of "AAA" hence there was no physical
impossibility for him to be present at the crime scene. Also, the RTC observed
that Oletin’s testimony did not "prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it to
state that the private prosecutor correctly noted that the said witness was
always smiling and laughing when answering questions propounded to him
as if making a mockery of the proceedings which his own brother-in-law was
facing."30
Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal
Case No. 99-16237) is death when the victim is a child below seven years old.
There is no dispute that at the time the rape was committed on April 8, 1999,
"AAA" was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,31 the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed on the appellant but without eligibility for parole. 32 The CA thus
correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below
seven years old is punishable by reclusion temporal.33 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no other aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision
mayor34as minimum, to reclusion temporal,35 as maximum. The CA thus
correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No.
99-16237 (statutory rape). However, the award of moral damages must be
increased to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.36 As regards
70
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by
sexual assault), the CA likewise properly awarded the amounts of ₱30,000.00
as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, for each count.
However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of rape by sexual
assault must be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.37 In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with
modification the July 3, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of
statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral
damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape) is increased to
₱75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-
16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased
to ₱30,000.00 for each count. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181473 November 11, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONEY GADUYON y TAPISPISAN, Accused-Appellant.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a case of a father defiling his 12-year old daughter on three separate
occasions.
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02511 that affirmed in toto the January 18 2006
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6572-74, finding appellant Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape,3 qualified object
rape4 and sexual abuse5 committed against his own daughter "AAA".6
Factual Antecedents
Three Informations were filed against appellant, the relevant portions of
which read as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 6572 for Qualified Rape
That on or about the 22nd day of August 2002, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his moral
authority and ascendancy and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
"AAA," a minor, 12 years of age, against her will and without her consent, the
said crime having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority, the said accused being the parent of the said
victim, a 12-year old minor daughter of the accused thereby raising the crime
to Qualified Rape which is aggravated by the circumstance of Treachery,
Abuse of Superior Strength, Nighttime and Dwelling.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
In Criminal Case No. 6573 for Sexual Abuse
That on or about the 21st day of August 2002, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his moral
authority and ascendancy being the parent of the victim "AAA", with lewd
design x x x and intent to debase, degrade or demean said victim, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit lascivious conduct on
the said "AAA," a minor, 12 years of age, by then and there touching her
breast and rubbing her arms, against her will and without her consent
thereby constituting SEXUAL ABUSE which is prejudicial to her normal
growth and development with attendant aggravating circumstance of
RELATIONSHIP increasing the penalty of the offense to its maximum period.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
In Criminal Case No. 6574 for Qualified Object Rape
That on or about the 9th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his moral
authority and ascendancy and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously insert his finger into the
genital orifice of "AAA," a minor, 12 years of age, against her will and without
her consent, the said crime having been attended by the qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority, the said accused being the
parent of the said victim, a 12-year old minor daughter of the accused
thereby raising the crime to qualified object rape which is aggravated by the
circumstance of Treachery, Abuse of Superior Strength, Nighttime and
Dwelling.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Upon termination of the pre-
trial conference, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
71
Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom he has three
daughters. Their eldest child is "AAA," who at the time material to this case
was only 12 years old.
On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of
her auntie in Caloocan City. "AAA" and her father, the appellant, were thus
the only ones left in the family residence in San Mateo, Rizal. At around 9:00
p.m. of the said date, "AAA" was lying in her bed in the family room located at
the upper portion of their house when appellant fondled her breasts and
touched her arms.10Appellant threatened "AAA" not to tell her mother about
the incident or else something bad might happen to the latter.11
At around 11:00 p.m. of the following day, August 22, 2002, and while her
mother and sisters were still in Caloocan City, "AAA" was awakened when
appellant lowered her shorts and panty.12 Appellant spread her legs and
inserted his penis into her vagina.13 "AAA" felt pain but could do nothing but
cry.14 Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted it again into "AAA’s" vagina.
When he was done, appellant put her shorts and panty back on and again
threatened "AAA."15
After more than a month or on October 9, 2002, at about 10:30 p.m. and
while "AAA" was sleeping in a double-deck bed and her sister was in the
lower portion thereof, "AAA" was suddenly awakened. She noticed that her
short pants had been lowered while appellant was already lying beside
her.16 Appellant then inserted his index finger into "AAA’s" vagina. "AAA" only
cried upon feeling the pain. After his deplorable act, appellant reiterated his
previous threat to "AAA."17
After a few minutes, "AAA’s" mother entered the room where her daughters
were sleeping. She noticed that "AAA" was covered with pillows, except for
her head and feet.18 Upon approaching "AAA," she saw that her legs were
spread apart and her panty was slightly lowered and inserted at the center of
her genitals.19 The mother then suspected that her husband did something
bad to "AAA" since only she and her husband were awake at that time.
However, she opted to remain silent and just pray.20
When "AAA" went to school the following day, she was asked by her religion
teacher if her father did something bad to her.21 "AAA" who was teary-eyed
did not answer.22 Later, "AAA’s" class adviser called her.23 They ate in the
canteen and thereafter proceeded to the adoration chapel to pray.24 After
praying, the teacher asked "AAA" the same question propounded by the
religion teacher.25 This time, "AAA" replied that her father did something bad
to her twice but did not reveal the details surrounding the same.26 "AAA’s"
mother then came and asked her daughter if appellant did something bad to
her. "AAA" answered "Yes. It happened twice."27 Thus, "AAA" and her mother
went to the police station and reported the incidents of her defilement. 28 A
physical examination done upon "AAA" revealed that she was in a non-virgin
physical state but that there are no signs of any form of trauma.29 A
psychiatric evaluation likewise revealed that "AAA" was suffering from Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder with Depressed Mood.30
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied the accusations against him and instead advanced the
following version of events.
From August 21, 2002 until 9:00 a.m. of August 22, 2002, his wife and their
two younger daughters attended the wake of his wife’s sister in Caloocan
City.31 While he admitted that only he and "AAA" were left in their house, he
denied mashing her breast.32 He claimed that at the time of the alleged
incident on August 21, 2002, he was overseeing their computer shop.33 He
also denied raping "AAA" the following day since his wife and his youngest
daughter were already home by then and they all slept in their house in the
evening of that day.34
Anent what transpired on October 9, 2002, appellant claimed that he closed
their computer shop at around 10:00 p.m.35 He then proceeded upstairs and
saw his wife feeding their youngest daughter.36 She asked him to take over so
she could go to the bathroom downstairs.37 At 10:25 p.m., his wife
returned.38 Appellant then heard a noise from the outside. After a while, his
kumpare called him to report that his brother threw stones at the house of
his kumpare’s father.39 Appellant immediately went outside.40 There was
therefore no truth to the claim of "AAA" that he inserted his finger inside her
vagina that night.41
The defense believed that "AAA" was just induced by appellant’s wife to make
false accusations against him.42 This was due to his wife’s infidelity which
was confirmed when his wife confessed that she went out with another
man43 and when their younger daughter saw his wife kissing another
man.44Despite this, appellant claimed that he already forgave his wife for the
sake of their children.45
Appellant’s mother corroborated his story. According to her, appellant’s
family was in their house in the morning of August 22, 2002. 46 She even
talked to the wife of appellant at around 6:00 p.m. and was told that she
went home with her youngest daughter so they could rest since they have no
place to stay in the wake they attended in Caloocan City.47The next day,
"AAA," her mother and sister went back to the wake.48
Appellant’s sister-in-law testified that after "AAA," her mother and sister went
to the wake on August 23, 2002, she, together with her son, mother-in-law,
and appellant followed that evening.49 She observed that there seemed to be
nothing wrong with "AAA" since she was serving food in the wake and playing
with her cousins.50
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
72
In its January 18, 2006 Decision,51 the RTC gave more weight to "AAA’s"
positive testimony as against appellant’s bare denials since her testimony
was candid, straightforward and free from material contradictions. Her
testimony was complemented by the findings of the medico-legal officer who
examined "AAA." In fact, "AAA" suffered intense psychological stress and
depression as a result of the abuses.
On the other hand, the RTC found that appellant’s denials were not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.1âwphi1 It also found
unacceptable his attempt to malign the reputation of his wife and daughter
in order to exculpate himself. According to the said court, this evasive
attitude of appellant cannot prevail over "AAA’s" testimony.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the criminal cases thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 6572, for the rape committed on August 22,
2002, accused Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim "AAA," the amount
of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 6573, for the sexual abuse committed on
August 21, 2002, accused Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of One (1) year and One (1)
month of Prision Correcional as minimum to Two (2) years, Eleven
(11) months of Prision Correccional in its medium period as
maximum.
(c) In Criminal Case No. 6574, for the rape committed on October 9,
2002, accused Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim "AAA" the amount
of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.52
On September 4, 2006, the RTC, however, partially modified the above
judgment53 insofar as the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 6574 is
concerned, viz:
The aforesaid judgment is hereby partially modified x x x to read, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
 (a) x x x
(b) x x x
(c) In Criminal Case No. 6574, for the rape committed on October 9,
2002, accused Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the victim "AAA", the
amount of ₱30,000.00, as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00, as moral
damages and ₱15,000.00, as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED."54
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the appellate court sustained appellant’s conviction. Like the
RTC, it stressed that appellant’s bare assertions cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim. It brushed aside the inconsistencies on
the part of "AAA" as pointed out by appellant and concluded, after a careful
evaluation of the facts and evidence on record, that appellant’s guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the CA’s July 31, 2007 Decision:55
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.56
Assignment of Errors
Still insisting on his innocence, appellant prays for the reversal of the CA’s
appealed Decision and adopts the same assignment of errors he advanced
before the said court, viz:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACCORDING TO THE
ACCUSED THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE TO WHICH
HE IS ENTITLED IN CRIMINAL CASES AND FOR
CONVICTING HIM OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED WITHOUT
THE BENEFIT OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
DESPITE THE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT –
A. THE CLAIM OF THE PROSECUTION THAT THE
ACCUSED AND HIS DAUGHTER WERE ALONE AT
THEIR SAN MATEO RESIDENCE IN THE EVENING
OF 22 AUGUST 2002, THE DATE WHEN THE
73
ALLEGED PENILE PENETRATION TOOK PLACE IS A
BRAZEN LIE;
B. "AAA" DID NOT MANIFEST OVERT PHYSICAL
SIGNS THAT SHE WAS RAPED;
C. "AAA" GAVE FOUR CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS ON
HOW SHE WAS RAPED;
D. "AAA" GAVE THREE CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS
ON HOW SHE WAS "FINGERED" BY HER FATHER
IN THE EVENING OF 9 OCTOBER 2002;
E. X X X THE MOTHER OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM,
CONCOCTED THE 9 OCTOBER 2002 INCIDENT;
F. THERE IS NO SPONTANEOUS DISCLOSURE.
"AAA" WAS PRESSURED TO ACCUSE HER FATHER;
G. "AAA" IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE AND
MANIPULATION;
H. "AAA" BESTOWED [ON] HER FATHER A WARM
SMILE WHEN SHE IDENTIFIED HIM IN COURT,
WHICH IS UNEXPECTED IF SHE HAD IN FACT
BEEN RAPED AND MOLESTED BY HER OWN
FATHER;
I. THE DEMEANOR OF "AAA" X X X IN THE
COURSE OF THE COURT PROCEEDINGS IS FAR
FROM INSPIRING;
J. "AAA" GAVE FOUR CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF
WHAT TRANSPIRED AFTER THE ALLEGED RAPE;
K. "AAA" IS CONSISTENT IN GIVING INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS;
L. THE STATEMENT OF "AAA" THAT HER FATHER
DID BAD THINGS TO HER TWICE CONTRADICTS
HER CLAIM THAT SHE WAS SEXUALLY MOLESTED
THRICE;
M. "AAA" GAVE CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS ON HOW
SHE FINALLY DISCLOSED HER ORDEAL;
 N. THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION GAVE
CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF HOW "AAA" MADE
THE DISCLOSURE;
O. X X X THE CLASS ADVISER OF "AAA" AND A
WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, COULD NOT
BE BELIEVED WITH SAFETY;
P. THE CLAIM THAT THE ACCUSED "FINGERED"
HIS DAUGHTER IN THE EVENING OF 9 OCTOBER
2002 IS INCREDIBLE;
Q. FROM HER TESTIMONY, IT APPEARS THAT
"AAA" IS SUBCONSCIOUSLY SENDING SUBTLE
HINTS TO THE COURT TO RECEIVE HER
TESTIMONY WITH CAUTION;
R. THE PARENTS OF "AAA" ARE NOT GETTING
ALONG WELL;
S. THE CLINICAL FINDING OF THE PSYCHIATRIST
IS FAULTY AND INCONCLUSIVE; AND T. THE
MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF
RAPE.57
In fine, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes attributed to
him.58 He argues that his alibi and denial deserve greater weight in evidence
than the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.59
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
The crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, reclassified the crime of rape as a crime against
persons.60 It also amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein
Article 266-A which reads:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed-
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
74
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; d. When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or
through sexual assault. In rape under paragraph 1 or rape through sexual
intercourse, carnal knowledge is the crucial element which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.61This is also referred to as "organ rape" or "penile
rape"62 and must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. There must be evidence to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator’s penis touched the labia of the
victim or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.63
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is
commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of
the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of
rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It
is also called "instrument or object rape", also "gender-free rape", or the
narrower "homosexual rape."64
The crime of sexual abuse under Republic Act No. 7610
On the other hand, RA 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", defines
and penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuse. "Sexual abuse
includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest
with children. Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or Q: Last August 21, 2002, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening where were
pubic area of a person."65 you?

The Information in Criminal Case No. 6573 against appellant was for A: I was in our house, sir.
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently provides:
xxxx
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the Q: At such time, place and date do you recall any unusual incident that
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual happened?
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
A: There was, sir.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following: Q: What was that?

xxxx A: I saw my daddy fondling my breasts and holding my arms, sir.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct Q: And where were you in the house when your father did that to you?
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the A: I was in the room, sir.
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or Q: Where in the room?
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x. (Emphasis supplied) xxxx

In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused A: In the bed, sir.
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female is below eighteen (18) years
of age.66 This paragraph "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct Q: What were you doing in bed?
not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected
to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused
for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or A: I was lying, sir.
influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct."67
Q: And you said that your father, while you were in bed in the room, touched
Appellant is guilty of the two kinds of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC and your breasts, would you please demonstrate to the court how your father
of sexual abuse under RA 7610. touched your breasts?

Our examination of the testimony of "AAA" reveals that there was carnal A: Like this, sir.
knowledge or sexual intercourse through force, threat and intimidation on
August 22, 2002. Appellant also committed rape by sexual assault when he ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
inserted his finger into the genitalia of "AAA" on October 9, 2002. He also
subjected "AAA," a minor at 12 years of age, to sexual abuse by means of Witness cupping with her two (2) palms her breasts x x x.
lascivious conduct through intimidation or influence, when he mashed her
breasts and stroked her arms on August 21, 2002. "AAA" gave detailed
accounts of these acts of perversion, viz: xxxx

75
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN: A: Also at the wake, sir.

Q: You also said that your father touched your arms, would you please Q: How about your sister "DDD"?
demonstrate to the court how your father touched your arms?
A: Also at the wake of my aunt, sir.
A: Like this, sir.
Q: What time was that again?
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN
A: 9:00 o’clock, sir.
Witness demonstrating with her right palm placed on her left shoulder and
the left palm placed on her right shoulder and then moving them downwards. Q: Daytime or nighttime?

Q: When your father did that to you, what did you do? A: Evening, sir.

A: I was crying, sir. xxxx

Q: And did you say anything to your father? Q: "AAA," while you are testifying now, what do you feel?

A: None, sir. A: I am afraid (natatakot po), sir.

Q: Did your father say anything to you? ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:

A: Yes, sir. May we manifest that while the witness answers "natatakot po" she is crying
and wiping her eyes with her handkerchief.
Q: What was that?
Q: At about 11 o’clock in the evening after August 22, 2002, where were you?
A: He told me not to tell anything to my mother because in case I would tell
something to my mother, something will happen to her, sir. A: I was in the house, sir.

ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN: Q: What house?

May we manifest, your Honor, that the witness, while saying the words she A: The house of my grandmother, sir.
had just said, had teary eyes and was wiping her tears with her
handkerchief.
Q: Where is that?
Q: When that was done to you by your father, who were in the house?
A: "YYY," San Mateo, Rizal, sir.
A: Only the two (2) of us, sir.
Q: At that time, date and place, do you recall an unusual incident that
happened?
Q: Where was your mother?
A: There was, sir.
A: She was in the wake of my aunt, sir.
Q: What was that?
Q: Where was your sister "CCC"?

76
A: While I was sleeping I was suddenly awakened, sir. xxxx

Q: Why were you suddenly awakened from sleep?
A: Because my dad was lowering my shorts, sir.
Q: How did you know that your daddy was lowering your shorts?
Q: When the penis of your father was already inserted into your vagina, what
happened next?
A: He pulled it out and then inserted it again (hinugot niya tapos ay ipinasok
niya uli), sir.

A: I saw it, sir. Q: How many times did that happen that your daddy pulled out his penis
from you and then inserted it, how many times?
Q: Was your daddy able to lower your shorts?
A: Two (2) times, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then afterwards what happened?
Q: What else did he do after lowering your shorts?
A: He pulled it out again then he returned my panty, sir.
A: He lowered my panty, sir.
Q: What else?
Q: Was your daddy able to lower your panty?
A: He also returned my shorts, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you say anything to your daddy when he did that to you?
Q: What were you doing when your daddy was lowering your shorts and then
panty, what were you doing? A: No, sir.

A: I was crying, sir. Q: How about your daddy, did he tell you anything?

Q: After your daddy has lowered your shorts and panty what happened next? A: Yes, sir.

A: He separated my legs (ibinuka niya po ang hita ko), sir. Q: What was that?

Q: After your daddy separated your legs, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: You said he inserted his penis into your vagina, was he able to insert his
penis into your vagina?
A: Not to tell anything to my mother because something will happen to her if
I tell anything to her, sir.
Q: Who were in the house when your father did that to you?
A: Only the two (2) of us, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Where was your mother?

Q: When your daddy inserted his penis into your vagina, what did you feel? A: She was still in the wake of my aunt, sir.

A: It was painful, sir. Q: How about your sister "CCC"?

77
A: She was also in the wake, sir. Q: What are you doing in bed?

xxxx A: I was sleeping, sir.

Q: What time was that when it happened? Q: Now, you said that you found out that your shorts was no longer being
worn by you, what happened next?
A: At 11:00 o’clock, sir.
A: My daddy inserted his finger in my vagina, sir.
Q: Daytime or nighttime?
Q: Which finger of your daddy was inserted at that time into your vagina?
A: Nighttime, sir.
A: The index finger, sir.
xxxx
xxxx
Q: "AAA," I am asking you this question, at about 10:30 o’clock in the
evening of October 9, 2002, where were you? Q: "AAA," when your father inserted his finger into your vagina, what did you
feel?
A: I was in the house, sir.
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: What house?
Q: What did you do when your father inserted his finger into your vagina?
A: "YYY," San Mateo, Rizal, sir.
A: I just cried, sir.
Q: At such time, date and place, do you recall any unusual incident that
happened? Q: Did you tell your father anything?

A: There was, sir. A: None, sir.

Q: What was that? Q: How about your father, did he tell you anything?

A: When I saw my shorts under my feet and my dad was already lying beside A: Yes, there was, sir.
me, sir.
Q: What was that?
Q: How do you know that your daddy was beside you?
A: Not to tell anything to my mother, sir.
A: I saw him, sir.
Q: Now, who were in the house when that happened?
Q: Where were you at that time, what place in the house?
A: My sisters "CCC" and "DDD" and also my mother, sir.
A: In the room, sir.
Q: Where was your mother when your father was inserting his finger into
Q: Where in the room? your vagina, where was your mother?

A: x x x my bed, sir. A: I do not know, sir.

78
Q: How about your sister "CCC"?
A: At the lower portion of the double-deck, sir.
Q: What was "CCC" doing there at the lower portion of your double-deck bed?
A: She was sleeping, sir.
Q: How about "DDD"?
A: She was on the mattress, sir.
Q: What time was that in the evening?
A: At about 10:30, sir.68
We agree with the observation of the lower courts that the testimony of "AAA"
is worthy of credence. She positively identified appellant as her abuser. She
did not waver on the material points of her testimony and maintained the
same even on cross-examination. Indeed, her statements under oath are
sufficient evidence to convict appellant for the crimes alleged in the
Informations.69
Moreover, "AAA’s" testimony is corroborated by the result of her medical
examination which showed the presence of a deep healed laceration in her
private part.70 This finding is consistent with her declaration that appellant
inserted his penis and finger into her vagina. "Where a victim’s testimony is
corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis
for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place."71
Appellant seeks to discredit "AAA’s" testimony by insisting that he could not
have raped the latter in the evening of August 22, 2002 since the whole
family was in their house that day. This assertion is undeserving of credence
due to our constant pronouncement that a bare assertion cannot prevail over
the categorical testimony of a victim.72 Even if corroborated by appellant’s
mother, the same does not deserve any weight since courts usually frown
upon the corroborative testimony of an immediate member of the family of an
accused and treat it with suspicion. The close filial relationship between the
witness and the accused casts a thick cloud of doubt upon the former’s
testimony.
Even assuming that appellant was not alone with "AAA" on August 22, 2002,
the presence of other people is not a deterrent to the commission of rape.
This observation is apparent from the rape by sexual assault committed on
October 9, 2002 while the entire family was in the residence. As aptly held by
the RTC and the CA, rape indeed does not respect time and place. Appellant
impugns the credibility of "AAA" by emphasizing that she gave conflicting
79
accounts on the manner she was raped. He also stresses the contradictions
in the testimony of "AAA" and the other prosecution witnesses on the events
that transpired after the alleged rape and regarding the disclosure by "AAA"
of her ordeal.
We are not persuaded. Our review of the transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveals that these
inconsistencies refer to inconsequential matters "that do not bear upon the
elements of the crime of rape. The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape
is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis
for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts indispensable to the guilt or
innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. As the inconsistencies
alleged by the appellant had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of
rape, they cannot be used as [grounds] for his acquittal."73
With regard to the inconsistencies on the part of "AAA," it bears stressing
that "victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of
the manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, an errorless
recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness,
especially when she is recounting details from an experience as humiliating
and painful as rape. Furthermore, rape victims, especially child victims,
should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed
in such a situation."74 Verily, in this case, minor inconsistencies in the
testimony of "AAA" are to be expected because (1) she was a minor child
during her defloration; (2) she was to testify on a painful and humiliating
experience; (3) she was sexually assaulted several times; and, (4) she was
examined on details and events that happened almost six months before she
testified.75
Anent appellant’s other assigned errors, we quote the following findings of
the CA:
The argument that "AAA" did not manifest overt physical signs of having been
raped since she acted and walked normally the following day cannot justify
the reversal of appellant’s conviction. How a person goes about the day after
the happening of a horrid event is not a tell-tale sign of the truth or falsity of
an allegation. The workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of
emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable and different people
react differently. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, overt
physical manifestations cannot be expected since "AAA" did not put up any
form of resistance. The threat of harm to be inflicted on her mother was
sufficient intimidation for her to succumb to her father’s lust out of fear. The
pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to
intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in virtually all cases. It is
through this fear that the perpetrator hopes to create a climate of extreme
psychological terror which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and
force her to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. The
relationship of the victim to the perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the
perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the
victim.
Appellant would also want to impress upon this Court that the accusation of
his daughter was concocted by his wife because of their marital problems.
This contention is preposterous. It is unnatural for a mother to sacrifice her
own daughter, a child of tender years, and subject her to the rigors and
humiliation of a public trial for rape if she was not driven by an honest desire
to have her daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly.
Neither can it be said that there was no spontaneous disclosure by "AAA" of
the incident.1âwphi1 Appellant threatened "AAA." The humiliation caused by
the rape by her own father in addition to the burden of being responsible
should her mother be harmed are sufficient to prevent any child from freely
disclosing her ordeal. We must be reminded that the crime of rape by itself
attaches much humiliation and more so if the loss is caused by her father.
Delay and the initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault
on her virtue is neither unknown [nor] uncommon. That there was no
spontaneous disclosure does not mean that appellant is innocent of the
crimes. "AAA" was apparently a terrified young child who was completely at
the mercy of her shameless father. Thus, "AAA’s" hesitation may be
attributed to her age, the moral ascendancy of the accused over her, and his
threats against her.
On the other hand, neither should the smile of "AAA" while identifying her
father in court be given any malicious significance. While appellant puts
much importance to said smile, which could be a way of concealing her
nervousness, he ignored the fact that "AAA" cried while testifying on the
details of the incidents. In fact, during her testimony, she categorically stated
that she was afraid and ashamed. The candid and straightforward narration
of how she was abused and the tears that accompanied her story are
earmarks of credibility and must be given full faith and credit.
With respect to appellant’s contention that the clinical finding of Dr. Joven
Ignacio, the psychiatrist, is faulty and not conclusive because she appeared
to be biased, it is noteworthy that even without said psychiatric test, the
finding of the trial court would still be affirmed considering that the sole
testimony of the victim is sufficient basis for conviction in rape, which is a
crime usually committed in seclusion.
Indeed, We are convinced that "AAA" had no reason to falsely incriminate her
own father in view of the fact that the accusation would surely deny her
mother the companionship of a husband and the protection of a father for
her younger sisters. It has been consistently held that the testimony of a rape
victim as to who abused her is credible where she has no motive to testify
against the accused.76
80
On the other hand, what appellant offered for his defense were mere denials
which, as aptly observed by the RTC, are unsupported by clear and
convincing evidence.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the CA correctly affirmed the Decision of
the RTC finding appellant guilty of the crimes charged.
The Proper Penalty
The RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of death for committing the
crime of qualified rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Case No.
6572. The Information in this case alleged the qualifying circumstances of
relationship and minority. Appellant is the father of "AAA" and he admitted
this filial bond between them during the pre-trial conference77 and trial.
"Admission in open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and,
hence, conclusive to prove relationship with the victim."78 Also, "AAA’s" birth
certificate was submitted as proof of her age. This document suffices as
competent evidence of her age.79
"In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, which prohibits the
imposition of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, should be imposed."80 Appellant is thus sentenced to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for the crime of qualified rape
committed through sexual intercourse in Criminal Case No. 6572.
With regard to the crime of sexual abuse under RA 7610, the penalty
provided for violation of Section 5, Article III thereof is reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua . "As the crime was committed by
the father of ["AAA,"] the alternative circumstance of relationship should be
appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness,
relationship is always aggravating."81 With the presence of this aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty in Criminal Case
No. 6573 shall be applied in its maximum period – reclusion perpetua.82
On the other hand, prision mayor is the penalty prescribed for rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-B of the RPC. The penalty is increased to reclusion
temporal if the rape is committed with any of the 10 aggravating/ qualifying
circumstances mentioned in said article.83 Just like in Criminal Case No.
6572, the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are
sufficiently alleged and proven in this case. The penalty therefore is reclusion
temporal which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. Hence, the trial court and the CA correctly imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum in Criminal Case No. 6574.
The Damages
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages to "AAA" in
Criminal Case No. 6572 must be increased as follows: ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.84 She is further awarded civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00, moral
damages and a fine at ₱15,000.00 each in Criminal Case No. 6573.85 In
Criminal Case No. 6574, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages at
₱30,000.00 each are maintained but the award of exemplary damages is
increased to ₱30,000.00.86"AAA" is also entitled to an interest on all the
amounts of damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.87
WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02511 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 finding appellant Doney Gaduyon y
Tapispisan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1. In Criminal Case No. 6572, appellant Doney Gaduyon y
Tapispisan is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 6573, appellant Doney Gaduyon y
Tapispisan is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and ordered to pay AAA ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, Pl5,000.00 as
moral damages and a fine of 15,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 6574, appellant Doney Gaduyon y
Tapispisan is ordered to pay AAA ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175876 February 20, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TOMASTEODORO y ANGELES, Accused-Appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
81
The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if
the records show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need
for the financial support of the accused.
This rule comes to the forefront once again in our review of the affirmance by
the Court of Appeals (CA) of the conviction for two counts of rape of Tomas
Teodoro y Angeles,1 in which the victim, AAA,2 was the 8-year old daughter
of BBB, his common-law wife. The Regional Trial Court had pronounced
Teodoro guilty of two counts of statutory rape on December 10, 2001, and
condignly meted him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.3
Antecedents
Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with
statutory rape committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-02
That on or about the 18th day of December, 1997, at, 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, in Sitio Seringan, Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, an eight (8) year
old minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659)4
Criminal Case No. 98-03
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1998, at 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, in Sitio Seringan, Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, an eight (8) year
old minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659)5
With respect to the statutory rape charged in Criminal Case No. 98-02, the
records show that on December 18, 1997 BBB left home in Kitcharao,
Agusan del Norte on an errand in Surigao; that her children, including AAA,
were left under the care of Teodoro, her common-law husband; that late that
night, he returned home drunk, and his arrival roused the children from
their sleep, because they had not yet eaten; that they eagerly ate the food he
set down for them; that soon after the dinner, he told the children to go to
bed; that the children went to sleep in their respective places on the floor;
that AAA became puzzled when he turned off the lights that were supposed to
be left on; that AAA eventually fell asleep beside her siblings; that at some
point later in the night, he roused AAA, and ordered her to strip naked; that
she initially defied him, but he himself then undressed her; that he took off
his pants and drawers down to his knees, exposing his penis; that he went
on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made push and pull
movements; that she felt a sharp pain inside her vagina; that he stopped his
movements when she protested due to her pain becoming unbearable,
because he did not want the other children to be roused from sleep; that he
returned to his own place, but she got up to relieve herself; that she felt
searing pain in her vagina as she was relieving herself; and that she did not
tell her mother upon the latter’s return from Surigao about what Teodoro had
done to her.
Anent the rape committed on February 8, 1998 (Criminal Case No. 98-03),
BBB was again away from the house, having gone to Manila. Teodoro
committed the rape in a fashion similar to that in the first rape. However,
AAA could no longer bear her ordeal, and told of the rapes to CCC, the older
brother of BBB: Tay, guihilabtan ko ni Tomas Teodoro (Tay, I was touched by
Tomas Teodoro).6 CCC immediately reported the crimes to the Kitcharao
Police Station. The police quickly arrested Teodoro. Upon BBB’s return in the
afternoon, CCC informed her about what Teodoro had done to her daughter.
BBB and CCC took AAA to the Kitcharao District Hospital for physical and
medical examination.
Dr. Mary Ann D. Abrenillo of the Kitcharao District Hospital examined AAA,
and issued a medical certificate on her findings, as follows:
1. Intact Hymen that admits Right Small Finger of examiner and with
slight peripheral erythema.
2. Labia Majora and Minora slightly Gaped Exposing Hymenal
Opening, with tenderness.7
Based on the medical certificate, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Agusan del Norte charged Teodoro with two counts of statutory rape through
the aforequoted informations.8
At his arraignment on August 17, 1998, Teodoro pleaded not guilty to the
informations. Although he subsequently manifested a willingness to change
the pleas to guilty, he balked when he was re-arraigned on December 23,
1998 by qualifying that he had only "fingered" AAA. Accordingly, the RTC
reinstated his pleas of not guilty.
During the trial, AAA9 and BBB10 testified for the Prosecution, but two years
later recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the
82
RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAA’s vagina on the nights of December
18, 1997 and February 8, 1998.11
On his part, Teodoro claimed12 that he had only caressed or touched AAA’s
body on the night of February 8, 1998; that before going home from work on
that day, he had joined his friends in drinking Kulafu; that he had arrived
home late that night, and had gone to bed after serving the children food to
eat; that he had later awakened to find somebody sleeping beside him; that
he had embraced and caressed the different parts of the body of that person,
whom he thought was BBB whom he had earlier sent off to Surigao on an
errand; that he had realized that he was caressing AAA only after she
shouted: Cle, Cle, ayaw! (Uncle, stop that!); that he had then gotten up to go
to a different part of the room;13 and that he did not rape AAA on the night of
December 18, 1997,14 although he admitted being at home then.15
Ruling of the RTC
After the trial, on December 10, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment
convicting Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape notwithstanding the
recantations by AAA and BBB. The RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
TOMAS TEODORO Y ANGELES in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-02 and 98-03
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape committed against
AAA, an eight (8)-year old minor. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in each of the cases, with the
accessories provided for by law, to pay the offended party the sum of
₱100,000.00, ₱50,000.00 for each case, and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is credited with the full time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment conformably to Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
The RTC rejected AAA’s recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent
with the testimony of Dr. Abrenillo showing that the redness on the edges of
the protective structure of her vaginal opening had been caused by friction
from the forceful introduction of an erect penis; and that such forceful
introduction of an erect penis had led to the gaping of the labia
minora and labia majora of AAA.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, Teodoro focused on the RTC’s rejection of AAA’s recantation. He
argued in his appellant’s brief17 that no rape was committed considering that
the Cebuano-Visayan word guihilabtan used by AAA in describing what he
did to her signified only touching, as contrasted with lugos, the proper c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
Cebuano-Visayan term for rape that AAA did not use. and

Unimpressed, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAA’s recantation for d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
being dictated by her family’s financial difficulties. It agreed with the demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
observation of the Office of the Solicitor General to the effect that AAA’s be present.
recantation should not be considered because it came about after she had
returned home from the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
Development (DSWD). In contrast, it found AAA’s court testimony given on article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
November 17, 1998 consistent with the physical findings of Dr. Abrenillo.
xxxx
The CA decreed:
The crimes charged were two counts of statutory rape. The elements of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED for statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is
evident lack of merit and the assailed Judgment is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION granting in each case moral Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on
₱25,000.00. the female, nor the female’s deprivation of reason or being otherwise
unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations
SO ORDERED.18 or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape.20 Full
penile penetration of the female’s genitalia is not likewise required, because
Issues carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman.21
1. Were the rapes charged against Teodoro established beyond
reasonable doubt? Describing the rape committed against her on December 18, 1997, AAA
declared thus:
2. Should the recantation by AAA be accepted?
Q: How about your uncle, Tomas Teodoro, do you know what did he do after
you have already eaten and drank water?
Ruling of the Court
A: Yes. My uncle commanded us and he told my elder brother, EEE, to go to
The appeal lacks merit. sleep and on that night, I was surprised because he put off the light.

Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Q: Now, AAA, could you describe how your uncle look like when he arrived in
Republic Act No. 8353,19 define and punish rape as follows: your house?

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed – A: Yes, Ma’am.

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the Q: How did he look like? Did he look normal?
circumstances:
A: Yes, Ma’am, but he was drunk.
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxxx
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
Q: What do you mean by he drinks something?

83
A: It was Kulafu, Ma’am, because it smelt bad.
xxxx
Q: x x x. After your uncle put off the light, did you immediately fall asleep?
A: Not yet. I first looked at the light because I was surprised why it was put
off and I noticed that it was my uncle who put off the light.
xxxx
Q: Now, AAA, before this incident happened on December 18, 1997, do you
have a good relationship with your step-father?
A: Yes, ma’am we have a good relationship.22(Emphasis supplied)
Concerning the rape committed on February 8, 1998, AAA’s testimony ran as
follows:
Q: Now, what happened to you while you were sleeping or about to sleep on
February 8, 1998 at your house?

Q: So you are telling the Court that you were the last one to sleep that night A: He touched "hilabtan" me, Sir.
including your uncle, of course, among you and your siblings? You were the
last one who went to sleep that night Q: When you said "he touched you", you are referring to your stepfather,
the accused in these cases?
A: Yes ma’am
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, when you already fell asleep, was it then the time you were
awakened again because your uncle came near you? Q: Now, would you kindly tell this Honorable Court how did the accused
Tomas Teodoro touch you?
A: Yes ma’am
A: He laid on top of me, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Before he laid on top of you, what did he do to you?
Q: How did he force you to undress?
A: He undressed me.
A: He was the one who undressed me ma’am.
Q: What kind of clothes did you wear?
Q: After he undressed you, your uncle also undressed his trousers and
drawers, correct? A: I was wearing a whole dress, Sir.

A: He just lowered his pants up to his knee Q: When you said "whole dress," it is the same kind of clothes you are
wearing now?
Q: After lowering his pants up to his knee, he laid on top of you correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: He laid on top of me
Q: Before he laid on top of you, you said that he undressed you. Now,
Q; After that, x x x what was the next thing that he did? was he able to undress you?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina. A: I undressed myself.

xxxx Q: You undressed yourself because your father told you?

A: Yes, sir.

84
Q: Now, were you wearing a panty at that time?
A: Yes, Sir, I was wearing a panty.
Q: Now, what happened to your panty before your step-father laid on top
of you?
A: He lowered my panty up to my thigh.
Q: When your father lowered your panty up to your thigh and you were
completely naked, were you lying down on the floor of the room where
you were sleeping?
A: Yes, Sir, I was lying down.
Q: How about your step-father before he laid on top of you, what kind of
clothes did he wear?
A: He was wearing a jacket and a t-shirt, Sir.
Q: Did he remove his jacket and t-shirt?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How about his pants, did he remove his pants before he laid on top of
you?
A: When he laid on top of me, he just lowered his pants up to his knee.
Q: Did he also lower his drawers?
A: He also lowered his drawers up to his knee, Sir.
Q: Now, when he laid on top of you, what else did he do to you aside
from lying on top of you?
A: He touched me, Sir; he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: After he inserted his penis into your vagina, what else did he do?
A: He made some push and pull movement, Sir.
Q: When he made that push and pull movement, what did you feel?
85
A: I felt pain, Sir.
Q: Where did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina, Sir.
Q: Now, while your father made that push and pull movement, what did
you do or say?
A: I begged him to stop because it was really painful and after that I
urinated and it was really very painful.
Q: Where did you feel that pain while you were urinating?
A: In my vagina, Sir.23 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court declares that the findings of the RTC and the CA on the
commission of the two counts of statutory rape by Teodoro were well-
founded. AAA’s recollections given in court when she was only eight years old
disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration of her ordeals at his hands.
She thereby revealed details that no child of her very tender age could have
invented or concocted. The only rational and natural conclusion to be made
by any objective arbiter is to accord the fullest credence to her.
Yet, Teodoro would have us undo his convictions for statutory rape, arguing
that AAA’s description of his acts in Cebuano-Visayan, the dialect spoken by
AAA, was guihilabtan, not lugos, the former being the dialect term
for touching and the latter for rape.
Teodoro’s argument is directly belied by the established facts. AAA remained
categorical and steadfast about what Teodoro had done to her all throughout
her testimony in court, even during her delivery of the supposed recantation.
She narrated how he had committed the rape in the evening of December 18,
1997 by undressing her and himself, going on top of her, inserting his male
organ into her vagina, and making push and pull motions, causing her to
suffer severe pain in her vagina, to wit:
Q: Now, do you remember what happened to you while you were inside that
room about to sleep on that evening of December 18, 1997?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, what happened to you?
A: At that time, he laid beside me and he told me to take off my clothes. After
that, he also took off his clothes then he laid on top of me.24
xxxx
Q: When your father laid on top of you, what did he do aside from lying on
top of you?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina and he made some push and pull
movement.
Q: You said that your father inserted his penis into your vagina and
made a push and pull movement. Now, when this was happening, what
did you feel?
A: I asked him to stop because I felt pain, but he told me to keep quite
because others might hear us.
Q: When you told your father or begged your father to stop because you
were feeling pain, which part of your body did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina, Sir.
Q: When you begged your father to stop because there was pain on your
vagina, did your father heed your request to stop?
A: He stopped, Sir.
Q: You mean your father stopped his push and pull movement?
A: Yes, because after that, I told him.
Q: Now, after your father stopped his push and pull movement, what did
your father do next?
A: He stopped and after that I urinated and I felt pain.
Q: Now, where did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina.
Q: When you urinated, did your father go to sleep?
A: He did not go to sleep right away but he just lay down on bed.
Q: You mean to tell this Court that he returned to his place where he was
lying down before he raped you?
86
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, before you urinated, did your father tell you about what to do?
A: He told me never to tell the incident that happened because the moment I
will tell the truth, he will reprimand me.25 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Moreover, to believe Teodoro’s argument is to belie that AAA exhibited at the
time of her physical examination by Dr. Abrenillo a peripheral erythema, or
redness, in her hymen, as well as tenderness and gaping in her labia
majora and labia minora. Dr. Abrenillo explained the significance of her
physical findings, to wit:
Q. So, you are telling this Honorable Court that when an erect male penis
may contact in this particular area, that might have caused the discoloration
of the reddish in color of that particular area, is that correct?
A. Yes, because the force of the friction might be that adequate to cause the
reddish or inflammation that resulted in the discoloration of the normal
tissue or structure.
xxxx
Q. Now, in your second findings, you said that there is a slightly Gaped
Exposing Hymenal Opening of the Labia Majora and Minora, in your expert
opinion as medico legal expert, what might have caused this Gape Opening?
A. Again related to number 1, a friction also mean something can cause the
gaping or exposure of the opening and it can be substantiated also that there
was pain that was experienced by the patient.
Q. Now, you are telling this Honorable Court that when you touched this
particular area, the patient experienced pain?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. As a medico legal expert, could this particular injury be caused by a
contact of an erect male organ?
A. Well, it is sustain and with a force.
Q. In this particular case because there is a gape opening of the lips which
you said this medico legal term, Labia Majora and Minora, could this opening
be caused by a contact of an erect male organ?
A. Yes, Sir, because normally, gape should not be exposing the Hymenal
Opening and the smaller lip should be covered by the bigger one.26
In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in
consummated statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the
female. The Court has clarified in People v. Campuhan27 that the mere
touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary
to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused
capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of
the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once
the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual
act touches either labia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained
in People v. Bali-Balita,28 the touching that constitutes rape does not mean
mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or
a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons
pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the
female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape
proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated
beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to
touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface of the female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of
touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established.
argument on the distinction between the dialect
terms guihilabtan and lugos reflected nothing better than his self-serving
opinion on their meanings. Such opinion, already by its nature
argumentative, should not prevail over the physical evidence. Worse, it was
not even relevant, for what he ought to have done, instead, was to flesh out
his opinion through a credible demonstration during the trial that by her
usage of the dialect term guihilabtan she really meant mere touching of her
genitalia that did not amount to his having carnal knowledge of her.
Teodoro’s further submission that AAA recanted the accusations against him
is bereft of substance.
The relevant portions of AAA’s recantation on November 20, 2000 went as
follows:
Q: Now, it appears that during the time that you were made to testify, you
testified before this honorable court that your stepfather had carnal
knowledge with you, the question is – why did you make that testimony
before?
A: Because I saw him doing that to me, Sir.
Q: Which one?

Here, the proof of the penis of Teodoro touching the labias of AAA was A: Because he undressed me and he touched my private parts. He
sufficient and convincing. Dr. Abrenillo found the peripheral erythema in the touched my vagina and I told him to stop because I felt the need to
hymen of AAA and the fact that her labia majora and labia minora were urinate. When I urinated, it was very painful since the act has just been
tender and gaping, exposing the hymenal opening. In other words, the done.
touching by Teodoro’s penis had gone beyond the mons pubis and had
reached the labias of the victim. Such physical findings, coupled with the
narrative of AAA that, one, Teodoro went on top of her body; two, he inserted xxxx
his penis into her vagina; three, he made push and pull motions thereafter;
and, four, she felt great pain inside her during his push and pull movements, Q: AAA, why are you crying?
rendered the findings of rape against him unassailable as to the rape
committed on February 8, 1998. With respect to the rape committed on A: Because of my problem, sir.
December 18, 1997, we concur with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that AAA’s
testimonial account thereon likewise sufficiently and convincingly established
the commission of rape. She suffered severe pain inside her genitalia while Q: What is your problem, AAA?
his penis was penetrating her, which could only be understood in the light of
the foregoing explanation made herein about his penis attaining some degree A: When my step-father touched me.
of penetration beneath the surface of her genitalia.
Q. AAA, you pity your step-father or your uncle because he has been in
Apart from being incompatible with the established facts, Teodoro’s argument jail for a long time and nobody can help your mother now?
remained a matter of pure semantics. For sure, rape as defined and used by
the Revised Penal Code is a legal term whose exact nuances and juridical A. Yes, Sir.
consequences no victim of AAA’s tender age and naivete could already fully
know or realize. As such, her usage of the term guihilabtan to describe in the
dialect what he had done to her should not be confined to what he would Q. You want your step-father to come home, is that correct, to help you
and your mother?
have us accept as the entire characterization of his deeds. Indeed, his
87
A. Yes, Sir. Court:

xxxx But despite the fact that your common law husband according to you he is a
troublesome person everytime he gets drank, this case will be dismissed. You
COURT want to maintain your relationship again?

Q: Why are you crying? A: Not anymore, Your Honor.

A: Because it is against my will, your honor. Q. Why?

Q: Which one is against your will? A. I want him to get out from Jail so that I could have somebody to help
me and to assist me in rearing my children specially so, Your Honor, my
children are now growing up.
A: When my uncle touched me your honor. That is why I cried.
Q. Okay, now if you want him to rear or help in rearing your children,
Q: You are no longer with the DSWD in Butuan city? naturally he used to go home to your house and sleep together with you,
do you want him to sleep in another house?
A: Not any more Your Honor.
A. He promised to me, Your Honor, that he will live in the residence of
xxxx his employer.30 (Emphasis supplied)

Q: You informed the Court before when you testified for the prosecution
that your uncle removed your panty, touched your vagina and inserted
his penis into your vagina is it not?
A: That is not true, Your Honor.
Q: What do you mean that is not true? What is your understanding
about that?
A: He was only touching me, Your Honor.
Q: Okay he touched your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: He did not insert his fingers into your vagina?
A: He did not, Your Honor.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Even during her intended recantation, AAA cried most of the time. Such
demeanor reflected how much she despised what he had done to her twice.
As such, her supposed recantation did not conceal the impelling motive for it
being that her mother and her family still needed the material support of
Teodoro. This was confirmed even by BBB, whose own testimony on AAA’s
supposed recantation was as follows:
88
BBB was then rearing four young children by Teodoro (the youngest being
born when he was already detained),31 as well as AAA and her five siblings
that BBB had from an earlier relationship.32She unabashedly needed the
material support of Teodoro; hence, she prevailed on AAA to withdraw her
charges against him. But a recantation under such insincere circumstances
was unacceptable.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation
of her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly
unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility that such
recantation may later be repudiated.33 Indeed, to disregard testimony
solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it ignores the
possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the
recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation
is required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the
recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a
mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous
witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too
willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient
opportunity given to the party adversely affected to crossexamine the
recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it.34 The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to
the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the
demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason
being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe
the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses.35
Finally, we rectify the amounts of the civil liability of Teodoro.1âwphi1 The
RTC had granted to AAA only the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each case, or a
total of ₱100,000.00 for both cases, without stating the character of the
award, but the CA modified the award by granting in each case moral
damages of ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00.
Both lower courts thereby erred. There is no longer any debate that the
victim in statutory rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00, moral
damages of ₱50,000.00, and exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00. The award of
civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape.36 Similarly, the award of moral damages of ₱50,000.00 is mandatory,
and made without need of allegation and proof other than that of the fact of
rape,37 for it is logically assumed that the victim suffered moral injuries from
her ordeal. In addition, exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 are justified under
Article 2229 of the Civil Code38 to set an example for the public good and to
serve as deterrent to those who abuse the young.39
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on April 24, 2006, with
the MODIFICATION that TOMAS TEODORO y ANGELES is ordered to pay
to AAA for each count of rape the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
The accused is further liable for the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 178321
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus - Promulgated:
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN, October 5, 2011
Accused-Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for
murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000.
89
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The
Information,[2] which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000,
alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a lead pipe and with
intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
attack, assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which
directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of
AAA.[3] The second Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and hitting
with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring
serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and
while in such defenseless situation, did then and there have
carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases
were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape
victim who was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was
corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her
neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she
and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice
paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National
Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was
holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them
to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant
struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall
down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit
her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed
Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with
thick grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in
such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed
her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her,
sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA,
appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining
hard. She crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8,
2000.[7] When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and
a certain Nano then brought her to CarpaHospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where
she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had
died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away
when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her
uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he
was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman
waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about 200 metersaway
from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind her. However,
when she was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman as
AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her
face was swollen, with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He
asked AAA what happened to her, and AAA uttered, Si Tata Coni referring to
appellant who is his son-in-law.[10] With the help of his neighbor, he brought
AAA home.[11] AAA was later brought to Carpa Hospitalin Baliuag, Bulacan
where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6,
2000, she visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts
of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She
sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista
where they found Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already
bloated.[12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of
the Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on the remains of
Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
90
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs
and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are
swollen; desquamation and bursting of bullae and
denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the
upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from
the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds,
three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the
submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the
chest of the victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result
of stab wounds [in] the head and trunk.[13]
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of
Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for
Jennifers funeral and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against
him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time
the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver
and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his
wife had reported him to the police after he went wild that same night and
struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their
house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape.[15]
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to
his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money.He claimed that in
the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they
left the following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his
house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because
that was the time when he went wild after seeing his wife with another
man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away
from the scene of the crime.[16]
The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that
he went to appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the
afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and
Jennifer before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA and his
uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived
before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning,
at around six oclock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant
meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have
his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San
Rafael, Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision[18] on June 30, 2003 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court
finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court
hereby finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably
with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[20] the case was referred to the
CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the
trial courts judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, inCriminal Case
Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.] 2162-M-2000,
Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual
damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial
Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced
to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]
91
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his
conviction for both crimes of rape and murder. In a
Resolution[22] dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties to submit their
respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties
submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting
the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the CA.Appellant had raised
the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the
rape of AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the prosecutions main witness, and
points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends
that the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the
execution of the crimes charged. According to him, AAAs narration that he
waylaid them while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for
work negates evident premeditation since there was no evidence that the said
path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He
argues that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of
Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim should
have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity
to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially
weak and unable to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt
upon AAAs testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on how, after she
was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put on her clothes
and crawl to her grandfathers farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness
AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a
question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its
unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts[24] and absent any substantial
reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and xxxx
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings,
particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have Q: Where were you when you were hit?
been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
the outcome of the case.[25]This rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court concurred with the trial court.[26] Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the
lead pipe by Conrado Laog?
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
weight to the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and
was herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial courts A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer to
the trial courts firsthand observations on AAAs deportment while testifying Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit: A: Yes, sir.

From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer
has come to discern in her the trepidations of a woman crying?
outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone A: He was beside me, sir.
through. She took her oath with trembling hands, her voice
low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were Court:
constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her
with the man she was about to testify against. After a few crying?
questions in direct, the emotion building up inside her came A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
to the fore and she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to
continue any further with her testimony.Thus, in deference Fiscal:
to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her direct- Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
examination. When she came back, however, to continue A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
with her aborted questioning, this time, composed and
collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all Q: Then, what happened next?
vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished.[27] A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.

Q: And what happened to Jennifer?

Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous A: She fell down, sir.
when she took the witness stand for the first time that the trial court had to
cut short her initial direct examination. However, during the next hearing she Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit
and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened
her. We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony: next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you
said that youre not able to reach your place of work Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not A: He came back to me, sir.
reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir. Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if
any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
92
 have held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and
Q: And what happened to you? consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir. eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant
whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing
Q: Then, what happened to you? evidence.[29] AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the one
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping
removed my panty and my blouse and my bra. AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were
relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and
Q: After that, what did he do next? proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir. identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA,
upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own
Q: Then, what happened? uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of
A: He sucked my breast, sir. victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the
crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being
Q: And after that? committed.[30] There is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir. of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the
commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina? worthy of full faith and credence.[31]
A: Yes, sir.

Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that --
penis into your vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir. It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial,
without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
Q: After that, what happened? overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity
A: After that, he stood up, sir. and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.
The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is
Q: And where did he go? the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir. difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
Q: And after that, what did you do? undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
A: I fell unconscious, sir. unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the
accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has
able to point to him? been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it
must also be shown that it would have been impossible for
him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.

Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the
and when asked his name, answered: Conrado Laog. evening of June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant
admitted that his house was more or less only 100 meters from the crime
x x x x[28] scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added
reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of
his children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot
denial and alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses
prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively
cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a
identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we
rape victim.[33]
93
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that
while she testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she was
raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to
her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends
that the prosecution should have presented the physician who examined AAA
to prove her allegations that she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely --
her blouse and bra were merely lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments
were just pulled down, which therefore explains why she still had her clothes
on when she crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this matter
raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details
and collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect
the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses declarations,
as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the
whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to
serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence
of the appellant for the crime charged.[35] It cannot be overemphasized that
the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor
inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital
did not testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict.[37] Thus we have ruled that a medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction
in rape.What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about
the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,[38] as what we find in this
case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was
the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not
have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in
a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including
one not raised by the parties.[39]The facts alleged and proven clearly show
that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special
complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.[40]
94
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex
crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of
the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with
rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,
and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime,
the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed;[] and that this provision gives rise to a special
complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges
that the victim Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in
connection with her detention and was killed subsequent
thereto and on the occasion thereof. Considering that the
prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. x x x[42](Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition
and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his
Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,[43]explained that composite
crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex
crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a
single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound
crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit
another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes
and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single
penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of
two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single
penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by
reason or on the occasion of the rape.
 ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape
of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable
for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that
appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help
once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may
not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire
having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as
he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily noticed or
seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had
inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA
survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with
homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in
this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy
may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the
component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De
Leon,[45] we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
95
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of
the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is
no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements
of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene
by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons
are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial
is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers;
the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide.
All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,
includes murder,parricide, and infanticide.[46] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to
be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.[47] Hence, even if
any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established
by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the
crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of
robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled
in People v. Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred
in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we
find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized
treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in
defending himself when his arms were held by two of the
attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded
them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be
 regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery
with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition
and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no
special complex crime of robbery with murder under the
Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the
circumstances proven concerning the actual commission
of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the
homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating
circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be
imposed.[49] (Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered
whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime.[50] It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the
head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was
dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer
with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to
render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly,
unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man
with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act
afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not
given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not
mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of
superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the
momentary position of both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a
lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the
superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him
over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden
attack caught the victim off-guard rendering her
defenseless.[52]
96
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic
aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A.
No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
the Philippines the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[53]
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
use of deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this
case is concerned. While the trial court and CA were correct in holding that
both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled
to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs further
clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages
as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer,
her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With
respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article
266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this
circumstance would justify the award of exemplary damages to the offended
party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is minority
of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
 the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of
the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged
in the information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to
ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship
to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the
determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where
the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v.
Catubig,[55] this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary
damages in criminal cases when an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if
the same was not alleged in the information. This is in
accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with
the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer
consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and
proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award
of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has
been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award
exemplary damages. Pertinent are the following sections of
Rule 110:
97
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the
principle that courts may still award exemplary damages
based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the
aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long
as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before
the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained
pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect
the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal
cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one
awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not
been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the
light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages
only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged
and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the
first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v.
Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the
Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the
Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People
v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,
and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the
difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal
case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the
Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the
legal basis for the grant of exemplary damagestaking into
account simply the attendance of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost
sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not
always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award
is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of
indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result
 of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or
gross fraudthat intensifies the injury. The terms punitive
or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person
to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case,
these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in
the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages,
therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same
way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision,
lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v.
Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter
other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also,
in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages
on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v.
Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito
Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco,
Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public
example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual
abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court
used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to
justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow
Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion
in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi
juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary
damagesto set a public example or correction for the public
good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful
design against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle
would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary
98
damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several
times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell
down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her
undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position,
covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field --
was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even
more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab
wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil
Codeallows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that
would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.[58] In line with
current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of
Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral
damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is
mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.[59]Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased
to P75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred
for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the
amount of P25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated
by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime
of rape, as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while
moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof,
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSEDfor lack of
merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant
Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000
as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as
exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.