The Salience of the Middle East

The world remains vitally dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Almost three decades

after the first oil price shock of 1973-74, oil remains of critical importance to

consumers and producers alike. OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries, is still alive and doing well in spite of repeated announcements of its

demise and the sometimes alleged irrelevance of oil. Despite concerns about

greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels, the world economy remains

highly dependent on oil, which provides 40 per cent of the world’s primary energy.

Despite the extensive search for oil elsewhere over the past 30 years, more than half

of the world’s oil reserves are located in Middle Eastern OPEC member countries.

世界依然严重依赖中东石油。在 1973 - 1974 年第一次石油价格冲击之后的近三十年，石

油对消费者和生产者都至关重要。石油输出国组织石油输出国组织尽管一再宣布其石油消亡和

有时称石油不相容，但它仍然活着并表现良好。尽管人们担心化石燃料燃烧造成的温室气体排

放，但世界经济仍高度依赖石油，石油占世界主要能源的 40％。尽管过去 30 年来在其他地方

广泛搜寻石油，但世界上一半以上的石油储量位于中东欧佩克成员国。

Middle Eastern politics directly affects the United States and the rest of the world, at

times in most unexpected ways. The study of potential links between oil exports and

the rise of Islam is empirically difficult. Oil exports and their revenues are easy to
define, and figures are publicly available, but Islamism is hard to define. Many diverse

groups are difficult to compare. They range in quality from gradualist and pragmatic

through revolutionary to Messianic. Most are non-violent, but some are extremely
violent, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks on New Yorkand Washington.DC, o

September 11, 2001. Groups also differ in size. Most are small, but some are part of

wild networks. Most Islamist groups operate clandestinely because they are illegal or

subject to police surveillance. Their life-spans vary because of repression, in-fighting

and competition. As well as mergers and takeover cases.

中东政治直接影响美国和世界其他地区，有时候是以最意想不到的方式。研究石油出口与伊斯

兰教崛起之间的潜在联系在经验上是困难的。石油出口和收入很容易确定，数字可以公开获

得，但伊斯兰教很难界定。许多不同的群体很难比较。他们的品质从渐进主义和务实到革命到
弥赛亚。大多数是非暴力的，但有些是非常暴力的，如 2001 年 9 月 11 日在纽约和华盛顿举
行的恐怖袭击所证明的。团体的规模也不同。大多数都很小，但有些是野生网络的一部分。大
多数伊斯兰组织秘密行动，因为它们是非法的或受到警方监视。他们的生命跨度因压制，战斗

和竞争而异。以及兼并和收购案件。

One view is that attacks on New York and Washington, DC, were carried out by
fanatics motivated by violent religious sensibilities, unrelated to the economic, social

and political problems of the Middle East, such as poverty or Israel’s occupation of

Palestine. In this perspective, fighting terrorism means eliminating individuals and

small groups. Oil is not an issue, neither as a cause of terrorism nor as a potential

target. Another view holds that a terrorist network has thrived on the political and

economic bitterness felt in much of the Arab world and the Middle East are

motivated by oppression and by their opposition to corrupt, authoritarian Arab

governments that are supported by the United States and other Western powers. In

this case, fighting terrorism means not only eliminating individuals and small groups,

but also undertaking comprehensive economic, social and political reforms.

一种观点认为，对纽约和华盛顿特区的袭击是由狂热的宗教情感驱动的狂热分子进行的，这与

中东的经济，社会和政治问题无关，例如贫穷或以色列占领巴勒斯坦。从这个角度来看，打击

恐怖主义意味着消除个人和小团体。石油不是问题，既不是恐怖主义的原因，也不是潜在的目

标。另一种观点认为，恐怖主义网络在阿拉伯世界大部分地区遭受的政治和经济苦难中蓬勃发
展，中东受到压迫和反对由美国和其他西方支持的腐败，专制的阿拉伯政府的动机权力。在这

种情况下，打击恐怖主义不仅意味着消除个人和小团体，而且还要进行全面的经济，社会和政

治改革。
In this representative, oil is a key factor: it has provided huge revenues for the rulers,

but neither political reform nor sufficient prosperity for the people. Since 1970, oil

revenues have profoundly changed the societies of the Middle East, but there has

been little political change that can cope with the ambitions of more numerous,

younger and better educated generations. The outcome has been a society with
rising social and economic inequalities and generational conflicts. The bitterness has

also been caused by Arab defeats against Israel, by the plight of Palestinians and by

the enduring sanctions against Iraq

在这个代表中，石油是一个关键因素：它为统治者提供了巨大的收入，但既没有政治改革，也
没有为人民提供足够的繁荣。自 1970 年以来，石油收入已经深刻地改变了中东社会，但几乎

没有什么政治变化可以应对更多，更年轻，受教育程度更高的世代的野心。结果是一个社会和

经济不平等和世代冲突日益严重的社会。阿拉伯战胜以色列，巴勒斯坦人的困境以及对伊拉克
的持久制裁也造成了这种痛苦。

It is hard to assess the extent and the intensity of the resentment against the rulers in

place and their Western allies and protectors because of the lack of freedom of

assembly and expression in most. If not all, Arab countries. The West has become a

victim of its own trap in the Middle East. By supporting corrupt and dictatorial

regimes for immediate economic and strategic advantages, the West has prevented

the kind of change necessary to stabilize these countires through representative

government. Western oil interests and economic stability are shaky when dependent

on moribund political systems and paralyzed societies. The United States has

provided military, political and at times economic support in return for access to oil.

At times the United States, again often supported by allies has actively destabilized

Middle Eastern governments with a popular mandate, as happened in Iran in 1953.

由于大多数人缺乏集会和表达自由，很难评估对当地统治者及其西方盟友和保护者的怨恨程度

和强度。如果不是全部，阿拉伯国家。西方已经成为其在中东陷阱的受害者。通过支持腐败和
独裁政权以获得直接的经济和战略优势，西方已经阻止了通过代表性政府来稳定这些优势的必

要变革。西方石油利益和经济稳定依赖于垂死的政治制度和瘫痪的社会。美国提供军事，政治

和有时获得经济支持以换取石油。有时美国再次经常得到盟国的支持，它们正在以一种普遍的
授权方式积极地破坏中东政府的稳定，就像 1953 年在伊朗发生的那样。

Rising Western dependence on the Middle Eastern oil since the 1960s has not been

matched by efforts to stabilize the region politically. Although the United States is

increasingly dependent on oil imports and on the Middle East supplying the world

market with volumes sufficient to stabilize price, there has, so far, been little interest
or insight into Middle Eastern affairs. The wisdom of giving unquestioning support to

corrupt and authoritarian regimes because they export oil is not evident. The error

has been to equate secure oil supplies with regimes more dependent on Western
backing than on a popular mandate. Such a policy can backfire – as it did for the
United States in Iran. In this perspective, the September 2001 terrorist attacks may
appear as the forerunner of more trouble insofar as they express a widespread but so

far hidden discontent. In that case, oil supplies and prices could be at stake.

自从 20 世纪 60 年代以来，西方对中东石油的依赖不断上升，这与政治上稳定该地区的努力
并不相称。尽管美国越来越依赖石油进口和中东地区向世界市场提供足以稳定价格的数量，但

迄今为止，对中东事务的兴趣或见解不大。由于出口石油而给予腐败和威权政权无可置疑的支

持的智慧并不明显。错误在于将安全的石油供应等同于更依赖西方支持的政权而不是普遍的任

务。这种政策可能会适得其反，就像它在美国在伊朗所做的一样。从这个角度来看，2001 年

9 月的恐怖袭击可能表现出更多麻烦的先驱，因为它们表达了普遍但迄今为止隐藏的不满。在

这种情况下，石油供应和价格可能会受到威胁

The Middle Eastern Rentier State

The chapter discusses the internal pressures that have been building up in the oil-

exporting countries of the Middle East due to rising population pressures, an

economic monoculture and political rigidity. In the 1970s and early 1980s, huge oil

revenues distorted economic development and caused political centralization within

the state. Regardless of oil process, the economic basis for this mode of development

is no longer present. Economic restructuring away from oil is urgent, but success will
depend on political power shifting from the state to the private sector, and from the

rulers to the ruled.

本章讨论了由于人口压力增加，经济单一化和政治僵化等原因，在中东石油输出国建立的内部
压力。在二十世纪七十年代和八十年代初期，石油巨额收入扭曲了经济发展并导致了国家内部

的政治集权。无论石油加工如何，这种发展模式的经济基础已不复存在。经济转型离石油是迫

切的，但成功将取决于政治权力从国家转移到私营部门，从统治者转移到被统治者。

Historically, in the key Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries there has been at least
some connection between rising oil revenues and lagging political reforms. Today’s

regimes depend on oil revenues to prevent or delay reforms in the short run, and to

survive in the long run. Rentier states need access to economic rent to survive. The
politically conditioned need for revenues, to but support and legitimacy, reduces oil
policy discretion. The alternative is economic reform, with a more independent
private sector and direct taxation, followed up by political reforms aiming at a more

representative form of government.

从历史上看，在中东主要石油出口国，石油收入上涨和政治改革滞后之间至少存在某种联系。
今天的政权依靠石油收入在短期内阻止或推迟改革，并长期保持生存。 Rentier 州需要获得

经济租金才能生存。政治条件下的收入需求，但支持和合法性，降低了石油政策的自由裁量

权。另一种选择是经济改革，私人部门更加独立，直接征税，随后进行旨在代表政府形式的政

治改革。

Rising prosperity based solely on oil is a phenomenon of the past in the Middle East.

With few exceptions, today’s Gulf oil exporters face a race against time, as they have

to develop away from oil dependence and their populations are rising quickly.

Political implications are important, as rulers financed by erstwhile plentiful oil

revenues are coming under increasing pressure to share power with representatives

of the private sector – not only it bosses, but also its works

纯粹以石油为基础的繁荣昌盛是中东过去的现象。除了少数例外，今天的海湾石油出口商面临

着与时间赛跑，因为他们不得不摆脱石油依赖，他们的人口正在迅速上升。政治影响是重要

的，因为由过去丰富的石油收入资助的统治者正面临越来越大的压力与私营部门的代表分享权

力 - 不仅是老板，而且其作品
In the Middle East, oil has caused a special, capital intensive mode of development.

With high oil revenues, capital accumulation could take place at a much higher rate in

the public sector than in private business. Control of the accumulation process moved
from private capitalists to pubic sector bureaucrats and autocratic rulers. Oil money

strengthened the state and the bureaucracy in relation to private business, creating a

distinctive political system based on the centralization of petroleum revenues within

the state.

在中东，石油已经导致了一种特殊的，资本密集型的发展模式。由于石油收入高，公共部门的
资本积累可能高于私人部门。积累过程的控制权从私人资本家转移到了公共部门的官僚和专制

统治者身上。石油资金加强了与私营企业有关的国家和官僚体系，在国家石油收入集中的基础

上创建了一个独特的政治体系。
Briefly put, the political process is that the rulers do not tax citizens or business, but
hand out selective privilege, financed by oil revenues, against loyalty and support

from a largely parasitic private sector. Access to large oil revenues channeled through

the treasuries is a distinctive feature of the state in the oil-exporting countries of the
Middle East. These oil revenues make the state a distributor of economic rent from oil

and therefore of privileges and transfers, instead of being a tax collector and

redistributor. Most economic activates outside the petroleum sector depend on

government permits, contracts, support and protection. This is usually coupled with

an absence of taxes on property and income, except for the religious tax, zakat.

Consequently, the Middle Eastern oil exporters have had no market economy, but

rather a protected concessionary and distributive economy that is directed by the

government. Private production, exports and investment have received reduced

importance in the context of the state-run oil economy. The private sector has lost

political weight.

简而言之，政治过程是，统治者不会向公民或企业征税，但是可以通过石油收入资助来获得选

择性特权，以抵制来自主要寄生私营部门的忠诚和支持。通过国库获得大量石油收入是该国中

东石油输出国的一个显着特点。这些石油收入使得该州成为石油经济租金的分配者，因此享有

特权和转移，而不是税收和再分配者。石油部门以外的大多数经济活动取决于政府许可，合
同，支持和保护。除了宗教税 zakat 外，这通常伴随着对财产和收入不征税。因此，中东石油

出口国没有市场经济，而是政府指导的受保护的特许经营和分配经济。在国营石油经济的背景

下，私人生产，出口和投资的重要性下降。私营部门失去了政治份量。
The contrast with independent capitalist development of the Western world is

striking. In the developed capitalist economics, organized economic interests use the

state for their political purposes. In the Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries, the

state uses private business for its political purposes. This is basic feature of the rentier

state.
与西方世界的独立资本主义发展形成鲜明对照。在发达的资本主义经济学中，有组织的经济利

益使用国家来达到其政治目的。在中东石油出口国，政府将私人企业用于政治目的。这是租赁

国的基本特征。
The result is the two-tiered economy. The public sector represents the developed
part. It consists of the state apparatus, the national oil company, other key state

enterprises and the leading financial institutions, all owned or controlled by the state.

It accounts for most of the value added. The private sector, however, is less
developed. It is dependent upon selective favors and transfers. Private businesses

usually operate in imports, trade or services, but seldom in large-scale manufacturing.

Agriculture is generally marked by low productivity and is dependent upon public

support. The merchant class, the traders and craftsmen in the bazaar, needs

differentiation. Some merchants have succeeded, through public favors and

concessions, in gaining considerable wealth. Others have been marginalized by

imports and large-scale trading.

其结果是两层经济。公共部门代表发达的部分。它由国家机构，国家石油公司，国家重点骨干

企业和国家重点金融机构组成，全部由国家拥有或控制。它占增值的大部分。然而，私营部门

欠发达。这取决于选择性的利益和转移。私营企业通常在进口，贸易或服务中经营，但很少进

行大规模生产。农业通常以低生产力为标志，并依赖于公众的支持。商人阶层，集市中的商人

和工匠需要分化。一些商人通过公共利益和让步取得了可观的财富。其他人被进口和大规模贸

易边缘化。

The absence of direct taxation has reduced the need for the state to prove its
legitimacy to the population through democratic institutions. Instead, the state buys

legitimacy by spending oil revenues. When the state does not impose taxes on wealth

and income, the need for liberal and democratic reforms diminishes. Instead, the
state can by legitimacy and support by granting selective economic privileges. These

selective favors have their counterpart in equally selective measures of discrimination.

Those groups that do not benefit from the selective favors find themselves as

second-class citizens. In the Gulf states, unlike the situation in Iran and Iraq, there are

a large number of foreign workers with inferior economic, political and social status.
As an instrument of power, oil money is supplemented by the military.

没有直接税收减少了国家通过民主机构向人民证明其合法性的必要性。相反，国家通过石油收

入来购买合法性。当国家不对财富和收入征税时，对自由和民主改革的需求就会减少。相反，
国家可以通过授予选择性经济特权的合法性和支持。这些选择性偏好有相同的选择性歧视措
施。那些没有从选择性好处中受益的群体发现自己是二等公民。在海湾国家，与伊朗和伊拉克
的情况不同，有大量经济，政治和社会地位较差的外国工人。作为权力的工具，石油钱由军队

补充。

The Military Pillar of Power.

The growth and power of the military are salient features common to most countries

of the Middle East, whether oil-exporting or not. Military officers have repeatedly

intervened to keep countries and political systems together, so that military

government has often been the rule rather than the exception. Iraq is a good case in

point. The social origins of the military, especially the junior officers, are largely in the

urban middle and lower middle classes. This is the case not only in Iraq. Historically,

the military establishment has become a conservative force in the Middle East,

depending its own privileges and its budgetary priorities. At the outset, military rule

was socially radical, motivated by the aim of redistributing wealth and income, of

carrying out profound reforms and asserting national interests against the colonial

legacy. It has over decades acquired its own vested interests – meaning budgetary

appropriations, training and the most modern equipment, apart from personal fringe

benefits and political influence. In the oil-exporting countries the sudden influx of
large oil revenues proved an irresistible temptation for the military establishment to

demand more money. The military establishment represents a salient part of the new

class of technocrats – wielding power, but not the ability to earn revenues. Like the
technocrats of the public sector, the military establishment is largely professional,

recruited by merit.

无论是否出口石油，军队的增长和力量都是中东大多数国家共同的突出特点。军官一再干预，

将国家和政治制度联系在一起，因此军政府往往是规则而不是例外。伊拉克就是一个很好的例

子。军队的社会起源，尤其是初级军官，主要集中在城市中下阶层。不仅在伊拉克情况如此。
从历史上看，军事编制已经成为中东的保守力量，取决于其自身的特权和预算优先事项。首

先，军事统治是社会激进的动机，其目的是重新分配财富和收入，进行深刻的改革，并维护国

家利益以对抗殖民遗产。它拥有数十年的既得利益 - 这意味着预算拨款，培训和最现代化的
设备，除了个人福利和政治影响力之外。在石油出口国，突然涌入的大量石油收入证明了军事
机构要求更多资金的不可抗拒的诱惑。军事设施是新一代技术官僚的一个重要组成部分 - 掌
握权力，但无法获得收入。就像公共部门的技术专家一样，军事机构在很大程度上是专业人

员，因此被招募。

Indeed, the rise in military expenditure seems easier to explain by the level of oil
revenues than by any sudden internal or external threats. Middle Eastern oil exporters

have a preference for military spending not shared by oil exporters elsewhere. In

1998, Mexico spent less than one per cent of its gross domestic product. GDP, on the

military. Indonesia about one per cent, Malaysia, Norway and Venezuela about two

per cent and, Iran about three per cent. By contrast, in Oman and in Saudi Arabia

some 13 per cent of GDP went to the military (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database).

In Islamic Iran the military evidently enjoys far less influence, privileges and money

than was the case under the Shah.

实际上，军费开支的增加似乎更容易用石油收入水平来解释，而不是由任何突然的内部或外部

威胁来解释。中东石油出口国偏爱其他地区的石油出口国不愿分享的军费。 1998 年，墨西哥

的国内生产总值不到其国内生产总值的百分之一。国内生产总值，在军事上。印度尼西亚约为

百分之一，马来西亚，挪威和委内瑞拉约为百分之二，而伊朗则约为百分之三。相比之下，在

阿曼和沙特阿拉伯，国内生产总值的约 13％投入军事（SIPRI 军费支出数据库）。在伊斯兰伊

朗，军队显然享有的影响力，特权和金钱远远少于沙赫。
External threats, Internal enemies, the pressure from foreign arms manufacturers as

well as the military complex can explain the military priority. The political instability of

the Middle East means that practically all countries of the region face actual or
potential threats from neighbors. Political instability also means that almost all

Middle Eastern governments face internal threats as well. Foreign arms dealers,

assisted by their governments, do their best to convince oil-exporting Middle Eastern

rulers that they need to buy the most sophisticated and expensive military hardware.

Finally, local officers, friends and family members of the rulers also promote arms
purchases, for a commission. High military expenditure helps the armed services

compete for personnel, drawing competence away from more productive civilian

tasks. In theory, the military burden means that the oil-exporting countries have
some flexibility in budgetary policies, policies, provided that it is politically possible to
cut expenditures on the armed forces and that no serious threats appear on the
horizon.

外部威胁，内部敌人，来自外国武器制造商以及军事情结的压力可以解释军事优先。中东的政

治不稳定意味着该地区几乎所有国家都面临邻国的实际或潜在威胁。政治不稳定也意味着几乎
所有中东政府都面临内部威胁。外国军火商在其政府的协助下，尽力说服中东石油出口国的统

治者，他们需要购买最复杂，最昂贵的军事硬件。最后，统治者的地方官员，朋友和家庭成员

也为了佣金促进购买武器。高昂的军费有助于武装部队为人员进行竞争，使其能力远离更高产

的民事任务。从理论上讲，军事负担意味着石油输出国在预算政策和政策方面有一定的灵活

性，前提是政治上可以削减军队开支，并且不会出现严重的威胁。

The Rentier Cycle

The lack of representative political institutions exacerbates the problem of

accommodating social and generational change and of redistributing income.

Autocratic governments, exercising varying degrees of repression, have traditionally

gained legitimacy by offering public services financed by oil revenues, without

imposing taxes on the population. Rising oil revenues at first financed rising public

expenditure, but the recent decline in oil revenues has led to cuts in public services.

The political effect has been a gradual weakening of political legitimacy. The lesson is
that only the distribution o oil revenues can buy legitimacy. Algeria and the Shah’s

Iran are telling examples of how oil revenues can serve to undermine legitimacy if

distribution is insufficient. The rapid population growth since the mid-1970s has
exacerbated the problem of declining oil revenues. The sudden rise in oil revenues

first led to rising investments in health, which in turn meant falling mortality rates,

but without a parallel decline in birth rates. Subsequently, investment in education

benefited large youth cohorts, but they could not always find suitable jobs in a labor

market that was depressed due to falling oil revenues. Throughout its war with Iraq,
Iran promoted population growth. Only in the 1990s did the country embark on a

policy to limit population growth.

缺乏具有代表性的政治制度加剧了适应社会和世代变化以及重新分配收入的问题。专制政府通
过不同程度的压制，通过提供石油收入资助的公共服务来获得合法性，而不对人口征税。首次
提高的石油收入资助了公共开支的增加，但最近石油收入的下降导致公共服务的削减。政治效
应逐渐弱化了政治合法性。教训是，只有石油收入的分配才能购买合法性。阿尔及利亚和沙赫

的伊朗正在举例说明，如果分配不充分，石油收入将如何破坏合法性。自 1970 年代中期以来

人口迅速增长，加剧了石油收入下降的问题。石油收入的突然增加首先导致对健康的投资增
加，这意味着死亡率下降，但没有出生率的平行下降。随后，对教育领域的投资使大型青年队

受益匪浅，但他们不可能在由于石油收入下降而沮丧的劳动力市场中找到合适的工作。在与伊

拉克的战争中，伊朗推动人口增长。只有在 20 世纪 90 年代，该国才开始实施限制人口增长

的政策。

In countries as culturally and historically different as Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the

economic monoculture has caused remarkably parallel economic, social and political

problem. However, they are at different stages of maturity within a cycle of stage and

events which in substance, if not in form, has strikingly similar features. The basic

common problem is the rentier economy, its exposure to oil market risk and the

consequent income discontinuities. Because of differences in oil resources in relation

to population, Iran was the worst hit by low oil prices in 1997-99, but Saudi Arabia

was also badly affected. The 1986 oil price decline had had less dramatic effects

because Iran and Iraq were at war and their civilian economy was already damaged.

Seen in historical perspective, Iran is the most advanced case, Iraq the least, among
the Middle Eastern oil exporters in a cycle of oil dependence where oil first brings

prosperity, then unmakes it. The following is a brief exposition of a theory of the

rentier cycle.
在与伊拉克，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯在文化和历史上有所不同的国家，经济单一文化造成了显着的

经济，社会和政治问题。然而，在阶段和事件的周期中，它们处于不同的成熟阶段，事实上，

如果不是形式上的，它们具有惊人的相似特征。基本的共同问题是食利者经济，其面临的石油

市场风险以及随之而来的收入不连续性。由于石油资源在人口方面的差异，伊朗受 1997 -

99 年低油价影响最大，但沙特阿拉伯也受到严重影响。 1986 年的石油价格下跌影响不大，

因为伊朗和伊拉克处于战争状态，其民用经济已经受损。从历史角度看，伊朗是中东石油出口

国中石油依赖循环中石油首先带来繁荣的最先进的事例，伊拉克最少，然后取消它。以下是食

利者周期理论的简要说明。
The first stage is the establishment of the rentier state and the rise of the new class.
The high oil revenues in the 1970s and early 1980s caused profound social change,

uprooting traditional society in the Middle East. In Iran this process started as early as

in the 1960s. During this initial period, the distributive rentier state was established,
with an increasingly parasitic private sector. At this time, the merchant class became

largely marginalized by the rising technocratic and military classes. Then rentier state

made substantial efforts in infrastructure, housing, health and education. Distribution

of wealth and income was not yet an important political issue, except in Iran, where

the rentier state was more established and inflationary pressures exacerbated the

distribution issue. Here, it culminated in the 1979 revolution. By contrast, In Iraq and

in Saudi Arabia, the consensus in 1970s was that the entire nation benefited from the

oil boom.

第一阶段是建立食利者国家和新阶级的兴起。在二十世纪七十年代和八十年代早期，石油的高

收入造成了深刻的社会变革，推翻了中东地区的传统社会。在伊朗，这个过程早在 20 世纪 60

年代就开始了。在这个初始阶段，分配租赁者国家成立，私营部门日益增多。此时，商人阶级

在技术专家和军事阶级日益上升的情况下被边缘化了。然后，租房者国家在基础设施，住房，

健康和教育方面做出了重大努力。除伊朗外，财富和收入分配还不是一个重要的政治问题，在

伊朗，食利者国家更加稳固，通货膨胀压力加剧了分配问题。在这里，它在 1979 年的革命中

达到高潮。相比之下，在伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯，20 世纪 70 年代的共识是整个国家都从石油繁

荣中受益。

The second stage comes with the consolidation of technocratic power at the expense
of the merchant class and poorer parts of the population. In Iran this happened back

in the 1960s and the early 1970s; in Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, then years later.

With stagnant or declining oil and gas revenues, the distribution of wealth and

income suddenly became an important political issue.

第二阶段是以牺牲商人阶层和贫穷人口为代价来巩固技术专家的权力。在伊朗，这发生在 20
世纪 60 年代和 70 年代初。在几年后的科威特，伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯。随着石油和天然气收

入停滞或下降，财富和收入的分配突然成为一个重要的政治问题。

In the third stage, the new class refuses to give up privileges and power, in the face of
rising opposition. In Iraq the new class has an important military component, in Saudi
Arabia a royal part that cherishes privileges. In Iran confrontation took place in the
late 1970s, whereas in the other countries it has been less acute. The problem of

accommodating social and generational change and of redistributing income

becomes exacerbated by the absence of representatives political institutions.

在第三阶段，面对不断上升的反对，新阶级拒绝放弃特权和权力。在伊拉克，新的阶级有着重

要的军事部分，在沙特阿拉伯是一个珍视特权的王室。在伊朗，对抗发生在 20 世纪 70 年代

后期，而在其他国家则不那么急迫。适应社会和世代变化以及重新分配收入的问题由于缺乏代

表政治机构而变得更加恶化。

In the fourth stage, the new class loses power. So far, this has happened only in Iran,

where most of the technocratic groups at the core of the Shah’s regime have fled

the country Others have reached compromises with the Islamic regime. In Iran, power

has been taken over by a heterogeneous coalition of interest. Include the clergy of

varying opinions and vested interests. Islamic foundations, merchants and

technocrats, Elsewhere in the Middle East, the position of the class, civilian and

military, seems recarious unless compromises can be made with the various forces of

opposition.

在第四阶段，新班级失去权力。到目前为止，这只发生在伊朗，沙赫政权核心的大多数技术专

家组已经逃离了伊朗。其他人已经与伊斯兰政权妥协。在伊朗，权力已经被异质的利益联盟所
接管。包括不同意见和既得利益的神职人员。伊斯兰基金会，商人和技术专家，在中东其他地

方，除非各种反对力量能够作出妥协，否则阶级，平民和军队的地位似乎很俗套。

Within this general cycle there are deep-seated differences between countries. The
outcome is not determined, but conditioned by oil prices and political skills. Low oil

prices put the rentier regimes under severe pressure, but they