Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Kinds of Negligence
Arising from crime
People of the Philippines vs. Bayotas
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People of the Philippines
Arising from contract
Air France vs. Carascoso
Arising from Tort
Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Castro vs People of the Philippines
Culpa Aquillana/Culpa Criminal
Fabre vs. Court of Appeals
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
Concepts of quasi-delict
Elements of quasi-delict
Cinco vs. Canonoy
Quasi-delict vs. Delict
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines
Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract
Far east vs. Court of Appeals
Calalas vs. Sunga
Negligence
Elements of Negligence
Picart vs. Smith
Negligence as the Proximate Cause
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Proof of Negligence
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Court of Appeals
Res Ipsa Loquitor
Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals
Respondent Superior
Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez
Violation of Traffic Rules
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai
BLT Bus Co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Defences
Contributory Negligence
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
Assumption of Risk
Afialda vs. Hisole
Last Clearance
Picart vs. Smith
Spouses ong vs. Metropolitan water district
Prescription
Ferrer vs. Ericta
Kramer vs. Court of Appeals
Force Majeure/Fortuitous evenmt
Gottesco vs. Chatto
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Exercise of Diligence
Ramos vs. Pepsi
Mistake and Waiver
Gatchalian vs. Court of Appeals
Damnum Absque injuria
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
Philippines Rabbit Bus Line, INC., petitioner. Vs. People of Philippines, respondent
FACTS:
Accused Napoleon Roman y Macadandang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The court further ruled
that (petitioner), in the event of the insolvency if accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgement against the accused had become final and executory. Admittedly, accused had jumped bail
and remain at-large.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to
dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defence of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgement of conviction independently of the accused.
RULING:
Pointing out that it had seasonable filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that
the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed in the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that is
appeal takes the place of the accused-employee. Article 102 of Revised Penal Code state the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows: in default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be held civilly for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances. The subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the
rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to
the present case because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the
criminal case against their employees. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from the employee. Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees: (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable. Respondent is correct in
arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Vivente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Sunga and Francisco Salva
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga, the a college student freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filed to the capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat”, a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated
at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerion Vercena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped into the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fractured of the “distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of
the underlying skin.” Dr. Oligario, an orthopaedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
three months and would have tyo ambulate in crutches during the said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage. Calalas, on
the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu Truck. Korte. The
lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it
was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case, filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in the same court held his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas
for the damage to his jeepney. The ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause od
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The Appellate Court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage
Ruling:
Breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of contractual
obligation. In quasi delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action.
Whereas in breach f contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
Thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in a Civil case, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
damage of the petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the Isuzu truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in quasi-delict actions, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. The obligation is created
by law itself. But where there is a re-existing contractual relation between the parties, it I the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. In so far as contract
of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death
or injury to passenger.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an “extension seat” placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
in transporting passengers. Sunga taking an “extension seat” amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is a kin
to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A Caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, was inevitable.
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna
Facts:
Private respondent Luis Luna applied for , and was accorded, a FAREAST CARD issued by the petitioner
Far East Bank and Trust Company at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card
to private respondent Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In
order to replce the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank’s internal
security proceedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so the record the lost card, along with the
principal card, as a “Hot Card” or “Cancelled card” in its master file. Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close
friend, a Filipino-American, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental
Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his Card Department. Since the card was not honoured, Luis was
forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBT the payment of damages. Adrian
Festejo, a vice president of the bank, expressed the bank’s apologies to Luis. Still feeling evidently aggrieved, private
respondent, on December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against
FEBTC. The RTC of Pasig given the factual settings, rendered a decision ordering the FEBTC to pay respondent
(a) 300,000.00 moral damages (b) 50,000.00 exemplary damages and (c) P20,000.00 attorney’s fees. On appeal the
Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a breach of contract and if moral damages can be awarded to such breach
Held:
In culpa-contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of contract. The Civil code provide: Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly
due. The same rule applies to breach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith, in
this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are
also allowed in the case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.
The bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to inform Luis of his own card’s cancellation. Nothing in the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part
of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondent. Neither could the FEBTC’s negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or Bad faith implies a conscious
and intentional design to do awrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the
negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or will.
The court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause of breaching a
contract that might therby permit the application of the appellate principles on tort even when there is a pre existing
contract between the plaintiff and defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondent’s
case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained would constitute an actionable tort
independently on the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of contract)
can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between the two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents damage claim I predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the cat or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to
stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Sunga and Francisco Sunga
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in physical education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat” a wooden stool at the back
portion of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
stopped to let the passenger off. As she was seated at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the “distal third of the left tibia-
fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required from him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
truck.
Issue:
Whether Salva and his driver were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner jeepney.
Ruling:
Culpa Aquiliana or culpa contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. In quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract,
the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. Thus no basis for the contention
that the ruling in Civil case, fining that Salva and his driver Verena liable for damage to petitioner jeepney, should be
binding to Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not
in actions involving breach of contract.
AS found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle., It is undisputed that petitioner driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney.
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an extension seat amounted to an
implied assumption of risk. It is a kin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passenger assumed greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could bot be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enrol in the second semester of that school year. She testified that
she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling because she could not walk and decided not to pursue
her degree, major in physical education her leg was already in defect. Plaintiff appleant likewise testified that even
when she was under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured foot. As a result of her injury, the
Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has “residual bowing of the fractured side” She likewise decided not to
pursue Physical Education as her major subject. Those are her physical pain and moral sufferings, the inevitable
bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair just and reasonable.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Inc., vs. Court of Appeals and SPS Antonio and Gloria Esteban
Facts:
An action for damages instituted in the former Court of the First Instance of Negros Occidental by private
respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Lon Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when the jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into the open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint
alleged that the respondent Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face. Leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent
husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. The trial court rendered a decision
in favour of private respondents, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending the motion for
reconsideration of private respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of September 1979 by
Justice Agrava was already final. It further submitted therein that the relationship of Bart and petitioner PLDT
should have viewed in the light of the contract between them and, under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is
not liable for the acts of an independent contractor.
Issue:
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of the respondent Antonio Esteban.
Ruling:
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of the respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one
of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known
to, hence, appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there
was some alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to uniform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondent already
knew of the presence of the aid excavations. It was not lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the
jeep of respondents to fall into deep excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane towards the accident mound. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where
their own failure to exercise due and responsible care was the cause therof. It is both a societal norm and necessity
that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Respondent Esteban had the last
clear chance or opportunity to avoid accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on the street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location
of the excavations thereof. It was his negligence that exposed him and of his wife to danger, hence he is soley
responsible for the consequence of his imprudence.
Pedro Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Godofredo Isidro and Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation
Facts:
Pedro Layugan filed an action for damagesagainst Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May 15 19797 while at
Berebet, bagabag, Nueva Viscaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck wirh
which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; the defendant’s truck driven recklessly by Daniel
Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized at Dr.
Paulino J. Garcia Reasearch and Medical Center and Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent TEN
THOUSDAND PEOS (10,000.00) and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Defendant
admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that
the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck; that the
truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Viscaya,
right after the curved; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in
installing the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked should be liable for damages sustained by the
truck of the herein defendant in the amount of more than P20,000.00;
Issue:
Whether the intermediate appellate court acted correctly in applying the doctrine if “res ipsa liquitor” with
proper juris-prudential.
Ruling:
The burden of proving that care and diligence was observed is shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as
adverted to, the motorist have the right to be on the road, while the immobile truck has no business, so to speak, to
be there. It thus for the plaintiff to show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he himself did
imply early warning device such as that required by law or by some other adequate means or device that would
properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place and
other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care as in the case at bar, will evoke the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of ress ipsa liquitor, on the part of the driver of the parked cargo
truck as well as plaintiff who was fixing that flat tire of said truck. “Where the thing which causes the injury is
shown to be under themanagement of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care puts it: Res ipsa liquitor. The thing
speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or interference that the defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that instrumentally cauing injury was in defendant’s exclusive conttol, and that accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged
wrongdoer may be interfered from mere fact that the accident happened provided character of accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and
the things which caused is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognises
that the prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. The doctrine is not arule of substantive law., but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof and culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. The
doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. It has generally been held that the presumption of inerence arising from the doctrine cannot be
aviled of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of
negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of
the accident and al the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.
Dr. Victoria Batiquin and Allan Batiquin vs. Court of appeals, sps. Quedo Acogido and Flotide Villegas
Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a resident physician at Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,she was acting Head of the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said hospital. Mrs Villegas is a married woman who submitted to
Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter’s private patient sometime before September 1988. Dr. Batiquin, with
the assistance of Dr. Doris Sy who was also a resident physician at the same hospital, C.I and O.R Nurse Diones
and some stuent nurses performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs Villegas and after 45 minutes Mrs Villegas
delivered her first child. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the hospital until September 27, 1988 during
which perid of confinement she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988 Mrs Villegas checked
out of the hospital. Soon after leaving the hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of
being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter’s polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs Villegas
no end despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin . When the pains become unbearable and she was
rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child’s Hospital in Dumaguete City. When Dr.
Kho examined Mrs Villegas at the Holy Child’s Hospital she found out that Mrs Villegas to be feverish, pale and
was breathing fast. Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus which she
suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could be cancerous. She had an x-ray
taken of Mrs Villegas’ chest, abdomen and kidney. The result of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest
that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs
Villegas she found whitish yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on
the ovarian cyst. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho decribed as a “foreign body” looked like a piece of
“rubber glove “and which is also “rubber drain like. It could have been a torn section of the surgeon’s glove or
could have come from other sources.
Issue:
Whether or not Res ipsa Loquitor is applied in this case
Ruling:
The rule of Res ipsa Loquitor comes to force. “Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of the things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanayio
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First the entire proceedings of
the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. BAtiquin. In this light, the private respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
respaondent Villegas’ body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.
Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which
could have caused the offending pieca of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, DR. Batiquin
therefore is liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas abdomen and for
all the adverse effects thereof.
Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients “with the greatest of solicitude, giving them
alsways his best talent and skill.” Through the tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Villegas, in
violation of her profession’s rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal standards sset fort for professionals,
in the general, and members of the medical profession.
Catilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vicente Vasquez, Jr., and Luisa Vasquez, and Cebu Doctors Hospital
Facts:
Remeo Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around the Fuente Osmena Rotonda. He was travelling
counter clockwise, but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was only carrying a Student Permit to drive at
the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad manager of appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered
owner of Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot
but instead going around the Osmena rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to
his route to General Mavilom St. or to Belvic St. The motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern
Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. Abad signed
an acknowledgement of Responsible party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and
other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. A criminal case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute. So the present action for damages were commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and
Luisa Vasquez, against Jose Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondent Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin and Abad and petitioner Castlex Industrial
Corporation to pay jointly and solidarily.
Issue:
Whether an employer may be held liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company issued vehicle.
Ruling:
The negligence of Abad is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner Castilex presumes said negligence but
claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by Abad. Petitioner contends that
the fifth paragraph of the 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged
in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is not covered by
said provision.
It is undisputed that Abad was a production Manager of Petitioner Castilex at the time of the tort
occurrence. As whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a
quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. Since Abad was driving the petitioners vehicle he was
acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue whether Abad was performing with the scope of his employment, we shall
first take up the other reason invoked by the reason invoked by the court of appeals in holding the petitioner
Castilex vicariously liable for Abad’s negligence, that the petitioner did not present evidence that Abad was not
acting within the scope of his assigned task at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the
Court of appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for the petitioner
Castilex to deny that Abad was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove
this negative averment. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The court has consistently applied the
ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rest the burden of proving his cause of action , fails to show in a
satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.
Abad who was presented as a hostile, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving the company
vehicle, registered under the name of the petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks
and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast rule
can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is
engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle , so as to fix liability upon the employer
because of the employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts.
The mere fact that Abad using the service at the time of the mishap is not of itself sufficient to charge the
petitioner for the negligent act of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course
or scope of his employment.
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Armando Pon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Heirs of Paz VDA.
De Pamfilo, Heirs of Norma Neri Baylon Sales and nena VDA Roales
Facts:
The Collision between Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLBT) driven by Armando Pon and
Superlines Transportation (Superlines) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay
Isobong,Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of Agugust 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death of Rosales,
Pamfilo and Neri and several injuries to Nena Rosales and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLBT . the evidence
show that as BLBT was negotiating behind the highway, it tried to overtake ford fiera car just as Superline Bu was
coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Pon made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and
tried to return his proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two buses collided with each other. Nena Rosales
and Baylon Sales and the surviving heir of the deceased passengers instituted separate cases in the Court of the First
Instance of Marinduque against BLBT and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed in the
Court of the First instance of Quezon.
The lower court exonerated defendant and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed the responsibility to
defendants BLBT and its driver Pon,
Issue:
Whether Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company or Superlines Transportation is liable for the mishap
causing the death and injuries of several passengers.
Ruling:
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in rthe death of the three passengers and injuries of the two
passengers of BLBT was the negligence of the BLBT, who recklessly operated and drove said bus by overtaking a
Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend of the highway, which was divided into two lanes by a
continuous yellow strip. BLBT admitted in hi cross-examination that the continuous yello line on the ascending
bend of the highway signifies a non-overtaking zone. It is no surprise then that the driver of the Superlines bus was
exonerated by the lower court. He had a valid reason to presuppose that no one would overtake in suck a dangerous
situation. These facts shows that patient imprudence of the BLBT driver. Before attempting to pas the vehicle
ahead, the rear driver must see that the road is clear and if there is no sufficient room for safe passage, or the driver
ahead does not urn out so to afford opportunity to pas, or if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking
vehicle that he cannot make the passage safely, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger and
collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary. The rule becomes more particularly applicable in this case
when the overtaking took place on ascending curved highway divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow line.
Appellant Pon should have remembered that When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is a
special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on the left hand
and side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction comes into
view. For his own negligence Pon is primarily liable in recklessly driving the Bus owned by his employer.
Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee
who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a
gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can
be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company
barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. It is disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of
damages though the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages the also elucidated the two kinds of
culpa which are 1.) culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation may be also considered as a real source of an
independent obligation contractual or culpa aquiliana and Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation
which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already
existing obligation "contractual or culpa contractual
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty
of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would
move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution
of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs
a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
Issue:
WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done.
Held:
The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light
of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so,
it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard
against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such
case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Facts:
Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees
for the death of their son, Dominador Ong. After trial, the lower court found
that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint
w i t h o u t pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Court because the amount
involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.Dominador Ong, 14-year old son of plaintiffs, in company with
two of his brothers went to swim at the defendant’s swimming pool. After paying the admission fee they went
to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. Later Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the
locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, his two brothers went to
the bigger pool. Later another boy in the swimming pool informed lifeguard employed by the defendant that
somebody was swimming underwater for quite along time. The lifeguard immediately jumped into the big
swimming pool and retrieved apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.
Artificial respiration and resuscitator were applied by employees of the defendant upon Dominador for the
purpose of reviving him. A doctor was summoned by employees of the defendant to revive the boy but all to no
avail. This action was instituted by the parents of the boy to recover damages from the defendant for the death of
their son.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence
of thedefendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought?
(2) Whether or not the Doctrineof Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling:
The record shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the
employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the
pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, Nurse Armando
Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen resuscitator.
When they found t h a t t h e p u l s e o f t h e b o y w a s a b n o r m a l , t h e
i n s p e c t o r i m m e d i a t e l y i n j e c t e d h i m w i t h camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its
contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the
University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body he found him to be
already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances
to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death. With regard to the
application of doctrine of last clear chance, since it is not known how m i n o r O n g c a m e i n t o t h e
b i g s w i m m i n g p o o l a n d i t b e i n g a p p a r e n t t h a t h e w e n t t h e r e without any companion in violation
of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the
body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear
that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability
to appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.
RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took
effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may
over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No.
4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate
into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order
No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr.
and Marta Kramer collided with anointer-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish
catch. Both parties filed their protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry for the determination of the proximate
cause of the collision. The Board decided that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the employees of
the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines. The findings made by the Board
served as the basis of subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coastguard dated April 29,
1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a
marine officer. On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the
private respondent before the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. Respondents argue that the prescription period for actions based on
quasi-delict is 4 years from when the cause of action accrued as stated in Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the
period should be counted from April 8, 1976 when the collision occurred. Petitioners argue that the period should
be counted from 1982, or when the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the
M/V Asia Philippines had become final. They claimed that maritime collisions have peculiarities and
characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of
Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. RTC denied the MTD based on the arguments of the petitioners.
It stated that prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the
negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. The CA reversed the RTC
decision. The CA stated that the decisions of an admin are not binding on the courts. If an accrual of a cause
of action has to be dependent on an action of an adminbody, then it might get delayed
Ruling:
YES. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon aquasi-delict must be instituted within
four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.
A. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a.i. A right in favour of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created
a.iii. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
B. The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arises.
C. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not
wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages.
Gotesco vs Chatto
Facts
Respondents went to see the movie “Mother Dear” at Superama Theater owned by petitioner. Hardly ten
minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of the balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into the darkness.
Shocked and hurt, respondents managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out, they
walked to the nearby FEU hospital for treatment. The next day they transferred to UST hospital. Due to the
continuing pain, respondent Gloria went to the US for further treatment. Respondents filed a case for damages.
Trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The ceiling collapsed because of some structural construction or
architectural defect. Petitioner is grossly negligent in failing to cause proper and adequate inspection and upkeep of
the building. CA affirmed the decision. Petitioner’s defense is that The ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to force
majeure.
HELD: YES
Petitioner presented Mr. Ong as its witness. Mr. Ong admitted that he could not give any reason why the
ceiling collapsed. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that he did not actually
conduct the investigation. It was not shown that any causes denominated as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have easily been discovered
if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by Mr.
Ong, there was no adequate inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. It is settled that: The owner or
proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices
are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or
qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable
means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not
have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant. That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse
was due to force majeure petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial
court denominated as
Gross.
National Power Corporation. Et al vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 6, 2002, as well as its Resolution dated August 30, 2002,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the complaint for
expropriation filed by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) against herein respondents "Petrona
Dilao et al." are being assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. To implement its Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project, the NPC filed on March 19, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City a
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land situated at Baring and Cantumog, Carmen, Cebu against Dilao and
siblings, and Enriquez. The complaint covers 7,281 square meters of land co-owned Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and
siblings, and 7,879 square meters of land owned by Estefania Enriquez (Enriquez). A day after the complaint was
filed or on March 20, 1996, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.
Dilao filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996. Enriquez did not. On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of the
RTC Danao, issued an Order granting NPC’s motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then appointed a
Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not NPC is liable due to a fortuitous event
Ruling:
There are two stages in every act of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” The order fixing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before the commissioners would be final. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-
way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation
of the transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. It cannot be opposed that NPC’s complaint merely involves a
simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et. Al’s sproperty. Aside from the actual damage done
to the property transversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on
the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to
the occupant’s life and limb.
The appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and substantive grounds. The just
compensation recommended, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for
the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.
Ramos vs. Pepsi
Facts:
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.
and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958,
involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the
collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven
by itsdriver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffsP2,638.50
actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00attorney's fees, with
costs.
Issue:
WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
Held:
Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when
he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which
he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
In view hereof, we are of the sense that Defendant Company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the choice or selection of defendant driver.
In the case of Campo vs. Camarote (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had
occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service. “Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia: The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be relieved from liability.
Facts:
July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang, of the
same province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. Mrs. Adela Delim visited
the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave transportation expense of
P12 in going home from the hospital and they were made to sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer
interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames.
Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages stating that
the mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating
mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from
her friends scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. Delim averred that
it was a fortuitous event CFI: dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit. CA: affirmed
HELD:
YES. CA, CFI REVERSED and SET ASIDE 1) P15,000 actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost of
plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000 moral damages; and 3) P1,000
attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the
promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. While
reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign
the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit.
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law
from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. To exempt a common carrier from liability
for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only
that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to
avoid.
The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus after the snapping sound. Court of
Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since,
being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a substitute
teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. A person
is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is
suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate
claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim,
the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
In view of the testimony, and the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973
which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we
consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable. Moral
damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier
.
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