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 Capitol Medical Center Inc., vs. NLRC, GR No. 147080, April 26, 2005

 FACTS

- Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (the Union, for
brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical
Center, Inc. had been the bone of contention between the Union and the petitioner. The petitioners refusal to
negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike on April 15, 1993.

- The Union had to contend with another union the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-
ACE) which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.

- Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution on November 18, 1994 granting the appeal. He,
likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to the
Court which rendered judgment on February 4, 1997 affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus:
 1. Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of
Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and
 2. Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the
Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.[3]

- The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr.
Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss
matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the Court. [4] However, in a Letter
to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the
petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the following grounds:
 3) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and
other documents as required by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality
as a union.
 4) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the National Labor
Relations Commission.[5]

- Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations in a Letter dated October 16,
1997 and suggested the date, time and place of the initial meeting. The Union further reiterated its plea in another
Letter[6] dated October 28, 1997, to no avail.

- Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary Laguesma as affirmed
by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike
the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/
restraint to self-organization.[7]

- On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes[9] of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on
November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the
results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were
spoiled.[10]

- On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on December 1,
1997, the Union filed an ex parte motion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The
Union likewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions, not limited to contempt and other penalties,
against the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith,
to bargain collectively with the Union, to adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guilty
of unfair labor practices, and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises.[11]

- On December 4, 1997, the SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor dispute.
 WHEREFORE, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical
Center pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking
workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and
the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same

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terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist
from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

- In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to
work.

- For its part, the petitioner filed a petition[13] to declare the strike illegal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97.

- In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those members who
alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997. [16]

- In the meantime, on September 30, 1998, the Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the
petition for the cancellation of the respondent Unions certificate of registration. The decision was affirmed by
the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on December 29, 1998.

- In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision on December 23, 1998 in NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97 in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents
illegal. The fallo of the decision reads:
 1. Declaring as illegal the strike staged by the respondents from November 28, 1997 to December 5,
1997;
 2. Declaring respondent Jaime Ibabao, in his capacity as union president, the other union officers,
and respondents Ronald Q. Centeno, Michael Eustaquio and Henry Vera Cruz to have lost their
employment status with petitioner; and
 3. Ordering the above respondents to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) by way of damages.[17]

- The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered a Decision [18] on June 14, 1999, granting their
appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

- On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed decision and
resolution of the NLRC.

 ISSUES

- The petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the following
ground:

 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE NLRCS FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT
STRIKE.[23]

- The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared that the
respondents complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike.

- The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held on the said date by the
respondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular inspection of the area where the respondents
members allegedly held the voting. The petitioner also points out that it adduced documentary evidence in the form of
affidavits executed by 17 members of the respondent union which remained unrebutted. The petitioner also posits that
the CA and the NLRC erred in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter; furthermore, there was no need for the
respondent union to stage a strike on November 28, 1997 because it had filed an urgent motion with the DOLE for the
enforcement and execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118915.

 RULING

- The petition is meritorious.

- We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10,
Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads:
 Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret
ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must

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be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or

association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose.

The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected
party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer
shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the
preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results
of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the
cooling-off period provided in this Rule.

- Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union
intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least
twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting
of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same,
if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC,[25] the Court
enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the
24-hour prior notice to the NCMB:
 1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the
Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution
of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of
unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is
threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.
 4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting,
with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot
approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
 5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.

- A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a notice of
strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the
soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the
event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their
dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the
requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the
decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority,
and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. [26] A strike vote report
submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed,
taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the
appropriate remedy before it is too late. [27] The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the
opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, [28] while the
seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really
carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.[29]

- The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the
meeting for the said purpose is designed to

 (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote;

 (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the
conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and

 (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including
the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of
the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be.

Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of the unions decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date,
place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and
insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of
notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent
strike staged by the union ILLEGAL.

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- In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB
before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained
that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.

- Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines[30] and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code,[31] no labor organization shall declare a strike unless supported by a
majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The
requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike ILLEGAL. [32] The
union is thus mandated to allege and prove compliance with the requirements of the law.

- In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the
NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever
took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the
respondent Union.

- We agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted by the
respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital, at the corner of Scout Magbanua
Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City.

- IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and NLRC are
SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs.

 Phimco Industries Ins. vs. Phimco Industries Labor Association, GR No. 170830, Aug. 11, 2010

 FACTS
- PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with principal address at Phimco Compound, Felix
Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly authorized
bargaining representative of PHIMCOs daily-paid workers. The 47 individually named respondents are PILA
officers and members.
- When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA
negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to
disagreements on salary increases and benefits.
- On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on
the ground of the bargaining deadlock. Seven (7) days later, or on March 16, 1995, the union conducted a strike
vote; a majority of the union members voted for a strike as its response to the bargaining impasse. On March
17, 1995, PILA filed the strike vote results with the NCMB. Thirty-five (35) days later, or on April 21, 1995, PILA
staged a strike.
- On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing through force, intimidation and coercion the ingress and
egress of non-striking employees into and from the company premises.
- On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to explain within twenty-four
(24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike. Three days later, or on
June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal.

- On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with
the NLRC.
- On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and
ordered all the striking employees (except those who were handed termination papers on June 26, 1995) to
return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the order. The Secretary ordered PHIMCO to accept
the striking employees, under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. [4] On the same day, PILA
ended its strike.
- On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with the NLRC, with
a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
PHIMCO claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress from the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing
PHIMCOs operations.
- On March 14, 1996, the respondents filed their Position Paper in the illegal strike case. They countered that they
complied with all the legal requirements for the staging of the strike, they put up no barricade, and conducted their strike
peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without incident.

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- LA Mayor decided the case on February 4, 1998, [5] and found the strike illegal; the respondents committed
prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs premises and preventing the non-
striking employees from reporting for work.
- On March 5, 1998, PILA and its officers and members appealed LA Mayors decision to the NLRC.
- The NLRC decided the appeal on December 29, 1998, and set aside LA Mayors decision. [6] The NLRC did not
give weight to PHIMCOs evidence, and relied instead on the respondents evidence showing that the union conducted a
peaceful moving picket.
- On April 26, 2002, without waiting for the result of its motion for reconsideration, PHIMCO elevated its case to the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[9]
- In a Decision[10] promulgated on February 10, 2004, the CA dismissed PHIMCOs petition for certiorari. The CA
noted that the NLRC findings, that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCOs evidence failed to show that the
picket constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the points of entry to and exit from the company premises,
were supported by substantial evidence.
- The petitioner argues that the strike was illegal because the respondents committed the prohibited acts under
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, such as blocking the ingress and egress of the company premises, threat,
coercion, and intimidation, as established by the evidence on record.

 ISSUES
- Whether the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
unions strike was legal.

 RULING
- We find the petition partly meritorious.
- Requisites of a valid strike
o Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 263[16] of the Labor Code, which requires
that:
 (a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
 (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
 (c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike.
o These requirements are mandatory, and the unions failure to comply renders the strike illegal. [17] The
15 to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute
with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the
DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the
union members.[18]
o In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements; a strike notice
was filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike vote was
filed with the DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April 25, 1995.
- Strike may be illegal for commission of
prohibited acts
o Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may
still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal.[19]The means become illegal when they come
within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:
 No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.
o Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and the CA, we
find the PILA strike illegal.
o To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.[40] The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking
employees outside of the company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing
focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in
the company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from the employers premises,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
labor dispute.[41] It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual stoppage of work.
o While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of
expression[42] and the right to peaceably assemble to air grievances,[43]these rights are by no means
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absolute. Protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises.[44] That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free
it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.
- Intimidation
o Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence, coercion or
intimidation is unlawful.[62]
o The manner in which the respondent union officers and members conducted the picket in the present case
had created such an intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and even company vehicles did not
dare cross the picket line, even with police intervention. Those who dared cross the picket line were
stopped. The compulsory arbitration hearings bear this out.
- Liabilities of union officers and members
o In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article
264(a) of the Labor Code:
 Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x
xxxx
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
o We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.[71] that the
effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between participating
workers and union officers. The services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal acts
during the strike. The services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated,
not only when he actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates
in an illegal strike.[72]
o In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required; substantial
evidence, available under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal on participating workers and union officers as above described. [73]
- PHIMCO failed to observe due process
o Under Article 277(b)[79] of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee, who is about to be
terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
o We explained in Suico v. National Labor Relations Commission,[80] that Article 277(b), in relation to Article
264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction
as to the cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed involvement in strike-related
violence prohibited under Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code.
o To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish him
or her with two (2) written notices:
 (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee a reasonable
opportunity to explain his side and
 (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee. [81]
- WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated February 10,
2004 and the resolution dated December 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70336, upholding the
rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission.

 Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Employees Union vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. GR nos. 164302-03, Jan. 24, 2007

 FACTS
- The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The individual petitioners are Union officers,
directors, and shop stewards.
- The Union and the Company had entered into a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
effective July 1, 1996 to expire on June 30, 1999. Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company
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of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the
Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa
ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and
members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the
view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of
employees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.[2]
- On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
- The petitioners relied on two grounds: (a) deadlock on CBA ground rules; and (b) unfair labor practice arising from the
companys refusal to bargain
- The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss [4] alleging that the reasons cited by the Union were not valid grounds for a
strike.
- Meanwhile, on September 15, 1999, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa
ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola in front of the Companys premises set for September 21, 1999. 106 Union
members, officers and members of the Board of Directors, and shop stewards, individually filed applications
for leave of absence for September 21, 1999. Certain that its operations in the plant would come to a complete
stop since there were no sufficient trained contractual employees who would take over, the Company
disapproved all leave applications and notified the applicants accordingly.[6] A day before the mass action, some
Union members wore gears, red tag cloths stating YES KAMI SA STRIKE as headgears and on the different parts of
their uniform, shoulders and chests.
- The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it to conduct a mass protest action within the perimeter of
the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.[7] Thus, the Union officers and members
held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14 personnel of the Engineering
Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one
of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift
with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The
volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical case[s] versus budget. [8]
- On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal [9].
- On November 26, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[15] granting the petition of the Company. He
declared that the September 21, 1999 mass leave was actually a strike under Article 212 of the Labor Code for the
following reasons: based on the reports submitted by the Production and Engineering Department of the Company,
there was a temporary work stoppage/slowdown in the company; [16] out of the usual three (3) lines for production for the
day shift, only one line operated by probationary employees was functional and there was a cumulative downtime of
five (5) hours attributed to the lack of manning complement and skills requirement.
- According to the Labor Arbiter, the strike conducted by the Union was illegal since there was no showing that
the Union conducted a strike vote, observed the prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote to the
DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly participating in the illegal strike, the individual petitioners
were considered to have lost their employment status. [18]
- The Union appealed the decision to the NLRC. On July 31, 2002, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter with the modification.
- The Union and its officers, directors and the shop stewards, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
- On September 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It also declared that
petitioners, in CA-G.R. SP No. 74860, were guilty of forum shopping.

 ISSUES
- The threshold issues in these cases are:
 (a) whether the September 21, 1999 mass action staged by the Union was a strike;
 (b) if, in the affirmative, whether it was legal; and
 (c) whether the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union should be dismissed from
their employment.

 RULING
- The petition is denied for lack of merit.
- The ruling of the CA that petitioners staged a strike on September 21, 1999, and not merely a picket is correct.
o Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals,[31] the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.[32] The term strike encompasses not only
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concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy
or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities. [33]
o Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor
dispute.[34] As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to
observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable
persuasion.[35]
o A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms
and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.[36]
o Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on
the general peace and progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. For a strike
to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a
notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor
practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. [39] It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the
statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
o In the present case, there is no evidence on record to show that respondents had complied with the
above mandatory requirements of law for a valid strike. Particularly, there is no showing that respondents
had observed the prescribed cooling-off period, conducted a strike vote, much less submitted a strike vote
report to the Department of Labor within the required time. This being the case, respondents strike
on September 21, 1999 is illegal. In the recent case of CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, 2999 (sic)
SCRA 410, the Supreme Court had said: It bears stressing that the strike requirements under Article 264
and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory requisites, without which, the strike will be considered
illegal.
- On the second and third issues, the ruling of the CA affirming the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter
ordering the dismissal of the petitioners-officers, directors and shop stewards of petitioner Union is correct.
o It bears stressing, however, that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers.
A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only
when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment
status.[41] For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment.[42] The
law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having
lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. [43]
- IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

 Capitol Medical Center Inc. vs. Trajano, GR Nos. 155690, June 2005

 FACTS

- Capitol Medical Center, Inc., petitioner, is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout Magbanua Street,
Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino
Workers, respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of petitioner hospital.

- On October 2, 1997, respondent union, through its president Jaime N. Ibabao, sent petitioner a letter requesting a
negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

- In its reply dated October 10, 1997, petitioner, challenging the unions legitimacy, refused to bargain with
respondent. Subsequently or on October 15, 1997, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR),
Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration,

- For its part, on October 29, 1997, respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
National Capital Region, a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-453-97. Respondent alleged that
petitioners refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated
conciliator-mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

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- On November 28, 1997, respondent staged a strike.

- On December 4, 1997, former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, now Associate Justice of this Court,
issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all striking workers to return to work and
the management to resume normal operations,

- Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 27, 1998.

- Meantime, on October 1, 1998, the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order denying the
petition for cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration. [5]

- On September 20, 2001, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the Secretary of Labor.

- It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable
him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.

- On October 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

- Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

- Petitioner contends that its petition for the cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration involves a
prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of Labor could order the parties to bargain
collectively.

 ISSUES
-

 RULING

- We are not persuaded.

- As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition, the Secretary of Labor correctly ruled that
the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining, thus:

 That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the respondent Union is not a bar to
set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be
ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the unions registration certificate (National
Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274), more so should the collective
bargaining process continue despite its pendency. We must emphasize that the majority status of
the respondent Union is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending
against it. Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent
are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty bound to collectively
bargain with the Union. xxx (Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United
Filipino Service Worker vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al., G.R. No. L-118915.)

- Petitioner also maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code without observing the requirements of due process.

- Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts.

xxxxxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over
the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption
or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and

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Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

x x x. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical
institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective
skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and
unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most
especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of
the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders,
prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain
of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out
employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.

- The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries
that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

- In Magnolia Poultry Employees Union vs. Sanchez,[6] we held that the discretion to assume jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to
any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own
consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interests.

- In sum, petitioners submissions are bereft of merit.

- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 20, 2001 and the Resolution dated
October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

 Steel Corporation of the Phils., vs. SCP Employees Union-NAFLU, GR now. 169829-30, April 16, 2008

 FACTS
- Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying
approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. [3] On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Union of the
Energy Leaders General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to
represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.[4] Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election [5] but
the same was denied for having been filed out of time.[6]
- On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices. Said
election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their
votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete with
irregularities.[7] On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for
Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner.[8] The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification
election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the conduct of the election with NAFLU and NO UNION as
choices. Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later
consolidated.[9]
- On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a consolidated
decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with FUEL-GAS, respondent and NO UNION as
choices.[10] Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18, 1999.[11] Unsatisfied, petitioner and
FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.[12]
- On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated without
prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent emerged as winner; hence,
the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.[13]
- Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision[20] certifying respondent as the
exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.[21]

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- As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for
reconsideration.[22]
- Finding no justification in petitioners refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor practice
(ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latters refusal to bargain with it. [23]
- On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA
decision.[24] On February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision.[25]
- On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.[26] Again, on April 2, 2001, another Notice of
Strike[27] was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination against
union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later consolidated with the
certified case.
- On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioners refusal to bargain and union
busting.[33] The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike. [34]
- On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union
busting.[35] Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the Labor Secretary
certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work. [36] The second certified case was
docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision[37] ordering
petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered
the reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without
loss of seniority rights and diminution of salary. [38] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution[39] dated January 26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.
- Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision[40] dated February 12,
2003 opted to resolve the parties respective motions for reconsideration collectively. In said decision, the NLRC
modified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the union officers whom it previously ordered terminated,
which in effect denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration. [41] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied in a Resolution dated June 30, 2003.[42]These decision and resolution became the subject of a petition
before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.
- On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[45] denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially
granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.
- In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of
the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioners claims are based on pure allegations and
not supported by any substantial evidence.[46]
- In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect, nullified and set aside. It is to be
noted that FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA added
that since it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was voted as the
duly-elected bargaining agent of petitioners rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its claim and it has no
right to demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it. [47]

 ISSUES
- Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. [WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE REINSTATEMENT OF OFFICERS
WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE.
2. [WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
DECLARE AS ILLEGAL THE STRIKE HELD BY THE UNION ON FEBRUARY 4, 2003.
3. [WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
INVALIDATE THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DIRECTING
THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE STRIKERS WHO DEFIED THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF
THE LABOR SECRETARY.
4. [WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE NLRC HAS RECONSIDERED ITS CONCLUSION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF
THE MARCH 2001 STRIKE.
5. [WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION MAY RECONSIDER

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IN THE SECOND CERTIFIED CASE ITS DECISION ON THE FIRST CERTIFIED CASE WHICH
HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.[50]

- Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim, petitioner
argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent as
the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to
conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding
the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition-strike, it
is illegal.[51]
- Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code,
particularly Art. 264,[52] which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending
arbitration between the parties.[53]
- Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost their
employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that they
committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their termination from
employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of the union
officers was warranted.[55]
- Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision [56] ordering the
reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike. It argues that
since the termination of the employees was due to their refusal to comply with the return-to-work order issued by the
Labor Secretary, not to their alleged participation in an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the decision. [57]
- Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the
NLRC may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.[58]
- Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the
negative. Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the
only issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent
union; and the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation.

 RULING
- The petition is meritorious.
- In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following
reasons:
 (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws;
 (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and
 (3) it was in violation of the Secretary’s return-to-work order.
- Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondents purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike
would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretarys return-to-work order and after
the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration.
- Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x.[62]
- The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of
the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is
granted great breadth of discretion to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the
automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. [63]
- Art. 264. Prohibited activities.
xxx
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
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- Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must
return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue
serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at
arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
- Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the
provisions of labor laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases
which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CAs
decision. That way, the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been
compelled to bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to
recognize it as the bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for
arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.
- Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the
union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
- Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. x x x
Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike
shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.
- It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. For knowingly participating in an
illegal strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union
officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and
prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. [68] Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to
their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and
preventing management from filling up their positions. [69]
- WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in
that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal
strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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