LEZAMA vs.
RODRIGUEZ as president and had authority to receive in behalf of
23 SCRA 1166|G.R. No. L-25643|JUNE 27, 1968
PETITION: Appeal
PETITIONERS: SPS. JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA
LEZAMA
RESPONDENTS: HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ (Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo) JOSE DINEROS (in his capacity as
Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE PLANT & COLD STORAGE CO.) and
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: The reason for the privilege of husband and wife
not to testify against each other is the natural repugnance in
every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to
be the means of the other’s condemnation and to subjecting
the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the
words of his intimate life partner.
FACTS:
1) Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice
Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a
judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant by the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
2) It was alleged that because of the mismanagement by
the Lezamas, the ice plant was placed under the
receivership of Dineros; that Roque brought an action
in CFI Manila against the ice plant for the collection of
P150,000 which Roque supposedly lent to the ice
plant; that instead of serving the summons against
Dineros, it was served on the spouses; and that
through the collusion of the spouses and roque, the
latter was able to obtain a judgment against the ice
plant
3) The spouses answered by admitting that the ice plant
was placed in receivership, but Mr. Lezama remained
the company. They denied collusion with Roque
4) At the Hearing, Dineros asked the court to issue a
subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as a witness
summoned by the plaintiffs. This was granted over the
objection of the petitioners who invoked Rule 130
sec. 20(b). said provision deals with 2 different
matters which rest on different grounds of policy
5) the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita was
to do no more than testify as an adverse party in the
case, and indeed, in the light of the allegations both
in the complaint and in the answer, the request was
apparently one that could reasonably be expected to
be made
6) Dineros alleged that in obtaining a judgement against
the ice plant, the spouses in gross and evident bad
faith, and in fraudulent conspiracy made it appear
that the ice plant obtained a P150k loan from Roque
and allegedly upon an authority vested by the board
of directors. that the spouses manipulated the books
o fthe ice plant to make it appear that the loan was
obtained
7) the spouses answered by denying the allegations
above, that they did not contest the complaint for
collection since they believed that the action was
legitimate and the allegations were true
8) The spouses did not deny the allegation that it was
Paquita, who as secretary signed the minutes of the
meeting where Jose Manuel was allegedly authorized
to negotiate the loan
 9) Dineros wanted Paquita not as a witness for or against
her husband but as an adverse party in the case as
provided for in Rule 132 sec. 6
10) The trial court affirmed the petition to bring in
Paquita as witness and required her to appear.
11) The spouses filed an action for certiorari but the CA
dismissed the petition
evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that
charge.
DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from
are reversed, and this case is ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No
costs.

ISSUE: Whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her husband

in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by the
adverse party under Section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, without infringing on her marital privilege not to
testify against her husband under Section 20(b) of Rule 130.

HELD: The interests of husband and wife in this case are

necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife’s own
interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud
between the spouses and would then work havoc upon their
common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is
the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her own
guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a manner
entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.

Because of the unexpansive wording of the rule which

provides merely that the wife cannot be examined "for or
against her husband without his consent," it is further argued
that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there
is no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for
or against himself or herself alone," and his or her testimony
could operate only against himself or herself.

Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception

to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be
inapplicable in this case where the main charge is collusive
fraud between the spouses and a third person, and the