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ZHENG Kai
ZHENG Kai (
)
Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
E-mail: zhengkai@pku.edu.cn
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 409
relevant to the discussion of the modes and values thereof, as well there also
being so many approaches and methods? Bentilun 本體論 (ontology) is, on the
one hand, the standard Chinese translation for “ontology” as it is used in Western
philosophy, on the other hand, the term is also widely used in interpretations of
Chinese philosophy advanced by modern thinkers, despite the fact that the
meaning of “benti” 本體 (root-body) and “the study of benti” are often unclear
or ill-defined. Such uses, or rather, misuses of “bentilun” serve only to
exacerbate the impression of incommensurability between Chinese and Western
philosophical traditions. In order to make a constructive comparative
investigation of Chinese philosophy more readily accessible to scholars primarily
versed in the Western philosophical tradition, this paper first provides a critique
of bentilun as it is used in the interpretation of Chinese philosophy, before then
turning to xingershangxue 形而上學 (metaphysics) in search of an appropriate
paradigm that might adequately outline the theoretical tendencies of the Chinese
philosophical tradition.
(1) For a long time, the scholars of Chinese philosophy, and indeed even the
entirety of the academic world of China, was keen on discussing “benti” 本體
(being qua being), and “bentilun,” not paying much attention to the different
understandings of the term in their respective contexts. In other words, it is
generally the case that what today is called “benti” and “bentilun” refer to words
used to translate Western philosophy. They are different from the “benti” and
“benti zhi xue” 本體之學 (the study of root-body) found in Chinese philosophy.
Now, whether or not ancient Chinese philosophy has a Western philosophical
concept of “to on” (benti) and a field of investigation similar to that of Western
“ontology” (bentilun) are questions that we must answer (Zhang 1996a).
The difference between the “benti” (root-body) of Chinese philosophy and the
“benti” (being qua being) of Western philosophy is very clear, although it is
difficult to pinpoint the point at which researchers into Chinese philosophy began
using the Western concept of “being qua being” to interpret Chinese thought. The
meanings at play here are so rich that is unclear how to make heads or tails of it
all, the situation being such that “this” (Chinese) term “benti” (root-body) was
unknowingly covered by “that” (Western) one of “benti” (being qua being). The
key to the question is: being stuck in the Western conception of “benti” (being
qua being), can we interpret the ben (root, source) and ti (body) in the Chinese
tradition in a better way? In other words, is the wide use of “benti” and
“bentilun” in the field of research into Chinese intellectual history and
philosophy an unintended misappropriation?
410 ZHENG Kai
According to Tang, this is the important difference between the Han Dynasty
philosophy and Neo-Daoism. As he says, “To put it simply, Neo-Daoism is about
ontology while the Han Dynasty philosophy is about cosmology and
cosmogony” (Tang 2000, 67).
A good number of scholars started using the concepts of “benti” and
“bentilun” to interpret ancient Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century. For
example, Fang Dongmei repeatedly utilized thorough and comprehensive
comparisons to discuss the connections between cosmology, ontology, and
transcendental-ontology: “If we say that Western philosophy since the ancient
Greeks is an ontology, then the philosophical pursuit of Laozi for the ‘dark and
mysterious gate of a multitudes’ (zhongmiao zhi men 衆妙之門) is a kind of
‘meta-ontology’” (Fang 2012a, 126). He not only says that works of Daoist
philosophy must be appreciated from an ontological perspective, but that it is
even more so the case that we must explain these in terms of a “meta-ontology”
because the philosophical questions Daoists are concerned with are not limited to
ontology. Instead, the course proceeds from “non-being” to “being,” such that “it
takes ontology and inquires upwards, it becomes a ‘meta-ontology’ and also
becomes a ‘non-meta-ontology.’ It conceives that behind, outside, or above any
universe, there is a real source of the universe even further away, even deeper,
even higher” (Fang 2012a, 187). He also says: “The ‘being’ of Laozi’s ontology
and the ‘non-being’ of his ‘meta-ontology’ come together to form a great
combination of ‘being’ and ‘non-being.’ This great combination stands as the
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 411
rise. Tang Yongtong’s research into Wei and Jin Neo-Daoism is a rather
representative case of the kind of “ontological” explanation which has
accompanied research into Neo-Daoism for a long time, however, the research
done in recent years makes clear that interpreting Wei and Jin Neo-Daoism’s
“bentilun” as a “meta-ontology” is still worthy of discussion. Zhang Dainian had
already early subtly criticized this interpretation and moreover tried to take it a
step further by organizing and analyzing ancient Chinese ontological concepts
and shedding light on the special characteristics of Chinese ontological concepts
by comparing them with Western ontological concepts (Zhang 1996a, 487−95,
629−46; 1996b, 163−66). Fang Dongmei thinks that Daoist philosophical
discussions about “non-being” indicate a kind of “meta-ontology” which inspired
people to profound thoughts and which was beneficial to spiritual understanding;
however, from the perspective that any “ontology” is just a footnote in regard to
Aristotle’s search for “being qua being,” “meta-ontology” or even “non-meta-
ontology” is already mired in an ontological mode of thought and thus it is
impossible to avoid the nominalism (i.e. mode of thinking based on the workings
of language) implied in the Categories (1a−9b). This is completely opposite to
Daoist philosophy. Mou Zongsan liked to use “ontological being” and “reality”
to explain Song-Ming philosophical concepts such as “xin zhi benti” 心之本體
(the root-body of the Heart-mind), “xing zhi benti” 性之本體 (the root-body of
nature), “qi zhi benti” 氣之本體 (the root-body of the quintessential substance),
etc.; Zhang Zai’s so-called “qi zhi benti” certainly has the meaning of “the
original state of qi”; Zhu Xi’s “xing zhi benti” and “xin zhi benti” both point to an
original state (Zhang 1996a, 631−32). Wang Yangming often used “xin zhi benti”
to point to the “original mind-state or the original state of the mind but not the
internal essence of the mind (Chen 1991, 82−83).” None of these deal with the
relation between “noumenon and phenomenon” of Western philosophy (Zhang
1996a, 632; Chen 1991, 83). Moreover and more importantly, if we say that
Chinese philosophy is a philosophy that discusses dao and li 理 (principle), then
are the dao and li mentioned and sought after in ancient Chinese philosophy each
a kind of substance that exists in reality? If the dao is without sign or form, then
how does li take form? In other words, the non-substantiation of the dao and li
are important characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are not to be neglected.
In conclusion, the discussion of “tiyong benmo” 體用本末 (body, function,
and root, tip) in Chinese philosophy (including Neo-Daoism) does not,
fundamentally, match up with the concepts of “ousia” (substance) or “being qua
being.” It is even more clear that they are fundamentally different if Wang Bi’s
Neo-Daoist concept of “yi wu wei ben” 以無爲本 (take non-being as the root)
(Wang 1980, 110) is compared to the notion of “being qua being.”
(3) I lean towards the opinion that we cannot be more cautious when using the
ambiguous terms of “benti” and “bentilun,” because they are, after all, attached
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 413
While traveling in the southern hamlet and a friend pointed to a flowering tree
among the stones and asked: “If there is nothing which is outside my mind in
all under Heaven, then what relation does this flower which blooms and falls
by itself deep in the mountains have to my mind?” I replied: “When you had
yet to see this flower, both your mind and the flower make stillness their abode.
After seeing this flower, then its appearance becomes immediately clear. Thus
you know that this flower is not outside your mind.” (Wang 2011, 122−23)
Chen Lai has offered an interpretation of this saying: “Here, Yangming did not
say that not having the idea is not having the flower. He only said that: ‘both
your mind and the flower make stillness their abode.’ Stillness is the opposite of
words which proceed from emotions, just like it is said: ‘that which is affected
and then moves is called idea,’ at the time that the mind has yet to be moved by
the flower, it has yet to have the idea thereof, but this does not mean we can say
the mind is a non-being; before the flower has entered into the structure of
perception it exists as an image in the state of ‘stillness,’ however, this does not
mean that the flower does not exist. Since Yangming did not bring up any
opposition to ‘blooms and falls by itself’ means that which he said is not about
the existence of the blooming and falling” (Chen 1991, 58−59). Since the main
point of Yangming’s philosophical reflections is not the “question of existence,”
then what reason do we have to continuing following the ontological approach in
asking the question of ontological being? Using phenomenological theories to
explain the theories of Yangming’s philosophy is very insightful. However, I
think that what is more important is the need to explain and understand it from
the perspective of the theory of xinxing. This is the same as Yangming’s remark
that “When Heaven and Earth, ghosts and spirits, and the myriad things leave my
spirit then there is no Heaven and Earth, ghosts and spirits, or the myriad things”
(Wang 2011, 140−41). This is also to say that theoretical paradigm of
Yangming’s philosophy is in the end a theory of xinxing. Now, this paradigm
cannot but be incompatible with a view that examines it from an
epistemological-ontological perspective. This is because these two different
philosophical paradigms simply do not have a common measure. Benti, the
relation between mind and matter, and the relation between knowledge and
action in the theory of xinxing or jingjie xingershangxue 境 界 形 而 上 學
(metaphysics of state-of-attainment) all possess special characteristics. The
example of “this flower [being] not outside your mind” given above, Yangming’s
position that “sincerity is the benti of the mind,” and even the very common
concepts of cheng 誠 (sincerity), zhong 中 (equilibrium), ren 仁 (humanity)
etc., can only be understood and comprehended on the level of xinxing—spiritual
metaphysics. Without this there is no means to advance.
In brief, “benti” in Chinese philosophy touches upon the theory of xinxing and
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 415
it is only within the context of the theory of xinxing that its actual meaning can
appear. Moreover, the “benti” of ancient Greek philosophy certainly has more to
do with epistemology and logic, which exhibits an essentialist way of thinking,
i.e. it proceeds from considerations of “phenomenon” and “essence.” That
“benti” is more like “substance” is expressed in Aristotle’s philosophy. In
reflecting on thoughts on “benti” expressed in Chinese philosophy, what is
essential is that “benti” attempts to avoid turning the fundamental “dao” or
“principle” or “non-being” into a substance, but instead, it leans more towards
using the unification between the subjective and the objective, mutual
completion of dao and things and ti and yong as one in order to explain the
relationship between being and phenomenon. If we say that the fundamental
theoretical paradigm of Western philosophy since ancient Greece is tied up in
epistemology and logic, then the theoretical paradigm of the theory of xinxing
that was founded in the Chinese philosophical tradition in the aftermath of the
Warring States period; if we say that the former is based in the “separation of the
objective and subjective,” then the latter leans more towards breaking down the
barrier between the objective and subjective in order to enter into a spiritual state
of “zhuke hunming” 主客渾冥 (murkiness of the subjective and objective).
(4) It is of utmost importance to seek a greater understanding of Chinese
philosophy introspectively—that is to say, within its own self-given framework,
from an inward insight, instead of an outward circumspection. Why is this so?
Viewed from the paradigm of Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy is full
of the ludicrous and the bizarre. Terms such as shengren qixiang 聖人氣象 (the
idiosyncrasy of the sage), jingshen jingjie 精神境界 (the spiritual state-of-
attainment), tianren heyi 天人合一 (the inseparability of Heaven and humans),
zhixing heyi 知行合一 (the inseparability of knowing and doing), xinwu heyi 心
物合一 (the inseparability of mind and things), tiyong heyi 體用合一 (the
inseparability of body and function), and also youwu shuangqian 有無雙遣 (the
double disposal of being and non-being), dao qi zhi guantong 道器之貫通 (the
penetration of Dao and things), yuzhou-benti zhi buer 宇宙−本體之不二 (the
oneness of the cosmos and the origin), all seem rather “unphilosophical.” And yet,
these “unphilosophical” doctrines are precisely what constitute the important
characteristics of Chinese philosophy.
The problem thus is as follows—how should we proceed with the confluence
of Chinese and Western philosophy so that Chinese philosophy can gain broader
acceptance and deeper understanding? In other words, if the transposition of
benti and bentilun in interpreting Chinese philosophy does not lead to a clearer
understanding of its way of philosophizing and its theoretical bearing, then how
do we proceed constructively, such that we can locate Chinese philosophy in a
wider frame of philosophical traditions, allowing the essential characteristics of
the Chinese tradition to become comprehensible in their own right, which could
416 ZHENG Kai
in turn make a comparative study of east and west philosophy truly possible?
Here I would like to use an example from studies of Zhuangzi. In my humble
opinion, Zhuangzi’s philosophy consists of two parts, i.e., the world of thoughts
and the spiritual realm. “The world of thoughts” refers to the issues that can be
grasped and expressed by concepts and language, including cosmology,
epistemology, ethics (including political philosophy), and even logic. These
topics receive a detailed discussion in the Zhuangzi. For example, the chapter of
On Equalizing Things manifests the work’s characteristic strictness, depth, and
also its logical propensity. However, the spiritual realm goes beyond the world of
thoughts. It is beyond any naming and image, outside of words and language.
Therefore, any revelation of the truth of the dao cannot appeal to naming, zhi (知
knowing) or zhi (智 knowledge) but instead make use of insights, enlightenment,
and practice, in order to point to an inwardly and subtle spiritual experience. To
take one step further, the one who embodies the dao can only be presented
through his/her spiritual realm. By the same token, the question of “What is the
dao?” can only be answered through this answer that is in itself not an answer.
Seen from this perspective, we can appreciate the centrality of the free
wandering shenren 神人 (godly human), zhenren 真人 (true human), zhiren 至
人 (ultimate human) and shengren 聖人 (sage) in Zhuangzi’s philosophical
thinking. It is exactly through these philosophical figures that Zhuangzi
presented to us a free and broad spiritual realm. I believe that the division of the
world of thoughts and the spiritual realm can be said to correspond to “the world
of things” and “the world of the dao” in Zhuangzi’s and Laozi’s texts. Through
the clarification of the world of thoughts, it might be possible for us to find an
approach, a bridge, a jumping board through which the spiritual realm might be
comprehended and grasped.
A profound suspicion is cast over the ubiquitous and misplaced use of bentilun in
the previous section. The purpose of giving voice to such a misgiving is not to
place an unnecessary obstacle in front of comparative study of eastern and
western philosophical traditions, but rather to establish a valid comparative
structure where philosophical dialogue between separate traditions could fall into
place. If we come to view Chinese philosophical writings sympathetically and set
aside the Hegelian idea of there being only one philosophy in the world, a
foundation for our comparative investigation becomes tenable: Chinese
philosophy is a distinct philosophical tradition that is independent from its
counterpart in the west. However, as one of many traditions within a multivalent
philosophical landscape, Chinese philosophy is still in need of justification. In
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 417
other words, unless we can supply a clear formulation of the theoretical paradigm
employed in the Chinese philosophical tradition, any discussion of the meaning
and value of Chinese philosophy will be in vain.
The reason that this essay searches for a theoretical paradigm within Daoist
philosophy is that a unique xingershangxue lies at the heart of Daoism—one that
is to be distinguished from the idea of metaphysics in ancient Greece. This
distinction is key to deepening our understanding of the theoretical paradigm and
value of Chinese philosophy. Another point is also important: existing studies
have paid close attention to Daoist philosophy, and their achievements provide a
firm ground for us.1
If it is possible to summarize Daoist philosophy as a conception of the study of
metaphysics, i.e. xingershangxue, we must ask: is it reasonable to identify
relevant Daoist doctrines and discourse as “metaphysical”? To answer this
question we must turn to a comparison between metaphysics as it is conceived in
the western tradition and xingershangxue before highlighting similarities and
differences between the two. By doing so we will also pinpoint the characteristics
unique to Daoist xingershangxue. This endeavor shall set an important
foundation upon which we might further apprehend the theoretical paradigm of
Chinese philosophy.
(1) The most important concept in Daoist philosophy, the dao becomes a
philosophical concept only after being distilled from wu. The discovery of wu is
an important foundation for Laozi’s philosophy; it also sets an important
measuring stick for the philosophical breakthroughs made by scholars in the
pre-Qin period.2 Without this intellectual discovery, ancient philosophers could
not have been able to “venture from the world of ordinary objects to the world of
the dao,” nor to venture “from the world of you to the world of wu” (Wang 2011,
3−11). It was precisely the discovery of wu and Laozi’s creative interpretation of
the dao through wu that endowed philosophical meaning and significance to the
dao. By doing so, Laozi greatly enriched the meaning of “dao” while setting it
completely apart from previous meanings of the word (Zheng, 2014).
In other words, “dao” went through a process of conceptualization under Laozi.
The dao as a philosophical concept is distinct from ordinary, vernacular
1
Mou Zongsan’s point that Laozi’s philosophy is “a kind of metaphysics of
state-of-attainment” is very insightful. For more details, see Mou (2003b, 108). Also, Wang
Zhongjiang, Zheng Kai, Ma Delin, Wang Bo have all written on this topic. For more details,
see Wang (2001), Zheng (2003), Ma (2003a), and Wang (2011), etc.
2
Zhang Dainian once said: “Laozi’s so called ‘wu’ can be analyzed to have three different
meanings. The first points to the empty part within individual things; the second points to what
comes before there are individual things and to the situation thereafter; the third points to the
highest source that transcends all individual things.” For more details, see Zhang (1989,
73−74).
418 ZHENG Kai
dao zhi dong” 反者道之動 (the movement of the dao by contraries proceeds)
(Laozi Ch. 40) offers an important interpretive hint for our understanding of wu.
More specifically, “wu” is not “being anything,” but rather an “x that is not any
thing” (e.g. “wuwuzhe fei wu” 物物者非物 [that which makes things things is
itself not a thing], “shengshengzhe bu sheng” 生生者不生 [that which gives life
to life is itself not living], and “xingxingzhe bu xing” 形形者不形 [that which
gives form to form is itself formless]). Far from being an empty signifier, this
“being which is not any thing” is represented concretely by wuxing, wuming,
wuwei, and wuyu (Zheng 2014).
The concept of wuming is a fundamental feature of the dao that marks the
latter’s profound divergence from the ancient Greek concept of logos. Laozi’s
poetic narration and Zhuangzi’s intentional zhiyan 卮言 (incredulous account)
employ an indirect, philosophical language that points at the xingershang 形而上
(metaphysical, “above-form”) truth of the dao. One of the intellectual resources
for Wangbi’s successful explication of the idea of “tiandiwanwu yi wu wei ben”
天地萬物以無爲本 (wu is the root of the myriad things under heaven) comes
from the neo-Daoist methodology of “deyiwangyan” 得意忘言 (forget words as
soon as the meaning is grasped). Buddhists (especially Zen Buddhists) argue for
truth that transcend names and forms, and believe that “the highest truth dwells
above name, words, and thought and is graspable while also indescribable” (Xu
2007, 112). This Buddhist tenet and corresponding Daoist notion wuming support
one another. Recent self-critical developments in Western philosophy including
the writings of Heidegger have called “logic-language-centrism” into question.
The fact that Heidegger finds intellectual resources in the writings of Laozi
should not be seen as a coincidence (Ma 2003a, 137−92).5
(2) It was the Japanese philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō who first translated
“metaphysics” as “xingershangxue” and his elegant choice of words has since
been universally adopted (Wang 2001, 7−8). Since these two words tell of an
obvious relation, similarities and differences between Daoist xingershangxue and
ancient Greek metaphysics deserve our attention. As such, a comparative study
shall reveal some of the core characteristics of Daoist philosophy.
Metaphysics was originally an untitled work of Aristotle’s. It was Andronikos
of Rhodos, who, in the 1st century BCE, gave this work its famous title for its
bibliographical position immediately after Physics. Metaphysics deserves to be
an independent philosophical work, for it deals with subject matters distinct from
those pertaining the study of natural phenomena, or physis. Physics prescribes
the investigation of laws that govern natural occurrence, whereas Metaphysics
5
Ma Delin expertly discusses Daoist “linguistic metaphysics” in this chapter of his book; see
also Ma (2003b).
420 ZHENG Kai
sets out to question “being qua being.” In this light, neither Plato’s conception of
eidos nor Aristotle’s conception of substance is exempt from influences from the
physical way of thinking. Aristotle’s treatment of the problem of participation
gives us a good example.
It seems that in the ancient Greek “logos” could be viewed as an intellectual
parallel for our understanding of the dao.6 The word “logos” as used in the 5th
century BCE has meanings that must be referred to by multiple words in modern
language, including discourse, narration, thought, cause, reason, justification,
measure, standard, analysis, and definition (Lü 1992, 21−26).7 Logos is the
articulation of rational thought and a representation of things as they are: cosmic
principles are identified with principles distilled from verbal articulation.
Following Heraclitus, Parmenides of Elea proposes a theoretical standpoint
founded upon logos, for example, he writes:
In this particular fragment “are” and “being” serve as the origin of the
quintessential concept of being that later found its indispensable place in Western
philosophy. Wang Taiqing points out that the various forms of the verb “to be”
means “to effect or to actuate” and effectively function as the foundation of both
the verb “to be” and the noun “being” (Wang 1993). The double meaning of “to
be” implies that “that which is” is precisely “that which is represented in
language” or “that which is cognizable.” Parmenides’ theory of “to on” was then
absorbed by Plato who later developed his theory of eidos (form), where “eidos”
stands for objective “being” as well as “that which is cognizable.”
Aristotle’s discussion of “being qua being” follows Heraclitus and Parmenides’
intellectual footsteps and analyzes ousia in terms of a theory of predication.8 For
Aristotle, ousia, closely connected to the verb “to be,” means “essence.” In the
Categories, protai ousiai, or primary substances, are defined as “that which is
6
Daoism clearly excluded knowledge and intention as being outside the essence of the dao,
moreover, it also different from Western philosophy. Xu Fancheng pointed out: “Knowledge
and intention” are both “logos.” That is to say, “logos” within Western philosophy mainly
includes the two aspects of knowledge and intention. Refer to Xu (2006, 170).
7
Lü cites the theory of W.K.C. Guthrie (1979, 422−24), and also analyzes it. This can be
referred to here.
8
Wang Taiqing also says: “This philosophy that investigates ‘on’ is called ‘ontologia,” it uses
“onta (being)’ for its name and we translated it as ‘bentilun’” (Wang 1993).
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 421
neither said of nor in any subject (Lü 1992, 106−7).”9 The incessant emphasis
placed upon language and conceptual analysis in the Western philosophical
tradition has its roots in a predicative logic typified by “being” and the verb “to
be.” This explains why Heidegger would go on to state that “language is the
home of being.”
(3) Daoist xingershangxue is a well-articulated and unique theoretical
paradigm.
Both “Logos” and “dao” could refer to “discourse.” Insofar as they both
signify immaterial entities, they pertain to thoughts that transcend limits
circumscribed by the study of material objects, i.e. physics. However, apart from
its similarities to “logos,” the dao is fundamentally unnameable. The passage
“dao yin wuming” 道隱無名 (the dao is hidden and has no name) (Laozi Ch. 41)
clearly states the non-verbal feature of the dao; whereas “logos” sets a
cornerstone in the tradition of identifying thought (language) with being. Indeed,
the dao can never be subsumed under an analytical vein that revolves around
language. This is to say that even though the dao may amount to a conceptual
equivalent to “being” or “that which is,” it shall certainly not be explicated
further by means of the verb “to be” —an inherent and indispensable component
of “logos.”
From a comparative point of view, the Chandogya Upanishad of ancient India
also provides an important point of reference. Let us look at this line from the
Rgveda once more:
We can see that, both the Chandogya Upanishad and the fragments of
Parmenides deal with ontology, especially the problem of homogeneity between
reality as it is and human cognition as centered on the is/is-not distinction.
Certain monistic schools of Hinduism identify Brahman (the ultimate reality)
with Atman (self, soul) and are therefore radically different from Parmenides, but
nevertheless, the word representing ultimate existence and truth (also good and
beauty), सत (sat) is also the present participle of the root of the verb “to be.” The
9
Lü quotation of Aristotle’s Categories is slightly different from Fang Shuchun’s translation
thereof. Cf. Fang (1959, 12). Fang Shuchun translates ousia as “shiti” (substance) and
hypokeimenon (grammatical subject) as “subject” (i.e. as opposed to object); however the
word “hypokeimenon” at least has this double connotation: on the one hand it is grammatical,
on the other it is existential.
10
Wu Baihui translates this line as “wu (not) is non-being (feiyou), you (being) is also
non-being (feiyou)” (Wu 2012, 52). This line was translated by Bai Gang in accordance with
Müller’s 1965 version of the Rgveda. For more details refer to Bai (2009, 76).
422 ZHENG Kai
11
Actually, parts of Aristotle’s Physics and his Metaphysics are the same, for example, Scrolls
A and B of Physics discuss the questions of the motion of substances and generation. This
discussion is related to the content of Scroll A of Metaphysics. It can be said that Metaphysics
strongly presents the characteristics of “post-physics.”
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 423
“physical.”12
3 Concluding Remarks
“xingershangxue of ren.”
Indeed, the Chinese philosophical tradition does not include the disciplines of
metaphysics or ontology as they are conceived in ancient Greece, i.e. the
philosophical tradition that relies upon logic and language to investigate “being”
with an analysis of the predicative verb “is.” On the other hand, even though the
ubiquitous use of the verb “to be” as found in western languages is evidently
absent in ancient Chinese texts, this does not mean that ancient Chinese thinkers
had not investigated philosophical questions that are otherwise pursued in the
quest for metaphysics.13 On this topic, Ye Xiushan points out, “the ‘limit’ (or
characteristic) of [the Chinese] language did not prohibit ancient Chinese
thinkers from contemplating ‘that-which-is-but-is-not-any-thing,’ it served only
to formulate our ‘way of thinking,’ which is markedly different from the ‘way of
thinking’ that stems from the ancient Greek tradition” (Ye 1994). The Daoist
xingershangxue theoretic paradigm is succinctly characterized by the ancient
definition, “xingershangzhe weizhi dao 形而上者謂之道 (the dao is that which is
above form),” which can be viewed in contrast to metaphysics and ontology from
ancient Greece. The former emphasizes wuming and transcends names and
definitions, while the latter incorporates a predilection towards logic and rational
thinking as exemplified by the study of logic, epistemology, and ontology.
One may summarize the pluralistic and complex theoretical structure of
Daoism with an elucidation of “wu” (not) and its related concepts, around
which central Daoist tenets converge. Concepts stemming from “wu” (not)
include: (1) “wuxing” (formless) (also “wuwu” 無物 [not-object] and “wuxiang”
無相 [without-representation]) is involved with theories of physics (i.e. natural
science). It is characteristic of Daoist thought that dao and its qualities are
grasped through a delicate unraveling of the contrastive relationship between
being and non-being; (2) “wuzhi” (knowledge-less) and “wuming” are concerned
with epistemological problems, these concepts provide a cutting criticism of
conventional veneration of knowledge and doctrinal values while also
highlighting a special kind of wisdom (comparable to “shenming” 神明 [divine
enlightenment]) above our rational capabilities that is necessary for our quest for
“the truth of the dao”; (3) “wuming” and “wuwei” are essential qualities of
13
From a comprehensive perspective, the linguistic and philosophical research on the copula
“shi” (to be) is both interesting and meaningful. For detailed research on this topic, refer to Z.
Wang (2015, 237−97); A.C. Graham (2003, 444−89); Shi (2010, 12−32). However, I must
point out that the Daoist metaphysical concept of “the dao” or “non-being” does not have any
connection to the verb “to be” that is commonly seen in Western literature and philosophical
contexts. In other words, Daoist philosophers opened a new style or method of their own and
developed a philosophical mode of thinking that has special characteristics. At the same, this
also explains clearly that the brand of Western philosophy that came out of ancient Greek
philosophy is not unique and unparalleled.
Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy 425
14
It should be said that, “non-substantiality” is indeed the special characteristic of the “dao.”
Huang Kejian said: “The “dao” which is the result of Laozi is one of metaphysics. This type of
metaphysics is a value metaphysics and a metaphysics of non-subtantiality; it appears as it is
intertwines with Heaven and Earth and the myriad things, yet it finds is ultimate end in the
highest realm of man.” For more details, refer to Huang (2010, 292).
426 ZHENG Kai
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