Republic of the Philippines
T-13238 by the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982
PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte and Southern
Leyte; FELICIANA CALLE, court-appointed guardian of the
minors Shirley and Leandro, both surnamed HOMERES; the
SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE CITY FISCAL OF
TACLOBAN; and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban
City, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
validity of an April 24, 1981 order of the respondent Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Leyte which required the petitioner and
Conchita Dumdum to —
give and deposit with the clerk of this court the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(PI0,000.00) more as additional consideration of
Lot No. 3085-G of the Tacloban Cadastre which
the court believes to be fair and reasonable price
of the property. This amount should be deposited
with the clerk of this court on or before June 24,
1981; otherwise TCT No. T-13238 in the name of
Patria Paciente now subject of a mortgage in
favor of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to guarantee an obligation in the
amount of P30,000.00, dated December 27, 1978,
will be cancelled.
as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which
denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita
Dumdum of the aforesaid order and directed the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City —
to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and
issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of
title to the following present owners of Lot 3085-
G of the Tacloban Cadastre: Patria Paciente, of
legal age, Filipino, married, residing in Tacloban
City, 1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years old, residing
in Tacloban City, 1/3; and, Leandro Homeres, 10
years old, residing in Tacloban City, Philippines,
1/3, subject to the mortgage lien of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.
because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order.
The facts of the case are as follow:
In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson
Homeres, and two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 3085-G situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City,
covered by TCT No. 12138. This lot which he had inherited from his
deceased father, Felizardo Homeres, has an area of one thousand
seven hundred one (1,701) square meters.
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to
Conchita Dumdum for P10,000.00.
On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for
guardianship over the persons and estate of the minors. The petition
was granted on August 9, 1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as
guardian on September 13, 1977,
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G,
which had been titled in her name under TCT No. T-13121, to
petitioner Patria Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00.
Consequently, Patria Paciente was issued TCT No.
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00.
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, filed a manifestation informing respondent court that
Lot No. 3085-G which is the subject of the guardianship proceedings
had been registered in the name of the petitioner under TCT No. T-
13238 and that it was mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of P30,000.00.
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent
court issued an order on November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner
and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to
appear before the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why
TCT No. T-13238, covering a parcel of land co-owned by the minors,
Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not be cancelled for having
been alienated without authority from the court.
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation did not appear before the
court. Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and explained to the
respondent court that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia
S. Homeres to the petitioner without obtaining the approval of the
court because she was not aware of such requirement regarding the
properties of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court
again issued an order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to explain why TCT No. T-
13238 should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial
authority before disposing of the said property.
At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's
husband, apprised the court that the petitioner was an innocent
purchaser for value of the lot in question. Respondent court then
issued the questioned order.
A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum
having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a
guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to
cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the
issuance of a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the
petitioner for her having failed to comply with the court's order
directing her to pay the minors the reasonable price of their property
that their mother alienated without authority of a competent court.
Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and
Parco and Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January
30, 1982, petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a
petition for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of
a Torrens Title. In the Cui case, this Court ruled:
... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to
have some relevancy is that of Castillo vs.
Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In this case, the court
made a distinction between the provisions of
sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which now correspond to section 6,
Rule 88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of
Court. This Court in that case said in effect that
while in administration proceedings the court
under section 709 may only question the person
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed away property belonging to the estate,
section 593 of the same Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes the Judge or the court to issue such
orders as maybe necessary to secure the estate
against concealment, embezzlement and
conveyance, and this distinction is now given
emphasis by respondents' counsel. the way we
interpret section 573 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97, section 6
1|Page
 of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid
down in the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante,
supra, is that the court may issue an order
directing the delivery or return of any property
embezzled, concealed or conveyed which belongs
to a ward, where the right or title of said ward is
clear and indisputable.
xxx xxx xxx
In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge
had no jurisdiction to issue his order of
September 5, 1951, in the guardianship
proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver
the rentals collected by them to the guardian and
authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the
future, for the reason that the jurisdiction of the
court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is
to cite persons suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property belonging to the
ward for the purpose of obtaining information
which may be used in action later to be instituted
by the guardian to protect the right of the ward;
and that only in extreme cases, where property
clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has already been judicially decided, may
the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:
In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held
that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed the property belonging to the ward for
the purpose of obtaining information which may
be used in an action later to be instituted by the
guardian to protect the right of the ward.
Generally, the guardianship court exercising
special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually
order the delivery of the property of the ward
found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed.
In a categorical language of this Court, only in
extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to
the ward or where his title thereto has been
already judicially decided, may the court direct
its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can
only be delivery or return of the embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property of the ward,
where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any
property said to be embezzled, concealed or
conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the
determination of said title or right whether in
favor of the persons said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not
in a guardianship proceedings.
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the
delivery or return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find
the orders of the respondent court valid. The petitioner's contentions
in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do
not support her argument. While it is true that in these two cases We
ruled that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed
or conveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right
whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined
in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We
also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is
clear and indisputable the court may issue an order directing its
delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property
is clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question
from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by
their mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal
(Yuson de Pua vs. San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).
In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent
court did not exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to
protect persons under disability.
The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional
consideration of P10,000.00 is a different matter. It was issued
without a hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property
but the time frame for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is,
consequently, null and void.
It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to
give the additional amount, the second order directing the
cancellation of the petitioner's title may be said to have superseded or
cancelled the first order. The second order directed the issuance of a
new title over the land inherited by Leandro Homeres from his late
father with each heir getting title to one-third of the property.
Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of violations of
due process and the guardianship court's unusual procedures in
dealing with the properties under guardianship, the respondent court
is directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the
reasonable price of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is found to be in
the best interests of the wards and consistent with the rights of all
parties involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in
Special Proceedings No. JP-0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Leyte is hereby ordered to conduct further
hearings of the case as above indicated.
SO ORDERED,
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
DIGEST
Paciente v. Dacuycuy Digest
Paciente v. Dacuycuy 114 SCRA 924
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982
Ponente: Guttierez, J.:
Facts:
1. Leonardo Homeres died, leaving to his widow Lilia, and two (2)
minor children a lot. Subsequently, the lot was sold to Conchita
Dumdum, who later on sold it to the petitioner. The petitioner then
mortgaged the subject lot to the Citytrust bank as security for a loan.
Thereafter, Lilia was declared guardian of the minors in the
guardianship proceedings.
2. The guardianship court issued an order for the cancellation of the
transfer certificate of title for the lot. It also ordered the petitioner to
pay the minors the price of the lot alienated. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the guardianship court has jurisdiction to order
the cancellation on the transfer certificate of title of the subject lot
RULING: Yes, in this case the title and ownership of the minors over
the disputed property is clear and indisputable, as such, the court
orders for the return or deliver of the property is valid. However, the
order directing the payment or deposit of P10,000 is null and void as
it was issued without a hearing to determine the value of the property
and the time frame for fixing such valuation was unclear.
Republic of the Philippines
2|Page
Supreme Court
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
NILO OROPESA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CIRILO OROPESA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 184528
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
April 25, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision[1] dated February 29, 2008,
as well as the Resolution[2] dated September 16, 2008, both rendered
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled NILO
OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA. The Court of Appeals issuances
affirmed the Order[3] dated September 27, 2006 and the Order[4]
dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which
dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over the
properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the
(respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No.
04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent)
has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and
June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and
such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory
and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property
properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a
quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to
conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker
conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her
report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see
and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition
for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of
his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated
May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his
written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and
the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally
offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the
Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to
Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the
(respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then
filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.[5] (Citations
omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order
dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the
case is DISMISSED.[6]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial
court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that
petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27
September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.[7]
3|Page
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but
his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated
February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September
27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was
denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution
dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this
Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN
INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2,
RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE
PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the
petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of
the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed
grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of
the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming
evidence presented by him showing respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[10] we laid out the nature and
purpose of guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in
which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward
whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A
guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of
the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as
to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has
been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of
one in loco parentis as well.[11]
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified
guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an
incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that
persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The
full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Under this rule, the word
incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent
should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.[12] We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be
applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and,
therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his
Memorandum[13] the following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already;
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St.
Lukes Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one
of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan
application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills,
when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of
money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due
to lack of care and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain
unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly
compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan
Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing another
vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure
another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the
sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account
under his name and his daughters without the latters knowledge or
consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a
kitchen knife to stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during
one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his
house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his
children.[14]
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited
petitioners lack of material evidence to support his claims. According
to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or
testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion
that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating
medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the
only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is
indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his
properties. Portions of the said document, entitled Report of
Neuropsychological Screening,[15] were quoted by respondent in his
Memorandum[16] to illustrate that said report in fact favored
respondents claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed
and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite
elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a
clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
4|Page
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the
domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental
calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to
copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render
and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to
suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x.[17]
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary
evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of
testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming
interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers
former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction).
These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical
testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners
cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence
that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to
make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were
comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered
in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on
their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his
fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the aforementioned Report of
Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was
ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings
regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained
findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was
indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of
the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that
where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will
suffice.[18]
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the
fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in
disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own
observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert
which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental,
emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the
contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the
average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable
of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem
situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in
memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court
that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19] (Citation omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a
trier of facts.[20] We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
certain exceptional circumstances;[21] however, we find them to be
absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be
disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts
are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record.[22] We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court
and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents
demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining
in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to
present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.[23] We have also held
that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part,
as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he
is not entitled to the relief sought.[24]
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the
petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present
his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to
evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to
preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the
facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the
Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Oropesa vs. Oropesa (G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012)Ponente:
Leonardo-De Castro,
JPetitioner: Nilo OropesaRespondent: Cirilo OropesaFacts:Petitioner
claimed that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies
and has been sickly for
over 10 years and was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgement. Due to
respondent’s
condition, he cannot manage his property wisely without the help of
others and has become an easyprey for deceit from his girlfriend,
Luisa Agamata.On January 23, 2004, the petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for him and his
companion to be appointed as guardians over the respondent’s
property
5|Page
. RTC dismissed the petition due to lack of evidence, and later on the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling. Issue: WON respondent is
considered an incompetent person and should be placed under
guardianship.Held:NO. respondent is not incompetent and should not
be placed under guardianship and therefore the petition was
denied.Ratio: According to the respondent, petitioner did not present
any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence. The Court noted
the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that
Gen.Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and
physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Respondent pointed out in the petitioner’s
evidence which includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
stating that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range inmost
of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations;
and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report
concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning,
except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and
orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still
sharp, alert and able. It is also long settled that "factual findings of
the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be
disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts
are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record."
We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and
the Court of Appeals and rule
that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in
the case at bar.
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the
petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present
his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to
evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to
preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the
facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO,
respondents.
Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner.
Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the
decision and resolution of the defunct Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 27, 1981. and June 26,
1981. respectively, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172
entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus Judge Jesus R. De Vega and
Pelagio Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner
Feliciano Francisco challenged the validity of the Order of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, now
Regional Trial Court, granting execution pending appeal of its
decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing respondent herein,
Pelagio Francisco, in his instead.
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals showed that:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania
San Pedro in Special Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On August
30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin
of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of
the incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and
for the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco.
Among other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the
guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to
render an accounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting
but failed to submit an inventory, for which reason the court on
March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days within which to do so,
otherwise he would be removed from guardianship Petitioner
thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondent Pelagio
Francisco filed an objection on the ground that petitioner actually
received P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not
P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in
his inventory. The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and,
in his order of April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered
his finding, relying on the deed of sale as the best evidence of the
price paid for the sale of the land. in his order dated September 12,
1980, respondent judge acknowledged that his finding was "rather
harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian." Nevertheless,
respondent Judge ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground
of old age. The order states in part as follows:
"... considering the rather advanced age of the present guardian, this
Court is inclined and so decrees, that he should nevertheless be, as he
is hereby, retired to take effect upon the appointment by this court
and the assumption of office of his replacement, who shall be taken
from the recommendees of the parties herein. For this purpose, the
present guardian is hereby given twenty (20) days from receipt of a
copy of this order within which to submit his proposal for a
replacement for himself and to comment on petitioner's recommendee
and the latter a like period within which to comment on the present
guardian's proposed substitute, after which the matter will be deemed
submitted for resolution and final action by the court.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was
only 72 years of age and still fit to continue with the management of
the estate of his ward as he had done with zeal for the past twelve
years. In an order dated November 13, 1980 the court denied his
motion. Accordingly, on December 17, 1980, petiti/ner filed a notice
of appeal 'from the order issued by the court on November 13, 1980'
and paid the appeal bond. On February 2, 1981 he filed the record on
appeal. 1
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of private
respondent, required petitioner to submit within three days his
nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its
order of September 12, 1980. In issuing the order, the court stated
that 'an indefinite discontinuance in office would defeat the intent and
6|Page
purpose of the said order of September 12, 1980 relieving the present
guardian.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition. (referring to CA-G.R. No. SP-1217)"
On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio
Francisco filed an "Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the
prayer (1) to restrain guardian from exercising office; (2) order
guardian to surrender to court all properties of the ward; and (3)
appoint new guardian . 2
Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus
motion claiming that the same was premature. 3 The trial court,
however, disregarded the opposition and required petitioner on
January 27, 1981 to submit within three (3) days his nomination for
guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of September
12, 1980, the court holding that "an indefinite continuance in office
would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of September
12, 1980, relieving the present guardian." 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, 5 but the trial
court overruled the same on March 4, 1981. Subsequently, on March
11, 1981, 6 the court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as
the new guardian of the person and property of the incompetent
Estefania San Pedro. 7
On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari challenging the validity of the order
of the trial court granting the execution pending appeal of its decision
and appointing respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian
despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the
pertinent portion of its decision reading as follows:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal "upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the case
at bar, the retirement of petitioner was ordered on the ground of old
age. When this ground is considered in relation to the delay of the
petitioner in the making of an accounting and the submission of an
inventory, the order amounts to a finding that petitioner, considering
his "rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing the
estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear that
petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the best interest of
the ward.
It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final.
Considering the time -it normally takes for appeals to be finally
determined as well as the purpose of the order under appeal, which
would be frustrated if it is not immediately executed, we cannot say
that respondent acted with grave and irreparable damage and that the
order of September 12, 1980 is not yet final, petitioner has not
demonstrated that in ordering execution pending appeal, the
respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within the
sound discretion of a court. Appellate courts win not interfere to
discretion, unless it modify control or inquire into the exercise of this
be shown that there has been an abuse of that discretion. (2 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 260 [1979].
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration
advancing the following arguments: that to grant execution pending
appeal would render petitioner's appeal moot and academic that
"advanced age" was not one of the, grounds raised by private
respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abuse its
discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact that
private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner.9
The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981,
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the court finding it
unnecessary to repeat the discussion of the arguments which it had
already considered and only entertained the argument regarding the
competency of the respondent as the new guardian. On this point,
respondent Court ruled:
The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco as
guardian was never assailed in the petition in this case. As already
stated, this case concerns the validity only of the orders of January
27, 1981 and March 4, 1981 which required petitioner to recommend
his own replacement, otherwise the court would appoint a new
guardian. It does not appear that petitioner objected to the
appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground now invoked,
namely, that Francisco is in fact older than petitioner. Nor does it
appear that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of March 11, 1981, calling attention to the fact that respondent
Francisco is older than petitioner, In short, the point now raised does
not appear to have been urged in the lower court so that the latter
could have rectified the error, if it was error at all, For this reason, it
is not proper ground for certiorari before this Court, much less for a
motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable
Court of Appeals has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that the removal of petitioner as guardian of the ward Estefania San
Pedro on the ground of old age is a good ground for the execution of
the decision pending appeal; and (b) The Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave misapprehension and misinterpretation of facts
when it declared that petitioner did not question the appointment of
private respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground that the
latter is older than the former by five (5) years.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in
which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the
"ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs.11 A guardianship is designed to further the ward's well-being,
not that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's property,
as wen as to render any assistance that the ward may personally
require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care
and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but
those of one in loco parentis as well. 12
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the
benefit and welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must,
therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of
a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the
physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present
and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen as the probability
7|Page
of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for
the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. 13 SO ORDERED.

A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.
disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral
delinquency or physical disability as to be prevented from properly
discharging the duties of his office. 14 A guardian, once appointed
may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of FIRST DIVISION
discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to
render an account or make a return.15 NELSON CABALES and G.R. No. 162421

We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need RITO CABALES,
for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship
over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. Petitioners,
The conclusion reached by the trial court about the "rather advanced
age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) Present:
finding him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As
correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To
sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a
person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as - versus - CORONA,
guardian, it may be a factor for consideration. 16
AZCUNA, and
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties
of a guardian, We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner GARCIA, JJ.
Feliciano Francisco as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both
the trial court and the appellate court. COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:

With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing JESUS FELIANO and
respondent Pelagio Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while
the latter's appeal was still pending, We hold and rule that respondent ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
appellate court correctly sustained the propriety of said execution
pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution Respondents. August 31, 2007
pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial
court, 17 and the appellate court will not interfere, control or inquire
into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been an abuse
thereof, 18 which We find none herein. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------x
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship
is for the protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason DECISION
for the immediate execution of the lower court's judgment for the
replacement of the first guardian. We agree with the reason given by
the appellate court in sustaining execution pending appeal that "an
indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose PUNO, C.J.:
of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian
(Feliciano Francisco)."

As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian, We likewise agree with the
respondent appellate court in denying in its resolution of June 26,
1981 for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner questioning the appointment of private respondent Pelagio
Francisco. We also find no abuse of discretion committed by the
appellate court.
The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain
issues brought before it for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo
vs. Martin Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs. Court of Appeals,
102 SCRA 597; Director of Lands vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed
decision and resolution of the respondent court dated April 27, 1981
and June 26, 1981, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v.
Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano, which affirmed with
modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No.
R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23,
2004, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well
established.

8|Page
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter
parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered
by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and
children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and
petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and
Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for
P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three
(3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each
getting a share of P666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note
(vale) from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period,
Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr.
Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale
with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased
son, Alberto, including his vale of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-
spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of
Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00)
corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to
Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this
instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them
upon reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land
in the names of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed
an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the
amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the
age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66
for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e.,
P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro
as well as his vale of P300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged
receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano,
representing the formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject
property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila,
went back to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same
year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject
property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject
land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors,
petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were
estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering
that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount
corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject
property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court
the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal
redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds
of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on
August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that
(1) Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner
Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one of them
repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively
subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for
Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3)
petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share to subject
property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it
was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on
July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial
court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos undivided
share to the property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal
representation but that the contract was effectively ratified by
petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The
appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the
extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not
subrogated to Albertos rights when she repurchased his share to the
property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the
late Saturnina Cabales the amount of P966.66, representing the
amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons
late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelsons
claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the
redemption money within the period prescribed by law.
9|Page
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales
as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right of legal
redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-
owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six
(6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and
petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New
Civil Code provides that [i]f a widow or widower and legitimate
children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children. Verily, the
seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito
and Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights
and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By
operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject
land were transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner
Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land
to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers
and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as
to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to
repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to
and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner
Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother,
and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the
Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos or his
heirs rights to the property when she repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,[3] we held that a co-owner who
redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of
all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the
redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.[4] But the one who redeemed had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a
lien upon the subject property for the amount due.[5] Necessarily,
when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then acquired
his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in her
ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the
right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon
the property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is
that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson,
retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was
resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and
Nelson were then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their
shares in the proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to be
paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the
New Civil Code[6] state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is
considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in
case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two
thousand pesos.[7] Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of
any judicial appointment in case the latters property does not exceed
two thousand pesos,[8] thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or
the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian x x x x[9]
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without
necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his
property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is
less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1[10] provides
that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed
shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the
management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as
the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall
have the management of all the estate of the ward within the
Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was
appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of
administration of the minors property. It does not include the power
of alienation which needs judicial authority.[11] Thus, when
Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro-
indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to
do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
10 | P a g e

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has
been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of
petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged
receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito
effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid
and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of
sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or
any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with
judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his
mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the
courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did
not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject
property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and
transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.[12]
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-
spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or
co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the
property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his
ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem
subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share
of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were
not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem
the subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so
within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-
owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[13] thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law,
the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter that killeth but to the
spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that
matter)[14] seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified
of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the
period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but
years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the
fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected.
Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then
of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property.
Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson
was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention
to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process.
But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on
January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about
the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign
ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict
proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an
obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending
the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of
redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to
petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in
1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process
to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson
filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the
thirty-day period had already expired.
11 | P a g e

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the
instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render
justice.[15]
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no
longer redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-
owners thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to
subject property must include them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and
February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new
certificate of title in the name of respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson
Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES v. CA, Sps. Feliano
G.R. No. 162421; August 31, 2007
531 scra 691
Legal Succession
Facts
Rufino Cabales died and left a parcel of land to his surviving wife
Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora,
Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto
sold the subject property to Dr. Corrompido with right to
repurchase within eight years and divided the proceeds of the
sale among themselves.
Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
Within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino
tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido while Saturnina paid
for the share of her deceased son, Alberto. Dr. Corrompido
released the document of sale with pacto de retro. On even date,
Saturnina and her four children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and
Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses
Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano. In 1988, Saturnina died.
Petitioner Nelson, went back- to his father’s hometown where
learned from his uncle Rito of the sale of subject property. In
1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land
Respondents spouses maintained that petitioner Nelson was
estopped from claiming any right over subject property
considering that Nelson failed to consign to the court the total
amount of the redemption price necessary for legal redemption.
The trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that Alberto or,
by his death, an$ of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their
right to subject land when not one of the& repurchased it from
Dr. Corrompido. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that
petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of
subject property. However, it denied petitioner Nelson’s claim for
redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the
redemption money within the period prescribed by law.
Petitioner Nelson contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
recognizing him as co-owner of subject land but denied him the
right of legal redemption
ISSUE
Whether or not Nelson Cabales is a co-owner of the subject land
and with the right of legal redemption –
YES
RULING
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his
six (6) children, including Alberto, survived and succeeded him.
Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that “[i];f a widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of
each of the children.” Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally
on subject property. Alberto, petitioner Nelson’s father, inherited
in their own rights and with equal shares as the others. But
before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By
operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of
subject land were transferred to his legal heirs 7 his wife and his
son petitioner Nelson. But may petitioner redeem the subject land
from respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New
Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by
the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not
be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The
right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners. Legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner
or co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share
in the property held in common. As established, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his Mother was not
valid such that they were not divested of their ownership thereto.
Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses. But they just do so within thirty days from
notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In the
instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but
years after the sale was made. Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held
by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property.
But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with
respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must
include them.
[ G.R. No. 7165, March 26, 1912 ]
DAMASA LAFORGA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND
APPELLANTS, VS. BRUNO LAFORGA, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLEE.
DECISION
MAPA, J.:
This is an action for the recovery of possession of two parcels of
land described in the complaint and situate, one in the sitio of
12 | P a g e
Balayoac and the other in Lubec, of the pueblo of Badoc,
Province of Ilocos Norte.
The defendant in his written answer admits that these parcels of
land belong to the plaintiffs but alleges that he is in possession of
them through their delivery to him by the plaintiff Damasa
Laforga on a mortgage the first of the two parcels, that in
Balayoac, as security for the sum of P95 and the second, that in
Lubec, for the sum of P200, and states that he is willing to return
said parcels to the plaintiffs whenever they pay him said sums.
Upon the evidence adduced at the trial, the court ordered the
defendant to deliver immediately to the plaintiffs the Balayoac
land, and also P203, likewise to deliver to them the Lubec land.
No special finding was made as to the costs.
The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment only with respect
to the obligation it imposes upon them to pay to the defendant the
sum of P203 as a condition precedent to his returning the Lubec
land to them.
The grounds upon which this part of the judgment appealed from
rests are thus stated therein:
"From the evidence adduced it has been proved that the
defendant has been paying money up to the sum of P203 to the
attorney for the plaintiff for the expenses of the suit which they
have been maintaining, with the agreement that the said
defendant should continue in the usufruct of the Lubec land until
he should be reimbursed for the aforementioned sum paid by
him."
The record discloses that the agreement referred to in the
judgment was excuted solely and exclusively by the plaintiff,
Damasa Laforga, the grandmother of the other plaintiffs, who
are still minors, and thai the land in question, that of Lubec,
belongs exclusively to them. Damasa Laforga was not the legal
representative of the said minors at the time of the execution of
that agreement and she evidently acted merely as their
grandmother. Even supposing that she might then have been
acting as the guardian ad litem of said minors, which is the most
that could be admitted from the evidence adduced at the trial,
such capacity could not authorize her validly to execute the
agreement concerned, which, therefore, lacks the legal force
requisite to make it binding upon the minors.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, in so far as it declares
that the plaintiff minors must pay the sum of P203 to the
defendant, and the latter is ordered to deliver immediately to
them the disputed Lubec land, but the right is reserved to the
defendant to prosecute his claim for said payment against
Damasa Laforga in the manner and form provided by law. No
special finding is made of the costs in this instance. So ordered.
[ GR No. L-5893, Feb 28, 1956 ]
CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA Y LOPEZ MANZANO v. EL
HOGAR FILIPINO
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
A parcel of land containing an area of 2,784 square meters as
described in transfer certificate of title No. 36234 issued on 6
September 1930 by the office of the Register of Deeds in and for
the City of Manila was registered in the name of Andres Luna de
Pardo de Tavera, single; Carlos Pardo de Tavera, married to Belen
Ramirez; Gonzales; Maria Audotte Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 3
years of age, single; Roberto Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 9 years of
age, single; and Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, 11
years of age, single (Exhibit B). On 6 August 1930 the co-owners
agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna,
Inc. for the purpose of building a modern structure on the parcel of
land' and to that end they also agreed to accept shares of stock of the
corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective shares in
the parcel of land and building erected thereon to be transferred to
tfi^f. corporation (Exhibit D-2). On 12 August 1930 the duly
appointed guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez
Manzano, mother of the minor, filed a petition in the probate court
(Special Proceeding No. 34154) praying for the approval of the
agreement referred to (Exhibit D-2) and seeking authority to accept
shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the share of the
minor in the property (Exhibit D-l). On 28 August 1930 the
probate court approved the agreement in so far as the minor
Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano was concerned and
authorized the guardian to accept the shares of stock of the
corporation in exchange for the share of the minor in, the property
(Exhibit E-l). The Tavera-Luna, Inc., was actually incorporated on
14 December 1930 and the guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de
Tavera y Lopez Manzano transferred her share.in the property on
16 January 1931. After the transfer of the shares of the co-owners
in the property, transfer certificate of title No. 36234 (Exhibit B) was
cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certif- icate of titlel No. 37347
ill the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. was issued on 23 January 1931
(Exhibit H). On 17 January 1931 upon application of the
corporation, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., a loan and building
association, granted it a loan of P1,000,000 for the purpose of
erecting a concrete building in lieu of the wooden building standing
thereon. This loan was secured by a first mortgage registered on
the certificate. On 11 February 1932 an additional loan of P300.000
was obtained by the corporation from El Hogar Filipino, Inc. secured
by a mortgage on the same property. The period of the first
mortgage of P1,000,000 was extended. Transfer certificate of title
No. 37347 in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. (Exhibit H) was
cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 40177
was issued on 28 April 1932 in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc., but
the parcel of land was subdivided into several lots with their
respective description (Exhibit K). Again, transfer certificate of title
No. 40177 (Exhibit K) was partially cancelled as to one of the
several lots and transfer certificate of title No. 41127 was issued in
the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. on 25 August 1932 (Exhibit K-l).
Thereafter, partial cancellations were made of transfer certificate' of
title No. 40177 Exhibit K) as to some of the small lots and transfer
certificates of title Nos. 41128, 43104, 43105, 43107, 43108, 43109
and 7276 were issued in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. The last
certificates of title cover small parts of the original parcel of land.
The larger part of the parcel of land is described in transfer
certificates of title Nos. 40177 (Exhibit K) and 41127 (Exhibit K-l).
Not long after the construction of the building known as "Crystal
Arcade" was finished, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., the mortgagee, took
over the possession and management of the property to apply the
rents, after deducting management expenses, to the payment of the
mortgagee debt and on 28 September 1933 the mortgagee
foreclosed the mortgage .extrajudicially and purchased the whole
property at public auction sale for P1,363,555.37 (Exhibits L and L-
l). The mortgagor having failed to redeem the property, the
mortgagee consolidated its title and the certificate of title Nos. 40177
(Exhibit K) and 41127 (Exhibit K-l) in the name of Tavera-Luna,
Inc. were cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificates of title
Nos. 59596 (Exhibit M), and 59570 (Exhibit M-l were issued in the
name of the mortgagee, El Hogar Filipino, Inc. on 12 August 1940.
On 26 August 1943, nearly nine months after the filing of the
original complaint in this case, El Hogar Filipino, Inc. .sold the
whole property to Magdalena Estate, Inc. for P1,400,000 in Japanese
war notes (Exhibit P). The certificates in the name of El Hogar
13 | P a g e
Filipino, Inc. Nos. 59569 and 59570 (Exhibits M and M-l) were
cancelled and. lieu thereof transfer certificates of title Nos. 67102
and 67103 were issued in the name of Magdalena Estate, Inc. on
26 August 1943 (Exhibits Qiand Q-l). On 22 September 1943
Magdalena Estate, Inc. "sold one third undivided share in the
property to Ernest Berg for P466,S66.66 in in Japanese war notes
(Exhibit R).
On 17 November 1942, Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the
transfer of her right, share and interest in the property made by her
guardian to Tavera- Luna, Inc. However, before judgment could be
rendered by the Court, the battle for liberation of Manila
supervened: and the record of the case was destroyed. After
reconstitution of the record of the case, amendment to the pleadings
to include the Magdalena Estate, Inc. and Ernest Berg to party-
defendants and trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered judgment annulling the order of the probate court
that had granted authority to the guardian of the plaintiff to transfer
her ward's right, share interest in the parcel of land to Tavera- Luna,
Inc. and the transfer thereof pursuant thereto; the transfers of the
ward's share in the property to El Hogar Filipino, Inc., Magdalena
Estate, Inc. and Ernest Berg; the certificates of title issued to the
transferees in so far as the ward's share in the property is concerned;
and ordering cancellation of transfer certificates issued to the
transferees and issuance of new ones in the name of the transferees
and the plaintiff with the statement in the certificates to be issued
that plaintiff's share in the property is two-ninths, free from any lien
or encumbrance, and accounting of the income collected by the
transferees during the periods of their respective possession of the
property and payment or delivery thereof to the, plaintiff in so far
as her share in the property is concerned. The defendants have
appealed.
The point that the plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of
limitations is no longer urged, because the plaintiff became of age
and released from guardianship on 19 November 1940 (Exhibit N-l
and 0-1) and the action was brought on 17 November 1942, or within
the period provided for in section 579, Act No. 190, which says:
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be
maintained by the "ward, or by any person claiming under him,
unless it is commenced within three years next after the termination
of the guardianship, or, when a legal disability to sue exists by
reason of minority or otherwise, at the time when the cause of action
accrues, within three years next after the removal of such disability.
The plaintiff contends and the trial court sustained her claim that
the order of the probate court of 28 August 1930 (Exhibit E-l) is a
nullity because the provisions of section 569, Act No. 190, the law
then in force, were not complied with and for that reason the probate
court was without jurisdiction to order the transfer of her share in
the property to the corporation to be organized and' formed. She
alleges and argues that as the petition which brought about the entry
of the order of the probate court of 28 August 930 was not verified; it
did not set forth the condition of the estate of the ward and the
facts and circumstances upon which the petition was founded
tending to show the necessity or expediency of the sale (transfer) ;
the Court did not direct "the next of kin to the ward, and all
persons interested in the estate, to appear before the judge or court,
at the time and place therein specified, not less than four nor more
than eight weeks from the time of making such order, to show cause
why an order should not be granted for the sale or such estate," the
order is a nullity for lack of jurisdiction of the court issuing it.
That the probate court in guardianship proceedings No. 34154
entitled "Tutela de la menor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez
Manzano," had jurisdiction over the petition filed by the guardian
admits of no boubt. Only upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction
may an order entered by a court be assailed collaterally. If the
court had jurisdiction, -irregularities in the proceedings which would
or could invalidate the court's order may be assailed directly by
means of an appeal but not collaterally,[1] Lack of verification of. a
petition filed in a probate court for the sale of real property
belonging to the estate of a minor is not a jurisdictional defect.[2] It
should have been attacked directly and not collaterally.[3] In her
petition the guardian alleged that the transfer of her ward's share in
the property to the corporation then to be organized would be to or
for her benefit and she expected that the construction of a new
building would enhance the value of her ward's share in the property
and increase her income (Exhibits D-l and D-2). No other
consideration or motive could have prompted the guardian, mother of
the minor, to file the petition. It is not necessary for a grant of
authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state that
the income "is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to
maintain or educate the ward when a minor." It is enough, as the
other alternative of the law provides, that "it appears to the
satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the ward that his
real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds
thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive
security."[4] The petition of the guardian falls under the last quoted
part of section 569, Act No. 190. That part of the section, requiring
the probate court to enter an order directing the next of kin to the
ward and all persons interested in the estate to appear before the court
at a time and place therein specified, was substantially complied
with, because the next kin to the ward was her own guardian and
mother and all persons interested in the estate of the ward were her
uncles and aunt who agreed to make the transfer of their respective
shares in the property to the corporation, Tavera-Luna, Inc.
Moreover, "next of kin" are those whose relationship is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[5] There were
no creditors to the ward's estate. Notice to "the next of kin to the
ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear before the
judge or court, at the time and place therein specified," was not
necessary, because the next of kin to the ward and all persons
interested in the estate were her mother and guardian, uncles and
aunt. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that that
part of the provision of section 569, Act No. 190, has been complied
with. Hearing on the petition, as required in said section does not
necessarily mean that witnesses testify or documents be produced or
exhibited. If the court be satisfied that the allegations of the petition
are true and the interested persons tor close relatives of the ward
did not object because they themselves were interested in the
scheme to organize a corporation to which all their shares in the
property were to be transferred, the provisions of the law on
hearing were also complied with. The conclusion arrived at renders it
unnecessary for us to pass upon the question whether El Hogar
Filipino, Inc. was a purchaser for value and in good faith. Suffice it
to say that even if the loan was granted when the certificate of title
was still in the name of the plaintiff and her co-owners, the fact
that the loan was applied for by. an entity that was in the process of
organization and by the same persons who were the registered
owners of the property, the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon the
order of the probate court granting authority to the guardian to
make the transfer of the share of her ward in the property and was not
bound to inquire further to find out whether there were irregularities
committed or defects or vices that would render the order null and
void.[1] So also the question whether the action brought by Carlos
Pardo de Tavera y Cembrano in his own behalf and in behalf of the
minor, the herein plaintiff-appellee, is res judiecda need not be passed
upon. Certainly, it would be awkward for this Court to review a
14 | P a g e
final decree or judgment which upheld the validity of the mortgage
in favor of the appellant, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., in the case of
Carlos Pardo de Tavera and Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano vs.
El Hogar Filipino, Inc., 68 Phil., 712, and to declare null and void
the order of the probate court as far as the share in the property of the
minor is concerned, a declaration which would partly reopen,
review, reverse or set aside that final decree or judgment rendered
by this Court.
This action would not have been brought if the scheme and plan of
the organizers or incorporators of the Tavera-Luna, Inc. should have
met with success.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, the complaint dismissed,
with costs against the appellee.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angela, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3408 December 23, 1950
JOSE SORIANO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DALMACIO LATOÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Vicente Bengzon for appellants.
Conrado M. Soriano for appellees.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, rendered in a case for annulment of a sale of land upon
an agreed statement of facts. The stipulation, however, has neither
been submitted to this Court nor copied in either brief. We assume
that the facts as stated in the decision are correct. Evidence was
introduced as to the market value of the land and an offer of the
plaintiffs to return the purchase money, matters which we do not
think are material.
It appears from the lower court's findings that the title to the parcel of
land in question was registered under the Land Registration Act in the
name of Jose, Paciencia, Felicidad, Milagrisima and Teofilo, all
surnamed Soriano,when they were minors. Upon motion of the
children's mother, who had been duly appointed guardian of their
estate, the court, on October 15, 1932, made an order couched in
these words:
It appearing to be well founded the motion of the petitioner dated
October 12, 1932, as prayed for, the said petitioner in her capacity as
guardian of her minor children is hereby authorized to execute and
deliver to Silvino Latoño and Dalmacio Latoño the deed of
conveyance, for the consideration of P1,000, for the first parcel of
land described in certificate of title No. 36909 and in the inventory
dated April 23, 1930, and also to execute and deliver to the aforesaid
parties a deed of mortgage for the second parcel of land described in
the aforesaid certificate of title and inventory in the amount of P500
to be redeemed within a period of not to exceed five years, in order to
provide fund for the liquidation of the entire indebtedness of the said
minors.
The proceeds of sale were to be used, and it is not denied that they
were used, to pay off an outstanding obligation for attorney's fees
incurred in the registration of the minors' properties including the one
now in litigation. In pursuance of the above order, the guardian
executed a deed of sale on June 16, 1933, in favor of the vendees,
who immediately thereafter entered upon the possession of the land
and continued in such possession to the exclusion of all others up to
this date. On January 11, 1944, the guardianship proceedings were
ordered closed and the wards' property turned over to them, all the
wards having attained the age of majority.
On March 17, 1944, nearly 12 years after the sale, the former wards
brought this suit against the purchasers to recover the above-
mentioned parcel and to secure an accounting of the produce they had
obtained from the land. It was alleged, as grounds of action, that the
sale was null and void (a) because it had not been approved by the
probate court and (b) because the deed of conveyance had been
acknowledged before a notary public of Calasiao who was not
authorized to act in the municipality of Bayambang where the
document was ratified.
The court below dismissed the action with costs. It held that
subsequent confirmation of the sale by the court was unnecessary,
and that the document was not assailable on the ground of lack of
authority of the notary public who ratified it. The decision told the
defendants to present their deed to the register of deeds and to have a
new certificate of title issued in their favor.lawphil.net
There are no merits to the appeal. The court's order expressely
authorized the guardian "to execute and deliver" to purchasers
definitely named a deedof conveyance to a parcel specifically
described at a price already fixed.Judge by its language, the order was
intended as the approval itself of the sale. From the tenor of the order,
we can make the inference that the movant and the court had in mind
a sale already perfected or agreed upon by the seller and the buyers,
needing only a judicial go-ahead signal to reduce the agreement to the
statutory form. No departure from the terms of the order having been
made, it would have been a useless formality to submit the deed to
the court for action in the absence of any clear requirement or
direction to that effect. A sale by the guardian may be approved
before the deed is executed, depending on the intention of the court
and providing that faithful compliance with the conditions proposed
or imposed has been made. Under the circumstances of this case, it is
doubted if the court could properly have set aside or disapproved the
sale in the absence of fraud, mistake or inadvertence.
The formal objection to the deed of sale is of no moment. We agree
with the trial Judge that had not this instrument been notarized at all,
the same would have been fully effective as between the parties under
article 1261 of the old Civil Code in force at the time of the
conveyance. All the elements of a valid contract were present: subject
matter, capacity and consent of the parties, and lawful consideration.
A new ground has been brought out on appeal to reverse the lower
court's decision. It is said that the sale was indirectly disapproved by
the court and that such disapproval constitutes res judicata.
There is not much to this contention. The court in its order of January
11,1944, so far from passing on the validity of the disputed sale,
"declines to decide the question . . . since the wards may bring a
separate action for the determination of such issue, if they so desire."
Furthermore, asabove stated, there was no necessity for the court's
confirmation or a new approval of the conveyance to validate it, and
the fact that the purchasers sought such confirmation more than ten
years afterward did not alter the case.
The appealed decision is affirmed with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and
Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
15 | P a g e
Moran, C.J., Mr. Justice Paras voted for the affirmance.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3071 May 29, 1950
SALVACION LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE TEODORO, Sr., Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, EULALIO LOPEZ, Jr., and JESUS
JALBUENA, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jose O. Hizon and Jose T. Jamandre for
petitioner.
Lakandola G. Lopez for respondents Teodoro, Sr. and Lopez, Jr.
Antonio T. Lozada for respondent Jalbuena.
TUASON, J.:
Eulalio Lopez, Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of
Eulalio Lopez, Jr., was the exclusive and absolute owner of an
hacienda in Silay, Negros Occidental, having a total area of over 100
hectares. On September 3, 1948, the Court of First Instance, acting
upon a motion of Senen L. Gamboa and Adelaida Gamboa filed in
the proceedings for guardianship, ordered the guardian to pay the
movants P7,312 plus 12 per cent interest from August, 1944, amount
which represented loans properly authorized by court. The order
provided that if the guardian did not have funds to pay those debts, he
should take the necessary steps for the sale of some of the property of
the guardianship.
In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the above tract of
land, the only property of which the incapacitated was possessed, on
January 11, 1949, to Jesus bound himself to pay the mortgage debt
and other obligations aggregating P22,346.30, and to satisfy the
balance in two installments.
It is admitted that in authorizing the sale of some of the property of
the incapacitated, the court did not follow the requirement of section
2 of Rule 96 to the effect that the court shall direct the next of kin of
the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear at a
reasonable time and place to be specified in the order, to show cause
why the prayer for the sale should not be granted. Nor did the court
specify, as provided by section 4 of the same Rule, whether the sale
should be effected publicly or privately.
Although Eulalio Lopez, Jr. was the judicial guardian, the
incapacitated was and is under the actual care and custody of his
sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing that the sale was prejudicial to her
brother's interest, Salvacion Lopez filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court's order authorizing said sale, and upon the motion being
denied, she brought this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
contending that the sale was null and void by reason of the court's
failure to adhere to Rule 96, and praying that the orders of the
respondent court be corrected and the said court directed to revoke
the sale.
The judicial guardian, Eulalio Lopez, Jr., and the vendee, Jesus
Jalbuena, have filed separate answer and raised several defenses.
These are, first, that the petitioner's remedy, if she has any, is by
appeal and not certiorari and/or mandamus; second, that the petitioner
has no interest whatsoever in the subject matter of her petition; third,
that whether the sale is prejudicial or not is a proper ground for a
separate action and not certiorari or mandamus; fourth, that the sale
was not made in contravention of existing laws; and fifth, that the
court, as probate court, has lost jurisdiction over the property sold
because the land is now registered in the name of the purchaser to
whom a new transfer certificate of title has been duly issued.
Without deciding the legality or illegality of the sale, or whether this
matter should be ventillated in an ordinary action instead of in a
proceeding for certiorari, it is evident that appeal and not certiorari or
mandamus is the proper remedy. Unquestionably, the court of first
instance in which the guardianship proceedings were pending had
jurisdiction to order the questioned sale. The court's jurisdiction is not
disputed. Nor was there an abuse of discretion, judging from the
averments in the answers. It appears that the outstanding
indebtedness of the guardianship properly and legally incurred
amounted to P36,833.66, part of which was due the petitioner for the
support and maintenance of the incapacitated.
The other defense that does not leave much room for discussion is
that the petitioner has no legal interest in her complaint. The
incapacitated has children, all of age, one of whom is the judicial
guardian, while the petitioner is only the ward's sister. Not being
Eulalio Lopez's forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the sale she
seeks to impugn. It is true that she was a creditor but she does not
claim any right to be notified of the sale as such creditor, and her
credit was not impaired. On the contrary, she was benefited by the
sale in that she was paid what was due her from its proceeds. As to
the other creditors, they did not appear to have any objection to the
action taken by the judicial guardian and authorized by the court.
The petitioner insist that she is next of kin. She is in error. "Next of
kin" within the meaning of Rule 96 are relatives whose relationship is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. (33
C.J., 930-931.) "Next of kin" is also defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed., as to mean not the next of kindred but those
relatives who share in the estate according to the statute of
distribution including those claiming per stripes or by representation.
None of the children of the incapacitated is or was opposed to the sale
sought to be set aside. Only these had an interest in the land of their
father, besides the creditors, and only they or the creditors who may
have been prejudiced by the sale have a right to object thereto.
Having reached these conclusions, it is unnecessary for us to discuss
the other questions raised.
The petition is denied, without costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14302 April 30, 1963
JOSE MARGATE, applicant-appellee,
vs.
JULIA RABACAL and her minor children JESUS, CORAZON,
JULIO, FE, HELEN, RAMON and ELI, all surnamed
BERINA, appellants-oppositors.
Manuel S. Tiuseco for applicant-appellee.
Dominador Padilla and Juan B. Ballecen for appellants-oppositors.
16 | P a g e
PAREDES, J.:
This is an application for the registration of a residential land, with a
house, containing an area of 465 square meters, situated in the barrio
of San Miguel, Iriga, Camarines Sur, more particularly describe in
plan PSU 123636 (Exh. A), and in the technical description (Exh. 4),
by Jose Margate who claims to have purchased the property from
Julia Rabacal, for P4,000.00. An order of general default was entered
against the whole world, with the exception of the Director of Lands
who did not file any formal opposition, andJulia Rabacal and her
minor children who opposed the application, on the ground that the
property was under gauardianship proceedings when sold; that the
sale was not authorized by the court; that the purchase price of
P4,000.00 was not fully paid, as there was a remainining balance of
P500.00 and that the market price of the lot and house was
P10,000.00. After due hearing, the registration court confirmed the
title of the applicant to the parcel of land in question, and ordered that
the same be registered in the name of Jose F. Margate, widower,
citizen of the Philippines, with residence at Iriga, Camarines Sur, and
that once the decision has become final, the decree and title thereof
issue. Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified
the case to Us, stating that the issues involved are purely legal in
character.
As found by the registration court, the parcel of land and house, in
question,originally belonged to Francisco Vela who was in
possession thereof as early as 1889. After his death in 1903, he was
succeeded by Pedro Evangelista, who purchased the land. Evangelista
later on sold the land to Valentin Magistrado,who possessed it until
he sold the same to a certain Tinay, mother-in-law of Vicente Brinas
who built a house thereon and possessed the land until be sold it to
Dr. Julio Berina. Dr. Julio Berina died on October 15, 1945, survived
by his widow, Julia Rabacal, and his minor children Jesus, Corazon,
Julio, Fe,Helen, Ramon and Eli, all surnamed Berina, the oppositors
herein.
In 1946, Julia Rabacal filed a petition for the appointment of a
guardian of the persons and properties of the minor children of Dr.
Berina, which petition was amended on June 3, 1946 (Exhibit 1).
Julia Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minor children and
letters of guardianship was issued in her favor (Exh. 5). On March 16,
1948, a petition (Exh. B), was filed by the guardian Julia Rabacal,
alleging that it was necessary to sell parcel 4 of the inventory (Exh.
6), in order to defray the expenses in the prosecution of Civil Case
No. 919 and for the support and education of the wards. This petition
was approved by the court in its order of May 23, 1948, authorizing
the guardian to sell the residential lot and its improvements.
Applicant Jose F. Margate, who was then intending to buy a house
and lot of one Mr. Brown, happened to meet Julia Rabacal who
offered to sell to him the residential lot in question, for P5,000.00.
After negotiations, the parties agreed on the selling price of
P4,000.00. After the agreement, Rabacal began getting money from
Margate, such that when Rabacal secured the authority to sell (Exh.
C), from the court, she had already obtained from Margate the sum of
P500.00, and after having secured the order of authority to sell,
Rabacal showed to Margate a copy of the order. On May 27, 1948, a
deed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal, acknowledged before a
Notary Public, Jose Madara, selling the land in question to Margate
for P4,000.00 (Exh. D), on which date Margate paid the balance of
P3,500.00 to Rabacal. At the time the house was already in a ruinous
condition, because of the typhoon Jean, and for the repair and
improvement of the same, Margate spent around P6,000.00..
On the allegation of Rabacal that Margate had still a balance of
P500.00 unpaid of the purchase price, the trial court held that Rabacal
and her evidence do not deserve any credence after the said court had
found that she had deliberately deceived the court in the guardianship
proceedings. The trial court declared that notwithstanding the fact
that Rabacal had sold parcel 4 of the inventory, and executed a deed
of sale on May 27, 1948 (Exh. D), Rabacal still filed Exh. 3, in the
guardianship proceedings, asserting that despite her efforts, she was
unable to find a buyer for said parcel of land. The trial court
concluded that if it is true that Margate lacked P500.00 or more,
Rabacal would have taken action against him, considering the fact
that from 1948 (date of sale), to the filing of her amended opposition
in this registration proceeding (1953), nearly 5 years had already
elapsed.
Oppositors-appellants claim that the registration court erred (1) in
holding that the deed of sale, Exh. A, is valid; (2) In ordering the
registration of the property, in applicant's name; (3) In not dismissing
the application for lack of merits; and (4) In not ordering the
registration of the property in the name of the oppositors.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Appellants argue that the deed of sale (Exh. B), executed by the
guardian, Julia Rabacal in favor of applicant, had no binding effect,
because the authority to sell was cancelled and the sale was not
approved by the guardianship Court. As appropriately commented by
the trial court, the cancellation of the authority to sell did not, and
could not, affect, the rights of the buyer, because "at the time that the
order cancelling the authority to sell was entered, the guardian, Julia
Rabacal, had already acted in accordance with authority, Exhibit C,
and sold the land to Jose F. Margate.The authority of the Court had
already been exhausted, after it was fulfilled by the guardian, and
there was nothing to cancel. Moreover, the cancellation of the order
to sell was entered by the Court due to the deception of the guardian,
who informed the court that she could not find any buyer of parcel 4
of the inventory. If the court had been informed of the sale, the court
would certainly not have revoked the authority. Moreover, the
revocation was entered without notice to the purchaser Jose F.
Margate". The persuasiveness of those disquisitions cannot be over
emphasized. With respect to the lack of approval of the sale by the
court, His Honor held that the law merely requiresthat the guardian
should be authorized, and that the authority to sell did not impose the
condition that the deed of sale executed by the guardian shouldbe
approved by the Court. The approval of the sale by the court, under
the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, would then be
merely pro-forma, since the appellants were not able to show any
reason why the guardianship could would have refused to approved
the sale which was already a fait accompli and within the authority
given by said court.
The appellants should be the last to impugn the lack of approval of
the sale. The defeat was not substantial so as to render the sale invalid
or void. Being the petitioners-vendors in Exhibit B, appellants cannot
validly attack the proceedings had in the sale, on certain formal
technicalities, considering the fact that they were the very persons
who requested, obliged and prayed the court in the guardianship
proceedings to approve the said sale, and that they had derived the
utmost advantage and benefit out of the proceeds thereof. They are
not estopped from asserting a fact inconsistent with their previous
acts.
In the original and amended oppositions, the land and house were
admittedly the conjugal property of the deceased Dr. Julio Berina and
herein oppositor Julia Rabacal. Upon the death of Dr. Berina on
October 15, 1945, said properties descended to the surviving spouse
Julia Rabacal and his minor children. Under the old Civil Code
(whose provisions should apply), Julia Rabacal was entitled to one-
half (1/2) as her share in the conjugal property. This being the case, at
least, the one-half portion belonging to her which was included in the
sale of the entire property to the appellee, could stand as legal and
valid. In her behalf, she could dispose of her share, even without the
benefit of judicial approval — which merely goes to show that, the
sale of the entire or whole property in question, was not altogether
null and void.
17 | P a g e
The rules alleged to have been violated, (Secs. 2, 3 and 4, of Rule 96,
Rules of Court) refer to the proceedings in the guardianship court and
not to the proceedings in the registration court, where the Registration
Law (Act No. 495), specifically provides the procedure to be
followed, in the event the parties in a registration case desire to have
the decision thereof reviewed. The present appeal does not allege
fraud in the registration. Moreover, there being a presumption that the
sale in question is valid, the same can not be attacked collaterally in
the registration proceedings. Appellants should have filed a separate
action to avoid or rescind the said sale, on the ground specified by
law.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Padilla and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part.
mortgage, pledge, improve or exchange any property, real or
personal, hold hereunder for such price and upon such terms as;d
conditions as may be seen advisable; and to deal cm behalf of the
trust vnlii any subsidiary or affiliate, without increase of liability and
a,a freely as though dealing with an independent third party."
******
IV
"I nominate and appoint the Philippine Trust Company executor of
and trustee under this my last will and testament to serve
without bond and as guardian of my children James E.
Stegner, Henry G. Stegner, Ruth H. Stegner, and Catherine Stegner."

[ GR No. L-8532, Oct 11, 1957 ]

GUARDIANSHIP OF JAMES E. STEGNER v. CATHERINE This testator 'seems to have left the following properties:
STEGNER
DECISION
102 Phil. 131 Cash.................................................

FELIX, J.:
P18,972.88
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila approving the consolidated statement of accounts filed by the. Cert. No. 06386, Serie "C", for 1 share of "La Urbana", at P200 per
Philippine Trust Company as guardian of the properties of the minors share
James, Henry, Ruth, Catherine and Mildred, all surnamed Stegner,
and releasing said guardian 'from its responsibilities. The facts of the
case are as follows; 200.00

W. A. Stegner, a citizen of the United States, was at the time of his Cert. No. 06996, Serie "C", for 1 share of "La Urbana", at P200 per
demise a resident of Pamplona, Cagayan. He left a will containing the share
following provisions:

200.00

"I, W. A. Stegner, of. lawful age, a resident of the Municipality of Cert. No. 07140, Serie "C", for 1 share of "La Urbana", at P200 per
Pamplona, Province of Cagayan, Philippine Islands, and a citizen of share
the United States of Minnesota, United States of America, being of
sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting under undue
influence or restrained of any kind, do hereby make, publish, and 200.00
declare this to be my last will and testament, hereby revoking all
other wills and testamentary dispositions by me made." Cert. No. 09161, Serie "D", for 3 share of "La Urbana", at P200 per
share

*******
600.00

lll (Account receivable) Balance of Promissory Note dated May 10,

1935,

"I give, devise and bequeath unto the executor and trustee
hereinafter named absolutely and in fee simple and of my property,
real, personal and mixed of every kind, nature and description
whatsoever, of "which I may seized or possesses or to which I may be executed by "La Granja, Inc.," in favor of W. A.
in any manner entitled, or in any manner interested at the time of my Stegner....................
death in trust however, for the use and purposes hereinafter set out
and same other, giving unto my said executor and trustee full power
and authority to sell any of the property, real or personal, subject to __10,000.00
the trust hereby created, and to invest and reinvest the proceeds of
any such sales, in such manner as my said executor and trustee may
deem proper, all without the legal restrictions otherwise applicable to
trustee; to borrow money for the benefit of the trust; to sell, lease,

18 | P a g e

Total Assets ......................
P24,672.86
and in addition thereto, the minors were to receive monthly pensions
from the U.S. Veterans. Administration.
Although there is no evidence on record, the decision of the trial
Court states that said will of W. A. Stegner was duly admitted to
probate and this statement was-never refuted by any of the parties.
On November 11, 1986, Juanita T. Stegner, widow of the deceased
and mother of the minors, petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the issuance in her favor of letters of guardianship over
the person and properties of her children, which petition was granted
by the Court in its order of November 13, 1336, upon the filing by the
petitioner of a bond in the sum of P500. The Veterans
Administration, however, recommended that the guardianship over
the properties be placed in the hands of a solvent trust company doing
business in Manila.
The Philippine Trust Company thereafter filed a petition, which was
later amended, praying that in view of the will of W. A. Stegner
appointing said company as guardian for the estates of the minors,
letters of guardianship for the properties of James, Henry, Ruth,
Catherine and Mildred Stegner be issued in its favor, and upon
agreement of the parties, the Court set aside its previous order and
appointed Juanita T. Stegner as guardian over the persons of the
minors and the Philippine Trust Company as guardian of their
properties, James E. Stegner reached the age of majority and was
consequently released from guardianship by order of the Court of
March 28, 1941, but it appears that he and his sister Ruth were killed
by the Japanese in 1945.
The remaining wards under guardianship having reached the age of
majority, the Philippine Trust Company on May 26, 1953, filed a
final consolidated statement of account and petition for discharge
containing a detailed statement of cash receipts and disbursements
made covering the period from June 1, 1942, to May 20, 1953, in the
case of Henry Stegner; from June 1, 1941, to May 20, 1953, in the
case of Ruth, Catherine and Mildred Stegner. It also showed that the
amount of P15,117.29 in Japanese military notes which was
invalidated by-Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 49 was deducted from
the balance of P16,282.32 remaining in favor of the wards; that the
participation in the notes of La Granja, Inc., had been eliminated
upon discovery that the balance of the same was duly paid for on
January 4, 1940, and was correspondingly noted in the inventory
account of July 6, 1940, which was approved by the Court on August
29 of the same year; that the value of the participation in the La
Urbana was reduced from P3,200 to P400 in view of the fact that
P2,800 had already been paid on April 12, 1938, as stated in the
inventory account dated June 29, 1838, and duly approved by order
of the Court of November 3, 1948; that the company was entitled to
5 per cent of the total amount received by said guardian as fees. It
was, therefore, prayed that the statement of accounts be approved;
that it be authorized to collect the sum of P418.77 as fees or
commission and the amount of P437.31 as attorney's fees; that it be
authorized to deliver the estate of the deceased Ruth Stegner to her.
brother Henry and sisters Catherine and Mildred, in equal shares; that
the residuary estates of the wards be delivered to them; that it be
relieved from further responsibility as such guardian, and that the
proceedings be declared closed and terminated.
Catherine and Mildred Stegner opposed this petition alleging, among
others, that although the guardianship commenced in 1937, the
consolidated statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust
Company started only from 1941; that it did not explain why the
minors should be prejudiced by the sum of P15,117.29 allegedly
invalidated; that despite the absence of previous judicial
authorization, the company invested the funds of the wards in
mortgage loans; that said loans were not contested by the wards when
they were informed of the same because they were still minors at the
time; that as the loans were in the name of the Philippine Trust
Company and not in the names of Catherine and Mildred Stegner,
these wards should not be prejudiced by the payments made by the
mortgagors during the enemy occupation amounting to P15.117.29
which was declared invalidated. They also assailed the validity of
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 49 on the ground that they were illegal
and unconstitutional. Furthermore, oppositors objected to the items
listed as the company's commission; attorney's fees; the
miscellaneous disbursements allegedly incurred for the wards; and
charged that the Philippine Trust Company did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to protect the interests of the
minors with respect to the participation in La Granja and La Urbana
and which negligence resulted in the loss of P9.900 belonging to said
minors. Thus, they asked the Court to disapprove the statement of
accounts submitted by the company and that it be ordered to present a
new one with the objected items eliminated.
On July 29, 1954, the Court issued an order finding the opposition
interposed by Catherine and Mildred Stegner as groundless and
approved the statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust
Company, authorizing the collection of its commission and attorney's
fees; and the delivery to the wards Henry, Catherine and Mildred
Stegner of their respective residuary estates. The motion for the
reconsideration of said order filed by oppositors having been denied
for lack of merit, the matter was brought to this Court on appeal.
Consolidating the interrelated questions raised by oppositors, the
main issue in the instant case is whether the Philippine Trust
Company could be held liable for the investments of the funds of the
wards made without securing the previous authorization of the Court
and which resulted in the loss of P15,117.29. In defense of its
actuation, petitioner-appeliee contends that it relied on the provisions
on trust corporations, specifically Section 139 of the Corporation
Law (repealed by Republic Act No. 337, known as the General
Banking Act) which provides that deposits or moneys received by a
trust corporation as guardian or trustee can be loaned and invested in
accordance with the provisions governing loans and investments of
savings and mortgage banks, unless otherwise directed by the
instrument creating the trust. Appellants, on the other hand, maintain
that the properties of the wards were received by the guardian in a
fideicommissary capacity which partakes of the nature of a
"commodatum" for the benefit of said minors, thus requiring court
authorization before said funds could be invested.
Although the context of the will of W. A. Stegner unmistakably
conveys the testator's intention to create a trust and make the
Philippine Trust Company a trustee, it must be remembered that upon
said company's application and by agreement of the parties, the Court
in its order of February 23, 1937, appointed the Philippine Trust
Company as guardian (not as trustee) of the properties of the minors,
and there is no showing either that when the will of W. A. Stegner
was presented and allowed to probate in case No. 49170 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, appellee was appointed as such trustee.
Having assumed office as "guardian" of the properties of the wards,
the company should be governed, in the management of the funds of
said minors, by the provisions of the Rules of Court on guardianship
and not by the rules on trust corporations under the Corporation Law.
19 | P a g e
Petitioner-appellee, however, asserts that although it did not secure
previous judicial approval of those investments, they were included
in the annual accountings which were passed upon by the court from
time to time. In support of such contention, the Vice-president of the
Philippine Trust Company took the witness stand and testified that
for the investments made in the mortgage of the Tambunting
brothers, the Veterans Administration when notified offered no
objection and recommended approval thereof, and such investment
was approved by the Court on July 22, 1939; that the investments in
the mortgages of Cadsawan and T. de Vera were included in the
inventory of July G, 1940 and duly approved by the Court on October
29, 1940 without objection from the Veterans Administration; that on
March 8, 1941, the guardian filed a final accounting and a petition for
discharge with respect to James Stegner who had then reached the
age of majority, and to which accounting the Veterans Administration
and James Stegner himself confronted in writing. This final
accounting which included the investments in the mortgages of
Tambunting, and J. Pickering & Co. was approved by order of- the
Court of March 28, 1941; that on July 11, 1941, an inventory was
again filed with the written conformity of the Veterans
Administration wherein it appeared that certain amounts were
invested in the mortgage of the Servants of the Holy Ghost and that
of J. Pickering & Co., which inventory was approved by the" Court
on August 4, 1941; and that on June 12, 1943, an inventory with
respect to Henry Stegner was filed wherein it showed that he had
been paid his share of the investments in the mortgages, and which
accounting was duly approved by the Court on June 7, 1943. The
witness testified that in all these cases the mother and guardian over
the persons of the minors, Juanita T. Stegner, was' duly furnished
copies of the accounting- and apparently she offered no objection
whatsoever. It was further brought out that the interests accruing out
of such investments were duly credited to the wards and formed pact
of their funds from which they made withdrawals every now and
then. Evidence was also presented to prove that the corresponding
mortgage participation certificates, specifying the amounts invested,
were issued in the names of the wards (Exhibits A-1, A-2, A-3, B-2,
C-1, D-1, D-2, E-1).
It is to be noted in this connection that the mortgages of Cadsawan
and Pickering were settled and paid prior to the outbreak of the war
and they are not questioned in this case. The mortgages of the
Tambuntmg brothers, Servants of the Holy Ghost, T. de Vera,
Hermoso and Francisco, which ware also executed before the war
were not yet due when the Japanese forces invaded the Philippines,
and soon after their occupation of Manila the Japanese Military
Command ordered the mortgage debtors of almost all the banks
herein established to settle their obligations immediately. This,
undoubtedly, cause the mortgagors mentioned above to pay the
balance of their respective debts in Japanese military notes, which
was then the legal tender, amounting to P15,117,29, which after the
liberation of the island was declared invalidated by Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 49.
Section 5, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
Sec. 5, COURT MAY ORDER INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS
AND DIRECT MANAGEMENT OF ESTATE. The Court may
authorize and require the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or
encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in his hands, in real
estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned,
and may make such other orders for the managements investment,
and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may
require.
Although the authority referred to in this Section may not have been
secured prior to the investment of the properties or funds of the ward,
yet We believe that the court's approval of the annual inventories and
accounts submitted by the guardian, with the conformity and/or
acquiescence of the U.S. Veterans Administration and the mother of
the minors, wherein the questioned investment was mentioned and
accounted for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian
and compliance with the provisions of section 5, Rule 96 aforecited.
Passing upon the same question arising out of practically the same set
of facts, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ricardo Paras,
held:
"It is not necessary for us to pass upon the applicability of section
189 of Act No. 1459, because we hold that, under section 5 of Rule
96 of the Rules of Court, tho investments in question were valid and
binding upon appellant's ward. It is noteworthy that in the four
previous inventory-accounts filed by the appellant, with the lower
court, the mortgage loans extended by tho appellant and tho interest
collected thereon were plainly reported; * * *. We are of the opinion
that this approval had the effect of impliedly validating appellant's
acts and making them binding upon its ward" (Philippine Trust Co.
vs. Ballesteros, 98 Phil., 1007).
Aside from the fact that the participations in La Granja and La
Urbana were duly Included in the accounts approved by the Court
and which We hold to be unassailable, We find no merit in the
imputation of negligence on the guardian with respect to said assets
after taking into consideration the satisfactory explanations made by
said guardian.
Wherefore, the order of the Court, a quo of July 29, 1954, appealed
from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angela, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed
FIRST DIVISION
NELSON CABALES and G.R. No. 162421
RITO CABALES,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
G
A
R
C
I
A
,
J
J
.
COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
20 | P a g e
JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents. August 31, 2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v.
Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano, which affirmed with
modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No.
R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23,
2004, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court
are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square
meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife
Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora,
Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and
Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido
for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The
three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves,
each getting a share of P666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note
(vale) from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period,
Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr.
Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale
with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased
son, Alberto, including his vale of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-
spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed
of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood
that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00)
corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of
Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still
minors upon the execution of this instrument are
held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and
delivered only to them upon reaching the age of
21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land
in the names of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children
executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only
receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he
reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late
father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale
with pacto de retro as well as his vale of P300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged
receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano,
representing the formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject
property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila,
went back to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same
year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject
property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject
land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have
sold their respective shares in subject property when they were
minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus
damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were
estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering
that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount
corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject
property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court
the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal
redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds
of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and
on August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held
that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner
Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one of them
repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively
subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for
Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3)
petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share to subject
property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it
was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on
July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of
the trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos
undivided share to the property was unenforceable for lack of
authority or legal representation but that the contract was effectively
ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24,
1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-
owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as
Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights when she
repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner
Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount
of P966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the
obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto. Finally, however,
it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for redemption for his failure to
tender or consign in court the redemption money within the period
prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson
21 | P a g e
Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right of legal
redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-
owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject
land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and
his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto
and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the
New Civil Code provides that [i]f a widow or widower and legitimate
children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children. Verily, the
seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito
and Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights
and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto
died. By operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of
subject land were transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son
petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of
subject land to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the
brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but
only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died
prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were
transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son,
petitioner Nelson.But the records show that it was Saturnina, Albertos
mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to
Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she repurchased the
share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,[3] we held that a co-
owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the
owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-
ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.[4] But the one who redeemed had the
right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed,
holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount
due.[5] Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos heirs who
had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not
vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But
she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a
lien upon the property for the amount due until reimbursement. The
result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner
Nelson, retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject
property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-
owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as
indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held
in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon
reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable
as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the
New Civil Code[6] state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence
the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and
obligations of guardians under the Rules of
Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is
considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in
case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two
thousand pesos.[7] Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of
any judicial appointment in case the latters property does not exceed
two thousand pesos,[8] thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the
property of the child under parental authority is
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or
the mother, without the necessity of court
appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x[9]
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without
necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his
property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is
less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1[10] provides
that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall
extend. A guardian appointed shall have the care
and custody of the person of his ward, and the
management of his estate, or the management of
the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian
of the estate of a nonresident shall have the
management of all the estate of the ward within
the Philippines, and no court other than that in
which such guardian was appointed shall have
jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of
administration of the minors property. It does not include the power
of alienation which needs judicial authority.[11]Thus, when Saturnina,
as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share
in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of
another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of
petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged
receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito
effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid
and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of
sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or
any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with
judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his
mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the
courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did
not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject
22 | P a g e
property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and
transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.[12]
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from
respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code
are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell
his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing
of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-
emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners
excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or
co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the
property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his
ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem
subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid
such that they were not divested of their ownership
thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from
notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In reckoning
this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[13] thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law
not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter
that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to give
effect to the lawmakers will.
In requiring written notice, Article
1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter)[14] seeks
to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of
such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the shortness
of the period, it is really necessary, as a general
rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to
begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not
days but years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful
of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was
perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner
Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject
property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner
Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his
intention to redeem subject property during a barangayconciliation
process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and
damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from
learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot
feign ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require
strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an
obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending
the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of
redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the
sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period
commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought
the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January
12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal
redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had
already expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts
of the instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render
justice.[15]
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and his
mother remain co-owners thereof with respondents-
spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals of October
27, 2003 and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is
ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to
issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of
respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7
portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the
remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
23 | P a g e

G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE,
TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed
LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION,
MAURO, and, LOURDES, all surnamed
LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is
the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land,
four (4) hectares more or less, situated in Malaking Kahoy,
Parañaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow
of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children,
Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and
Lourdes,2 who thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction.
It was their contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the
sale from the probate court on June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as
they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship
proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the
two elder children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being notified
although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in
question,3 intervened in such action. In the lower court decision, they
were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the
property, the sale by the widow being considered null and void
insofar as they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio
Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths
appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by
the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court
in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of
sale executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the
spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without
prejudice however to the children demanding from their mother their
participation in the amount paid for the sale of such property. It thus
ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged
orders, starting with the two elder children not being notified of the
petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as
pointed out and stressed in their petition for review. There is need
then for the exercise of the corrective power of this Court. The
original decision of the lower court has much more to recommend it.
Thereby, the rights of the children are fully respected. With a
restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court, there is a
corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
So we decide.
The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision
thus: "After hearing the evidence, the lower court handed down
decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship
proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the
minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of them being
over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the guardian
stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have
validly authorized its sale, and the total absence of the requisite
notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the
defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a
purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of the land belonging
to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters of
Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the deed of sale ... upon her death in
1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest relatives, the
third-party plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer,
whose action had not prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra
Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on
September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed'; and that the
remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal property of
Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which,
upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the
other half to their children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares."4
Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was
explained this way: "It is unquestioned that the property in question
formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his three sisters, Agueda,
Tomasa and Silvestra, and brother, Meliton. When, after the death of
Florentino, that is, on December 6, 1943, the document denominated
'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ... was executed in favor of
Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda and married to
Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of
Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired the
participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of said
land, and became a co-owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not
execute said document and, therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided
portion of the said land, which 1/4 undivided portion passed, upon
her demise in 1952, to her nearest relatives who are the third-party
plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy
and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of her deceased
sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F.
Lorenzo, knew of this purchase made by her deceased husband, and
she had no right to mortgage the whole land which, for taxation
purposes was declared in her husband's name, without the consent of
aforenamed successors-in-interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell
the same afterwards to the defendant spouses, Martin S. Nery and
Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the guardianship court,
said authority having been granted upon her misrepresentation,
contained in her petition of May 26, 1953, that her minor children,
the plaintiff's herein, were the owners in common of 1/2 portion of
the land in question, the other 1/2 pertaining to her. However,
inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs were really the owners in
common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land, and the other
1/2, to their mother and guardian, the orders of the guardianship court
authorizing the guardian to sell the real property of the minors, and
approving the deed of sale executed in accordance with said authority
must be construed as referring to the correct real property of the said
minors."5
Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the
appealed judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the deed of
sale ..., executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the defendants
valid only insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question
is concerned, as to which portion, the defendants are declared owners,
and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano,
Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed Lorenzo,
are declared owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4
portion of the said land. In all other respects, the appealed judgment
is hereby affirmed. No Costs."6
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla,
not being satisfied with the above decision instituted the petitions for
review. As noted at the outset, the failure of respondent Court of
Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that
tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering
the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of
Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be
24 | P a g e
maintained. In that sense, the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the
lower court decision sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra
Ferrer,7 it is free from any infirmity.
1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is
that it was the lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals
that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded
thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is
filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and
shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the
minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may
direct other general or special notice thereof to be given."8 The late
Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional
character. These are his words: "Service of the notice upon the minor
if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional.
Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian."9
The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of
First Instance, 10 a 1915 decision. As was therein made clear: "There
is no need for interpretation or construction of the word in the case
before us. Its meaning is so clear that interpretation and construction
are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning
with which the English language has endowed the word; and that is
the meaning which the ordinary reader would accord to it on reading
a sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle
refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what
the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure
the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the
legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have,
cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for
its 'interpretation and construction.' " 11
Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its
assumption that the probate court could have authorized the sale in
question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome.
It was the lower court that acted correctly. There is the more reason
for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are
involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is quite
commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its
solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be
ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for every procedural
principle being observed before their interest in property to which
they have a claim could be adversely affected. It does not matter that
their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811, in Salunga v.
Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother
could have an "interest opposed to that of her children." 13 That may
not have been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the
facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would
have been better protected if they were notified as is required by law.
If there is any occasion then why there should be a strict insistence on
rule having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is it.
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or
individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent
in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in
a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those
arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of
their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves." 14
2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and
respondent Court of Appeals as to the heirs of Silvestra
Ferrer 15 being entitled to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such
property in the capacity of trustee for them. At the time then that the
settlement of his estate was pending in the probate court, his widow,
Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could not assert any other right,
except that traceable to her late husband. Respondent Court of
Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer. As a
member of the bar, he could not have been unaware that his vendor
could not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of. It is
much too late in the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to
a trustee being incapable of acquiring interest opposed to that of his
principal. So it was announced in Severino v. Severino. 16 That is in
conformity with an overmastering requirement of equity and
conscience. He should thus be held to the strictest degree of
acccountability. The law would lay itself open to well-deserved
criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The Nery
spouses ought to be aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its
authoritative force whenever called for.
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate
its inapplicability by the two principal errors assigned, namely, that
Silvestra Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far back as 1943
and that even if it were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and
thereafter his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of
ownership therein. It is obvious that on the face of such alleged errors
that they are essentially factual. We are thus precluded from inquiring
into their veracity as on such a matter what was decided by
respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us. Moreover, as to the
alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower
court in this fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa Ferrer
has not as yet prescribed because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in
1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3,
1958, barely six years had elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear and
satisfactory evidence that Leoncio Lorenzo and his successors-in-
interest had been in continuous, adverse, and open possession, and
under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion corresponding to
Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive
prescription." 17 Consequently, it was appropriate for the Court of
Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it
recognized the rights of the heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of
the land sold.
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above
set forth that Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro
and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased Leoncio
Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the
extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the property in question, as
was decreed by the lower court, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery and Leoncia L.
de Leon.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
DIGEST
Nery v. Lorenzo Digest
Nery v. Lorenzo 44 SCRA 431
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G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
Ponente: Fernando, J.:

Facts:
1. A parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the widow of
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo. The vendor was Bienvenida (widow),
guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of whom later
assailed the validity of the said transaction. The latter contended that
despite the order of the guardianship court authorizing the sale of the
lot, they were not informed of the move. Further, they contended that
the guardianship proceeding was conducted without notifying the two
older siblings although they were already more than 14 years of age
at that time.

2. The heirs of Silveria Ferrer who allegedly owned 1/4 of the

property likewise intervened in the action. The lower court adjudged
them the owners of the 1/4 portion and it likewise declared the sale to
be null and void.

3. The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared

the deed of sale to the spouses (as to the 3/4 portion) by the guardian
is valid, without prejudice to the children demanding from their
mother their participation in the proceeds. Not being satisfied with
the appellate court's decision, the spouses Nery, the children of the
deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court could have validly

authorize the sale of the property

RULING:
No, the juridictional infirmity is clear. The Court of Appeals failed to
give due weight to the jurisdictional defect that the minors over 14
years age were not notified. The probate court is therefor correct in
not have authorized the sale due to this clear jurisdictional infirmity.
The rights of the young should never be ignored and it does not
matter if their guardian is their mother, as even in some cases, the
interest of the mother is opposed to that of the children.

Finally, when minors are involve, the state being the parens patriae
has the duty to protect the rights of persons or individuals who
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position.

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