American Academy of Religion

The Post-Bultmannian Trend

Author(s): John B. Cobb, Jr.
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jan., 1962), pp. 3-11
Published by: Oxford University Press
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An AmericanView
The Trend
Post-Bultmannian
JOHN B. COBB,JR.
TO labelthat movementof contem- speaking world that its delay in sharing in
porary continental theology which
seems most vigorous and creative
today is just as difficult as was the labelling
of the movement after World War I led by
Karl Barth. The Barthian movement has
through the years displayed more and more
clearly its inner diversity to such a degree
that we no longer try to place Tillich, Bult-
mann, Gogarten, and Brunner in a single
school along with Barth. All these others
acknowledge the importance of the stimulus
they received from Barth, and perhaps they
could be labelled together as post-Barthian.
In a similar way several of the most impor-
tant currents of thought that we now see
emerging on the European continent bear
the mark of the profound influence of the
work of Rudolf Bultmann. For this reason
they may be called post-Bultmannian. But
any attempt to identify post-Bultmannianism
as a theological position is doomed to failure.
We may safely predict that even among
those who now emphasize common concerns
and commitments, the passage of the years
will reveal basic divergences.
It is the good fortune of the English-
JOHN B. COBB,JR. is AssociateProfessorof
SystematicTheology in the SouthernCalifornia
Schoolof Theologyat Claremont.Readersof this
splendidarticlewill be pleasedto know that Pro-
fessor Cobbhas workedout and documentedhis
understanding of RudolfBultmann'spositionin a
sectionof his forthcomingstudytentativelyentitled
Living Optionsin ProtestantTheology(Westmin-
ster Press). He and JamesM. Robinsonare edit-
ing a new Harper series on DiscussionsAmong
Germanand American Theologians. An initial vol-
ume, The Later Heidegger and Theology, will ap-
pear in 1962.
3
the post-Bultmannian developments has not
been as great as with the post-Barthian
movement. Such men as John Macquarrie in
England and James M. Robinson in Amer-
ica have not only interpreted these move-
ments in terms of other contemporary de-
velopments but personally participated in
them. Post-Bultmannianism is more likely
than any earlier theological movement to be
a shared experience of the German and Eng-
lish-speaking theological communities.
I
If we are to speak of post-Bultmannianism
intelligently, we must reach some agreement
on the position of Bultmann himself.' It is a
many-sided position arising in part out of
technical New Testament studies, in part
out of a modern world view, in part out of
the influence of Kierkegaard and the early
Barth, and in part out of fruitful association
with Heidegger. Bultmann has achieved a
remarkable integration of these influences,
but it is not surprising that tensions and in-
consistencies remain and give rise to a con-
fusing diversity of interpretation by ad-
mirers and critics alike.
I suggest that, at least for theological pur-
poses, we will understand Bultmann best if
we focus on the last two principles of his
thought just listed, those from Kierkegaard
through Barth and from Heidegger. The
first principle is that of paradox or "as
though not," the principle that the act of
God occurs in history but never appears
from the standpoint of history. Specifically
this means that the act of God in the death
and resurrection of Jesus Christ is, on the
one hand, the once-for-all occurrence on
4 JOHN B. COBB,JR.
which all Christian faith wholly depends and,
on the other hand, something absolutely un-
verifiable from the standpoint of historical
research. Furthermore, this latter unverifi-
ability is not to be understood as some un-
fortunate result of modem scholarship but
instead as a positive fulfillment of the ideal
of faith, i.e., faith has no support outside it-
self and is false to itself when it seeks such
support. The once-for-all event may in the
freedom of God become contemporary for
us in its proclamation. The act of God in
which this occurs for us is the effecting in
us of Christian existence.
At this point the second principle becomes
decisive. The task of the theologian is to ex-
press and describe Christian existence or
Christian self-understanding. His normative
source for such work is the New Testament.
Any account of a special mode of self-under-
standing requires as its framework a general
account of human existence. In Heidegger's
phenomenology of existence such an account
is available to us-an account far better than
anything available to New Testament writ-
ers. Hence, theology becomes the formulation
in Heideggerian categories of the distinc-
tively Christian understanding of human ex-
istence.
From the perspective of these two princi-
ples we can grasp the basic meaning of
Bultmann's demythologizing venture. Some-
times he seems to justify it in terms of his
own understanding of the modem world
view, but I am here assuming that this is
not the central principle of his thought. Pre-
sumably, even if he were not so sure that in
the modern world we must think in terms of
a closed universe, he would still object to any
account of the acts of God that pictured
them as tangible and visible from natural
and historical perspectives. Since he rejects
such picturization of the acts of God yet
acknowledges that it occurs frequently in
the New Testament, he cannot accept the
New Testament literally as it stands. He
must, on the one hand, separate the affirma-
tion that God acted in Jesus Christ from all
such objectifying language and, on the other
hand, uncover and reformulate in non-ob-
jectifying language the understanding of ex-
istence contained in the objectifying lan-
guage. This de-objectifying of the New
Testament Bultmann calls demythologizing.
Since Bultmann's understanding of myth is
only one of several possible interpretations,
a considerable part of the confusion attend-
ing the demythologizing controversy would
be avoided if the word "myth" were dropped
from the discussion.
For our purposes the most important con-
sequence of Bultmann's two principles is
their bearing upon the relation of Jesus to
Christian faith. It is true that Bultmann de-
fends his position here on the basis of criti-
cal historical scholarship, but the position
follows systematically in considerable inde-
pendence of such scholarly arguments. If the
one all-decisive act of God occurred in the
death and resurrection of Jesus and in such
a way as to be invisible to any historical
perspective, it follows that the form and con-
tent of the historical life of Jesus must be
essentially irrelevant to Christian faith. This
would be true even if historical scholarship
should show that Jesus explicitly proclaimed
himself Messiah2 (which Bultmann em-
phatically does not believe) and regardless
of any similarity that may obtain between
Jesus' own understanding of existence and
that of Christian faith. This does not mean
that at the level of historical study we can-
not state a great deal about Jesus' message
and the understanding of existence that it
expresses,3 or that we cannot trace cause-
effect relationships between Jesus' message
and the form in which the act of God is pro-
claimed by the disciples. But again all this
is ultimately irrelevant to faith. What is
proclaimed by faith is the crucified and res-
urrected Christ, not Jesus' understanding of
existence.4
 THE POST-BULTMANNIAN TREND
II curs at the point of the act of God in the
That the rejection of ultimate concern resurrectionevent. The affirmationthat the
about the historical Jesus follows system-
atically from the Kierkegaardian principle
in Bultmann's thought suggests that the re-
vival of the quest of the historical Jesus in
post-Bultmannianism has accompanied a de-
cline of this emphasis. Unfortunately, so
much discussion has centered on historical-
critical questions that the systematically de-
cisive issues have been obscured. Neverthe-
less, we may assert that only as some shift
occurs in the understanding of the content
of Christian proclamation can the historical
Jesus assume genuine importance for faith
and theology.
The point of widest agreement among the
advocates of a new quest of the historical
Jesus is that Jesus is to be understood as
falling within the sphere of Christian faith
rather than within Judaism. Bultmann de-
nies this on the ground that the all-decisive
event is that of Easter. The Christian epoch
is not inaugurated until this event. His argu-
ment is that Jesus, along with other Jews,
looks forward to the Easter event, whereas
Christian faith looks back upon it. Bult-
mann's position is countered here by the
assertion that Jesus himself already looks
back to the preliminary inauguration of the
New Age in John the Baptist.5 Of course, he
also looks forward to the consummation of
the New Age in the future. But this latter
position is shared as well by those who affirm
the Easter faith. Hence, Jesus' orientation
toward the future is no reason to deny him
a place within the sphere of Christian faith.
The above rejoinder to Bultmann need in-
volve no more than modest intent. One may
employ it to justify Christian interest in
Jesus without suggesting that the historical
Jesus has equal importance for Christians
with the act of God in the crucifixion-resur-
rection event.6 However, the consequences
of this modification of Bultmann's position
are likely to be drastic. For the crucial point
in his position is that an absolute break oc-
5
break has already taken place in part at an
earlierjuncture,namely,in Johnthe Baptist,
has the effect of pluralizing or fragmenting
the act of God, that is, the eschatological
event. The outcomeis a successionof acts of
God with some intelligiblecumulativemean-
ing.
It is, of course, possible to affirm that the
New Age had its absoluteorigin in John the
Baptist, but it is likely that such a position
will prove unstable. If we first distinguish
the mode of presence of the New Age as be-
ginning with John and then make it begin
with the crucifixion-resurrection event, we
have in effect introduced the idea of degrees
of presence.7It then becomesextremelydif-
ficult to deny that to some lesser degreethe
New Age was also introducedby the mighty
acts of God in the earlier history of Israel.
Hence, the idea that the New Age already
beganwithJohnthe Baptistis likelyto open
the way to a revival of Heilsgeschichte as the
appropriate form of Christian theology.8
A second principle of the new quest of the
historical Jesus is closely related to the first
but goes beyond it in crucial respects. The
first point was simply that Jesus is to be un-
derstood as a Christian. The second point is
that Jesus' message is effective as kerygma.
Bultmann does hold that the Christian ke-
rygma is the proclamation of God's gracious
act of inauguration of a wholly new possi-
bility of existence in the once-for-all cruci-
fixion-resurrection of Jesus. He stresses,
however, that the kerygma is truly heard
only as it mediates the experience in the
hearer of dying to his old self and rising to a
new life of freedom and love. In one sense,
the kerygma, therefore, is the offer of such
life. But for representatives of the new quest,
Jesus' authentic sayings mediate to us the
grace of God, just as the preaching of the
early church does. Indeed, the message of
Jesus and the kerygma of the church are in
essence identical. This point has been espe-
6 JOHN B. COBB, JR.
cially developed by Robinson.9 His position
is that the offer of new life is given also in
the authentic message of Jesus, and from this
he argues to a material identity of Jesus'
message with the kerygma. If the meaning
of the kerygma is essentially its existential
meaning for the hearer, such a conclusion
seems inescapable. If, however, the primary
meaning of the kerygma is that God acted
decisively and once-for-all in the crucifixion-
resurrection event, then the similarity of the
existential import of Jesus' preaching and of
the kerygma is of only incidental interest for
faith. Thus it is that by a weakening of what
I am calling the Kierkegaardian-Barthian
element in Bultmann, the theological justifi-
cation of the new quest is effected.
A third principle builds upon the other
two but adds to them and qualifies them in
important ways. If the second principle
places Jesus' message on a position of equal-
ity with the kerygma, the third assigns to the
historical Jesus the decisive place in theolog-
ical interest. Relying again upon Robinson's
formulation, we may state this third princi-
ple as maintaining that the function of the
kerygma is to mediate Jesus' self-under-
standing.10Once we understand the kerygma
in this way, the possibility of a more direct
encounter with Jesus in his self-understand-
ing through the recovery of his authentic
sayings is given utmost theological impor-
tance. It even provides a basis for judging
the kerygma of the church from a more re-
liable and adequate perspective."1
Bultmann, of course, rejects this under-
standing of the kerygma. Such rejection is
made once again in terms of the Kierke-
gaardian-Barthian principle in his thought.
The encounter with a possible way of under-
standing our existence is a proper aim of
historical studies, but it is subject to all the
relativism of such studies. Jesus' mode of
self-understanding is one among many pos-
sible modes of self-understanding. As such it
cannot demand from us absolute decision.
This element of absolute decisiveness, which
Bultmann regards as essential to Christian
faith, is correlative to the absolutely mysteri-
ous and historically undiscoverable act of
God which occurs at the end of the life of
the historical Jesus and recurs whenever the
proclamation of that act is repeated.
Although in some respects these three
principles are mutually supportive and all
three find a place in Robinson's understand-
ing and justification of the new quest, they
stand also in some tension with each other.
Here I shall note only the tensions between
the first and the third, reserving for the fol-
lowing section a consideration of the possi-
ble implications of the second. According to
the first principle the eschatological acts of
God are located in the events of John the
Baptist and the crucifixion-resurrection.
This means that Jesus could at once look
backward and forward to the acts of God.
If Jesus' ministry is seen as the locus of ad-
ditional acts of God, these occur within the
larger series of such acts and thus cannot be
considered as in themselves all-decisive. On
the other hand, if we regard our ultimate
existential need as that of encountering the
self-understanding of Jesus (either through
its reflection in the kerygma or more di-
rectly in his authentic sayings), this presup-
poses that that self-understanding-subject
to the freedom of God-is itself the effective
agent of the New Age. The ultimately de-
cisive act of God should then be seen in
God's encounter with Jesus rather than in
the work of John the Baptist or in the cruci-
fixion-resurrection event. The event of John
would receive its importance from the inter-
pretation placed upon it by Jesus and the
crucifixion-resurrection event would be un-
derstood in terms of the delayed effect on the
disciples of their encounter with the histori-
cal Jesus. The transition from one age to the
other occurs in the event of Jesus' new un-
derstanding of existence grounded in his
unique encounter with God.
All the systematic or substantive issues
between Robinson and other post-Bultmann-
 THE POST-BULTMANNIAN TREND 7

ian proponents of the new quest on the one about how this possibilityfirst appearedin
hand and Bultmann on the other are also ex- history.
egetical issues. Bultmann appeals to Paul This position is theoretically compatible
and John as having dissociated the act of with the view that the possibility of Christian
God in the exalted Lord from the historical existence depends absolutely on God's
Jesus.' Whether this understanding of the unique act in Christ. The origin is super-
two apostles can survive the criticism of natural but, once inaugurated, Christian ex-
those who on systematic grounds prefer to istence is made possible apart from aware-
stress the unity of the historical Jesus with ness of this origin. And as a matter of fact
the Christ proclaimed in Christian preaching such advocates of this view as Schubert M.
remains to be seen. Furthermore, Bultmann's Ogden understand the possibility of Chris-
special canonization of Paul and John is not tian existence to be grounded in the univer-
independent of his personal preference for sal human situation of freedom before the
their more gnostic theologies. Further fer- grace of God.13
ment in critical New Testament scholarship The issue between Ogden's position and
is to be expected at this very point. that of the new quest is one of the factual
dependence of Christian existence on an en-
counter with Jesus Christ. Bultmann, of
III
course, believes in this dependence, but he
Thus far my main contention has been also believes that once whatever is encoun-
that the most conspicuous post-Bultmannian tered is de-absolutized, the necessity of the
movement, the new quest of the historical encounter can no longer be affirmed. Those
Jesus, depends systematically on a gradual who support the new quest have before them
dissolution of the Kierkegaardian-Barthian the task of showing the inextricable relation
principle in Bultmann's thought. But it must of encountering the self-understanding of
be emphasized as well that this dissolution is Jesus and participating in Christian exist-
also compatible with a rejection of that ence. Once again, the systematic and factual
quest. We have seen that the second of the questions are intertwined with exegetical
three principles on which the quest has been questions, since each position supports itself
undertaken involves equating the essential by means of an interpretation of the New
meaning of the kerygma with its existential Testament.
meaning for the hearer. That is, the meaning Ogden presents his position not simply as
of the kerygma lies in its offer of a new life his own but also as the only legitimate out-
attainedthroughdying to one's old self. On come of Bultmann's own principles. He
the basis of this principle it is persuasively chides Bultmann for failing to carry through
argued that Jesus' message is essentially the program of demythologizing in a way
identical with the kerygma. But a most sig- that will free theology from appeal to an act
nificant implication of the principle is that of God of a unique order discontinuous with
any message with such existential import is man's general relatedness to God. From Og-
just as Christian as any other message. den's point of view the affirmation of such
Neither the encounter with Jesus' own un- an "act of God" is clearly mythological and
derstanding of existence nor the encounter unacceptable as such. To demythologize, Og-
with the proclamation of the crucifixion-res- den holds, is to replace affirmations about
urrection event is, in principle, required. divine acts with an account of the existen-
The essential content of the Christian mes- tial meaning of such affirmations. Only the
sage becomes the possibility of Christian ex- latter is theologically acceptable. If, as Og-
istence in abstraction from any affirmation den affirms, Bultmann can give no adequate
 8 JOHN B. COBB,JR.
reason for refusing to carry through his
program at this point, then Ogden may
rightlyclaimthat his own interpretationrep-
resents the authentic completion of Bult-
mann'sessentialprogram.14
Ogden'spositiongains some supportfrom
Bultmann'sown procedure.When Bultmann
demythologizes New Testament eschatology
with its three-story universe, he does so by
substituting statements about existential self-
understanding for statements about the fu-
ture and the cosmos. Thus to a considerable
degree, for Bultmann, demythologizing is an
interpretation using Heidegger's categories
of existence that engages in a process of ab-
straction from any event or entity objective
to the individual. However, Bultmann does
not understand demythologizing as such to
involve such abstraction from something
initially objective to the individual. After all,
there is nothing mythological either in as-
serting that a past event has actual or possible
import for present existence or even in af-
firming that such an event is an act of God-
so long as that act is not held to be visible
apart from faith. It is true that New Testa-
ment language about the pre-existence of
Christ, the virgin birth, the transfiguration,
the resurrection, and the ascension requires
demythologizing, but such demythologizing
only brings to sharpest focus the unique act
of God in Jesus' death and resurrection. In-
terpretation in existential categories does not
involve elimination of this act; it means in-
stead the exposition of the profound meaning
of the act for the believer.
The real difference between Bultmann and
Ogden is, therefore, not that Ogden is con-
sistent where Bultmann has refused to be so,
but that Ogden has no place for the Bult-
mannian idea of an act of God. In Ogden's
view no such act is needed, since it is man's
universal situation before God that provides
the possibility of authentic existence. Fur-
thermore, Ogden finds the idea of such acts
simply unacceptable to the modern mind; he
opposes any sacrifice of the intellect to
faith.15 Bultmann, on the other hand, recog-
nizes that the kerygmatic affirmation scan-
dalizes modem man, but he regards this as
representative of the essential and authentic
scandal of faith.
The post-Bultmannian tendencies thus far
treated are all left-wing. They all follow (or
exceed) Bultmann in their zeal for demy-
thologizing in existential terms. There are,
of course, other interpreters who acknowl-
edge the validity of the demythologizing pro-
cedure but in limits that will save from de-
objectification a greater or lesser number of
events, and notably the resurrection of
Christ. More important in what we may call
the right-wing response to the challenge of
demythologizing, at least in the United
States, is the heightened interest in the na-
ture of myth and indeed in religious lan-
guage generally. Demythologizing is opposed
by many interpreters on the ground that
myth is essential to religious expression. We
must recognize the importance of Bultmann
in stimulating this discussion, but we can
hardly regard the proponents of a positive
use of myth and symbol in theology as dis-
tinctively post-Bultmannian. They are much
better understood as Tillichian or post-
Tillichian.
IV
Bultmann is important not only for his
historical work but also for his articulate
use of, and concern with, philosophy. This
means that the term post-Bultmannian
should be used not only for those who carry
forward Bultmann's historical research in
the New Testament and accept his account
of the nature of Christian existence, but also
for those who are influenced through him to
make self-conscious use of philosophy in
their theological work. Specifically, the in-
creasing use of Heidegger in continental the-
ology should be included under the heading
of post-Bultmannianism.
Bultmann has limited his use of Heidegger
to the latter's phenomenological analysis of
 THE POST-BULTMANNIAN TREND
humanexistencein his early work, Sein und
Zeit. But others have seen no reason to
limit themselvesin this way. Gogartenhas
placed much emphasis on Heidegger's re-
jection of subject-object thinking,le from
which Bultmannhimselfis not entirelyfree.
Fuchs and Ebelinghave appealedto Heideg-
ger's later study of language. But it is
Heinrich Ott who has most clearly pointed
out the importancefor theology of the shift
from the early work of Heideggeron which
Bultmannrelies to the later work in which
Heidegger "surpasses"metaphysics.17The
shift of focus here is emphaticallyaway from
"humanexistence"toward"being."Authen-
ticity is no longer understoodas a living out
of one's own properpotentialitiesbut as the
sheer "lettingbe" of "what is." To put the
mattervery abruptly,Heideggershifts from
what seemed to be existentialismto a phi-
losophyof being.This philosophyof being is
not, in Heidegger'sterms, a matterof meta-
physics, becauseit goes beyondthe question
of the being of entities to that of being per
se. But this being is not hypostatizedas
Being Itself or the Ground of Being; it is
simply being--in its immediacy,manifold-
ness, and becoming.
Ott sees the positionof the later Heideg-
ger as in crucial respects supportingBarth
rather than Bultmann.As with Barth, the
focus of attentionis away from the self and
its understandingof existence toward the
given. For the philosopher,this given is be-
ing; for the theologian,it is the revelationof
God. In bothcases the thinkerattemptsto let
what is given to him simply be itself. His
work is authentic when the language in
which he reflectsis formedby that which is
given to him rather than structuredby his
own personal, prior understanding. Ott
shows that the phenomenologicalquest for
freedomfrom all presuppositionsculminates
in a movement beyond the regional ontology
of existence so painfully elaborated by the
earlier Heidegger. Hence theology also
should move beyond Bultmann in his ex-
9
tensive dependenceon this ontology as a
modeof philosophical
pre-understanding.
V
If one asks what all this means for the
teacherof religionin the Americanscene,
the answercan only be that it may mean
manythingsandthatthe choiceis left with
him.I havetriedto suggestthatthe devel-
opmentof post-Bultmannianism does not
mean that close adherenceto Bultmann's
own positionhas been madesystematically
impossible.I thinkthat whilemorecareful
formulation is now required,it is still pos-
sibleto followBultmannin maintaining the
non-objectifiable once-for-allact of God in
the crucifixion-resurrection of Jesus Christ
on whichthe renewalof the life of eachbe-
lieverdepends.But one mustthenrecognize
andacceptthe depreciation of the historical
Jesusandthepreceding historyof Israelthat
is entailedas well as the factthat Christian
affirmationshave to operatein a tightly
closedcircle.Indeed,the resultmust be a
moreBarthianBultmannthanwe havecus-
tomarilyknown.
Thosewhocannotfollowsucha Barthian
Bultmannmaymovein any one of several
post-Bultmannian directions.In the first
place,probably theradicalseparation in many
circlesof the Christof faithfromthehistori-
calJesusandtheacutederogation of interest
in thelatterthataccompanied suchseparation
will be a decreasinglyacceptableposition.
On the whole,the Americantraditionhas
neverfoundthisaspectof continental dialec-
ticaltheologyattractive,and with its aban-
donmentin Germanpost-Bultmannianism
we may expectits influencein Americato
wane rapidly.The dangeris that in this
countrythe revivalof interestin the quest
of the historicalJesuswill failto distinguish
itselfadequately fromthe nineteenth-century
quest. Nevertheless,the renewalof the quest
should mean a greater willingness to ac-
knowledgethe varied ways in which within
the New Testamentitself faith is relatedto
 10 JOHN B. COBB, JR.
the historic person and event of Jesus Christ.
Such openness should also result in raising
anew the question of the history of revela-
tion in its continuity from Old to New Tes-
tament times as well as in its discontinuity.
The historical Jesus has now been re-appro-
priated in terms of his own self-understand-
ing. The whole history of revelation needs
corresponding rediscovery on the basis of
the actual development of self-understanding
in Israel rather than in terms of the history
of Israel's past constructed by successive
projections of the stages in that self-under-
standing. Such a task will require the appli-
cation of existential categories and those of
depth psychology to the whole Israelite lit-
erature, along with the traditional disciplines
of Form-criticism, archaeology, and compar-
ative religion. In sum, I am suggesting that
one impact of post-Bultmannianism may be
a new, secularized Heilsgeschichte. Of cru-
cial importance will be the question of the
relation of our present participation in sal-
vation to our consciousness of the events
through which such participation has become
a possibility.
In the second place, we may safely predict
that American religious thought will be com-
pelled by post-Bultmannian developments
to take a serious interest in the work of
Heidegger and especially in the transition
from the earlier to the later stages of his
thought. His writings are becoming increas-
ingly available in English, although unfor-
tunately this does not in itself guarantee a
ready response on the part of the American
mind. Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge
that to a large degree the new frontiers of
theology and of biblical scholarship will be
expressions of the varied impact of Heideg-
ger upon other German thinkers. Hence, if
we are to maintain creative contact with con-
tinental thought, we must come to terms re-
sponsibly with this difficult thinker. Prob-
ably in the coming decade Heidegger will
receive more careful attention among Amer-
ican theologians than among American phi-
losophers.
In the third place, post-Bultmannianism
may be expected to institute a more rigorous
and searching interest in philosophy and its
relations to theology. This interest never
waned in America to the degree that it de-
clined in Europe, but the revival of a self-
conscious use of philosophical categories in
post-Bultmannianism will also challenge
American philosophical theology. Our study
of Heidegger must be a comparative study.
The fact that he is the pre-eminent philo-
sophic influence on German theologians does
not necessarily mean that he provides a phi-
losophy intrinsically better or more suited to
the needs of Christian theology than such
other twentieth-century philosophers as Al-
fred North Whitehead.
Should the impact of Bultmann eventuate
in a new form of Heilsgeschichte on the one
hand and a revival of philosophical theology
on the other, the results will certainly be
ironical. But such irony is not infrequently
the fate of thinkers. From some perspectives
Bultmann will have wrought better than he
dreamed.
With respect to the diversity of directions
in which post-Bultmannianism may develop,
there seems to be only one constant. The ap-
plication of the phenomenological method to
human existence is with us to stay. In a gen-
eral way this is nothing new, for Christians
have always attended to the contents of their
experience with some objectivity. But the
life work of Edmund Husserl in refining
phenomenological method and the brilliant
application of this method to human exist-
ence by Heidegger and Sartre have raised
erstwhile random analyses to the level of a
science. Thus, psychiatry has been deeply
affected by these achievements, and neither
academic psychology nor Anglo-Saxon phi-
losophy can permanently ignore them. Fur-
ther, Roman Catholic thinkers have already
made impressive use of phenomenological
method under the direct influence of Hus-
 THE POST-BULTMANNIAN TREND 11

serl. Protestants have so far experienced its M. Robinson,New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960,
impact primarily through students of the his- p. 51. This point is also taken up in James M.
Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus,
tory of religions on the one hand and Hei- London: SCM Press, 1959, pp. 17-18, 116-19, and
degger and Sartre on the other. Perhaps the it is noted in Bultmann,Das Verhiiltnis,p. 16.
most valuable result of Bultmann's work will *Bultmann quotes the position of Conzelmannas
be his paving the way for a belated apprecia- reflecting this moderate divergence from his own
tion of the theological importance of phe- exclusion of the historical Jesus from theological
importance (Das Verhdiltnis,pp. 24-25).
nomenological method. 'Bultmann himself accepts the view that the
In conclusion, I must note a profound "once" became the "once-for-all." However, this
concern that I feel with respect to post- terminology retains the dichotomy of "before"and
Bultmannianism and indeed neo-liberalism "after" Easter as radically decisive (Das Verhiilt-
generally. The positions of Kierkegaard, nis, p. 25).
"It is
significant in this connectionthat Robinson
Barth, and Bultmann arose in part as a radi- has written of the possibility of a new interpreta-
cal response to the devastating challenge of tion of Heilsgeschichte using the categories of the
nihilism brought about by an all-dissolving later Heidegger ("Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungs-
historicism. The older liberalism was help- geschichte," to be published in Evangelische The-
less before this challenge, and in consequence, ologie).
* Robinson,A New Quest of the Historical Jesus,
where the challenge was acutely felt, liberal-
pp. 121-25. Although here and elsewhere I am fol-
ism disappeared. Since, despite the acknowl- lowing Robinson chiefly, it should be noted that
edged brilliance of the response, I cannot ac- he presents his position as a crystallization of the
cept it, I welcome its dissolution into the new work of such leading German scholars as Born-
liberalism. But it is not yet clear that the new kamm, Conzelmann, Kasemann, and Fuchs. Also,
liberalism will be more capable than the Macquarrie refers to Robinson's formulation with
approval and sees his own position as similar (The
old of enduring in the face of the increasing Scope of Demythologizing, New York: Harper &
tide of nihilism. Brothers, 1960,pp. 95ff., 245-48).
Robinson,A New Quest, pp. 87, 94.
" Ibid., p. 94. This principle that the historical
NOTES AND REFERENCES
recovery of Jesus' self-understanding provides a
1The general statements about Bultmann in the norm for judging the primitive Christian message
present essay simply affirm conclusions to which I has decisive practical implicationsfor the discrimi-
have come in my forthcoming book, tentatively nation of heresy from authentic Christian faith.
entitled Living Options in Protestant Theology, to Robinson is applying this principle specifically to
be published by Westminster Press. I have, how- the study of heresy in the Pauline Church at
ever, added references to Bultmann's latest and Corinth.
perhaps last lecture on the new quest of the histori- SBultmann,Das Verhiiltnis,p. 9.
cal Jesus, Das Verhiiltnis der urchristlichen Chris- ' Schubert M. Ogden, Christ Without Myth,
tusbotschaft sum historischen Jesus, Heidelberg: New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961,pp. 140ff.
Carl Winter-Universititsverlag, 1960 (hereafter re- "Ibid., pp. 117ff.
ferred to as Das Verhdltnis). SIbid., p. 130.
t Bultmann,Das Verhiiltnis,p. 8. 16 Gogarten's
references on this point are largely
* Bultmann himself has, of course, written exten- to Heidegger's "Die Zeit des Weltbildes." See
sively in this area. Cf., e.g., Jesus and the Word, Friedrich Gogarten, The Reality of Faith, trans-
translated by Smith and Huntress, New York: lated by Carl Michalson and others, Philadelphia:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934. Westminster Press, 1959,pp. 94-97 and passim.
'In Das Verhiiltnis, this point is reaffirmed "1Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein, Zollikon-
clearly and repeatedly in contrast to the post-Bult- Ziirich: Evangelischer Verlag AG, 1959. The vol-
mannian proponents of the quest of the historical ume, The Later Heidegger and Theology, edited
Jesus. See, e.g., p. 13. by James M. Robinson and myself, to be published
"Giinther
Bornkamm,Jesus of Nazareth, trans- by Harper & Brothers in 1962, will focus on Ott's
lated by Irene and Fraser McLuskey with James interpretation.