The Doctrine and its Exceptions:

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Melvin P. Lacsie

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction
then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no
less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However,
we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery
of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded:

(1) WHEN THERE IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS - QUISUMBING V. JUDGE GUMBAN, G.R. NO.
85156, FEBRUARY 5, 1991

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fact rule. It has been repeatedly held that
the requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one: where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process. The rule does not apply where
insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987]).

(2) WHEN THE ISSUE INVOLVED IS PURELY A LEGAL QUESTION - EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V.
POEA, L-76633, OCTOBER 18, 1988

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the
theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This
case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions
of law. Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court,
observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice. WHETHER POEA or
NLRC has the jurisdiction over the case.

(3) WHEN THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION - INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC. V. SINSUAT, L-29171, APRIL 15, 1988

The plea made in behalf of respondent Secretary that IPSI had gone to Court without first exhausting all
administrative remedies cannot be sustained in view of the doctrines set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion.
There is merit in IPSI's appeal, therefore. The respondent Secretary had indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. His acts must be nullified, and the Trial Court's judgment upholding those
acts must be set aside.

(4) WHEN THERE IS ESTOPPEL ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED -
VDA. DE TAN V. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION, L-12944, MARCH 30, 1959

It is further contended by the Commission that the petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative remedies
by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court (Montes
vs. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil., 490; 54 Off. Gaz. [7] 2174. The respondent Commission is in estoppel

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 The Doctrine and its Exceptions:
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Melvin P. Lacsie

to invoke this rule, considering that in its resolution (Annex F of the Stipulation of Facts) reiterating its obstinate
refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the
Commission declared that — “The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which
may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse,
(Annex F)”. Thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted
by the Commission.

(5) WHEN THERE IS IRREPARABLE INJURY - DE LARA V. CLORIBEL, G.R. NO. L-21653, MAY 31, 1965

While as a rule of petition for cetiorari which is interposed to dispute the validity of an order or decision that may be
rendered by an administrative official in pursuance of the powers and duties with which he is invested cannot be
entertained if the party in interest fails to avail of the administrative remedies officials are the most competent to pass
upon matters that exclusively come within their jurisdiction, such rule may be relaxed when its application may
cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except by taking the opportune
appropriate court action. Stated otherwise, the rule is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and
injury will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative
official concerned on the matter. This is the situation herein obtained. Because of the conflict existing between
petitioner and respondent company regarding a portion of the logging area awarded to them, as well as the use of the
logging road constructed by the company, the case was taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
for his final resolution, who in the meantime directed petitioner "to refrain from entering and operating within the
contested area until the said case shall have been finally decided," but before such resolution could come De Lara
disregarded the directive and continued operating within the contested area to the irreparable damage and injury of
the company. This act of defiance prompted the company to take the needed appropriate action. In the circumstances,
we find the action taken by respondent court proper and justified even if no final decision has as yet been rendered
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Respondent court did nothing but to maintain and put into
effect the directive issued by said official. Indeed, before the protest lodged by the company could be decided
regarding the conflicting interests it is best that the status quo be maintained as was done by respondent court. We
see on this no abuse of discretion.

(6) WHEN THE RESPONDENT IS A DEPARTMENT SECRETARY WHOSE ACTS AS AN ALTER EGO OF
THE PRESIDENT BEARS THE IMPLIED AND ASSUMED APPROVAL OF THE LATTER - DEMAISIP
V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 13000, SEPTEMBER 25, 1959;

It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration, and
ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be denied and that of defendant Beunaflor be given due course
upon compliance with certain requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action
in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is
that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the
latter (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451). It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action
should not be entertained because he has failed the exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him.

Explaining his petition for review, Nicolas Diego called attention to the circumstance that no appeal had been taken
to the President from the Secretary's administrative determination n issuing the permit And then he argued for non-
interference by the courts with the acts of executive officers, unless all administrative remedies have been previously
exhausted. Upon examination of the Record on Appeal, however, we note that this defense was not interposed in
the court of first instance. Perhaps because the pleader knew courts had entertained civil action of this nature against the Secretary
of Agriculture and/or subordinate officers, even if complainants had not previously taken the matter up to the Chief Executive; and
perhaps because such defense might only be valid in special civil actions — this is not one — wherein the petitioner
must allege and prove that the has no other speedy and adequate remedy. (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54
Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956; Emphasis supplied)

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 The Doctrine and its Exceptions:
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Melvin P. Lacsie

BARTULATA V. PERALTA, G.R. NO. 23155, SEPTEMBER 9, 1974

Respondents, however, would contend that the present action should be dismissed because petitioner "has not
exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to court. Respondents would want petitioner
to appeal his case to the Office of the President before availing of court processes. In a long line of decisions, this Court
has held that the doctrine requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval
of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having been brought against the Secretary
of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly untenable.

(7) WHEN TO REQUIRE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WOULD BE

UNREASONABLE - CIPRIANO V. MARCELINO, G.R. NO. L-27793, FEBRUARY 28, 1972

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, nor is it a condition precedent to
judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may
and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. To require the petitioner to go
all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of collection of the small total sum of nine
hundred forty-nine (P949) pesos, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her
appeal shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her
claim, would in all likelihood have been spent. xxx When all the documents required to support payment of
Cipriano’s salary and the cash commutation of her unused vacation and sick leaves have been accomplished, Cipriano
has earned the right to the said payment, and it has become the corresponding duty of the respondent treasurer to
recognize such right and effect payment.

(8) WHEN IT WOULD AMOUNT TO A NULLIFICATION OF A CLAIM - ALZATE V. ALDANA, G.R. NO.
14407, FEBRUARY 29, 1960

Anacleto Alzate, Principal of the South Provincial High School in Agoo, La Union Province, had taken this present
appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of La Union in Civil Case No. 1308 dismissing his petition for
mandamus to compel herein respondents Director of Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools for
La Union, to adjust his salary pursuant to the provisions of Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 842,
entitled Public School Salary Act of 1953. The order of dismissal is predicated on the finding that the same was
premature, petitioner not having exhausted all the administrative remedies available to him.

In case at bar the parties had to agree and the court had to approve the agreement that the Director of Public Schools
shall recommend to the proper officials not later than June 30, 1958 and before the closing of office hours on that date
the commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by petitioner to be due him under Republic Act No. 842, to accounts
payable in order to prevent its reversion. This is a recognition by the parties as well as the court of the validity and
urgency of the action taken by petitioner. Under the circumstances, petitioner should be deemed to have had
sufficient cause of action at the time he filed his petition for mandamus on June 11, 1958, and in view of the special
situation, resort to the court without awaiting for the final decision of the administrative officers is not premature.

(9) WHEN THE SUBJECT MATTER IS A PRIVATE LAND IN LAND CASE PROCEEDINGS - SOTO V.
JARENO, SUPRA

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that
it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.

Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to private lands, as also settled in
a number of decisions rendered by this Court. 11 Once registered, the homestead granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to
have the character of public land and so was removed from the operation of the said doctrine.

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 The Doctrine and its Exceptions:
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Melvin P. Lacsie

But notwithstanding the above principles, the petition will still have to be dismissed because the change sought is
not authorized under Section 112 of Act 496, as interpreted by this Court.

According to Tangunan v. Republic, 12 the amendment of a certificate of title is allowed under this section only "if
there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case
where the incident properly belongs."

(10) WHEN THE RULE DOES NOT PROVIDE A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY -
QUISUMBING V. JUDGE GUMBAN, SUPRA

ADD’N : …still in the instant case We deem it more felicitous and expedient to resolve the same on the merits to
avoid multiplicity of suits since after all the circumstances warrant a final disposition of this petition, namely the
granting thereof because private respondent had previously been appointed as district supervisor, without indicating
any specific place as her permanent station. Her status was therefore akin to that of a district supervisor at large. Her
transfer was neither whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious.

(11) WHEN THERE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATING THE URGENCY OF JUDICIAL

INTERVENTION - ROLLO PP. 236-240

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of
their case. The letter, reads, thus:

"...If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the Secretary."

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition
of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available
and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their
relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

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