THAT SECTION 292 OF THE CLANDESTINESIA PENAL CODE AND SECTION

67,67A OF CLANDESTINESIA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT ARE NOT

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF CONSTITUTION OF CLANDESTINESIA.

It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that Section 292 of the Clandestinesia Penal Code
and Section 67,67A imposes reasonable restriction on the Fundamental Rights of the citizens of
Clandestinesia and is in consonance with the procedure established by law to put reasonable
restrictions on fundamental rights.

[1.1]: Section 292 of the Clandestinesia Penal Code and Section 67,67A of the
Clandestinesia Information Technology Act, 2000 is constitutionally valid and has been
created in order to maintain public order.

“Absolute or unrestricted individual rights do not, and cannot exist, in any modern State.”1 In
India the wide concept of public order is split into different heads. It enables the imposition of
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of right to freedom of speech and expression in the
interest of security of the state, friendly relationship with foreign state, public order, decency and
morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement of offences. All grounds
mentioned there in be brought under general head of Public order in its most comprehensive
sense.2 In Akhila Publishers Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Karnataka 3it was observed that Article
19(1)(a) Freedom of Press is one of the four pillars of democratic system. Obscene publication
bring about loss of health, physical and mental and character during formative period and are
disastrous. Section 292 IPC acts as a reasonable restriction on right under Article 19(1)(a) falling
under Article 19(2) unjustified and unreasonable encroachment on freedom of press injurious to
public interest.“Our constitution acknowledges that there cannot be any such thing as absolute or
uncontrolled liberty, for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. Liberty has to be limited in
order to be effectively possessed.”4 “The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases even in
innocent matters, is not absolute. It must frequently yield to common good.”5 The govt. is vested

1
Liversidge v Anderson, (1942) AC 206 (261)
2
Madhulimaye v Sub divisional magistrate & others (1970) 3 SCC 746
3
ILR 1988 KAR 481
4
Gopalan v State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88 (253-5: AIR 1950 SC 2.
5
Adkins v Children’s Hospital, (1923) 261 US 525
with the duty of protecting the interests of the society, which of course includes general
welfare.”6 Through Section 292 of the CaPC and Section 67,67A of the Information Technology
Act, 2000 the government only seeks to prohibit the offences of expressing obscenity.

In determining the substantive reasonableness the Court has to take into consideration various
factors, such as the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of
the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time. In the present case

[1.2] Section 292 of Clandestinesia Penal Code and Section 67,67A of Clandestinesia
Information Technology Act, 2000 puts proximate and reasonable restrictions over Art. 19
within the framework provided under the constitution.
All freedoms under Art. 19 (1) of the constitution have voluntary element but this voluntariness
in all the freedoms in Art. 19 (1) is subject to Art. 19 (2)- 19 (6) of the constitution.7 It is always
open to the Govt. to make such restrictions which are permissible under Art. 19 (2). 8 In the
present case the restrictions imposed over the freedom of speech and expression are in
consonance with the reasonable restrictions provided under Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. They
are intended to protect the security of the state, friendly relationship with foreign state, public
order, decency and morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement of
offence and hence forms an exception for right to freedom of speech and expression. The
limitations imposed in the interest of public order to be reasonable restrictions should be one
which has a proximate connection or nexus with public order but not one far-fetched,
hypothetical or problematical or too remote in the chain of its relation with public order. 9 In the
present case Section 292 and section 67,67A are intended to prevent obscenity. The anticipated
danger should not be remote, conjectural, or far fetched It should have direct nexus with the
expression.10 The object of Section 292 of Clandestinesia Penal Code and Section 67,67A of the
Clandestinesia Information Technology Act, 2000 is to curb the incitement of obscenity which

6
Berman v Parker (1954) 348 US 26; Treigle v Acme Homestead Assocn. (1936) 297 US 189 (197); NY Savings
Bank v Hahn (1946) 326 US 230; Goldblatt v Hempstead (1962) US 590.

7
Parmati Educational Institute & cultural trust v union of india (2014) 8 SCC 1.
8
Superintendent central prison v Ram ManoharLohiya (1960) 2 SCR 821.
9
Superintendent central prison v Ram ManoharLohiya (1960) 2 SCR 821
10
S rangarajan v p Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574.
can be well achieved by its provisions. Hence there is a proximate nexus between the object
sought to be achieved by the act and the restrictions imposed.