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Art. 248. Murder.

— Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.chanrobles virtual law library
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin.chanrobles virtual law library
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of
an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity.chanrobles virtual law library
5. With evident premeditation.chanrobles virtual law library
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim,
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.chanro

Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion
temporal.

Art. 256. Intentional abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of
the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the
consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
woman shall have consented.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. —


The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period,
respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific
knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.

Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall
dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos.

Chapter Two
PHYSICAL INJURIES

Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, or some essential organ of reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium
and maximum periods.chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
(WBA) another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted,
the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the
use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot,
an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become
incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become
deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use
thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.chanrobles
virtual law library
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article
246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case
covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case
covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who
shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. — The penalties


established by the next preceding article shall be applicable in the respective case to
any person who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious, physical
injury, by knowingly administering to him any injurious substance or beverages or by
taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender
has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging
in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the
offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.
Art. 359. Slander by deed. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and
punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another
person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

QUASI-OFFENSES
Sole Chapter
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:


1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided
in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to
death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.chanrobles virtual law
library

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such
help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21,
1957).

Palaganas v. People

On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is guilty of the crime of Homicide for the death of Melton in Criminal Case No. U-
9610, and Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Servillano in Criminal Case
No. U-9608, we do not, however, concur in their ruling that petitioner is guilty of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609. We hold that petitioner
therein is guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide.

xxx

In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the
crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of
the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are
present.[55] However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or
mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.[56]
If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the
victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical
injury.[57]

Based on the medical certificate of Michael, as well as the testimony of the physician who
diagnosed and treated Michael, the latter was admitted and treated at the Dagupan Doctors-
Villaflor Memorial Hospital for a single gunshot wound in his right shoulder caused by the
shooting of petitioner.[58] It was also stated in his medical certificate that he was discharged on the
same day he was admitted and that the treatment duration for such wound would be for six to
eight days only.[59]Given these set of undisputed facts, it is clear that the gunshot wound sustained
by Michael in his right shoulder was not fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound
was short and he was discharged from the hospital on the same day he was admitted
therein. Therefore, petitioner is liable only for the crime of attempted homicide as regards
Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609.

PEOPLE vs DAYADAY y DAGOOC

Under Article 24843 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed
when: (I) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was
with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in
Article 248; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.44

All elements of the crime of murder have been established in this case
beyond reasonable doubt.

Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it was


established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed him. As to
the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains the CA's finding
that treachery attended the killing of Basilio. There is treachery when a
victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as when the accused
attacks the victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected
and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, or is, in any
event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself,
thus insuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.45

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which
came from behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was
completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking home
with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio and
the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and
incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the case at bar,
sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BULING G.R. No. L-13315 April 27, 1960

*New fact supervened which changes the character of the offense which is not in existence
at the time of the filing of the first offense*

The only question for resolution by this Court whether the prosecution and conviction of
Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious
physical injuries.

Two conflicting doctrines on double jeopardy have been enunciated by this Court, one in
the cases of People vs.Tarok, 73 Phil., 260 and People vs. Villasis, 81 Phil., 881, and
the other, in the cases of Melo vs. People, 85 Phil., 766, People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil.,
829 and People vs. Petilla, 92 Phil., 395. But in Melo vs. People, supra, we expressly
repealed our ruling in the case of People vs. Tarok, supra, and followed in the case of
People vs. Villasis, supra. In the Melo vs. People case, we stated the ruling to be that:

. . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a
new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and
distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. (85 Phil., 769-770).

Do the facts in the case at bar justify the application of the new ruling? In other words,
has a new fact supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People, which changes the
character of the offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case for less
serious physical injuries was filed? We do not believe that a new fact supervened, or that
a new fact has come into existence.

What happened is that the first physician that examined the wounds of the offended
party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised,
wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15
days to heal and incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time from his
usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on December 8, 1956,
defendant-appellant was found guilty of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.

But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the offended party, taking an X-
ray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been wounded. The examination
discloses, according to the physician, the following injuries:

Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end arm, right. X-ray plate
finding after one month and 12 days — Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal
end, radius right, with slight calus. (Exh. "E").

and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from 1 ½ months to 2 ½
months barring complications.

Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a
result of which another offense had been committed. It is argued that the injury and the
condition thereof was the same when the first examination was made on December 10,
1956, as when the examination was made on January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact
had been disclosed in the latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in the
previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence on the part of the
examining physician. We find much reason in this argument. What happened is no X-ray
examination of the wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was
merely superficial. The physician who made the first examination could not have seen
the fracture at the distal end of the right arm, and this could only be apparent or visible
by X-ray photography.

Under the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to agree with the contention
made on behalf of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which
has transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to serious physical
injuries.

But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong, supra, and argues that
our ruling in said case should apply to the case at bar, for the reason that in the said
case the first crime with which the accused was charged was less serious physical
injuries and the second one was serious physical injuries and yet we held that there was
no jeopardy.

We have carefully examined this case and have found that the first examination made
of the offended party showed injuries which would take from 20 to 30 days to heal,
whereas the subsequent examination disclosed that the wound of the offended party
would require medical attendance and incapacitate him for labor for a period of 90 days,
"causing deformity and the loss of the use of said member". No finding was made in the
first examination that the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the
right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity
and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume that such fact was not apparent or
could not have been discernible at the time the first examination was made.

The course (not the length), of the healing of an injury may not be determined before
hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the
reason why the court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the
filing of the original information.

But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X-ray examination
discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have
existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is,
therefore, no now or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen
since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling
enunciated by us in the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, supra. We
attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of
the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10,
1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have
certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in
existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very
superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no
supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case
of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to
apply the general rule of double jeopardy.

We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting officers that before
filing informations for physical injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of
the injuries should first be made to avoid instances, like the present, where by reason of
the important Constitutional provision of double jeopardy, the accused can not be held to
answer for the graver offense committed.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of conviction is set aside
and the defendant-appellant acquitted of the charge of serious physical injuries. Without
costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YORAC G.R. No. L-29270November 23, 1971

1. The Constitution, to repeat, is quite explicit: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. As Justice Laurel made clear in an address as
delegate before the Constitutional Convention, such a provision finds its origin" from the
days when sanguinary punishments were frequently resorted to by despots." 9 A
defendant in a criminal case should therefore, according to him, be adjudged either
guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being
precluded from taking an appeal. 10 It is in that sense that the right against being twice
put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of
finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed,
enabling him to plan his, future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not
to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant
litigation. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to
equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and
impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit.

Then, as a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Laurel had the first opportunity to give
meaning to what, under the Constitution, should be considered "the same offense." In
the case of People v. Tarok, decided in 1941, 11 the then comparatively new Rules of
Court in its Section 9 of Rule 113 speaks of a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged after a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, "or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof or for, any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." 12

In the Tarok case, the conviction for parricide of the accused was sought to be set aside,
as previously he had been indicted for the crime of serious physical injuries, to which he
had pleaded guilty. He was sentenced and was actually incarcerated by virtue of such
penalty imposed. The offended party was his wife whom he hacked with bolo, his ire
being aroused by certain, remarks made her. While he was thus serving sentence, the
victim died resulting in the new prosecution for parricide of which he was convicted. On
appeal to this Court, it was decided over the dissents of the then Justice Moran and
Justice Diaz that the offense of serious physical injury of which he was found guilty being
included in parricide his previous conviction was a bar to such subsequent prosecution
for the more serious crime. The lower court judgement of conviction was thus reversed.
According to Justice Laurel who spoke for the Court: "To our mind, the principle
embodied in the New Rules of Court is a clear expression of selection of rule amidst
conflicting theories. We take the position that when we amended section 26 of General
Orders No. 58 by providing that the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense not only
necessarily therein included but which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information, we meant what we have, in plain language, stated. We
certainly did not mean to engage in the simple, play of words." 13

2. Such a ruling was however re-examined and set aside in Melo v. People, 14 where it
was held that an accused who pleaded guilty to the offense of frustrated homicide, the
offended party thereafter dying in the evening of the same day, could not rely on a plea
of double jeopardy if, as a result thereof, the information was amended to charge him
with homicide. 15 As was clarified in the opinion of this Court through the then Chief
Justice Moran, one of the dissenters in the Tarok case: "This rule of identity does not
apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy." 16 Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a
new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the
character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot
be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." 17 It is noteworthy,
however, that in the Melo ruling, there was a reiteration of what was so emphatically
asserted by Justice Laurel in the Tarok case in these words: "As the Government cannot
begin with the highest, and then down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for
every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin the lowest and ascend to the
highest with precisely the same result." 18

3. There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which]
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime
imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and
distinct offense. The conclusion reached in People v. Buling, 19 the latest case in point
relied upon by Judge Alampay in the resolution no appeal, was thus, predictable. As set
forth in the opinion of Justice Labrador in the case, there was a medical certification that
the wounds for which the accused Buenaventura as first prosecuted for less serious
physical injuries would require medical attendance from a period of from ten days to
fifteen days. He pleaded guilty and on December 8, 1956, sentenced by the Justice of
the Peace of Cabalian Leyte, to one month and one day of arresto mayor. He started
serving his sentence on the same day. On January 18, 1957, however, another
physician examined the offended party and with the use of an X-ray apparatus, certified
that he did suffer a fracture requiring a treatment of from one and one-half months to two
and one half months, barring complications. As a result, on February 20, 1957, an
information was filed against the same accused, this time before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, charging him with serious physical injuries. He stood trial and was
found guilty of such an offense and sentenced to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor as minimum to one year of prision correccional as maximum. On appeal to this
Court, his invocation of the defense of double jeopardy struck a responsive chord, and
he was acquitted.

4. The opinion of Justice Labrador explained with clarity why the constitutional right
against being put twice in jeopardy was a bar to the second prosecution. Thus: "If the X-
ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture
must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There
is therefore, no view or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen
since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling
enunciated by us in the cases if Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong ... . We
attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of
the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10,
1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have
certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in
existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was, caused by the very
superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no
supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case
of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to
apply the general rule of double jeopardy." 20 It is quite apparent, in the light of the
foregoing, why the lower court, submitting to the compulsion of the Buling decision, had
to sustain the motion to quash and to dismiss the information against appellee Yorac. No
error could therefore be rightfully imputed to it.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of June 21, 1968 of Judge Nestor B. Alampay granting the
motion to quash, ordering the dismissal of the case and the immediate release of the
appellee Rodrigo Yorac, is affirmed. Without costs.

PEOPLE vs. ADIL and FAMA, JR. G.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977

Deformity may be considered as a supervening fact.

No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was
mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss
of the use of the right hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent
or could have been discernible at the time the first examination was
made. The course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of
healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there
was a supervening fact occuring since the filing of the original information.

BARREDO, J:

Petition for certiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge dated September 22,
1975 and October 14, 1975 dismissing Criminal Case No. 5241 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo against private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr., said dismissal being
predicated on the ground of double jeopardy, in view of the dismissal of a previous
charge of slight physical injuries against the same respondent for the same incident by
the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 3335, notwithstanding that in
the information in the first-mentioned case, it was alleged that the injuries sustained by
the offended party, aside from possibly requiring medical attendance from 6 to 9 days
barring complications", as was alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 3335, had
left "a permanent sear and deform(ed) — the right face of (said offended party) Miguel
Viajar."

The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975 (Case
No. 3335) was as follows:

That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino
Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused,
while armed with a piece of stone, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one
Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel
Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would
have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9
days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician
hereto attached.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)

Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the


Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent
Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged
in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After conducting a preliminary investigation, under
date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an
information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for serious physical
injuries as follows:

That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January, Province


of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, armed
with pieces of stone did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and throw pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on
the lower right eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days barring
complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right
face of said Miguel Viajar.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)

On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in
Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be
prosecuted. This motion was opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both parties
to file their respective memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy.

In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal of Case No.
3335, but the Municipal Court did not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for
hearing, and in view of the postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await the
resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in Case No. 5241, on September 11, 1975, the
following order was entered:

Under our democratic and constituted system of government litigants


before our courts of justice, plaintiffs and defendants, complainants and
accused are entitled to the equal protection of our laws. More is an
accused, the trial of his case has been repeatedly postponed for several
times by this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion at the instance
of the prosecution. So, when this case was called for hearing on the
afternoon of September 1, 1975 the accused through counsel vigorously
objected to another postponement and moved for the dismissal of the
case against him. To grant another postponement as sought by the Fiscal
against the vehement, strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to
the mind of the Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion
consistent with justice and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of
discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a grave violation of, the
right of the accused to a speedy trial to which he is rightfully entitled to
under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of Rights) of the Philippine
Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the above-entitled case is hereby


ordered dismissed. The Cash Bond posted by the accused is hereby
ordered cancelled and released (Pp. 96-97, Record.)

Whereupon, on even date, Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in Case No.
5241 inviting attention to the above dismissal order and reiterating his theory of double
jeopardy. On September 22, 1975, respondent court issued the impugned order
sustaining the contention of double jeopardy and dismissing Case No. 5241. The
prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied in the other assailed order of
October 14, 1975, respondent judge relying on the ruling laid down in Peo. vs. Silva, 4
SCRA 95.

In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court
of January, the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only,
because according to the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by
the offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only
"baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only
three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place,
and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by
said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been
filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity
became apparent.

Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity
that would be left by a wound on the face of a person cannot be pre-determined. On the
other hand, whether or not there is actually a deformity on the face of Viajar is a question
of fact that has to be determined by the trial court. The only issue We are to resolve here
is whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No.
5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this case out of the ruling
in People vs. Silva cited by respondent court.

In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to property and physical
injuries suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and known when
the prior minor case was prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo
vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, in which it was held:

This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple
reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the
first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent
Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against the same
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:

Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on
which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of
the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be considered as
a supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We
held:

No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was
mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss
of the use of the right hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent
or could have been discernible at the time the first examination was
made. The course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of
healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there
was a supervening fact occuring since the filing of the original information.

In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of
private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by
certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders of September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 herein
complained of are hereby set aside and respondent court is ordered to proceed with the
trial and judgment thereof according to law. Costs against private respondent Fama Jr.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

ENRILE AND ENRILE vs. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414 October 22, 2014

The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious
physical injuries were specifically averred therein. **inquisitorial in nature –
PI**

Ruling of the Court

The CA did not commit any reversible errors.


According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a


complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.22

By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed


for lack of one of the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the
petitioners were averring that the facts charged did not constitute offenses.
To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer to the law
defining the offense charged, which, in this case, is Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code, which pertinently states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 265. Less serious physical injuries – Any person who shall inflict upon
another physical injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical
assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

x x x x.

Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries
are, namely: (1) that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another;
and (2) that the physical injuries inflicted either incapacitated the victim for
labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required medical assistance for
more than 10 days.

Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To


answer this query, the Court refers to the averments of the complaints
themselves, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Criminal Case No. 03-276

That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more
or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused motivated by anger by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of
one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical
injuries that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will
incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time attached Medical
Certificate (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW.23
Criminal Case No. 03-277

That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more
or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above named accused MOTIVATED by anger did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right
and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO
inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical Attendance for a
period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication as per Medical
Certificate hereto attached.

CONTRARY TO LAW.24

The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious
physical injuries were specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal
Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the petitioners “wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO
MORAÑO;” and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the
complainant “that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and
will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time;” while that
in Criminal Case No. 03-277 alleged that: (a) the petitioners “wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right and give hitting her head
against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO;” and (b) the petitioners
inflicted upon the complainant “physical injuries [that] will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication.”

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25cralawred the


complaints sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical
injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts
constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts
allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being
evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not
quashable.

In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that


the “complaints do not provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish
and to show that the medical attendance rendered on private complainants
actually and in fact lasted for a period exceeding ten (10) days;” and the
medical certificates attached merely stated that “the probable disability
period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15
days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the healing periods were
merely speculations, surmises and conjectures.” They insist that the “private
complainants should have presented medical certificates that would show the
number of days rendered for medication considering that they filed their
complaint on March 15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the alleged
incident.”26
The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit.

As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates
to prove the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their
incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before or during the
preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan,27 the
preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the
parties’ respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their
separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare the information.28 It is not yet a trial on the
merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof.29 The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of
a trial before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be
sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime
charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be
removed.30

We further agree with the RTC’s observation that “the issues raised in the
motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a
full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of actual healing period of the
alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be established in the
trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent
evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the instant petition for the
dismissal of the criminal cases against them for less serious physical injuries
is to prevent the trial court to hear and receive evidence in connection with
said cases and to render judgments thereon. x x x All things considered, it
would be premature to dismiss the subject criminal cases filed against the
herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial
of the merits.”31

And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the
MTC by bringing the special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, the
petitioners deliberately disregarded the fundamental conditions for initiating
the special civil action for certiorari. These conditions were, firstly, the
petitioners must show that the respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or
exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and, secondly, because the denial was interlocutory, they must
show that there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.32

The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the


success of their recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that the
MTC had no jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to
quash, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would have opened
the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained unopened
to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion to quash was
procedurally and substantively correct because the duration of the physical
incapacity or medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on
the merits, not at the early stage of dealing with and resolving the motion to
quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the denial was interlocutory,
not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet completely terminate its
proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was
to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the
decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on
their appeal from the judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of
their motion to quash.33Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC
because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;


AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21,
2004; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles

irtuallawlibrary

PEOPLE vs MAPALO G.R. No. 172608 February 6, 2007

** We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal


and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailants intent to take
the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to
exclude reasonable doubt thereof. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by
the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.[95]

** In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either prior or
subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears reiterating
that no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellants act of hitting the victim
with a lead pipe. On the nature of the weapon used, the lead pipe was described by Garcia as one
and a half feet in length, and one and a half inches in diameter

In the case at bar, no injury was shown to be attributable to the appellant. The only medical
evidence that appears on records is the deceased Piamontes death certificate, [89] which indicates
that the cause of death is massive hypovolemia[90] secondary to multiple stab wounds. The factual
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals coincide to show that the cause of death of
Piamonte is multiple stab wounds. Nothing has been shown otherwise. Other than the presence of
multiple stab wounds, no other type of injury on the deceased was established. No contusions or
injury on the head of the victim or anywhere else in his body caused by a lead pipe was
shown. The witness Garcia, in his testimony, merely pointed to stab wounds on the different parts
of the body of the deceased.[91] No proof on the injury that was sustained by the deceased that can
be attributable to appellants act was demonstrated. No other physical evidence was proffered.[92]

We cannot convict appellant of Attempted or Frustrated Murder or Homicide. The principal and
essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailants intent to take the
life of the person attacked.[93] Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly, so as to
exclude reasonable doubt thereof.[94] Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b)
the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number
of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered
by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.[95]

In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either
prior or subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears
reiterating that no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellants act of hitting
the victim with a lead pipe. On the nature of the weapon used, the lead pipe was described by
Garcia as one and a half feet in length, and one and a half inches in diameter. The relevant
testimony of Garcia on the incident follows:

xxx

Homicidal intent must be evidenced by the acts that, at the time of their execution, are
unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by adequate means. [97] We cannot
infer intent to kill from the appellants act of hitting Piamonte in the head with a lead pipe. In the
first place, wounds were not shown to have been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent
proof of circumstances to show the intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, this Court cannot
declare that the same was attendant.

When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury, and without
causing dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under Article 266,[98]par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was beyond reasonable doubt that by hitting Piamonte, appellant ill-treated the latter,
without causing any injury. As we have earlier stated, no proof of injury was
offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included in Murder, which is the offense charged in the
Information. Thus:

xxx

MUPAS vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 172834 February 6, 2008

** Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to sustain the claim that
petitioners had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking but wounds were
inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only and in this case, less
serious physical injuries considering the attending physicians opinion that the wounds sustained
by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal.[

Although the Information charged petitioners with frustrated homicide, a finding of guilt for the
lesser offense of less serious physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is
necessarily included in the former, and since the essential ingredients of physical injuries
constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of homicide.[38]

In sum, absent competent proof, Jun should be held liable only for the crime of less serious
physical injuries under Article 265[39] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Gil, alias Banjo,
must be absolved from any liability for failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that he
had conspired with Jun in the commission of the crime or that he had any participation in it.

The Court sustains the appellate courts award of P4,000.00 as temperate damages. Having
suffered actual injuries, Rogelio is likewise entitled to moral damages.[40]The award of P5,000.00
as moral damages is sufficient under the circumstances.[41]

AGUIRRE vs. SECRETARY OF DOJ G.R. No. 170723 March 3, 2008

** Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does
not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction. Notably, the
ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the
body),[60] with the operative expression being deprivation. In the same manner, the
word castration is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries.[61] Such being the case in this
present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of
mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist
who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents.

Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some
essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.

In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas
deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where
they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely
tied.[57] That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the
duct system of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly
organized unit of structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting
of a range of tissues.[58] Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be
considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential
organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or
portion of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped
back into the incision.[59]

Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure
does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the deprivation of a limb or
essential part (of the body),[60] with the operative expression being deprivation. In the same
manner, the word castration is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries.[61] Such being the
case in this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to
the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient
evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they
did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence,
should not be issued.

It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Courts general policy of non-interference
in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot
order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence
to support at least a prima facie case.[62] The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as
a rule, have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.[63] The possible exception to this rule
is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But
that is not the case herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of


merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria
Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.

PENTECOSTES, JR. vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 167766 April 7, 2010
**
When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted
murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate[29] issued by the doctor who
attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and
he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries
only

As to the crime committed by petitioner, this Court also concurs with the conclusion of
the CA that petitioner is guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries, not attempted
murder.

The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the
part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear
and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
aggressor.[27] In the present case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of
the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or
even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt.[28] When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the
crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal
Certificate[29] issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require
ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime
committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy
is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who
inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical
attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor."

THE PEOPLE vs. OCAYA G.R. No. L-47448 May 17, 1978

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

** The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge dismissing


the information for supposed lack of jurisdiction as null and void. Respondent
judge wrongfully dismissed the case before him in disregard to the elemental
rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information and
that the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the information had
duly vested his court with jurisdiction.

The Court orders the transfer of the case below to another branch of the
Bukidnon court of first instance, since it is doubtful that the State and
offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of
the case from respondent judge who with his erroneous preconceptions and
predilections has adversely prejudged their case for serious physical injuries
as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries.

The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation


filed an information dated October 13, 1977 in the court of respondent judge,
charging the three private respondents-accused (Esterlina Marapao, Leticia
Marapao and Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries committed as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still
on the twelfth (12th) day from her child delivery, by then and there wrestling
her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size
stone at the face thereby inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES: —

‘lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in width at the
level of the maxillary arch of the face, with contusion and swelling all around
the inflicted area’

which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said
Mrs. LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising
from her weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which relapse
incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more
than thirty days.

"Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal


Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been
held much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued.
Instead after "scanning the records of (the) case" and noting that the thereto
attached medical certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the victim
Lolita Ares would require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and, therefore,
"may either be slight or less serious physical injuries only" contrary to
victim’s affidavit that she was incapacitated from her customary labor for
more than 30 days and the fiscal’s findings as to the prominent scar left on
the victim’s face as a result "which considerably deforms her face" (as duly
alleged in the information), respondent judge motu proprio ordered the
dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical injury is not
within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order of October 27, 1977,
stating as his reason that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a physical
injury case is the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of
treatment, and not what the victim declares because the same is self-
serving."cralaw virtua1aw library

The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge in
his Order of November 16, 1977 denying the same, evaluating the case
without having heard the parties or their witnesses (particularly the physician
who issued the medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and
ruling against the deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his
perception from a reading of the medical certificate and the fiscal’s written
resolution finding proper basis for the filing of the information,
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed a big scar
at the left cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita Ares justify the filing of the charge of
serious physical injuries, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, when
the attending physician certified that what he found was a lacerated wound
on the right side of the face? Clearly, the scar found by the investigating
fiscal could not be the result of the acts imputed to the accused but for some
other cause, for how could the scar be found on the left side when the injury
inflicted was on the right side?" *

Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for nullification of
respondent judge’s orders.

The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is ample legal and
factual basis for the information charging serious physical injuries, stating
that" (T)hat the allegations in the Information that a fist-size stone hit the
face of Lolita Ares causing lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the face
which considerably deformed her face (are) not only supported by the
medical certificate, but also by the admission of accused Diosdado Marapao
during the preliminary investigation that he threw a fist- size stone which hit
the face of Lolita Ares and the personal finding of Fiscal Tamin during the
preliminary investigation that there is a prominent scar on her face," and
that the offense as charged falls under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes thereon a penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods and is therefore properly cognizable by
respondent judge’s court.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
in precipitately dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the
mere basis of his totally wrong notion that what governs in the filing of a
physical injury case is the medical certificate regarding the duration of
treatment and "not what the victim declares because the same is self-
serving."

It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined


by the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the
result of the evidence presented at the trial, much less by the trial judge’s
personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the
record of the case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor
receiving their evidence at a proper trial.

It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the
trial would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial court’s jurisdiction
was committed does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had
vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed since" (once) the
jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the
subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not
operate to oust jurisdiction already attached." 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the
case had only resulted in duplication of work and wasted time in the remand
of records when respondent trial judge dismissed the instant case for want of
jurisdiction, when it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the
accused and try him."cralaw virtua1aw library

Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed
with proper study and circumspection before summarily dismissing cases
duly filed within their court’s cognizance and needlessly burdening the
appellate courts with cases such as that at bar which should not have
reached us at all in the first instance. Respondent judge’s disregard of the
established rule that the information for serious physical injuries properly
vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the case, and that if from
the evidence submitted a lesser offense was established, that he equally had
jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense, is difficult of
comprehension. Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate had
yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably could corroborate the victim’s
testimony that her injuries bad taken longer to heal than had at first been
estimated by him as well as clarify the location of the victim’s facial scar.

Respondent judge’s actions and premature and baseless declaration that the
victim’s declaration as to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise
serious doubts as to whether the State and the offended party may expect a
fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since
seemingly with his erroneous preconceptions and predilections, he has
adversely prejudged their case as one merely of slight or less serious
physical injuries. The case below should therefore be transferred to another
court presided by another judge.chanrobles law library : red

ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null


and void. The case below for serious physical injuries is remanded and
ordered transferred to Branch V of the court of first instance below, and the
judge presiding the same is ordered to issue the corresponding warrants of
arrest and to proceed with dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents-
accused and the trial and determination of the case on the merits. Let copy
of this decision be attached to the personal record of respondent judge. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

(1-9 days of medical attention)

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

** Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.

xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider
the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise
from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention,
too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and
intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones
at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner
was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its
minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor.

The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in
criminal cases resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the
lower courts as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new
judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the
Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED

xxxxx

L. RA 8504 ARTICLE VI Sec. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34


ARTICLE VI CONFIDENTIALITY
Sec. 30.Medical confidentiality.– _All health professionals, medical instructors, workers, employers,
recruitment agencies, insurance companies, data encoders, and other custodians of any medical record,
file, data, or test results are directed to strictly observe confidentiality in the handling of all medical
information, particularly the identity and status of persons with HIV.
Section 31.Exceptions to the mandate of confidentiality.– _Medical confidentiality shall not be
considered breached in the following cases:
(a) when complying with reportorial requirements in conjunction with the AIDSWATCH programs
provided in Sec. 27 of this Act;
(b) when informing other health workers directly involved or about to be involved in the treatment or
care of a person with HIV/AIDS: Provided, That such treatment or care carry the risk of HIV transmission:
Provided, further, That such workers shall be obliged to maintain the shared medical confidentiality;
(c) when responding to a subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum issued by a Court with
jurisdiction over a legal proceeding where the main issue is the HIV status of an individual:
Provided,That the confidential medical record shall be properly sealed by its lawful custodian after being
double-checked for accuracy by the head of the office or department, hand delivered, and personally
opened by the judge:Provided, further,That the judicial proceedings be held in executive session.
Section 32.Release of HIV/AIDS test results.– _All results of HIV/AIDS testing shall be confidential and
shall be released only to the following persons:
(a) the person who submitted himself/herself to such test;
(b) either parent of a minor child who has been tested;
(c) a legal guardian in the case of insane persons or orphans;
(d) a person authorized to receive such results in conjunction with the AIDSWATCH program as provided
in Sec. 27 of this Act;
(e) a justice of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as provided under subSec. (c) of this Act and in
accordance with the provision of Sec. 16 hereof.
Section 33.Penalties for violations of confidentiality.– _Any violation of medical confidentiality as
provided in Sec.s 30 and 32 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months to four
(4) years, without prejudice to administrative sanctions such as fines and suspension or revocation of the
violator's license to practice his/her profession, as well as the cancellation or withdrawal of the license to
operate any business entity and the accreditation of hospitals, laboratories or clinics.
Section 34.Disclosure to sexual partners.– _Any person with HIV is obliged to disclose his/her HIV status
and health condition to his/her spouse or sexual partner at the earliest opportune time.

O. RPC
Art. 174, 175, 259, 347, 365
Section Five.-Falsification of medical certificates, certificates of merit or services and the like.
Article 174.False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or service, etc.- The penalties ofarresto
mayorin its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceedP1,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection, with the practice of his profession, shall issue a false
certificate; and
2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit of service, good conduct or similar
circumstances.
The penalty ofarresto mayorshall be imposed upon any private person who shall falsify a certificate falling
within the classes mentioned in the two preceding subdivisions.
Article 175.Using false certificates.- The penalty ofarresto menorshall be imposed upon any one who shall
knowingly use any of the false certificates mentioned in the next preceding article.
Article 259.Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives.- The penalties
provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or
midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any abortive shall
sufferarresto mayorand a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
SIMULATION OF BIRTHS AND USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS
Article 347.Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or abandonment of
a legitimate child.- The simulation of births and the substitution of one child for another shall be punished
by prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall conceal or abandon any legitimate child
with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the duties of his profession or office, shall
cooperate in the execution of any of the crimes mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs, shall
suffer the penalties therein prescribed and also the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Article 365.Imprudence and negligence.- Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty ofarresto mayorin
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty ofarresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty ofarresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if
it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property
of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person
shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

** Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

** Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended
by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

*Dangerous Drugs Act - . RA 9165*

RA 7170 January 7, 1992


AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE LEGACY OR DONATION OF ALL OR PART OF A HUMAN BODY AFTER DEATH FOR
SPECIFIED PURPOSES

U. RA 7885 AN ACT TO ADVANCE CORNEAL TRANSPLANTATION IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY (R.A. NO. 7170),
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ORGAN DONATION ACT OF 1991

xxx
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO G.R. No. 175540 April 7, 2014
**Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices
were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They
failed to present any expert witness to prove that given the medical technology and
knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors could or should have waited longer
before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation

Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the removal of some of the
internal organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in accordance with the
letter of the law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
856, i.e., giving his subordinates instructions to exert all reasonable efforts to locate the
relatives or next of kin of respondent's son.

In fact, announcements were made through radio and television, the assistance of police
authorities was sought, and the NBI Medico-Legal Section was notified. Thus, petitioner
insists that he should not be held responsible for any damage allegedly suffered by
respondent due to the death of her son and the removal of her son’s internal organs for
transplant purposes.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that there was negligence on
petitioner's part when he failed to ensure that reasonable time had elapsed to locate the
relatives of the deceased before giving the authorization to remove said deceased's
internal organs for transplant purposes. However, a close examination of the records of
this case would reveal that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the general rule
that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
on this Court. There are some important circumstances that the lower courts failed to
consider in ascertaining whether it was the actions of petitioner that brought about the
sufferings of respondent.6

The Memorandum dated March 3, 1988 issued by petitioner, stated thus:

As shown by the medical records, the said patient died on March 3, 1988 at 9:10 in the
morning due to craniocerebral injury. Please make certain that your Department has
exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives or next-of-kin of the said deceased
patient, such as appeal through the radios and television, as well as through police and
other government agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified
and is aware of the case.

If all the above has been complied with, in accordance with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to
the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart
of the said deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient
who maybe in need of said organs to live and survive.7

A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make
certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even
enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach
said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and
remove the internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of
the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted
prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the
relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer. He even
specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department of
Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not
have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the
Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and
acting only in accordance with the requirements of the law.

Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors and
personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to the media
and sought the assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2,
1988, even before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure
for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the doctors concerned also the sought the
opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate
notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased.

The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed for notices to
reach the relatives of the deceased.

If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices
did not properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at
petitioner's door. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the
opportunity to ascertain the name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong information
regarding the deceased's identity to NKI.

The NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient,
because as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the
time he was brought to the NKI.

Ultimately, it is respondent's failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this


case.1âwphi1 As stated in Otero v. Tan,8"[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The
parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defense offered by their opponent."9

Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices
were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They
failed to present any expert witness to prove that given the medical technology and
knowledge at that time in the 1980's, the doctors could or should have waited longer
before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation.

Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding petitioner
liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the
deceased were removed only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the
emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death of her son cannot in any way be
attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on record to show that
respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her
son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.

MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL vs SO UN CHUA and TY G.R. No. 150355 July 31, 2006 *for
review*

** When Dr. Sy testified as rebuttal witness for the respondents themselves and whose
credibility respondents failed to impeach, he categorically stated that he consented to
the removal since the removal of the said facilities would not by itself be detrimental to
the health of his patient, respondent Chua.57

In brief, the courts a quo concurred in the holding that the petitioner and its staff failed to
take into consideration the physical condition of its patient, respondent Chua, when it
removed the facilities provided in her room;10 that the removal of these facilities, namely,
the air-conditioner, telephone lines, television, and refrigerator, aggravated the condition
of the patient, triggered her hypertension, and caused her blood pressure to
fluctuate,11 considering that there was no proper ventilation in the room.12

In view of the foregoing, the courts a quo concluded that the actuations of the petitioner
were oppressive, unnecessary,13 and anti-social,14 done in bad faith without proper
notice,15 with no intention other than to harass or irritate the respondents,16 all of which
constitute an abuse of rights.17

We do not agree. The conclusions of the courts a quo are either haphazard conjectures,
or founded on a misapprehension of facts. The record is replete with evidence that
justifies a different conclusion.

Indeed the operation of private pay hospitals and medical clinics is impressed with public
interest and imbued with a heavy social responsibility. But the hospital is also a
business, and, as a business, it has a right to institute all measures of efficiency
commensurate to the ends for which it is designed, especially to ensure its economic
viability and survival. And in the legitimate pursuit of economic considerations, the extent
to which the public may be served and cured is expanded, the pulse and life of the
medical sector quickens, and the regeneration of the people as a whole becomes more
visibly attainable.

In the institution of cost-cutting measures, the hospital has a right to reduce the facilities
and services that are deemed to be non-essential, such that their reduction or removal
would not be detrimental to the medical condition of the patient.18

For the moment, the question to be considered is whether the subject facilities are
indeed non-essential – the air-conditioner, telephone, television, and refrigerator – the
removal of which would cause the adverse health effects and emotional trauma the
respondents so claimed.
Corollary to this question is whether the petitioner observed the diligence of a good
father of the family19 in the course of ascertaining the possible repercussions of the
removal of the facilities prior to the removal itself and for a reasonable time thereafter,
with a view to prevent damage.20

After an extensive analysis of the record, it becomes rather worrisome to this Court that
the courts a quo unreservedly drew their conclusions from the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimonies of the respondents the probative value of which is highly
questionable.21 We hold that the respondents failed to prove the damages so claimed.

The evidence in the record firmly establishes that the staff of the petitioner took proactive
steps to inform the relatives of respondent Chua of the removal of facilities prior thereto,
and to carry out the necessary precautionary measures to ensure that her health and
well-being would not be adversely affected: as early as around two weeks after her
admission on October 30, 1990, to the time when the facilities had been removed
sometime in the middle of May 1992,22 and even up to the point when she actually left
the premises of the hospital three weeks later, or during the first week of June
1992,23 the medical condition of respondent Chua, as consistently and indisputably
confirmed by her attending physician, Dr. Rody Sy, a cardiologist, who was called as
witness for both parties,24whom even respondent Chua repeatedly praised to be "my
doctor" and "a very good doctor"25 at that, and whose statements at times had been
corroborated as well by Sister Mary Philip Galeno, SPC, the Administrator of the hospital
and who also happens to be a registered nurse, had been "relatively
well,"26 "ambulatory,"27 "walking around in the room,"28 and that she was "able to leave
the hospital on her own without any assistance;"29 that although she complained of
symptoms such as dizziness, weakness,30 and abdominal discomfort,31 Dr. Sy requested
several medical examinations, such as the laboratory tests, renal tests, MRI, ultrasound,
and CT scan,32all of which were administered after procuring the consent of respondent
Chua's family33 as admitted by respondent Ty herself,34 and even called on other
specialists, such as a neurologist, endocrinologist, and gastroenterologist, to look into
her condition35 and conduct other tests as well36 according to their fields of specialty, all
of which yielded no serious finding;37 that her illnesses were "lifelong illnesses"38 at a
stage where they cannot be totally removed or abolished,39 making it clear to her family
that "one hundred percent recovery is not possible" despite being given daily medication
in the hospital;40 but that her condition, nonetheless, is not serious,41 as the blood
pressure is more or less controlled and within acceptable limits,42 "not that critical to
precipitate any acute attack,"43 nor likely to fall into any emergency,44 nor yet does she
require continuous or prolonged hospitalization45 since she was stable enough to be
treated at home and on an "out-patient" basis, so much so that Dr. Sy encouraged her to
exercise and avoid resting all the time,46 and recommended that "anytime she may be
discharged"47

even in just "two weeks after confinement,"48 the propriety of his order of discharge
concurred upon by the other specialists as well,49 had it not been for respondents'
insistence to stay in the hospital in view of their hope for absolute recovery50 despite the
admission of respondent Chua herself that she cannot anymore be totally cured.51

It is also undisputed that the hospital administrator, Sister Galeno, prior to the removal of
the facilities, consulted the attending physician, Dr. Sy.52 To Sister Galeno, also a
registered nurse, the matter of removal and its possible repercussions on the health of
the patient, as a matter of hospital policy, is a critical and sensitive maneuver, and,
hence, it is carried out only after discussing with the doctors to evaluate all important
factors.53

The fact of prior consultation54 as well as the medical determination to the effect that it
was safe to remove the facilities and would cause no harmful effect55 had been amply
corroborated by respondent Chua's own doctor himself.56

When Dr. Sy testified as rebuttal witness for the respondents themselves and whose
credibility respondents failed to impeach, he categorically stated that he consented to
the removal since the removal of the said facilities would not by itself be detrimental to
the health of his patient, respondent Chua.57

And in this respect, he had been advising respondent Ty, the daughter of the patient,
that the facilities, such as the air-conditioner, television, refrigerator, and telephone, are
not absolutely necessary, and, that although they may add to the comfort of the patient,
if absent, they will not cause any significant deterioration of her condition, 58 given that, in
his experience as a cardiologist, and after personally attending respondent Chua on a
daily basis before, during, and after the removal and even up to the time of her actual
discharge,59 he concluded that many hypertensive and diabetic patients, as in her case,
do not at all need in particular an air-conditioning unit, among the other facilities
aforementioned.60

And, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo and the self-serving testimonies of
respondents that the lack of ventilation, after the removal of the air-conditioner, triggered
her hypertension, Dr. Sy categorically stated that during his daily rounds with the patient
he was certain that, although admittedly the blood pressure in general would fluctuate
daily, there had been no adverse effect on her, and that her blood pressure were within
acceptable limits,61 especially considering that he treated the patient on a daily basis up
to the point of actual discharge,62 and accordingly, as confirmed by the medical records,
he made no change in the medications thereafter.63 In support of Dr. Sy's findings, Sister
Galeno, testified that she knew the condition of the ventilation of the
patient's deluxe room, located at the fifth floor, even without the air-conditioning, notably
in times of brownout, and that there had been enough ventilation since the grilled
window of that room was large enough which, if opened, would permit sufficient
ventilation.64 The Court finds that the premise of the RTC judgment refers merely to
hypothetical statements which fail to establish any clear and direct link to the injury
allegedly suffered by the patient:

Xxx

FELIX MARQUEZ vs. BOM G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR


OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, respondents.

Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

** In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has
the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense
of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one
who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however
appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. 6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him, have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The
medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice
failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT.
After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take
the NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times
and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected
his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private
respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely
challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held
that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through
an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.


In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is
some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT
as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized
to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have
before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by
upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the
current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test


like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread
use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]
and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful
to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects
of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not
applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and
said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar.
The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be
gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the
three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has
the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense
of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one
who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however
appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. 6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him, have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The
medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While
his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless
love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a


person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any
work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to
succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled
to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his
latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never
have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
could be better as merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as
determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with
mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence
but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated
January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so
ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

DECS vs. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE DIZON-CAPULONG G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004

PRC vs. DE GUZMAN et al G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989

Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must
appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by
the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being
less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a
definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily
met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of


Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure
Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine
successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the
medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-
Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100%
in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and
twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who
passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark
lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools
was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only
for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of
the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration
as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. [4] The PRC
asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or
irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J.,
an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-
Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison
of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of
examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed
that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually
clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason
creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause strong enough to
eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees
[of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc.[5]
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees
in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees
gained early access to the test questions.[6]
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina
S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M.
Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No.
93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was
adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging
respondents with immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit in connection with the
Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of
the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by
the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the
preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to
administer the physicians oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in
the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the
dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as follows:

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary mandatory


injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in
G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for
failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
Xxx
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of
the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion,
cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28,
1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional
Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of
Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court ruled
that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial
was reset to November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court
judge for alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to
be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to
Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No.
93-66530, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and
intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic], [9] to
take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians.

It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary
action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner
provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other
professionals.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.[10]

xxx

In sustaining the trial courts decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the
respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure
examination for physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said examination.
Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,[14] they should be allowed to
take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
xxx
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of
law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of
mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point
out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when the duty sought
to be performed is a ministerial and not a discretionary one.
The petitioners argue that the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283
upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own
pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes
discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful examinee has
not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this Courts
Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no showing that
the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned
judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R.
No. 112315 has long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for
physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to administer to them the oath as
physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section
20[16] of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that
respondents complied with all the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore,
respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had
passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners
had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name
of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to
some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed, or from operation of law.[17] Section 3 of Rule 65[18] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
the other is entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of
Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official
concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.[19] Moreover, there must be
statutory authority for the performance of the act,[20] and the performance of the duty has
been refused.[21] Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to
administer the Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under the
Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:

It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully complied
with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for physicians
conducted and administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993.
Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same
examinations.[22]

The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register
them, steps which would enable respondents to practice the medical
profession[23] pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in
concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic
Oath to respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory
construction that each part of a statute should be construed in connection with every
other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one
section.[24] The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute
taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20 of
Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the other provisions
of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to
administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians,
recourse must be had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law
uses the word shall with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the
petitioners shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board. In statutory construction the
term shall is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an
examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is
obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section
20 and par. (1) of Section 22[25] of the Medical Act of 1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry
concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the
respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was
phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised
grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be
appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to
conduct administrative investigations and disapprove applications for examination or
registration, pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section
1[26] thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm.
Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to
practice medicine, as required by Section 9[27] of Rep. Act No. 2382. In
its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:

WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[] examination papers in the
Physician Licensure Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS them from
taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the
promulgation of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled
examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the BOARD.

SO ORDERED.[28]
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained,
according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration
of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of
mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not
issue a certificate of registration only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who
has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving
moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the
investigation by the Board; or (3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver
that none of these circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution
No. 26,[29] dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the examinees
from Fatima College of Medicine for immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the
Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations. It likewise sought to cancel the
examination results obtained by the examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 8[30] of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who
aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have satisfactorily passed the
corresponding Board Examination. Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only
be administered to physicians who qualified in the examinations. The operative word
here is satisfactorily, defined as sufficient to meet a condition or obligation or capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance.[31] Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing
authority apparently did not find that the respondents satisfactorily passed the licensure
examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by
the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has
been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application
of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. [32] There
must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded.[33] It is long
established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by
the government.[34]
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right[35] of every citizen to select
a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements.[36] But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the
people.[37] Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a
previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical
Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with
the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona,
Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the examination
required by the Philippine Medical Act.[38] In another case worth noting, we upheld the
power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical schools through
admission tests.[39]
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in
an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise
of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up
ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.[40] Under the view that
the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a
public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in
public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful
business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the
guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.[41]
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No.
2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of
medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and
conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians
license, or revoking a license that has been issued.
Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that
he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must
appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by
the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being
less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a
definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily
met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed the petition for mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the
administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The records show that this is not the
first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This
issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals,
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-
G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court and the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the petitioners sought
to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did
not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our consolidated decision,
dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice
Bellosillo opined that:

Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant petition has been rendered meaningless by
an event taking place prior to the filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a
logical consequence.[42] There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.[43] It should be recalled that in its decision of 19
December 1994 the trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents,
which decision was received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23
December 1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them was
to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal
on 26 December 1994.[44]

The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling.
Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in
the instant case advance their cause any.
Section 26[45] of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial
remedies that respondents herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board
of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the
PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the
President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to
bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule, mandamus
will not lie when administrative remedies are still available.[46] However, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure
question of law is raised.[47] On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the
door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil
Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F.
Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando
T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph
A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M.
Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R.
Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez,
Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita
Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C.
Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in
proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A
similar manifestation and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-
Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C.
Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S.
Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick
D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L.
Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and
Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as
the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate courts ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly
not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta,
Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr.,
Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and
Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely:
Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria
T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V.
Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed
decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which
affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer the physicians
oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the
appellate court, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and
affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. ALFONSO, G.R. No. 8825 August 10,
1989

G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING,


in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and Chairman, Board of Medical Education, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
74, Fourth Judicial Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.

Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.

Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.

It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation
therein contemplated — where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the
prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and has failed
to do so within three (3) years from the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining
in the case at bar — where respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious
as to warrant its immediate closure.

Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or


cancellation of government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last
evaluation conducted on the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally
prescribe a three-year waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn.

Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the discretion, depending
on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an educational institution
which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3)
years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or
cancellation of the government; authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at
bar are far from nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by
the paragraph in question.

There had never been a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to
comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had been that it be
forthwith closed, its discovered deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a
character as to be irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to
determine if in the course of time the petitioner school had already fully complied with all
the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the original recommendation for its
closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as already mentioned, the
subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years, served but to confirm
the validity of that initial proposal for its closure.

Under these circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision,


paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial
compliance therewith.

NARVASA, J.:

Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises
and regulates the country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for
a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P.
Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the
enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine
Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the
College).lâwphî1.ñèt

The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed
purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old
attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the
establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to
operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first
proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed
its name to the Rizal College of Medicine.

In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of
Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a
study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commission showed
that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical
schools. 1 The, team of inspectors, composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena
Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes,
recommended the closure of the school 2 upon the following findings, to wit:
(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created
because of its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of
subjects relating to Muslim culture and welfare;

(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a
"balanced humanistic and scientific" education;

(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training of its
students in the major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;

(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-
time, resulting in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading,
and in general, poor quality teaching.

The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the
Board of Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors 3 for a re-
evaluation of the College. After inspection, the team confirmed the previous findings and
recommended the phase-out of the school. 4

The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors. 5 A
year thereafter, the College failed another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of
its fitness to continue as a medical school conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team
from the Board of Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for
government recognition. The, College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the
survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and studentry. 6 The,
inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly
recommended denial of government; recognition.

Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of
the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The, College however
succeeded in having the Board form yet another team to review the previous findings.
Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang
and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although
there had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions
and the library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and
library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no prospects for
satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was) below par from the point
of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and
preparedness at various stages of medical education," and "the most serious deficiency
... (was) the almost total lack of serious development efforts in academic medicine —
i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost
non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the recommendation was to close the
College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical schools. 7

In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the
College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of
Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual
phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate the students and
staff and to minimize financial loss. 8 The, Board subsequently allowed the College to
continue its operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this
decision being "final and unappealable." The, College was, however, assured of
assistance in the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an institution for
health-related and paramedical courses. 9

The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse
of discretion to the Secretary. 10 On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested decision, affirmed it. 11

On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of
respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as illegal,
oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain its implementation.

The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May 10,
1989. 12 His Honor ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of
the closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of the College that the
inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard manner" by a team of inspectors
who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence
supporting the findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his philosophy
ocular inspection of the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report
were non-existent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big
enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on smoothly at
the time of the ocular inspection."

The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all
levels of the medical college and in its pre-board review classes. 13

Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989 as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a restraining order
against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the action instituted in the court a
quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the respondent College to desist from
advertising and admitting students, and the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing
his injunction order.

The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on
the ground that the closure order against which it was directed was issued without
factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to due process of law, and that it
violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to the effect that the penalty of closure
cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the last evaluation, which in this
instance was made, on June 18, 1988.

Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of


Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this
case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from
decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any
other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions
and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution
meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to continue
operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute
its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court
would have the competence to do so.

The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or
not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers
granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any
decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by
any court.

Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case
exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call
for peremptory correction — or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave
abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled — it becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action
through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever
may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there
has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids
such an abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within
bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to
the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by
an educational institution of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to
which it should not ordinarily substitute its over judgment for that of said office.

In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of grave
abuse of discretion containing the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly
show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys
were conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance with the minimum
standards established for a medical college. The, first survey, that undertaken by the
Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in
the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4) other
surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or teams, at the school's
instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results of that first survey.
Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President.
Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and
purposes accepted the validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it
proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent
College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made, as early as 1986, that
recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times thereafter until it was finally
approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was confirmed by the Office of
the President. Said respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of
all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice
which was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students
before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After having
resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it, without success, it
sought to obtain from the respondent Court the relief it could not obtain from those
sources, and what can only be described as a deliberate attempt to frustrate and
obstruct implementation of the decision for its closure as of June, 1989 openly solicited,
by newspaper advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old students.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for
medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have
been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the
questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken,
allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single ocular
inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the
circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state
of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of the evaluating team
came from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine, 14 and their
judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge
whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have given him much more to go on
than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities and into the conduct of the classes
and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should
not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts
have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts,
because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under
their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters
andn their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality,
by the courts. 15 There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them
obtains in this case.

The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly shows
that the College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to
requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by the
evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards
when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary
Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that
the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its
performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a
reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of
opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the
ruling complained of.

There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated NMCS
ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the lapse of
the three-year period therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from
June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The, provision referred to reads:

The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for
failure to comply with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.:

xxx

c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government; authority to


operate, for failure to fully comply with the prescribed requirements after
three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school.
It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation
therein contemplated — where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the
prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and has failed
to do so within three (3) years from the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining
in the case at bar — where respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious
as to warrant its immediate closure.

Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or


cancellation of government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last
evaluation conducted on the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally
prescribe a three-year waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn.

Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the discretion, depending
on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an educational institution
which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3)
years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or
cancellation of the government; authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at
bar are far from nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by
the paragraph in question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be
granted an opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the
proposal had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered deficiencies as a medical
college being of so serious a character as to be irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys
were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time the petitioner school had
already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the
original recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as
already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years,
served but to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its closure. Under these
circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied
to petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial compliance
therewith.

Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no
useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further
proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial
Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have acted within the scope of
their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon
here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its
philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical institution
has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since,
as here ruled, it has not that power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of
preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered
to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25135 September 21, 1968

PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,


vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and JOSE MA. TORRES, respondents.

Seva-Albert-Vergara and Julio V. Presbitero for petitioner.


Regino Hermosisima, Jr., for respondent Jose Ma. Torres.
Solicitor General for respondent Board of Medical Examiners.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Original action for certiorari and mandamus, against the Board of Medical Examiners
and Jose Ma. Torres, to annul a resolution of the former and a certificate issued by the
same authorizing the latter to practice medicine in the Philippines without examination.

The facts are not disputed. Jose Ma. Torres — hereinafter referred to as respondent —
is a Spanish subject and a member of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart of
Mary, otherwise known as the Claretian Missionaries. Having graduated from the
University of Barcelona, Spain, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery, he
is entitled, under the laws of Spain, to practice medicine and surgery throughout the
territory thereof.

On January 21, 1955, respondent was granted special authority to practice medicine in
Lamitan, Basilan City, where he resides, pursuant to Section 771(e) of the Revised
Administrative Code reading:

SEC. 771. Persons exempt from registration. — Registration shall not be


required of the following classes of persons: . . .

(e) In cases of epidemic or in municipalities where there is no legally qualified


practicing physician, or when the circumstances require it, in the interest of the
public health, the Director of Health may issue special authorizations, to all
medical students who have completed the first three years of their studies, or to
persons who have qualified in medicine, and to graduate or registered nurses,
who may request it.

This authority was revoked, on November 8, 1960, by the then Secretary of Health, upon
the ground that "the conditions under which it was granted no longer obtained in Lamitan
Basilan City, there being enough practising physicians in that locality." Said officer
restored the authority on December 19, 1960, to be revoked again, on January 22, 1963.
It was renewed once more, on September 1, 1963, and, once again, it was revoked on
February 10, 1964, upon the recommendation of the Board of Medical Examiners —
hereinafter referred to as the Board. On motion for reconsideration filed by respondent,
the Board issued, on April 6, 1965, its Resolution No. 25, series of 1965, which was
approved by the President, granting respondent a certificate to practice medicine in the
Philippines without the examination required in Republic Act No. 2882, otherwise known
as the Medical Act of 1959. The resolution relied therefor upon The Treaty on the
Validity of Academic Degrees and The Exercise of the Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, signed at Manila on March 4, 1949,
and ratified on May 19, 1949. 1

Petitioner herein, Philippine Medical Association, is a domestic corporation. On June 14,


1965, it addressed the Chairman of the Board a communication requesting
reconsideration of said resolution No. 25, upon the ground that, pursuant to said Medical
Act of 1959, respondent has to take and pass the examination therein prescribed, before
he can be allowed to practice medicine in the Philippines. This letter was followed by
another, dated October 6, 1965, to which said Chairman replied on October 8, 1965,
stating "that the final decision on the matter will have to come from the President of the
Philippines upon whose authority said resolution has been finally approved and
implemented."

Thereupon, or, on October 18, 1965, petitioner commenced the present action, for the
purpose stated at the beginning of this decision, upon the theory that the Board had
violated Republic Act No. 2882 in granting respondent's certificate for the general
practice of medicine in the Philippines without the examination prescribed in said Act;
that the Board had exceeded its authority in passing said Resolution, because of which
the same is null and void; that the Board should, therefore, be ordered to cancel the
certificate issued in pursuance of said resolution; and that petitioner has no other plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In their respective answers, respondents admit the basic facts, but not the conclusions
drawn therefrom by the petitioner and allege that the resolution in question is sanctioned
by the provisions of the Treaty above referred to; that petitioner has no cause of action;
and that the petition should be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the
available administrative remedies.

Respondents cite the cases of Costas vs. Aldanese2 and Almario vs. City Mayor 3 in
support of the theory that petitioner herein has no sufficient interest or "personality" to
maintain the present case. In the first case, it was held that the President of the
Association of Philippine (Marine) Engineers4 had no particular "individual" interest, and,
hence,no cause of action for mandamus to compel the Collector of Customs to
implement section 1203(j) of the Administrative Code, providing that steamers making
round trips of more than 48 hours or travelling at night shall carry the complement of
marine engineers therein specified. In the second case, a citizen of the Philippines, as
such, who is not an Applicant for any stall or booth, or the representative of any such
applicant, stallholder or any association of persons who are deprived of the right to
occupy stalls in said market, "is not the real party in interest who has the capacity, right
or personality" to bring an action for mandamus, to compel the office of Pasay City to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. 37, by ejecting, from the public market of
said City, stallholders who are not nationals of the Philippines.

Said cases are not in point. To begin with, both are actions for mandamus, whereas the
case at bar is mainly one for certiorari. Although, petitioner herein, likewise, seeks a writ
of mandamus, directing the Board to cancel the certificate of registration issued to the
respondent, this would be a necessary consequence of the writ of certiorariannulling the
disputed resolution. Moreover, said two (2) cases were commenced by individuals, who,
as such, had no special interest in the relief therein prayed for. Indeed, in
the Almario case it was intimated that the result might have been otherwise had it been
brought by an "association" whose members have an interest in the subject matter of the
action.

This was confirmed by PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,5 in which we sustained the right of the
Philippine Constitution Association to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3836, insofar as it allowed retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
leave to members of Congress and to elective officials thereof. Further authority in favor
of petitioner herein is supplied by Nacionalista Party vs. F. Bautista Angelo 6 in which the
Nacionalista Party successfully impugned the validity of the designation of the then
Solicitor General as Acting Member of the Commission on Elections.

It is our considered opinion that the view adopted in the last three (3) cases should be
maintained and that, in line therewith, petitioner herein has sufficient interest to
prosecute the case at bar and a cause of action against respondents herein.

As regards their objection based upon petitioner's failure to appeal to the President,
suffice it to say that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is
concededly subject to exceptions, among which are cases involving only questions of
law or when jurisdiction is in issue7or the action complained of bears the approval of a
department secretary, as the disputed resolution, which was approved by the Executive
Secretary "by authority of the President," or as an alter ego of the Executive. 8 The case
at bar falls under these exceptions to said rule.1awphîl.nèt

The main issue herein hinges on the interpretation of Article I of the Treaty
aforementioned, reading as follows:

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or diplomas to
practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by
competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said
professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the
latter. When the degree or diploma of Bachelor, issued by competent national
authorities allows its holder without requiring further evidence of proficiency to
pursue normally higher courses of study, he shall also be deemed qualified to
continue his studies in the territory of either Party in conformity with the
applicable laws and regulations of the State which recognizes the validity of the
title or diploma in question, and with the rules and regulations of the particular
educational institution in which he intends to pursue his studies.

This Treaty provision was the subject matter of our resolution of August 15, 1961, in
connection with the petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission to the Philippine Bar
without taking the Bar Examinations. After completing, in Spain, the course prescribed
therefor, Garcia had been graduated from the College of Law of the Universidad Central
de Madrid with the degree of "Licenciado en Derecho", which entitled him to practice law
in Spain. Having invoked the provisions of said treaty in support of his claim of
exemption from the requisite bar examinations, this Court denied his petition upon the
ground, among others ". . . that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession;
and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have
the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the
Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; . . ."

We find no plausible reason to depart from this view. On the contrary, we reiterate the
same, inasmuch as the theory of respondent herein cannot be accepted without placing
graduates from our own educational institutions at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Spanish
graduates from Spanish schools, colleges or universities. Indeed, the latter could —
under respondent's pretense — engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines
without taking the examination prescribed in Republic Act No. 2882, whereas the former
would have to take and pass said examination. Worse still, since — as we ruled in
the Garcia case — the benefits of the aforementioned Treaty cannot be availed of in the
Philippines except by Spanish subjects, the result would be — should respondent's
contention be sustained — that graduates from Spanish schools of medicine would be
entitled to practice medicine in the Philippines without examination, if they were Spanish
subjects, but not if they are Filipinos.

Surely said treaty was not made to discriminate against Philippine schools, colleges or
universities, much less against nationals of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, we hold that said Treaty merely extended to diplomas issued or degrees
conferred by educational institutions of Spain the same recognition and treatment that
we accord to similar diplomas or degrees from local institutions of learning; that holders
of said Spanish diplomas or degrees must take the examination prescribed by our laws
for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from educational institutions in the Philippines;
that resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent Board is violative of Republic Act
No. 2882 and hence, null and void; and that, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
should be, as it is hereby ordered to cancel the certificate of registration, for the practice
of medicine in the Philippines, issued in favor of respondent Jose Ma. Torres, without
special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education,
one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center
for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education
and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26
April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set
aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern


(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) the examination
for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of
the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is
composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized
representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative;
(d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a
representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of
Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of
Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized


college of medicine;

(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of


colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and
supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for
instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient
services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance
with modern trends;

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications
of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;

(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the
degree of Doctor of Medicine;

(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a


medical school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an
experimental curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements
other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students
shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants
the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;

(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the


hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as
provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and

(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations
for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has
not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's
degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical
school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral
character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d)
birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.

xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:

2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading


the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its
calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff
score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with
the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each
applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for
under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.

3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical
college may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a
corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission that will yield information on
other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the information
derived from the NMAT.

xxx xxx xxx


8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission
(CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college,
beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as
called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted
NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December
1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to
medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of
constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as
entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a
writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative
order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right
to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in
their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions
invoked read as follows:

(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect of human rights. "

(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual
and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."

(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress and to promote total human liberation and
development. "

(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all. "

(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements."

Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies"
which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not
seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and
the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections
11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies
upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is
relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational
terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional
provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language
descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and
therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even
a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the
constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.

Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact
clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra
— that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to
promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section
1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter
phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really
enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible to all who
might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely
to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. "

2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which
forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary
standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general
principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the
more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great
departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes
which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and
technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world.
Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co.,
Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation


of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or
delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et
Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922,
Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.
17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil.
318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by
an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is
public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe
transit upon the roads. 5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle.

3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is
an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due
process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the
NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that
passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission
requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or
private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability
of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or
authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of
the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those
questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the
courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and
administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning,
is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote an the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety
of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long
ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority
of the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional
and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of
those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools
in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely
known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT
as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants
into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance,
medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test
[MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners
to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That
end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects
of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.

4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict
with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert
that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the
NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education
after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis
supplied)

infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students
seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a
different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are
discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious."
The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different
school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus,
the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year;
the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average
score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the
current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score
regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an
unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being
arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein
as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent
trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

BOARD OF MEDICINE vs YASUYUKI OTA, G.R. No. 166097 July 14, 2008

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84945[2] dated November 16, 2004which affirmed the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated October 19, 2003.[4]

The facts are as follows:

Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously
resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College of
Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a degree of Doctor of Medicine.After successfully completing a
one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an
application to take the medical board examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was
required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking,
stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice medicine
until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admitting
foreigners into the practice of medicine.[6]

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of
Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus
I. Yabes;[7] thus, he was allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which
he subsequently passed.[8]
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8,
1993, denied respondent's request for a license to

practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board believes that no genuine
reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly
practice there.[9]

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC
of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the
PRC through its Chairman.[10]

In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing to
issue in his favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted
arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382
(The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the
Philippines to his great damage and prejudice.[11]
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had
adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted
license and be admitted into the practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that
the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to
respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially complied with the requirements under the
law.[12]
The RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the corresponding
Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine in the Philippines.[13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while
respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in
Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and
attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the
PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not
ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.[14]

The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.[15]

Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE


ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE
EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.[16]
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and conclusive evidence that
reciprocity in the practice of medicine exists between the Philippinesand Japan. While documents
state that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the
conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign
applicant. There is no reciprocity in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine
in Japan are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with. There are also ambiguities in the
Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by respondent, i.e., what are the
provisions of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister of Health and
Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign
medical graduates are the same or better than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can
actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination. Consul
General Yabes also stated that there had not been a single Filipino who was issued a license to
practice medicine by the Japanese Government. The publication showing that there were
foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which respondent presented before the Court, also did
not specifically show that Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said profession.[17]

Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman,[18]the power of


the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, which power is
discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.[19]

Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be reversed and set
aside, that a new one be rendered reinstating the Board Order dated March 8, 1993which
disallows respondent to practice medicine in the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before
the trial court be dismissed for lack of merit.[20]

In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the Medical Practitioners Law of
Japan and Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists between
the Philippines and Japan concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws clearly state that both
countries allow foreigners to practice medicine in their respective jurisdictions as long as the
applicant meets the educational requirements, training or residency in hospitals and pass the
licensure examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in his letter dated January
28, 1992 stated that the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine
in Japan after complying with the local requirements. The fact that there is no reported Filipino
who has successfully penetrated the medical practice in Japandoes not mean that there is no
reciprocity between the two countries, since it does not follow that no Filipino will ever be
granted a medical license by the Japanese Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that
before a citizen of one of the contracting countries can demand its application, it is necessary that
the interested citizens country has previously granted the same privilege to the citizens of the
other contracting country.[21] Respondent further argues that Section 20 of the Medical Act of
1959[22] indicates the mandatory character of the statute and an imperative obligation on the part
of the Board inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen,
who successfully passes the examination and has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications, is entitled as a matter of right to the issuance of a certificate of registration or a
physicians license, which right is enforceable by mandamus.[23]

Petitioners filed a Reply[24] and both parties filed their respective memoranda[25] reiterating their
arguments.

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted


by the government.[26] It is a right that is earned through years of education and training, and
which requires that one must first secure a license from the state through professional board
examinations.[27]
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.[28]

It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the
authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. As the
legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public
agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public
officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business,
profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said
officials in the exercise of their power.[29]

R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section 9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for Board
examinations shall have the following qualifications:

1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who


has submitted competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by
the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his countrys existing laws
permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof;

xxxx

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 223[30] also provides in Section (j) thereof that:

j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon the


recommendation of the Board concerned, approve the registration of and
authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or without examination
to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That the
requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are
substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the
Philippines and that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of
the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same
privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country: Provided,
finally, That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary
evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his
country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. The
Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe additional requirements or
grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the
same privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are required of
citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country;

xxxx

As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the Medical Practitioners
Law of Japan, duly authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of
the Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2 and 11, thus:

, mmArticle 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner must pass


the national examination for medical practitioner and get license from the
Minister of Health and Welfare.

xxxx

Article 11. No one can take the National Medical Examination except
persons who conform to one of the following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a university based
on the School Education Laws (December 26, 1947) and graduated
from said university.

2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the National Medical
Examination and practiced clinics and public sanitation more than
one year after passing the said test.

3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical school or acquired


medical practitioner license in a foreign country, and also are
recognized to have the same or more academic ability and techniques
as persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article.[31]

Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to
practice medicine therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the
requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with, there is no reciprocity
between the two countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license to practice medicine in
the Philippines.

The Court does not agree.

R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board
examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary
evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his country’s
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof.

Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e.,
it may, upon recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of
a certificate of registration with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the
laws of his country, provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the
registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those
required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such foreign state
or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and
grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that
the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the
DFA, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional
requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the
same privileges are granted to or some additional requirements are required of citizens of
the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country.

Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the
conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by
Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license
and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may be given
license to practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No.
223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's
existing laws permitcitizens of the Philippines to practice the profession [of
medicine] under the [same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and
practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been granted
license and is actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements provided for under
R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.

While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the
Medical Practitioners Law of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the
criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and
technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or better than that of graduates
of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test for the
National Medical Examination respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are actually
practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to practice there.

Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government


publication, Physician-Dentist-Pharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign
physicians practicing medicine in Japan.[32] He also presented a letter dated January 28,
1992 from Consul General Yabes,[33] which states:

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993, concerning your


request for a Certificate of Confirmation for the purpose of establishing a
reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical profession relative to the case of
Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes to inform you that
inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and
Welfare as well as Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:

1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was granted a license by
the Japanese Government to practice medicine in Japan;
2. However, the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice
medicine in Japan after complying with the local requirements such
as holding a valid visa for the purpose of taking the medical board
exam, checking the applicant's qualifications to take the
examination, taking the national board examination in Japanese and
filing an application for the issuance of the medical license.

Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single Filipino physician


who was issued by the Japanese Government a license to practice medicine,
because it is extremely difficult to pass the medical board examination in the
Japanese language. Filipino doctors here are only allowed to work in Japanese
hospitals as trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On certain
occasions, they are allowed to show their medical skills during seminars for
demonstration purposes only. (Emphasis supplied)

Very truly yours,

Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General

From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice
medicine therein provided that the local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the
impossibility or the prohibition against Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino
physicians holding licenses and practicing medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing the
board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who has been
given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to
be given one.

Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue licenses is
discretionary, hence, not compellable by mandamus.

The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of
the case at bar; hence, the principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this
case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about the integrity and validity of the test results of the
examinees from a particular school which garnered unusually high scores in the two most
difficult subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants satisfactory
compliance with the Board requirements.[34] And as there was no definite showing that the
requirements and conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily
met, the Court held that the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.[35]

Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has
fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority.[36]

In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:

A careful reading of Section 20[37] of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses


that the law uses the word shall with respect to the issuance of certificates of
registration. Thus, the petitioners [PRC] shall sign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of
the Board. In statutory construction the term shall is a word of command. It is
given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for
the grant of his physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his
oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par.
(1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.[38]

In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He


finished his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine.He completed a one-year
post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government
hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations which was given on August 8,
1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.

In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of
respondent to prove that there is reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in
admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. Respondent has satisfactorily complied with
the said requirement and the CA has not committed any reversible error in rendering its Decision
dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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