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1. santiago v republic of the philippines 2.

In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29,
the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau 1972
should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without
finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities
prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the
on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the
government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by
contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is
the government.
a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of
the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public

Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also
ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's
HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is fees.
implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The
government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government
through the Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and
not complying with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have the government did not give its consent to be sued.
his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard
would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
advances. Case should prosper.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner
for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for

perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be
the price or value at the time of the taking.


Facts: 3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the
fiesta committee liable for the death of Fontanilla?

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed

2 resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the Held:
other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The
Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment
and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the 1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui
amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the
and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage municipality.
collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the
afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for
damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality, the Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative
municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer, Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but
defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the
to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state.
in turn, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of
as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the
due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of
construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision a town fiesta.
and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two
Issues: fold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in
1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental or a corporate function of the municipality? governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public
2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla? service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the

other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.
Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf
of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the
state or sovereign power. 3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a
governmental function. The legal consequence thereof is that the
Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation
2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary
for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its
attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-
agents. responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla
committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .
do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability. (Torio
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable vs. Fontanilla, GR No. L-29993, October 23, 1978)
not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only 4.
P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the
floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the post and braces used
were of bamboo material. The collapse of the stage was also attributable to
the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality
and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to prevent
such an occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain the
safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators
from mounting and accumulating on the stage. Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assesor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He
filed a complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses
against respondent Fermin and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that
respondent deliberately ignored and caused non-payment of the vouchers
Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was
because he defied the latter’s request to register and vote in the local
Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through
elections. On the other hand, Fermin countered that Nessia’s claims could not
its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee
be approved because they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The
on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage.
Municipality, for its part, added that Nessia was also at fault since he did not
Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine

give justification for drawing funds in excess of the budget. RTC decided in Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZSANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE
favour of Nessia. Both of them elevated the case to the Court of Appeals: NATIONAL BANK (PNB),respondents.
Nessia praying for an increase in award of damages; Fermin seeking
exoneration from liability; Municipality did not appeal.

In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of

Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749.
The affected employees assailed thelegality of the abolition. The CFi in 1973
declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all thedismissed
Whether Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, hence liable
employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The
under Art. 27 of the Civil Code.
City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed.In 1986 the
City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partialpayment of her back-wages. The
others were paid in full.

In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries
YES. It is contended that Nessia may not claim relief under Art 27 because his (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to
theory of unjust inaction is incompatible with his allegations in the complaint Santiago.The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back
that Fermin denied/refused the vouchers. However, the allegations alluded wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one
to, i.e. “plaintiff presented the said claims to defendant Mayor Fermin, but of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was
refused and continue to refuse to pay,” should be construed as admission of given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor
the act of disapproval of the claims. Refusal to pay is not inferred solely from vehicle;properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge
disapproval of claims but from inaction thereon as well. Accordingly, said Allarde denied the motion and directedthe sheriff to levy and schedule at
allegations cannot be considered as contradictory to Nessia’s theory of unjust public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of
inaction. He may be held liable under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of
he did not act on the vouchers. P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago asback-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde
issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check butthe City
Treasurer can¶t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May
5. 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds
of the City Government of Caloocancorresponding to the claim of Santiago.
Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the CityTreasurer sent
CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold
PNB liablefor any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds
petitioners,v. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC
of the city.
of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of



Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e.
exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago¶s claim.
1. n May 2001, Mario Crespo, also known as Mark Jimenez, was declared as
HELD: the elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Pablo Ocampo was the
rival candidate who filed an electoral protest in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) alleging that Crespo’s win was due to election fraud
Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the and vote buying. In March 2003, Crespo was declared by the HRET as
plaintiff seeks to subjectto his claim property of the defendant in the hands ineligible for office due to lack of residence in the said district of Manila. Due
of a third person, or money owed by such third personor garnishee to the to such declaration, Ocampo then requested the HRET to declare him as the
defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds winner of the election done in 2001 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6646 which
deposited inthe PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine provides that “Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
or special deposit, remain government funds and may not besubject to counted…” Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo should then be
garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as considered as stray votes. And that being the fact that Ocampo received the
required by law. Eventhough the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is second highest number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of 768
relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. votes), he should be declared as the winner of the said election. The HRET
Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is denied Ocampo’s petition.
atliberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and
execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not
authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgmentsrecovered, and only ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.
convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as
final andmake provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not
absolute and admits of a well-definedexception, that is, when there is a HELD: No. Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second
corresponding appropriation as required by law. placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified
candidates in the event that the highest earner of votes is disqualified. The
In such a case, themonetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocanalready approved and passed
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for
elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second
Santiago¶s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the
highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective
exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced
office. Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
against such funds.
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a
disqualified candidate to be considered “stray.” Hence, when a candidate has

not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the Election Day and was
voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would
COMELEC first division ruled his disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling,
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The
another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and who garnered the second
obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate
highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the
who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the
COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming that the cancellation
people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their
of Armado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, him, as the
franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with
the trial and hearing. However, it reversed and set aside the ruling of the fist
division granted Arnado's MR.

2. Maquiling v COMELEC

FACTS: Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring
Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of US
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a
passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
consequence of his subsequent naturalisation as a citizen of USA, he lost his
mayoralty race.
Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under RA NO 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco. USA and tool the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. On the same day, an
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
order of approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in
citizenship amount to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
his favour. In 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and
executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenshop. On 30
November 2009, Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Respondent Linog Balua another mayoralty RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of a foreign passport after
candidate filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record renouncing one;s foreign citizenship is positive and voluntary act of
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and representation as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
departing the Philippines. Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to personally file his

answer. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
him in default. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the higherst number of provides:
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his answer.

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no
matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which function
to safeguard liberty and to punish official transgressors. The essential object
xxxx and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. If the mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification must have the means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public great writ of liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the defense offered
officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x[31] constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

3. VILLAVICENCIO v. LUKBAN 4. Agustin v Edu

FACTS: FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the
validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of
closed. One hundred and seventy women were deported to Davao without “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this
their knowledge and consent. The women were received as laborers in a order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring
banana plantation. Some of the women were able to escape and return to public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough
Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel
of the deportees presented an application for heabes corpus to the Supreme motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
Court would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter

ISSUE: of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all
vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In
Davao; and compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the
corpus to Davao compliance thereof.

This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
of police power. purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail
business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the
Issue country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent equal opportunity.
Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally

accepted principles.


The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In
question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted
exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be
5. iCHIONG V. HERNANDEZ in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence,
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in city market.

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by

Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military
6. In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no
Facts: military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further
assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils.
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of
filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed
to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to
phils. the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
bar. contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a
prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”

The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on
academic degrees between the republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot
be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens 8. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter
or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than
7. lagman v zosa
twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died

a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
married to another woman. prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality
and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate
respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises
as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion

9. Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into
an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total
one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the membership of the Philippine Senate.
most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further
or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of

criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and

exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No.
18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the
in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or
a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”

Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Was the VFA unconstitutional?



Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality
party with a national constituency.
of the VFA.]

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities
for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The
the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional
and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging
the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
other contracting state.

leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can
be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and
phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
ISSUE: susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on
Whether or not COMELEC's refusal of Pamatong's request for presidential the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
candidacy along with the grounds for such refusal violate the right to equal unenforceable rights may be sourced.
access to opportunities for public service.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be

RULING: subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
an interpretation of the sort. person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation
of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into
the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note
office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every
be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the

step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these
nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
12. Calalang v Williams

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of
legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the
in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao
Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

Facts: Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for 2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond to
equivalent tothe one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he
is a candidate,
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

ISSUE: whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
HELD: NO. Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the
with the natureand essence of the Republican system ordained in our resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same. The court theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
reasoned out thatSovereignty resides in the people and all government approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
authority emanates fromthem, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic
right to vote and to be votedshall not be dependent upon the wealth of the on national roads.
individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all,
rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of
poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

Issues: 2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
well-being and economic security of all the people? estsuprema lex.

Held: Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the the greatest number.”
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal 13. APCD V PCA
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
No. 232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid
integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil
industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct FACTS:
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a
regulatory scheme set up by law. On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties
at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant
operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93
which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning
apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on
of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were
smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus
to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93. On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and
supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order
and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from
further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno,
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have vs. Quimpo,".
repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to
the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the ISSUE:
general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of
“protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and
because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government power of the CRH?
reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare and when the public interest so requires.



No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and
functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare
all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". and protection of the Filipino workers.

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an

adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision
directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services
to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the police power.
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is
pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. RULING:

The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580. “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
15. PASEI v. Drilon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
FACTS: of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE “The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4)
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. they apply equally to all members of the same class.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity
of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her
workers — rests on substantial distinctions. Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council.

16. UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President,
which request was denied by President
G.R. No. 134625

FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the

doctoral program in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
completed the units of course work required and finished her dissertation preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had
and was ready for oral defense. unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording
her procedural due process.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that
she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived
dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. of her right to substantive due process.

RULING: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated heard several times.
disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP
administration and warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the
exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it did Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge
not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated. that private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and

recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
informed private respondent of the charges against her. opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed
of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been
CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to denied due process.
withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree.

In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
and given opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
explanation which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday
she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months
or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance practices.
of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of


Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right
to strike.

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,
of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec.
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers 31].
to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the
of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein)
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the

constitution includes the right to abort her child.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, HELD:
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a
charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"]
conclude that the right of personal privacy includes abortion decision, but
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
state interests in regulation.”
part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum “A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that
prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of exempts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother,
the SSS was illegal. without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the interests
involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
19. Roe vs. Wade

20. Pierce v. Society of Sisters
This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which
Pierce v. Society of Sisters involved a challenge by a religiously affiliated
granted the declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the
school to an Oregon law requiring that all children between the ages of eight
constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an
and 16 attend public school. Specifically, the Society of Sisters claimed that
injunction against enforcement of such statutes.
the law interfered with parents’ right to send their children to a school where
In 1970, Norma L McCorvey ( “Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman they would receive religious training. The Supreme Court struck down the
(allegedly a result of rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District compulsory education law on the grounds that it did unconstitutionally
Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws which proscribe interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the and education of their children. While the Court noted that states may
purpose of saving the mother’s life. She argues that said laws are reasonably regulate their schools, set standards for teachers and pupils, and
unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy require that all children of a certain age attend some school, the government
as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth may not force children to attend public schools. Short of some evidence that
Amendments. Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on a religious school is not fit to educate children, the government may not
behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated;” thereby becoming prevent parents from choosing a religious school for their children.
a class suit.

21WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
respondents. encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as
a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation,
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the
executive offices concerned therewith. oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda
— international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international
effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines
“to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and
as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as
impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court. in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and
reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are
ISSUE: Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating
Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines. the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
HELD: Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper
against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
NO. The WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the
Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the
Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it
concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.