NAVA, Maria Carlina J.

Torts and Damages

II. SOURCES OF CIVIL LIABILITY (based on negligent torts)
Kinds of Negligence
Arising from Crime
People of the Philippines v. Bayotas
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People of the Philippines
Arising from Contract
Air France v. Carascoso
Arising from Tort
Andamo, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Castro v. People of the Philippines
Culpa Aquiliana/Culpa Contractual/Culpa Criminal
Fabre, et al. v. Court of Appeals
Calalas v. Court of Appeals

III. CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT

1. Elements of Quasi-delict
Cinco v. Canonoy, et al.
2. Distinctions
A. Quasi-delict v. Delict
Philippine Rabbit v. People of the Philippines
B. Quasi-delict v. Breach of Contract
Far East v. Court of Appeals
Calalas v. Sunga

IV. NEGLIGENCE
Concept of Negligence
Definition; Elements
Picart v. Smith, Jr.
Negligence as the Proximate Cause
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
Proof of Negligence
A. Burden of Proof
PLDT v. Court of Appeals
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Batiquin v. Court of Appeals
Respondent Superior
Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, et al.
Violation of Traffic Rules
Caedo, et al. v. Yu Khe Thai, et al.
BLT Bus co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.

V. DEFENSES
a. Contributory Negligence
Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
b. Assumption of Risk
Afialda v. Hisole
c. Last Clear Chance
Picart v. Smith
Spouses Ong v. Metropolitan Water District
d. Prescription
Ferrer, et al. v. Ericta, et al.
Kramer, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
e. Force Majeure/Fortuitous Event
Gotesco v. Chatto
National Power Corporation v. et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
f. Exercise of Diligence
Ramos v. Pepsi
g. Mistake and Waiver
Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals
h. Damnum Absque Injuria
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals
Arising from Crime

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y

CORDOVA, accused appellant
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted on June 19, 1991.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of
the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General said that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the
accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil penalties. Said counsel argued that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused (Rogelio Bayotas) pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability.

Ruling:
Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. The death of accused having been established, and considering that
there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil
liability of the said accused was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code).
Consequently, the case against him should be dismissed. The rule established was that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished
together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
Moreover, if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

Facts:
On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled
that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of
the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer
to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed
by the accused had already been dismissed by the Court of Appeals, then the judgment of
conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Ruling:
No. When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out
becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a
notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil
liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability
of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
 Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows: In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and
any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special
police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also
subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods.
No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeepers employees. Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to
employers, according to Article 103 which reads: The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.
To address the issue raised by petitioner, Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Only the civil liability of the
accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that
is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
The 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
 What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising
from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,
the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may --
subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect
the remaining civil interest therein.
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which
was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to
the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While
they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the
former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees
in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied
due to insolvency. Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-
employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since
the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent
on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has
become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability
has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Arising from Contract

AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

Facts:
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged,
had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead
body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having
a hot discussion with the white man, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in
the plane. Carrascoso sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his
trip.

Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to damages.

Ruling:
Yes. There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage. Said contract was breached when petitioner
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. There was bad faith when petitioner's
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation after he was already
seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The Supreme Court did
not give credence to the claim of Air France that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger
is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says
that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Arising from Tort

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation,
waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops
and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay
and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners also filed another
action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, for damages. The trial court
dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead
of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a),
Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by
respondent’s waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
Yes. A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages. The recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing
contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
The fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have
sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the
right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. Article 2176 states that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
 JEROME CASTRO, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 180832 July 23, 2008

Facts:
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan’s son, Justin
Albert, a then a Grade 12 student, for violating the terms of his disciplinary probation. Upon
Tan’s request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed non-appealable conditions such as
excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies. Aggrieved, Tan filed a
complaint in the Department of Education for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private
Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code against RIS. He alleged that the
dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the DepEd found that RIS code violation point system allowed the summary
imposition of unreasonable sanctions. The system violated due process. Consequently, the
DepEd nullified it. The DepEd ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus,
he was able to graduate from RIS. After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a
fellow parent at RIS. During their conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit
against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster. Then Ching made a call to the petitioner and told him the plan of Tan to sue the
officers of RIS. At the end of their conversation, petitioner told Ching, “Okay, you too, take care
and be careful talking to Tan, that’s dangerous. Ching then called Tan and informed him that
petitioner said talking to him was dangerous. Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation against petitioner. The prosecution tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan as a
dangerous person. Ching testified that petitioner warned her that talking to Tan was dangerous.
Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioner’s statement shocked him as it portrayed him as
someone capable of committing undesirable acts. He added that petitioner probably took offense
because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the DepEd. Petitioner denied harboring ill-
feelings against Tan despite the latter’s complaint against RIS in the DepEd. Although he
admitted conversing with Ching on the telephone, petitioner asserted that he never said or
insinuated that Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous.
The MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Tan, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave oral defamation. On appeal, the RTC declared that
petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation. RTC also ruled that prescription had already set in
and it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground. The Court of Appeals however found that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion and it reinstated the MeTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner violated Article 26 when he announced that private respondent
is a dangerous man.

Ruling:
Petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code. Article
26 states that every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (3)
Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends.
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the
youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith.
Petitioner Jerome Castro is acquitted of slight oral defamation as defined and penalized in
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
 FABRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL
G.R. No. 111127, 26 July 1996, 259 SCRA 426

Facts:
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda
minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children
which they operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in
1981, after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St.
Scholasticas College in Malate, Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the
World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33
members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back. The usual route to
Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under
repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La
Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At
11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to
east direction, which he described as siete. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing
the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of
one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a
series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. Several passengers were injured.
Criminal complaint was filed against the driver, and the spouses were also made jointly
liable. In its decision, the trial court found that no convincing evidence was shown that the
minibus was properly checked for travel to a long distance trip and that the driver was properly
screened and tested before being admitted for employment. All the evidence presented has
shown the negligent act of the defendants, which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of
this case. The trial court renders judgment against defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and
Porfirio Cabil and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioners are liable for injuries suffered by the respondents based on
culpa contractual and/or culpa aquiliana.

Ruling:
This case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to
be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. Article 1732 states that common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers
or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. As
common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe
transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employee. As Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides, common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
Petitioners are liable under Articles 2176 and 2180 for quasi-delict and guilty of breach
of contract of carriage under Articles 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, Cabil’s negligence gave rise to the presumption that
his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employee. Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant
possessed a professional drivers license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his
qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand,
requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance
of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with the rules. In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union,
apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from
their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a
two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could
remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his
qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union
was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.
Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, this case falls within the purview of Article 2219(2)
providing for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict. On the theory that
petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized
by Article 1764, in relation to Article 2220, since Cabil’s gross negligence amounted to bad
faith. The Supreme Court held the bus company and the driver jointly and severally liable for
damages for injuries suffered by a passenger.
 CALALAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 356

Facts:
On August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Sunga, then a college freshman, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled
to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion
Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the
rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment against
Salva and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case, a civil case, filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which it held Salva and his driver Verena jointly
liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
lower court on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not
quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code. The Court of Appeals dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

Ruling:
Article 1733 of the Civil Code states that common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case. The extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is
set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756. Article 1755 states that a common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Article 1756 states that in
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
The Court held that the driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, without due
regard for all the circumstances as required by Article 1755. The jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Petitioner’s driver also took
in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was
seated in an extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers
were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he
was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Moreover, as a general rule, moral damages
are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract. As an exception,
such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. In this case,
there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
QUASI-DELICT
ELEMENTS OF A QUASI-DELICT

CINCO vs. CANONOY, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-33171, 31 May 1979 90 SCRA 369

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular
accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequent, a criminal case was filed against the driver,
Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal
case, invoking Section 3 (b), Rule 1111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion
and ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of First
Instance alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance dismissed
the petition on the grounds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City
Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances
when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the
resolution of the City Court is interlocutory.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Couth said that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of
the criminal action. From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court, it is evident
that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Where the plaintiff made the essential
averments in the complaint that it was the driver’s fault or negligence in the operation of the
jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said
jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal connection
exists between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-driver and
where the defendant-operator in their answer contended that they observed due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict,
such action is principally predicated on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code which is quasi
–delictual in nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil
Code. Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading: Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided, the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to other civil actions arising from
cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule in which case, once the criminal action has being
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall
be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered. The civil action referred to in Sections. 2(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising
from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict. Article 31 of the Civil Code
is more appropriate in this case. Article 31 states that when the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept
of quasi-delict as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between damage
to persons on the one hand and damage to property on the other. Indeed, the word damage is
used in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done. And with respect to harm
it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include
damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors
responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or
property.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the City
Court, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated.
DISTINCTIONS
QUASI-DELICT v. DELICT

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

Facts:
On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled
that petitioner, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of
the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer
to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed
by the accused had already been dismissed by the Court of Appeals, then the judgment of
conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Ruling:
No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or
motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based
on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the
criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction
meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from
the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in
the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on
their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of
their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. In the absence of any collusion between
the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person
who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses
mere civil liability. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee. The
subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of
the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by
reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
QUASI-DELICT v. BREACH OF CONTRACT

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.
G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

Facts:
Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD
issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). Upon his request, the bank
also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna. In August 1988, Clarita
lost her credit card. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In
cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would appear to be to
meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a Hot Card or Cancelled Card
in its master file. On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend. To pay
for the lunch, he presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter. The card was not
honored, forcing him to pay in cash the bill. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
Luis then filed a complaint for damages against FEBTC with the RTC. The RTC rendered a
decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to damages.

Ruling:
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to
have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. Article 2220 of the Civil
Code provides that willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages
if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith,
in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of
carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault
(which is presumed) of the common carrier. Concededly, the bank was negligent to personally
inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC
to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad
faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Article 21 of
the Civil Code states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. Article 21 contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume
that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted
only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly
must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code
authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to
fraud or bad faith.
Furthermore, moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a
breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil
Code, which provide as follows: Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries; Article 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith. By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes
apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith
or fraud is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and (b) That a breach of contract
cannot be considered included in the descriptive term analogous cases used in Art. 2219; not
only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused contractual breach,
but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases
where there is a pre-exisiting contractual relations between the parties. Article 2176 provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
In the case at bar, there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral
damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore,
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Article 2220,
would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial
legislation. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation. The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can
be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly
govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the
breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the
parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship;
without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a
separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort. The Court finds, therefore, the
award of moral damages to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
 CALALAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 356

Facts:
On August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Sunga, then a college freshman, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled
to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion
Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the
rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment against
Salva and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case, a civil case, filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which it held Salva and his driver Verena jointly
liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
lower court on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not
quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code. The Court of Appeals dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.

Issues:
Whether or not Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage
caused to petitioner’s jeepney.
Whether or not the petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.

Ruling:
 The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in
quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof. There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in the civil case,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner’s jeepney, should be
binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as
well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. Article 1733
provides that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,
1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. Article 1755 stated that common carrier
is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Article 1756
provides that in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755. In the case at bar, upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to
prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
As to the second issue, the Court held that the driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga
safely as far as human care and foresight could provide using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, without due regard for all the circumstances as required by Article 1755. The
jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Petitioner’s
driver also took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact
that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Moreover, as a general
rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of
contract. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results
in the death of a passenger and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith.
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual
finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract
of carriage.
NEGLIGENCE
Concept of Negligence

PICART vs. SMITH, Jr.

G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March 1918, 37 Phil. 809

Facts:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to
get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near,
there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days

Issue:
Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done.
Ruling:
Yes. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse
and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge
it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In
the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance
away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being
run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or,
seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently
far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider
to this danger, he was negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as
to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. The proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences. Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant
in the present case, negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, has recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and
would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against
the threatened harm.
 Moreover, the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last
clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Negligence as proximate cause

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 127326, 23 December 1999, 378 SCRA 1137

Facts:
For five years up to the time of his death, Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio
City meat market. On 14 January 1985, Jose together with other meat vendors went out of their
stalls to meet a jeepney loaded with slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat they would sell
for the day. Jose was the very first to reach the parked jeepney. Grasping the handlebars at the
rear entrance of the vehicle, and as he was about to raise his right foot to get inside, Jose
suddenly stiffened and trembled as though suffering from an epileptic seizure. The vendors
rushed to Jose and they discovered that the antenna of the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten
entangled with an open electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall. Jose died. The cause of
his death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion with petheccial
hemorrhage, brain bilateral pulmonary edema and congestion and endocardial petecchial
hemorrhage and dilation (history of electrocution). On 6 February 1985 Caridad O. Bernardo,
widow of Jose Bernardo, and their minor children, Jojo, Jeffrey and Jo-an, filed a complaint
against BENECO before the Regional Trial Court for a sum of money and damages arising from
the electrocution of Jose Bernardo. In the same civil action, BENECO filed a third-party
complaint against Guillermo Canave, Jr., the jeepney owner. In its decision, the trial court ruled
in favor of the Bernardos and ordered BENECO to pay them damages. Both petitioner and
private respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its
decision which BENECO now assails contending that the appellate court gravely erred in
ordering BENECO to pay damages in light of the clear evidence that it was third-party defendant
Canave's fault or negligence which was the proximate and sole cause, or at least the principal
cause, of the electrocution and death of Jose Bernardo. The appellate court dismissed for lack of
merit the counterclaim of BENECO against the Bernardos and its third party complaint against
Guillermo Canave, Jr., as well as the latter's counterclaim.

Issue:
 Whether or not BENECO was solely responsible for the death of Jose Bernardo.

Ruling:
Yes. BENECO was solely responsible for the untimely death of Jose Bernardo
through accidental electrocution. The plaintiffs adduced proof tending to show that the defendant
BENECO installed a No. 2 high voltage main wire distribution line and a No. 6 service line to
provide power at the temporary meat market. It put up a three-inch G.I. pipe pole to which the
No. 2 main line was strung on top of a stall where a service drop line was connected. The height
of the electrical connection from the No. 2 line to the service line was barely eight to nine feet
which is in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code which requires a minimum vertical
clearance of fourteen feet from the level of the ground since the wiring crosses a public street.
Another violation is that the main line connected to the service line was not of rigid conduit
wiring but totally exposed without any safety protection. Worse, the open wire connections were
not insulated. The jeep's antenna which was more than eight feet from the ground got entangled
with the open wire connections, thereby electrically charging its handlebars which Bernardo held
on to enter the vehicle resulting in his electrocution. There is no question that as an electric
cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet
province, its primordial concern is not only to distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to
ensure the safety of the public by the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. It is clear
that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point
between the service drop line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was only
eight feet from the ground level, in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code. BENECO's
contention that the accident happened only on January 14, 1985, around seven years after the
open wire was found existing in 1978, far from mitigating its culpability, betrays its gross
neglect in performing its duty to the public. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years,
BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's
death was an accident that was bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO.
In the instant case, there is a clear showing of BENECO's gross negligence when it failed
to detect, much less to repair, for an inexcusably long period of seven years the uninsulated
connection which caused the death of Jose Bernardo. The gravity of its ineptitude was
compounded when it installed the service drop line way below the prescribed minimum vertical
clearance of fifteen feet. Again, precautionary measures were not taken in wanton disregard of
the possible consequences. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to
happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO. On the other hand, the owner of the jeep,
Canave is not liable since he was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area, and
there was no showing that any municipal law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any
foreseeable danger posed by his act. To sum up, the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of BENECO, and it should be solely liable for damages to the heirs of Bernardo.
Proof of negligence
Burden of Proof

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

ET AL.
G.R. No. 57079, 29 September 1989, 178 SCRA 94

Facts:
In the evening of July 30, 1968 the Estebans’ jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into
an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to
notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of
any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban sustained
injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent
husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. PLDT denies
liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of
their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte
and Company, an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and
the conduit system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that,
under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or
injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In its
answer, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving
respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by
installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with
barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to
warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the Estebans. However, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in said appealed case,
reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It
held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT
from the claim for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by the Estebans.
Ruling:
The accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of
petitioner PLDT. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had
remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND. It shows through
the tire marks that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is,
swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the
accident, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident
was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep
from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it. Moreover, plaintiff's jeep was not running
at 25 kilometers an hour. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck
the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several
feet as indicated by the tire mark. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had
been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the
windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries. The plaintiff-husband also had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he
should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have
made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25
kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to
brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and
visible. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen any warning
sign either. He knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it
many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of
the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND. These findings clearly show that
the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those
of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the
site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the
lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound.
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and
necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that
exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his
imprudence. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence
must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his
cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
Res ipsa loquitur

PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION,
respondents.
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

Facts:
Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of
the National Highway. Defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left leg
was amputated so he had to use crutches to walk. Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his
ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant said that
the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver
of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the
right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the
incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before
leaving, he checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He
bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a stop
position. From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified and said,
“When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped on
my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have found out later that the
fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.” Plaintiff points to the
negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent,
and says that absent such proof of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke
the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his
helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent.
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.

Ruling:
No. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano
has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether cargo truck was parked along
the road or on half the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. But despite this
warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a
direct consequence of such accident, Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
No. This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care. Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: Res ipsa loquitur. The thing
speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises
upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is
rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that
accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably
to believe that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive
law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine
cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents
evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury
is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions
will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever
the source of the evidence, as in this case. Thus, In this case, it is inapplicable because it was
established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver.
 BATIQUIN, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 118231, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 334

Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,
Dumaguete City from January 9, 1978 to September 1989. Between 1987 and September, 1989
she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said
Hospital. Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as
the latter's private patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the morning of September 21,
1988 Dr. Batiquin performed a simple cesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental
Provincial Hospital and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child, Rachel Acogido.
On September 28, 1988, Mrs. Villegas checked out of the Hospital. Soon after leaving the
Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She
also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines. In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical
Certificate by Dr. Batiquin certifying to her physical fitness to return to her work. So Mrs.
Villegas returned to her work. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered
Mrs. Villegas no end and despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains
become unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. Upon
examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus which she suspected to
be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could be cancerous. She had an
x-ray taken of Mrs. Villegas' chest, abdomen and kidney. She also took blood tests of Plaintiff. A
blood count showed that Mrs. Villegas had [an] infection inside her abdominal cavity. The result
of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another
surgery to which the latter agreed. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she
found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries and a
piece of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on the ovarian cyst. This piece
of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a rubber
glove. It could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from other
sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of
all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery. Respondent then sued petitioner
for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners herein. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the fault or negligence of Dr. Batiquin is
established by preponderance of evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Dr. Batiquin is liable.
Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for itself) is the rebuttable presumption or inference
that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was
in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen
in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened provided the
character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to
have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. Under this doctrine, the
happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control
and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive
law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when,
under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the
entire proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In
this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside
from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which
could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that
such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr.Batiquin. The
petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind
a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
Respondeat superior

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. VASQUEZ, JR., ET AL.

G.R. No. 132266, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 393
Facts:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was
driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmena Rotunda. He was traveling counter-
clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles.
He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Benjamin Abad was a manager
of petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with
plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a
parking lot but instead of going around the Osmena rotunda he made a short cut against [the]
flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. In the process, the
motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries
to the former. Abad brought Vasquez to Cebu Doctors Hospital where he died. A criminal case
was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. An action
for damages was then commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the
deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose
Benjamin Abad and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation to pay jointly and solidarily the
respondents. Cstilex and Abad separately appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of the trial court holding Abad and Castilex liable but held that the liability of the latter
is only vicarious and not solidary with the former.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer (Castilex) may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee (Abad) of a company-issued
vehicle.

Ruling:
 No. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employer shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Under the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the
torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold
the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. In the
case at bar, it was not sufficiently proven that such was the case. Jurisprudence provides that an
employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to
eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.
Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled
to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the
finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the
vehicle. Traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of
the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Thus, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though
he uses his employer's motor vehicle. Moreover, an employer who loans his motor vehicle to an
employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for
the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even
where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the
employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the
employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it
has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. The foregoing principles and
jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction although based on the doctrine of respondent
superior. In this case, Abad did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, which was located
in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña,
Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. At the
Goldie's Restaurant, Abad took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when Abad was
leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. Thus Abad was engaged in affairs of
his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured
in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of August 28, 1988, way beyond the normal
working hours. Abad’s working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed.
His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and
drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to
his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form
of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. Since there is lack of evidence that
Abad was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a
service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability
for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle
 MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM
CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father,
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. YU KHE THAI and
RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
Facts:
A mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now
E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his
Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was
scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three
daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver
Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his
regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The
carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post
on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista. Rafael Bernardo
testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away.
This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights,
one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, the carretela should anyway have been
visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights
for a considerable while. In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the
opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela
until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his
car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and
carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his
speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait
behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble, beat the Mercury to the point where it
would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky
maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving
at from 30 to 35 miles per hour, it was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw
the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the
presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his
car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it
loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last
moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. As a result of a vehicular accident in
which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were injured, they filed this
suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Caedo
and against Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, ordering them to pay plaintiffs damages
solidarily. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issues:
Whether or not Bernardo is liable.
Whether or not Yu Khe Thai is solidarily liable with Bernardo.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's
negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. As to the
issue of whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver,
the applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads: ART. 2184. In motor vehicle
mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that
a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. The imputation of liability to Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error.. Under the foregoing provision, if the
causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise
held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The same rule
applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such
a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his
driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had
a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes
himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive
up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him,
although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both
criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if
the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity
to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of
the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible,
either civilly or criminally, therefore.
The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length
of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own. The basis of the
master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of pater
familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage. In the present case, the defendants' evidence is that Rafael
Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by
Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no
record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all
may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the
immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver
from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient
time to act upon it. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The
road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the
car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of
his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters
behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself
at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his
driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car
was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning
it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that,
wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence
as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead
hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with
sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by
the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows
how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person
who is not similarly equipped. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of
Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should
do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level
imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear
to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO PON, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA. DE PAMFILO,
THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON SALES and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988
Facts:
The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
(BLTB) driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company
(Superlines) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay Isabong,
Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death of
Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena Rosales and
Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046. The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus
No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as
Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Armando Pon, driver of the
BLTB Bus, made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his
proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two buses collided with each other. Nena Vda. de
Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto
Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two
buses were filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon. Defendants BLTB and Superlines,
together with their drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due
care and diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all interposed counterclaims
against the plaintiffs and cross claims against each other. The lower court absolved defendants
Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants
BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them jointly and severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs.
Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed from the decision of the lower court to respondent
appellate court which affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the actions of private
respondents are based on culpa contractual.
Ruling:
The IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana. The
proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the
passengers of BLTB was the negligence of the driver of the BLTB bus, who recklessly operated
and drove said bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend of
the highway which was divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow strip. The driver of the
BLTB bus admitted in his cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the ascending
bend of the highway signifies a no-overtaking zone. It is no surprise then that the driver of the
Superlines bus was exonerated by the lower court. He had a valid reason to presuppose that no
one would overtake in such a dangerous situation. These facts show the patient imprudence of
the BLTB driver. It is well settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has the duty to see that the road is clear and not
to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Before attempting to pass the vehicle ahead, the rear
driver must see that the road is clear and if there is no sufficient room for a safe passage, or the
driver ahead does not turn out so as to afford opportunity to pass, or if, after attempting to pass,
the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter
must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary. The above rule becomes more particularly applicable in this case when the overtaking
took place on an ascending curved highway divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow line.
Appellant Pon should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a
curve there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the
right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is
approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation. In failing to observe these simple precautions, BLTB's
driver undoubtedly failed to act with the diligence demanded by the circumstances.
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his employer, appellant
Armando Pon is primarily liable. On the other hand, the liability of Pon's employer, appellant
BLTB, is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death of or injuries to its
passengers was through the negligence of its employee, and such liability does not cease even
upon proof that BLTB had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees. The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its
passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination.
They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
have observed extraordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the appellants failed to prove
extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that the bus
driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and the owner must answer for
injuries or death to its passengers. The liability of BLTB is also solidarily with its driver even
though the liability of the driver springs from quasi-delict while that of the bus company from
contract.
Therefore, it is settled that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of
three and injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the
BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed
by Traffic Rules and Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against petitioner
BLTB. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to transport
the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
 M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
Facts:
Plaintiff was one of a gang of eight laborers employed by the defendant to transport rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company’s yard near the Malecon in Manila. The rails were
being transported on two-hand cars immediately following one another. The rails lay upon two
cross pieces or sills secured to the cars but without side pieced or guars to prevent them from
slipping off. At a certain spot at or near the water’s edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car
either canted or upset, the rails lid off and caught the plaintiff breaking his leg which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. The sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie,
which was the immediate occasion of the accident, was due to the dislodging of the crosspiece or
piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent
of the company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in the sand. No effort was made
to repair the injury at the time of the occurrence. According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression
of the track, varying from one half inch to one inch and a half, was thereafter apparent to the eye,
and a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears that the day before the accident he called the
attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening out the crosspiece,
resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the very same
timbers as before. It has not proven that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or had
any proper system of inspection. Action was instituted by plaintiff to recover damages from his
employer. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded payment for damages. Atlantic
assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be
walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side
guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should sue the
foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was
negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to exonerate defendant
from liability.
Ruling:
 While Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the track, Rakes was guilty of
contributory negligence. Rakes’ contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was
on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of
damages though. The Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages.
The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in
fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars he is charged with carelessness:
First, that having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and second, that he
walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or
behind it. The Court ruled that his lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman
to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a
general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car,
and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof, the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the
plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement
of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages
— that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
The allegation that plaintiff was at fault for continuing his work despite notice of the
sagging of the track constituted contributory negligence that exonerate defendant is untenable.
Nothing in the evidence shows that plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath.
Plaintiff had worked on the job for less than two days. Where plaintiff contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of the determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction
with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less the sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
 MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO
HISOLE, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949
Facts:
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947,
without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby
causing his death. Afialda’s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil
Code, the possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may
cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only
in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may
have suffered it.
Issue:
Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed
Afialda.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 1905 of the Civil Code states that the possessor of an animal, or the
one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should
escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise
from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. The owner of an
animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the
caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under
article 1902 of the same code. It is no authority for a case like the present where the person
injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names the
possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for any damages it may cause and this for the
obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is
therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. In the present case, the animal
was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such.
Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.
 PICART vs. SMITH, Jr.
G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March 1918, 37 Phil. 809

Facts:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to
get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near,
there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across
the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days

Issue:
Whether or not Smith is negligent.

Ruling:
Yes, and so was Picart. Picart himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But the defendant was
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately
and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his
horse did not move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the other lane at that
point instead of swerving at the last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the
unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no
chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can
therefore recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his
contributory negligence. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The last clear chance rule of the law
of negligence is particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where
the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant.
MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
Facts:
Spouses Ong seek to recover from Metropolitan Water District, a government – owned
corporation for damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their 14 year old
son, Dominador Ong who drowned in one of their swimming pools. MWD owns and operated
three recreational swimming pools. The main pool is between two small pools known as Wading
pool and Beginners pool. There are diving boards in the Main pool and the depths of the water at
different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall, in conspicuous places certain rules
and regulations governing the use of the pools are displayed, one of which prohibits the
swimming in the pool alone or without attendant/s" It has a recreational section composed of
staff in charge of the safety of its patrons, they do not maintain a full time physician, however,
they have a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen
resuscitator if the need should arise.
Dominador is a high school student and a boy scout. In the afternoon of July 5, 1952,
Dominador and his two brothers went for a swim in one of the MWD’s swimming pools. The
boys swam in one of the shallow pools while a few hours later, Dominador excused himself to
get bottle of coke in the locker, his two brothers then transferred to the bigger pool/main pool. At
around 4:40 to 4:45PM, the bathers in the big pool called the attention of the lifeguard named
Abano informing him that somebody has been swimming underwater for quite a long time.
Abano, immediately jumped into the pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of
Dominador. He was attended by MWD’s recreational section to save his life, but all, to no avail.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied in the case at bar.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of last clear chance does not apply
considering the record does not show how Dominador got into the big swimming pool. The only
thing the record discloses is that Dominador informed his elder brothers that he was going to the
locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to
him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, as the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his
opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Since it is
not known how Dominador came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went
there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use
of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abano responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of
appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room
for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. The
last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of
the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury
 MR. AND MRS. ROMEO FERRER AND ANNETTE FERRER, petitioner, v. HON.
VICENTE G. ERICTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVIII, MR. AND MRS.
FRANCIS PFLEIDER AND DENNIS PFLEIDER, respondent
G.R. No. L-41767 August 23, 1978
Facts:
Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider were the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up
car. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1970, in the streets of Bayawan,
Negros Oriental, their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was then only sixteen years of age,
without proper official authority, drove the above-described vehicle, without due regard to traffic
rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent injury to persons or
damage to property, and as a consequence the pickup car was overturned, causing physical
injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed
her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than two
years. As a result of the physical injuries sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable
physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock and
spent a considerable sum of money for her treatment. The plaintiffs filed a complaint for
damages against respondents. Defendants filed their answer, putting up the affirmative defense
that defendant Dennis Pfleider exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle
aforementioned and alleging that Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were
not passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely joy riders and that, consequently,
defendants had no obligation whatsoever to plaintiffs. At the pre-trial, only plaintiffs-petitioners
and their counsel were present. Consequently, defendants-private respondents were declared in
default. Petitioners moved that they be granted an extension of ten days to present her evidence,
which was granted by the court. The presentation of petitioners' evidence was later continued by
the trial court, when the deposition of Annette Ferrer was submitted by petitioners and admitted
by the trial court. Private respondents then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and
subsequent pleadings on the ground that defendants' failure to appear for pre-trial was due to
accident or excusable neglect. The motion of private respondents was denied by respondent
Judge. On the same date, respondent Judge rendered judgment against private respondents,
finding that the minor Dennis Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to operate a Ford pick-up car
and because of his reckless negligence caused the accident in question, resulting in injuries to
Annette, and ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs damages. Private
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision and of the order denying the
motion to set aside order of default, based on the ground that the tile complaint shows on its face
that it was filed only after the lapse of more than four years from the date of the accident on
December 31, 1970, likewise appearing from the complaint and, therefore, the action has already
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. On September 23, 1975, respondent judge,
without setting aside the order of default, issued an order absolving defendants from any liability
on the ground that the defense of prescription is meritorious, since the complaint was filed more
than four years after the date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on quasi-
delict prescribes in four years.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private
respondents' failure to allege the same in their answer.
Ruling:
No. Defense of prescription is not deemed waived. The Supreme Court held that where
the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant's claim of
prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a
waiver of the defense of prescription. It was explained that the defense of prescription, even if
not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense
raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading. It is true that the defense of
prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant
and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been
declared in default, but such rule does riot obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of
action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations. In
the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription.
The complaint in the civil case alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained by
plaintiff Annette Ferrer occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for
damages was only filed on January 6, 1975 or only after the lapse of more than four years.
Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within four
years from the date of the accident. The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed or the date of the accident.
 ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
Facts:
In the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the
petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to
Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision
with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-
Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with
it its fish catch. After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine
protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted
an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the
negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a
subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982
wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the
dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of
the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a
quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have
filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint
filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Petitioners
contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with
special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can
properly analyze and resolve. They argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled
by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982,
the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines
had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code
should be computed from the said date. Petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint
was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed. In its order, the trial court denied the
Motion filed by the private respondent. The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence
relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to
such collision, and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted precisely to answer the
need. The trial court said that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the
Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. The private respondent elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals alleging therein that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Complaint filed by the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
Complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private
respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.
Ruling:
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the
last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. It is
clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place,
that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff,
which is the time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for
damages arising from the collision of two vessels the four year prescriptive period must be
counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by
an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the collision was caused by the fault
or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Immediately after the
collision, the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault
of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found
that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The
complaint for damages filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four year
prescriptive period.
 GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and
LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents
G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992
Facts:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter,
plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater,
owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then
were unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten
minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged
into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the
fallen ceiling. They suffered physical injuries. Respondents filed a case for damages. Defendant
tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction
defect. Mr. Ong, Gotesco’s architect testified that after he had conducted the investigation, he
found no reason why such balcony would collapse. He attributed its collapse to force majeure.
This was overruled. The trial court ruled in favor of the Chattos, saying that Gotesco was
negligent in maintaining the cinema balcony; that the ceiling collapsed because of some
structural construction or architectural defect, not because of force majeure; and that petitioner is
grossly negligent in failing to cause proper and adequate inspection and upkeep of the building.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the cause of the collapse of the balcony ceiling was force majeure.
Ruling:
Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to force
majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, Mr. Ong, admitted that he could
not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. Having interposed it as a defense, it had the
burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have
collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force
majeure. Force majeure is defined as inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by
any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation,
or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person (Blackstone). It is also defined by Escriche
as the event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail,
inundation, hurricane, public enemy, and attack by robbers. Bouvier defines the same as any
accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such as could not
have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected.
The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused by
lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy, etc.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to
force majeure. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either
he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held,
incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's
examination. Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present
proceedings. What is significant is that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was
no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four years prior
to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeure
obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have
been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and
maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions
on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the
same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City
Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove
that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that
no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. It is settled that the owner or
proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. This implied warranty has given rise
to the rule that where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the
thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened
if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant. That presumption or inference was not overcome by
the petitioner. Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously
insists, the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because
it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from the
definition of force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993
Facts:
National Power Corporation operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant
in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant
supervisor at the time of the incident in question. Despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as
October 24, 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due
diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam. When the said water level went beyond the
maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and
recklessly opened three of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which
inundated the banks of the Angat River. As a consequence, members of the household of the
plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were washed away in the
evening of October 26 and the early hours of October 27, 1978. Private respondents sought to
recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by
the inundation. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants
of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam without prior warning to the residents within
the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the
water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises
diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It
further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the
alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and
even assuming that respondents suffered damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous event and
such damages are of the nature and character of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents have
no cause of action against them. The Trial Court awarded damages, interest, and attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed such ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the injury caused to private respondents was due to fortuitous event.
Ruling:
No. The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner
of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss
or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private
respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating
or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the
case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners cannot escape liability
because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. From the mass of
evidence extant in the record, the Supreme Court was convinced, and so hold that the flash flood
on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters, but by stored waters suddenly and
simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees, particularly from
midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978. The event then was
not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or
imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed
to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence
was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
 PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners, vs. PEPSI-COLA
BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967
Facts:
On May 10, 1958, the car of Placido Ramos collided with the tractor-truck and trailer of
PEPSI-COLA. Said car was driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-
COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a
consequence, On June 30, 1958, Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. and
Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance. The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and
declared that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved that it exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were
ordered to pay the plaintiffs damages. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but absolved PEPSI-COLA from
liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.
In its decision, CA stated that the uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel
manager of defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a
member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired as a driver, he
had sized by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience,
physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of theoretical examination and the practical driving examination, all of
which he had undergone; and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
The Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that in order that the defendant may be considered
as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully
examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of
service. Defendant Company has taken all these steps. Appellant contended that Añasco, being
PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his testimony is not
believable.
Issue:
Whether or not PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee.
Ruling:
 As testified to by Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-
applicant Bonifacio as to his qualifications, experiences and record of service, taking all steps
mentioned by the Court of Appeals in its decision. Such being the case, there can be no doubt
that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its driver. In order that
the defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family,
he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should
have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience
and record of service. It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as
to due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
The Supreme Court said that two things are apparent: (1) that when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that the presumption is
juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that
if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he
is relieved from liability. As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by
PEPSI-COLA is only due diligence in the selection of its driver. And, parenthetically, it is not
surprising that appellants thus confine their arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the
record would show sufficient evidence to establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-
COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer
against all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil Code is very explicit that the
owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an
employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made
responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees.
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
Facts:
On 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's "Thames" mini
bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On
the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a
snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle
bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into
a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. Gatchalian sustained
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. On 14 July 1973, while injured. Passengers were
confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for
their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay
her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. They were made to sign a Joint
Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and owner of the said Thames. Petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of
First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral
damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had
left her with a conspicuous white scar on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an
inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away
from her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of
opportunities for employment. In defense, respondent averred that petitioner had already been
paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him (private respondent)
and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on July 14, 1973. The trial
court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint
Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had
against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal
of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver.
Ruling:
No valid waiver of Gatchalian’s cause of action had been made by petitioner. The
relevant language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again: “That we are no longer interested
to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.” A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in
the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention
of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually
be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly an evidence intent
to abandon a right vested in such person.
The terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in
"clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was
signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still
reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days,
when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing;
that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who
had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether
petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of
private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of
action against private respondent. Because what is involved here is the liability of a common
carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, any such purported waiver must be construed most strictly
against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law,
morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be
to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common
carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. Such a purported waiver is offensive to
public policy.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993
Facts:
National Power Corporation operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant
in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant
supervisor at the time of the incident in question. Despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as
October 24, 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due
diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam. When the said water level went beyond the
maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and
recklessly opened three of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which
inundated the banks of the Angat River. As a consequence, members of the household of the
plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were washed away in the
evening of October 26 and the early hours of October 27, 1978. Private respondents sought to
recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by
the inundation. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants
of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam without prior warning to the residents within
the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the
water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises
diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It
further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the
alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and
even assuming that respondents suffered damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous event and
such damages are of the nature and character of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents have
no cause of action against them. The Trial Court awarded damages, interest, and attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeals affirmed such ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court cannot give credence to petitioners' assignment of error that the
damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the
fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to
operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways
to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.