Power Technology and Engineering Vol. 44, No.

5, January, 2011

HYDROTECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION

FIRST RESULTS OF INSPECTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

AT THE SAYANO-SHUSHENSKAYA HPP AFTER THE FAILURE
OF 17 AUGUST 2009

E. N. Bellendir,1 Yu. D. Semenov,1 and V. G. Shtengel’1

Translated from Gidrotekhnicheskoe Stroitel’stvo, No. 7, July 2010, pp. 2 – 8.

First results of inspection of structural components at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP after the 17 August 2009
emergency are presented.
Keywords: Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, structural components, hydraulic generating sets, water conduits, in-
strument investigations.

above GS-2, GS-3, and GS-4 were totally destroyed. Many

On 17 August 2009, destruction of structural compo-
nents in the powerhouse occurred as a result of failure of
the No. 2 generating set (GS-2) at the Sayano-Shushen-
skaya HPP (Fig. 1). Figure 2 shows the cross section of the
powerhouse.
The monolithic reinforced-concrete covers of GS-2,
GS-7, and GS-9 at elevation 327.0 m, and the columns sup-
porting the monolithic covers of these sets and the walls of
the annular shafts of the generators at elevations from 319.8
to 327.0 m were destroyed as a result of the failure (Fig. 3).
The enclosing MARKhI structures of the machine room
1 JSC “VNIIG im. B. E. Vedeneeva,” St. Petersburg, Russia.
of the cantilevered slabs along the walls of the lower pool
had been completely demolished or deflected, and a large
number of the second stage structures had failed; and, stair-
ways were damaged by rubble-laden water flows.
Coworkers of the JSC VNIIG im. B. E. Vedeneeva par-
ticipated in a study conducted by special commissions to
evaluate the situation at the HPP as early as several days after
the failure, while a diagnostic-monitoring group from the
VNIIG in conjunction with representatives of the Sayano-
Shushenskaya HPP, the publicly owned joint-stock company
Lengidroproekt, and the Siberian Scientific-Research Insti-
tute of Hydraulic Engineering has been conducting a techni-

a b

Fig. 1. Machine room in powerhouse: a, prior to failure; b, after failure on 17 August 2009.

335
1570-145X/11/4405-0335 © 2011 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.
336 E. N. Bellendir et al.

Wa
ter
co
nd
uit

QHPP 3585 m3/sec

Maximum dead
volume horizon

Fig. 2. Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Cross section through powerhouse.

Situation plan
GS-10 GS-9 GS-8 GS-7 GS-6

Axis of generating sets

GS-5 GS-4 GS-3 GS-2 GS-1

Axis of generating sets

Column in serviceable condition Inaccessible

Strengthening or dismantling is required Column is destroyed

Fig. 3. Monolithic reinforced-concrete covers of GS-2, GS-7, and GS-9 at elevation 327.0 m, and columns supporting monolithic covers of
these sets and walls of annular shaft with generators were destroyed as result of failure.
First Results of Inspection of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP after the Failure of 17 August 2009
Fig. 4. Dynamic-percussive effects as GS-2 accelerated from dead stop and ascended resulted in failure of “shaft body” of generator, rotor and
stator foundations, and cover slab at elevation 327.0 m.
cal inspection of the reinforced-concrete structures from the
ceilings at elevations 319.8 – 327.0 m (block A, Fig. 2) to
the structural components of the central bodies in which the
generating sets are located (block B, Fig. 2). The basic pur-
pose of the engineering inspection in its initial stage was to
evaluate the extent of operational damage as a result of fail-
ure of the bearing structures of the machine room and central
body for subsequent determination of the volumes of restor-
ative work required.
Inspection of the structural components consisted of four
basic steps:
— analyze design documentation and executive
drawings;
— visually inspect components, establish conformity of
the components to the design, the appearance of visible
defects (existence of cracks, seepage, delamination of the
protective layer on reinforced-concrete components, corro-
sion of metallic components, and deflections of components,
as well as the condition of butt joints, welded connections,
etc.), and compile a schedule for detailed inspection of the
structure;
— perform a set of instrument investigations by nonde-
structive monitoring methods; and,
— analyze inspection results, evaluate the technical
condition of components of the structure, and develop rec-
ommendations for elimination of defects that have appeared.
337
The indicated work had to be performed virtually simul-
taneously, and also within compressed time frames according
to a schedule approved by on-site staff for the execution of
restorative work. The condition of structural bearing com-
ponents and components formed from mass concrete was
monitored during the period when there was no safe access
to individual components, or was restricted by a significant
amount of debris from failed reinforced-concrete structures
and equipment.
A characteristic of the investigations was the need to
make on-going decisions concerning the fate of the compo-
nents. The rate of disassembly and dismantling of the failed
components was dictated by the search for buried persons,
and also by the solution of such technical problems as:
— preparation of the room for restoration of the heating
circuit;
— assessment of the feasibility of placing the generating
sets that had been preserved back into service in order to pass
water from the reservoir in a “no-load”regime; and,
— prevention of secondary failures as the rooms were
being cleaned.
It was primarily generating sets GS-2, GS-7, and GS-9
that were sources of the failures.
Analysis of the pattern of failures and damages
sustained by the structures inspected made it possible to iso-
late the following basic types of unexpected effects during
the emergency.
338
Fig. 5. GS-2. Formation of series of subhorizontal and inclined
cracks with openings ranging from 1 to 7 mm in column KG1 within
elevation range from 319.8 to 327.0 m (as viewed from GS-1).
1. Dynamic-percussive effects of the No. 2 generating
set (during its “acceleration” from dead stop, and ascent
under the water pressure) resulted in failure of the shaft
(“body”) of the generator, the rotor and stator foundations,
and the cover slabs at elevation 327.0 m (Fig. 4). The im-
pacting force of the spinning rotor of GS-2 was such that half
of massive column KG1 of the crane trestle above elevation
327.0 m was completely demolished (Fig. 1b), while sub-
stantial displacement-induced damages were sustained by
the column when the rotor had dropped (Fig. 5).
2. Direct percussive effects by the stator windings, and
by debris from the failing generating sets and “body of
the shaft” resulted in destruction of the cover-support
columns within the elevation range from 319.8 to 327.0 m
(Fig. 6), and the cover slabs themselves at elevation 327.0 m
(Figs. 1b, 4, and 7) within the zones of the failed units (GS-2,
GS-7, and GS-9).
3. The quasi-seismic type of dynamic-percussive ef-
fects, which were transmitted from one structural unit to an-
other through the cover slabs at elevation 327.0 m, caused
the expansion joints to deform between the covers of the
generating units at elevations 319.8 and 327.0 m, resulted in
damage to the sectional reinforced-concrete structures of the
rooms between elevations 319.8 and 327.0 m (Fig. 8), and
led to expansion of the cover concrete under the ceramic
filler slab (Fig. 9), as well as to the appearance of cracks in
certain cover slabs at elevation 327.0 m (Fig. 10).
4. The action of the powerful water flow containing de-
bris from structural components and stripped equipment re-
sulted in damage to the stairways (Fig. 11) and damage to the
doors and door frames, window units, and the slag-concrete
walls and finish coating of the rooms.
5. The percussive effect of flying debris from the gener-
ating sets and structural components at the time of the failure
led to damaged cantilevered slabs, the finished surfaces of
E. N. Bellendir et al.
Fig. 6. GS-8. Failed column K1.
the rooms, and the coatings on the structural components,
and to damaged metallic components of the machine-room
ceiling and window frames.
Based on results of visual inspection of the structural
components, zones were selected for instrument investi-
gation using methods of nondestructive-monitoring of
concrete:
— the magnetic method using the “Poisk 2.3” in-
strument (employed to assess the positioning of reinforcing
rods with respect to cracks that emerge onto the surface of
structures);
— the mechanical elastic-rebound method using an
OMSh-1 spectrometer — analogy of the type-N Schmidt
hammer (used to assess the strength of the surface layers of
concrete); and
— the ultrasonic method using a “Pul’sar 1.2” instru-
ment (used to determine the strength of concrete in its cover
and deep layers, and also estimate the depth of cracks emerg-
ing onto the surface of concrete).
Moreover, an ultrasonic A1208 thickness gage was in-
cluded in the set of inspection equipment to monitor the
thickness of the metal.
As of 1 May 2010, the following had been inspected:
— virtually all cover components with elevation range
319.8 – 327.0 m, and the components between them;
— the structural components of the central bodies of
generating sets GS-4, GS-5, and GS-6;
— the structural components of the central bodies of
generating sets GS-1, GS-2, and GS-3 (including the pen-
stocks and water-conducting circuit);
— the water conduits for GS-5 and GS-6 (continuous vi-
sual and selective instrument monitoring in conjunction with
the JSC “Priroda” and Siberian Scientific-Research Institute
First Results of Inspection of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP after the Failure of 17 August 2009 339

Fig. 7. Failure of cover slab at elevation 327.0 m and “body of shaft” of GS-7.

Fig. 8. GS-2. Cracks and failure of sectional reinforced-concrete Fig. 9. GS-7. Failure of ceramic filler slab along concrete tie rod at
structures in rooms at elevations ranging from 320.0 to 327.0 m. elevation 327.0 m.

of Hydraulic Engineering). Inspection of the water conduit
for GS-4 has been completed.
The repair and restorative work performed, and the
absence of a complete set of emergency gates on the side of
the lower pool has not yet enabled us to complete our in-
spection of components of in penstocks and water-conduct-
ing circuit for GS-1, GS-2, GS-3, GS-7, GS-8, GS-9, and
GS-10.
Questions concerning the suitability of the structural
components for continued service (demolition, preservation,
reconstruction, or strengthening) were resolved in conjunc-
tion with specialists from the JSC “Lengidroproekt” during
340
Fig. 10. GS-8. Cracking in cover slab.
inspections to ensure that repair and restorative operations be
carried out.
The following conclusions were drawn on the basis of in-
spections performed on the internal metallic lining of the
steel-reinforced-concrete water conduits for GS-6 and GS-5:
— exposed defects (delamination, recesses between the
concrete and metallic lining) are not a consequence of the
failure of 17 August 2009);
— the overall condition of the metalwork and joints in
the internal metallic lining of the penstocks for GS-6 and
GS-5 is considered serviceable;
— the technical condition of the components in the wa-
ter conduits for GS-6 and GS-5 will permit placement of
generating sets GS-6 and GS-5 in temporary service; and,
— the water conduits for GS-6 and GS-5 did not satisfy
the complete multifactorial instrument monitoring required
by regulatory documents [1, 2]. Considering the acute need
for the most rapid placement of GS-6 and GS-5 in service in
order to acquire an additional reserve for the passage of
spring floods and reduce the load on the intake, which was
not designed for a prolonged period of service, however,
their technical condition will make it possible to extend the
time required for their detailed complex inspection to the
scheduled repair (2012 – 2014).
At the time of the next scheduled repair of GS-6 and
GS-5, it has been recommended that measures be developed
(preparation for construction and refitting) to ensure access
to any point on the internal and external surfaces of the water
conduit for its detailed engineering diagnostics.
The monitoring that can be carried out at the present time
is limited by a lack of off-the-shelf equipment [3], which will
make it possible to gain safe access to any internal or exter-
nal zone on the surface of the water conduits for instrument
inspection. Considering the clearance dimensions and char-
acteristic features of these components of the structure, the
development, fabrication, assembly, and operation of hoist-
ing mechanisms and platforms for safe deployment of people
E. N. Bellendir et al.
Fig. 11. Damage sustained by stairways under action of powerful
water flow containing debris from structural components and
stripped equipment.
and equipment are costly measures that may be necessary
merely by proceeding from requirements of long-term pros-
pects for reliable operation of the entire series of ten water
conduits.
It must be pointed out that the water conduits, like many
other structural components of the HPP, are nonstandard
large-dimension components having primarily one-sided ac-
cess. Many forms of existing measuring equipment will
therefore require adaptation to characteristics of the compo-
nents and the conditions under which they are diagnosed.
Under conditions where reliable access is created to any
sections of a water conduit, modern approaches to estimation
of the degree of fatigue of the metal and its geometric struc-
tural parameters, and to assessment of the monolithicity of
the reinforced-concrete jacket, particularly in the zone where
it contacts the metallic lining, the corrosion-induced wear of
the metal, the condition, and, accordingly, the need for crack
elimination in the concrete, the stress distribution in the
metal and in the concrete along segments of the water con-
duits, etc. should be adapted to the system in addition to the
standard slightly informative set of methods and means. This
will permit adjustment of the analytical plan and valid as-
sessment of the feasibility of continued service of the water
conduits and the need for repair measures (which can also be
accomplished from working platforms). Similar multifactor-
ial investigations of penstocks have never been conducted
within the landmass of the Russian Federation.
The overall process of the failures and damages to struc-
tural components of the machine room and equipment were
progressive in nature, depending on the propagation of the
flow of water and the components of the failed structures that
it had entrapped at elevations ranging from 319.8 to 327.0 m.
The question (for discussion) concerning the expediency of
creating hydraulically insolated units at the HPP, i.e., separa-
tion of the hydraulic generating sets by wall partitions with
First Results of Inspection of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP after the Failure of 17 August 2009
the creation of a certain directionality to the discharge of wa-
ter to the lower pool (in the case of an emergency influx of
water into the machine room), and minimization of possible
lateral outflow (for the case in question, with respect to ele-
vations 319.8 and 327.0 m) arises in this connection. Similar
safety measures are employed in shipbuilding and shaft con-
struction, for example, in the upper-Kama potassium-salt de-
posits [4].
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions were drawn based on results
of the first instrument inspections of structural components
at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP:
— failed generating sets GS-2, GS-7, and GS-9 were
primary sources of the destruction;
— as a result of their failure, basic damages sustained
by bearing structures due to the percussive effects caused by
the failed sets were situated at elevations ranging from 319.8
to 327.0 m;
— within the elevation range from 305.0 to 319.8 m, no
failure-induced destruction has been manifested within the
limits of the central body of inspected sets GS-6, GS-5, and
GS-4. The conditions of these bearing structures can be as-
sessed as serviceable;
— the strength of the concrete in both the sectional and
monolithic structures is higher than the design values
(M300-M400). The available strength reserve of the concrete
made it possible to reduce the volume of destruction of the
components as a result of greater unforeseen force-induced
effects; and,
— water conduits GS-6 and GS-5 are considered to be
in serviceable condition, and their technical condition has
made it possible to place generating sets GS-6 and GS-5 in
temporary service.
According to the chart for restorative work, which has
been approved by the on-site staff, it is planned to complete
341
inspections of structural components at the Sayano-Shushen-
skaya HPP in 2010. A final assessment of the condition of
the structures at the HPP could be provided after completion
of inspection of the remaining generating blocks, and partic-
ularly failed sets GS-2, GS-7, and GS-9 (impeller chamber,
spiral casing, water conduits, etc.).
Since studies related to multifactorial inspection of steel-
reinforced-concrete penstocks have yet to performed in the
Russian Federation, it will be necessary to fabricate struc-
tures and equipment for the safe deployment of people. It is
necessary to develop a program and perform complex engi-
neering diagnostics of penstocks during the period from
2010 through 2014 in conformity with the plan to replace the
generating sets during the period when a specific water con-
duit is taken out of service for an extended period of time.
There are currently no regulatory documents governing
the inspection of steel-reinforced-concrete conduits. Based
on the multifactorial investigations performed on the water
conduits at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, it is expedient
to develop a supplementary regulatory document entitled
“Guidelines for complex engineering monitoring of the con-
dition of penstocks at HPP.”
REFERENCES
1. Rules for Technical Operation of Electric Power Plants and
Grids of the Russian Federation [in Russian], SPO ORGRÉS,
Moscow (2003).
2. Regulating Document 153-34.0-20.340-98. Methodical Instruc-
tions for Monitoring the Condition of Metallic Pipelines at Hy-
droelectric Power Plants [in Russian].
3. V. I. Bryzgalov, Building and Operating Experience Gained
at the Krasnoyarsk and Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric
Power Plants [in Russian], Krasnoyarsk (1999).
4. Instructions for the Flood Protection of Mines and Preservation
of Undermined Entities at the Upper-Kama Potassium-Salt De-
posit (in Conformity with the State Committee for Supervision of
Industrial Safety and Mining Inspection of the Russian Federa-
tion issued 24 March 2004) [in Russian], St. Petersburg (2004).