GuidelinesforEnhancingBuildingSecurityinSingaporeJul2010 PDF

FOREWORD
A safe and stable environment is one of the key pillars behind Singapore’s success. This will continue to be so.
The Government has invested heavily to maintain safety and security: from the efforts at our border checkpoints, to
hardening of potential targets and to building up the preparedness and resilience of our communities. While we will
continue to put in place the necessary measures and infrastructure to protect Singapore and its people, the wider
community’s involvement and contribution are equally vital.
Every person, business and building owner can take a direct responsibility to ensure their own safety and security. Our
strength lies in us leveraging on the people to embrace a security mindset, both in preventing and mitigating a terrorist
attack, and very importantly to practice it in our daily activities.
The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS) is a comprehensive compilation of international
best practices in building security that can be applied to Singapore. It provides the building and construction community
with practical information and guidelines on how they can take personal action to enhance the security of their buildings.
Developers, engineers, architects and security managers will find the guidelines relevant.
A salient point made in the publication is the importance of incorporating security considerations from the very beginning
of the building design process. This way, the cost of security is greatly minimised and the architectural vision of the
building can be preserved. Indeed I think you should plan for security as the building is being designed, as it is almost
always more costly to retrofit a building to implement security measures after it has been built.
I encourage the building and construction community to study this publication and use it actively to enhance the security
of buildings in Singapore. Your efforts in doing so would be a direct and invaluable contribution to the safety and security
of Singapore and our people.
WONG KAN SENG

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs
January 2010
Page 1
(Updated as at July 2010)
The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS)

is a follow-up from the earlier ‘Enhancing Building Security’ booklet and has been prepared by
Homefront Security Division - Ministry of Home Affairs
in consultation with:
Singapore Police Force;
Internal Security Department;
Singapore Civil Defence Force;
Building and Construction Authority;
Urban Redevelopment Authority;
as well as with inputs from external consultants.
The GEBSS is a ‘live’ document which will be updated when necessary. For feedback or queries, please write to
MHA_Guidelines_BuildingSecurity@mha.gov.sg.
No part of the GEBSS shall be reproduced in whole or part without prior written consent of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword 1
Table of Contents 3
1 Introduction To Building Security 9
1.1 The Costly Threat of Terrorism 9
1.2 Overview of the Guidelines 9
1.2.1 Background 9
1.2.2 Purpose 9
1.2.3 Assumption 10
1.2.4 Possible Threat Scenarios 10
1.2.5 Factor in Security in Building Design Early 11
1.3 Who Should Read the Guidelines 11
1.4 How to Use the Guidelines 11
1.5 Need for Security & Protective Design/Blast Consultant(s) 12
1.6 Feedback and Queries 12
2 Key Building Design Considerations 13
2.1 Introduction 13
2.2 General Architectural Considerations 13
2.2.1 Creating Stand-Off Distance 13
2.2.2 Building Orientation 14
2.2.3 Perimeter Line 14

14
2.2.5 Planning of Internal Areas 15
2.2.6 Materials/ Façade Systems 15
2.3 General Structural Considerations 15
2.3.1 Prevention of Progressive Collapse 16
2.3.2 Structural Redundancy 16
2.3.3 The Use of Detailing to Provide Structural Continuity and Ductility 16
2.3.4 Capacity for Resisting Shear Failure 16
2.3.5 Multi-storey and Underground Car Parks 16
2.4 Mechanical and Electrical System Considerations 17
3 Building and Protection Categories 18
3.1 How To Use This Chapter 18
3.2 Determining Building Category 18
3.3 Determining Building Structure category 19
3.3.1 Construction Method 19
3.3.2 Envelope Wall 20
3.3.3 Structure Category 20
4 Protection Recommendation Tables 21
4.2 Small Building/ Very Low Occupancy – Building Category S 21
4.3 Low Occupancy – Building Category L 24
4.4 Medium Occupancy – Building Category M 27
4.5 High Occupancy – Building Category H 30
4.6 Special Buildings – Building Category Y 33
5 Perimeter Design 36
5.1 Introduction 36
5.1.1 Stand-Off Distance 36
5.1.2 Perimeter line 36
5.1.3 Clear Zone 36
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5.3 Perimeter Line 37
5.3.1 Introduction 37
5.3.2 Vehicle Anti-Ramming Perimeter Line 39
5.3.2A Introduction 39

40
5.3.2C Vehicle Anti-Ramming Standards 40
5.3.2D Design of Vehicle Anti-Ramming Perimeter Line 42
5.3.2E Natural and Landscaping Barriers 42
5.3.2F Fabricated Barriers 44
5.3.3 Infrastructure Pipes 45
5.3.3B Design of Infrastructure Pipes 45
5.3.3C Example of Design 46
5.3.4 Anti-Intrusion Fence 46

46
5.3.4C Design of Anti-Intrusion Fence 47
5.3.4D Examples of Designs 47
5.3.5 Blast Shielding Wall 50

51
5.3.5C Design of Blast Shielding Walls 51
5.3.5D Examples of Designs 51
5.3.6 Ballistic Perimeter Line 52
!
52
5.3.6C Ballistic Standards 52
5.3.6D Design of Ballistic Perimeter Line 52
5.3.6E Examples of Designs 53
5.4 Vehicular and Pedestrian Entrances 53
5.4.2 Vehicle Anti-Ramming Entrance 54

54
5.4.2D Design of a Vehicle Anti-Ramming Entrance 57
5.4.3 Administrative Barriers 58
5.4.3B Design of Administrative Barrier 58
5.4.3C Examples of Designs 58
5.4.4 Protected Pedestrian Entrance 58

58
5.4.4C Forced Entry Standards 58
5.4.4D Design of Protected Pedestrian Entrance 59
5.4.5 Delivery/Service Vehicle Access Control 60

60
5.4.5D Design of Delivery/Service Vehicle Access Control 63
5.4.6 Interlocking Vehicle Entrance (For higher security needs) 63
!
63
5.4.6C Design of Interlocking Vehicle Entrance 63
5.4.6D Example of Design 64
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5.5 Security posts 64
5.5.2 Pedestrian security posts 64

65
5.5.2C Standards 65
5.5.2D Design of Security Posts 65
5.5.3 Vehicle Entrance Security Post 66
5.5.3B Design of Vehicle Entrance Security Post 66
5.6 Landscaping 66
!
66
5.6.3 Design of Landscaping 66
5.6.4 Example of Design 67
5.7 Security Lighting 67
5.7.2 Security Lighting - Perimeter Line and Entrances 67
"
68
5.7.2C Illumination Standards 69
5.7.2D Design of Security Lighting 69
5.8 Positioning of car parks and critical utilities 69
5.8.2 Positioning of Car Parks 70
5.8.2B Design of Car Parks 70
5.8.3 Positioning of Critical Utilities 70
5.8.3B Design of critical utilities 70
6 Building Façades 71
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# 71
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71
6.2.2 Standards for Blast Resistance 72
6.2.3 Standards for Forced-Entry Resistance 72
6.2.4 Standards for Ballistic Resistance 72
6.3 Building Walls 73
6.3.2 Pre-Cast Load Bearing Walls 73
6.3.3 Non-Load Bearing Wall Panels 74
6.3.4 Light Walls 75
6.4 Curtain Walls 75
6.4.2 Fully Framed Glass Curtain Walls 76
6.4.3 Point Supported or Other Curtain Wall Systems 76
6.4.4 Stone or Metal Finished Light Walls 77
6.5 Windows 78
6.5.2 Blast Protected Windows 78
6.5.3 Ballistic Protected Windows 80
6.5.4 Forced Entry Protected Windows 83
6.5.5 Combined Protection of Windows 84
6.6 Doors
6.6.2 Blast Protected Doors 85
6.6.3 Ballistic Protected Doors 85
6.6.4 Forced Entry Protected Doors 86
6.6.5 Combined Protection For Doors 87
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7 Building Structure 88
7.1 Introduction 88
"
88
7.3 Design Criteria 88
7.3.1 The Blast Load 88
7.3.2 General Guidelines 89
7.4 Progressive Collapse Prevention 89
7.4.1 The Systematic Approach 89
7.4.2 The Localised Approach 90
7.4.3 Column Protection 90
7.4.4 Wall Protection 92
7.4.5 Beam Protection 93
7.4.6 Slab Protection 94
8 Security Systems 95
8.2 Security Control Room 96
%
96
8.2.3 Design of a Security Control Room 96
8.3 Intercom and Communication System 98
%
98
8.3.3 Design of an Intercom and Communication System 98
8.3.4 Examples of Designs 98
8.4 Public Address System 99
%
99
8.4.3 Design of a Public Address System 99
8.5 Alarm System 99
%
100
8.5.3 Design of an Alarm System 100
8.5.4 Examples 101
8.6 Access Control System 102
%!
103
8.6.3 Design of An Access Control System 103
8.6.4 Examples of Design 103
8.7 CCTV System 103
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104
8.7.3 Design Considerations 104
8.7.4 Installation & Operation 105
8.7.5 Essential Support 106
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8.7.7 References 107
8.8 Security Lighting for CCTV systems 107
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108
8.8.3 Standards 108
8.8.4 Design of Security Lighting 108
8.8.5 Example 109
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9 Special Attention Areas 110
9.2 Parking 110
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111
9.2.3 Design of a Car Park 111
9.2.4 Example 111
9.3 Pedestrian Entry Areas 111
<
112
9.3.3 Design of Pedestrian Entry Areas 112
9.4 Loading Docks 113
<
113
9.4.3 Design of a Loading Dock 113
9.5 Garbage and Waste Disposal Dock 114
9.5.2 Design of Garbage and Waste Disposal Areas 114
9.6 Mail and Delivery Room 114
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114
9.6.3 Design of Mail and Delivery Rooms 114
9.7 VIP Holding Room 115
9.7.2 Design of VIP Holding Rooms 115
9.8 Protected Rooms 115
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115
9.8.3 Design of Protected Rooms 115
9.9 Central Utility Rooms 116
9.9.2 Design of Central Utility Rooms 116
9.9.3 Example 116
9.10 Air-conditioning System 116
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116
9.10.3 Design of an Air-Conditioning System 117
9.11 Water Supply and Tanks 117
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117
9.11.3 Design of Water Supply and Tanks 117
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Appendix A
Sample of Security and Safety Design Requirements for Buildings: For Tendering Purposes 118
1 Engagement & Scope of Security and Protective Design/Blast Consultant(s) 118
2 Assessment Process 118
3 Security and Protective Design Plan Submission Stages 119
4 Site Planning and Design Considerations for Crime Prevention 119
5 Site Planning and Design Considerations for Vehicular Threats 119
6 Site Planning and Design Considerations for Parking 120
7 Site Planning and Design Considerations for External Circulation 120
8 Architecture and Interior Design 120
9 Structural Design 121
10 Mechanical Design 123
11 Electrical Design 123
12 Chemical, Biological & Radiological Protective Measures 124
Appendix B
General Security Guidelines for Hotels 125
Introduction 125
Security Rings 125
1 Deterrence 125
2 Pro-active Security 126
3 Perimeter Security 126
4 Access Control 127
5 Security Command & Control Rooms 129
6 Emergency Plans & Procedures 130
Concluding Remarks 130
Appendix C
General Security Guidelines for Shopping Malls 131
Introduction 131
The Security Concept 131
Security Rings 132
1 Deterrence 132
2 Pro-active Security 133
3 Perimeter Security 133
4 Access Control 134
5 Security Command & Control Rooms 135
6 Emergency Plans & Procedures 136
Concluding Remarks 137
Page 8
1 INTRODUCTION TO BUILDING SECURITY
1.1 THE COSTLY THREAT OF TERRORISM 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES

1.2.1 BACKGROUND
Financing terrorism may be cheap but a terrorist attack The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security
anywhere is a very disruptive and potentially destabilising force. in Singapore (GEBSS) was drawn up following a series of
News reports and press statements from governments tell us that comprehensive threat and risk analysis studies that were carried
there are many types of costs, direct and indirect, associated out on several types of buildings in Singapore. The studies were
with a terrorist bomb attack. Other than the loss of precious undertaken in order to review current construction techniques and
human lives and injuries suffered, there are also business materials typically used, security procedures, culture, practices
losses, cost of rebuilding, insurance payouts, shattered investor and constraints for different types of buildings in Singapore, as

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are just a small sample of the many costs that businesses, and physical protection guidelines. The types of buildings reviewed
governments, have to deal with in the wake of a terrorist bomb included those that belong to the hospitality and retail industries,
attack on or in the vicinity of their establishment. transportation infrastructure and government institutions.
The September 11 terrorist (9/11) attacks in 2001, which 1.2.2 PURPOSE

cost the terrorists US$500,000 to stage, claimed 3,000 lives and
the total losses of life and property cost insurance companies The GEBSS intends to provide a menu of good
approximately US$40 billion. This direct cost pales in comparison security practices and considerations to help building owners
to the indirect costs. Shopping centres and restaurants across and professionals implement pragmatic and practical security
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procedures, physical protection concepts and security technology.
buildings (such as the Sears Tower in Chicago) were evacuated; A series of security recommendations and considerations have
planes were grounded; and the stock market ceased trading for q^, @ J
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four consecutive days. The effects were not only felt in New York. requirements, which allow building designers to focus on the key
The Florida tourist industry was also badly affected where the recommendations that are applicable to their type of building. This
total tourism activity had been reduced by one-third, or about is based on factors such as design occupancy levels, structural
US$20m per day. An APEC Tourism Working Group statement types and façade type that affects the building’s inherent risk and
said that falls in tourism arrivals since 9/11 had varied from a few vulnerability.
percent in some member economies such as Thailand, 10% in
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contribution from tourism of over 5% of GDP across the APEC the structure and façade of the building before referring to the
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list of security measures and choosing those that are most
economies is substantial. applicable. In other words, it allows them to minimise the security
risk of their building complex while still preserving the essence of
Closer to home, the Oct 2002 Bali Bombing, which cost their architectural design.
the terrorists approximately US$20,000 to stage, claimed the lives
of around 200 innocent people and devastated Indonesia’s US$6 The GEBSS also aims to provide domain owners with
billion tourism industry. The Indonesian stock market crashed clear professional security guidelines and standards, which will
and the Bali tourist economy, which contributes about 5% of the serve as recognised norms that can guide manufacturers of
country’s GDP, came to a halt. Overall, the attack resulted in a 2 security equipment, security practitioners and users alike. This
percent drop in Indonesian GDP for 2002. will put everyone on the same page and ensure a minimum level
of acceptable security standards in the industry. For example,
More recent attacks in the region have shown that the guidelines will state internationally recognised standards (e.g.
terrorists continue to actively pursue their terror campaigns and for vehicle barriers: SD-STD-02.01, ASTM F2656-07 or UK BSI
the targets are now commonly hotels or resorts. The attack on PAS68:2007) that manufacturers should adopt if they wish for
the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in Sep 2008, co-ordinated attacks their equipment to be used in Singapore. Building owners and
in Mumbai in Nov 2008 which included 2 hotels, The Taj Mahal consultants will also be able to use these standards as a basis to
Palace & Tower and The Oberoi Trident and the Jul 2009 determine the technical requirements of the security measures to
bombings in Jakarta’s JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels are put in place.
just a few such examples.
The levels of protection recommended in these
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to cripple economic activity and recognise that the shockwaves of additional protective measures as threat levels increase. They
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impact. Certainly, such attacks would undermine businesses and required as a standard but suggest design considerations and
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ways of preparing the infrastructure for later implementation of
higher levels of protection. If project constraints prohibit the full
implementation of the relevant guidelines, it is up to the project
developer or user of this guide to decide on the extent to which
the various protective elements will be implemented, based on
the location of the potential threats and subsequent analysis.
Page 9
1.2.3 ASSUMPTION
These guidelines are based on the common assumption are aimed at mitigating the casualty level. Full implementation
that comprehensive protection against every possible threat is of these guidelines will provide reasonable protection against
cost prohibitive. The philosophy introduced in these guidelines is terrorist threats.
that appropriate protection can be provided for new development
projects either at a reasonable cost or at no additional cost. As most building developments nowadays are designed
Building designs that employ factors to eliminate or limit the to house large concentrations of people, a reasonable level of
possibility of an attack help reduce the need to employ hardening protection for the large numbers of people who visit the area
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areas. When the possibility of an attack cannot be eliminated buildings should not aggravate the likelihood of mass casualties
or limited, the guidelines will supply recommendations that among the visitors in the event of a terrorist attack.
1.2.4 POSSIBLE THREAT SCENARIOS
The threats as illustrated in Table 1 : Possible Terrorist- the different threat scenarios that are likely to be executed at
Related Threats, are derived from the adversary’s ideology, locations throughout the development that are assessed to be
capability and modus operandi, and have been used to determine vulnerable.
Table 1 : Possible Terrorist-Related Threats 1
Ministry of Home Affairs: June 2007

1
This table illustrates possible scenarios to be considered. Actual threats to any particular buildings may vary on a case-by-case basis.
Page 10
1.2.5 FACTOR IN SECURITY IN BUILDING 1.3 WHO SHOULD READ THE GUIDELINES
DESIGN EARLY
This set of building security guidelines describe concepts
ACHIEVING AESTHETICS and provide detailed information for security oriented building
design. The targeted audiences include, but are not limited
While building prohibitive structures may enhance to, building owners, architects, structural engineers, urban
security, it can also cause the complex to lose its aesthetic construction developers, construction project managers, security
appeal, making it look like a fortress. However, many solutions consultants, security system designers and others engaged in the
available today meet the objective of raising the level of security, design and construction of buildings.
yet blend in very well into the architectural design. The best
time to assimilate elements of building security will be during the General information is included to provide senior
planning and design stages of the development life cycle. Indeed, managerial staff and decision makers with an understanding
effective building security design can be factored in as early as of security concepts and to help emphasise the importance of
the conceptual design stage. This will not be at the expense of physical design in matters of security. At the same time, it also
the architectural vision envisaged by the building owners. It is provides developers, engineers and architects with a new and
possible to design-out security risks while still preserving the innovative resource for determining security oriented design
essence of the design. approaches to protect buildings against terrorist-related incidents.
This is achieved through the introduction of a cohesive strategy
MAINTAINING BUILDING FUNCTIONAILTY that creates synergy between elements from the structural,
technical and human resources domains.
Building functionality can be maintained if security
design is taken into account from the early stages of the building The security principles and considerations highlighted
development life cycle. For example, the failure of a main transfer in this document are applicable to any type of civilian buildings,
beam led to the progressive collapse of a substantial portion of especially those serving large numbers of people on a daily basis
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In fact, such as commercial buildings and shopping complexes. These
most of the structural damage, and a vast majority of the fatalities can either be new buildings or existing buildings undergoing
were caused by this progressive collapse, and not by the direct repairs, alterations or additions (whether carried out within or
effect of the bomb blast. outside the building).
According to testimony by an expert witness to the US

Congressional committee investigating the attack, progressive
collapse could have been avoided through the installation
of additional strengthening structures. In fact, additional 1.4 HOW TO USE THE GUIDELINES
strengthening structures would not even have to be installed,
The guidelines first provide an introduction to key
if building designers had taken this propensity to progressively
building design considerations for enhancing building
collapse into account early on.
security, in terms of general architectural considerations
and general structural considerations (in Chapter 2). Next,
MANAGING COSTS for users who intend to apply building security principles
to a specific building, Chapters 3 and 4 provide details on
It is common knowledge that a well designed building how to determine the building and protection categories
requires relatively less maintenance and this rule can also be and to select the relevant protection elements needed
applied to security design. The primary underlying principle of the (refer to Diagram 1 for an illustration on this process).
guidelines is therefore to balance security needs with economic The remaining chapters of the guidelines provide detailed
viability and sustainability. To achieve this, the guidelines adopt information on the protection elements listed in the
risk management principles, where users focus on what are Protection Recommendation Tables (PRT) (these are
assessed to be higher likelihood and higher consequence threats. categorised into: Chapter 5 – Perimeter Design, Chapter 6
It also takes into account the local context, such as local threat – Building Facades, Chapter 7 – Building Structure, Chapter
scenarios, construction trends, urban planning requirements, 8 – Security Systems, Chapter 9 – Special Attention Areas).
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A can be used as a sample for tendering purposes for the
Security designs, if factored in early in the design phase security and safety design requirements for buildings.
of a new development, can result in minimal cost implications Appendix B provides general security guidelines for hotels
while at the same time, increase the inherent protection level and Appendix C provides general security guidelines for
provided to the building. This can be met through prudent master shopping malls.
planning, and through following design and construction practices
which typically result in minimal constraints on the design and
architecture. By factoring in elements of protective security
early in the design stage, the developer will be able to avoid
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environment. This will help to minimise the impact of additional
security measures, and thus control costs more effectively.
Hence, implementing these guidelines will have positive effects
on the building’s day to day security operation and its cost.
Page 11
Diagram 1 : Illustration on the process for selecting the These guidelines address the following issues:
relevant building and protection categories and
Protection Recommendation Table (PRT):
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including the perimeter line, landscaping and the structural scheme
itself;
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communications, which are all crucial to the protection of buildings
and their occupants;
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damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings
and related infrastructure; and
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resulting from conventional IED bomb attacks and other types of
attacks.
1.5 NEED FOR SECURITY & PROTECTIVE

DESIGN / BLAST CONSULTANT(S)
The levels of protection recommended in these guidelines Building owners and developers should decide on the
establish a foundation for the rapid deployment of additional extent of security provisions that they would like to incorporate
protective measures as threat levels increase. They do not into their building design. In this regard, building owners and
assume nor recommend that maximum protection are required developers are encouraged to engage professional security and
as a standard, and they suggest design considerations and ways protective design/blast consultant(s), even as early as the project
of preparing the infrastructure for later implementation of higher concept stage to assist in conducting threat, vulnerabilities and
levels of protection. risk assessments of their buildings. This ensures that adequate
and commercially viable security measures can be put in place
If project constraints prohibit the full implementation to address these threats.
of the relevant guidelines, it is up to the project developer or
user of this guide to decide on the extent to which the various
protective elements will be implemented, based on the location of
the potential threats and subsequent analysis. Examples of this 1.6 FEEDBACK AND QUERIES
include determining the level of blast load the protective windows
are required to withstand in different sides of the building based
on how close each wall is to a road, determining which openings Building owners who are members of the Safety and
require forced entry protection based on their accessibility from Security Watch Group (SSWG) may approach their respective
ground level, etc. Community
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GEBSS can also e-mail feedback and queries to MHA at
While the guidelines may establish a minimum level of MHA_Guidelines_BuildingSecurity@MHA.gov.sg.
acceptable security foundation, building owners should also
consider engaging professional security and protective design/blast
consultant(s) where the functionality and the physical constraints
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Page 12
2 KEY BUILDING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The project concept as well as the design and planning cases, incorporating this notion into the building design
stages of the building development are key milestones to considerations will provide a better secured facility at no additional
incorporate security considerations into the architectural layout, cost.
the structural aspects as well as the mechanical and electrical Stand-off refers to the distance from the building to a potential
systems of the building development. At the project concept threat and not the distance from the building to the perimeter of
stage, key issues to be considered include but are not limited the lot (although in many cases the two align). This requires a
to site selection and location, the building type, dimensions, preliminary assessment of the current and foreseeable threats.
positioning and orientation within the lot, landscaping as well as
@ ^J, J design and planning stage, The blast load is characterised by an overpressure shock wave,
important deliberations include but are not limited to the structural which rapidly expands as a hemispherical pressure wave from
scheme, characteristics of the envelop walls and facades, the source of the explosion. The nature of the shock pressure is
, @ a sudden rise of pressure and rapid exponential decay, followed
congregation areas. by a longer and smaller negative phase.
Relating to physical security issues during the initial An explosive charge detonating very close to the structure
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effective way to achieve the required security level at minimal over a local area.
cost. Studies have demonstrated that the implementation of
security elements at the preliminary design stage according to For example, if the lot has a public road that runs along
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for protection of the facility, by relating to the security aspects (Figure 1: Stand-off distance).
early on, architects and planners will be able to blend the
required protection elements into the design of the facility thereby
ensuring a minimum aesthetic impact. This could also assist the
architect to avoid any compromise in his vision or design of the
facility in favour of security elements. Such compromises are
typically sources of tension between the architect and the security
planners if security aspects are only considered at a later stage of
the project.
The following sections of this chapter relate to general

design, structural and system issues which should be addressed
regardless of the security level.
2.2 GENERAL ARCHITECTURAL

CONSIDERATIONS
Considering security issues during the initial stages of

a development project has an enormous impact on the ability to However, given the scarcity of land in Singapore, most
implement cost effective protective solutions. By eliminating or commercial developments within the city centre are built up to
limiting the possibility of carrying out an effective attack, the need
the road reserve. These are either party-wall developments or
to harden the building or vulnerable areas can be reduced. are set back about 3m from the common boundaries. Hence, the
application of adopting a larger buffer zone for stand-off distance
2.2.1 CREATING STAND-OFF DISTANCE might not be practical for most developments and could also run
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Due to the physics of explosions and the behaviour of
stand-off distance cannot always be achieved in Singapore’s
the resulting pressure waves (loads), stand-off distance is the
urban environment, there are other means of increasing stand-off
single most important factor when considering the mitigation of
the effects of an explosive attack. The importance of stand-off
distance to reduce the protection burden on the building such as
distance can be clearly demonstrated by the simple fact that if positioning possible vulnerable locations (e.g. main façade) as
the closest distance that an explosion could occur is increased far as possible from public vehicle or pedestrian access areas.
from 10 to 25 metres, the resulting applied loads will be reduced q*,J* @, q
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by approximately one order of magnitude (90%). Eliminating the façade of a high rise building will typically allow for a greater
the possibility of an effective vehicle-borne improvised explosive stand-off distance due to the distance from the public area
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and the height of the façades. For buildings located in urban
effort and capital costs that would otherwise be needed to deal areas, the security solution must depend more heavily on other
with the attack consequences. It has been proven that in some recommendations found in the guidelines.
Page 13
2.2.2 BUILDING ORIENTATION 2.2.4 TRAFFIC FLOW, ACCESS ROADS AND PARKING
The orientation of the building and its elevations may With a large vehicle population in a dense urban
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By taking advantage of the horizontal and vertical angles development. The security requirements for limiting entry and
and obscuring the lines of sight from a potential threat, the access control must be balanced with the need to meet standard
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Raising the ‘ground level’ as high as possible over the public accessibility to the building and parking areas. These issues,
areas will also increase the stand-off distance. Positioning the and in particular the location for current or future access control
building at an angle in the lot (Figure 2 & Figure 3), or opposite points, must be factored in at an early stage in order to meet the
a natural retaining wall may also reduce its vulnerability. The *:
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explosive device and the buildings will also affect the loading on aspect as well as the convenience of the users of the facility.
the buildings.
J
`@@ J *,,
take into account the need for vehicle screening and consider
factors such as the number of screening bays, the type of
screening measures and the average time taken to screen each
vehicle.
Special care should be taken to study the security

**J
@ @,
Jq*,Jq *|,:
*,
design mistakes and to allocate space for such activities. Making
sure the access roads and the entrances to the building and
its drop-off and parking areas complies with the access control
and other security requirements will assure proper functionality
when the site is operational. Proper analysis and design in the
early stages of the project according to the security requirements
will prevent demands for costly and problematic additions and

,
2.2.3 PERIMETER LINE
*,J *,J^,,[
@J:,@
line separating secure and non-secure areas as it is the last
obstacle preventing a vehicle from approaching within dangerous
proximity of the building.
The perimeter line should be designed to assist in

preventing such threats by ensuring that they will not endanger
vulnerable areas. This line can be achieved in many ways
depending on the protection level required, and the layout of the
building. A more detailed discussion on perimeter lines can be
found in Chapter 5.
Page 14
2.2.5 PLANNING OF INTERNAL AREAS
Many facilities are characterised by the presence of large The internal positioning of the various functional areas
J @ @,@
^*JJq*,J JJJ,* J Jq,:
areas of mass congregation are considered highly attractive for protect them. For example, areas that hold high crowd densities
terrorists and therefore should be given special consideration should be positioned away from high risk areas such as envelope
during the design stage. As crowd concentrations behind large ,,, 9,@,
glass façades in public areas are exposed to a great risk, it is rooms should be positioned at the core of the building or in
therefore not recommended to use exposed façades as the main specially protected areas. The areas that should be considered
light source opposite public areas. This, however, does not apply include:
to internal façades which are not exposed to threat scenarios.
2.2.6 MATERIALS/ FAÇADE SYSTEMS
Building materials are a critical issue when protecting 2.3 GENERAL STRUCTURAL
a facility. Different materials have different hazard levels and CONSIDERATIONS
require different protection methods. The main categories to be
considered are: An explosive charge detonating very close to the building
imposes a very high impulse and very high, intense pressure over
a local area. This tends to shatter the structural materials or to
cause them to shear. At greater distances, the peak pressure is
@,:
,:** J|@ ,:q*
a larger area of the structure will be affected and more structural
members will be exposed to the overpressure. The load on the
building will appear as concentric rings of different load intensities.
^ ,,@
J@ ,, ,
failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part
of it.
Any type of building collapse must be avoided, but the

most critical category to be avoided is progressive collapse. Past
incidents have demonstrated that progressive collapse results in
^:JJ ,:,,*
,,,
to humans, buildings and other structures in the surrounding area.
In order to mitigate progressive collapse, protective measures
should be directed towards strengthening primary structural
elements.
The primary structural elements are the essential parts

of the building, which provide the resistance against progressive
collapse due to blast loads. Primary structural elements of
buildings include main columns, beams, girders and the main
lateral resistance. The secondary structural elements are the
remainder of the load bearing elements that will provide protection
against local collapse.
The intensity of the blast load on the structure is a function of the

distance between the centre of the blast and the building, the
type of explosive used and the weight of the explosive charge.
Page 15
2.3.2 STRUCTURAL REDUNDANCY
The ability of the structure, façade or object to resist The use of redundant lateral and vertical force resisting
blast pressure given all the above parameters is a function of the systems is highly encouraged in order to overcome forces
material composition of the structure, and the section properties imposed by the blast and transfer loads from locally damaged
of the main structural elements, the structural spans and the structural elements. Redundancy tends to promote a more
connection details. These structural design guidelines should be robust structure and helps to ensure that alternate load paths
considered during the initial structural design phase to minimise are available in the case of the failure of structural elements.
J @ J q*,
, J @ Additionally, redundancy provides multiple locations for yielding
these features will provide a much more robust structure and to occur, which increases the probability that damage may be
increase the probability of achieving a low potential for progressive constrained.
collapse.
2.3.3 THE USE OF DETAILING TO PROVIDE
During the design and planning stage, the public façade STRUCTURAL CONTINUITY AND DUCTILITY
should have a simple structural scheme consisting of a beam/
column system or even pre-fabricated load bearing panels. Arising It is critical that the primary structural elements be
from the studies of the Oklahoma City attack, it is recommended capable of spanning two full spans (i.e., two full bays). This
that placing large transfer beams carrying the façade opposite requires beam-to-beam structural continuity across the missing
public areas that are accessible by vehicles be avoided. It is ,* ,, J |*, q,: q J @:
recommended that internal primary structural elements be placed and secondary elements to exceed their elastic limit without
behind the public façade, which acts as a form of shielding. experiencing structural collapse.
2.3.1 PREVENTION OF PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE 2.3.4 CAPACITY FOR RESISTING SHEAR FAILURE
^ ,,@
J@ , It is essential that the primary structural elements
local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the *
J*,:*q ,,
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part event to preclude a shear failure such as in the case of a structural
of it. Progressive collapse occurs, for example, when the loss of element failure. When the shear capacity is reached before the
one column results in the collapse of a disproportionate portion of |*,@:J@ q,: * [*, ,*
the building. This was illustrated in the bombing of the Alfred P. the element exists, which could potentially lead to a progressive
Murrah building in Oklahoma City on 19 Apr 1995. The majority of collapse of the structure.
the 168 fatalities were due to the partial collapse of the structure
rather than the result of the direct blast effects.
2.3.5 MULTI-STOREY AND UNDERGROUND CAR PARKS
The forces acting on the structure as a result of an

explosion in an underground car park or other enclosed spaces
are quite different to those from other possible detonation
locations. Since the behaviour and potential effects of such an
|@, J^
,: J**J
multi-storey and underground car park must be designed and
analysed carefully whilst relating to the structural stability provided
by the main structural columns and to any possible breaching of
the slabs. Since the blast in an underground car park is subject to
: J@*,*JJJ @
to an explosion in the open air. The lifting forces are therefore
|@ q^:JJqJ ,
be expected. This was seen in the 1993 attack on the NY World
Trade Centre when a car bomb detonated in the underground car
park.
These guidelines promote a local approach to design.

This incorporates the design of primary structural elements
against local failure for the given threat and stand-off distance. For
example, pre-fabricated load bearing walls with proper connection
details can resist very high concentrated loads. Another design
approach is to design certain areas of the structure to redistribute
the loads in the event that a key element is destroyed. The design
of structure against progressive collapse requires structural
redundancy and increasing ductility. The structure must be able
to absorb large displacement and redistribute the loads over
damaged areas.
Page 16
2.4 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
Given that the rationale behind these guidelines is
to have all the security requirements for a new development
project incorporated into the general design, security
considerations for mechanical and electrical systems should
also be considered at an early stage. Compatibility and
integration with the general design in the initial stage will help
achieve an effective assimilation of systems to the design.
#*J ,, , @^ q J
system requirements and other factors such as the urban
@,,@,J
:
The solutions should be designed based on current

technology but take into consideration future generations
of the systems. Any software and hardware used should
therefore be modular and upgradeable with adequate physical
space catered for future replacement. It is also recommended
@ |q,: J *
check-points at various locations in the future if needed.
Typically, many systems are either shared by security,

safety and administration or at least must take into account the
requirements and environment of each other. This has to be
considered at an early stage to ensure that the requirements
of all parties are met and that there is adequate integration
between them. This will ultimately save resources and effort.
Detailed discussion on mechanical and electrical systems

are found in Chapters 8 and 9.
Page 17
3 BUILDING AND PROTECTION CATEGORIES
3.1 HOW TO USE THIS CHAPTER
In order to identify the security recommendations for any given The Protection Recommendation Tables have been
building, this chapter should be used in the following way (as divided into four general categories and these relate to the
illustrated in Diagram 2): MAJOR protective role of each of the elements that appear in
the table, i.e. what are the main phenomena each element is
supposed to prevent. Most of these elements have additional
I. Determine building category.J:@,,:
q: roles which can be found in Chapter 5 to Chapter 9 that describe
q J Jq*,@*@ + each element’s proper application and design.
example, a one story museum that hosts a relatively small number
@ @, @ J * ,, q
J^ , *@: The major protective roles referred to in the Protection
and a large 25 storey crowded hospital building hosting many Recommendation Tables (PRT) are:
J * @ @, *,q,,q
J^
JJ *@:+^ J^q
J + :+J @ ^ ,,:
details and selection criteria can be seen below in Section 3.2. penetrate perimeter lines, doors, windows or walls.
II. Determine building structure category. This is determined ^9 ,,@9J J@
by the proposed construction method and the types of façade/ an initial local failure from element to element, eventually resulting
envelope wall. For more details regarding the structure and in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large
façade/envelope wall categories, refer to Section 3.3. It is highly part of it.
advisable to consider more than one construction method in order
@ ^|q,:*J + + J , ,,
projectiles that are hurled or shot at a building or its interior (e.g.
III. Review the relevant Protection Recommendation Table bullets, primary and secondary fragmentation, etc).
(PRT) (Chapter 4). For each building category, a protection
recommendation table lists all the structure categories and the #@, # J J
different possible protection elements. By reading the table, it is @^ *J` , @
Jq*
possible to determine which elements are recommended for each that may be subject to threats due to their special characteristics
structure category. or their sensitive role in the building’s operation during routine
or emergencies (e.g. control room, loading dock, ballrooms, VIP
IV. Look up the details for each protection element (Chapter rooms, etc).
4). For each item in the protection recommendation table, a
detailed description on its technical requirements is provided.
3.2 DETERMINING BUILDING CATEGORY

Diagram 2 : Illustration on the process for selecting the
relevant building and protection categories and Protection
Recommendation Table (PRT): The required protection level is derived from the building’s
purpose, level of activity, occupancy and number of people found
in and around it.
It is important to note that the main objective of these

guidelines is to protect lives, therefore the occupancy criterion
J J ^q, * J q*,
protection level.
Generally speaking, the larger the number of occupants in

the building, the more protection is required. However there
are circumstances when the authorities, the developers or the
occupants might identify additional factors which may change
the level of protection required for a building. Examples of
buildings that may require extra considerations include medical
clinics, hospitals, and critical infrastructure buildings.
When selecting a building as a potential target, terrorists

will usually consider the impact of a successful attack. Their
considerations will include the potential achievable number of
casualties, the type and nature of the building’s activity and its
occupancy. For this reason, the building’s purpose and activity,
JJJ,@
J *@: *, J
protection guidelines. Note that a symbolic building that may be
targeted regardless of its occupancy will be assigned a special
category (Y).
Page 18
An analysis of terrorist activities shows for example that IMPORTANT NOTE: If the building is designated as special or
certain types of commercial properties have become targets symbolic and assigned as Category Y, it is vital to engage the
where the number of occupants served only as secondary factor services of security and protective design/blast consultant(s)
to the terrorist. In cases such as these, it may be desirable to throughout the design since the protection cannot be determined

Jq*,@,q*,9 : fully through these guidelines, and special or unique solutions
may need to be designed. Simply assuming a maximum
Five building categories are listed in the table below. protection level for such a building and taking the highest level
The categories are very broad and are aimed at reducing the of protection from every category in this document could result in
protection burden2 on small buildings which may not have a high over-design of an unnecessarily fortress-like structure. Security
occupancy or may not be considered strategically important. The and protective design/blast consultant(s) working with the design
categories roughly follow the building categories used by the ,,qq, @
@ ,* q
Singapore Civil Defence Force under the Fire Safety Act 1994 suited for a unique building.
although they vary in a number of aspects.
After determining the building category, the next stage
When a stakeholder decides to apply increased is to determine the building’s structure category according to the
protection to a building category, the design team may wish to proposed construction method and building envelope. It should
J : JJ J J : JJ J q JJ,Jq*, :
|J:q
building’s real occupancy. The result will be a greater level of |q,: J J q*, ** :
protection but with the increased demands that go with it. according to budgetary and design considerations.
Table 2: Building Categories
3.3 DETERMINING BUILDING STRUCTURE

CATEGORY
The building’s structure determines the ability of the

structure to survive a large explosion within or outside the
building. It is determined by a combination of the construction
method employed, and the type of building façade. Whenever a
combination of methods or façade types is used, it is important to
always select a category according to the weakest link in order to
determine the correct protection level. For example, if a building
has both cast in-situ columns and pre-cast concrete beams, it
should be categorised as a pre-cast structure.
3.3.1 CONSTRUCTION METHOD
There are many ways in which buildings can be built, but

a survey undertaken in Singapore in early 2006 found four major
categories of construction commonly used here.
Table 3: Construction Methods
In order to determine the correct building category, the

purpose and activity must be carefully considered. In cases
where there is uncertainty as to which category to assign to a
given project, it is recommended to always choose the higher
category rather than the lower one. It is also recommended to
@ *J|q,:@ q, J ,,
for a future change in functionality and occupancy.
2
In order to reduce the protective burden, risk management is
used. It is highly recommended for the stakeholders to understand
the alternatives as it may be desirable to adopt a higher level of
protection, especially when the incremental costs are minimal.
Page 19
3.3.3 STRUCTURE CATEGORY
Structural engineers are advised to take the protection
, J** JJ*
on the overall structure category (see Table 5). If the appropriate In this section, the construction method and the envelope
construction method cannot be clearly selected from the above walls are combined in a table to represent a structure category for
table, it is recommended to choose one level down the list (with any given building.
‘1’ being the weakest type of construction and ‘4’ the strongest).
In other words, when in doubt, always choose a category which Once the structure category has been established, the
will result in a stricter or more comprehensive protection solution. design and construction team can then review the Protection
Recommendation Tables (PRT) for the proposed building category
3.3.2 ENVELOPE WALL J@
@
the building.
The building’s envelope wall plays a major part in the
^,,@ @q, Jq*,`J
, The way that the tables are constructed allow the
@ q,, ,,
@ architect and structural engineers to see the trade-offs in the
forced entry and many other crime and terror related threats. The design methods and the costs related to special protection
building envelope’s materials and construction also determine the elements like perimeter wall, windows, doors, parking area
extent of fragmentation in the event of a blast. and more. For example, by selecting a perimeter wall of 20cm
concrete with small windows rather than a light brick wall with
From the security point of view, the more desirable , J@ ,^,q
,:
envelope wall would be constructed of reinforced concrete (with with very little effect on the budget.
or without cladding) and include small, protected windows. This
type of wall requires a minimum of security design but is usually Table 5: Building Structure Categories
not the type of wall favoured by architects. If any other envelope
wall is considered, the architect should consider the protection
requirements for each wall system before deciding on any Structure Pre cast
In-situ
Pre-cast load column,
proposed system. This is even more important for façades that column &
bearing walls beams &
Steel
face open public areas. It is strongly recommended to consider beam
slabs
J ,* q
, Envelope
There are protection solutions for almost every type of façade, Walls
1 2 3 4
q*J
,@ *J ,* :q

J:: q,:^,q,J Curtain
A 1A 2A 3A 4A
walls
For protection purposes, envelope walls fall broadly into
Large
one of four categories: windows B 1B 2B 3B 4B
above 25%
Table 4: Envelope Walls Medium
windows C 1C 2C 3C 4C
10% - 25%
Small
windows less D 1D 2D 3D 4D
than 10%
The aim of the Building Structure Category Table is to give

the design team the overall picture for protection design options.
The design can be based on the envelope walls (according to
the rows) or on the structure characteristics (according to the
columns).
The best design combinations from the protection and

security point of view are as follows:
Fewer Protection Elements Recommended:

3C, 4C, 3D, 4D
Moderate Number of Protection Elements

Recommended: 2B, 3B, 4B, 2C, 2D
More Protection Elements Recommended:

1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 1B, 1C, 1D
If the type of façade proposed for the building does not
appear in the above table, it is recommended to choose one
If the desired design option does not appear in this table, the
category above the category closest to it. In other words, when
closest option should be selected keeping in mind that whenever
in doubt, always choose a category which will result in a stricter
in doubt, a more conservative grouping should be selected. This
or more comprehensive protection solution (with ‘A’ having the
ensures that the building is not under-protected.
strictest protection requirements and ‘D’ the least strict) .
Page 20
4 PROTECTION RECOMMENDATION TABLES
The aim of the Protection Recommendation Tables All the design options relevant to the same building
(PRT) are to give the architect and the design team the list of category are listed in the same table. Within the table, the columns
protection elements and recommended materials to be included represent the items relevant to each building structure category
in the design of the building. This may be used as a general (construction method + envelope walls). The protection elements
guide, and in conjunction with the Threat Vulnerability and are listed in each row of the table only by name. To learn more
Risk Assessment (TVRA) conducted for the building, which will q *J@
J@ ,
J@
@ , please refer to the detailed technical information in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
The PRTs divide the different protective elements into
*@ J @, J @

element’s major role in the protection of the building. It is
important to note that the different elements usually have more 4.2 SMALL BUILDING/ VERY LOW
than one role. Each structure type (combination of construction
method and façade material/ design) that appears in the Structure OCCUPANCY – BUILDING CATEGORY S
Category table will have different protection requirements.
J q, q, J @ *
To use the Protection Recommendation Tables (PRT): for small buildings or buildings with a very low occupancy that
serve as commercial, residential or any other use. By very low
I. Select the Building Category from Table 2: Building (S, L, M, occupancy, it is assumed that the building has one or two storeys
H, Y) (Section 3.2). and contains no more then 10 people in it at any one time. It
is therefore assumed that the building requires only minimal
II. Select the Building Structure Category from Table 5: Building protection and security since its risk level can be considered
Structure Categories (A1, A2…. D3, D4) (Section 3.3.3) having low. Despite the low occupancy, if the design team considers the
J * J q,9 * building to be particularly threatened for whatever reason, it may
Methods) (Section 3.3.1) and envelope walls (Table 4: Envelope choose to relate to a higher category (L or M) with the associated
Walls) (Section 3.3.2). higher level of protection.
III. Go to the Protection Recommendation Table for the selected To use the table below:
building category and identify the column for the selected building
structure category. I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.
IV. The rows in the table for the selected building structure category II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
determine the protection elements that are recommended or category (a combination of construction method and envelope
required. ,,,#
III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
For each building category, a separate Protection ‘+’, the protection element for that row should be included in the
Recommendation Table appears in this chapter: design.
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
Some of the protection elements will be referenced as

q*,J *:@
* q *J,^,
of protection needed for each building category. In this case,
the user should consult security advisers, the relevant authority
or alternatively, choose the most relevant protection level to the
project.
For more details on each of the protection elements,

refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to Chapter 9.
Page 21
Table 6: Small building / very low occupancy – Building Category S
Page 22
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category S), there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
building’s design. In this case, it is highly recommended to design every building to incorporate the items highlighted in the above
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 23
4.3 LOW OCCUPANCY – BUILDING
CATEGORY L
Jq,q, J@ q*, II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
with a low occupancy. By low occupancy it is assumed that the category (a combination of construction method and envelope
density of people in the building is less than one person per 30 m2 walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
on average or less than 100 people in a relatively large building
(for example each room in the building holds an average of only III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the
one person at a time). Despite the low occupancy, if the design symbol ‘+’, the protection element for that row should be included
team considers the building to be particularly threatened for in the design.
whatever reason, it may choose to relate to a higher category (M
or H) with the associated higher level of protection. IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
To use the table below:
For more details on each of the protection
I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed. recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
Table 7: Low occupancy – Building Category L
Page 24
Page 25
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category L) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 26
4.4 MEDIUM OCCUPANCY – BUILDING
CATEGORY M
Jq,q, J@ q*, III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the
with a medium occupancy. By medium occupancy it is assumed symbol ‘+’, the protection element for that row should be included
that the density of people in the building is less than one person in the design.
per 10 m2 and more than 1 person per 30 m2 on average, or less
then 1000 people in total. If the design team believes that more IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
than 250 people will congregate in a single area of the building at recommended protection envelope for the building.
any time, it is recommended to select a higher category of H with
the associated higher level of protection. For more details on each of the protection
recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
To use the table below: Chapter 9.
I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.
II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
category (a combination of construction method and envelope
walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
Table 8: Medium occupancy– Building Category (M)
Page 27
Page 28
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category M) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 29
4.5 HIGH OCCUPANCY – BUILDING
CATEGORY H
III.Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
The table below is meant for buildings with a high ‘+’, the protection element for that row should be included in the
occupancy. By high occupancy, it is assumed that there are more design.
than 1000 people in the building and/or more than 1 person to
every 10 m2 ^J ::q* @
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
lower occupancy locations which would otherwise be assigned recommended protection envelope for the building.
Category M or L but may require a higher level of protection.
For more details on each of the protection
To use the table below: recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.
II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
category (a combination of construction method and envelope
walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
Table 9: High occupancy – Building Category H
Page 30
Page 31
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category H) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 32
4.6 SPECIAL BUILDINGS – BUILDING
CATEGORY Y
The table below is meant for special or symbolic To use the table below:
buildings. The concept of ‘special’ relates to the need for special
security and this category is relevant for buildings that are at high I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.
J* J*JJJ@
, J@ @,J
their symbolic nature. For example, Parliament House requires II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
@
, [ @ q category (a combination of construction method and envelope
terms of the ratio of people per square metre. walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
It is common practice for special or symbolic buildings III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
to have a unique architectural design. In order to ensure that ‘+’, the protection element for that row should be included in the
the building’s overall design incorporates the required level of design.
protection without compromising the aesthetic aspect or the
architect’s vision, it is important for the design team to include IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
a protective design/blast consultant. The guidelines in the table recommended protection envelope for the building.
below are intended to provide the basic protection concept for a
high security facility and should allow a budget to be derived. For more details on each of the protection
recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
Table 10: Special or symbolic buildings – Building Category (Y)
Page 33
Page 34
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category Y), all protection elements are critical and it is highly recommended to include them in the building design.
Page 35
5 PERIMETER DESIGN
5.1 INTRODUCTION 5.1.2 PERIMETER LINE
This chapter discusses the positioning of a building Unimpeded access to the buildings and open spaces in
within the lot and the protection elements between the building’s a lot constitutes a risk, and may enable the perpetration of most
envelope walls and the boundary line of the lot. The chapter will threats close to the critical elements of a building or to areas
consider two scenarios: with large crowd concentrations. Perimeter line protection can
assist by preventing a threat or intruder from approaching the
I. Where the building’s envelope wall itself forms the boundary building envelope walls and openings and populated areas of the
line. building. By adding protection elements on the perimeter line,
the risks and threats from every building category are reduced.
II. Where there is an open area between the building’s envelope This is especially important to the more vulnerable building types
walls and the boundary line. such as those with envelope wall type A (glass curtain walls) or
structure type 1 (pre-cast columns and beams).
This chapter provides conceptual solutions for integrating
perimeter line designs, landscape architecture (vegetation,
landforms, and water) and site planning. 5.1.3 CLEAR ZONE
Integrating security requirements into a comprehensive

approach achieves a balance between many objectives including: The purpose of the clear zone is to establish a
demarcation of the secured boundary and permit visual
o Risk elimination or mitigation
*:J*J@ *
o Achieving planned building functionality by an adversary. Clear zones are the integration of security needs
o Aesthetics and architecture into the civil and architectural elements of the exterior landscape
and pedestrian and vehicle access to the structures.
Many protection objectives can be achieved during the
early stages of the design process when threat elimination and/
or mitigation are the least costly and most easily implemented.
Developers, architects, and landscape designers play an
important role in identifying and implementing crucial asset
protection measures while considering the orientation of buildings
on the site and the integration of vehicle access, control points,
physical barriers, landscaping, parking, and protection of utilities
to mitigate threats.
KEY COMPONENTS OF PERIMETER DESIGN:
5.1.1 STAND-OFF DISTANCE
The stand-off distance (setback) of a building from

@ , J J * * J
outcome of any potential attack. Providing adequate distance
can reduce or even eliminate the need to provide additional
protection to the building.
Distance is the most effective and desirable method

to provide site protection because other measures vary in
effectiveness and some times have unintended consequences.
The most effective solution for mitigating explosive effects is to
ensure that an explosion, if happens, occurs as far away from the
building as possible.
There is no ideal stand-off distance since it is determined

by the type of threat, the methods of construction, and the
,^, @ ,J *J *
[
off distance cannot always be achieved in Singapore’s urban
environment, where possible, maximising the distance may be
the most effective solution. Stand-off distance must be coupled
with appropriate building hardening, as discussed in Chapter 6
and Chapter 7, to provide the necessary level of protection.
Page 36
When determining the site landscape and perimeter line, The following protection elements appear in this chapter:
designers should consider the following factors:
Building footprint within the lot.
Suitable building location relative to the site perimeter.
Distance between the perimeter line and the building.
Access via foot, road, rail, water, and air and the implications of
access on the ability to maintain a secure perimeter.
Current and planned infrastructure and vulnerabilities such as

tunnels or main roads.
Presence of natural physical barriers such as water features,

dense vegetation, and terrain that could provide access control
and/or shielding (e.g. grade level differences), or suitability of the
site for the incorporation of such features.
Topographic characteristics that could affect the performance

of weapons.
Lines of sight from beyond the site boundaries and the ability
of vegetation in proximity to the building or site to screen covert
activity.
5.3 PERIMETER LINE
5.2 HOW TO USE THIS CHAPTER 5.3.1 INTRODUCTION
A perimeter line is a physical line, usually following a

This chapter contains descriptions and technical site boundary, which provides an element of security to the site.
@
@ *:,, * There are many possible objectives for a perimeter line, and
of the building on the perimeter line and within the property’s depending on the objectives, different physical characteristics or
boundary line or building lot. The protection recommendation security systems may be required.
tables in Chapter 4 refer to the various elements in this chapter.
Different objectives for a perimeter line include:
Each protection element is described in its own section
J J @
@ , ` Marking an administrative border line of a private area.
protection elements in this chapter can be implemented even if Preventing unintended entry of vehicles or people.
they do not appear in the list of recommendations table. In this Creating a stand-off line for a variety of threats.
case, the design team should refer to the protection role of the Deterring possible intruders.
@
, J ,^, @ + J Preventing or delaying the intrusion of a person.
element, the levels of protection are mentioned and standards Preventing the intrusion of a vehicle.
(if applicable) are described. The level of detail provided is not ^ ,:,,,|

@ ^ *,, J, @
q* J An operative defence line for security guards or police.
provide basic knowledge and assistance in the procurement Shielding element against blast.
procedure and to ensure that the right demands are made of Shielding element against ballistic threats.
suppliers and/or protection engineers. A line-of-sight blocking element against ballistic threats.
An architectural or landscape feature.
A combination of these objectives may be relevant but it

will be necessary to strike a balance between the security needs,
the cost, the complexity and the architectural impact of meeting
the objectives.
Page 37
A physical perimeter line is a means of establishing ,J *J
*, JJ q*,
a controlled access area around a building or asset. Physical would be at risk from a terrorist-related attack, building owners
q,@q*
J@J:, should adopt a prudent approach. For example, most buildings
limits of a building and can help to restrict, channel, or impede will require basic perimeter line measures such as establishing
access and create a continuous barrier around the site. Physical a vehicle anti-ramming line and infrastructure pipes. Other
barriers are also a deterrent for anyone planning to penetrate the measures such as anti-intrusion fences, blast shielding walls and
site and as such, they should either delay or prevent access. The establishing a ballistic perimeter line would be for buildings that
types of barriers selected can have a direct impact on the number have been assessed to require higher levels of security.
and type of security posts that may be needed to ensure site
security. The objective of this section is to provide a basic understanding
of perimeter defence issues. This will enable architects to
As explained in the following sections, there are a make decisions about the types of fence, wall or line necessary
number of solutions to the creation of a physical barrier including for any building, based on knowledge and understanding of
various types of fences, barriers, walls, bollards, planters, the relevant design points and building’s characteristics as
concrete barriers, grade level differences and trees. The described previously in Chapter 3. The sections will discuss the
selection of barrier elements must take into account the level of various protection levels to be achieved and describe various
desired security based on the threat levels (e.g. in the case of a architectural possibilities and design considerations for each of
vehicle, the various approach speeds). The leading factors that these categories.
must be taken into account when deciding on the type of physical
barrier solution are the urban landscape design, architectural
requirement and the threat level to be countered. The various
,* ^,q, **,,: q,
, @J:,
architectural considerations.
Page 38
5.3.2 VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING PERIMETER LINE
5.3.2A INTRODUCTION
The aim of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line is to J

J @, ^J, [
prevent unauthorised vehicles from entering the building/ facility ramming perimeter line is to reduce the number of locations
boundary and coming close to the building/ protected facility. where a vehicle can penetrate the perimeter line. This can be
This line can also be designed as a combined protection element affected by ensuring that the perimeter line is not close to any
to also prevent pedestrian intrusion. roads or any other area which allows vehicles to approach.
J ,, ,

| q *J
| Note that a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line usually
bollards, concrete walls, grade level differences, planters and requires foundation works to be done and therefore must be
trees. Active barriers such as retractable bollards, crash beams, considered early on in the project. The establishment of this
and sliding gates will be discussed in Section 5.4. barrier foundation can present a challenge since for maximum
effectiveness, the barrier needs to be placed as close as possible
The breaching of the perimeter line by a vehicle is one to the kerb. Since the property line of buildings does not usually
of the most serious scenarios and must be prevented in order extend to the kerb, approval should be sought from all relevant
to mitigate threat consequences. The range of possibilities for government authorities including the Singapore Land Authority,
perpetrating threats using a vehicle is great and can include: Urban Redevelopment Authority, Land Transport Authority and
National Parks Board before the barriers are installed.
I. A vehicle carrying a large explosive device driven by a suicide
bomber. The vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line can be combined
with the ability to prevent or delay intrusion of a pedestrian intrusion
II. A vehicle ramming into a building or a mass congregation area. and/or blast shielding. This combination can be achieved using
a single structure such as a blast wall high enough to prevent
III.A vehicle carrying assailants used as a carrier to break through anyone from climbing over it, and strong enough to withstand a
the perimeter line. close detonation of a car bomb. In some cases the combination
can be achieved by creating an individual line for each task. For
IV. A vehicle crashing into the perimeter by accident. example a bollard line on the kerb side, followed by a pedestrian
anti-intrusion fence, followed by a retaining wall for blast shielding.
Page 39
5.3.2B TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Table 11A: Impact Standard SD-STD-02.01 Issued by the
US Department of State
For the designation of vehicle weight and allowed impact

speed under ASTM F2656-07, please refer to ‘Table 1: Impact
Condition Designations’ of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled
‘Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter
Barriers’3.
For the designation for vehicle weight and allowed

impact speed under PAS68:2007, please refer to ‘Table 2:
Vehicle Impact Test Criteria’ of the PAS68:2007 document, titled
#@
0J, #*: 4 . When adopting
the UK BSI PAS68:2007 in lieu of the SD-STD-02.01, only the
barriers tested using the Vehicle Impact Method (Performance
Class V) are acceptable.
The acceptable ASTM F2656-07 and UK BSI PAS

5.3.2C VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING STANDARDS 68:2007 crash tested barriers corresponding to SD-STD-02.01
are shown below.
The guidelines for vehicle anti-ramming here are based
on the SD-STD-02.01 standard issued by the U.S. Department
of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security which is commonly used
worldwide for anti-ramming barriers and walls and the UK BSI
PAS68:2007 issued by UK British Standards Institute. The SD-
STD-02.01 standard considers various threat levels in the form of
vehicles weighing 6,800kg ramming the barrier at various speeds
and is aimed at preventing a vehicle ramming into the barrier
from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line. As of
1 Feb 2009, SD-STD-02.01 was replaced by ASTM F2656-07.
Both ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007 allow for different vehicle
types (e.g. from passenger cars to very heavy trucks) ramming at
@
@@
When it is determined that a vehicle anti-ramming

perimeter line is required, the protection level should be
decided by the facility owner/developer in consultation with the
architects, security and protective design/blast consultant(s). The
parameters to be considered should include the speed a vehicle
is able to achieve before impacting the potential barrier and the 3
Please refer to ASTM’s website to obtain the ASTM F2656-07
type of vehicle that is able to approach the perimeter line (e.g. car, ‘Standard test method for crash testing of perimeter barriers’
van, truck, etc.). Unless proven otherwise, the minimum standard (http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2656.htm).
for barriers should adhere to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or
the equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or PAS68:2007 standard. 4
Please refer to BSI’s website to obtain the PAS 68:2007
#@
^J, *: q J@J @
The designation for vehicle weight and impact speed bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030135101).
under SD-STD-02.01 is as follows:
Page 40
Table 11B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01, ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
* This data was extracted from ‘Table 1: Impact Condition Designations’ of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled ‘Standard Test
Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers’.
J| q,0J,`@9 J#!%>>" *,#@

0J,
Security Barriers’.
Notes:
+ q*#'+!![>"@q,@ $
+ q*#!%>>"J@ J *, q J$' qJ *, q
[ @* JqJJ, q, @^^J,J>>

ramming the barrier at 80km/h from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line (PU50 to C40 under ASTM F2656-07; or 2
500-80 to 1 500-48 under PAS68:2007 would also fall within this criteria).
Page 41
5.3.2D DESIGN OF VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING VEGETATION
PERIMETER LINE
In general, the anti-ramming barrier line should be Vegetation along a perimeter line can be used to deter
continuous and should completely surround the site. Any intruders from approaching the building. The vegetation is
locations where an unscreened vehicle could possibly approach required to act as an obstacle preventing the direct approach of
or enter the site should be analysed and eliminated, including vehicles. Trees with a trunk diameter larger than 50 cm can be
neighbouring plots and open areas around the site. Factors to be used to stop a vehicle, depending on the protection level required.
considered in the design of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line However, thick vegetation is not advised as weapons and
are: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) hidden in dense plantings
in close proximity to a building may not be easily detectable.
I. The approach speed of a potential vehicle approaching the Fabricated perimeter barriers capable of stopping moving
perimeter line is a design criterion which should be considered vehicles can be integrated with vegetation such as shrubs, trees
at the initial design stage when planning the access roads to or other plants for aesthetics purposes to hide or soften the
J ` q, : * J @ *
appearance of the security elements.
q,: ,@ ,
J*
lower the required protection level of the barriers. The feasibility of employing vegetation as a natural and
,@ q ,,: @ J @ q,
II. The edge-to-edge distance between discontinuous barriers between plant growth and the presence of underground utilities.
such as bollards, or trees with a trunk diameter larger than 50cm, As large plants and trees grow, their root systems may affect
should be no more than 120cm. If the barriers are tapered, the subsurface conditions and undermine both utilities and the well-
edge-to-edge distance should be measured at mid-height. Any being of the plant. Close collaboration between the security and
decorative coverings should be ignored in determining the edge- protective design/blast consultant(s) and landscape designers is
to-edge distance. critical to create an aesthetic landscape design in which plantings,
light distribution, pedestrian circulation and surveillance work
III.The minimum height of the barrier should be 65 cm from the together. This collaboration should also include a plan for the
ground. care and maintenance of the landscape.
IV.The mass and foundation of the barrier are major factors in its
ability to stop vehicles. The barrier foundation for a typical anti-
ramming barrier is required to be approximately 60 cm deep and
should always be designed according to prevailing soil conditions.
There are also designs available for anti-ramming barriers to suit
shallow foundations.
V. Often there are obstacles to the creation of deep, strong

foundations for the barrier due to underground utilities or even
a basement or car park under the pavement. In this case, the
barriers should be designed from piles, shallow footing strips
made of steel-concrete composites or shallow buried heavy
planters. Embedding a barrier next to the basement wall or
through the basement roof may introduce design complications.
Another problem is barriers built on top of paving stones or similar
materials such as decorative stones. The foundation of the
qJ *,q*JJJ@^, *
it to ensure proper operation.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS WATER
The effectiveness of bodies of water or water features

Two main barrier types are typically considered:
q ^^J,J q*
q*J
value in slowing vehicles and as a deterrent is obvious. For this
*,,@q
reason, it is best to use them in situations where the stand-off
distance available is relatively large. For example, cars and light
+qq
trucks will be limited to speeds of approximately 40 km/hr by wide
bodies of water 15-20 cm deep. Bodies of water 90 cm deep
5.3.2E NATURAL AND LANDSCAPING BARRIERS @, q ^ ^J, ` J J
body of water is uneven or contains several deep trenches, the
Natural and landscape barriers can be very effective but ^q
,:Jq*
must be integrated into the design at an early stage. Natural and the uneven ground under the water further impedes possible
landscape obstructions such as the terrain, creating grade level movement speeds.
differences, retaining walls, water and vegetation can be used
to stop, deter, or slow a vehicle trying to enter a facility. Three In addition, water features such as fountains or pools
types of natural and landscape barriers will be considered here: may be used as barriers if additional structural components are
Vegetation, Water and the Terrain/Grade level. built in.
Page 42
Page 43
TERRAIN/GRADE LEVEL
Terrain features such as retaining walls, natural steps, As long as the inner core comprises a proper steel
or large rocks may provide effective barriers to vehicles. Grade pole able to withstand the impact according to the standard,
level differences can also be built in to the landscape design as the covering can be decorative and can match any architectural
another form of barrier. design (bollards located in the city centre should also comply with
URA’s requirements). Bollards used as part of a vehicle anti-
ramming perimeter line should minimally meet the SD-STD-02.01
5.3.2F FABRICATED BARRIERS K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or PAS68:2007
There are a wide variety of options for fabricated vehicle standard.
barriers. The following are a few examples:
PLANTER
BOLLARD A planter is a concrete landscape feature with vehicle

anti-ramming capability that is installed partially underground and
partially above ground. The planter is required to be specially
designed to withstand the forces of a ramming vehicle according
to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F2656-
07 or PAS68:2007 standard.
A bollard is the most common type of anti-ramming vehicle

barrier. It is usually made of a steel pole with a large reinforced
* J @ , , :@,,:
,, J
,,q
| ^q, q,#
designs incorporate deep piles without concrete foundations. The
J,, *
|:@q ,, ,[
concrete composites footing strips. At the high-end, bollards are
constructed to completely stop most vehicles.
As there are manufacturers who offer barriers that do not

comply with the anti-ramming standard, it is strongly advisable to
|J@

J@ @ q ,,
carefully.
Page 44
HARDENED STREETSCAPE ITEMS 5.3.3 INFRASTRUCTURE PIPES
Items integrated into the streetscape, such as benches, 5.3.3A INTRODUCTION

sculptural or seating barriers, lamp posts, signposts may be
hardened to function with bollard-like performance. These can Ducts, channels, drain and sewage infrastructure can all
often be used effectively in combination with other barrier types be used to perpetrate attacks against buildings and installations.
(natural and fabricated). Such pipe works could either be used to penetrate a building/
facility, or could be used as a hidden location for inserting an
explosive device or hazardous materials.
These infrastructure elements are a necessity to the

building’s functioning and therefore cannot be eliminated. It is
therefore critical to ensure that they do not become a hazard.
The openings, access or vents to these infrastructure

elements may often be at the perimeter line or beyond (e.g. rain
drainage pipes in a perimeter fence), on the street (e.g. sewage
manholes that lead into the building’s sewage system), or they
can be incorporated into the building itself (e.g. air intake ducts).
5.3.3B DESIGN OF INFRASTRUCTURE PIPES
The following factors should be considered in the design

Picture: U.S. GSA of pipe/duct infrastructure:
Figure 15: Examples of sculptural feature
I. The number of large openings to exterior unprotected areas
should be limited to the absolute minimum.
II. The forced-entry protection level for pipe/duct infrastructure

WALLS should be according to the level of protection provided at the
point that the pipe/duct exits the building. For example, if the rain
Walls that are structurally reinforced can be used drainage channel leads to the yard, it should be protected to the
effectively as part of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter. These level of the perimeter line. If the air intake leads into the building
may consist of retaining walls, plaza edges, an extension of a itself, it should be protected to the level of the building envelope.
building’s architecture or as the base of a fence. For such walls,
it is vital that the foundation be continuous, and be specially III.The intrusion detection level for the pipe/duct infrastructure
designed to withstand the forces of a ramming vehicle according should be according to the level of protection provided at the point
to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F2656- that the pipe/duct exits the building. For example, if the sewage
07 or PAS68:2007 standard. Such walls may typically be used in pipe leads into the building itself, it should be protected to the
combination with other barrier types. level of the building envelope.
IV. The size of the openings should be limited to the minimum

required for proper functioning.
V. All utility pipes or ducts that penetrate the site’s perimeter

should be screened, sealed, or secured to prevent their use as
access points for unauthorised entry into the site. If access is
required for maintenance purposes, all pipes, ducts or channels
should be secured with screening, grating, latticework, or other
similar devices to prevent intruder access. If warranted by the
sensitivity of the building, it may be necessary to install intrusion
detection sensors and consider overt or covert visual surveillance
systems.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards that
are relevant to the protection of sewage or drainage access
pipes.
Picture: U.S. GSA

Figure 16: Example of wall used
as base of fence
Page 45
5.3.4 ANTI-INTRUSION FENCE
VI. Drainage ditches, culverts, vents, ducts, and other 5.3.4A INTRODUCTION
openings that pass through a perimeter and which are greater
A pedestrian anti-intrusion perimeter line is designed
than 25 cm in diameter should be protected by securely fastened
to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the site and
welded bar grilles. The addition of grilles or pipes to culverts or
approaching the building. It is also possible to combine this line
other drainage structures must be coordinated with the engineers
with other protection elements in order to prevent the ramming of
J J J @: q @
vehicles. This section will relate only to fences.
additional maintenance resulting from the installation can be
taken into account.
An intrusion of a person can be stealthy and silent or
forced and noisy. The ranges of possible threats include:
VII. Manhole covers 25 cm or more in diameter must be
secured to prevent unauthorised opening. They may be secured
A suicide bomber carrying an explosive device.
with locks and hasps, by welding them shut, or by bolting them to
An intrusion in order to plant an explosive device.
their frame.
A start of an assailant attack.
An intrusion for sabotage / theft.
5.3.3C EXAMPLE OF DESIGN |,:

*, J
be breached under any circumstances, the planning and design
of an anti-intrusion perimeter line at the initial stages should focus
on causing the maximum delay for an intruder to give reaction
forces adequate time to respond.
An anti-intrusion fence can be designed and built per

project or can be purchased as an off-the-shelf product. In many
cases, the fence will be combined with a detection system in order
to detect the intruder as well as to delay him. In some cases, the
fence line can be virtual, with an intrusion detection system but no
physical presence. This can only be done when there is a large
buffer zone which allows the response team time to intercept the
detected intruder.
Page 46
5.3.4C DESIGN OF ANTI-INTRUSION FENCE
The following factors should be considered in the design J *,[@*@ @
,*
of an anti-intrusion fence: is hollow 4 mm 5 X 5 cm. The distance between bars should
be no greater than 10 cm. Due to the weight of the fence and
I. The fence should be designed to meet the required level of the desired heavy duty performance, it is particularly important to
protection across all its component parts. This includes not plan the pole foundation properly.
only the fence itself but also the footing (to prevent anyone from
digging under), the corners, and connection to structures.
The fence can be produced with or without the top part
II. The minimum height required for an anti-intrusion fence is 250 angled outward but it is important to make sure that no element
cm. of the fence design or location will allow an intruder to use it as
@ q*, J J @
, ^ ,:
III.Vegetation, light poles or similar objects near the fence line, single intruder or blocking a mob. For certain designs of the base
should be designed in such a way as to prevent them from * q:*J^,@
,:, @
assisting an intruder to scale the fence. a ramming car. As stated previously, combining fence types can
J^ *@ @ @
J J J
IV.The line should be planned in such a way as to prevent or fence type can be fully upgraded to a smart fence.
,:* *
J*:
@
to arrive.
V. The design should take into consideration the detection, alarm

and surveillance systems to be installed.
VI.The line-of-sight requirements should be considered at the

initial design stage and fence materials (opaque or transparent)
should be selected accordingly.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards for
the construction of anti-intrusion fences.
Note: URA may have restrictions on fence heights at 1.8m.

CONCRETE FILLED HOLLOW BRICK WALL OR RED BRICK
5.3.4D EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
WALL
HARDENED WELDED CHAIN LINK WIRE FENCE This type of anti-intrusion fence is a wall constructed of
This is a welded chain link wire fence with a minimum J ,, q*,qJ
,,J
wire thickness of 4 mm. In most cases, the fence should be may or may not include steel bars inside to increase the strength.
placed on a concrete base to achieve maximum effectiveness. q,,:, *
q*,,J,,
This type of fence is useful to prevent an accidental intruder or an *, q@
,,: JJ
intruder, but it is not strong enough to stop a crowd. level and security needs.
A hardened welded chain link fence has a relatively long This wall is effective for stopping different kinds of
life compared to other simpler fences and is recommended in intrusions or a mob and the fence can be upgraded to a smart
most cases. It is possible to upgrade this fence to a smart fence fence.
by combining it with detectors.
STEEL PROFILE FENCE

J^: ,@
,Jq
used for fences but which vary in cost and effectiveness. The
:@,@
, J ,, ¡*@
,
,$>¡$>@
,J JJ@
,
*@ J@
JJ*
structural stability.
Page 47
PREFABRICATED CONCRETE WALL CONCRETE WALL CAST ON-SITE
Prefabricated concrete walls are formed from elements A reinforced concrete wall built on-site usually varies
built elsewhere and assembled on site. The dimensions of a from 20 to 80 cm thick but construction of this kind must be done
single element typically start from 1.5m wide and 2.5m high. The @

detail for connecting the elements should be designed according
J@
This wall is effective against a wide range of threats
including intruders, attacks, crowds and ramming cars, and both
This type of wall is extremely suitable in situations small and large blasts. It can also be upgraded to a smart fence.
where a heavy duty wall is needed for a limited period of time.
It is effective against a wide range of threats including intruders,
attacks and crowds. In some circumstances, depending on the
@
, * , @^
even serve as a blast shielding wall. This wall can be upgraded to
a smart fence.
Page 48
FENCE OPTIONS SMART FENCES
A range of options can be installed on the top of the

*, @ ,q ^`
cases these options can also be used as the detectors for the
smart fence. These options can typically be built into the fence at
the time of its installation or added on later depending on budget
and needs.
Page 49
5.3.5 BLAST SHIELDING WALL
5.3.5A INTRODUCTION
The purpose of a blast shielding wall is to reduce the load For example, at a given standoff distance and threat
levels on areas of the building’s structural elements and external level, the expected load on the building is an impulse of 1,300
façade as a result of an explosion. A blast shielding wall is often @,,[J,,,
,:*J
used when it is not possible to establish an acceptable stand-off loads to an impulse of under 100 psi*msec. This would allow for
distance between a potential blast and the target building, and a wide variety of standard design solutions of building elements
when the hardening of the structural elements and the façades is instead of specially-designed elements with high resistance to
*
q,,,J,,,:,, blast loads.
the architects and engineers to use building methods, materials
and products (walls and windows) that would otherwise not be *, J J *,, @* $>>
feasible. psi levels striking unprotected buildings can be reduced to 50 psi
at ground level. The extent of pressure reduction will depend on
Reducing loads on the building walls is achieved by two means: the height of the wall in relation to the height of the building, and
the distance between the wall and the building.
` J q, ^ @@, J ,, : J
building.
II. Creating a “shadowed” area that will reduce the loads on the
building.
It is important to note that generally speaking the spherical

blast wave that is projected from the blast will “hit” the shielding
,, q*@J JJ
,,^, *J,,
,,J^ q
the barrier and the wall of the building. The pressure however,
,,qJ, ,^,JJJ *,,,^,
Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the shadowing of the shielding wall
on the building.
A typical blast shield wall is a massive reinforced

concrete structure which can be designed to be structurally
destroyed, rotated or slide, as long as it does not create secondary
fragmentation of concrete elements. More innovative shield walls
| J J^ q q
@

needs.
Figure 25: The shadowing effect of

a shielding wall on a building.
Figure 28: Heavy pre-cast shielding walls – before

Figure 29: The walls after the detonation
test
An alternative concept to the construction of blast shielding

walls is to use materials that will allow the wall to disintegrate
or scatter rather than withstand the blast in a rigid manner. For
|@,q,,, J |,:

,,J, JJJ :
fragments. Blast shielding walls can also be designed as a
landscape feature such as retaining walls.
Figure 25: The reflection of a blast from a

building due to a shielding wall.
Page 50
IV. The wall may be constructed of any material (sand, earth,
water) as long as the 3 points above are observed.
V. The wall should be designed to absorb expected loads in a

manner that will ensure no fragmentation or spoiling.
VI. The distance of the blast shielding wall from the protected
building wall should not exceed 15 metres.
VII. The expected detonation point should be as close as possible

to the blast shielding wall. If the detonation point is expected to be
some distance from the shielding wall, the loads on the building
should be analysed. In such a case, the shielding effect will be
reduced, but the loads on the building will also be reduced since
the point of detonation will be further away from the building.
VIII. A blast shield can incorporate natural features such as

landscaping as well as take advantage of elements like retaining
walls and ground elevations.
Note: URA may typically have restrictions on wall heights at

5.3.5C DESIGN OF BLAST SHIELDING WALLS 1.8m.
In general, shielding walls are best used where there

is only a short distance between the structure to be protected
and the closest possible point of detonation. Such conditions are 5.3.5D EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
typical in urban areas in which the land around the building is
limited, and vehicles can get within close proximity to the building.
The design of a shielding wall is different from a standard

dynamic design, since it is expected and permitted for the wall to
be completely destroyed, to rotate or to slide as long as it does not
@ *J^: : JJ: Jq*,
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security
standards for blast shielding walls or their performance. This
is mainly due to the fact that there are so many parameters
involved in a blast against a wall. The selection of the wall type
depends on:
The distance between the detonation point and the wall
The distance between the wall and the building
The height of the protected areas in the building
The wall can be designed with heavy foundations, in

which case the blast energy on the wall will be absorbed by deep
plastic deformation. Ductility of 30-40 cm is possible as long as
shear failure is prevented.
The following factors should be considered in the design of a

blast wall:
I. The wall should be designed by a structural engineer who is

able to calculate dynamic responses and design accordingly.
``
|,,,,*^ * q @ @
soil investigations.
III. A shielding wall designed to slide will require dynamic analysis

to show that the wall will not become a projectile and impact the
building. Such a wall can be built using pre-cast wall elements.
Page 51
5.3.6C BALLISTIC STANDARDS
Figure 33: A shielding wall designed for sliding
Figure 34: Examples of blast shielding walls made of prefabricated sections

As demonstrated in the picture on the left, shield walls can be decorated and incorporated into an area's
landscape design
5.3.6D DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PERIMETER LINE

5.3.6 BALLISTIC PERIMETER LINE of a ballistic perimeter line:
5.3.6A INTRODUCTION
I. All components of the fence or partition should be designed
A ballistic perimeter line prevents a shooting incident to meet the required level of protection. This includes both the
from outside. This line can be combined with other elements to panel and the connectors.
prevent both intrusion and the ramming of vehicles. This section
relates to locations where exterior ballistic protection is required. II. If there are external areas which overlook the parts of the
Areas that may be considered for ballistic protection include facility which require protection, the protection will have to be
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,
example).
III.Every effort should be made to prevent a direct line of sight
The two concepts usually employed for preventing from the exterior into the building. This usually does not serve as
shooting assaults from outside are as follows: ballistic protection but might eliminate or at least limit the threat.
Blocking the line of sight can be achieved either by decorative or
A physical barrier to stop the penetration of a projectile. standard fencing, or by landscaping and vegetation.
A barrier made of material that blocks the line-of-sight from the

outside. This reduces the probability of the attack, but does not
stop the actual bullet.
Page 52
5.3.6E EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Figure 35: A glass ballistic partition Figure 36: A steel ballistic partition
5.4 VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN

ENTRANCES The following general measures should be considered in the
5.4.1 INTRODUCTION design of entry control points:
Wherever a perimeter line is planned, points of access VEHICLE ENTRANCES

for vehicles and pedestrians are required at various points along
If possible, the entry point should be at a location as far as
the line. These points are usually regarded as the weak links of
possible from the building or facility itself.
the perimeter as they require a breach in the protective line every
time they are opened. Access points control the time and people
Entry roads which run under parts of the building should be
permitted to enter a building or facility. In addition to controlling
avoided in all cases.
passage, access management usually includes the ability to
observe and track movement in and out of controlled areas.
If possible the access road should be designed in a way that
will force drivers to approach at low speed.
The entry points through a perimeter line will typically
consist of vehicle gates, pedestrian gates, and in some cases, a
The number of access roads and entrances to a building or site
guard post. The entry points provide places where the required
should be optimised.
level of vehicle or pedestrian screening and access control can
be implemented. The challenge of designing an entry point is
Designate an entry to the site for service and delivery vehicles,
@^ **J J, | J
preferably away from high-risk locations buildings and vulnerable
authorised access by pedestrians or vehicles.
venues.
Planning for vehicle and pedestrian access and entry
Position the entry control point to allow adequate visual
control points for a new project should begin at the initial stages
assessment of approaching vehicles.
J
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expected rates of vehicular and pedestrian access to the site.
The approach to the site should be designed according to peak
'JJ@ *JJ *

J * @
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is one of the main challenges when planning an entrance of any
road network.
kind.
Allow adequate passage for a vehicle that has been denied
For most buildings located in urban settings, the vehicle
access at the security check to exit without having to enter the
entrance often leads directly into an underground or multi-story
site or move vehicles in queue.
car park. It is important to note that the security screening of
passengers at a vehicle entrance usually does not provide the
Consider current and future inspection technologies (e.g.
same level of scrutiny as the security screening at a pedestrian
above vehicle and under vehicle surveillance systems).
entrance and therefore does not replace it. The entrance from the
car park to the building will therefore require the same screening
Anti-ramming barriers should be implemented both at the
level as the other pedestrian entrances.
entrance and exit points.
Three types of vehicle screening and two types of
Any vehicle gate on the perimeter line should provide the same
pedestrian screening entrances are required which may be at
level of protection against vehicles and intruders as that provided
separate locations or incorporated into one.
by the rest of the perimeter line.
Entrances should be designed in such a way as to enable

access control to be implemented either for unattended entry
using an access control system or by guards.
After working hours closure requirements should be taken into

account.
Page 53
PEDESTRIAN ENTRANCES
If possible, the entry point should be at a location as far as In such cases, it would be more effective to install two separate
possible from the building or facility itself. gates at the entrance for vehicles and pedestrians.
The entrance should be designed in such a way as to 5.4.2B TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
contain an attack and prevent it from progressing towards the
protected facility.
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Any pedestrian gate on the perimeter line should provide the

same level of protection against vehicles and intruders as
that provided by the rest of the perimeter line.
Entrances should be designed in such a way as to enable

access control to be implemented either for unattended entry
using an access control system or by guards.
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for communication (which may be at a distance) between the
people entering and those responsible for approving access.
After working hours closure requirements should be taken

into account.
Future needs and technologies should be facilitated.
5.4.2 VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING ENTRANCE
5.4.2A INTRODUCTION
A vehicle anti-ramming entrance is used to prevent
unauthorised vehicles from entering the premises. A combination
of elements may be used to also prevent the intrusion of
pedestrians.
A vehicle getting within close proximity of the building or

gaining access to an underground or multi-storey car park is one
of the main threats which needs to be prevented. The range of 5.4.2C VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING STANDARDS
possibilities for perpetrating threats using a vehicle is wide and
can include: The guidelines for vehicle anti-ramming here are based
I. A vehicle carrying a large explosive device driven by a suicide of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security which is commonly used
bomber. worldwide for anti-ramming barriers and walls and the UK BSI
PAS68:2007 issued by UK British Standards Institute. The SD-
II. A vehicle ramming into a building or a group of people. STD-02.01 standard considers various threat levels in the form of
III. A vehicle carrying assailants used as a carrier to break through and is aimed at preventing a vehicle ramming into the barrier
the perimeter line. from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line. As of
IV. A vehicle crashing into the perimeter by accident. Both ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007 allow for different vehicle
At the early stages of project planning, consideration @
@@
should be given to optimising the number of entrances and most
importantly, positioning them at the least vulnerable locations. When it is determined that a vehicle anti-ramming
For maximum protection, the vehicle anti-ramming decided by the facility owner/developer in consultation with the
entrance needs to be placed as far from the building as possible. architects, security and protective design/blast consultant(s). The
However, as far as possible, it should be established within the parameters to be considered should include the speed a vehicle
property’s boundary line/building lot as otherwise, approval from is able to achieve before impacting the potential barrier and the
the appropriate authorities (e.g. SLA, URA, LTA) would need to type of vehicle that is able to approach the perimeter line (e.g. car,
be sought for any barriers proposed to be installed outside the van, truck, etc.). Unless proven otherwise, the minimum standard
boundary line/building lot. for barriers should adhere to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or
the equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or PAS68:2007 standard.
Vehicle anti-ramming perimeter entrances may
q * , @ ^J*,
[ The designation for vehicle weight and impact speed
hours, but still need to provide access to pedestrians. under SD-STD-02.01 is as follows:
Page 54
Table 12A: Impact Standard SD-STD-02.01 Issued by the US
Department of State
For the designation of vehicle weight and allowed impact

speed under ASTM F2656-07, please refer to ‘Table 1: Impact
Condition Designations’ of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled
‘Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter
Barriers’ 5.
For the designation for vehicle weight and allowed

impact speed under PAS68:2007, please refer to ‘Table 2:
Vehicle Impact Test Criteria’ of the PAS68:2007 document, titled
#@
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the UK BSI PAS68:2007 in lieu of the SD-STD-02.01, only the
barriers tested using the Vehicle Impact Method (Performance
Class V) are acceptable.
The acceptable ASTM F2656-07 and UK BSI PAS

68:2007 crash tested barriers corresponding to SD-STD-02.01
are shown below.
5
Please refer to ASTM’s website to obtain the ASTM F2656-07
‘Standard test method for crash testing of perimeter barriers’
(http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2656.htm).
6
#@
^J, *: q (http://www.shop.
bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030135101).
Page 55
Table 12B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01,
ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
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Page 56
5.4.2D DESIGN OF A VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING
ENTRANCE

of a vehicle anti-ramming entrance:
I. The approach speed of a potential vehicle approaching

the perimeter line is a design criterion which should be considered
at the initial design stage when planning the access roads to
J ` q, : * J @ *

q,: ,@ ,
J*
lower the required protection level.
II. The minimum height of the barrier should be 65 cm.
III. The foundation requirements of the proposed barriers

should be considered early on since an underground car park
beneath the barrier line could limit the choice. 5.4.2E EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
SLIDING GATE
IV. Consideration should be given to any requirements for
pedestrian access as well as the vehicle anti-ramming criteria. A sliding gate can be a barrier for both vehicles and
pedestrians, however they can be very deceptive with regard to
V. Space for vehicles waiting to enter must be planned the level of protection they provide and must be massive in order
q J|@^J, J@, @ ^J,
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level. , @
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anchoring on both sides of the gate.
VI. Certain types of barriers are more suitable to extended
opening if the site does not require vehicle screening at all times Sliding gates are very slow when opening and closing
(e.g. only at elevated or high threat levels or at certain hours). and until completely closed do not provide any anti-ramming
protection. Leaf (hinged) gates are usually not able to provide
VII. Barricade Speed / Response Time. The barrier system adequate protection levels.
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time delay after activation to allow vehicles to enter or exit the
parking area.
VIII. Cycle Time / Pass-through Rates. The device pass-

through rate should be consistent with the desired vehicle
processing (3 to 15 seconds is suitable for most inspection and

*
IX. Environment. Not all barriers are suited to the

environmental conditions at all locations. Barrier components
may require protection from excessive heat, dirt, humidity, sand,
high water table, or require additional maintenance.
ARM BARRIER
X. Reliability/Maintenance. Reliability is an important factor
in selecting active barriers. Evaluate the system’s failure modes to An arm barrier provides protection from vehicles but not
ensure that the barrier will fail in the predetermined position (open from pedestrians. There are many arm barriers available, but
or closed) based on the security and operational requirements. not many meet anti-ramming standards and in order to provide
Backup generators or manual override capabilities are needed to adequate protection, they will usually be equipped with an
ensure continuous operation during power failures or equipment internal cable. The barrier needs to be fully closed to provide the
malfunction. protection level. If there is a roof above the barriers, the height of
the opened gate should be considered.
XI. Safety Options/Features. Active barrier systems are
@q, * *: ^ J * J
intended purposes. Warning devices (visible colours and patterns,
,J,J :,J *,q
used to mark the presence of a barrier and enhance its visibility to
drivers. Vehicle detector safety loops and road plates chequered
for good traction can also enhance safety.
XII. Proposed screening equipment should be based on the

ability to discover threat devices according to the relevant threat
level (e.g. if the threat to the building is a large bomb hidden in a Figure 41: The reinforcing cable (both inside
Figure 40: An anti-ramming arm barrier
car boot, a screening system to search the underside of a vehicle the arm and below it)
will not be effective).
Page 57
RETRACTABLE BOLLARDS 5.4.4 PROTECTED PEDESTRIAN ENTRANCE
Automatic retractable bollards provide protection from
5.4.4A INTRODUCTION
vehicles but not from pedestrians. They are useful because
of their relatively fast operation cycles and can therefore be A forced entry gate prevents unauthorised people from
@,JJJ ^J, entering the premises. Intruders may seek to gain entry to a
building with either criminal or terrorist intentions. In the case
Retractable bollards which meet anti-ramming standards of terrorist attacks, the entrance itself is often where the attacks
would typically require a relatively deep foundation, and so need have taken place, particularly when there is some form of security
to be located suitably. in place there.
It is recommended to have the bollards installed together When considering the pedestrian entrances at the initial planning
with a light arm barrier for visibility and safety reasons. stage of a new development project, the aims should be to:
I. Optimise the number of entrances.
II. Position the entrances at the least vulnerable locations.
For maximum protection, the entrances need to be

placed as far from the building line as possible but in all cases it
is recommended to locate them in an area that will prevent any
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or the area above an entrance could be left unoccupied to avoid
an explosion at the entrance affecting anyone above.
5.4.3 ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS

5.4.3A INTRODUCTION
An administrative barrier prevents an unauthorised
vehicle with no hostile intention from entering the premises
accidentally and is used for the administrative arrangement of
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5.4.3B DESIGN OF ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIER

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,
required, or a sliding gate if it is to serve as a pedestrian barrier
as well.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards that
are relevant for administrative barriers. 5.4.4C FORCED ENTRY STANDARDS
A standard level of forced entry is determined according

to the following three criteria:
5.4.3C EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
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, The accessibility of the area to a potential intruder both
required, or a sliding gate if it is to serve as a pedestrian barrier in terms of the length of time that an intruder can stand and work
as well. to gain entry without being disturbed, and in terms of physical
accessibility.
The importance of the site.
J J
[@ ^
Page 58
The following international standards are recommended for use XI. Where an interlocking system is required, it should be
in Singapore: implemented at entrances and exits.
XII. If screening is to be undertaken as a standard procedure

either at present or in the future, it should take place before the

,,
XIII. In case of an interlocking system, the area between

the barriers should be used as the security screening point and
preferably should be outside the perimeter line. Every attempt
should be made to avoid locating this area under populated or
vulnerable parts of the building.
XIV. If there is no choice but to locate the screening area

under parts of the building, the whole area must be strengthened
in such a way as to contain any possible attack that could take
place there.
XV. In all cases it is recommended that the entrance be

located in an area that will prevent any potential incident from
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*,q, J,
J : Jq ^
5.4.4D DESIGN OF PROTECTED PEDESTRIAN an entrance could be left unoccupied to avoid an explosion at the
ENTRANCE entrance affecting anyone above.
of a protected pedestrian entrance: XVI. Even if procedures at normal threat levels do not require
an interlocking entrance, it is recommended to try to allocate
I. A gate in the perimeter line should be built to the same necessary space in case such a procedure is required in the
protection standard as the perimeter line. future for higher threat levels.
II. A portal at the entrance should be built to the same XVII. Preparation for the installation or deployment of
protection standard as the building envelope. screening equipment should be considered, and this should
include the following:
III. The gate should prevent anyone from breaking through
as well as climbing over or under. Space for a walk-through metal detector and an x-ray
machine.
IV. Waiting areas may need to be assigned both on the J ,qJ *, *
, qJ
exterior side (pre-security screening) and on the interior side equipment (mentioned above).
(post-security screening). Suitable electricity infrastructure.
Suitable post for the guard performing the screening.
V. The different security requirements for during and after

J *J *,q XVIII. For effective screening, proper lighting is required.
VI. Cycle Time / Pass-through Rates. The device pass-

through rate should be consistent with the desired entry
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5.4.4E EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
VII. Reliability/Maintenance. Reliability is an important factor
in selecting gates or turnstiles. The system’s failure modes
should ensure that the barrier will fail in a predetermined position
(open or closed) based on security and operational requirements.
Backup generators or manual override capabilities are needed to
ensure continuous operation during power failures or equipment
malfunction.
0``` , J ::^*

issues should be resolved at early stages.
IX. Safety Options/Features – some gate systems are

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purposes. Warning devices should be used to mark the presence
of a gate.
X. It is recommended to plan for the possible upgrade of

each entrance to an interlocking system. Even though this may
not be required for current threat levels, it may be necessary in
the future.
Page 59
5.4.5 DELIVERY/SERVICE VEHICLE ACCESS CONTROL
5.4.5A INTRODUCTION
Loading docks and service access areas are a necessity

q*,J@
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In many cases, loading docks are positioned either inside the
building itself or in an underground car park and therefore careful
attention should be given to these service areas in order to avoid
*q,*
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If a delivery or service access control point is planned,

it should always be equipped with a barrier line at least to the
same standard as the vehicle access point (if it exists). It should
be noted that the vehicles at the loading dock are expected to
q
,:J^JJ J*,^J,
Figure 47: Pedestrian access point plan
point. Reference should be made to section 5.4.2 on Vehicle
Anti-Ramming Barriers for the design considerations and possible
designs used in a delivery/ service access control point.
Page 60
7
5.4.5C VEHICLE ANTI-RAMMING STANDARDS Please refer to ASTM’s website to obtain the ASTM F2656-07
‘Standard test method for crash testing of perimeter barriers’
The guidelines for vehicle anti-ramming here are based (http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2656.htm).
of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security which is commonly used 8
worldwide for anti-ramming barriers and walls and the UK BSI #@
^J, *: q J@J @
PAS68:2007 issued by UK British Standards Institute. The SD- bsigroup.com/en/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030135101).
STD-02.01 standard considers various threat levels in the form of
and is aimed at preventing a vehicle ramming into the barrier
from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line. As of
Both ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007 allow for different vehicle
@
@@
When it is determined that a vehicle anti-ramming

decided by the facility owner/developer in consultation with the
architects, security and protective design/blast consultant(s). The
parameters to be considered should include the speed a vehicle
is able to achieve before impacting the potential barrier and the
type of vehicle that is able to approach the perimeter line (e.g. car,
van, truck, etc.). Unless proven otherwise, the minimum standard
for barriers should adhere to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or
the equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or PAS68:2007 standard.
The designation for vehicle weight and impact speed

under SD-STD-02.01 is as follows:
Table 13A: Impact Standard SD-STD-02.01 Issued by the US

Department of State
For the designation of vehicle weight and allowed impact speed

under ASTM F2656-07, please refer to ‘Table 1: Impact Condition
Designations’ of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled ‘Standard
Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers’7.
For the designation for vehicle weight and allowed impact

speed under PAS68:2007, please refer to ‘Table 2: Vehicle Impact
9 J #!%>>" * , #@

for Vehicle Security Barriers’8. When adopting the UK BSI
PAS68:2007 in lieu of the SD-STD-02.01, only the barriers tested
using the Vehicle Impact Method (Performance Class V) are
acceptable.
The acceptable ASTM F2656-07 and UK BSI PAS 68:2007

crash tested barriers corresponding to SD-STD-02.01 are shown
below.
Page 61
Table 13B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01,
ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
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Notes:
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Page 62
5.4.5D DESIGN OF DELIVERY/SERVICE 5.4.6 INTERLOCKING VEHICLE ENTRANCE (FOR
VEHICLE ACCESS CONTROL HIGHER SECURITY NEEDS)
The following factors should be considered in the design 5.4.6A INTRODUCTION

of a delivery/service vehicle access control point:
An interlocking system for a vehicle entrance is used to
ensure that an authorised vehicle entering the premises is not
I. It is recommended to separate delivery entrances from main
tailed by an unauthorised vehicle which takes advantage of the
vehicle entrances.
open barrier to slip in after the authorised vehicle.
II. Separate loading docks and shipping/ receiving areas by at
An interlocking system is created by installing two lines
least 20 metres in each direction from utility rooms, utility mains,
of barriers in such a way as to guarantee that only one barrier
^ ,, ,@J

can be open at any time. This is usually controlled by electronic
, :
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means rather than procedures.
and heating mains, etc.).
Such a system is typically used where anti-ramming
III. Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed under
protection is required, so at least one of the two barrier lines
the building. If this is not possible, the area should be hardened
must be able to withstand ramming. The other line may be an
for blast and under no circumstances should the location be close
administrative barrier line as it is protected by the standing
to major structural elements.
vehicle.
IV. Loading dock design should limit damage to adjacent areas 5.4.6B TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building.
V. If loading zones or drive-through areas are necessary, monitor

them and restrict their height to keep out large vehicles.
VI. Avoid driveways to the loading docks within or under buildings.
VII. Provide signs to clearly mark separate entrances for deliveries.
VIII. It is recommended to use an interlocking vehicle entrance

for the delivery / service entrance, or at least have the ability to
upgrade to one in case of elevated or high threat levels.
IX. The delivery or service access control point should be

protected with the appropriate vehicle anti-ramming barriers,
which should be at least the same level used for the barrier line.
The same protection level is required at both entrances and exits.
X. The security screening area should be located on the exterior

of the barrier.
5.4.6C DESIGN OF INTERLOCKING VEHICLE
XI. Consideration should be given to the expected queue of ENTRANCE
delivery vehicles at peak hours and a queuing area should be The following factors should be considered in the design
considered. of an interlocking vehicle entrance:
XII. The security screening method should be discussed at I. When one of the barrier lines also forms part of the perimeter
an early stage to ensure it can be implemented. The delivery fence, it is recommended that the sliding gate be the light barrier
/ service entrance area will almost always have some form of (i.e. non-anti-ramming). This ensures quicker operation and is
security check / registering and a proper guard post should also more commercially viable.
be established. Preparation for the installation or deployment
of screening equipment should be considered. This could II. It is preferable to establish the second barrier as the anti-
include screening machinery, underground pits, extra lighting, ramming line.
underground cameras etc. all of which will require electricity
outlets and space. III.The interlocking system is required at both entrances and
exits.
XIII. Proposed screening equipment should be based on the
ability to discover threat devices according to the relevant threat IV. It is recommended to have both barriers operated by the same
level (e.g. if the relevant threat to the loading bay is a large bomb system controller.
hidden in one of the deliveries, a screening system searching the
bottom of the vehicle will not be effective). V. The area between the barriers should be used as the security
screening point and preferably should be outside the perimeter
line. Every attempt should be made to avoid locating this area
under populated or vulnerable parts of the building.
Page 63
VI. If there is no choice but to locate the screening area under 5.5 SECURITY POSTS
parts of the building, the whole area must be strengthened in
such a way as to contain any possible attack that could take place
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION
there.
Security posts are built when there is a security need to
VII. Even if procedures at normal threat levels do not require man a static location on the building’s perimeter line or at critical
an interlocking entrance, it is recommended to try to allocate positions for long periods of time. The security post is meant to
necessary space in case such a procedure is required in the enhance the ability of the security guard to perform his duties by
future for higher threat levels. being well positioned and well equipped regardless of the weather
or light conditions. It can also be used to improve his survivability
VIII. The distance between the two barrier lines should take into in case of an attack aimed at breaching the building’s perimeter.
consideration the maximum vehicle size of potential users of the
entrance (delivery trucks/ private vehicles). The actual distance Security posts can be designed and built as part of the
should be at least 150% of the size of the largest vehicle expected development or can in certain situations, be bought as a ready-
to enter. made product when only a small booth is required (usually at
vehicle entrances).
IX. The entrance should be designed in such a way as to prevent
a vehicle from bypassing the second line once it has been allowed The security posts will usually combine the ability to
J *JJ
, perform pro-active security and monitoring both physically and
using security systems.
X. Preparation for the installation or deployment of screening
equipment should be considered. This could include catering for
5.5.2 PEDESTRIAN SECURITY POSTS
electrical outlets and space.
5.5.2A INTRODUCTION
XI. For effective screening, proper lighting is required.
As seen in Section 5.4.4 a pedestrian entrance can be one of
the most vulnerable and critical locations within a site because it
5.4.6D EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
performs three main functions:
Administrative admission / information.
Access control.
Security screening.
For these reasons, a pedestrian security post could be

considered as a sensitive location which may be subjected to
#*
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balance between aesthetics, functionality and protection since
J@ ^J^ J
@
of the building.
Page 64
5.5.2B TERMS AND DEFINITIONS BALLISTIC RESISTANCE STANDARDS
5.5.2C STANDARDS
BLAST RESISTANCE STANDARDS
Due to the fact that the guard post is usually on the front line,
it is almost impossible to provide it with full protection due to its
proximity to the potential threat. Therefore it is recommended to
use medium level as standard.
5.5.2D DESIGN OF SECURITY POSTS
of a security post:
I. Security post positions on the perimeter which are securing the

J *,q ^J*
,
vision and tactical control of the area under their responsibility.
FORCED ENTRY STANDARDS II. Where necessary, the observation of the area under
responsibility should be augmented by proper lighting and
A standard level of forced entry is determined according cameras.
to the following three criteria:
III. Blind spots should be prevented and backed up by CCTV
The accessibility of the area to a potential intruder both in monitoring or mirrors if they cannot be avoided.
terms of the length of time that an intruder can stand and work
to gain entry without being disturbed, and in terms of physical IV. No critical controls for the building security systems should
accessibility. be placed in the perimeter or entrance security post. Exceptions
can be made only if the security post has an adequate protection
The importance of the site. level.
J J
[@ ^ V. The systems in the security post should be fail-safe to ensure
the site remains sealed if the post is breached. If the post is not in
an area secured from the potential threat in the exterior side, the
The following international standards are recommended for use line between the security post and the inner side of the building
in Singapore: should be protected to prevent any potential problem moving into
the building.
VI. The entrance to the security post should be from the inner
area and not from the outside.
VII. If the security post is on the building line, it should be carefully

considered if access is needed both between the security post and
the screening area and between the security post and the inner
building area. This should be avoided or where unavoidable, a
high level of forced-entry protection must be installed.
VIII. A security control room, if it exists, should have the ability

to overrule the access control systems operated by the security
post.
Page 65
5.5.3 VEHICLE ENTRANCE SECURITY POST 5.6 LANDSCAPING
5.5.3A INTRODUCTION
5.6.1 INTRODUCTION
A vehicle entrance is one of the most vulnerable and The clear zone is the area between the buildings and
critical locations within a site. For that reason, designing an the perimeter line. Unrestricted visibility is required in order to
effective security post at this point has a major effect on the future ensure that no approach will be unnoticed and package-sized
protection level provided to the site. As the vehicle entrance point objects cannot be abandoned without detection. A clear zone
is usually on or close to the building lot line, design mistakes are can be achieved by using a combination of civil and architectural
^:
*, @,,: [ elements with exterior landscaping.
achieved. Vehicle entrance security booths are in common use in
a wide range of developments. They typically perform three main
tasks: 5.6.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Administrative admission (charging parking fees).
Access control.
Security screening.
In higher security developments (such as building type

Y as referred to in these guidelines), it is recommended to divide
these three tasks into three physically separate positions. Due to
their critical role in providing protection to the assets by keeping
unauthorised vehicles away, a certain protection level is required
for the post itself.
5.5.3B DESIGN OF VEHICLE ENTRANCE

SECURITY POST

of a vehicle entrance security post:
I. Security post positions on the perimeter which are securing the

J *,q ^J*
, 5.6.3 DESIGN OF LANDSCAPING
vision and tactical control of the area under their responsibility.
In a typical facility there are two zones of protection for
II. Where necessary, the observation of the area under
the Clear Zone; namely Zones 1 and 2.
responsibility should be augmented by proper lighting and
cameras.
ZONE Zone 1 (see diagram) is the first 2 metres adjacent to the structure. Within
III. Blind spots should be prevented and backed up by CCTV 1: Zone 1 there should be no planted material or landscape feature that is
taller than 15 centimetres.
monitoring or mirrors if they cannot be avoided. ZONE Zone 2 starts 2 metres from the structure and extends to 10 metres from the
2: structure. Within Zone 2 there should be no planted material or landscape
IV. No critical controls for any building security system should feature that is taller than 50 centimetres or wider than 40 centimetres.
be placed in the perimeter or entrance security post. Exceptions Plants should be selected that do not obscure more than 20% of the ground
in any place. Plants may be taller than 50 centimetres at full maturity as
can be made only if the security post has an adequate protection long as they do not have a horizontal density that obscures more than 10%
level. of the ground and wall systems in any place. Plants or landscape features
may be clustered to create planters or monuments as long as they do not
obscure visibility of more than 10% of the ground or wall systems in any
V. The systems in the security post should be fail-safe to ensure place and do not create hiding places for a package
the site remains sealed if the post is breached.
VI. The entrance to the vehicle security post should be from the
inner area and not from the outside.
VII. If the security post is on the building line, it should be carefully

considered if access is needed both between the security post and
the screening area and between the security post and the inner
building area. This should be avoided or where unavoidable, a
high level of forced-entry protection must be installed.
VIII. A security control room, if it exists, should be able to override

the access control systems operated by the vehicle entrance
security post.
IX. The vehicle entrance security post should have enough

allocated space to house all screening equipment for both
currently planned and future options.
Page 66
5.6.4 EXAMPLE OF DESIGN 5.7.2 SECURITY LIGHTING - PERIMETER LINE AND
ENTRANCES
5.7.2A INTRODUCTION
Lighting along the perimeter line, together with other

alarm and surveillance systems is a basic tool in the detection
of intruders into an installation. The lighting around the entrance
points of an installation is often critical to the proper operation of
access control. The lighting types and coverage should therefore
be designed carefully based on the intended security screening
methods at the site.
Note that the need for a clear zone can be reduced if

stronger controls are used on the outer security ring or if the
building structure’s resistance to blast effects is increased.
5.7 SECURITY LIGHTING
5.7.1 INTRODUCTION
Security lighting increases visibility around perimeters,

buildings, and sensitive locations and also acts as a deterrent.
It should therefore be provided at the perimeter to allow security
personnel to maintain visual observation during darkness both by
direct surveillance and through the CCTV system. It is a security
management tool that is applicable in almost all environments
within an urban development, and should be considered when
installing other access control systems, particularly those focusing
on surveillance.
At a minimum, all access points, the perimeter and

restricted areas should be illuminated from sunset to sunrise or
during periods of low visibility. In some circumstances, lighting
may not be required, but these circumstances must be addressed
in the building’s security plan. Lighting however, also needs to be
matched to the operating environment and this should be taken
into consideration during planning. For example, lighting can also
make a critical difference in the effectiveness of the CCTV system
at night.
Page 67
Page 68
5.7.2C ILLUMINATION STANDARDS ENTRANCES
The recommended standards are based on the US DOT I. All vehicle and pedestrian entrances to the facility should have
standards FTA-TRI-MA-267085-05 and DOT-VNTSC-FTA-05-02. appropriate lighting.

II. Lighting at manned entrances must be adequate to identify
people, examine credentials, inspect vehicles entering or
departing the facility premises through designated control points
(vehicle interiors should be clearly lit), and prevent anyone from
entering unobserved into the premises.
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environmental conditions.
IV. Lighting intensity at entrances should be planned to ensure

that drivers arriving at the facility can readily recognise the
premises and see where to drive their vehicle.
V. Lighting should not be placed in such a way as to blind the

driver.
VI. Security posts at entrance points should have a reduced level

of interior lighting to enable the security guards to see better,
increase their night vision adaptability, and avoid inward viewing.
VII. The control for the lighting system should be in a secured

area, preferably in the security control room.
5.8 POSITIONING OF CAR PARKS AND

5.7.2D DESIGN OF SECURITY LIGHTING
CRITICAL UTILITIES
of security lighting: 5.8.1 INTRODUCTION
PERIMETER LINE Addressing security issues during the initial stages of a

development project has an enormous impact on the ability to
implement cost effective protective solutions. By eliminating or
I. Where perimeter lighting is required, the lighting units for a limiting the possibility of carrying out an effective attack, the need
@,J *,q, *
JJ to harden the building or vulnerable areas can be reduced.
protected area and above the fence so that the coverage will
include an area both inside and outside the fence. The following can make a critical difference to the outcome of a
terror event:
II. Light poles should be positioned in such a way as to prevent
Stand-off distance between potential threat areas and either
anyone from climbing over the fence or into the building.
critical areas or areas where people gather.
III. Perimeter lighting should be continuous on both sides of Good positioning of the buildings or vulnerable areas within
J@,J *,q*
*@@ J990 the lot.
system.
Whilst the stand-off is hard to achieve because of
IV. The cone of illumination from lighting units should be directed land scarcity and other architectural considerations, the
downward and outward from the structure or area being protected. right positioning is able to considerably compensate this
Cones of illumination should overlap to provide coverage in the lack of stand-off.
event of bulb burnout.
For example, if the building’s lot has a public road that
runs along it, the structure positioning should try to maximise
V. The lighting should be arranged so as to create minimal
the distance between the road and the structure or areas where
shadows and minimal glare in the eyes of security guards. people gather.
VI. The control for the system should be in a secured area, The congregation of a large number of people behind
preferably in the security control room. large glass façades in public areas poses a great risk and exposed
façades opposite public areas should not be used as the main
VII. The lighting should be turned on automatically by a clock or light source for the interior of the building. Internal façades can
photoelectric cell. be used for the main source of light and the location of crowded
areas. The internal positioning of the various functional areas
VIII. The lighting design should consider the future matured state JJJ,* J Jq,:
of the vegetation used in the landscaping. protect them.
Page 69
This section will focus on two main areas whose
5.8.3 POSITIONING OF CRITICAL UTILITIES
positioning is particularly sensitive:
Car parks
Critical Utilities 5.8.3A INTRODUCTION
,::*
J*q
5.8.2 POSITIONING OF CAR PARKS the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical
for safely evacuating people from the building or to the emergency
5.8.2A INTRODUCTION response to an attack. Their destruction could cause damage
that is disproportionate to other building damage resulting from
Car parks constitute a relatively simple opportunity to |@, |@, *,qJ
q *
introduce large quantities of explosives to a building’s vicinity *, |@, J * J
|*J
or to its sensitive and vulnerable areas. Limiting or restricting or smoke ventilation systems not functioning can be much higher
parking can help to keep threats away from a building, however than the direct results of the explosion.
in dense urban environments such as Singapore, parking spaces
in close proximity to the building, and underground parking are
common. Mitigating the risks caused by parking in close proximity 5.8.3B DESIGN OF CRITICAL UTILITIES
can be achieved by creative design measures, including parking
regimes, perimeter buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening The following factors should be considered in the design
and other architectural and engineering solutions. Operational of critical utilities:
measures may also be necessary to inspect or screen vehicles
entering car parks. I. Plan the utilities to be underground, concealed, and protected.
II. Provide redundancy to life saving utility systems.

5.8.2B DESIGN OF CAR PARKS
The following factors should be considered in the III.Protect water treatment plants and storage tanks by limiting
positioning of car parking areas: and securing access points, such as manholes.
I. Vehicle parking areas should be as far as possible from the IV. Locate the main fuel storage away from areas that can be
building’s highly populated areas. easily accessed.
II. Parking areas should be separated by at least 20 meters 0,, *,J q
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from utility rooms, utility mains and service entrances, including from the outside of the building thereby limiting the need for
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service vehicles to enter.
suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.
VI. Locate garbage containers as far away from the building as
III.Parking under the building is not recommended but if possible.
unavoidable, the building should be hardened for blast and if
vehicle access close to major structural elements is unavoidable, VII. Conceal incoming utility systems within building and property
the major structural elements must be protected against blast. lines.
IV. The design of the car park should limit damage to adjacent VIII. Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on exterior
areas and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building. walls or on walls shared with mailrooms, loading docks etc.
V. If possible, separate resident and visitor parking and locate To limit opportunities for aggressors to place explosives
visitor or general public parking near, but not on, the site itself. underneath buildings, ensure that access to crawl spaces, utility
tunnels, and other means of under building access is controlled.
VI. If possible, design the parking lot with one-way circulation. All utility penetrations of a site’s perimeter barrier, including
penetrations in fences, walls, or other perimeter structures,
VII. Prohibit parking within the stand-off zone based on the ability should be sealed or secured to eliminate openings large enough
of the structure and its materials to withstand a potential threat. for an intruder to pass through the barrier. Typical penetrations
could be for storm sewers, water, electricity, or other site utility
VIII. Provide parking lots with adequate lighting and with CCTV services.
cameras connected to the security system.
IX. Height limitations should be imposed to limit the size of

vehicles allowed to the car park or to highly vulnerable areas.
¡' J**

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be considered carefully
Page 70
6 BUILDING FAÇADES
This chapter describes construction methods, solutions The following protection elements appear in this chapter:
and protection elements relating to the building’s envelope
including façades and openings. The façades at the building’s
envelope walls are the main protection against most criminal and
terror related threats including silent or forced entry, shootings
and explosions.
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic protection

design guidelines enabling architects and engineers to make
decisions regarding doors, windows, envelope walls and building
materials. These decisions should be based on knowledge
and understanding of the relevant design criteria, protection
requirements and the building’s characteristics as described in
Chapter 3.
Standards
Every wall or protection element mentioned in Chapter
6 must minimally meet the relevant building codes and

internationally recognised standards: 6.2 DEFINITIONS AND STANDARDS
Blast resistance 6.2.1 DEFINITIONS
Forced entry
Ballistic resistance
Pre-fabricated wall elements and curtain wall systems

are the dominant construction systems in modern countries.
In Singapore, the trend towards industrial construction of
prefabricated walls, beams and column is prevalent. These
guidelines will focus on these construction systems.
This chapter contains descriptions and technical

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at the building’s facades and openings. The Protection
Recommendation Tables (PRT) in Chapter 4 refer to the various
elements in this chapter.
Each protection element is described in its own section

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protection elements in this chapter can be implemented even
if they are not indicated as recommended in the PRT. In this
case, the design team should refer to the protection role of the
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element, the levels of protection are mentioned and standards
are described. The level of detail provided is not intended to
@ ^ *,, J, @
q* J @ ^ q
knowledge and to assist in the procurement procedure to ensure
that the right demands are made of suppliers and/or protection
engineers.
The guidelines cover basic design principals and

materials that are commonly used in Singapore. If a proposed
building system or product design is not mentioned in the
guidelines, it is recommended to refer to the recommended
protection level for the closest relevant system or design whilst
applying best engineering practice. In such a case it is also
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design/blast consultant.
Page 71
6.2.2 STANDARDS FOR BLAST RESISTANCE
Blast Resistance
6.2.3 STANDARDS FOR FORCED-ENTRY RESISTANCE

Forced-entry Resistance
6.2.4 STANDARDS FOR BALLISTIC RESISTANCE

Ballistic Resistance
Page 72
6.3 BUILDING WALLS
6.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Envelope walls have many architectural and functional
roles in the building and in some cases they form the main
structural support. In this section, the protection roles of the
building envelope walls and the need for the addition of special
protection elements will be discussed. The objective of this
chapter is to provide basic protection design guidelines to enable
architects to make decisions about the type of doors, windows,
envelope walls and building materials to use for any given building
or facility. To fully understand the security and protection role of
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read the General Architectural Considerations in Section 2.2.
The main protection and security functions of the envelope walls

are:
Sealing the inner parts of the building against silent or forced

entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads, bullets

and shrapnel.
Concealing the activity inside the building from external

intelligence gathering or targeting.
Providing structural support to the building.
The external walls should be straight without recesses,

JJ *, * J @,
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recommended that columns are positioned behind the external
wall, thereby enabling the external wall façade to shield the
,*` J @ q,J ,*J *,q*JJ In the above diagrams, it can be seen that in Figure
the external wall. In all cases, the narrow side of the column 55: External wall with exposed column line, the column line is
should face the external threat. It is not recommended to use exposed and the external wall is recessed whereas in Figure 56:
exposed external columns or exposed transfer beams. External Column line protected by external wall, the columns and transfer
walls recessed behind a line of exposed transfer beams and beams are shielded by the external wall and straight wall columns
columns that might be directly affected from an explosion in the are not exposed to direct blast loads.
vicinity are particularly dangerous and may cause heavy blast

6.3.2 PRE-CAST LOAD BEARING WALLS
INTRODUCTION
In-situ reinforced concrete walls are the most cost-

effective method of protection in the building industry. The
highest level of protection is achieved when construction
methods, details and materials are according to those required
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Today’s construction methods favour the use of pre-cast load
bearing elements rather than in-situ reinforced concrete walls. It
is therefore critical that the same guidelines for wall strengthening
are followed for pre-cast elements where protection is required
for high blast loads.
DESIGN OF PRE-CAST LOAD BEARING WALLS
Standards
All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
Page 73
In general, the standard pre-cast load bearing walls DESIGN OF NON-LOAD BEARING WALL PANELS
which are commonly used in the building industry in Singapore
provide relatively high resistance to blast loads. A typical vehicle-
borne IED (VBIED) at a distance of approximately 10m from the Standards
building will create an impulse of 500 psi*msec. At this level, the All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
wall itself will be severely damaged but is expected to continue be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
to support the vertical loads of the building. The recommended guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
general design criteria for pre-cast load bearing walls should
include the following:
In general, the standard pre-cast walls which are commonly
I. Blast resistance. The pre-cast load bearing wall must be used in the building industry in Singapore provide relatively
able to withstand a full range of expected blast loads and should high resistance to blast loads. A typical VBIED at a distance of
preferably exceed the expected parameters. Among the many approximately 10m from the building will create an impulse of
aspects to consider, the structural engineer must design the 500 psi*msec. At this level, the wall may be destroyed, but the
steel reinforcement and concrete characteristic according to the **J*J^J,, :
causing secondary fragments of concrete and building materials
@ @
J JJ |@
due to the blast leakage. The recommended general design
act on the wall in an explosive event. A professional protective criteria for pre-cast non-load bearing wall panels should include
design/blast consultant/engineer may be essential if there are the following:
special requirements.
I. Blast resistance. The pre-cast load bearing wall must
II. Forced entry. If the connection details and the section be able to withstand a full range of expected blast loads and
properties are planned correctly, a pre-cast load bearing wall can should preferably exceed the expected parameters. Among the
withstand a high level of forced entry. A professional protective many aspects to consider, the structural engineer must design
design/blast consultant/engineer may be essential if there are the steel reinforcement and concrete characteristic according to
special requirements. The most sensitive parts of the wall are J@ @
J JJ|@
the openings for windows, doors and utilities where the required act on the wall in an explosive event. A professional protective
level of forced entry protection must be ensured. design/blast consultant/engineer may be essential if there are
special requirements.
III. Ballistic Resistance. 10 cm of concrete can very easily
withstand bullets and other projectiles but close attention must be II. Forced entry. If the connection details and the section
given to the connection details for doors, windows, and adjacent properties are planned correctly, a pre-cast load bearing wall can
walls to ensure that they offer the same level of protection. withstand a high level of forced entry. A professional protective
design/blast consultant/engineer may be essential if there are
special requirements. The most sensitive parts of the wall are
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
the openings for windows, doors and utilities where the required
level of forced entry protection must be ensured.
III. Ballistic Resistance. 10 cm of concrete can very easily

withstand bullets and other projectiles but close attention must be
given to the connection details for doors, windows, and adjacent
walls to ensure that they offer the same level of protection.
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
6.3.3 NON-LOAD BEARING WALL PANELS
INTRODUCTION
Non-load bearing wall panels should be supported

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#@
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can provide resistance to high blast loads. In general, the
standard connection details currently used in the building industry
are adequate to provide resistance to medium blast loads.
The above-mentioned resistance only relates to the

panel and not for the supporting building components. In the
event of an explosion, blast loads on the panels will be transferred
to the supporting elements of the building and therefore adequate
consideration must be given to them as well.
Page 74
6.3.4 LIGHT WALLS EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
INTRODUCTION
Light walls or light metal walls are used mainly for
*,
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are sensitive to vertical loads and may not be able to support
more solid structures. They can also be used as internal light
metal walls placed behind external curtain walls which would not
otherwise provide the necessary level of protection (See Section
6.4 for more information). The protection capabilities of light walls
are limited in the following ways:
Blast resistance is limited to low pressure. If the light walls

need to resist higher pressure, special details will need to be
applied.
Forced entry resistance is limited however it is possible to add

special details to increase its resistance.
Resistance to bullets and other projectiles is very limited, but

special materials may be applied to increase protection either as
cladding or as an inner layer.
DESIGN OF LIGHT WALLS
Standards
There is a wide range of options for light walls but in

general, a metal façade of a building has a low resistance to blast
loads, projectiles and forced entry. It is recommended that where
higher levels of protection are required, a custom designed wall
can be used (possibly as a second layer behind the external
façade), which can be designed to provide either blast, ballistic or
forced entry protection:
I. Blast resistance. Custom designed walls can meet the full

range of blast loads thereby compensating for the low level of
protection typically provided by light walls.
II. Forced entry. Custom designed walls can meet the full range of 6.4 CURTAIN WALLS
forced entry requirements.
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
III. Ballistic resistance. Custom designed walls can meet the full
range of resistance requirements to bullets and other projectiles. Curtain walls are used very frequently in modern
architectural design. In this section, the protection roles of
curtain walls and the need for the addition of special protection
elements will be discussed. The objective of this chapter is to
provide basic protection design guidelines to enable architects to
make decisions about which doors, windows, envelope walls and
building materials to use for any given facility, based on knowledge
and understanding of the relevant design considerations and
the building’s characteristics as described in Chapter 3. To fully
understand the security and protection role of the envelope walls,

J,
Architectural Considerations in Section 2.2. The main protection
and security roles of the curtain walls, windows and doors are:
Sealing the inner parts of the building against silent or forced

entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads, bullets

and shrapnel.
Page 75
Concealing the activity inside the building from external Protection is further enhanced if the bite of the curtain
intelligence gathering or targeting. wall frames is increased in order to retain the “binding” of the
laminated glass together with structural silicone sealant is used to
Preventing fragments of building material from hitting people adhere the laminated glass to the frame. In all cases, the overlap
inside the building. between the glass and its frame should be as large as possible.
The minimal size of the bite should be 20mm. This attention to
In general it is recommended to use fully framed curtain the size of the bite and the sealant attachment will prevent the
walls which, when designed in accordance with these guidelines, J ,, :
will provide basic protection to occupants of the building. The use becoming a large projectile.
@ ,,,
,:*J
casualty level in the case of a terror attack involving explosives The laminated inner glass must be glued to the framing
or forced entry. Point supported curtain walls and other curtain members with a four sided structural silicone adhesive, preferably
wall systems are not as desirable as a fully framed curtain wall, a two-part “shop glazed’ application of structural silicone. This will
due to the concentration of loads on the elements providing the enable the PVB membrane to act as a blast shield and prevent
support. If however, a point supported curtain wall is to be used, JJ *, : J Jq*,
applying laminated glazing and a catcher system to it will reduce It will also prevent the glazing from detaching from the frames and
the casualty level. allow the system to fully realise the energy absorbing capacity of
the glass.
6.4.2 FULLY FRAMED GLASS CURTAIN WALLS
Applying these recommendations will provide a basic
INTRODUCTION level of protection.
The purpose of protective glazing is to prevent or reduce

casualties and damage in case of an attack against the building EXAMPLE OF VALID DESIGNS
or its vicinity. In the event of an explosion, attempt at forced entry
,,
,*,,,^,:
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glass debris from the damaged façade can cause many casualties
because of its hazardous nature. The creation and impact of
such debris, termed secondary fragmentation, can be effectively
controlled by means of protective glazing materials.
Protective glazing should be considered for all

exterior windows/curtain walls including skylights where
blast overpressures, shrapnel and projectiles may produce a
hazardous condition. Applying these protective design features
will dramatically reduce the risk to occupants, the building and
its equipment. Protective designs should take into consideration
blast, as well as ballistic and forced entry resistance in the
,^ , *J J * , qq: J
densely populated areas.
DESIGN OF FULLY FRAMED GLASS CURTAIN WALLS 6.4.3 POINT SUPPORTED OR OTHER CURTAIN WALL
SYSTEMS
of fully framed glass curtain walls:
INTRODUCTION
The ability to resist loads is a function of the connection Glass facades which are not fully framed are attached
to the supporting frame and the type of glazing. Annealed glass to the building structure with metal hangers that are connected
can resist minimal blast pressure whereas heat-strengthened to the glass by point supports. These systems provide relatively
glass, fully tempered glass and laminated glass can resist larger poor protection. Point supported systems are not capable of
pressure loads. The post-damage behaviour of glass determines withstanding high blast pressure loads. The supports concentrate
the hazard to the occupants. Unlike annealed glass, fully tempered the blast forces at the four corners of the glazing and as a result,
glass breaks into pebble sized pieces. Laminated glass has one there are large stress concentrations in the glass corner supports.
Instead of absorbing energy (by bending), the components of
of the most desirable post-damage behaviour with its ability to
point supported systems can turn into large projectiles with high
hold the fragments in place after the glass fractures. The most energy. These types of glass facades do not provide a high level
effective protective glazing utilises laminated glass, connected of protection against forced entry and in order to achieve higher
to the mullions with structural silicone sealant. Insulated glazing protection levels, special designs and glass systems must be
panels (thermo-panels) can be very effective if interior laminated used.
,*
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structural silicone sealant. In this case, it is recommended that Where a higher level of protection is needed, secondary
the laminated glazing be made out of heat strengthened glass. protection systems can also be added to the glass façade to
J J @, J * @
, enhance the protection levels without touching the original curtain
element, but testing has proven that the external glass adds to wall.
the protection level of the glazing.
Standards
Page 76
DESIGN OF POINT SUPPORTED CURTAIN WALL DESIGN OF STONE OR METAL FINISHED LIGHT WALLS
SYSTEMS
The following factors should be considered in the design ,
J,J,,
of point supported curtain wall systems:
In the event of an explosion, protected façades will
In general, it is not recommended to use point supported probably transfer part of the attack’s force into the building’s
curtain walls due to their limited resistance to blast loads. structure. This transferred force must be calculated and
considered when designing the structure. Some products will
Where a higher level of protection is needed, a secondary transfer more energy than others and their performance under
protection system should be added to the glass façade. This may extreme conditions must be proven by the manufacturer in
be in the form of a catcher system. test conditions or by calculation. The failure mechanism of the
protection element must be provided to the design team and
studied in order to ensure that it will not cause more damage than
Standards an unprotected façade.
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail. Standards
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
Stone is a fairly brittle material, therefore when using

stone panels, it is advisable that the backing elements be
designed as a debris catcher system. In general, stone panels
are not recommended for locations where large numbers of
people gather. If they should be located in such areas with mass
congregation, it is recommended to install the panels above head
JJ$% J ,q
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
6.4.4 STONE OR METAL FINISHED LIGHT WALLS
INTRODUCTION
Transparent or decorative walls, constructed of light
, : J,J
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buildings. These wall systems are relatively weak and provide
little protection against most threats including blast or forced entry.
There are two major ways to enhance its protection capabilities:
To specially design it for protection with stronger materials and

connection details.
To add an extra protection layer behind the standard façade.

The protection layer can be designed as a decorative feature like
wooden bars or a steel mesh.
A stone or metal panel façade can be designed to

withstand blast or forced entry by using materials with a steel or
concrete backing, which have been fully tested and approved, and
specially design connections. Any such design must be tested by
*,
,q : @ ^q:,*, *,
to be able to withstand the expected force and impulses. The
architect will usually not be limited in his façade design since
the protection elements, which are typically on the inner parts
of the façade, will not interfere with the exterior aesthetics of the
building.
Page 77
6.5 WINDOWS
Protective windows and glazing should be considered for
6.5.1 INTRODUCTION all exterior windows where blast overpressures may produce a
Windows are used in every building for light and J * `*:q* :q
occasionally for ventilation. However, they are normally a weak and from exposure to direct blast pressures. In general, basic
point in the protection envelope of the building. The building protection should be applied:
industry has recognised the problem and there are many
available products that can meet the required protection levels. + J
J JJ
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic protection design
guidelines to enable architects to make decisions about which To windows in the building’s facades which are not subject to
windows and building materials to use for any given building or the threat.
facility. In order to understand the security and protection role of
J
# To windows in internal courtyards.
^ ,

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The main protection and security roles of windows are: q
J,*,q,,^,#@,|@
J *,q@@, JJ
Protecting the inner parts of the building against silent or forced to recommendations and threats.
entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads, bullets,

other projectiles and shrapnel.
Preventing fragments of building material from hitting people

inside.
` , J @ J *, q

|
cannot be opened) and could be designed as an integral part of
a curtain wall system or glass façade between slabs or applied
as an integral part of pre-fabricated wall panels. Windows that
can be opened do not provide as high a level of protection and
should be only be used at certain areas to allow for cleaning,
maintenance or emergency access.
6.5.2 BLAST PROTECTED WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION
STANDARDS FOR GLAZING HAZARD PROTECTION
There are many commercially available windows which
meet different protective levels. Only windows which have The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) blast
q* *,,:@@ ^q:
,,q : protection criteria have been adopted by the Interagency
should be used. The test report must be attached to the detailed Security Committee (ISC) and are the most widely recognised
installation drawings enabling installation and supervision in line ,
,^, ,J@
with the testing method. Without clear and approved construction table below).
drawings, it is impossible to validate the installation of the protected
windows. Although most of the blast protected commercial

| q @
case of emergency. It is recommended to place the windows
which can be opened (whether they be protected or unprotected)
in less populated areas.
While tilt or tilt-turn windows are available, such windows

will meet the protective criteria only when the windows are closed
and fully locked. There are four basic protection levels (refer to
Blast Resistance Standards in Section 6.2). For higher protection
levels, only approved tested products can be used.
The purpose of using protective windows and glazing

is to reduce (or prevent) casualties and damage in the event of
an explosion outside the building. Glass debris can cause many
casualties and damage because of the velocity and shape of
J: JJ : q
effectively controlled by means of protective glazing materials.
Typically, as the level of blast protection increases, so does the
level of forced entry resistance and ballistic protection, in addition
to the expected life span of the product. It is recommended to
check all these parameters with the manufacturer.
Page 78
Table15: GSA/ISC Performance Conditions for Window System Response
DESIGN OF BLAST-PROTECTED WINDOWS Annealed glass can resist minimal blast pressure
whereas heat-strengthened glass, fully tempered glass and
laminated glass can resist larger pressure loads. The post damage
The ability to resist loads is a function of: behaviour of glass determines the hazard to the occupants.
Unlike annealed glass, fully tempered glass breaks into pebble
The connection of the window to the supporting frame. sized pieces. Laminated glass, which includes an interlayer of
The connection of the glazing to the frame of the window. [J[
,#+:@,,:@ ,:^:,q*:,0JJ
The type of glazing. most desirable post-damage behaviour with its ability to hold the
fragments in place after the glass fractures. The most effective
Standards protective glazing utilises laminated glass, which is adhered to
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) blast the frame of the window with structural silicone sealant. Insulated
protection criteria have been adopted by the Interagency glazing panels (thermo-panels) can be very effective if interior
Security Committee (ISC) and are the most widely ,,*
| J J
! with structural silicone sealant. In this case, it is recommended
that the laminated glazing will be made out of heat strengthened
!
glass. With thermo panels, the outer pane is considered a
Refer to Chapter 6.2 for Details.
,,q*J@ ^JJ|,,
adds to the protection level of the glazing.
The supporting frame can be a reinforced concrete wall
element or equivalent. The window frame can be constructed
from materials including aluminium, HPVC, steel or others. If a Protection is further enhanced if the bite of the curtain wall
window is to be opened, the ability to transfer loads from the frame frames is increased in order to retain the “binding” of laminated
of the window to the supporting frame of the building depends on glass together with structural silicone sealant is used to adhere
the locking mechanism. In most commercial windows, the ability the laminated glass to the frame. This attention to the size of the
of the locking mechanism to resist blast loads is very limited. bite and the sealant attachment will prevent the entire sheet of
,, : q ,
projectile. The minimal recommended bite is 20mm.
Page 79
The laminated inner glass must be glued to the framing
members with a four sided structural silicone adhesive, preferably
a two-part “shop glazed’ application of structural silicone or
*^,J,,q,J[J[
, J,
glass to act as a blast shield and prevent the shattered outer
, : J Jq*,`,,, @^
the glazing from detaching from the frames and allow the system
to fully realise the energy absorbing capacity of the glass.
#* J [J[

, J J
mechanically connected anchorage system further reduces the
likelihood of the glazing system exiting the frame. Mechanical
attachment includes anchoring methods that employ screws
q@JJ J
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or four sides. The mechanical attachment method can be less
aesthetically pleasing when compared to the “shop glazed”
approach because additional framework is necessary.
Applying these recommendations will provide a basic level

of protection.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
6.5.3 BALLISTIC PROTECTED WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION
There are many commercially available bullet resistant

windows which meet different protective levels. Only windows
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,
laboratory should be used. The test report must be attached
to the detailed installation drawings enabling installation and
supervision in line with the testing method. Special care should
be taken at the connection of the ballistic protection, the wall and
its supporting frame. Without clear and approved construction
drawings, it is impossible to validate the installation of the
protected windows.
DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PROTECTED WINDOWS
The protective components of the bullet resistant windows

J *, q @@ ^ q:
,q : J
most common method of providing ballistic protection in windows
is by combining thick glazing with steel plates which are used to
protect the connecting details to the supporting frame. The test
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with the steel corner protection to ensure that identical products
are installed on site. Some commercial windows use aluminium
or ceramic materials instead of steel plate which is acceptable
, J
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followed.
Standards
The European EN standard should be used.
Refer to Chapter 6.2.4 for details.
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some can be opened either for maintenance or in an emergency.
` ,
| q*,,
because the connection detail to the supports will only involve one
frame. Windows which can be opened usually require two frames
– one for the glazing and one for the connection to the supporting
element. While tilt, tilt/turn or sliding windows are available, such
windows will only meet the protective criteria when the windows
are closed and fully locked.
Page 80
Bullet resistant windows can be used as an integral part
of a curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general it
is recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated concrete
panel or in-situ reinforced concrete wall. The connection detail
between a ballistic protected window and a reinforced concrete
opening is relatively simple, with minimal gaps/holes. The
connection detail to a structural steel frame is also straight forward
q*J , *,,
*,
in general not recommended.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
GUIDE SPECIFICATION
GLASS-CLAD POLYCARBONATE
Each unit of glass should be designed for applications where

ballistics performance is primary and optical characteristics are
secondary.
The protected side of window is a mar resistant polycarbonate

with the Threat Side a glass surface.
Each unit should have a nominal overall thickness of 1.25”.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
#'9$<[>##@
J*,+,
Glass Clad Polycarbonate.
#'9$>![>!##@
+,,
KEY FEATURES OF BULLET-RESISTANT SYSTEMS:

INSTALLATION
*|,@
,,, @,,**,, :
J@,, @,

,,@, Follow recommended glazing installations as set forth in:
#*:
Glass Association of North America Glazing Manual.
Compliance with standards for bullet-resistant windows, doors Glass Association of North America Sealant Manual.
JJ@@ @

Wide range of designs.
High level of system security.
Page 81
Page 82
6.5.4 FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION Forced entry windows can be used as an integral part

of a curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general
Forced entry resistant windows serve as an integral part it is recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated
of secured buildings, especially on the ground levels. Protection concrete panel or in-situ reinforced concrete. The connection
,^, ,^,: JJ
^ * : detail between forced entry protected windows and a reinforced
resistance level. For comparison, the normal anti–housebreaking concrete opening is relatively simple, with minimal gaps/holes.
steel bars commonly found on windows will not withstand more The connection detail to a structural steel frame is also straight
than two minutes of forced entry. forward but the connection detail to a standard aluminium curtain
,,
*,,
Modern forced entry resistant windows can be designed
with no visible bars or protection elements by using glass
(laminated or polycarbonate), frames and locking mechanisms STEEL GRILL
JJ @
,,: J @*@ J It is common to protect windows against forced entry
many commercially available forced entry protected windows by adding steel grills. Although it may not be aesthetically
which meet the various protective levels. Forced entry resistant pleasing, they are usually a cost effective solution that provides
q* ,: @q:
protection when the window is open. The grill must be designed
report from an approved laboratory. The test report must include in accordance with the forced entry standards, including its
detailed installation drawings which will allow the windows to be connection details. There are many commercially available
installed and checked against the tested product. Special care forced entry grills but care must be taken to ensure that they meet
J
J*,
should be taken at the connections between the wall and its
supporting frame and the window’s frame and the wall’s frame. It is recommended to install the forced entry resistant grill
Without approved construction drawings that include clear details internally to the glass window so that the grill can also act as a
of the protected connections, it will not be possible to validate the catcher system for additional blast protection.
installation of the protected windows as an equivalent product to
the tested sample.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
DESIGN OF FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED WINDOWS
The protective components of the forced entry windows

J *,q@@ ^q:
,q :J
common method of providing forced entry resistance in windows
is by combining the glazing itself, the connection details between
the glazing and the sub-frame, and the locking mechanism to the
frame of the wall (in the case of opening windows). The test
@ * ,*
J , J ,
mechanism (in the case of opening windows) and the wall
connection of the frame.
+ :

,q
q:@ ,JJ@
,*,
and electric). For every protection level, there is different set of
tools and time limits by which the technicians have to open a
window of a predetermined size. The difference in the standards
is that the US DOS standard is based on a manual set of tools
(mainly against the attack of a massive unorganized mob)
whereas the EN standards are based on the use of electric tools
assuming a smaller and more organized group attempting forced
and silent entry. The project team must make the decision on the
standard that is more suitable for the building in question.
Standards
The US Department of State 12-FAH-5 standard or the
European standard ENV 1630: 1999 should be used.
Refer Chapter 6.2.3 for details.
' ,
|J JJ
be opened are usually designed for maintenance or emergency
| ` , *
| :
protected windows where the relevant connection details are
limited to one frame only. Where a window opens, it usually
includes two frames – one frame for the glazing and one frame
for the connection to the supporting element. While tilt, tilt/turn
or sliding windows are available, such windows will only meet the
protective criteria when the windows are closed and fully locked.
Page 83
DESIGN CRITERIA
See the relevant sections in each of the protected window types:
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Figure 85: Bullet & blast resistant glazing system
Figure 84: Example of a 15 minute forced entry grille design
6.5.5 COMBINED PROTECTION OF WINDOWS
INTRODUCTION
Windows can be designed to meet a combined level

@ + |@, J *
be designed to resist blast loads as well as forced entry and
ballistics. Many designers and manufacturers tend to forget that
in most cases, it is desirable for bullet resistant windows to also
be able to withstand blasts. The addition of blast protection to
bullet resistant windows is usually not complicated and the small 6.6 DOORS
, **,,:@ ^
,: @
against many more threats than just ballistic ones. Another 6.6.1 INTRODUCTION
example of a combined system is a forced entry grill which when
installed behind basic blast protected windows can provide both External doors are used mainly for pedestrians, cars and
forced entry protection and can be used as a catcher system cargo to enter the building. They can be transparent (made of
against high blast loads. glass or other material), single or double and in any shape or
size. Doors are an important factor in the overall protection of
Most protected windows can be designed with all three the building, especially against forced entry threats. Doors are
protection capabilities. It is advisable at the design stage to check less important for the envelope protection against blast or ballistic
the differences in costs and appearance of using multi-protection threats, since they cover only a very small percentage of the
JJJ*@ ,^,@
façade. They do, however, have a major role in the protection of
the most vulnerable locations of the building. The main protection
and security roles of doors are:
Protecting the inner parts of the building against silent or

forced entry.
Protecting the inside of the building against blast loads,
bullets and shrapnel.
Preventing splinters or shrapnel from the building materials
from hitting people inside.
Controlling access to the building.
Page 84
Standards EXAMPLES OF VALID DESIGNS
Contradictions between the security guidelines and safety
standards can usually be resolved, For example, an external
door with a panic device which is used for evacuation can
serve also as a forced entry protected door by means of a
magnetic lock system.
The objective of this section is to provide basic protection

design guidelines to enable architects to make decisions about
which doors and building materials to use for any given facility,
based on knowledge and understanding of the relevant design
points and the building’s characteristics as described in Chapter Figure 88: Blast-resistant door after a 22 kg Figure 89: Blast-resistant door after a 100 kg
2. This section relates to all building doors both internal and explosion at 7.6 m explosion at 10 m
external, but the emphasis is on external doors.
6.6.2 BLAST PROTECTED DOORS
INTRODUCTION
There are many commercially available blast doors

which meet the various standards for blast loads. Doors can be
* ,: @ q:
@
an approved laboratory. The test report must include detailed
installation drawings allowing for the doors to be installed
and checked against the tested product. Without approved
construction drawings, which include clear details of the protected
connections, it will not be possible to validate the installation of the
protected doors as an equivalent product to the tested sample.
Blast protected doors should be considered for all

exterior doors where blast overpressures may produce conditions
hazardous to people behind them. As blast protected doors are
,^,: ,:
*, J
they are installed when they are facing crowded areas. If this
is not possible, then a catcher system or partitions should be
installed behind the doors. 6.6.3 BALLISTIC PROTECTED DOORS
Doors may be hinged, sliding, double-leaf or any other INTRODUCTION

@`**,,:@ q,
@ ^
of each of these door types which have been tested and approved. Ballistic protected doors are typically used at the
Doors can be set in concrete walls, installed as part of a curtain entrances to special locations in the building or at specially
wall design (typically glass doors), installed as part of a special protected buildings. Typical locations for ballistic protected doors
steel wall, or used in many other ways to complete the overall include the external guard’s booth, security control room, treasury
protection of the façade. room and interlocking room at the entrance to a secured area or
building. There are many commercially available ballistic doors
Blast protected doors should be considered for all which meet the various protective levels. Ballistic doors can be
sensitive locations such as the central control room, safe areas * ,: @ q:
@
and VIP rooms as they will dramatically reduce the risk to an approved laboratory. The test report must include detailed
occupants and equipment in the facility. installation drawings allowing for the doors to be installed and
checked against the tested product. Special care should be
DESIGN OF BLAST PROTECTED DOORS taken with the ballistic protection at the connections between
the wall and its supporting frame. Without approved construction
It is acceptable for the doors to be completely destroyed as drawings, which include clear details of the protected connections,
" #" it will not be possible to validate the installation of the protected
leakage. doors as an equivalent product to the tested sample. This should
The protected door must be supplied by the manufacturer also include the handles, peep hole and others, which should be
with the complete instructions for implementation within the @@ ^q:
,q :
designed wall. Blast protected door typically open outwards
and are supported by the frame against positive pressure. The Standards
designer is advised to ensure that the wall and door connection All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
systems are able to withstand the same or greater blast loads as be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
the door. guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
Standards Ballistic doors can be used as an integral part of a
All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general it is
be followed. If there is a contradiction between these recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated concrete
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail. panel. The connection detail between ballistic protected doors
Blast doors similar to the CD shelter doors meet the basic and a reinforced concrete opening is relatively simple, with
level of protection and hence, may be used for basic levels minimal gaps/holes. The connection detail to structural steel
frame is also straight forward.
of protection.
Page 85
In many cases ballistic protected doors should also be and its supporting frame. Without approved construction drawings,
blast protected. It is important to check that the ballistic door will which include clear details of the protected connections, it will not
:J*q JJq,, be possible to validate the installation of the protected doors as
an equivalent product to the tested sample.
DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PROTECTED DOORS
The protected door must be supplied by the manufacturer DESIGN OF FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED DOORS
with the complete instructions for installing it in the designated
wall. The protective components of the forced entry doors
J *, q @@ ^ q:
,q : J
The protective components of the ballistic door should most common material used to provide forced entry resistance
q @@ ^ q:
,q : J in doors is steel which is extensively used in the plates, ribs and
commonly used protective material in ballistic doors is steel frame. The strength of the connection between the door panel
@, J @ * ,*
J , and the supporting frame is achieved by the locking mechanism.
and the frame to ensure that the identical products are installed in J@ *,*
J, @
the site. Ballistic protected doors with glazing should be treated and the locking mechanism.
like ballistic protected windows.
Ballistic doors can be used as an integral part of a Standards
curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in general it is All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated concrete be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
panel. The connection detail between ballistic protected doors guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
and a reinforced concrete opening is relatively simple, with
minimal gaps/holes. The connection detail to structural steel
frames is also straight forward but the connection detail to a + :
,q
,** * ,,
*, , q:@ ,JJ@
,*,
recommended. and electric). For every protection level there is different set of
tools and time limits by which the technicians have to open a
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN window of a predetermined size. The difference in the standards
referred to in Section 6.2 is that the US DOS standard is based
on a manual set of tools (mainly against the attack of a massive
unorganized mob) whereas the EN standards are based on the
use of electric tools assuming a smaller and more organized
group attempting forced and silent entry. The project team must
make the decision on the standard that is more suitable for the
building in question.
Forced entry protected doors can be used as an integral

part of a curtain wall or a pre-fabricated wall system but in
general it is recommended to use them as part of a pre-fabricated
concrete panel. The connection detail between forced entry
protected doors and a reinforced concrete opening is relatively
simple, with minimal gaps. The connection detail to a structural
steel frame is also straight forward but the connection detail to
,** * ,,
*, ,
recommended.
6.6.4 FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED DOORS

INTRODUCTION
Forced entry resistance is a basic attribute of every
door. The many doors which are commercially available differ
in their levels of protection. In order to select the correct door, it
is necessary to decide the level of protection required at every
door location in the building. In general, a higher protection level
will be required at the outer envelope doors or special locations,
with the level of protection decreasing as you move towards the
middle of the building.
There are many commercially available forced entry
protected doors which meet the various protective levels. Forced
entry resistant doors can be used only if accompanied by a test

@ @@ ^ ,q : J
report must include detailed installation drawings which will allow
the doors to be installed and checked against the tested product.
Special care should be taken at the connections between the wall
Page 86
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS DESIGN CRITERIA
See the relevant sections in each of the protected door types:
8 transversal steel bars
4 sides locking system
Rigid polystyrene
foam blocs
2/16” (3 mm) EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
thick plate
Figure 92: 15 minutes forced entry resistant door
6.6.5 COMBINED PROTECTION FOR DOORS
INTRODUCTION
Doors can be designed to meet combined levels of protection,

for example entry doors in a secured building will typically be
required to withstand forced entry, blasts and ballistics. The level
@ q
q: J *: @ ,
chosen by the project team according to the recommendations in
these guidelines. In most cases, it is desirable for ballsitic doors
to also be able to withstand blasts such as those created by hand
grenades and small explosive devices.
Page 87
7 BUILDING STRUCTURE
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide general and

local guidelines for the protection of buildings against progressive
collapse. General guidelines relate to the entire construction
scheme of the building, while local guidelines assume the
involvement of a professional protective design/blast consultant
who will develop protection solutions for precise areas of the
q*,q @
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7.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

An explosive charge situated very close to a building
imposes a very high impulse and very high, intense pressure
over a local area. This tends to shatter or shear the structural
materials.
7.3 DESIGN CRITERIA
The fundamental design criteria must ensure that major

damage sustained to the building or any part of it will not result
in progressive collapse. However, a controlled level of casualties
and asset damage may be permissible.
7.3.1 THE BLAST LOAD
The intensity of the blast load on the building is a function

of:
The distance from the centre of the explosion to the building.
The type and quantity of explosive material used.
The structure of the explosive device and its casing/housing.
The ability of the structure, façade or object to resist the
blast pressure, is a function of:
The structural materials.

The section properties of the main structural elements.
The structural spans and the connection details.
The blast load is characterised by an overpressure

shock wave which rapidly expands as a hemispherical pressure
wave from the source of the explosion. The nature of the shock
pressure is a sudden rise of pressure and rapid exponential
decay, followed by a longer and smaller negative phase.
At greater distances the peak pressure rapidly and

,: * |@ , : q* J
area of the building is larger and more structural members will
be exposed to the overpressure. The load on the building will
appear as a concentric ring of differing load intensity.
Page 88
7.4.1 THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
One approach is to consider the structure as a whole

and design certain areas to redistribute the loads in the event that
a key element is destroyed. This type of approach requires
structural redundancy and increased ductility. The structure
should be able to absorb large displacements, redistributing
the loads over damaged areas.
The systematic approach is relatively simple to

apply for in-situ reinforced concrete beams and columns
structure. Prefabricated columns and beams require special
design that will enable them to have ductile connections
and continuity. Flat slabs construction systems are also
relatively sensitive to progressive collapse and need to be
designed in a special way to enable them some measure
redundancy.
$ %%
'*#
This systematic approach can be combined with a
localised approach (see the next section) which will help protect
a distance of 100 feet. the structure against progressive collapse by increasing the
@ @
^@ *Jq*,q
on the threat and risk analysis. This concept is covered in the
UFC guidelines9 where the levels of protection correspond to
those in these guidelines according to the following table:
7.3.2 GENERAL GUIDELINES
I. Redundancy – The use of redundant lateral and vertical force

resisting systems are highly encouraged. Redundancy tends to
promote an overall more robust structure and helps to ensure
that alternate load paths are available in the case of the failure
of structural element(s). Additionally, redundancy generally
provides multiple locations for yielding to occur, which increases
the probability that damage may be constrained. NOTE: ^,
J *, * *
design by a protective design/blast consultant.
II. The use of detailing to provide structural continuity and
ductility – It is critical that the primary structural elements be The following are some examples of design
capable of spanning two full spans (i.e., two full bays). This considerations for the systematic approach:
requires beam-to-beam structural continuity across the removed
,* ,, |*, q,: q J @: I. Tie Force requirements (TF)
secondary elements to well beyond their elastic limit without
experiencing structural collapse. The design must provide horizontal tie force capabilities for
Category S buildings or both horizontal and vertical for Category
III. Capacity for resisting shear failure – It is essential that L buildings. If vertical tie cannot be provided, the alternative path
J@:**,,*
J method must be applied to bridge the removed elements.
ductility under an abnormal load event to preclude a shear failure
such as in the case of a structural element failure. When the shear II. Alternative Path requirement (AP)
@:Jq J|*,@:J@ q,:
a sudden, non-ductile failure of the element exists which could The alternative path method must be used when a vertical
potentially lead to a progressive collapse of the structure. element cannot provide the required strength. This is not relevant
for very low or low levels of protection, but for medium and high
levels of protection, alternative paths will need to be planned for
@
,
7.4 PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE PREVENTION III.Additional ductility requirement
^ ,,@
J@ , , *,: J *, q @
,
local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the Category M and H buildings.
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part
of it. Progressive collapse occurs, for example, when the loss
of one column results in the collapse of a portion of the building.
There are two general approaches to design against progressive
collapse. The systematic approach considers the building as
a whole while the localised approach focuses on strengthening
@
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9
UFC 4-023-03, 25 Jan 2005 and Progressive Collapse Analysis
*, +,
*, '
Modernization Projects June 2003
Page 89
EXAMPLES OF DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
7.4.2 THE LOCALISED APPROACH

The localised approach to design against progressive
collapse focuses on strengthening and protecting key elements
of the structure by analysing their expected behaviour for a given
threat and stand-off distance. For example, pre-fabricated load
bearing walls with proper connection details can resist very high
concentrated loads. Another example is a special design for the
,*J * JJ
This section discusses columns, beams and load-

bearing walls in the external façade of the building, primarily on
J
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in underground parking will be discussed separately.
7.4.3 COLUMN PROTECTION

This section considers a detonation of an explosive
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. In general, the
structure should be designed in such a way as to ensure that the
loss of one column will not cause a progressive collapse. The
localised approach is to design the column against local failure.
Actual car bombs events and recent tests demonstrate
that columns constructed from reinforced concrete or structural
steel has a relatively high resistance in the case of close
J|,, J ,* q*
,:
to the resistance of the column.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR COLUMN PROTECTION
Shielding – Columns should be located internally behind the

external wall, enabling the external wall façade to shield the
,*` J @ q,J ,*J *,q*JJ
the external wall, with the narrow side of the column facing
the external threat. It is not recommended to design exposed
external columns.
Sleeve – A sleeve is an external casing cover that will appears

, ^
JJ@*@ J q q
some of the blast energy and to reduce concrete crushing due
to the detonation. This failure mechanism of the column with
J
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are ductile and able to absorb large plastic displacement. The
J *J
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steel casing concrete with steel columns, which have a very high
*,J
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be promising.
Page 90
Detailing –J *: ,*, J *

,# @ @ q ^,
spans must take into consideration the loss of lateral support for
the column. Shear reinforcement in the column is important for
close detonation of explosives.
Page 91
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR COLUMN PROTECTION –
CLOSE DETONATION
charge at a distance of between 1 and 3 metres. A closer
,,q
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structure should be designed in such a way as to ensure that the
loss of one column will not result in progressive collapse. Special
care should be given to corner columns. If a localised approach
is adopted, the column should be designed against local failure.
Details on shielding and sleeve protection can be found in Figure
105: Reinforced concrete column with steel sleeve.
In the event of a close detonation, the column may be

locally damaged prior to or together with the dynamic response
|*JJ| J * J
distance, the charge and the type of the sleeve. A well designed
sleeve can prevent this phenomenon. Otherwise, the area
which is at risk should be redesigned including the possibility of
increasing the surface area of the column section.
GUIDELINES FOR DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

Loads on the columns could be calculated using the
Conwep software package or other approved software. Dynamic
analysis using a Single Degree of Freedom (SDOF) or Multiple
Degree of Freedom (MDOF) model should be undertaken for
the column and using a permissible ductility of 2 for reinforced
concrete and steel columns. The equivalent reaction should be
calculated and the maximum shear capacity of the column must
prove to be greater than or equal to the applied shear forces.
7.4.4 WALL PROTECTION

charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater from a load-bearing
wall constructed of reinforced concrete, however, a load bearing
pre-fabricated wall could also be considered. A distance of 1-3
metres is considered a close detonation.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR WALL PROTECTION

Geometry – J,,J *,qJ*JJ,
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energy applied to the wall. It is recommended to shield the load
bearing walls.
Detailing – Shear reinforcement, double mesh arrangement,

vertical and horizontal continuity in the supports and details are
all equivalent to the reinforcement details of the standard home
shelters in Singapore. The wall should be supported against the
slabs and a “mechanical” support is recommended to allow the
direct shear forces to be applied to the supporting slab edges. A
“bite” of 10cm or more is recommended. If mechanical support
is not possible, the wall should be connected by means of shear
studs that will transfer the applied horizontal forces to the slabs.
Page 92
Loads on the walls could be calculated using the Conwep
software package or similar. Dynamic analysis using a SDOF or
MDOF model should be undertaken for the wall panel, using a
permissible ductility of 4 for reinforced concrete. The equivalent
reaction should be calculated and the maximum shear capacity
of the wall must prove to be greater than or equal to the applied
shear forces.
7.4.5 BEAM PROTECTION

charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. A closer distance will
q
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CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR BEAM PROTECTION

Geometry - It is recommended that beams are positioned
internally behind the external wall, thereby enabling the external
wall façade to shield it. If this is not possible, the beam should
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design transfer beams or columns and leaving them exposed as
was demonstrated during the Oklahoma City event. However,
exposed transfer beams may be designed but it is advisable for
calculations to be undertaken by physical protection experts who
can take into account the effects of blast loads.
Figure 118: An illustration of the Oklahoma City event showing

the crater and the exposed columns and beams
Detailing – The continuity of the beam is critical, primarily along

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spans must take into consideration the possibility that the vertical
support for the beam may be lost. Shear reinforcement of the
beam is important for its protection against close detonation of
explosives.

Loads on the beam could be calculated using the
Conwep software package or other approved software. Dynamic
analysis using a SDOF or MDOF model should be undertaken
using a permissible ductility of 2 for reinforced concrete and steel
beams.
Page 93
7.4.6 SLAB PROTECTION
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. The main slab to be
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slab may be exposed to high lifting forces.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR SLAB PROTECTION

Shielding –,@ |,,,J * ,,
shield the slab. If this is not possible, the external wall façade
should be designed from standard wall panels such as a non-
load bearing prefabricated wall panels with small openings. Light
frangible façade such as non-protected curtain wall, will not shield
the slab and lifting of the slab is possible.
Detailing – Double mesh arrangement, continuity in all the

supports should be equivalent to the reinforcement details of Civil
Defence (CD) home shelters.
Page 94
8 SECURITY SYSTEMS
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic security Security systems are usually used for the following purposes:
design guidelines that will enable architects and electric system
engineers to make the right decisions when choosing the Detect illicit activities or intrusions.
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when deciding on its positioning throughout the building. Warn designated security personnel of hostile activity and/or
breaches of security to the building.
Technical and electronic systems such as CCTV and
alarm systems are part of every modern building plan and are Monitoring of activity in sensitive or vulnerable locations.
considered basic. These security systems which are installed
throughout the building usually consist of: Recording activities for future investigations.
End points, which are the systems’ data gathering sensors Deterrence.
(e.g. detectors, cameras, etc.).
Replacing or supporting human security resources for cost
Base points, which receive and process all the input gathered effectiveness.
by their system’s end point (e.g. CCTV matrix, alarm system).
Assuring the proper function of physical security elements.
Cabling, infrastructure and wireless channels.
The systems are usually meant to assist in the When planning the security systems layout for a building,
implementation of the building maintenance plan, the it is recommended to take into account possible future upgrades
administration plan or the security plan. Some systems are and enhancements of the systems’ capabilities. Such planning
dedicated to serve one of these plans while others play two or should enable the system at least 50% growth and should include
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electronic security systems into the overall electrical design of the and added infrastructure that will enable the installation of more
building has many advantages. It will help to assure that the end end points. This pre-planning will allow the building’s security to
points are positioned in a manner that enables them to perform in conduct low-cost future upgrades when necessary.
the best way. It will also help to assure that the systems’ cabling
will be installed in such a way that will make it as unnoticeable as
possible and that the spaces and features in which the systems
are meant to be located are adequate, and will not hamper their
performance. 8.1 HOW TO USE THIS CHAPTER
This chapter contains information on security systems
Early planning of the systems will also allow important and security related systems, located in the various parts of a
coordination between the building domain, the human domain building development. The Protection Recommendation Tables
and the technology domain. This will assure minimal changes (PRT) in Chapter 4, mention a list of protection elements that can
and additions once the building is occupied and hence avoid be found in this chapter. Each protection element is described in
additional and unnecessary security costs. JJ@
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If desired, protection elements in this chapter can be implemented
:
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security products made by different manufacturers. Only a PRT. For each element, the levels of protection are mentioned
relatively small number of these systems are tested and approved and standards are described. The level of detail provided is
by national laboratories or military institutions around the world. @ ^ *,, J, @
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to provide basic knowledge and to assist in the procurement
These technical systems are usually not considered to be “life
procedure to ensure that the right demands are made of suppliers
saving” systems but are operated as “support” systems that and/or protection engineers.
give an extra value to the security deployment of a building. It
is therefore advised that the project team consider whether their The following protection elements appear in this chapter:
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usually more expensive). In some cases non-approved systems
might be adequate for performing a minor supportive role.
Security systems, unlike physical protection elements,

have a relatively moderate life span (usually not more the 10
years). It is therefore advisable to design the relevant parts in
the building’s infrastructure to enable changing and updating of
these systems at minimal extra expenses and / or damage to the
buildings.
Page 95
8.2 SECURITY CONTROL ROOM The security control room design must allow it to function
as an effective tool for managing the security operations of the
8.2.1 INTRODUCTION building in both routine and emergency situations. In order
to perform its tasks, the security control room must have the
The security command control room is the nerve centre following capabilities:
of security operations for a building and should receive and
provide vital information to and from the security personnel on Collecting all the data required in order to formalise a clear and
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routine and emergency situations. The data received and presented should relate to, among other
things, any regular and irregular activities, crowd concentrations
An effective control room that focuses on relevant and security related incidents. The data should be collected
threats can make the difference between a proper response during both routine and emergency situations.
and chaos, once an incident has been initiated.

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A building’s security operation should be aimed at both cutting down the number of monitors that need to be watched
crime and terror prevention. The level of effectiveness in which and prioritising inputs received from the security cameras and the
crime and terror prevention operations are carried out is greatly alarm system in a way that will make sure that only real incidents
dependant on the capabilities of the control room and its operating @ *@ q: J , : J q

staff. include:
A typical control room should contain all of the main Communicating information to both staff and visitors in
operating stations of the security systems installed throughout emergency situations.
the building. The control room should also contain sub-stations
of several of the building’s management systems such as the air- Assisting in and monitoring the evacuation of the
conditioning and lift control systems. Some of these substations building’s occupants when necessary.
should have overriding authority over the main station, whereas
others can have regular operating capabilities or should be limited #*@@

to view only. responders while they are performing their respective
responsibilities.
The following systems should be included in a security
control room: Operate in full function during post attack periods.
8.2.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
8.2.3 DESIGN OF A SECURITY CONTROL ROOM

GENERAL
I. It is recommended to design the control room as a
dedicated unit (i.e. that it will not serve a dual purpose as both a
security control room and an access control guard post).
II. The security control room should have a direct connection

to or integrated with the building’s management systems that are
considered to be critical or security related (e.g. air conditioning
systems). This is meant to enable the security control room staff
to override or control these systems when the situation requires
it10.
III. Protection and backup of all critical systems is required

in order to allow the security systems to continue operating
during emergency situations in which the security control room is
damaged and during events of power failure.
Page 96
IV. The security control room plays a critical role in a building’s CCTV MONITORS & RECORDERS
security deployment. It is therefore recommended to design its
protection in a robust manner. The purpose of these measures I. The number of constantly viewed monitors should be
is to make the security control room able to withstand an attack limited to a minimum and should not exceed 8 images per person.
either against the building it occupies or a direct attack against The images for each person could either be presented on a single
the security control room and continue to function both during large monitor or on several smaller ones.
and after the emergency. The entrance to the security control
room should be equipped with an access control system and II. The minimal image size is 10”.
forced entry. These measures are meant to ensure that no
un-authorised persons will gain access to the security control III. The monitors should be located in a way that allows the
room. person in the control room to perform his regular duties (phone,
log book, access control) and monitor the cameras without
V. The lighting in the control room should be designed in a interference.
way that will ensure that it does not cause glare on the various
monitors. For this purpose, it is recommended that the control IV. All data received by the systems (CCTV, alarm, access
* ,J control) should be recorded for post incident investigation. The
required recording rate (FPS), the recording’s resolution, and
VI. The security control room should be equipped with a the period that the recordings are stored for, should follow the
working surface that is positioned in way that will allow the security guidelines in Section 8.7. It is important to note that issues
control room operator to have a good view of the monitors. pertaining to data storage have implications both on operational
matters (e.g. face recognition) and on administrative matters (e.g.
VII. The security control room should be equipped with amount of space required for holding the equipment).
emergency power and lighting to enable it to continue to function
during power failures.
ALARM
VIII. The security control room should be equipped with
a climate control system. This is meant to help create a more I. Indication of alarms, transferred to the security control
comfortable working environment that will assist the security room, should appear in the most accurate way possible. Alarm
control room operators to stay alert, especially during night-time indications are required to relay the exact location of the breach
and long shifts. or event to the security control room operator. Each indication
should also be accompanied by a visual picture of the location
IX. The security control room should be supplied by at least where the breach or event is taking place.
two separate power lines. One dedicated to security systems
while the other for administrative purposes. EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
X. When planning the security control room, there is a need
to designate an area for administrative proposes. This area
should be planned and positioned in a way that will ensure that
any activities conducted within do not interfere with the security
control room’s regular operation and in emergencies.
XI. The control room should be equipped with a dedicated

phone line that has a direct external line.
10
It is not recommended to have both the security systems and the Figure 123: Example of a bad design Figure 124: Example of a good design
building’s management systems installed in the same room.
EQUIPMENT ROOM
I. It is recommended to place other electrical equipment
used by the security control systems that are located in the
security control room, in an adjoining but separate room.
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allow cabling to be installed.
III. A concentration of electrical equipment in a closed room

can cause the temperature in the room to rise considerably. The Figure 125: Equipment room
rise in temperature may even damage the electrical systems

causing them to fail. It is therefore recommended to install climate
control systems in the equipment room.
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control room and its adjoining equipment room (where applicable)
must be of a kind that, if operated, will not cause damage to the
electrical equipment.
V. It is recommended that both the security control room

and (where applicable) the adjoining equipment room, should not
have water pipes running through them.
Page 97
8.3 INTERCOM AND COMMUNICATION
SYSTEM VI. When designing a non-matrix intercom system for
access control, it is important to make sure that the system’s
8.3.1 INTRODUCTION cabling enables communications between the unit installed at the
An intercom is a private telecommunication system that access point and the units installed both at the access control
allows people from two or more locations to communicate with point and the security control room.
each other. Although usually considered administrative systems,
intercom systems and other similar communication systems VII. Most intercom systems need to undergo maintenance on
play an important role in a building’s security deployment. This a regular basis. It is therefore recommended to install them at a
is especially true with regards to access control. The intercom location that will allow for the maintenance work to be conducted
system enables the personnel operating the access controlled in a convenient manner.
doors or gates to communicate with the people wishing to enter
the building, without exiting the relatively secure inner area in VIII. Exterior intercom units should be protected against
which they are positioned (whether it is located inside the building environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity and rain.
or in an external security post).
IX. Exterior intercom units should be designed with anti-
There are many types of systems that can be used as an intercom vandalism measures.
system, these include:
X. Intercom units that are installed at vehicle entrances
Standard point to point intercom system (party line systems). should be designed in a way that will not require drivers to exit
Matrix systems. their car in order to operate them. For example a call initiator
Videophone systems. can be connected to a detector that operates it as soon as a car
Wireless systems. approaches the designated area.
Telephone based systems and others.
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window openings could potentially stop radio communication
8.3.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS with emergency responders who are inside the building. With
the installation of cell enhancers, communication by radio among
emergency responders becomes possible between the interior
and exterior of the building and within the building between the
different storeys including basement levels.
Standards
The system should comply with the relevant construction
and electricity related standards.
8.3.4 EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
8.3.3 DESIGN OF AN INTERCOM AND

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
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levels should be set after taking into consideration the noise
levels of the operating environment (e.g. an intercom located on
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installed in a room).
II. The applied levels of both volume and background

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distance that the users will be from the unit while operating it
(e.g. an intercom used by drivers in their cars requires a different
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entrance).
III. It is recommended to combine intercom units employed

for use in access control, with CCTV coverage, and proper
lighting. This will enable the security personnel to screen incoming
persons in a more effective manner.
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system for security purposes, it is important to check whether
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adequate for use in the building’s environment.
V. Electric infrastructure might create interference with

the intercom system’s audio signals. This occurs if the two
systems are positioned too close to each other. It is therefore
recommended to maintain proper separation between intercom
lines and other electric lines.
Page 98
8.4.3 DESIGN OF A PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM
I. A building should always have one PA system that can
be controlled from the security control room.
II. Access to the PA system should be provided to the

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for evacuation.
Figure 128: Combined video/ intercom/ access control unit Figure 129 :Point to point videophone unit
III. The system should include pre-recorded messages in all
relevant languages covering the required response to the various
Desk Desk Unit attack scenarios.
Videophone
Unit
IV. The speaker coverage should be complete and cover
each and every room.
Switchboard
V. The system should be easy to operate under emergency
situations.
Standards
Access Electric lock The system should comply with the construction and
Controller
electricity related standards.
Door
videophone
Unit
Master Unit
Figure 130: Typical point to point intercom system layout

8.5 ALARM SYSTEM
8.5.1 INTRODUCTION
Alarm systems installed in buildings and/or complexes
are aimed at detecting both unlawful intrusion and lawful entry

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a combination of elements (sensors, keyboards, control units
8.4 PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM and others) that create a “smart” system. This “smart” system
is programmed to be able to monitor various parameters, which
8.4.1 INTRODUCTION may include, but are not limited to, the following: opening of doors
, ^

The public address (PA) system plays an essential role shifts in temperature; change in lighting etc. The type and number
when it comes to emergency procedures. During emergency of parameters monitored by the system can vary and should be
situations the system can be used to convey life-saving designed according to the requirements of the building’s security
instructions to the general public. The PA system must be plan.
designed as an integrated part of the building’s intercom system
and other security systems. A typical PA system will include the
An alarm system will usually consist of:
following:
Detectors of various types
Keyboards
Indoor / outdoor speakers
Control Units
@,

Display units
Microphone
Diallers
Area division panel (to be able to address parts of the building
Cabling
individually)
Sirens
Backup batteries
8.4.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Optional – remote controls/ wireless items / signal lights
There are many types of anti-intrusion detectors that are

used to protect different types of areas throughout different types
of complexes and buildings. The following are some examples of
the various detector types:
PERIMETER LINE DETECTORS

Protecting a perimeter line and fencing is usually done
using “smart” fences which are fences with detection systems
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alert when someone or something attempts to cross the fence
line.
Page 99
8.5.3 DESIGN OF AN ALARM SYSTEM

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DETECTORS
I. The type of detector that is to be used should only be
determined after all location (e.g. indoors, outdoors etc.) and
environmental (e.g. humidity, temperature etc.) issues have been
taken into consideration.
II. An alarm system should include several types of

detectors.
III. Cabling for alarm detectors should always be installed in

a protected manner.
IV. It is recommended to avoid installing detectors with a

relatively high false alarm rate. A high false alarm rate (more
then one false alarm per week for the whole system) will reduce
the effectiveness of the system and add to the probability that a
true alarm will be ignored.
V. The display unit should provide clear information as to

which zone and detector were set off. A smart system should
clearly display the zone and detector on a computerised map of
the protected site. A standard system may display the information
on the keypad unit.
Page 100
VI. Alarm systems should have two sets of detectors

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are supposed to be permanently closed (e.g. emergency exits),
and (b) day/ night detectors, that are installed on doors that are
regularly opened during day/ activity hours but closed during after

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manner. The two sets of detectors should be designed to sound/
give out different types of alarms at different situations (e.g. a
buzzer during the day and siren at night).
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inputs received from the detectors (e.g. sounding different alarms
for different amount of weight applied to weight sensors).
VIII. An alarm system should include a dialler so that it would

be able to alert response forces in case of a breach. A siren or
other alarm element should be considered.
IX. Magnetic or mechanical switches that are installed on

window frames are an effective tool to make sure that windows
are closed after hours. However, it must be noted that they are
not able to detect situations in which the window’s glass is broken.
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equipment.
XI. All external openings that can be reached by people

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ground level openings and those openings that can be reached
by climbing.
XII. It is recommended that an independent expert in the
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alarm system.
Standards
The system should comply with the construction and
electricity related standards.
8.5.4 EXAMPLES
Page 101
Figure 132: Example of an alarm system layout
8.6 ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM

8.6.1 INTRODUCTION
Access control is the ability to determine who may and The measures must still facilitate access to the building by
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a fundamental principle of access management, and an important
aspect of any effective security system. When applying access When designing an access management plan, developers
control, the following issues need to be taken into account: should analyse which areas and assets need to be protected by
access control measures. After deciding which areas and assets
The number of entrances to the building/installation should should be protected, the proper measures need to be selected
be minimised. and deployed. Entry-point screening is typically employed at the
Identifying and deciding areas to which access should be entrance to secure/ non-public areas. This type of screening can
limited. @, : J ,, * : ^
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physical screening (e.g. people, bags, vehicle, etc.), x-ray
screening, weapons detection measures, explosives detection
protection and safety systems.
measures, and chemical/ biological agent detection measures.
Page 102
The security related access control system must be 8.6.4 EXAMPLES OF DESIGN
designed together with the other security systems. This section
will relate to access control systems while other access control
issues can be found in Section 5.4.
Access control is a combination of physical elements

and security procedures. The physical access control measures Camera
usually include the following and more:
Door closer
Card readers.
Control panels for opening doors.
Electromagnetic locks. Intercom
Electric locks.
M switch
Emergency escape buttons (glass break).
Open door detectors (magnetic switches).
Access control management software.
Access control management stations.
A door closer. Access Controller

Figure 133: An example of a typical access controlled door layout
8.7 CCTV SYSTEM

8.7.1 INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of a CCTV system is to support

and enable the overall management of a building’s security. Video
surveillance facilities are an aid to security monitoring, especially
of vulnerable or sensitive areas. CCTV systems may also act as
an investigative tool as a post-incident source of evidence, or
8.6.3 DESIGN OF AN ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM may deter potential criminals/terrorists if they perceive that their
actions are being monitored. However, the CCTV system does
I. All external doors that are used on a regular basis but not perform an active protective role and should not be designed
should be closed to the general public would require access ^J ,@ ^*@
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control. must work in conjunction with other security measures (e.g.
access controls, alarm systems, etc.).
II. All access controlled doors should be equipped with a
closer. THESE GUIDELINES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE
FOR A UNIFORM AND CONSISTENT APPROACH TO
III. If in doubt, infrastructure should be prepared to
THE RECOMMENDED SPECIFICATION, INSTALLATION,
allow access control measures to be deployed, as adding the
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*, OPERATION AND PERFORMANCE OF CCTV SYSTEMS
ACROSS BUILDINGS IN SINGAPORE.
IV. The main entrance doors should be equipped with an
automatic locking mechanism allowing external guards to lock the Given the dynamic CCTV market, these guidelines will
doors if an emergency situation occurs outside. @,, * @
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system but relate to general concepts and design considerations
V. A door that is supposed to be protected against forced that should be taken into account when developing a building’s
entry must be equipped with an electromagnetic lock rather than CCTV system.
an electric lock.
AS THERE ARE MANY CCTV OPTIONS AVAILABLE ON
Standards
The system should comply with the construction and THE MARKET, IT IS RECOMMENDED TO EMPLOY A
electricity related standards. PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANCY WHEN DESIGNING CCTV
SYSTEMS.
Page 103
8.7.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 0` ,,:J *,q
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non-authorised users. In addition to these, it may be good to
install PTZ cameras (especially in areas where there may be
mass congregations or main thoroughfares) to allow the security
surveillance operators to pan, tilt or zoom as and when required.
MONITORS
I. All monitors should be capable of displaying colour
images and have appropriate adjustment controls (e.g. contrast,
brightness, sharpness, etc.).
II. The displayed picture on monitors should be sharply

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free of noise, interference or pulsing effects.
III. Monitor sizes should be appropriate for the intended

viewing distance within the room housing the viewing facilities.
The system should allow multi-view display on CCTV monitors.
RECORDING EQUIPMENT
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capacity to enable the continuous 24-hour recording of each
camera and archival of at least 28 days, with an additional 10%
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be kept to replace those seized by security agencies for post
incident investigations.
II. The system should have duplex multiplexing capability or

greater. This is meant to allow simultaneous image recording and
playback. The system should be designed in a way that enables
playback of footage without causing interruption to the recording
process.
III. The system integrator or vendor should propose codecs

to achieve optimal compression ratios while ensuring no or little
loss of image/ video quality (e.g. MPEG4 and M-JPEG2000).
The video container format proposed for the DVR recorded
images and viewer software should be open-source container
formats and/or common multi-media container formats (e.g. *.avi
(Microsoft), *.mov (Apple QuickTime), *.mp4 (MPEG)).
IV. An authentication mechanism should be included to

8.7.3 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ensure the integrity of all recordings by allowing for detection
of any alteration or tampering (e.g. watermarking). This should
CAMERAS include the recording of the camera ID and date and time
(synchronised from a single source), which must not be adjustable
I. The CCTV system should consist of multiple cameras
by the operator.
distributed throughout the building to give comprehensive
coverage of all common areas11 JJ ,^,
QUALITY OF RECORDED IMAGES
II. Cameras in common areas should be situated where I. Images captured by the CCTV cameras should be
they cannot be easily evaded, damaged or obscured and should recorded using digital video recorders (recommendation subject
be clearly visible to members of the public. Where headroom is to change with future advancements in technology).
restricted and cameras may obstruct public passage, cameras
should be mounted in recesses so as to avoid the possibility of II. The footage collected by each camera should be
injury to members of the public. recorded at a minimum of 6 frames per second (for indoor) or
12 frames per second (for outdoor). In addition, the capability to
III. Cameras located in vulnerable locations should be record from selected or designated cameras in real time mode at
protected against vandalism by means of vandal resistant 25 frames per second would be useful.
materials and design (e.g. vandal-resistant enclosures with non-
^J[,^@ III. The recording equipment should be able to record colour
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IV. All cameras should provide colour images to maximise quality meeting a resolution of at least 4CIF or equivalent.
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offenders.
V. Cameras should be suitable for internal or external use

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and view in all weather conditions. These include general access locations such as main entrance
lobbies, corridors, taxi stands, car parks, pavements, streets within the
development’s boundary line.
Page 104
IV. The recorded image should at all times be accurate, Table16: Summary of Recommendations for Key Areas
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normal lighting. For reduced lighting or emergency lighting
conditions, the recorded image should minimally be an accurate

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PLAYBACK FACILITIES
I. The CCTV system should provide for the playback,
removal or transfer of any image from any camera recorded up to
28 days prior (in a controlled environment).
EXPANSION CAPABILITY
I. The installed CCTV system should be designed to
allow for future expansion or additional capacity with minimum
disruption to the working system.
COVERAGE AT KEY AREAS

I. Common Areas – Comprehensive coverage throughout
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behaviour. This includes general access areas such as main
entrance lobbies, street areas, pavements, car parks and vehicle
boarding and alighting points such as taxi stands, bus-stops and
vessel docking points within the development’s boundaries. For
hotel premises, coverage should include to the lobby, front desk,
concierge, entrance/exit points and corridors. General views
should meet a minimum image height at ‘Detection (10%R)’ level
,
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CCTV systems).
II. Entrances & Exits - All external public access doors,

emergency exits and vehicle entrances/exits (e.g. at the gantry
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a clear, unobstructed image of all persons entering/exiting
through them (frontal view). The cameras must be mounted at a
suitable height (e.g. where they cannot be evaded, damaged or
obscured) – looking towards, rather than down at the doorway or
driver, and meet a minimum image height of ‘Enhanced Detection
(20%R)’ level. For buildings with sizeable open areas included
in its boundary, the minimum image height would be ‘Recognition
(50%R)’ level.
III. Lifts – For lifts which act as alternate entry and exit points
to the building, frontal view of the lift doors for people entering the 8.7.4 INSTALLATION & OPERATION
building and general views of the associated lift lobby areas are
to be monitored at ‘Enhanced Detection (20%R)’ level. INSTALLATION OF THE CCTV SYSTEM
I. The positions of the cameras should be carefully
IV. Checkpoints – For locations that involve security checks planned and located to provide the required coverage with the
or registration before people are granted permission to proceed minimum number of cameras. Account should be taken of the
further into the building like checkpoints and ticket issuance effect that periods of maximum human density may have on the
counters, the CCTV system should capture the frontal view of achievement of the operational requirement.
people at ‘Recognition (50%R)’ level.
II. Notices strategically located around the building should
V. Sensitive areas – These include rooms or open areas be provided to inform members of the public that the CCTV
that house important and critical equipment, documents, system is being continuously monitored and recorded.
property and people e.g. warehouses, locker facilities, etc. In
particular, cameras should also cover facilities involving monetary
transactions, such as at banks, money changers and ATM
machines locations. Cameras at these areas should be installed
with a minimum image height of ‘Enhanced Detection (20%R)’.
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upon activation of the alarm, trigger the display of the image of
the relevant camera(s) automatically on a dedicated monitor.
Page 105
CCTV OPERATING STAFF
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@*@ : I. The shift patterns adopted for the CCTV operating staff
a soft and hard copy of each of the agreed camera views and J *,,**
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image quality (both monitor view and the recorded image) should of the staff.
be taken and reviewed by the building’s Security Manager, to
*JJ
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Jq*,*:* training as stipulated by the building’s Security Manager for

security personnel. They should rudimentarily be taught what to
IV. If the same proprietor owns adjacent buildings, it would look out for and be able to react when a potential incident occurs,
be useful for each building’s CCTV system to include the capability to monitor the event accurately and not lose information that
of accessing images from the adjacent locations as well. could be pertinent to any future investigation.
V. To facilitate incident management by Emergency ``` ` *,, qq

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Agencies during a crisis situation, it would be good to provide Procedures (SOPs) in place for reference and to conduct regular
capabilities for the Emergency Agencies’ mobile command post refreshers to ensure that the CCTV operating staff are familiar
to retrieve live images for remote viewing. This could include up with the SOPs.
to 3 video output channels and one control port extended to, and
terminated at the room housing the building’s viewing facilities.
8.7.5 ESSENTIAL SUPPORT
VI. The storage facilities for the CCTV systems should POWER SOURCE
be capable of keeping the recordings in a secure environment
protected from excessive moisture and dust, with preventive I. Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) with at least 30
measures against unauthorised removal or viewing of the minutes of backup capacity should be provided for the CCTV
recordings. The location of the recording and storage facilities system.
should be decided on a local risk assessment which takes into
account security and crime-related risks, and should be sited in the II. The CCTV system should feature an alert system for
inner parameter of the building and away from vehicular access. loss of power or image due to technical failure.
If the location of these facilities is located in the inner parameter
of the building but still deemed to be high-risk (e.g. open to public
access), then it is recommended that the room be built with LIGHTING FOR CCTV
adequate reinforcement/protection to withstand the explosion I. The building should be provided with adequate lighting
of a 10kg TNT or equivalent charge (with fragmentations) at a 24/7 to ensure that quality coloured images for facilitating
distance of 5 meters away. monitoring, investigation and prosecution are captured.
0`` J *J^*
qJ *@@ II. In the event of lighting failures, the CCTV system should
the requirements of the CCTV system (e.g. in terms of the be capable of producing images that will enable evacuation of
maximum number of concurrent feeds). the building to be effectively managed under emergency lighting
conditions.
USE OF THE CCTV SYSTEM
I. Within the CCTV viewing facility, the operator should be MAINTENANCE AND AUDIT OF CCTV SYSTEM
able to select any camera picture for display on any monitor at any I. The CCTV system should be supported by a maintenance
time or alternatively to set up a scanning sequence as desired. regime that ensures the operational requirements are consistently
The dwell time of the scanning sequence should be adjustable. met and availability of all parts of the system are maximised.
System availability should be set at 95% over a 12 month time
II. The camera selection control system should allow rapid frame.
selection of any camera using minimum manual effort and be
consistent across the CCTV network. II. The quality of the visual and recorded images should
be monitored and compared to a set of auditing standards,
III. The CCTV system should include a ‘default settings’ implemented by the building’s Security Manager. Any deterioration
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auto reset to their original position after a pre-determined time
duration. ``` ,, : *,
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24 hours, or sooner if the fault results in serious loss of CCTV
IV. Any one user selecting a live image (feed) should not coverage.
preclude other users selecting the same live image (feed), or any
other live images (feed) on the same system. IV. The building’s Security Manager should also be
responsible for auditing the correct implementation of the CCTV
V. For viewing of recorded images, the recording equipment system to meet the operational requirements and identify any
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, improvements (if necessary).
forward, rewind, record, stepping frame, visual search – forward
& reverse, speed search and stop.
VI. The camera ID and the date and time should be displayed
on monitors in a single imposition and for the recorded image
be located where it is least likely to obscure or interfere with the
image of the main subject.
VII. The numbering of cameras and the associated recording

sequence should be carefully planned in order to facilitate both
the rapid and seamless tracking of targets’ movement and the
speedy retrieval of recorded images.
Page 106
8.7.6 DEFINING AND MEASURING FIELDS OF VIEW
FOR CCTV SYSTEM
CATEGORIES OF VIEW
I. Fields of view required for CCTV systems are described
by four categories of view as follows:
a) DetectionKJ
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the available screen height. Following an alert an observer can,
after a search, ascertain with a high degree of certainty whether
or not a person is visible in the pictures displayed to him.
b) Enhanced Detection (ED)- Following an alert

an observer can, after a search, ascertain with a high degree
of certainty whether or not a person is visible in the pictures
displayed to him. It must be noted that “Enhanced Detection
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measure.
c) Recognition K J J

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least 50% of the screen height, viewers can say with a high
degree of certainty whether or not the individual shown is the
same as someone they have seen before.
THIS GUIDELINE OF RECOMMENDED STANDARDS FOR
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at least 120% of the screen height, picture quality and detail is PRODUCED BY HOMEFRONT SECURITY DIVISION AND
*
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beyond reasonable doubt. AFFAIRS, SINGAPORE.
II. The categories are measured by relating the views to
the image height of a standard test target 1.6 m high. When the 8.7.7 REFERENCES
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said to be 100%R., where “R” is the abbreviation of “Rotakin”. I. London Underground Limited - Station Surveillance
+ *Jq*,^ JJ^q
CCTV Standard (Reference No: 2-03066-004, version A3, dated
as follows: July 2005);
a) Detection - Not less than 10% R. II. Video Surveillance System (VSS) – Standard For Bus
Interchanges (Version 3.0, dated July 2006);
b) Enhanced Detection (ED)-Not less than 20%
R. III. Video Surveillance System (VSS) – Standard For Mass
Rapid Transit (MRT) Stations (Version 3.0, dated July 2006);
c) Recognition - Not less than 50% R.
IV. Building a Building Security Code (BSC) Framework in
d) + - Not less than 120% R. Singapore (Version 7.0, dated 18 Aug 2006);
III. For Detection (10%R) and Enhanced Detection (20%R), V. CCTV Cameras Standards for Police Establishments
*JJ J*
,: (Version : 3.0, dated 22 Dec 2006);
above the threshold of human sensitivity and that the picture is
not unduly cluttered with non-targets. VI. Draft for Public Australian Comment Standard – AS
4806.1 Closed Circuit Television, Management & Operation Code
`0 + >¤ `
$>¤ of Practice (dated 16 Sep 2005);
is assumed that the angle of view and lighting is suitable and no

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out of focus is evident. #
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V. It should however be noted that these measurement

guidelines were originally set up using a fully analogue PAL system
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into the digital domain. For digital systems, consideration should
be given to the number of ‘pixels on target’ when attempting
to categorise the level of detail required in the image. It is also
important to examine the recorded picture quality to ensure that
the picture quality is not reduced due to the image compression
technology.
Page 107
8.8 SECURITY LIGHTING FOR CCTV
SYSTEMS
This section discusses the lighting requirements
for security systems including CCTV. For general lighting
considerations, please see Section 5.7.
8.8.1 INTRODUCTION
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seen. From a security point of view, lighting that is strategically
placed can increase the effectiveness of CCTV systems and
guard work while reducing the chance of criminal acts occurring
in the illuminated area. The basic level of lighting should allow the
security deployment (CCTV and guards) to identify a human face
from a distance of about 10 metres.
8.8.4 DESIGN OF SECURITY LIGHTING
If the area is intended to be used during the hours of
darkness, the lighting system should provide adequate visibility I. Lights located in vulnerable locations should be protected
for the intended night time operation. Pedestrian walkways, back against vandalism by means of vandal resistant materials and
lanes and access routes open to public areas should have a basic design.
level of lighting. Inset spaces, signs, entrances and exits should
be adequately lit so that CCTV coverage would provide a clear II. Lighting design should take into account the various
picture. current and future obstructions that may cause light to be blocked
(e.g. various types of vegetation, such as trees).
Security lighting is employed in order to increase the
visibility around perimeter lines, buildings, and sensitive locations. III. Design proposals should take into account the possibility
It is a security management tool that is applicable in almost all
environments within an urban development. Proper lighting of night time outdoor activities and should specify the type,
can greatly improve the combined operation of other security location and intensity of the various lighting elements that will be
systems, particularly CCTV and other surveillance measures, installed.
and therefore it must be designed to compliment these systems.
IV. Lighting should be equally spread out, reducing contrast
8.8.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS between shadows and lightened areas. It is recommended to
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with higher wattage. This will help reduce the creation of deep
shadows and will help avoid excessive glare.
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heights that enable easy maintenance and replacement.
VI. The lighting plan should locate areas that may be

shadowed and light them up.
VII. Lighting at manned entrances must be adequate to

identify persons, examine credentials, inspect vehicles entering
or departing the facility premises through designated control
points (vehicle interiors should be clearly lighted), and prevent
anyone from entering unobserved into the premises.
VIII. The lighting illuminating the building’s entrance should

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extreme environmental conditions (e.g. heavy downpour).
IX. Security posts at entrance points should have a reduced

level of interior lighting to enable the security guards to see his
surroundings while minimising the adversary’s ability to look
inside the posts.
X. The controls of the lighting systems should be positioned

in a secured area, preferably in the security control room.
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support the CCTV coverage.
XII. Cones of illumination should overlap to provide coverage

in the event of bulb burnout.
XIII. Lighting should be arranged so as to create minimal

shadows and minimal glare.
XIV. Lighting should be turned on automatically by clock or

photoelectric cell.
8.8.3 STANDARDS
The recommended standards are based on the US DOT
standards FTA-TRI-MA-267085-05 and DOT-VNTSC-FTA-05-02.
Page 108
8.8.5 EXAMPLE
Page 109
9 SPECIAL ATTENTION AREAS
Most buildings have rooms or operational areas that The following protection elements appear in this chapter:
require special attention in terms of security. These operational
areas are usually required for the basic functions of the building
such as access control, loading and unloading, parking, building
maintenance, mail delivery etc. Addressing the security and
protection requirements for these areas is essential for maintaining
the security level in the building. Ideally, the protection should
be designed in such a way that there is minimum interference
with the original operational design of the building. Nevertheless
in most cases, answering security needs will require a certain
degree of change to the building’s everyday activities. Most of
the security changes to these areas will be aimed at the following
goals:
Prevention of the entry of unauthorised people or packages.

Protection of the building structure and inhabitants from an
event occurring at those locations.
Protection of the areas to prevent a localised attack that may
affect the whole building.
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic

protection design guidelines for these areas thereby enabling the
architect to make decisions regarding their positioning, design
and construction.
Whereas chapters 5-8 relate to the different protection

elements according to the building category, the subjects
addressed in this chapter should be considered by the
architect or relevant consultant in any case where one of the
listed functional areas is included in the planned building.

Any developer or architect designing a new project which 9.2 PARKING
includes one or more of the areas referenced in this chapter
should follow the associated security guidelines. In most cases, 9.2.1 INTRODUCTION
this will be required regardless of the building type or building In dense modern urban areas, the most common solution
structure category (discussed earlier in Chapter 3). is to position the car park underground or on one or more of the
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The following sections include security requirements the vulnerability of the building in relation to potential car bombs
and explanations for a number of different functional areas. because:
The requirements for these areas include a variety of security
elements described previously in Chapters 5 to 8. When relevant, A relatively large explosive charge can potentially be driven
this chapter will include a reference to the required item in those into the building.
chapters.
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Each protection element is described in its own section ,,*:q,, q*J
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protection elements in this chapter can be implemented even if
they do not appear in the list of recommendations table. In this The typical structure of a car park allows an explosive charge
case, the design team should refer to the protection role of the to be placed extremely close to primary structural elements.
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element, the levels of protection are mentioned and standards Following the recommendations in this chapter will help
are described for approval or/and approved drawings. The mitigate the threat of a car bomb explosion whilst maximising the
level of detail provided is not intended to provide a full technical ability to control incoming vehicles.
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in the procurement procedure to ensure that the right demands
are made of suppliers and/or protection engineers.
The guidelines cover basic design principles and

materials that are commonly used in Singapore. If a proposed
building system or product design is not mentioned in the
guidelines, it is recommended to refer to the recommended
protection level for the closest relevant system or design whilst
applying best engineering practice. In such a case, it is also
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protective design/blast
consultant.
Page 110
9.2.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LOCATION
I. Critical infrastructure areas such as the emergency water
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electricity supply must be protected from catastrophic events in
the car park as consequences of a general or targeted attack
against them. It is recommended to position these areas in
known or resident designated parking areas if it is not possible to
position them away from all the parking areas.
II. For loading dock considerations see Section 9.4.
ENTRANCES AND EXITS OF CAR PARKS
9.2.3 DESIGN OF A CAR PARK I. The entrances to car parks should be designed with
access control check points, which can either be automated or
GENERAL controlled by trained security personnel (see Section 5.5.3 for
guidelines). The entrances are the most likely locations for attacks
` *: |q,: ** and therefore should be positioned as far away as possible from
control and screening needs should be taken into account when primary structural elements (a minimum of 10 metres). The
designing the entrances to the building from the parking area. J *,, q@
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This usually means providing adequate space for screening from crowded critical areas.
equipment and security personnel and planning for the provision
of utilities such as electricity and adequate lighting. This is true II. The entrances and exits must be equipped with an anti-
even when current access control procedures do not require ramming vehicle barrier to an adequate level (see Section 5.4
a security check at the access point since an upgrade may be for details).
necessary at higher threat levels.
II. When planning and positioning areas in the site during 9.2.4 EXAMPLE
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between the car park and the location of any potential dense
crowds (such as conference rooms) or sensitive areas. This
is relevant not only for underground car parks belonging to the
building, but also to any neighbouring underground car parks that
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Standards
All standards and guidelines against progressive collapse
(see Chapter 7.4) are recommended for car parks. In the
building core and in populated areas, it is imperative that
these standards be followed.
PARKING LOCATIONS
I. Parking alongside primary structural elements should be
prohibited. If that cannot be achieved, parking along the primary
structural elements should be limited to screened vehicles
of trustworthy people such as residents or management. In
all cases, a physical barrier is required to maintain a distance
between the vulnerable element and the nearest parking location.
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critical areas such as the Fire Control Centre (FCC), water
tanks or other key areas should be prohibited. If that cannot be
achieved, parking near these areas should be limited to screened 9.3 PEDESTRIAN ENTRY AREAS
vehicles of trustworthy people such as residents or management.
In all cases, a physical barrier is required to maintain a distance 9.3.1 INTRODUCTION
between the vulnerable element and the nearest parking location.
Pedestrian entry and/or exit areas and lobbies are
one of the most vulnerable areas in a building as these would
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be the places where an attacker will try to enter the building.
above or beneath a populated area should be limited to screened
For architectural and aesthetic reasons, the entrance lobby is
vehicles of trustworthy building tenants.
typically a wide and open area with a glass facade. The principal
recommendations in this section are relevant for every opening
that separates the inner part of the building (the secured area)
from public or unsecured areas.
Page 111
9.3.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 9.3.4 EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
9.3.3 DESIGN OF PEDESTRIAN ENTRY AREAS

The following guidelines are for the architectural design. For
structural guidelines please refer to Chapter 7.
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for the
entrance and exit areas, however there are standards which
apply to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter
8.
MAIN ENTRANCE LOBBY

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load capacity of 7.5 kpa at locations where checking equipment
and security operations may take place in the future. Such
equipment includes X-Ray machines, Walk Through Metal
Detectors (WTMD), Hand Held Explosive Detectors (HHED)
“Sniffers” and security checking tables and turnstile gates. It
is highly recommended to plan for space, as well as electricity
and low voltage infrastructure in the relevant locations for future
equipment. The checking area must be designed to enable a
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than one every 5 seconds when it is operational.
It is advisable to physically shield or separate the main
entrance checking area from the main inner lobby. This will allow
the future isolation of the checking area and will help contain a
terror attack at the checking point. Such an attack could occur

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or security people. It is advisable to plan for a security standing
point, room, or booth positioned in such a way as to give security
personnel an unobstructed view of the entire entrance area.
ELEVATORS OR STAIRCASES
When designing elevators or staircases at entrance
areas, it is necessary to plan an option for deploying access
control systems and forced-entry resistant gates/doors which
could be locked during periods of high alert. The entrance area
which usually connects to the elevator or staircase should be
equipped with electricity and low voltage infrastructure and space
to cater for the possible deployment of screening equipment in
the future.
EMERGENCY EXIT DOORS

Every emergency exit door must be equipped with a
detector connected to an alarm system which will raise an alert
in case of unauthorised opening. It should also have a locking
mechanism suitable for an emergency door according to the
regulations and standards.
The entrance area which usually connects to the
emergency exit via a corridor should be equipped with electricity
and low voltage infrastructure to allow for the deployment of
screening equipment at a later stage should the door be converted
to a normal entrance.
Page 112
9.4 LOADING DOCKS LOADING DOCK LOCATED UNDERNEATH THE BUILDING
No primary structural elements should be located in the
9.4.1 INTRODUCTION loading dock. If this is unavoidable, then the structural engineer
Most modern buildings have designated areas for must design the primary structural elements for maximum
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and all other deliveries to the building. Commercial buildings in the same manner, and no critical building element or important
such as shopping malls or hotels require the loading dock to be a building functions should be located there.
relatively large area. Loading docks can be internal or external.
Access control issues for loading docks are discussed in LOADING DOCK LOCATED AT THE SIDE OF THE
Section 5.4.5. In this section, the security and protection issues BUILDING
for loading docks are considered. These guidelines will have to
be coordinated with the operational procedures which, especially The loading dock should be located as far away from the building’s
in commercial buildings, must take into account the unloading wall and primary structural elements as possible, but in all cases
time, queuing time and subsequent line of waiting vehicles which a distance of no less than 10 meters should be ensured between
could build up. There are two typical locations for a loading dock: primary structural elements and the vehicle parking positions. If
this is not possible, the structural engineer must design primary
In the basement of the building, under its main structure structural elements for maximum redundancy. No large opening
should be located at or overlooking the loading bay. If this is not
At the side of the building (above or below ground), away possible, glass and other building materials must be protected to
from its main structure the highest blast resistant level (see Chapter 6 for details).
For more security design details regarding the entrance,
parking, access control and other subjects, please refer to
Chapter 5 or Chapter 7. 9.4.4 EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
9.4.3 DESIGN OF A LOADING DOCK Upper Floor

The entrance to the loading dock must be designed with building line
a vehicle anti-ramming barrier and access control or security

personnel. The gate and access control point must be placed
as far away from the building as possible and where possible, it
should not be under the building and/or below or next to a primary
structural element.
During high alerts, for other security reasons or even at
peak delivery times during normal alert levels, queuing vehicles
must be taken into consideration. The security checking time at
the entrance point may take a number of minutes and delivery
vehicles may even be asked to turn around and exit. Space
must be allocated for cars to turn around (without them passing
the check point) and for vehicles to safely queue. The loading/
unloading area must be located as far as possible from any
crowded areas or areas where large numbers of people gather
(such as conference rooms) or critical functional areas of the
building such as the security control room, safe haven or key
building utilities.
Shielding elements should protect the elevator and

staircase from the main loading and unloading area. These
elements need to be designed to withstand the high loads that
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dock. The shielding elements will block any direct line of sight
between vehicles parked in the loading dock and the elevator
lobby. The same shielding elements should also block the line of Figure 138: A typical loading dock layout
sight to any main corridors or important areas in the building. It
is advisable to allocate an area in the loading dock for checking
deliveries and goods. This should include future X-ray or other
checking equipment.
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for loading
dock areas, however there are standards which apply to the
equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
Page 113
9.5 GARBAGE AND WASTE DISPOSAL DOCK 9.6.3 DESIGN OF MAIL AND DELIVERY ROOMS
9.5.1 INTRODUCTION The room should be located near the entrance to the
Garbage and waste disposal areas, rooms and docks building in order to prevent delivery people from unnecessarily
can be designed in many ways. From a security point of view, entering the building. It should be located to the side of the
it is an area that is close to or inside the building, and which building and never in or attached to a main structural element
has openings to both the secure areas of the building and to such as a building core or staircase. It is recommended to build
the unprotected areas outside of its perimeter. The purpose the room from reinforced concrete and design it as a structurally
of this section is to give the architect and engineer guidelines insulated box with walls that can withstand an inner static
for designing protected waste disposal docks or areas without @*, >>@J J *,q :
compromising their functionality. the insulated mail room and additional permissible load of 10 kpa
for inspection equipment. The door must open inwards and be
There are two types of garbage and waste disposal areas: designed to withstand the aforementioned blast load (for more
details see Section 6.6.3).
A disposal area that can be accessed by the contracted
service provider without passing any security checks or The room should have no connection to the building’s
barriers. main ventilation system or openings. All openings or ventilation
A disposal area that can only be accessed after passing for the mail room should be separate and ventilated to the
through a security check or barrier. outside. The room should be provided with an electricity and low
voltage infrastructure to support X-ray equipment, HHED and
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coverage and an intercom and door which should be closed
9.5.2 DESIGN OF GARBAGE AND WASTE DISPOSAL during inspection.
AREAS
Every vehicle wishing to cross the perimeter line must Standards

pass through an anti-ramming car gate with access control There are no special standards or regulations for mail and
and security supervision. All openings from the building into delivery rooms, however there are standards which apply
the garbage collecting area or openings which lead to garbage to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
containers must be closed and covered by CCTV and detectors
at all times. If the openings are chutes leading from the interior of
the building, they must include a door which can be closed after
work hours, anti-intruder detectors and CCTV coverage. 9.6.4 EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for garbage
and waste disposal areas, however there are standards
which apply to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 8.
9.6 MAIL AND DELIVERY ROOM

9.6.1 INTRODUCTION
In such rooms, mail, parcels and delivery items arrive
and are stored until collected by the recipient. They also typically
receive large boxes. From the security point of view, if such
rooms are not properly designed and positioned, entry of letters
and parcels can represent a threat to the people in the building
and even to the stability of the building itself (if large parcels are
delivered). The purpose of this section is to provide the design
team with guidelines for locating and designing the mail room and
the equipment in it.
Page 114
9.7 VIP HOLDING ROOM
It is also recommended to allocate an area for VIP cars.
9.7.1 INTRODUCTION The area should be closed or protected against all types of
intruders including pedestrians and should be covered by CCTV
VIP holding rooms are common in modern buildings and detectors. There must also be escape routes close by.
and especially in government buildings and luxury hotels. A VIP
holding room can be any room that can accommodate the head 9.7.3 EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
of an organisation, a meeting room for important or threatened
people, or the presidential suite in a hotel that may accommodate
celebrities or politicians. Such rooms should be designed in a way
that physical protection and security procedures will be relatively
easy to implement in the future and with minimal incremental
cost.
Standards
There are no special security standards or regulations for
VIP holding rooms, however there are standards which
apply to the equipment and procedures as detailed in
Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
9.7.2 DESIGN OF VIP HOLDING ROOMS

The VIP holding room may be designed with a dual
purpose or use for an alternative function, provided that this
does not impact its availability for major functions. These rooms
should be located near function areas where VIPs are expected
to congregate. They should be located as close as possible to
an emergency escape route that will be under the total control of
the security forces during an event or emergency, which lead to
an onsite car park and/or adjacent roads. The main entrance to
the room should not lead to the emergency escape route. It is
preferable to have a second exit from the VIP room that leads to
the escape route.
J,,, J0`J , * 9.8 PROTECTED ROOMS
all be available for the total inspection of the security team. There
should be a key or card access system that can open all doors 9.8.1 INTRODUCTION
within the building to facilitate bomb sweeps. The main entry way
is recommended to be via a double-door interlocking entry hall Most modern buildings will have rooms with special
with forced entry resistant capabilities on the inner door. There protection and security needs. This can be as a result of the function
should also be CCTV and intercom equipment to cover both of the room or the importance of the equipment, information
doors (see Chapter 8 for details). it holds. This includes computer rooms, communication rooms,
or the treasury room. In many cases, a room can be designed
Note that all the walls and openings of the VIP holding room to be multi-purpose. This is particularly relevant for buildings
should provide 15 minutes forced entry resistance (see where rooms may change their function over the course of time.
Section 6.6.5 for design details). The purpose of this section is to give the design team the basic
characteristics for protection of such rooms in the building.
The VIP holding room should be without windows. If this
is not possible, all exterior windows or glass façades in the room 9.8.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
J *, q q, @ @ J JJ J
room is located (see Chapter 6 for design details) as follows:
9.8.3 DESIGN OF PROTECTED ROOMS

All openings in the walls of the protected room must be
forced entry and blast resistant to a minimal level but will typically
J^JJ@ ,^, :@

needs or design team decisions (see Chapter 6 for details). All
@ ^, @ J *, q
, ,^,
$>*,,^, J *,q
J
All windows or glass façades that can be seen from forced entry resistant bars (tested according to the standards in
@*q, J ,,
J 0` J *, Chapter 6) and intruder detectors. The protected rooms should
be ballistic resistant to the level of the threat or at least level 1 be equipped with an infrastructure for security systems.
(see Chapter 6 for design details). All windows and doors are
q
JJ ,[ Access to the protected room should be via an easily
break detectors connected to an alarm system. protected and secured route to allow the relatively isolated
movement of equipment and goods and better protection
It is recommended to consider allocating an area to @q,J^ J,,,
the security attachment. This would typically include of the protected room should provide 15 minutes forced entry
resistance (see Chapter 6 for design details).
bodyguards in an adjacent room with the security equipment
infrastructure connecting the two rooms and a line of sight
to the VIP room’s interlocking entrance.
Page 115
The main entry way is recommended to be via a double- Every window or other opening, including ventilation or
door interlocking entry hall with forced entry resistant capabilities air-conditioning ducts must be closed off with forced entry resistant
on the inner door. There should also be CCTV and intercom bars to a minimum 5 minutes resistant (see Chapter 6 for testing
equipment to cover both doors (see Chapter 8 for details). All standards). It is highly advisable to have all the above openings
exterior windows or glass façades in the room should be blast
J , : JJ
@ @ J JJ J , alert against intruders or an attempted break-in. Areas containing
(see Chapter 6 for design details) as follows: *@@,:,
, :
must be locked at all times and access should only be permitted
for authorised personnel.
Standards
All recommendations in this section must comply with the
safety and building regulations standards and other legal
requirements.
9.9.3 EXAMPLE
,, q

with magnetic switches and/or glass break detectors connected
to an alarm system.
If safes are to be placed in the protected room either now
or in the future, this should be considered during the design stage
*JJ *@@ , $>>>@
m2 as the minimum design criteria.
Standards
All accepted building and safety standards must be applied
in the design and all relevant guidelines in this document
should be followed. If there are major contradictions
between the two, the national standards should always
prevail and the security and protective design/blast
consultant(s) should be informed.
9.9 CENTRAL UTILITY ROOMS

9.9.1 INTRODUCTION
A building’s central utility rooms serve most of its areas
and are connected to almost every location within it. The main 9.10 AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM
functions of the utility rooms which are of interest from the
security point of view are water, electricity, communications and 9.10.1 INTRODUCTION
air-conditioning.
A central air-conditioning system is responsible for
It should be noted that counter infrastructure attacks and supplying the entire building with fresh and treated air. It
other types of terror attacks can be perpetrated through a usually draws air in from the outside (via vents in the roof or
building’s utility ducts, pipes and other supply channels. other locations), mixes it with the inner treated air and pumps
it back into the ventilation system through the cooling system.
The purpose of this section is to provide guidelines to the This simplistic description describes the operation of a typical
design team who can design better protected and secured utility air conditioning system for the purpose of these protection and
rooms and prevent costly changes in the future. It is advisable to security guidelines only and does not necessarily represent an
implement these protection recommendations with access control accurate description of every air-conditioning system.
and forced entry doors, since maintenance people are often from
external companies. Air conditioning systems may be used by an adversary to
introduce chemical or biological agents into the building’s
environment.
9.9.2 DESIGN OF CENTRAL UTILITY ROOMS
These guidelines will refer to central air-conditioning
Utility rooms must be located in areas which are well :J *,q*, *,q
,
away from potential threats. They should therefore not be
close to public car parks or public areas. If this is not possible, to pose a threat to the building’s occupants. They do not relate
then the rooms must be built with adequate protection, such as to relatively small individual systems which are typical to private
a shielding wall to protect them from blast related threats on houses or individual rooms. The purpose of this section is to give
all exposed facades (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 for design the system designer and architect an idea of a more secure and
details). Entrances to the utility rooms should be locked at all protected air-conditioning system.
times, controlled by an access control system and monitored from
the control room by CCTV and intruder detectors (see Chapter 9
for more design details). 9.10.2 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Page 116
9.10.3 DESIGN OF AN AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM 9.11.3 DESIGN OF WATER SUPPLY AND TANKS
The vents which provide the intake of fresh air must Mandatory requirements for security of water storage
be positioned as high as possible to ensure that they cannot be tanks for potable water supply in buildings are stipulated in the
reached from a public location. The air intake pipes and their Public Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply) Regulations
location must be protected against any intruder or object thrown and the Singapore Standard CP 48 – Code of Practice for Water
from a minimum of 10 metres (the protected area should be far Services.
more than 10 metres). It is highly recommended to place the
collection of intakes on the private protected building roof as far The requirements state that all drinking water tanks and
as possible from any threat. their ancillary equipment must be secured against unauthorised
access. They must be housed in a secured and locked dedicated
Any feed or exhaust for the air-conditioning system tank/pump room or located within a secured and locked enclosure.
including air pipes, air intakes and vents should be closed J J J ^ @@ J J,,
with forced entry resistant bars or mesh to a minimum level of be within the secured and locked dedicated tank/pump room,
5 minutes resistant (see Chapter 6 for testing standards). In , * J ^ @@ J,, @ *
JJ,:^q, J^,,Jq ^ @
outside the secured and locked room, enclosure or area.
with detectors and connected to an alarm system to alert against
intruders or an attempted break in. It is also recommended to Additional security measures to be considered would
provide the infrastructure for future installation of detectors of toxic be for all entrances to the water tanks rooms or openings and
or other biological/chemical agents in the air-conditioning system pipes main valves to be closed with forced entry resistant doors/
(these can be combined with smoke detectors). These should mesh and windows to a minimum level of 5 minutes resistant
be located at the main intake of fresh air and on the exhaust vent (see Chapter 6 for testing standards). It is highly advisable to
J @,,:@*q, add detectors to all the above openings and to send an alert to
security in the event of intruders or an attempted break-in. This
It is highly advisable to install valves/shutters to close is all designed to make it very hard for anyone to sabotage the
not only the main fresh air intake, but the intake and exhaust vent system or insert dangerous materials into it.
from every room. These valves/shutters will be activated when
a biological/chemical agent or smoke is sensed by the detectors. ` J @*
,:
They can be operated automatically or manually by the security or the facility it must be locked in a room with the same protection
operational control room. It is also highly advisable to allocate an level as above (5 min forced entry resistant) and must include
J,
, an access control system on the door and detectors against
system into the main air-conditioning system. This will provide a unauthorised entry.
** @ @ ^
,,: @
^
J J* ^,^ It is highly recommended to provide the infrastructure for
detectors to be added to the water system in the future to detect
toxic or other biological/chemical agents (this can be combined
J @*
` q, , *J
detectors at the main intake pipe (to check the incoming water)
9.11 WATER SUPPLY AND TANKS and the supply exiting from the tank (to check the water supplied
to the building’s residents).
9.11.1 INTRODUCTION
Water in most buildings in Singapore is supplied through
large pipes that feed into reservoir tanks located within the building.
The threat to the drinking water supply is mainly from inserting a
biological or chemical agent into the water that will affect everyone
that drinks it. The insertion could either be into the pipes or more
simply, into one of the reservoir tanks. In most buildings there are
separate tanks for drinking water and for utilities. The description
below is for the purpose of security and protection of the drinking
water only, and does not necessarily relate to the water supply in
each building. The purpose of this section is to give the system
engineer and design team recommendations for more secured
water line design and implementation.
Standards
Mandatory requirements for the security of water storage
tanks for potable water supply in buildings are stipulated
in the Public Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply)
Regulations and the Singapore Standard CP48-Code of
Practice for Water Services.
Page 117
APPENDIX A
SAMPLE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY DESIGN

REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS: FOR
TENDERING PURPOSES
PART 1: PROCESS
1 ENGAGEMENT & SCOPE OF SECURITY AND

PROTECTIVE DESIGN/BLAST CONSULTANT(S)
a. The Developer shall engage a security and protective

design/blast consultant(s) (hereafter called the ‘Consultant’) to
incorporate comprehensive provisions for building security from
the onset of the building’s conception. The Consultant shall
submit and show relevant experience, track records, curriculum
vitae, and in cases involving sensitive projects, have the
necessary security clearance. Although the Consultant does not
J^, ,
@^#@ J:
shall clearly demonstrate the ability to communicate effectively
with the developer for the duration of the contract.
b. The Consultant shall prepare a preliminary security and
@ ^ @, @
J q*, J @, J,,
comprise an assessment and analysis of asset values, threats
and hazards, vulnerabilities and risks of the building, and blast
analysis should be conducted for the relevant areas. The plan
J,,,
J*:@ ^*,
to, but not limited to, the design of the following:-
I. Site planning and landscape design;

II. Architecture and interior design; and
III. Structural, mechanical and electrical designs.
c. The Consultant shall work closely with the architects
and engineers to develop the requirements of the security
@ ^ @, @
,
implementation in the project as well as subsequent operation
and management of the building.
d. The Consultant shall work closely with the relevant
government agencies to ensure that the security and protective
design plans are adequate to address the threats and hazards,
vulnerabilities and risks to the building.
2 ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The consultant shall carry out an assessment and

analysis of the asset values, threats and hazards, vulnerabilities
and risks of the building, which shall include, but not be limited to,
the following:
a. Asset Value Assessment
Assets shall include but not be limited to people, information and
property. The asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that
would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the asset.
The Consultant shall identify the assets of the building, including
critical assets that can be affected by threats and hazards. The
Consultant shall rate each asset’s value and justify the basis for
the ratings.
Ministry of Home Affairs: June 2007
;!<
The Consultant shall consider the following threats that have
,:q
q:J': ¦
Page 118
c. Vulnerability Assessment III. TERRITORIAL REINFORCEMENT. The master plan
Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an should incorporate the provision of clear boundaries between
aggressor, or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an public and private areas. This could be achieved by using physical
asset susceptible to hazard damage. The Consultant shall elements such as fences, pavement treatment, art, signs, good
^,*@
q*,J*, * maintenance, landscaping, etc, to express a sense of ownership
identify the vulnerabilities of building functions, systems, etc. The by legitimate users and create territorial reinforcement. The space
Consultant shall rate the vulnerabilities and justify the basis for or area being reinforced should have clear legibility, transparency
the ratings. and directness to discourage potential offenders because of the
users’ familiarity with their environment.
d. Risk Assessment and Management
The Consultant shall evaluate the risks using a threat-vulnerability 5 SITE PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
matrix. The Consultant shall rate each of the risks and justify the
basis for the ratings. The Consultant shall identify the top risks FOR VEHICULAR THREATS
where measures are necessary to mitigate the vulnerabilities and The Developer shall incorporate within the building
reduce the risks. master plan, principles that facilitate the protection of the building
from vehicular threats. This includes preventing progressive
collapse of the building due to damage caused to critical
structural elements by an explosion that occurs in proximity to
3 SECURITY AND PROTECTIVE DESIGN PLAN the building and reducing the potential blast waves caused by an
SUBMISSION STAGES explosive threat in the form of a vehicular bomb. The method or
process of protecting the building from vehicular threats depends
The Consultant shall submit the security plan in 3 stages on its structural design and proposed site layout. To achieve
during its development for review and acceptance. The format this objective, consideration shall be given to stand-off distance,
and content for each stage’s submission shall be proposed and buffer zone and vehicle screening.
submitted to the building owner for review and acceptance.
a. Preliminary security and protective design plan – to be
submitted by the Consultant as part of the tender. I. STAND-OFF DISTANCE. The appropriate distance
from unscreened vehicles to the building should be considered
b. Detailed security and protective design plan – to be to protect it against vehicular threats. A buffer zone around the
developed by the Consultant in consultation with the relevant building to unscreened vehicles could be created using design
government agencies. features such as street furniture, urban landscape design and
bollards that can function as vehicle anti-ramming barriers.
c. Final security and protective design plan – to be
developed by the Consultant and agreed upon by the Developer. II. PERIMETER PROTECTION ZONE. This can be
achieved with the installation of perimeter barriers or layers of
barrier systems (e.g. planter boxes, natural landscape designs)
that meet the US DOS K4 standard or equivalent ASTM F2656-
07 or UK BSI PAS68:2007 standard12. Consideration should be
given to limiting the speed of approaching vehicles with good
PART 2: PLANNING AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS J*, ^J*,
:q:
offsetting vehicle entrances as necessary from the direction of a
vehicle’s approach (to force a reduction in speed).
4 SITE PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
FOR CRIME PREVENTION III. PERIMETER VEHICLE SCREENING. The provision
of space for vehicle screening shall be considered and located
The design of the building, including site layout and at an appropriate distance away from the building. The vehicle
landscaping, shall support the building’s functions. It shall provide screening bays shall include design features that can stop
a safe and secure environment for occupants and visitors. The vehicles, prevent them from leaving the screening area, prevent
Developer shall incorporate within the building master plan, tailgating and reject vehicles that fail the screening.
principles that facilitate the prevention of crime and public order
incidents.
The Developer can achieve this by incorporating the

basic principles and concepts of ‘Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design’ (CPTED). They are:-
I. NATURAL SURVEILLANCE. In terms of the operation
of the building, this could be achieved by placing more people
(observers) or legitimate ‘eyes on the street’ at the area being
surveyed to increase the perceived risk to potential offenders.
In terms of the design, it can be achieved by generating or
channelling activities to the area, and by having more windows,
good lighting and removing obstructions to improve line of sight,
etc.
II. NATURAL ACCESS CONTROL. Consideration should

be given to providing adequate locks, doors, window barriers,
fences and shrubs, etc, for private/ restricted areas. In public
or semi-public areas, properly located entrances, exits, fencing,
landscaping and lighting, etc, shall be considered to subtly direct
q J @ ^J*,
: J
criminal opportunities.
12
US Department of State (DoS) SD-STD-02.01 ‘Vehicle Crash Testing of
Perimeter Barriers and Gates, Revision A, dated March 2003’, or ASTM
2656-07 ‘Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter
#!%>>"#@
0J,#*:
Page 119
6 SITE PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS II. VEHICLE CIRCULATION. In order to ease congestion,
consideration should be given during the master planning of the
FOR PARKING q*, @ ,,[
*, * J ,
multiple ingress and egress roads to the various car park areas,
The Developer shall incorporate within the building drop-off points and service areas. This should be developed in
master plan, the provision of safe and secure parking facilities * JJ
`@,:`@ *q
(if applicable). In order to achieve this objective, consideration to the LTA for approval (if applicable). The TIA Report shall also
shall be given to providing public parking, parking for authorised take into consideration the time taken to screen vehicles entering
vehicles and natural surveillance of all parking areas in the the building.
development.
III. PEDESTRIAN CIRCULATION. Consideration during
I. VIP PARKING AND ALIGHTING POINT (IF RELEVANT). the master planning of the building should provide footpaths
The site layout should take into consideration the provision of that are suitable for dealing with large crowds arriving from bus-
separate and dedicated car park space for VIPs. This will include stops and MRT stations (if applicable). This should also include
providing ingress/ egress into the VIP car park space that should segregating pedestrians from the vehicles leaving the location.
not be shared with other car park users. The alighting point for
VIPs should be covered or located at a basement. There should IV. PERIMETER ACCESS CONTROL. Consideration
be a secured passageway immediately at/or close to the drop should be given to pedestrians’ circulation routes during the
off point for VIPs. There should not be any direct line of sight master planning of the building to concentrate activities towards
into the passageway. There should not be any glass windows or designated access controlled points (or portals) and away from
, J@@ @^: secured areas.
an explosion to injure the VIPs during the evacuation process.
V. BUS STOPS AND TAXI STANDS. Consideration should
II. BASEMENT OR MULTI STOREY CAR PARKS FOR be given to the location of bus stops, taxi stands and coach bays.
PUBLIC. If the car parking areas are located within the building These should be located at an appropriate setback distance from
(i.e. at the basement or multi-storey), the relevant threats and the building.
protective measures will need to be considered.
III. NATURAL SURVEILLANCE. All parking facilities should
be provided with consideration to maximise visibility across, as
well as into and out of the parking facility. The natural surveillance 8 ARCHITECTURE AND INTERIOR DESIGN
would also be improved by limiting vehicular ingress/ egress to a
minimum number of locations. a. Architecture
I. BUILDING SHAPE. The shape of the building can have
7 SITE PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS a contributing effect to the overall damage to the structure caused
FOR EXTERNAL CIRCULATION by a bomb blast. Re-entrant corners and overhangs shall be
avoided as they are likely to trap the shock wave and amplify the
The Developer shall incorporate within the building effects of the blast. If curved surfaces are used, convex shapes
master plan, the provision for safe and secure external circulation shall be preferred over concave shapes. In general, simple
within the building boundary by considering effective site lighting, geometrics should be preferred.
signage, and landscaping.
II. OFFICE AND ROOM LOCATIONS
:
a. Site Lighting
, * 0` * @
press room, holding room) should be located or treated so
I. EFFECTIVE SITE LIGHTING LEVELS. Consideration that the occupant(s) are secure and cannot be seen from the
should be given to providing effective levels of lighting at vehicular @*q, J^ @ q, J
J *,
and pedestrian entrances and for vehicular and pedestrian face courtyards, internal sites or controlled areas. If this is not
circulation areas. Consideration should be given to providing possible, suitable obscuring glazing or window treatment should
perimeter lighting that is continuous and on both sides of the be provided, including blast and ballistic resistant glass, blast
@qJ,J ,@ *
curtains or other interior protection systems.
to support CCTV coverage.
III. MIXED OCCUPANCIES. Function rooms for VIPs’ use
b. Site Signage
:
,J *,q@*
housed with other users. If they are co-located together, the
I. EFFECTIVE SIGNAGE. Confusion over site circulation, public areas should be separated from the sensitive areas.
parking and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site
security. The master planning should incorporate a signage IV. PUBLIC TOILETS AND SERVICE AREAS. Areas that
strategy that considers off site and entrance signage, on-site escape surveillance or allow individuals or items to be hidden
directional, parking and cautionary signs for vehicle and persons. should be avoided. Public toilets, service spaces or access to
Consideration should be given to provide electronic signboards vertical circulation systems (e.g. stairways/ lifts/ elevators) should
that allow various messages to convey important information about be avoided in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area
arrival direction, measures in place, etc. It is also recommended before screening at public entrances.
that signs should generally not be provided to identify sensitive
areas. V. LOBBIES. This space is designed to separate the
secure and non-secure areas at the point of entry. It does not
c. Landscaping include access to vertical circulation systems. Access should be
controlled between the separate secure and non-secure areas
I. EFFECTIVE AND AESTHETIC. Consideration should with space provided for screening equipment to conduct checks,
be given to landscaping design elements that are attractive including turnstiles, walk through metal detectors, or other
and welcoming as they can be used to enhance security. For ^ * * J

example, plants can deter unwanted entry, ponds and fountains @ ^ J *, q |q, @ q, ,,
can block vehicle access, and site grading (gradient) can also limit J
@ , q J
access. It is recommended that the master plan avoids creating area should be located within the secure area. Mechanical
landscaping that permits concealment of criminals or obstructs ductwork, piping and main electrical conduit runs should not
the view of security personnel and CCTV. extend into the non-secure area.
Page 120
VI. HIGH RISK LOBBIES (E.G. SPACE FOR QUEUING). III. EQUIPMENT SPACE. Public and employee entrances
These points of access will need to be designed or operated in should include space for possible future installation of access
accordance with the appropriate level of risk. High risk areas control and screening equipment.
should be enclosed in blast and fragment resistant construction.
The installation of features, such as trash receptacles or IV. ROOF ACCESS. Locking systems should be designed
,q | Jq* J^ to limit roof access to authorised personnel.
high risk non-secured areas should be avoided. The structure
for high risk lobbies should be distinctly separated from the rest V. MATERIAL USED. The use of non-structural elements
of the building, but it can be located within the building setback such as false ceilings and metal blinds should be limited. If need
space. The area should be designed to mitigate the effects of be, lightweight non-structural elements can be used to reduce
a blast on primary vertical or lateral bracing members. The air :qJ+|*J,,: J
pressure in high risk lobbies should be maintained at positive, or system above for strength can also be used.
relative to the exterior, so that contaminated air can be expunged
manually by opening the external doors. VI. EGRESS ROUTES. Egress routes should not be
clustered together in a single shaft or location but be separated
VII. LOADING AND UNLOADING BAY AREAS. The and spread out. The use of glass along primary egress routes
installation of critical utilities and services such as main switch and stairwells should be kept to a minimum.
board, water tank, standby fuel or generator adjacent to the
loading/ unloading bays should be avoided. These areas should
be an appropriate distance from critical utilities and services. The 9 STRUCTURAL DESIGN
recommendation for lobbies would apply at these areas as this
space is designed with secure and non-secure areas. It should The building shall be designed against both progressive
be separated from the access to the parking spaces (if any). and disproportionate collapse. The secondary goal shall be to
The area should be designed to limit damage to adjacent areas design the structural components against localised failure, and
and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building. There J : q q, J
should be space for screening equipment to conduct checks on occupants of the building. This will enhance life safety and
all incoming deliveries. facilitate rescue and evacuation. It is suggested that the design
to mitigate effects of blasts be done in conjunction with a detailed
VIII. RETAIL AND F&B SPACES. These areas should be threat assessment of the building and its critical components.
arranged, designed and operated such that products and staff The following items below are recommendations of how a building
are subject to the appropriate screening process. Retail and can be designed to resist both progressive and disproportionate
F&B spaces should preferably be accommodated within the collapse.
lobby, instead of within the main building. These areas should be
designed to mitigate the effects of a blast on primary vertical or a. Robustness
lateral bracing members.
The building shall be designed to comply with the robustness
IX. STAIRWELLS. Stairwells required for emergency *@
J,^q*, *J
egress should be located as remotely as possible from areas CP65, BS8110 and BS5950.
where blast events might occur. Where possible, stairs should
not discharge into lobbies, parking or loading areas. b. Resistance to Progressive Collapse/ Alternate Load
Paths/ Removal of Columns
X. MAILROOM. The mailroom should be located away
from main entrances, areas containing critical services, utilities, J q*, J,, q J
distribution systems and important assets. In addition, the effects of progressive collapse and disproportionate collapse.
mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building with
an outside wall or window designed for pressure relief. It should J q J^ J *J ^ * *J
have adequate space for explosive disposal containers. An area alternate load paths and inherent redundancy in the structural
near the loading dock may be a preferred mailroom location. system.
The mailroom should be built to withstand a blast due to a mail
or parcel IED. The air handling unit for the mailroom should be `*J*@
J
stand-alone. of Buildings to Resist Progressive Collapse by the Department
of Defence, USA or other equivalent documents be used as a
b. Interior Construction guideline to design the building against disproportionate and
progressive collapse. At a minimum, the removal of a primary
I. UNSECURED AND SECURED AREAS. Unsecured ^, , q , q ^ J *,
building areas should be located exterior to the main building not cause the progressive collapse of the entire building.
structure where possible. Unsecured and secured areas should
be separated horizontally and vertically using buffer zones and/or =
J ,,
Critical vertical load bearing building components should also
II. CRITICAL BUILDING COMPONENTS. The location of be explicitly designed to resist the design-level explosive forces
the following critical building components should be located at an
J #*J q, J
appropriate distance from any main entrance, vehicle circulation, J *, * **, q J , ,^,
parking or maintenance area depending on the structural J, J
:| ^J,@
treatment of the area. threats. It is recommended that this be viewed in conjunction with
a detailed threat assessment study of the building in order to
i. Emergency generator including fuel systems, determine the possible design blast loads.
:
@,*@@,:
ii. Normal fuel storage; d. Structural Systems
iii. Main switchgear;
iv. Telephone distribution and main switchgear; It is recommended that in the selection of structural systems,
v. Fire pumps; due consideration is given to the ductility and robustness of the
vi. Building control centres; system. A suggested list of desirable structural characteristics for
vii. UPS systems controlling critical functions; the mitigation of air blast effects and progressive collapse is listed
viii. Main refrigeration systems if critical to building below:-
operation;
ix. Elevator machinery and controls; I. MASS. Structural systems with inherently high mass
x. Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities; such as concrete are in general more resistant to blast effects.
xi. Critical distribution feeders for emergency
power.
Page 121
II. SHEAR CAPACITY. Primary members and/or their III. Floor System
J,, * J *, |*, @:
achieved before failure. Brittle shear failure shall be avoided to ` , J #:

,:J**q,: q q: q ^J *,@@,: :,,
III. CAPACITY FOR REVERSING LOADS. Primary +, : J,, q J q
members and their connections shall be designed for possible ,, J q ^*JJJ ,*
load reversals caused by blast effects. above does not cause subsequent progressive collapse.
IV. REDUNDANCY. Where possible, redundant load paths #**,J :q ^**
shall be incorporated in the vertical load carrying systems to areas (e.g. lobbies, loading docks and mailrooms) should be
ensure alternate load paths are available in the event of the considered. Heavily occupied areas should not be located
failure of structural elements. *J ** ^ , *
cannot withstand localised breeching caused by package bombs
V. TIES. An integrated system of ties in perpendicular @, J
directions along the principal lines of structural framing shall
serve to redistribute loads during catastrophic events. IV. Interior Columns
VI. DUCTILITY. Members and their connections shall ` , J | ,*
be designed to maintain their strength while undergoing large under ‘Exterior Frame’ (mentioned above) should apply to interior
deformations. Ductile plastic design concepts such as strong columns as well.
column weak beam together with appropriate detailing should be
adopted. V. Interior Walls
VII. MATERIALS. Due consideration should be given to ` ,, * * ** J *, q
materials selection from the view point of ductility and brittleness. designed to contain the explosive effects within the unsecured
areas. Ideally, unsecured areas should be located adjacent to the
building exterior so that the explosive pressure may be vented
outward as well.
e. Structural Elements
,, 9' :
It is suggested that critical structural components be designed to unit) walls shall be reinforced vertically and horizontally, and
the following criteria:- adequately supported laterally. Anchorage at the top and bottom
J,,J,,q@q, ^, @J *,,|*,@:
I. Exterior Frame of the wall.
| ,* J,, q @q, @ ,,J,,@ q,:@ [:
more stories without buckling. limit damage to supporting columns.
9 ,*J,,q
J, ,:@ VI. Evacuation Routes (e.g. Lift Shafts, Staircase cores)
ties or spiral reinforcement to enhance shear capacity, ductility
and improve the performance of lap splices in the event of loss of : ^* * *J , J
concrete cover. staircase cores of the building shall be constructed of reinforced
concrete or adequately hardened such that they are still available
#, ,*@,J,,q@, q ^ for evacuation purposes in the event of an emergency.
level as practical. Splices at exterior columns shall employ
@,[@ , q*,:
such that the connection does not fail before the member develops f. Building Envelope
*,|*,@:
I. Walls
II. Roof System
,, J *, q J [,^, q,
* J *, q ^ J :
*J J **, ,* * q:
J * pressure loads. Any failure of the walls should be in the ductile
a ductile fashion which gives adequate time for the occupants |* Jq, J J,,
to respond. This can be achieved by providing adequate ties, should be at least as strong as the windows, doors or frames they
redundancy and ductility in both the vertical load bearing elements support.
@,:
` ^ ,,q * J, II. Windows

,, ,q * J ,[
J
,, J *, q * ,JJ
,, ` :J J
Due consideration should be given to the provision of ties such the supporting wall should be capable of resisting the breaking
as the inclusion of shear connectors between the steel beam and pressure of the window glass. The window glass should fail
deck and the provision of a steel mesh within the concrete deck.
Beam end connections shall be capable of developing the ultimate before the frame, anchorage or supporting wall system.
|*, @: J q ^ q, ,* [ [
column connections shall be able to resist load reversals. J J , J @q,
conventional loads should be used. The type of glass used
`JJ,: J *@@[ should be laminated annealed glass. For insulated panels, only
post-tensioned systems shall be designed for load reversals
arising from blast effects. the interior pane needs to be laminated. Tempered glass should
be avoided for external windows as it is 4 times stronger than
+ ,q@, : * annealed glass.
consideration should be given to mitigate punching shear failure
at the columns. Continuous bottom reinforcement shall be
provided across the columns to retain the slab in the event of
punching shear failure.
Page 122
J J *, J^ * q 10 MECHANICAL DESIGN
½-inch. The minimum silicone sealing around the inside glass
a. Emergency Functions
perimeter should be a ¼-inch, with a minimum tensile strength of
20 psi (138 kPa).
I. GENERAL. All emergency functions should be located
away from high-risk areas in protected locations with restricted
J* @@ ,:[Jq qq,
access. Do not place them near structurally vulnerable areas
net curtains and catcher systems should be considered and used
(such as transfer girders). Harden and/or provide physical buffer
where applicable.
zones for the enclosures around the emergency equipment,
controls and wiring. Provide redundant and separated emergency
J, *@ q* q,J *,
systems as well.
be retained by the frame, be caught by catcher systems, or exit
J q* :q: J@@ @J
b. Ventilation System
III. Doors
I. AIR-INTAKES. Air-intakes should be located as high as
practical to limit access to the general public. For buildings of
J *, @ Jq, J:q
more than 4 stories, air-intakes should be located on the fourth
against the door frame/jam. The door frame anchorage should
JJq*, ,,
have a lateral capacity greater than door leaf itself.
the roof or as high as practical. Locating air-intakes high on a wall
is preferred over a roof location. Sloping vent guards should be
,q q@@
installed to prevent injection of foreign objects into the air-intake
a master key should have access to all doors, windows or
system.
receptacles (including service and utilities areas).
II. SURVEILLANCE. For public access areas, there
*q,[, J *,q* ^*
should be securing and monitoring of all air diffusers and return
along designated egress routes.
air grilles. Air-intake locations, fan rooms and other mechanical
rooms should also be under security surveillance and tied to the
IV. Louvres
alarm system.
*^ J @J *,q J
III. EGRESS ROUTES. Positive pressurisation of egress
the supporting structure has a lateral capacity greater than that of
routes, stairwells and vestibules is recommended.
the element.
c. Utility Protection
*JJq, J^,[ [
JJ *JJ, *^q J *,qq*,
I. UTILITIES AND FEEDERS. Utility and feeder systems
of the louvers.
should be located at least 30 metres away from loading bays,
lobbies, parking areas and other high risk areas.
Jq ,qJ *,q@ @,:
anchored into the structure behind the louvres.
II. INCOMING UTILITIES. Within the building and property
lines, incoming utility systems should be concealed (underground).
V. Cladding
These systems should not be located at vehicle screening points
or at high risk areas (e.g. lobbies, loading bay, parking areas).
J,J *,@ q,:*JJ
panel thickness that is acceptable for conventional loads.
d. Water Supply
J , *@@ *@@ ** J *,
I. WATER TANKS. The water tanks should be located in
be designed to resist the ultimate lateral resistance of the panel.
a secured area and inaccessible to the general public or staff.
Mandatory requirements for security of water storage tanks for
9, J *, J^ ,
potable water supply in buildings are stipulated in the Public
transmission path into the main structure as practical to minimise
Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply) Regulations and the
shear and torsional response.
Singapore Standard CP 48 – Code of Practice for Water Services.
In addition, CCTVs should be installed to monitor activities in
+ J, ,* J@:
this area.
vertical load-carrying members should be avoided. Instead, the
,J *, J @J 11 ELECTRICAL DESIGN
VI. Venting a. Emergency Power Supply and Fuel Storage
J q*, J *, , J ^ I. EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM. Redundant
explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to outside emergency power systems remotely located from each other
of the structure. An example is the use of blow-out panels and should be provided. The emergency power distribution feeders
window systems that provide protection from external blast J *, q , J , *
*
pressure but fail or vent internal blast pressure. redundant routing paths to enhance reliability. Emergency
distribution panels should be located in rooms separate from the
normal power system and hardened where possible.
Page 123
II. FUEL STORAGE. Fuel storage tanks should be VI. ELECTROMAGNETIC DOORS. 1200 lbs Electro-
, : q*,@
[J magnetic locks should be used for all exterior doors. The magnetic
enclosures. Their access should be restricted and protected. switches should be able to be de-activated during emergency to
Fuel piping within the building should be located in hardened facilitate evacuation. In order to detect possible intrusion when
enclosures, and redundant piping systems should be provided to the switches are de-activated, CCTV cameras should be installed
JJ,q,: J *,q* :+*,
,, to monitor the movement at the egress points. As an added
stations should be located away from public areas and monitored security feature, these doors should only open from inside the
by CCTV. building.
III. TRANSFORMERS. Transformers should be located VII. DURESS ALARM OR ASSISTANCE STATIONS. Call
inside the building and away from public access. Multiple buttons should be provided at key public areas and areas that are
transformers should be located remotely from each other to
JJ
enhance their reliability should one transformer be damaged by
an explosion. VIII. MONITORING SYSTEMS. Physical/ electronic security
and monitoring system as well as backup power should be
b. Lighting provided.
I. LIGHTING. There should be adequate environmental

lighting to enhance building security and complement CCTV 12 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL & RADIOLOGICAL
*^,,+ *:,J
|* PROTECTIVE MEASURES
exit signs should be provided with integral battery packs. Non- I. ACCESS RESTRICTION & SURVEILLANCE. Restrict
slip phosphorescent treads should also be used. access to critical ventilation equipment such as AHUs and to
mechanical control rooms. Diffusers and return air-grilles in
public areas, as well as air-intakes and mechanical control rooms
c. Communications and Security Systems should be secured and under surveillance.
II. HVAC SYSTEMS. Zone HVAC systems and isolate
I. BACKUP COMMUNICATIONS. The building could HVAC zones in unsecured areas. Each zone should have its
have a backup communication system or telephone service to own AHU and duct system. Isolation of the return air system (i.e.
maintain communications in case of an incident. The preferred no shared returns) is also recommended. Incorporate fast acting,
alternative is to have a base radio communication system with low-leakage shut off dampers in the HVAC systems.
antennas installed in the stairwell, and portable sets distributed on III. SAFE ZONES. Create safe zones using enhanced
JJ *,, q Jq*, *
, [J * : @
systems as well as back up power provision. * : @@ @ *@@,

aid, water, personnel-protective equipment). Provide positive
II. RADIO TELEMETRY. Distributed antennas could pressurisation of primary egress routes, safe havens and critical
areas.
be located throughout the facility if required for emergency
communications through wireless transmission of data. IV. PUBLIC AREAS. Filter both the return air and outdoor
air supply for public areas.
III. SPARE CONDUITS. Empty conduits and power outlets
should be considered for possible future installation of security V. HIGH RISK AREAS. Lobbies, loading docks and
mail rooms, etc, are considered high risk areas. They should
control equipment, Smart Card Technologies or other security be located outside the main building footprint and be provided
solutions. with separate HVAC systems with isolated returns capable of
100% exhaust. In addition, these areas should be maintained
IV. OPERATIONAL COMMAND CENTRE (OCC), FIRE at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building but at
COMMAND CENTRE (FCC) AND SECURITY COMMAND a positive or neutral pressure relative to the outdoors. Their
construction should be air-tight with vestibules and air-locks if
CENTRE (SCC). The SCC and OCC may be co-located. The
JJJ,, :|J*
chain of command should be carefully pre-planned to ensure the to be activated upon suspected internal CBR release should also
*,
,J@ , @
:@ ^ be considered.
Secure the information links between the SCC, OCC and FCC.
The FCC shall be accessible from the building exterior. VI. FILTRATION SYSTEMS. J
, :J *,
be carefully designed and employed to maximise effective
^,
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, ¦
,
V. CCTV SYSTEMS. A colour CCTV surveillance system JJJ
:
, :J *,q
with recording capability should be provided to view and record ^
, J:J *,qJJ
activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at primary potential to integrate detection systems at a later stage.
entrances/exits, and VIP’s enclosure. A mix of monochrome
VII. POSITIVE PRESSURISATION. The HVAC design
cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate should create a slight overpressure of 5 to 12 Pa within the
illumination for colour cameras. The system should be capable building environment relative to the outdoors. The design should
of archiving high resolution CCTV footage for 30 days. Intelligent q qJ
, : J@
CCTV (i-CCTV) should be installed for space designed for secure against external release of CBR agents.
and non-secure areas e.g. lobbies, unloading bays. For details,
please refer to the guidelines for ‘CCTV Systems’ at Section 8.7 VIII. AIR-TIGHTNESS. In order to maintain the desired
of the Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore. pressure relationships between HVAC zones and limit the

, *Jq*,J
structure and its boundaries (e.g. doors, windows, walls, etc)
should be designed to be as airtight as practical.
Page 124
APPENDIX B
GENERAL SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR
HOTELS themselves expect to feel secure while visiting the hotel. It can
INTRODUCTION therefore be said that there is a commercial value in creating a
secure environment in the hotel.
¦ , @ : ** @,:

role in a country’s economy. They serve both the local and ¦ , J^ J J

international business communities and bolster the economy with challenge in designing security and protective countermeasures:
foreign currency. Terror attacks that target hotels can therefore
potentially cause great harm to a country’s economy. They are open to the general public.
They host large numbers of local and foreign guests.
Modern terrorism, as demonstrated in recent events, has * @q:,*

targeted hotels and has made them a preferred target. Terrorist weight.
organisations understand the vulnerabilities of the hotel industry. They host major functions such as conferences, parties and
J:, *J
J * weddings that attract even more guests, who visit the hotel
attractions could have on tourism, the economy and on public for a relatively short period of time.
morale. It is these factors that have brought terror organisations Hotels routinely receive large numbers and amounts of
,J§` *
@ J @@ deliveries and supplies (both in volume and quantity).
mass terror attacks against hotels and tourist resorts. Hotels employ a large number of permanent and temporary
Standards staff.
There is a Singapore Standard for Hotel Security Luxury hotels often host or entertain both international and
SS545:2009 by SPRING Singapore. This provides a , ,0`@ ,,
*,q
framework for hotels to assist them in setting up a
security management system. The general directions presented in this appendix are divided
according to the following security rings:
The prominent past terror attacks against tourist centres include:
1. Deterrence
Coordinated attacks at different locations in Mumbai which 2. Pro-active Security
included 2 hotels, The Taj Mahal Palace & Tower and The 3. Perimeter Security
Oberoi Trident (November 2008, 173 dead and hundreds 4. Access Control
more wounded); 5. Security Command and Control Room
The attack on the Islamabad Marriott Hotel (September 2008, 6. Emergency Procedures
54 killed, more than 200 injured) where a suicide bomber
*@*
,,J|@, ^ J SECURITY RINGS
hotel;
1. DETERRENCE
Simultaneous attacks against three hotels in Amman
(November 2005, 57 dead and hundreds more wounded);
Deterrence theory explores the conditions under which one party
Attack against the Egyptian resort of Sharm al-Sheikh (July
can deter another opposing party from taking an action that is
2005, at least 88 dead and hundreds more wounded);
: J
@::@,,:^ ,^
The attack against the Hilton Taba and two beach resorts
either or both of the following aspects:
(October 2004, 32 dead and over a hundred wounded).
The attack on Park Hotel in Netanya (March 2002, 30 killed
I. The threat to use force in response to an undesired
more than 140 injured) where a terrorist took advantage of
action – this is aimed at making the opponent decide that the
a religious event in the hotel to perpetrate a mass murder
projected losses caused by the violent response will be greater
attack.
than the projected gains from the actions he wishes to perform.
Among the tourist attractions attacked in the region were:
II. The assurance of failure – this is aimed at convincing the
adversary that his planned actions are doomed to fail, thus giving
Twin bombings at Jakarta’s JW Marriott Hotel and Ritz-
him no gain.
Carlton Hotel (July 2009, 9 dead, 53 injured);
Bomb attacks in Bali’s Jimbaran (near Four Seasons Hotel)
Deterrence is both an aim and a by-product of a security plan,
and Kuta areas (Oct 2005, 23 dead, 129 injured);
and can be achieved with little or no extra cost.
The attack outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (August 2003,
12 dead and over a hundred wounded);
When relating to deterrence in the protective security arena, the
The attacks against tourists in Bali (October 2002, 202 dead,
measures employed are usually aimed at making the adversary
many more wounded, and October 2005, 26 dead and more
think that he is doomed to fail.
than a hundred wounded).
The assurance of failure is created both by deploying robust
When planning security measures for a hotel, it is imperative to
and clearly recognisable security measures and by cultivating a
remember that the security plan should create a balance between
reputation of tight, effective security deployment.
the need to create a secure environment and the requirements
of the hotel to maintain an open, inviting and warm environment.
Providing the correct level of security measures throughout a
hotel can contribute to the hotel’s business as it is the host’s duty
to provide a secure environment to its guests and the guests
Page 125
A robust and clearly recognisable security deployment is achieved The solution to the apparent inferiority of the defending force
by: can be found in its inherent advantages. The security force can
usually afford better training for its personnel. The security team
I. Applying a pro-active security concept – security guards must be able to take advantage of the fact that it is operating on
that actively and visibly “hunt” the threat create an intimidating J * J q, J q

security presence and give the adversary the feeling that his detailed knowledge of their terrain which can provide them with
operative might also be singled out and apprehended by the tactical superiority during the adversary’s intelligence gathering,
security deployment. as well as during an attack.
II. Deploying visible technical security measures such as Pro-active security is a tool for enhancing the security unit’s
CCTV coverage of an area which could be interpreted by the advantages while minimising those of the potential attacker.
adversary as a pro-active security measure even if the footage
of the CCTV camera is not reviewed regularly (a fact that the Pro-active security is comprised of:
adversary is not likely to be aware of).
I. A pro-active mindset – The security guards must be
III. Implementing visible physical protection elements such educated to have a “hunter mentality”. This means that they
as perimeter bollards and fences, screening areas and access need to constantly seek out the potential attacker, screening their
control at entrances will deter most attackers from choosing that surroundings for suspects and irregularities. This will enable the
building as a target. security deployment to potentially detect the terrorists prior to an
impending attack. Even if the terrorists are not detected before
A reputation for tight, effective security deployment can be created they attack, the pro-active mindset will enable the guards to shift
both by advertising past successes in foiling real and simulated from routine to emergency mode faster.
attacks and by using propaganda (e.g. newspaper articles that
@*:*@, :@
, II. A pro-active deployment – The security deployment
must be outward-reaching and its various sensors must be
Deterrence helps prevent attacks in their planning stage and thus directed to detecting possible approaching threats. The practical
should be an essential component of every security plan. application of this type of deployment is the positioning of
perimeter guards and the direction of CCTV coverage at possible
In the case of hotels, deterrence can be achieved by: terrorist deployment areas.
I. Building physical protection elements at the perimeter III. A pro-active command – The security management
line and entrances including access control and gates (even if must lead the pro-active efforts. Security managers must be
they are only deployed during times of high alert). trained as commanders, leading their security unit by example.
Security commanders must be available to their team at all times
II. Deployment of robust technical security measures (equipped with a mobile radio), carry arms (if the unit is armed),
such as CCTV and alarm systems throughout the hotel and its q@
J:*:,,
perimeter.
IV. Pro-active specialised training – The security guards
III. The deployment of uniformed security personnel who will and commanders must be trained in the various skills that will
perform checks at the hotel’s entrances. enable them to detect terrorists and pre-attack reconnaissance.
Two important measures in achieving and maintaining a pro-

2. PRO-ACTIVE SECURITY
active security operation are pro-active minded audits and “red
teaming” exercises. These should be focused on testing and
` J
, [ @ |@ J J assuring pro-active security measures. They help to evaluate the
that the defender is usually in an inferior position vis-à-vis the level of preparedness and pro-activeness of the tested security
attacking terrorists. This is primarily as a result of the routine deployment. They also help to focus the security unit on the need
nature of security work combined with the relatively low number for applying pro-active security, by showing that the security
of attacks taking place which together tend to make security regulator puts an emphasis on these measures.
deployment defensive and reactive.
3. PERIMETER SECURITY
The attacker has the advantage of initiative on his side. He is able
to choose the time, place and modus operandi of the attack. He When planning perimeter security for hotels, special emphasis
can abort the attack or postpone the attack if he believes that he must be given to the various entrances and exits to the building
is in a disadvantageous situation. and especially to the main entrance.
On the other hand, security guards will usually be passive to their A hotel’s main entrance is usually a busy area, crowded with
surroundings and only once an incident has occurred or been guests going into and out of the hotel, and it hosts relatively large
reported will they move into an active mode. Analysis of terrorist concentrations of luggage waiting to be taken into the hotel or
attacks in recent years shows that the passive nature of some to be loaded onto out-going vehicles. A hotel’s main entrances
security operations have contributed to their failure in preventing is usually characterised by a relatively vulnerable structure, with
and defeating attacks. large openings and usually includes a large glass façade that
enables visitors and people walking by to look into the hotel’s
lobby and reception areas. Such entrances are also usually
accessible by vehicles which make them both attractive and
vulnerable to VBIED attacks.
Page 126
When planning the security deployment for hotels in Singapore This external security presence should have the means and
it is important to note that during normal periods the threat level q J
J J * *,
in Singapore is relatively low and thus the deployment of certain include:
noticeable security measures that would be utilised in hotels
in higher risk countries is not warranted. One must remember, I. `
@ q,
however, that given the deterrent role of the security and
protection elements, the hotel industry in Singapore needs to be II. `
@ , ,, @[
prepared for a rise in threat levels, which may occur at any time. intelligence (“recce”)
Preparations for such a rise in threat levels may take time and III. Deterring potential attacks
thus the industry must prepare itself in advance for making the
necessary increase in its security deployment’s strength. IV. Providing advanced warning and reporting possible
approaching threats
These preparations should include:
V. Providing the initial armed response to attacks
I. The installation of retractable barriers (US DOS K4 originating both inside and outside the hotel.
standard or equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or UK BSI PAS68:2007
standard13) that would remain open but could be closed in times b) Technological Security Measures
of heightened threat.
The technological security measures deployed on the hotel’s
II. Acquiring the necessary security equipment (e.g. X-ray perimeter needs to complement and support the human security
machines and explosive material detectors). measures. The technological measures must ensure that:
III. Preparing the necessary infrastructure for the I. Vehicles and people wishing to enter the hotel are only
deployment of the security equipment (designing the area to able to do so through the protected screening posts.
carry the equipment’s load, laying electricity cables, allocating the
necessary space at the relevant locations). II. Critical areas not covered by human security presence
can be viewed from afar using CCTV or other measures
IV. Training the security staff with the necessary skills (e.g. ncluding detectors to alert the guards of an intrusion.
correct use of technological screening equipment, pedestrian and
^J,*@
q, III. Any breach of the perimeter security will raise an alarm
that will in turn allow the security deployment to react
*,:@@JJ
,
a) Security Guards
It is important to note that the security measures employed
During periods of heightened threat or in any situations where it on a hotel’s perimeter need not be obvious or make the hotel
may be deemed necessary, a manned outer security perimeter to resemble a fortress. Vehicle barriers can be designed as
for the hotel may need to be created. In certain situations based decorative planters or attractive railings, CCTV cameras can be
on threat assessments, the Singapore Police Force may deploy placed out of sight, hotel security personnel can be dressed in
resources, if they deem it to be necessary, for this purpose or may hotel uniforms, thus blending into the environment.
require hotels to put in place the necessary security guards.
The perimeter security should consist of at least two armed 4. ACCESS CONTROL
guards who should be stationed at the entrance and the exit to
the hotel driveway on a 24 hour basis. These guards should be A policy of relatively free access is vital for a hotel’s regular
responsible for stopping an attack before the assailants reach the operation and especially to the operation of restaurants, bars and
hotel premises. other function facilities.
At normal threat levels, hotels employ visual screening of guests/

@ q:*:
@ J, qq:JJ ,
entrances. This measure is usually aimed at preventing both
terrorist and criminal elements from entering the hotel.
During an elevated threat, however, it will be necessary to apply

a more thorough examination to the people and vehicles wishing
to enter the hotel premises. Furthermore, during a high state of
alert, the number of open entrances to the hotel would have to be
limited or ‘reduced’.
In order for a hotel’s security unit to be able to move smoothly

and quickly between normal, elevated and high threat level
deployments, a prepared security infrastructure must be in place
in the hotel.
13
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Page 127
This infrastructure should include the space, structural load c. Screening of Deliveries for Guests
bearing capability and the electrical means needed to operate
technical access control screening measures. It should also Reccomendations for normal threat levels:
include adequate security procedures and the proper training of
the hotel’s security guards and management. Hotels must train their security staff and other personnel with
the skills needed to detect suspected IEDs.
a. Guest and staff screening
Packages delivered to hotel guests should be visually
Hotel staff members have a relatively high level of interaction with screened by the hotel’s staff.
the hotel guests. They clean their rooms, carry their luggage and
serve them in the different bars and restaurants. Suspicious packages should be deferred to the hotel’s
*:* J*@
q:*:
It is recommended that the hotel’s staff, both security and non- the package should be referred to the police for treatment.
*:^*@
JJ ,
members should be encouraged to be aware of terror related Reccomendations for elevated threat levels:
threats and to alert the hotel’s security unit of any suspicion they
might have regarding a guest or a visitor. Suspicious packages should be screened using the X-Ray
and explosive detectors in a protected area away from the
The hotel should also develop a system of background screening hotel’s guests or main building structure.
of staff and hotel staff should be encouraged to look out for and
report suspicious behaviour of colleagues as well as guests. Reccomendations for high threat levels:
The details of suspicious guests or staff may be sent to the All incoming packages should be screened using X-Ray and
Singapore Police Force for checks and follow-up actions (if explosive detectors in a protected area away from the hotel’s
necessary). guests or main building structure.
b. Screening of guests entering the hotel d. Screening of Deliveries to the Hotel
Recommendations for normal threat levels: Hotels routinely receive large quantities of deliveries both in
volume and number. These deliveries might be used in order to
Hotels should employ visual screening of guests/patrons by
,,|@, ^^ JJ ,**
*:
J ,,q@ J, qq:J
J ,*@
Recommendations for normal threat levels:
recommended for guards to make the visual screening more
effective in detecting the relevant threats. Designated time frames should be determined for each
delivery company.
Recommendations for elevated threat levels:
The hotel’s security must compile a list of approved delivery
It is recommended that hotels limit the number of open trucks and drivers.
access ways to their premises, and that all open entrances
will be monitored by security staff. J J@
J *, q J q: *:
personnel before allowing delivery trucks to enter the hotel’s
J*:
J JJ , loading bay area.
I. Visually screen pedestrians for indications of suspicious Delivery drivers and the deliveries themselves must be
behaviour. visually scanned by the hotel’s security,
II. Conduct a more thorough examination of suspects In order to enhance deterrence against terrorist attempts to
(using metal detectors, opening hand bags and discreetly
, |@, ^ J J , J
screening their luggage with an x-ray machine) in a more suspicious deliveries together with a small number of random
protected area or behind a protected movable shield. deliveries be checked using explosives trace detectors
(“sniffers”).
III. Conduct random checks in order to enhance deterrence.
Reccomendations for elevated threat levels:
Recommendations for high threat levels:
Delivery companies will be instructed to notify the hotel’s
It is recommended that hotels limit the number of open security in advance with the particulars of delivery driver’s
access ways to their premises, and that all open entrances and delivery vehicle’s registration numbers.
be monitored by security staff.
#*@@,J,,q,^J *
J *
Everyone wishing to enter the hotel should be checked with J , ,, J^ q ^
J J ,^:
metal detectors, in order to create deterrence and to ensure company and the ordering store, prior to entering the loading
the potential terrorist will be examined. bay area and being accepted by the hotel.
All luggage and handbags should be checked with an x-ray Reccomendations for high threat levels:
machine, suspected luggage should also be checked with
explosive detectors. All deliveries will be checked by explosives trace detection
devices.
An area must be allocated for suspicious luggage and people
and have protection elements and forced entry resistant
doors and windows.
Page 128
e. Vehicle Access
` ¦Jq,: @ J
Vehicle access routes in the vicinity of the hotel usually exist for during routine and different types of emergencies.
three main reasons:
`` #*@@

I. To enable access to the hotel’s parking areas. responders while they are performing their respective
responsibilities.
II. To enable the parking of selected vehicles in front of the
hotel. III. Is robust, secure and resilient under routine and
emergency situations.
III. To allow vehicles to access the entrance for the purpose
of picking up or dropping off guests and their luggage. The basic requirements of a command and control room:
Recommendations for normal threat levels: I. Location – To be placed in the most secure and protected
part of the building with extra physical protection
Technical measures such as car barriers should be installed elements if needed. (See the guidelines for more
so that they can quickly be deployed during elevated and details).
high threat levels.
II. Operational Effectiveness – This is achieved mostly by
During normal threat levels, the hotel need not screen creating prioritisation of the alarm and CCTV system’s
^J,*,J@
* outputs.
for the hotel to do so).
III. Accurate alarm indications – This enables the Command
Recommendations for elevated threat levels: & Control Room operator to immediately understand
where the breach or event is and to receive an
Barriers, which should have been installed but kept in the immediate visual picture of it via CCTV.
open position, should now be deployed in order to allow the
hotel’s security staff to screen incoming vehicles and prevent `0 ,,:
# @
suspected VBIEDs from entering the hotel driveway. Procedures) to be taken during each of the various
emergency situations that could arise. This enables the
#*:
J *, q @ J ^: security staff to initiate an effective security response
^*,,:q:* J *@ to a variety of emergency situations quickly.
of vehicles wishing to enter.
V. Automated procedures such as automated alarms that
Suspicious vehicles need to be searched (inside the notify the different security forces involved in responding
passenger compartment, in the baggage compartment, to the incident. This should take some pressure off the
next to the engine and underneath the vehicle) as do their security control room staff.
occupants (using metal detectors). This should allow the
detection of weapons and IEDs before permitting them to VI. Direct connection or integration with the hotel’s
enter the hotel’s driveway. management systems that are considered critical or
security related. This should enable the security control
Recommendations for high threat levels: room staff to override or control these systems when the
situation requires.
All vehicles need to be searched (inside the passenger
compartment, in the baggage compartment, next to the VII. Protection and backup of all critical systems. This gives
engine and underneath the vehicle) as do their occupants the security systems resilience during emergency
(using metal detectors). situations in which the security control room may be
damaged. Provisions that allow for an off-site Command
Vehicles should not be permitted to park in parking spaces and Control centre are recommended.
located at the front of the hotels, and should also be kept
away from other vulnerable areas.
The design of the command and control room should

correspond with these tasks.
5. SECURITY COMMAND & CONTROL ROOM
CCTV MONITORING
The security command control room of a building is the nerve The tendency in hotel security planning is to design CCTV
centre of the security operations and should receive and provide systems for crime prevention and insurance reasons. Security
vital information to and from the security personnel on the shift, managers should not overlook the importance of deploying anti-
|*^
@ q J * terror CCTV coverage throughout the hotel and its perimeter (for
emergency situations. J@
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guidelines).
A hotel’s security operations should be aimed at both crime and
terror prevention. The effectiveness and the manner in which Another issue to remember when planning the CCTV monitoring
these operations are carried out are dependant on the capabilities scheme is that the security personnel operating the security
of the control room and its operating staff. control room have a limited ability to cover monitors.
The security control room design must allow it to function as an In order to avoid “overloading” the security control room operators
effective tool for managing the security of the building. This can with information, and thus making the CCTV monitoring ineffective,
only be achieved if the security control room: it is recommended that each operator cover a maximum of 8
monitors that supply an image of at least 10”.
Page 129
The monitors to be observed in the security command room SAFE HAVENS AND ESCAPE ROUTES
need to be carefully selected in accordance with threat and risk
assessment. Additional monitors can be installed, but should only Safe havens
be operated in emergencies when the security control room staff
is bolstered by reinforcements. In many threat and emergency scenarios, the safest place
to be is in a safe haven within the building rather than trying
JJ990@, : ^q
to escape. Typically, the safe haven room will be reinforced
incidents and exercises should also be taken into account. If an against forced entry and even equipped with bio-chemical
attack occurs or an alarm is set off, CCTV footage of the area can 9
,: q,@ @, *^^ q
be used to reconstruct events, recognize suspects, solve crimes attacks for long periods of time until help comes. In many
, , q J * *, *: buildings it will be the “shelter room”.
responses. In order to accomplish all of this, CCTV footage has to
be stored for a period of time (30 days is recommended. Please Identifying and incorporating safe havens into the building’s
refer to section 8.7.3 of the guidelines for details). emergency planning is one of the main responsibilities of a
building’s security manager. The security manager needs to
give clear and simple instructions to the building’s occupants
6. EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES regarding the use of these safe havens. These instructions
must include clear criteria that determine in which situations
Emergency procedures should cover modern terrorist attack the occupants must go to the safe havens. Safe havens are
scenarios such as: especially critical in situation whereby evacuation routes may
be inaccessible following a terror attack.
I. Armed assaults.
Emergency escape
II. Staggered attack comprising a combination of scenarios
(e.g. a VBIED explosion followed by an armed assault). Routes should be designed taking into consideration the
threats and risks estimated for the hotel according to possible
``` #*Jq:J
@ terror scenarios. Special care should be taken to ensure that
whilst they are dealing with the wounded. they do not pass through areas that are considered hazardous
in an emergency situation. The escape routes should be
IV. Attacks utilising unconventional weapons (dispersion of planned in accordance with and in coordination with both the
a chemical agent via the building’s ventilating systems). : *, Jq*,J
:@,
: @, *

J The guiding principle for determining whether to activate an
following: escape plan is simple. Evacuation is ordered when the danger
to the occupants is greater within the building/installation than
` J ,,qJ
@ ¨ it is outside it.
II. The responsibilities and duties of all employee groups It must be possible to initiate emergency and evacuation
(hotel security team, maintenance, front lobby staff, etc.) procedures immediately without having to await permission
during and after the emergency situation – a special from an administrative manager/executive. Seeking
focus should be put on assigning a team to help guests administrative permission to evacuate the building/installation
who cannot evacuate themselves. in life threatening situations is not advisable due to the
time constraint.
III. A clear chain of command at all stages of the attack.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
IV. Which local forces will provide immediate reinforcements?
The above appendix of general security guidelines for hotels
V. Who evacuates the guests and visitors?
provides generic recommendations for security solutions for
hotels that if implemented will enhance security levels. The
VI. Who will be responsible for reporting and to whom? Both
appendix includes many general recommendations according to
within and outside the hotels’ management structure.
the different security rings presented. The overarching concept
of the appendix, which will greatly facilitate the implementation of
VII. The position of emergency equipment and its functions.
the recommendations, is that by correctly preparing and training
J J ,
*: [ *
VIII. Safe havens and escape routes.
they will become a force multiplier in anti-terrorism preparedness.
Page 130
APPENDIX C
GENERAL SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR Shopping malls have certain characteristics that create a

J,,*:@ ^ *
SHOPPING MALLS
measures:
INTRODUCTION
J: @ J@*q,
In Singapore, both the booming tourist industry and the hot climate
combine to make our major shopping malls important centres for J: **,,: J^ *,@, @
economic activity. The large and prosperous shopping malls,
hosting thousands of shoppers daily, can be seen as symbols J:**,,:* ^q: * *
of Singapore’s economic success. The impact of a major terror @ *
^J,
attack against one of these malls would be severe and would
probably cause serious damage to the country’s economy. J ©:@,¥^ J
J
An analysis of terror attacks in the modern era show that terrorist J: , *q ^ q J , ,
organisations have frequently targeted shopping malls in their foreign.
terror campaigns. In the terror campaign against Israel, which
began in September 2000, the Palestinian terror groups had J
,,JJª J
attacked shopping malls in Israel’s cities, one example being can be used as places for concealing IED’s.
the attack which took place at the Sharon Shopping Mall in sea
side city of Netanya in December 2005. In this attack, a suicide J: *,,: ^ , * J
bomber from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad detonated himself at and supplies.
the entrance to the mall after his entrance was blocked by security
*J
Jq q*@ J: J^ , q, , @,,:
in their food halls and in areas that hold clothing).
The IRA had also targeted shopping malls and commercial
centres in the past with the VBIED attack against the shopping J:**,,:J^, J
centre in Manchester on the 15th June 1996 being the most attract customers).
prominent example. In this attack, over 200 people were injured
despite the warning given by the IRA close to detonation. J: @, : ^: , *q @
temporary staff including a security force made up
Another terror organisation that had attacked shopping malls was usually of both uniformed guards and plainclothes store
the Kurdish PKK. In an attack at a mall in Istanbul in March 1999, detectives.
J
q qJJ @@,,,,$"
people in the attack. The Abu Saif organisation had attacked malls JJJ@*,,:
in the Philippines and the ETA had planted bombs in department ,J * JJ
stores in Spain. halls.
Terrorist organisations understand the vulnerabilities of the J J,, ,JJ:

commercial and tourist centres and have attacked many tourist procedures and can not be drilled to gain familiarity.
related targets. The attack against the Egyptian tourist resort of
Sharm al-Sheikh (July 2005, at least 88 dead and hundreds more
wounded) and the attack against the Hilton Taba and two beach
In normal threat environments, the general security concept
resorts (October 2004, 32 dead and over a hundred wounded)
employed in shopping malls is derived from the main
are just two examples.
objective of their security policy – crime prevention. In
order to achieve this objective, shopping malls allocate
Large and crowded shopping malls are attractive targets to
" ">
the rising threat of global terrorism, which is characterised by
technology and procedural domains. These resources
professionalism, detailed planning, identifying and utilising
can be effectively utilised to provide security solutions to
vulnerabilities and a lack of inhibition in attacking civilian targets
threats of terrorism that malls may face.
seeking to cause mass casualties.
In order for the security resources of a shopping mall to be
utilised effectively, there must be an anti-terrorism security plan
THE SECURITY CONCEPT for the mall. This plan must be integrated into the mall’s security
policy through management policy, training and audit. The mall’s
When designing a security concept for the protection of malls, security force(s) must be trained in all the skills and procedures
@ qJ
JJq, necessary for carrying out their roles in the anti-terrorism security
between creating a secure environment and the requirements of plan.
the shopping mall to be open to the public with an inviting and
commercially attractive environment. Providing the correct level Since shopping malls on a regular basis employ a
of security for customers is the domain owner’s responsibility and ">" >
can contribute to the mall’s quality and therefore to its business. through adaptive training, achieve fairly high levels of
security for relatively little additional investment in security.
Creating a secure environment in and around shopping #*:@, : ,,J *,q|q,qq,
malls has a commercial value. adapt to different threat levels. The model presented below offers
a system for transferring protection assets from crime prevention
to anti-terrorism according to threat levels. The transfer will be
q J @ @, : * J
levels rise, so more of the shopping mall’s security assets are
allocated to anti-terrorism functions and positioning.
Page 131
SECURITY RINGS
It is important to note that shifting a guard or plainclothes store
detective from crime prevention mode to anti-terrorism mode
1. DETERRENCE
does not necessarily mean that the crime prevention level will be
lowered. In some cases the new role may make the guard more Deterrence theory explores the conditions under which one player
alert and dynamic and therefore improve the effectiveness of the can deter another opposing player from taking an action that is
crime prevention. A store detective with experience at identifying : J
@,: '
the suspicious behaviour of shoplifters will be able to adapt very involves one of two aspects or a combination of both:
well to identifying other possible suspects provided he is equipped
with the necessary tools and training. I. The threat to use force in response to an undesired
action – this is aimed at making the opponent evaluate the
projected losses caused by the violent response to be greater
than the projected gains from the actions he wishes to perform.
II. The assurance of failure – this is aimed at convincing the

adversary that his planned actions are doomed to fail, thus giving
him no gain.
Deterrence is both an aim and a by-product of a security plan,

and can be achieved with little to no extra cost.
Well maintained deterrence saves resources over time.
When relating to deterrence in the protective security arena, the

measures employed are usually aimed at leading the adversary
to the decision that his attack plan is likely to fail completely or not
achieve the results that were sought.
The assurance of failure is created both by deploying robust

and clearly recognisable security measures and by cultivating a
reputation of tight, effective security deployment.
Another important component of deterrence is the

adversary’s lack of understanding of the entire scope and
level of the security deployment.
A robust and clearly recognisable security deployment is achieved

by:
I. Applying a pro-active security concept – security guards

that actively and visibly “hunt” the threat create an intimidating
security presence and give the adversary the feeling that his
operative might also be singled out and apprehended by the
security deployment.
II. Deploying visible technical security measures, for

example CCTV coverage of an area could be interpreted by the
adversary as a pro-active security measure even if the footage
of the CCTV camera is not reviewed regularly (a fact that the
adversary is not likely to be aware of).
A reputation of tight, effective security deployment can be created

both by advertising past successes in foiling real and simulated
attacks, and by using “propaganda” e.g. newspaper articles that
@*:* @, :@

shopping mall, etc.
Deterrence helps prevent attacks in their planning stage and thus

should be an essential component of every security plan.
In the case of shopping malls, deterrence can be achieved by the

The general directions presented in this appendix are divided deployment of dynamic uniformed security guards and technical
according to the following security rings: security measures, such as CCTV and alarm systems, throughout
the mall and its perimeter.
1. Deterrence
2. Pro-active security
3. Perimeter Security
4. Access Control
5. Security command and control room
6. Emergency Procedures
Page 132
2. PRO-ACTIVE SECURITY 3. PERIMETER SECURITY
` J
, [ @ |@ @ ^ J The majority of terrorist attacks against shopping malls have
the defender is usually in an inferior position in relation to the been conducted by placing an IED inside the mall or by trying
attacking terrorists. This is primarily as a result of the routine
,*q q ,:J@
nature of security work combined with the relatively low number of a dynamic, pro-active perimeter security deployment cannot
of attacks taking place, that tend to make security deployment be underestimated. One of the principles of security is the ability
defensive and reactive. to detect a suspected attacker as far away from the building as
possible or at a point where the attacker would cause the least
The attacker has the advantage of initiative on his side. He is able amount of damage. One of the means to do this is by employing
to choose the time, place and modus operandi of the attack. He external security rings.
can abort the attack or postpone the attack if he believes that he
is at a disadvantage. Another major threat relating to the building perimeter is the easy
approach of a potential VBIED to the external walls and entrance
On the other hand, a security guard will usually be passive to his and ramming through them to enter the main building. This threat
surroundings and only once an incident has occurred or been may have catastrophic implications on the mall if carried out.
reported will he move into an active mode. Analysis of terrorist The main principle in mitigating consequences in such an event
attacks in recent years show that the passive nature of some is by determining the vulnerable locations for such threats and
security operations have contributed to their failure in preventing preventing the attack from being carried out in a catastrophic
and defeating attacks. manner (assuming complete prevention is not always possible).
This would be done usually by installing a physical barrier to
The solution to the apparent inferiority of the defending force can prevent the vehicle from approaching a critical proximity and
be found in its inherent advantages. The security force can usually installing blast mitigation elements on glass facades.
afford better training for its personnel. The security team must be
able to take advantage of the fact it is operating on home ground; Perimeter security is a critical external ring and when not
this enables them to have an intimate and detailed knowledge effectively realised it may cause a serious vulnerability
of their terrain which can provide them with tactical superiority in a building’s security deployment. This is the kind of
during the adversary’s intelligence gathering as well as during an vulnerability to which terrorism is attracted.
attack.
When planning perimeter security for shopping malls, special
emphasis must be given to the mall’s various entrances and exits
Pro-active security is a tool for enhancing the security unit’s
and especially to the main entrance.
advantages while minimising those of the potential attacker. It is
made up of:
A mall’s main entrance is usually the busiest and most crowded
entrance often positioned facing the main road, packed with
I. A PRO-ACTIVE MINDSET - the security guards must
shoppers entering and exiting the mall. A shopping mall’s
be educated to have a “hunter mentality”, that is to say that they
main entrance is usually characterised by relatively vulnerable
need to constantly seek out the potential attacker, screening
construction; large openings, a large glass façade that enables
their surroundings for suspects and irregularities. This will enable
both shoppers and passers-by to view the merchandise on
the security deployment to potentially detect the terrorists prior
display inside the mall. These main entrances are also usually
to an impending attack. Even if the terrorists are not detected
accessible by vehicles to allow private car and taxi drop-off and
before they attack, the pro-active mindset will enable the guards
pick-up of shoppers, a feature that makes them very attractive
a smoother shift from routine to emergency mode.
and vulnerable to VBIED attacks.
II. A PRO-ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT – the security
Preparations for such a rise in threat levels may take time and
deployment must be outward facing; its various sensors must be
thus the industry must prepare itself in advance for making the
directed to detecting possible approaching threats. The practical
necessary increase in its security deployment’s strength.
application of this type of deployment is the positioning of
perimeter guards and the direction of CCTV coverage at possible
These preparations should include:
terrorist deployment areas.
I. The installation of retractable barriers (US DOS K4
III. A PRO-ACTIVE COMMAND – the security management
standard or equivalent ASTM F2656-07 or UK BSI PAS68:2007
must lead the pro-active efforts. Security managers must be
standard14) that would remain open but could be closed in times
trained as commanders, leading their security unit by example.
of heightened threat.
Security commanders must be available to their team at all times
(equipped with a mobile radio), carry arms, if the unit is an armed
II. Acquiring the necessary security equipment (e.g. X-ray
q@
J:*:,,
machines and explosive material detectors).
IV. PRO-ACTIVE SPECIALISED TRAINING – the security
III. Preparing the necessary infrastructure for the
guards and commanders must receive training in the various
deployment of the security equipment (designing the area to
skills that will enable them to detect terrorists and pre-attack
carry the equipment’s load, laying electricity cables, allocating the
reconnaissance. Two important measures in achieving and
necessary space at the relevant locations).
maintaining a pro-active security operation are pro-active minded
audits and “red teaming” exercises. These should be focused
IV. Training the security staff with the necessary skills (e.g.
on testing and assuring pro-active security measures. They help
correct use of technological screening equipment, pedestrian and
to evaluate the level of preparedness and pro-activeness of the
^J,*@
q,
tested security deployment. They also help to focus the security
unit on the need for applying pro-active security, by showing that
the security regulator puts an emphasis on these measures.
14
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Page 133
General recommendations for normal threat levels: a. Walk-in Shoppers’ Screening
Due to the very large numbers of people in Singapore’s General recommendations for normal threat levels:
major shopping malls and their attractiveness as targets for
terrorism, there should be an armed and pro-active security A preliminary visual screening of people entering the mall
presence even during times of normal threat (2-3 armed is most effective if carried out at the various entrances.
guards) on the perimeter of these malls. #*@ q
,JJJ *,
be countered or neutralised before they enter the building.
This external security presence should have the means and Some of the screening can be done by exterior patrols and
J
JJ*J *, some by guards posted at or near the entrances. Special
include: attention should be given to people such as individuals
carrying large bags, wearing heavy clothing like suits or coats
` `
@ q, or who stand out as unusual or odd.
`` `
@ , ,, @[
reconnaissance Suspects will be physically screened using metal detectors
III. Deterring potential attacks and their handbags should be searched visually or screened
IV. Providing advanced warning and reporting using a hand-held metal detector.
possible approaching threats
V. Responding to alerts given from the command Relevant screening equipment should be available.
post
VI. Providing the initial security response to the At elevated threat levels:
attack
Security guards need to be posted at each entrance to
General recommendations for elevated threat levels: visually screen all people entering the mall. Any suspects
and a pre-determined percentage of random individuals will
A minimum number (to be determined) of randomly picked be physically screened using hand-held metal detectors and
shoppers need to be checked per hour by the perimeter their bags will be visually searched.
*:
J @ @ @,

*@J*,, Closing some of the less busy entrances should be considered
to enable a concentration of effort for access control at the
In addition to the armed exterior presence at the entrances, open entrances if resources are limited.
frequent patrols (two per hour) should be operated around
the perimeter. At high threat levels:
A perimeter of crowd control barriers should be erected to

General recommendations for high threat levels: q, , q *

away from the entrance in order to provide stand off and depth
The perimeter security should provide protection for crowd for reaction. These crowd control barriers should be manned
concentrations that might form at shopping malls’ exteriors by an armed guard and an additional security guard.
near the screening at the entrances.
The diagram below is an illustrated example of this type of
, *: J *, q crowd control barriers.
:@[ @, :

4. ACCESS CONTROL
Access control deals with authorisation and rules by which
vehicles, personnel and goods may enter a building. The reason
access control is such an important security feature is that in most
cases, an attack that takes place inside will cause much more
damage and casualties than an attack which occurs outside. For
this reason it is recommended that a shopping mall’s security
unit deploys a certain level of access control measures at normal
threat levels which will increase with a rise in the threat level.
The different methods for implementing access control for walk-in

shoppers, vehicles and deliveries, are derived from the potential
JJ@ Jq*, *@

tuned to enable discovery of that threat. A person walking into
the mall can only carry a relatively small amount of explosives.
The most likely threat quantity is an IED carried by an individual
assimilated in the crowd i.e. 5-20 Kg. On the other hand, a VBIED
can contain much larger quantities of explosives of up to several
hundred kilograms.
Page 134
Security guards need to be posted at every entrance of the General recommendations for elevated threat levels:
shopping malls except those entrances which are behind the
crowd control barriers. Delivery companies should be instructed to notify the shopping
malls’ security departments in advance with the particulars of
An elevated guard post should be constructed and manned the driver’s and the vehicle’s registration numbers.
by an armed guard. The position will enable tactical control
over the areas around and beyond the crowd control barriers. #*@@, JJ ,^ J *
J *
J , ,, J^ q ^
J J ,^:
All people wishing to enter the shopping malls will be company and the ordering store, prior to entry.
physically screened and their bags will be searched.
General recommendations for high threat levels:
b. Screening of Deliveries Delivery companies will be instructed to deliver supplies at

|J *JJ,,, J@*q, *
Major shopping malls receive vast quantities of merchandise and the peak hours.
supplies each day. The delivery of merchandise and supplies can
be used as a platform for bringing VBIED’s or large IED’s into a All deliveries will be checked by explosives trace detection
J @@ ,,
, * J J ,^ q devices.
screened according to the threat level.
c. Vehicle Access
General recommendations for normal threat levels:
Major shopping malls in Singapore often provide car parking
space for their clients in the form of underground or multi-storey
At normal threat levels three basic anti-theft and fraud measures car parks within the shopping mall building. The threat of a
commonly used are adequate for dealing with the VBIED and IED VBIED entering a mall’s car park poses a serious threat. These
threats. These three measures are: threats are presented in the main body of the guidelines. This
appendix assumes that such a threat exists and relates to it with
I. Screening of the documentation of incoming @
*:* JJ,^,J
delivery vehicles in order to make sure that the delivery aim of these recommended security screening measures is to
was ordered by a tenant of the shopping mall. :
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car park. The greater the vulnerability to a mall from a particular
`` 0
JJ,^ q car park, the greater the importance of the screening measures.
unloaded from the trucks at the loading docks matches
General recommendations for normal threat levels:
the details of the delivery as is written on the delivery
papers. The match should be according to number of All vehicles should be visually screened at the entrance to
parcels and their size. the car park driveway for suspicious people or suspected
VBIED’s.
III. Drivers that are not regulars or drivers that
seem suspicious should be questioned by the security Suspected vehicles and people will be directed to a

designated15@ Jq:*:

General recommendations for elevated and high threat

levels:
All vehicles wishing to enter the shopping mall’s car park

will be searched internally and externally, according to the

J
Suspicious and random vehicles will be checked with

explosives detection devices.
5. SECURITY COMMAND & CONTROL ROOMS

The security command control room of a shopping mall is the
nerve centre of security operations for the mall and should receive
and provide vital information to and from the security personnel
JJ |*^
@ q J
routine and emergency situations.
A shopping mall’s security operation should be aimed at both

Important note: crime and terror prevention. The effectiveness and the manner in
which these operations are carried out are greatly derived from
The additional training that shopping mall security personnel and dependent on the capabilities of the control room and its
should receive as recommended in the guidelines will further operating staff.
enhance the security response for this threat level.
In order to enhance deterrence against terrorist attempts

against shopping malls, it is also recommended that
suspicious deliveries together with a small number 15
The screening area should be determined taking into account its
of random deliveries be checked using explosives trace location in regards to structural vulnerabilities, high crowd concentration
detectors (“sniffers”). area, etc.
Page 135
The security control room design must allow it to function as an VIII. Protection and backup of all critical systems – this
effective tool for managing the security of the mall and emergency is meant to allow for the security systems’ resilience during
situations. This can only be achieved if the security control room: emergency situations in which the security control room will be
damaged.
¦ , @* J * J ,, q J
routine and emergency situations in order to assist the IX. Access control for the control room itself, preventing un-
decision makers to make the right decisions based on authorised entry.
facts.
The formulation of the command and control room should
9 ^ J,, J@ , correspond with these tasks.
positioned in it to keep a high level of alertness without
CCTV Monitoring
^ 16 .
Normally there is a tendency in shopping mall security planning
¦Jq,: @ J
to design CCTV systems for crime prevention and insurance
during routine and different types of breaches and
17 reasons. Security managers should not overlook the importance
emergencies .
of deploying anti-terror CCTV coverage throughout the mall and
@ J@
@, :
¦Jq,: @
,:q J section 8.7 of the guidelines).
and visitors in emergency situations and monitor the
evacuation of the people if necessary. It is important to note when planning the CCTV monitoring
scheme that the security personnel operating the security control
#*@@
room have a limit to the number of images they can monitor at
responders while they are performing their respective any one time.
responsibilities.
In order to avoid “overloading” the security control room operators
` q* * , * * with information and thus making the CCTV monitoring less
emergency situations. effective, it is recommended that each operator cover 4 to 8
images, no less than 10” wide each.
The basic requirements of a security command and control
room are: The monitors to be observed in the security command room
need to be carefully selected in accordance with threat and
I. Operational Effectiveness – This is achieved mostly by risk assessment, time of day, and different activities at hand.
creating prioritisation of the alarm and CCTV systems’ outputs Additional monitors can be installed, but should only be operated
,^*, *q,
©* ¥q in emergencies when the security control room staff is bolstered
by reinforcements. Monitors that are meant to assist in access
II. Accurate alarm indications – This is meant to enable the control in controlled areas should be dedicated.
C&CR operator to immediately understand where the breach or
event is and to receive an immediate visual picture of it via CCTV. When designing the CCTV deployment and coverage plan, we
, J^ *J* q

``` ,,:
q J , and exercises. If an attack occurs or an alarm is set off, CCTV
to be taken during each of the various routine and emergency footage of the area can be used to reconstruct events, recognise
situations that could arise. This enables the security staff to suspects, solve crimes and learn lessons from both successful
initiate an effective security response to a variety of emergency *:@ ` @,J,, J
situations in a relatively short time. CCTV footage has to be stored for a period of time (28 days is
recommended. Please refer to section 8.7.3 of the guidelines for
IV. A log book which supports the investigation of incidents details).
and gives a clear picture of what happened and the actions taken.
It should be noted that CCTV coverage also plays a key role in
V. Recording all data received by the systems (CCTV, creating deterrence.
alarm, access control) for post-incident investigation.
6. EMERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES
VI. Automated procedures such as automated alarms that Terror attacks are lethal, immediate, develop at a rapid rate
notify the different security forces involved in responding to the and usually occur with no prior warning, leading to possible
incident – this is meant to take some pressure off the security catastrophic results. In these cases, there is no time for planning
control room staff. the response, reporting and requesting orders. Time is critical,
many lives are at stake and the security response must be
VII. Direct connection or integration with the shopping mall’s immediate, automatic and pre-planned. This is achieved through
management systems that are considered critical or security the emergency and evacuation plan.
related – this is meant to enable the security control room staff
to override or control these systems when the situation requires. In the case of a crowded mall, the consequences of an attack can
The most critical system that must be controlled by the control q
*,:q:JJ * J:
room is the public address system. of the crowd. Furthermore, the chaos can be created even if the
situation is only a scare and not an actual attack. The purpose
of the emergency plan is to save lives, minimise damage, ensure
continuity in the functioning of critical systems and accelerate
recovery.
16
Prioritizing inputs received from security cameras and connecting them
to an alarming system will enable only a few monitors to be viewed on a Shopping malls that are interconnected with links to other malls
constant basis. or MRT stations may share an inter-dependent risk and should
collaborate with these linked facilities on the relevant security
17
In many cases security and safety systems are connected and interact measures and contingency response plans.
and therefore it is necessary that the command post have the capabilities
to operate both.
Page 136
Emergency procedures should cover modern terrorist attack SAFE HAVENS AND ESCAPE ROUTES
scenarios such as:
Safe havens @[
J,
^: *@ * q installation which provide certain levels of physical protection for
the residents from threats during possible and actual emergency
*, situations. In many threat and emergency scenarios, the safest
place to be is in a safe haven within the building rather than trying
# @ q to escape. These should be considered in a mall as well, although
(e.g. a VBIED explosion followed by an armed assault). *, q
*, ,* J J q
emergency plan because the concept is against the nature of a
#*Jq:J
@ crowd.
whilst they are dealing with the wounded.
Identifying and incorporating safe havens into the buildings
*,* ^ ,@ @ emergency planning is one of the main responsibilities of a
a chemical agent via the building’s ventilating systems). shopping mall’s security manager. The security manager needs to
give clear and simple instructions to the mall’s shoppers regarding
?" * the use of these safe havens. These instructions must include
the following: clear criteria that determines in which situations the shoppers
must go to the safe havens. Safe havens are especially critical
J ,,qJ
@ ¨ in a situation whereby evacuation routes may be inaccessible
following a terror attack.
J,,qJ J ¨
Emergency escape routes should be designed taking into
J@ q,* ,,@, : *@ consideration the threats and risks estimated for the shopping
(management, shopping mall security team, mall according to possible terror scenarios. Special care should
maintenance, sales people etc.) during and after the be taken to ensure that they do not pass through areas that are
emergency situation – a special focus should be put on considered hazardous in an emergency situation. The escape
assigning a team to assist shoppers in need. routes should be planned in accordance with and in coordination
Jq JJ : *, J,,J
q
, J ,, J
The guiding principle for determining whether to activate an
JJ, , ,,@ ^ ¨ escape plan is simple and directed by simple instructions sounded
clearly in all areas of the mall in all major languages spoken in the
J ^*JJ @@¨ mall. Evacuation is ordered when the danger to the occupants is
18 19
greater within the mall/complex than it is outside it.
q^ * and required @ *@

relevant scenarios. Emergency and evacuation procedures must be allowed to be
initiated immediately without having to await permission from
J ,,q@ q, @ J q J an administrative manager/executive. Seeking administrative
within and outside the mall’s management structure? permission to evacuate the mall in life threatening situations is
not advisable due to the time constraint.
J@ :*@ *
Concluding Remarks
# J^ ,^,:@
The above appendix of general security guidelines for shopping
malls provides generic recommendations for security solutions for
shopping malls that if implemented will enhance security levels.
The appendix includes many general recommendations according
to the different security rings presented. The overarching concept
of the appendix, which will greatly facilitate the implementation of
the recommendations, is that by correctly preparing and training
J J @@ ,,
*: [
measures, they will become a force multiplier in anti-terrorism
preparedness.
18
According to the existing signs throughout the mall
19
According to the threat location and the exit locations
Page 137

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FOREWORD

community’s involvement and contribution are equally vital.

attack, and very importantly to practice it in our daily activities.

of Singapore and our people.

WONG KAN SENG

The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS)

1.1 THE COSTLY THREAT OF TERRORISM 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDELINES

The September 11 terrorist (9/11) attacks in 2001, which 1.2.2 PURPOSE

1.2.4 POSSIBLE THREAT SCENARIOS

Table 1 : Possible Terrorist-Related Threats 1

Ministry of Home Affairs: June 2007

According to testimony by an expert witness to the US

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1.5 NEED FOR SECURITY & PROTECTIVE

The following sections of this chapter relate to general

2.2 GENERAL ARCHITECTURAL

Considering security issues during the initial stages of

Special care should be taken to study the security

2.2.3 PERIMETER LINE

The perimeter line should be designed to assist in

2.2.6 MATERIALS/ FAÇADE SYSTEMS

Any type of building collapse must be avoided, but the

The primary structural elements are the essential parts

The intensity of the blast load on the structure is a function of the

The forces acting on the structure as a result of an

These guidelines promote a local approach to design.

The solutions should be designed based on current

Typically, many systems are either shared by security,

Detailed discussion on mechanical and electrical systems

3.1 HOW TO USE THIS CHAPTER

3.2 DETERMINING BUILDING CATEGORY

It is important to note that the main objective of these

Generally speaking, the larger the number of occupants in

When selecting a building as a potential target, terrorists

Table 2: Building Categories

3.3 DETERMINING BUILDING STRUCTURE

The building’s structure determines the ability of the

3.3.1 CONSTRUCTION METHOD

There are many ways in which buildings can be built, but

Table 3: Construction Methods

In order to determine the correct building category, the

The aim of the Building Structure Category Table is to give

The best design combinations from the protection and

Fewer Protection Elements Recommended:

Moderate Number of Protection Elements

More Protection Elements Recommended:

4.1 HOW TO USE THIS CHAPTER

Some of the protection elements will be referenced as

For more details on each of the protection elements,

Table 7: Low occupancy – Building Category L

I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.

Table 8: Medium occupancy– Building Category (M)

Table 9: High occupancy – Building Category H

Table 10: Special or symbolic buildings – Building Category (Y)

5.1 INTRODUCTION 5.1.2 PERIMETER LINE

Integrating security requirements into a comprehensive

KEY COMPONENTS OF PERIMETER DESIGN:

5.1.1 STAND-OFF DISTANCE

The stand-off distance (setback) of a building from

Distance is the most effective and desirable method

J*,: qJ ,^, @

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Building footprint within the lot.

Suitable building location relative to the site perimeter.

Distance between the perimeter line and the building.

Current and planned infrastructure and vulnerabilities such as

Presence of natural physical barriers such as water features,

Topographic characteristics that could affect the performance

The aim of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line is to J

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5.3.3C EXAMPLE OF DESIGN |,:

The distance between the detonation point and the wall

The distance between the wall and the building

The height of the protected areas in the building

A barrier made of material that blocks the line-of-sight from the

Entrances should be designed in such a way as to enable