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Some Aspects of Lysias' Argumentation

Author(s): J. J. Bateman
Source: Phoenix, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 1962), pp. 157-177
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1086812
Accessed: 26-02-2018 14:44 UTC

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SOME ASPECTS OF LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION

J. J. BATEMAN

ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING FEATURES of fifth-century


lectual history is the manifold way in which thinkers made th
serve as an instrument to analyse all kinds of human and natu
supernatural phenomena. A people's language mirrors their th
attitudes about the world they live in, and perhaps even s
experiences to some extent. But few peoples have ever shown s
of their language as the Greeks of the classical era. As the phi
the sixth and early fifth centuries used language to express th
the universe, so there were men who soon turned their atten
discovery of ways of using language with equal control in th
sphere, the courts and assemblies. They formulated rules for
and presentation of juridical and political matters, embodied t
in speeches and offered to teach others to do the same. The w
pioneers, the Sicilians Corax and Tisias, soon disappeared, but
was followed, almost from the very start, by most of those m
lump together under the label of sophist. The writings of th
have almost completely vanished, but from what survives, fro
are told of them, and from what traces they have left in the e
of others we can infer much about their interests and endea
It was the treatment given by Corax and Tisias to the task
arguments which seems to have been the most striking chara
their work. In particular, the peculiar twist they gave to the
from probability as a means of discovering motive and fixing resp
for a deed seemed to be their special contribution to rhetoric
Sicilians' successors interested themselves in many of the
oratory, their work on argumentation is what we find ment
Protagoras and Gorgias are credited with the elaboration of ar
stock topics which could be employed in various situations. P
also wrote a book entitled Antilogies the influence of which seems
in Thucydides. Of course, like the Dissoi Logoi, the Antilogies
have been focused directly on the special problems of the orat
title reveals Protagoras' interest in argumentation in itse
speeches, Helen and Palamedes, illustrate a similar interest in a
Although Gorgias is usually thought of as a stylist and his majo
limited to artistic style, both speeches show that the author
concerned with shaping his arguments as with expressing the
the Palamedes is a veritable survey of the various arguments
court. Moreover, the author of the Tetralogies which have com
157

PHOENIX, Vol. 16 (1962) 3.

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158 PHOENIX

us under Antiphon's name is likewise primarily concerned with d


the arguments appropriate to the situation of his speakers. And in
we hear of different sophists and rhetoricians being associated with c
kinds of argument.1
In view of the obvious interest of the Greeks themselves in arg
tion I find it surprising that, compared to the amount of study w
been spent on the style and composition or socio-historical cont
Attic oratory, relatively little attention has been given to the o
invention and argumentation.2 Even rarer are studies of particula
ments and their historical development such as Gebauer's descri
the argument from contraries, or Wilcox's treatment of the de
hypothetical syllogism. Solmsen's important study of Antiphon s
have had no followers, nor Karl Sch6n's fine dissertation on
"Scheinargumente."3 These studies, as well as a number of inves
of the sophists, historians, and dramatists of the years from 45
B.C., reveal the keen interest of all writers in the power of langua
use Isocrates' term, the logos, to analyse and depict human actio
motives. Everyone who wished to speak in public and, in particu
men who like Antiphon, Lysias, and Isocrates were making a pro
out of preparing speeches for others had to learn to use the log
could inform or deceive effectively, could make the audience ag
themselves and disagree with their opponents. It is necessary
investigate the Attic orators, just as the rhetoricians and sophis
been investigated, both for our understanding of Greek achieve
in argumentation and logic and for a proper appreciation of the s
themselves.
Aristotle in his Rhetoric distinguished two kinds of oratorical ar
artistic proofs and non-artistic proofs. The latter comprises arg
bearing on witnesses, oaths, documents, testimony of slaves, and s
prescriptions. The former involves, in essence, all other argumen
relevance to the situation is established or invented by the speake
'Cf. Ferdinand Schupp, "Zur Geschichte der Beweistopik in den alteren gri
Gerichtsreden," Wiener Studien 45 (1926-27) 17-23 and 173-185. The influence
ideas on Thucydides has been delineated by Jacqueline de Romilly, Histoire e
chez Thucydide (Paris 1956) 180-239. The earliest survey of arguments is
Aristotle's Rhetoric 2.23 and 24.
'To the many works mentioned by Wilhelm Kroll in his article Rhetor
Supplbd. 7 (1940) 1040-1048, add G. P. Palmer, The TOIIOI of Aristotle's Rh
Exemplified in the Orators (Chicago 1934) and Clark Kuebler, The Argum
Probability in Early Attic Oratory (Chicago 1944).
3Gustav Gebauer, De Hypotacticis et Paratacticis Argumenti ex contrario Fo
reperiuntur apud Oratores Atticos (Zwickau 1877); Stanley Wilcox, The Destructiv
thetical Syllogism in Greek Logic and Attic Oratory (New Haven 1938); Friedrich
"Antiphonstudien," Neue Philologische Untersuchungen 8 (Berlin 1931); Ka
Die Scheinargumente bei Lysias (Paderborn 1918).

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 159

the modern point of view only the non-artistic proofs, the direct e
provide the true centre of discussion and dispute, but the Gree
source of the art in the artist, and hence the products of his ow
tion are the true material of his art. I say Greek here because
Quintilian (5.1.1) writes as if he believed that Aristotle origina
distinction, it actually corresponds to practice and theory befor
who is simply formulating with precision a common concepti
able, in fact, to point to the very time when this view of rheto
orator's task began to prevail. Antiphon's argumentation, a
has shown, is still centred on the non-artistic proofs. The same
the non-professional Andocides, who is here the exception wh
the rule. The situation is essentially different in Lysias and in t
speeches of Isocrates. In their speeches we find that oaths and
and the other kinds of evidence in the case are only subsidiary i
in complex arguments invented by the orator. These invented a
tend to have two new focal points which have replaced the olde
on the evidence. These points are what later rhetoricians call th
-the speaker, his opponent, or the audience-and the "deed"-the
alleged or proposed actions which are the subject of dispute.4 Hence
between Antiphon's death in 411 and Lysias' first speech in 403 against
Eratosthenes (Or. 12) and Isocrates' speech against Callimachus (Or. 18)
in 402 there has been a decided shift in the manner of arguing cases in
court. Our view of this change must of course be circumspect because it
is so obviously limited by the meagreness of our evidence. And doubtless
the change was taking place over a longer period than the eight years I
have marked out here. But it is there and we must take account of it.
What caused this shift of focus in finding and presenting arguments?
Apart from the general delight in argument for its own sake which I have
noted above and which may have found its way willy-nilly into oratory,
I suggest that the decisive answer lies in the fact that it first appears in
the work of the logographers. Their task was somewhat different from
that of the ordinary speaker. They did not need to be directly involved in
the case and for the most part probably were not. Secondly, in their busi-
ness they would be compelled to deal with many more and more varied
situations in law and politics than the ordinary citizen and perhaps even
the politician might meet. But they were being paid to win, and so they
had to find ways of virtually guaranteeing success. (An easy solution to
this difficulty is to specialize, as Isaeus seems to have done.) I believe that
constructing speeches on the model of Antiphon, that is on the basis of
the kinds of evidence, presented too many problems, whereas the "person-
deed" pattern offered a relatively easy scheme for gathering and arranging
'For the distinction between person and deed see the Rhetoric to Alexander 7. 1428A,
16 ff.; Schupp op.cit. (see n. 1) 23-26, and Solmsen op.cit.passim.

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160 PHOENIX

material. Lysias made the further innovation of tailoring the sp


the personality of his client, or rather of giving his client the requis
sonality which his arguments seemed to demand. Most modern st
Lysias' speechwriting practices have tended to concentrate
ethopoeia. But the adaptation of speech to speaker was not felt
other logographers to be their main concern, nor, I think, was it
by Lysias himself. While character portrayal and other scarcely
charms have their role in his speeches, the narration and the argu
clearly the chief elements. In this paper I wish to consider certai
of Lysias' argumentation, and through it to try to uncover som
modes of his thought. His narrations deserve special treatment, f
was one of the greatest in a land of great storytellers.
Even a rapid reading of a few speeches such as those agains
(Or. 3), Agoratus (13), Evander (26), or those in defence of Erato
(1), the cripple (24), or the property-owner accused of destroyin
stump of a sacred olive tree (7), leaves the impression of a great v
individual arguments swiftly arrayed and stated as though the
were seeking to overwhelm his opponent and audience with a to
proofs. One perceives a many-sided invention and an artistry wh
merits the praise heaped on it by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.5 It
careful reading and close scrutiny to notice, first, the flaws and
actual ways in which the arguments are constructed and contribu
overall effect of the proof. The flaws were pointed out by Plato
sharpness and a touch of malice.6 An especial sin is Lysias' fa
develop his arguments in a logically cogent way. There is, says P
ananke in them, no logical reason for the particular arrange
sequence in which they occur.7 Plato's criticism is certainly true.
there are exceptions,8 Lysias' arguments usually cluster together l
piles of stones, and unity is simply the extrinsic one of association, li
of the buildings on the Acropolis.9 The answer to this criticism, if
to make one, is not that Lysias arranged his material badly, as i
because he was ignorant of or uninterested in dialectic-to th
probably an injustice to him'0-but that the unit of composition
'De Lys. 15, vol. 1, p. 25 U-R.
'Phaedrus 262-264.
7Cf. Friedrich Solmsen, "Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und R
Neue Philologische Untersuchungen 4 (Berlin 1929) 273-276, and Karl Sch5
(see n. 3) 113-115.
8For example 24. 19-20, 25. 7-14, 26. 16-20, 34. 3-5.
9This is a small thing perhaps, but one which suggests that Lysias belongs
ways more to the fifth century than the fourth. One can apply here the remar
E. Perry, "The Early Greek Capacity for Viewing Things Separately," TAPA
403-410 and 425.
10As does Friedrich Blass, following Plato, Die Attische Beredsamkeit' (Leipzig 1887)
384-386 and 402-403.

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 161

individual argument itself or the group of two or three argume


gathers his arguments into paragraphs which in most instanc
single aim, but unlike Isocrates he does not make this aim the c
factor in the construction of the paragraph. The common a
accounts for the location of the argument in this particular c
rather than that. It is the individual argument on which Lysi
his effort and relies for his effect. We are justified then in con
our own attention on these individual arguments and, though ta
out of their context, in deducing from them some judgm
Lysias' craft.
I wish to centre attention especially on two kinds of argume
derives its formal expression and much of its persuasive force
thesis; the other is related to antithesis but is expressed in the
hypothesis. A simple count of all the individual arguments in t
speeches will reveal that arguments falling within these tw
expression are by far the most frequent. This result is perhaps
surprising. Certainly the most popular argument used by
orators, and one deeply rooted in fifth-century philosophical ar
tion as well, is that from contradictions. As it appears in extant
argument comprises any context in which two supposedly con
propositions are juxtaposed and their contradiction manifes
many stylistic forms but the one especially favoured by the o
by Lysias in particular, who has over forty instances of it, is de
Gebauer thus: Per contrarium duae sententiae hunc in modum
comparabantur, ut aut absurdum aut turpe esse (fuisse) significet
quadam rerum condicione velfacere aliquid non facereve vel dicer
vel opinari non opinarive.1 Lysias employs this argument almo
in the same form though with varying degrees of complexity
through difference in the number of items contrasted. While the a
itself is brief and quickly stated, it usually is part of a larger co
statements and arguments bearing upon a single issue. The
e contrario has, as we shall see, some different and fairly well d
within this construction.
The speech against Nicomachus ends with a series of arguments directed
to the jurors with the intention of arousing distrust and anger at the
defendant's supporters (30.31-35). Material which would form one of the
central issues in a speech by Antiphon is thus relegated by Lysias to the

"Op. cit. (see n. 3) xxvi. For its treatment by rhetoricians see Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 23,
1400A, 15 ff. (also 1397A, 7 ff. and 1399B, 13 ff.), Rhet. to Alex. 10. 1430A, 14 ff., and
Cicero, Topics 17, 21, 47-49, 53-57, 88 which has the most detailed and interesting
information on the argument; cf. Cic. De Inv. 42 and Quintilian 5. 10. 2 and 14. 2-4,
8. 5. 9-10. Quintilian 9. 3. 99 remarks on the confusion of arguments and figures, and
in 9. 2. 106 we see the e contrario treated as a figure; cf. also Ad Herennium 4. 28
and 58 f.

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162 PHOENIX

periphery of his proof, and in fact is not really part of the proo
Lysias opens with a direct attack on the character of these men an
that some of them are actually criminals. Then he reinforces t
picions he has planted by four successive arguments. The first
has the form which Gebauer describes (32):

bewovv 6e AOI oKtoL et'va, ci Av5pes bLKaoraL, el TroVTOV IV l v6s 6vros


Vir6 Trjs T76X\cos ti5gKlCLvov OViK iTreXetprlaav EltaOat cUs XP') Vravaaa
keaATapravovTa, i,as bo TOTOVbTOVS 6vras Kati 7LK7riEvoVs 7rbo TrOVTO
trqTiacrova&v bs o XP'7 6&K7rv rap' abrov Xa,/3a4eYv.

The behaviour of these men is terrible because it conflicts with


values; it is inconsistent because the demands here anticipated c
with their action in the past. That the argument is logically we
without saying. The weakness is glossed over through the sharp
thetical formulation of the actual situation as Lysias wishes his
to understand it. The defendant is isolated from the audience b
set in contrast with the jurors who are here identified with the state
The particular antitheses employed in the argument are Lysian
and so at hand for use in almost any kind of argument. The redu
the total situation to a set of antitheses enables Lysias to express
ment in a pointed, easily comprehended way. A statement of th
theses in serial form will make this clear. First the main contras

A. They did not try to ask him


(a) to stop his wrongdoing against you.
B. They are now seeking to persuade you
(b) not to punish him.
The antithesis is constructed from the simple exploitation
synonyms, two antonyms and the negative. The auxiliary contr
C. (a) he being one; (b) you being many.
D. (a) he not having been wronged by the city; (b) you hav
wronged by him.

Parallels to this pair of antitheses can be found without difficulty in


every speech of Lysias. To the critical reader they are mea
additions, but they help to develop the opposition which is bein
lished between the defendant and his friends on the one side
jurors on the other. This opposition is then fostered in the sub
arguments (33-35). Each of these arguments, with the exception
concluding one, does little more than develop the implication
initial argument e contrario. We can see then how the argumen
the entire conclusion of the speech. Through it Lysias has created
"2Solmsen, "Antiphonstudien," (see n. 3) 30-32. The structure and intent of
ment here in Or. 30 is almost identical with that in 12. 87-91.

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 163

or setting in which the jurors are to view Nicomachus and his sup
At the same time the audience is itself implicated in each of the an
This involvement in the issue is emphasized by the vocative. If th
follow the speaker's thought and identify themselves with the "
his words, then they are led to the same logical and moral decision
he makes for them.
The subtlety of this use of a particular kind of argument to c
situation implicating the audience intellectually and emotionally
they hear is observable in the speech against Simon (3.37-38).
trial it is the defendant who speaks Lysias' words, and the argume
contraries is part of his refutation of the charges. The object of t
is to demonstrate the innocence of the speaker by shifting the re
bility for the fight which occasioned the trial to Simon, the plaint
method is to show that Simon's statements are lies (35-39). The s
selects certain items from his account of the fight and asks the B
consider them in the light of probable experience: who are at fau
who pursue or those who run away? He answers his own quest
pursuers are to blame-, and then argues: &ore 5ewvy el irepi roVrT
56k?w Trpovo1O'jvar, 7repl &v oTrot rv7X&VovaTV o TSrt 5&Ew& KCaI rap4voAa 7TreT
The elements of the contrast are emphasized by the anaphora
syntactical parallels. Premeditation is set against criminal and mon
deeds, appearance against action. As in the example discussed abo
antitheses are imposed on the situation. But since the opposi
between "I" and "they," the defendant and his accusers, Lysia
using an introductory phrase similar to that in the other examp
simply states that the situation is betv6v without qualification,
other judgment were conceivable. The issue of premeditation
supplies the contents of the two parts of the proof embracing t
(28-34 and 34-43), is adroitly worked in here too. It is assumed o
witnesses' testimony (cf. 15-20) that Simon and his friends are th
gators of the events and the real culprits. Such a portrayal of th
prevents the audience from giving any credence to the contention
defendant planned the whole affair.13 By putting his proof in the
an argument from contraries, Lysias implies that the premi
mutually exclusive. Since the truth of the defendant's view of h
nents' actions has already been confirmed, the falsity of Simon's
tention of premeditation follows. The argument is stated concise
simply enough for its logical import to be easily grasped. The
conclusion is then driven home in the second argument from co
which follows immediately:
"The pronoun omitted with 56tco is of course iurTv. Simon had to prove malice
in order to substantiate his accusation; cf. J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht un
verfahren (Leipzig 1905-15) 605-607.

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164 PHOENIX

Whatever would be my situation if the opposite of what has actually ha


the case: if I with many of my friends had met Simon and fought with him
him and chased him and after overtaking him tried to drag him off by forc
though he has done these things, I have been brought to a trial in which I a
of losing my citizenship and all my property?

This argument fits the passive type described by Gebauer.-4 Ly


employs this type in the extant speeches; I assume he does her
avoid repetition. His primary purpose is to amplify the conclu
preceding argument. He repeats the details of the fray for the
and substitutes for the earlier statement about premeditation t
details of the defendant's peril. The function of this argume
emotional rather than logical, to excite pity for the defendant
nation at Simon. Thus the two arguments together perform in
the same service as the series of antitheses in the proof from
against Nicomachus. The design of the arguments effects an
of extraneous factors and concentrates the issue in an easily com
structure. This structure is artificial; it does not arise out of t
the situation of the antagonists in the trial. It is just the revers
are fitted into the framework of the argument.
Another example from the speech against Nicomachus
Lysias' technique clear (30.15-16). The speaker has been con
the preceding part of his speech that Nicomachus was directly
for the death of Cleophon and for the success of the political e
ing up to the overthrow of the democracy and the establishme
Thirty in power. This paragraph justifies that attack. Nicoma
speaker alleges, is going to portray himself as a friend of the
thus be acquitted unjustly. Lysias sets out to controvert this
the democrat in two ways: first, by proving that Nicomachus a
overthrow of the democracy (9-14), and secondly by denying
cation of the evidence which Nicomachus is allegedly going to
his favour (15-16). The first part lends itself to an ampler
emotional treatment; the second is brief, cool, and seemingly l
the premisses (and even the transition) all presented in antithe
The issue is simple; exile is not the proof Nicomachus con
because other men who had taken part as he did in the overthr
democratic government were later executed or banished. T
confirmed by a sentence which reiterates the gist of the prece
mentation and brings Nicomachus into contrast with the audi
the rest of the citizen body: "He too contributed some part to
while you and the people were the cause of his own return." In
contact with the jurors Lysias anticipates his concluding a
"Op. cit. (see n. 3) xxvi: "... . illa passiva, cum quis miserum indignumqu
certo quodam rerum statu calamitate aliqua contumeliave affici."

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 165

Zn& i Ka.L 8epVi, el (Y v &Ktp V ticv ;are X&plv abcr? eZa'ae0, &v 6'
jAi,eijELav r&lAopLav 7roL7taEoOe. The neatness of the sentence stru
justifies the epithet which Plato uses of Lysias' style in th
terse (aorpo-yybXa, 234e). Despite its terse expression the arg
comparable in complexity to those quoted above. The juror
directly involved in the situation, but this time not as the o
objects of someone else's action but as the agents. It is the co
inconsistency in their actions, not those of the speaker or his
which is monstrous. It is their verdict which could be so described. The
diction used by Lysias to repeat what he has just said about Nicomachus
is abstract and probably already hackneyed.'5 But the reduction of the
deeds of Nicomachus with all their factual and emotional ramifications to
the simplest terms-willing: unwilling; suffer: do wrong-is the very
thing which permits the main contrast to stand out clearly before the
audience, and gives the argument its force. (Notice that Lysias even
avoids saying that Nicomachus was wronged or injured; he says only that
he "experienced" something.) These contrasts between what Nicomachus
did and suffered are the fulcrum on which the possible actions of the
jurors are poised. Again the diction is chosen with care in order to insinuate
a bad contrast between acquittal and condemnation. Acquittal and con-
demnation are described as gratitude (a pejorative word in this speech)
and punishment. There is no real question as to which the jurors are to
choose. The argument, the paragraph, this whole part of the proof ends
on the words: you will punish.'6
In the arguments we have been examining the logical pattern which
governs their structure is patent. Someone's behaviour is at variance with
the present circumstances, whether these circumstances are real or
imagined by the speaker, past or future. Somewhat different is an
argument met in the speech for the cripple (24.8). As in the argument
discussed above, the statement of the issue in a set of contradictory pro-
positions serves to make it crystal clear to the audience. The argument
from contraries here follows on a series of contentions in which Lysias
puts his case. The speaker, a cripple whom the prosecutor wishes to have
deprived of his public assistance, points out that his business is small
and unprofitable. In order to live he must have the obol each day from
the state (6). He follows up the description of his circumstances with a
pitiful appeal based on his age, his physical disability, and the injustice
and harshness of an adverse verdict on both himself and other disabled

16See the relevant items in the lists of antithetical terms in John E. Hollingsworth,
Antithesis in the Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus (Menasha, Wis. 1915) 73-75 and
Grover C. Kenyan, Antithesis in the Speeches of the Greek Historians (Chicago 1941) 40,
80, and 84.
'6Similar endings can be found in 3. 37, 18. 8 & 12, 24. 23, 26. 9, 31. 24.

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166 PHOENIX

citizens (7). It is readily apparent how Lysias has drawn these poi
the "person-deed" scheme. Their lively presentation through a
negative commands disguises the fact that they have the same
in the argument here as the statements, clothed in a different
form, in 30.15-16. In both instances material is furnished whic
lishes the situation into which the subject is put, in Or. 30 the o
Nicomachus, in Or. 24 the speaker himself. What conclusio
audience to draw from this situation? In both places Lysias'
effected by the argument from contraries; here is how it is exp
Or. 24: Kaio yap av &rorov erl, & /3ovX7', el 56e laV darXi7 aol iv v) avu
lapv 4>aLvoit/rlv Xa&upAvwv r6 alpyvptwv roror, vvv 6' 1Ire&6 Katl 7yrpas K
ra Trovro 7rb6LAevaK KCKa 7rpoayLyverati Aot, r6re a&atpeOel7v. Each pr
in this argument contains two items: the circumstances in w
speaker lived, and what he experienced or would experience f
state. To make both experiences come true would lead to a r
contradiction in the behaviour of the members of the Boul8. Ly
found the perfect formula for summing up and driving home
meaning of his contentions. The elements out of which the arg
put together are evident to anyone who examines the positio
cripple. Lysias invents nothing. But the factors cited are not ger
the real point at issue in the accusation. Lysias adroitly avoids an
the prosecutor's charges while seeming to devastate them.17 His p
is veiled by the ridicule, reinforced by the antitheses, directed
prosecutor. The device is sophistic chicanery. But the chicanery
not in the technique but in the particular application of it. The sa
of argument is used in places where the facts and the situation
Lysias' favour. For example, in the speech on the olive stump (O
defendant complains about the sycophancy of the plaintiff who
to obtain a condemnation while bringing forward only his o
supported testimony and argument (23): 5eLr6rara owiv raaoxo c,
7rapkaXero aIprvpas, robrots av t5lou LV 7areliet, Treft)6 6 OVK elatv ab
KaL Tavr7rlv rtl1iAav oLeraL Xp^Ova yevETOaL. As in the preceding argu
contrast is between what is taking place and what might take p
here the inconsistency is in the behaviour of the opponent rather
audience. The speaker insists that this inconsistency, if allow
have terrible consequences for him. The subject here is evidence
the focal points of non-artistic proof. But where Antiphon wou
developed this topic at length, Lysias deals with it in a brief, sh
turned way. What interests him is not the evidential basis of the
case, but the implications which he can draw from it that the a
a sycophant. He comes back to the topic a few moments later at t
17Cf. Sch6n, op. cit. (see n. 3) 99-101 for an analysis of the technique emplo
Similar complex arguments are 4. 13, 7. 34-35, 15. 6.

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 167

clusion of this part of the Proof in a second argument from c


(29). His client argues afortiori from the fact that no action h
taken against him in the past by the state board in charge of s
trees that the charge being brought by his present accuser is
perversion of probabilities. The board of expert Areopagites is
with the youthful, ignorant prosecutor; the fact that the board
itself accused him is contrasted with the present accusation
speaking, these statements are neither contradictory nor inco
but the phrasing and the use of the e contrario form give the argu
appearance of validity and lend it force. Again we seem to have
tical method of arguing. Lysias contrives a presentation of his c
which is going to put him in the most favourable light. Schon
nation of what he calls Lysias' Scheinargumente demonstrates
way of presenting the situation to the audience operates throug
entire speech, at least in Orations 12 and 24 (and I would say i
the others too). Even as in Or. 7 where everything seems to be
favour, he presents his brief in a manner which is not absolute
the facts in every respect.
Sch6n does not try to discover the basis of this technique bey
gesting that this is what every lawyer does. I am inclined to t
the method is the result of the position in which Lysias found
he came to prepare his cases. To a larger extent than seems nece
restricts his attention to the three parties involved in the trial:
defendant, and jury. His arguments have to be drawn mostly
attributes and behaviour of these persons. Any two of the thr
may be contrasted with one another directly. Or the set of con
propositions may be derived from the behaviour of the partie
different times, such as past and present or present and possibl
or under different circumstances, such as the frequent contras
the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and the existing democracy. W
of this sort may have their bearing on the trial, I do not believe
be considered wholly germane. Rarely are the constituents of
ment from contradictions taken from the case itself or the
belonging to it.18 Lysias' arguments are fictions like his narratio
native constructions from the material at hand. In order to
fictions verisimilitude, he seized on a common type of argume
which all his hearers were probably quite familiar.'1 Of course b
general utility the argument from contradictions always seem
in his speeches a special function or role in the total context of

18But cf. 3. 37, 24. 13.


"Although the argument is found in many contemporary writings, it oc
relative rarity compared to its frequency in Lysias. A striking exception i
speech against Callimachus, Or. 18; cf. ?? 3, 15, 18, 21, 24, 25, 68.

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168 PHOENIX

is a part. The variety of such special roles illustrates the adap


this form of argument; for example, it is used in a confirma
speaker's position or a refutation of his opponent's, in amplifi
issue, in abuse, ridicule, or pathos. These last four functions ar
speaking, non-argumentative and are usually found in passages
whole paragraph is devoted to amplifying or abusing etc.
Lysias' purpose is to persuade through the force of his logic
main function is the one I have noted in the arguments cited
expression in a clear and forceful manner of the issue and imp
previous statements.
What form does Lysias' argument take when he is dealing wit
of the case itself, the pragma? Let us examine an instance. In
posedly first speech in public, the accusation of Eratosth
12.28-29), Lysias refutes the defendant's contention that he w
under orders of the Thirty when he arrested the metics, includ
brother Polemarchus, who were later executed. Although his a
persuasive and doubtless true in spirit, it suffers from sever
logic. First, he commits the fallacy of substituting the class for a
member of it and secondly he makes the false assumption
deliberately) that the Thirty was a committee acting in h
concert when in fact they were split into several factions. Ly
by setting the Thirty off from the rest of the citizen body: "Mor
other Athenians do have, I think, a sufficient excuse in shift
Thirty the blame for what has happened. But how is it right
agree with the Thirty if they shift the blame from themselve
selves!" The paradoxical way of establishing the compariso
the illogicality of Lysias' assumptions. The comparison also an
the argument which follows and by identifying Eratosthe
vocally with the Thirty excludes him from those who could j
appeal to force majeure. Then comes the argument:

El .7V 7yap TLS V (v r WrobXE& &apx7 laXvporepa, 4v' is avrqw rpOo?


r6d 6Katov a&vOpdorovs &IroXXOvar, laos &v eiK6oTWS argT avvyvcJ
VVV 6 7rapa TOV 1rOTe KaL Xl'EcaOTE 5KIV, ErTTEp ktaTa& TOIS Tp&&KO
6TL T V'rb rwv TptaKovTa Trpo'TaX'PevTa 7oiovv;

Lysias employs the apagogic technique of reducing his oppone


tention to absurdity, an effective weapon which seems to
introduced into the rhetoricians' arsenal by Gorgias. Lysia
hypothetically that there was a governing body superior to t
he argues in effect that Eratosthenes' statement (cf. 25), t
entails such a body. Because there is or was no such body, ther
fore no logical basis for Eratosthenes' contention. As a matter
however, Eratosthenes had the weight of law and custom on hi

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 169

Attic courts recognized the appeal to superior force as suf


for acquittal. And Lysias was well aware of this fact.20
argument would appear to be logically unassailable also, bu
a way to subvert it. It should be noticed that except for th
of the arguments in this chain of reasoning is constructed in
(27-34). By making Eratosthenes' defence appear to rest
hypotheses which could be denied or were manifestly f
suspicion on both the reasonableness of the case and the cha
man.2' Lysias' method in this passage and in the whole spee
ably elucidated by Karl Sch6n. And so I shall note here only
in form and approach to the arguments e contrario in the s
Nicomachus. These arguments are grounded in the particul
of each speech, and yet they have a certain generality about
the names and particulars, and the same argument cou
another speech. Indeed, the hypothetical form in particula
as the skeleton of a locus communis.
In the first years after the restoration of the democracy the Amnesty
oath, taken by the hostile factions, was frequently appealed to in civil
and criminal proceedings. Refuge in the Amnesty was sought by accused
persons in various ways, including the attempt to convince the juries
that they should give a verdict in accordance with the oath of the
Amnesty. An appeal of this kind was expected by Lysias' clients in the
trial of the informer Agoratus (Or. 13). Lysias apparently felt that this
point was either a weak element in his case or a relatively unimportant
one, for his discussion of it is appended to the main body of the argu-
mentation and passed over rather quickly (88-90).22 The speaker meets
Agoratus' arguments with two objections: first, a brief reproach for
introducing irrelevant material, and secondly the following argument:
I do not believe that the oaths and agreements are relevant to our case against him,
since the oaths have been made between the two parties, the town party and the Peiraeus
party. Therefore, if he was in the town and we were in the Peiraeus, the agreements
would have some bearing as far as he is concerned. But in fact he too was in the Peiraeus
along with me and Dionysius and all these men who are seeking vengeance from him.
Therefore, there is no bar to our case because the Peiraeus party did not swear an oath
with itself.

We do not know if the argument persuaded the Athenian dicasts (its


paradox may well have amused them); it certainly does not convince

2OCf. ? 50 where the same issue is treated from a different point of view.
"For other instances of this kind of argument see 7. 15, 13. 53, 18. 16-17, 26. 10,
32. 23.

"It is interesting in this respect to compare the proportionate treatment given this
topic by Andocides in the De Myst. 90-109 and the anonymous author of the speech
against him, Ps.-Lysias 6. 37-41.

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170 PHOENIX

modern scholars, and rightly so.23 The argument also breaks the
logic for the hypothetical syllogism because Lysias has made the
error of denying the antecedent instead of the consequent. But
should not expect from Lysias rigorous compliance with rules of
knew nothing and the argument can be rewritten in correct form. T
thing to be noted here is the way he argues. He postulates a con
which would substantiate Agoratus' position. But the true facts c
this condition, and therefore validate his own opposing position
this form of argument has been carefully contrived is show
parallel in Or. 3.31 where the form is identical, though the prem
of course different.24 A survey of the arguments cast in the for
then...; but in fact...," reveals three main types which
distinguished according to whether the "but in fact" part is a s
of fact (a semeion) as in the argument just above, or a confli
probabilities of human action like the argument in Or. 12, or a
one of the premisses in the hypothesis, which turns the argume
destructive hypothetical syllogism as in 22.11-12.25 The und
rationale is the same in all three types. Lysias invents a statemen
will contradict his opponent's contention. Then he fashions out
contradictory propositions a hypothetical argument which will re
opponent's contention to absurdity. Lysias is not interested in p
or reconstructing a series of events or even a single event in its
Rather he picks out individual items in his own or his opponen
depicts them in a certain way, and compels his audience to take a
attitude toward the two parties. These three aims are inextricab
into a subtle argument.
An examination of the assumptions used by Lysias in his hyp
arguments reveals a striking dissimilarity to the kind of premis
the argument from opposites. With the exception of some argu
from consequences, almost all the hypotheses deal with the case i
majority of the arguments from opposites derive from a conside
the ethos of the speaker or his opponent. But only six of the arg
from hypothesis involve the persons rather than the facts of th
This difference suggests that the contents of the argument fre
prescribed the form it was given by Lysias.
So far we have been examining arguments which have a clearly
form. The arguments from contradiction are introduced by som
2"Cf. Frohberger-Gebauer, Ausgewahlte Reden des Lysias (Leipzig 1880) vol
Albert Schweizer, Die 13. Rede des Lysias (Leipzig 1936) 91 ff.; A. P. Dorjahn
Forgiveness in Old Athens, the Amnesty of 403 B.C. (Evanston 1946) 23 and 48
4Cf. also 13. 22, 36 and 30. 17.
2Cf. 1. 31, 42, 12. 32-33, 24. 11, 25. 5; and Wilcox, op. cit. (see n. 3) 20, 22 ff., 32, and
40-128 passim.
2Cf. 12. 32-33, 46-47, and 48, 7. 23-25, 16. 11, 32. 23.

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 171

like "it would be strange if" and the two contradictory sta
usually marked by the ubiquitous 1v ... b. particles; the
arguments are of course expressed in conditional sentences.
immediately perceived, and seems to have some persuasive
own in addition to the content of the argument. The basis o
a principle of contradiction. But the prevalence of this pri
contingent on the presence of the formal expression of the
the argument from opposites, even though arguments emb
principle occur mostly in the environment of the two form
Like most of the authors of his day, Lysias has a fondness f
His antitheses are not ornaments; they serve rather to adva
ment in some way.27 In the following group of arguments
is not just a feature of the style but more important as
principle which determines the arrangement of the ma
argument.
Non-formal antithetical arguments of this kind are employed for the
most part in refutations where Lysias develops his thought through a
series of contrasts. A carefully constructed argument of this sort occurs
in the speech on the murder of Eratosthenes (Or. 1.29). The speaker, the
defendant Euphiletus, has narrated the events which led up to the dis-
covery and capture in his wife's room of the adulterer Eratosthenes. He
killed Eratosthenes, but refrains from describing the actual killing.
Instead he gives us a brief dramatic sketch of his confrontation with the
captive who is begging for mercy (25). To Eratosthenes' pleas he replies
that not he but the law of the city is executing him. There follows a
sentence or two in which he refutes some contentions of the plaintiffs.
The law on adultery is read to the court, the Areopagus. Euphiletus then
begins the proof of his innocence by arguing that his refusal to accept
money as recompense for the wrong done to him and his killing of Eratos-
thenes are legally and morally justifiable. The gist of this argument is
contained in paragraph 29 and runs:

obK iealireL, c l pe, &, XX' ca\ oX6yel &5&KcZE, Koa 67rws Ai v pI airo&avn
rVTE,c6Xet Kal lKrTeUev, &rorlvetv 5' rTOLf#OS V Xpipaara. k7c& 8 TC iTv PKelvov
T&liJCaTr&L obf aveXcpouv, Trv 5^ T7JS 67rK6Xeco V6'Ov tlovv etvat KVp&cbrepov, Kal
racbrtv tXapov Trv 8SKtlV, ^P f)eLs 6SKa&orT&Trv etvaL atyratJ&ievoL rols rct rotavra
Ek&Tiq6feoVo'v eT&aaTe.

This plea is not simply a statement of Euphiletus' reason for killing


Eratosthenes, but also an argument for the rightness of that reason. After
a repetition of the basic fact of Eratosthenes' guilt two penalties are
contrasted: payment of money (the usual course, it seems) and execution
"Cf. Hollingsworth, op. tit. (see n. 15) 43.

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172 PHOENIX

(probably a rare occurrence).28 But instead of saying in th


sentence "I deemed it better to kill him" or the like, Lysias
euphemistic circumlocution "I deemed the law of the city super
substitutes the law for the person of Euphiletus and creates a c
between Eratosthenes the adulterer and the personified law. Th
ment is then made: "I took this penalty which you yourselves th
be the most just ..." He can say this because the law is KVpLWTEp
and the individual must yield to it (cf. 34). The penalty of deat
only one appropriate to the situation; it is &KuLTra'r7. This opin
just the speaker's, but the firm belief of the people (here, as us
the orators, identified with the audience itself) who passed the
ordained this penalty. The thought proceeds by a series of i
contrasts: Euphiletus and Eratosthenes, Eratosthenes and t
(money and death), Euphiletus and the jurymen (sc. the people),
and wrong. Of these contrasts only two are marked by an
Aev ... 6e (death and money, Eratosthenes and the Law). Lysias e
all his skill with language in order to spotlight the ideas which he con
fundamental and which he wishes the Areopagites to grasp
Eratosthenes' confession and the compulsion of the law. The
conflict between Euphiletus and Eratosthenes is transmuted
between the criminal and the law. Our examination of the ar
from opposites has shown us how to appreciate the artistry wit
Lysias reduces a complex situation to a simple but fundamen
thesis. He does equally well in this apparently artless argument a
keeps all the details in view through the unmarked, secondary co
Analysis of three other arguments will illustrate sufficiently the v
features of Lysias' technique. First, let us look at an argument in
speech against Alcibiades, Or. 14.34. The speaker has just comple
abusive harangue against Alcibiades the son, and now turns t
the father. His purpose here is to confute the contention of the
that the son deserves acquittal in recompense for his father's ben
the state (30-31). The speaker contends that one of the arg
employed in defence of Alcibiades is actually a further reason f
condemnation of his son (32-33). The defence, we are given t
stand, is contending that since no blame attached to the m
marched against the city from Phyle none should be attached to A
for having done much the same thing. The speaker attacks this a
from analogy by showing the falsity of the analogy. He argues
supposed similarity of the two attacks on Athens only disguises t
difference between them. The motives or goals of the two grou
wholly at variance. But in his argument Lysias does not simply st
"Cf. Ugo E. Paoli, "I/ reato di adulterio (MOIXEIA) in diritto attico,"
Documenta Historiac et luris 16 (1950) 123-182.

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 173

difference as self-evident. Instead he contrasts the attitudes


parties toward what they were doing:
The oligarchs were eager to return from exile in order to surrender the r
to the Lacedaemonians and to rule over you themselves; the people when t
from exile drove out our enemies and freed even those citizens who were
in slavery. Therefore, the actions he is talking about were utterly unlike
parties!

Democratic freedom vs. oligarchic despotism: between such alternatives


there is but one choice for the patriotic soldier on the jury. And the
Lacedaemonians are thrown in for good measure. In a framework of
events and emotions like this nobody can gainsay the speaker's inference
that the actions of the two parties were at bottom dissimilar; their simi-
larity is only superficial.29 The antithetical structure of the thought serves
both to shape the issue into a convincing argument and to state this
argument concisely and effectively. Thus the very form which the argu-
ment takes in Lysias' hands supplies the logical conclusion and the
persuasive force. There is no need to spend time and words driving the
point home. It better suits the situation of the speaker in this trial to cast
suspicion on the character of a defendant who would proffer so monstrous
a claim (cf. 32), and to draw him into a web of politically inspired malice.
A similar use of antithesis to organize an argument occurs in the speech
against Eratosthenes, 12.49. In the sentences preceding this argument
Lysias gives an account of the anti-democratic incidents in Eratosthenes'
life (41-47). He concludes his account with two arguments, one hypo-
thetical (48), the other antithetical (49), which bear on Eratosthenes'
service with the Thirty. Lysias had used the events of Eratosthenes' life
as proofs of his anti-democratic policy. He now uses Eratosthenes' work
for the Thirty as proof of his innate depravity. In the hypothetical
argument he contends that if Eratosthenes were a good man he ought then
to have done various things helpful to the democracy, which of course he
did not do. The antithetical argument then repeats the gist of the first
argument. Eratosthenes' refusal to reveal the machinations of the Thirty
is proof of his acquiescence in those schemes and of his ill-will toward the
people, since a genuine democrat would have attested his political beliefs
by active opposition to the Thirty. The argument actually has greater
force than it appears to have on the surface. Though no mention is made
of them, the audience would remember the fate of the various democratic
leaders who had been seized and murdered by the Thirty on the denunci-
ation of men like Batrachus and Aeschylides whom Lysias has just
mentioned in the preceding sentence. These men who died for their
"2Note the way Alcibiades is simply subsumed under the general class "oligarch." The
device is typical of Lysias; cf. Karl Schon, op. cit. (see n. 3) 51 ff. Umberto Albini, Lisia,
I Discorsi (Florence n. d.) calls the whole argument a "cliche rituale."

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174 PHOENIX

political beliefs provide an implicit contrast with Eratosthenes. T


ment, however, runs thus:

Kal /A.v 5b, I&v pes BLKacTaL, 6&ro& KaKbvo& faav rT btierkpq irXtietL, obbt
etXov arco&wrves' irpoI 7yp tjav ot XMyovTes Kat 7rp&TTov'Tes Xv Ob
7v Aetao KaKdI yevokaFat r 7r6XEL. 6ir6oot 5d' euvoIt aarv etvar, TrCs OiV
;5eLtav, abrot re rd,& 3EXrara X&yovreS Kal TobS etaLapraYvovas &rOTr

There is a flaw in the argument which makes it logically invali


himself elsewhere recognizes that the silence against which he here p
cannot be taken as a test of a man's beliefs and used as a proof o
without any qualification (cf. 75). However, this weakness is glos
by the form in which the thought is cast. Two conflicting atti
contrasted (ill-will and good-will), and two actions, one the con
the other, are also contrasted. From this antithesis the dicasts
only the conclusion that Eratosthenes was in truth "an enem
people." His claim to have acted in the best interests of the sta
rejected as specious, and his own anti-democratic role in politic
fixed. It is usual in Lysias' proofs for such antithetically shaped
ments to be joined, as here, with hypothetical arguments whic
restate in a different form (cf. for example 3.32 and 7.26). In th
ments the actions of the person under discussion are contrasted
placing them in two different situations or, as in the present ex
measuring them against some standard which allows the au
estimate his moral worth.
Just how much this use of antitheses can contribute to a
depiction of character is seen from our third example from the
the property of Aristophanes, Or. 19.18:

AXX&a jtv o6 ye 'Aptaorooavrjs r1 e'Xcov ri)v yuvalKa rIL 6 roXXoLs &v ,uaXX
i T lc iA,r trarpl, ~6tov yVWvat. i re yaip 2X&Kla oroXv &6&opos, I re
wrXeov' &KELvoV APlv y&p a v r& avTro lrp&rTTLv. 'Aptarok&vLvs b5 ob M
LStwv aXX& Kat rTvA KOLYCtv CjBOUX co rtXE,ea0at, KaL el T v at v a pbr
&vpXwaer ktirev,uiv rt,ilaoOa&.

This antithesis between the different natures of the two men, the sp
father and Aristophanes, his son-in-law, pervades Lysias' en
sentation of the material in 7-30. The speaker rapidly and briefly
the background of the trial and tells how his family became invo
Aristophanes (7-17). While 12-17 are ostensibly the story of the
speaker's father had arranged his children's marriages, their
purpose is to establish in the minds of the audience a picture of a
ested parent completely free from avarice. In a similar manner
while arguing that Aristophanes could not have left behind a lar

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 175

paint the portrait of a thoroughly ambitious politician. Aristo


his father-in-law were completely different in nature (4b6s)
ment I quoted above comes then at the mid-point of this implic
son and is a sort of fulcrum for it. The speaker ends his acco
father with the contention that it is unlikely his father m
daughter to Aristophanes for money; he opens his account of A
with the assertion that Aristophanes would have had many c
even after his marriage whom he would have preferred to his
law. The argument follows immediately and supplies the evide
assertion: the two men differed in age and interests. The one
private affairs; the other was always seeking public acclaim.
employs "age" and "nature" or character as if they were "sign
vouched for the truth of his statement, just as in the passag
above from the speech against Eratosthenes he had used
Eratosthenes' life as signs or evidence of his oligarchical s
The antithesis serves to give the argument about 6boss a f
enables it to be easily grasped. At the same time the antithet
highlights the statement of incompatibility between the two
Lysias wishes to make.
This particular argument also illustrates for us Lysias' usual
dealing with "signs" or the facts allegedly pertinent to a case
passages noticed just above from the speeches against Er
(12.41-49) and Alcibiades (14.30-34), Lysias presents his fac
part of a story, that is, he clothes them in a narrative rathe
argumentative style. Then he deduces appropriate conclusions
facts (or retKUipta as he ordinarily calls them) in one or t
formulated arguments. There are, to be sure, exceptions to t
notably in the speech against Simon (3.27-37) and in the speec
olive tree (7.4-11). But in most instances where a thorough ex
of the evidence seems required, Lysias avoids it. The penetratin
of all sides of a case which can be observed in Antiphon's speec
foreign to Lysias; perhaps this is as much the result of temper
technical interests. His forte, in any case, lies in the imaginati
of items from ordinary experience which can be brought to
matter in hand. In the argument from the speech on the pro
Aristophanes these items, age and personality, are the most ob
and probably the most persuasive for the audience.
Underneath the seeming difference of expression in all these
we have observed a principle of contrast common to the
intrinsic contrast is often reinforced by the antithetical struc
arguments and of the style. Such antitheses are frequently d
mere ornaments of the content. It seems to me, however, th
thesis is not an adjunct but the very essence of the thoug

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176 PHOENIX

Webster has noted how Lysias' narrations fall into a pattern of co


The same thing is to a large extent true of his argumentatio
milieu in which Lysias was educated and later turned to rhe
speechwriting the antithesis is only a variant of the antilogy
polarize one's view of experience seems to have been the norm.
and unquestionable connections between Lysias' speeches an
remnants of the sophists and other moulders of the fifth-centur
are not readily found." But the antithesis and hypothesis w
variation, the apagog, were important instruments for analysing
phenomena of nature and human conduct and the accounts given
by others.32 It is perhaps not improbable that part of Lysias' art
professional achievement was to make these instruments at hom
courts.

This new kind of oratorical argumentation which was cen


persons of the parties to a case and their actions was soon to
one more type of stock argument.33 At least, it appears distr
various headings in Aristotle's list of stock arguments. Mos

30Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens (London 1956) 22. Th


recognizing this attitude was stressed by Eduard Norden, Die Anti
(Leipzig and Berlin 1915) 16-23, whose remark about Heraclitus (p.
sich die Gegensatze mit einer gewissen logischen Konsequenz auch i
hypostasiert," is to some extent true of all who participated in the intellec
of the fifth century. Webster also remarks (p. 150) that "seeing in con
description of much work in the early fourth century." Cf. also Mari
The Sophists, translated by Kathleen Freeman (Oxford 1954) index, s.
31If Gorgias is considered one of these leaders, then we can see th
Palamedes 13-21 on Lysias 7. 12 ff. In spite of the very different diction
Lysias ? 12 with Gorgias ? 15, 14 with 16 and 18, 15 ff. with 17, 16 ff.
Note in particular the premiss that men commit crimes either to gain
avoid peril, the consideration of the effect of the criminal act upon a p
security, the use of the feelings of honour and respect, and the importan
in motivating action. Moreover, Lysias' argument on witnesses and
inability to control them parallels Gorgias' argument on Palamedes' ina
nate the barbarians. Cf. Ludwig Radermacher, Artium Scriptores (Vienn
Lysias had also read (or heard?) Antiphon's speech in his trial for tr
Nicole, L'Apologie d' Antiphon ou AOro2 IIEPI META2TA2EQ2
1907) 51-54, who points out some of the similarities between the Anti
and Lysias 25. 10-13.
32Cf. the studies by Otto Regenbogen (now reprinted in his Kleine Schri
1961] 141 ff.), Hans Diller, and Bruno Snell cited by T. B. L. Webster, "
to Modern Thought in Ancient Greece," Proc. of the Second Intern. Con
Stud., vol. 2 (Copenhagen 1958) 33, n. 1, and the convenient sketch by W
of the historical development of different arguments, 33-43 (repeated
his Greek Art and Literature 700-530 B.C. [Dunedin, N.Z. 1959] 86-97).
33By "new" I mean new in Attic oratory, as I pointed out in the begi
paper. The notions of person and deed probably come from Corax; cf. A
2. 24, 1402A, 17-20 and, note 4 above.

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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 177

antithetical and hypothetical arguments may be viewed in pa


instances of "the examination of inconsistencies."34 To con
experts in rhetoric Lysias' logic doubtless seemed narrowl
There are many other ways of formulating arguments than t
thesis and hypothesis. Lysias knows them; as Dionysius of Ha
says, he leaves out none of the elements from which argume
together.5 One finds in reading his speeches many arguments
the circumstances of time and place, from motive, consequenc
son, and so on. But of these types only comparison (synkrisis)
by Lysias as fully as antithesis and hypothesis. And comparis
all a form of contrast. These two modes of thought then furnish
pattern which itself contrasts strikingly with the structurall
presentation of the other arguments.
Because the formal arguments I have examined areonly one
Lysias' many-sided invention, a comprehensive evaluation of
mentation is not to be drawn from them. Nevertheless, it is
elicit some implications for his career as a speechwriter
preference for antithesis and hypothesis. This type of argum
concerned with the logicality of a set of statements. The rel
statements to the truth (by which I mean verifiable fact) is of
internal consistency or inconsistency alone is sought. Thi
allows Lysias to make his speech a work of fiction whose cre
controlled by the probabilities of acceptable experience. It ob
need of independent investigation and research by the lo
Everything now depends upon the plausibility with which the
and proves his case. In this way Lysias found an escape from
difficulty in preparing speeches for others.

3Cf. note 11 above, and Sch6n, op. cit. (see n. 3) 112.


"DeLys. 15; cf. also 19. I have studied these non-formal arguments in my (
dissertation for Cornell University, A Study of the Arguments in the Speec
(1958) 40-90.

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