Paradise Is a Bazaar?

Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99

Author(s): Indra de Soysa
Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 4, Special Issue on Civil War in Developing
Countries (Jul., 2002), pp. 395-416
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555274 .
Accessed: 30/03/2014 14:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Peace
Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ? 2002 Journalof PeaceResearch,
vol.39, no. 4, 2002, pp. 395-416
11-ft SagePublications(London,ThousandOaks,
CAand New Delhi)
[0022-3433(200207)39:4;395-416; 025813]

ParadiseIs a Bazaar?Greed,Creed,and
Governancein CivilWar,1989-99*
INDRA DE SOYSA
Department of Political & Cultural Change, Centerfor Development
Research(ZEF), Universityof Bonn

Some prominent recent studies of civil war argue that greed, not grievance,is the primarymotivating
factorbehind violence, basing their condusions on a strong empiricalassociationbetween primarycom-
modity exports and civil war. This study contrastsalternativepropositions that see need-, creed-, and
governance-basedexplanationsthat are intimatelyrelatedto the question of primarycommodity depen-
dence and conflict. Maximum likelihood analysison approximately138 countries over the entire post-
Cold War period shows little support for neo-Malthusian claims. Abundant mineral wealth makes
countries highly unstable, whereasscarcityof renewableresourcesis largely unrelatedto civil conflict.
A positive effect of population density on conflict does not seem to be conditioned by renewable
resourcescarcity.Ethnicity is relatedto conflict when society is moderatelyhomogenous; a highly plural
society faces less risk. Very slight political liberalizationleads to conflict, but largerincreasesreduce the
dangerconsiderably,supporting the view that conflict is driven by opportunistic behaviourratherthan
by grievance. Increasesin homogeneity among Islamic and Catholic populations make them riskier.
Perhapsinstitutional factors relating to separation of church and state rather than competing creeds
explain culture conflicts. Largershares of both Christians and Muslims within countries make them
safer,contrary to claims of natural antagonism between the two. Governance,proxied by the ratio of
total tradeto GDP, predictspeace strongly,an under-theorizedareawithin the study of civil war.Trade's
relationship to peace is robust to specification and sample size, supporting the findings of the State
FailureProject. Greaterattention should perhaps be paid to formal and informal institutional factors
that create the synergybetween privateand public spaces for overcoming collective action problems of
maintaining peace.

Introduction civil violence. Some popular explanations

see creeping ecological and demographic
The collapse of the Cold War has intensi- pressure as the causal mechanism behind
fied the search for appropriate theoretical violent conflicts. Apparently increasing
models for explaining a new environment of environmental scarcity and Malthusian

* I thankJohn Oneal, ErichWeede,MaximoTorrero,Nils

PetterGleditsch,MansoobMurshed,andthreeanonymous
refereesfor helpfulcommentsand suggestions.I am grate-
ful for comments receivedat the World Bank/Princeton
Universityworkshop(March2000), GECHSworkshopat
UC Irvine (March 2000), UNU/WIDER in Helsinki
(October2000), andfromcolleaguesat ZEEThe generous
supportof the ResearchCouncil of Norwayfor the Oslo
ProjectOffice of the Global EnvironmentalChangeand
HumanSecurity(GECHS)programis gratefullyacknow-
ledged.KerstinHenke and MariaLensuprovidedinvalu-
able researchassistance.The data are posted at http:
I am the sole miscreantof
//www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp.
all errors.

395

This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
396 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
pressureshave createda new age of insecur-
ity that drives people to fight for survival
(Homer-Dixon, 1999; Renner, 1996).
Others argue that conflict is caused by
'greed' rather than 'grievance', and that a
relativeabundanceof naturalresourcessup-
plies the motivation for organizingviolence.
Resourcesoffer lootable income over which
to fight, making costly strategiesof violence
viable - a few can 'do well out of war'
(Collier, 2000; de Soysa, 2000). Some focus
on societal grievances based on ethnic and
civilizational divides. Cultural difference
and ascription create natural battle lines
that result in violence over primordial
hatred. Others view culture as being instru-
mentalized by ethnic entrepreneursto gain
access to political and economic resources
(Gurr & Harff, 1994). This study will
systematically assess the relative contri-
butions of these general propositions, uti-
lizing new models of civil conflict generated
by researchat the World Bank (Collier &
Hoeffler, 1998). This study introduces
governance and social capital arguments
into the models on sound theoretical and
methodological grounds to test the robust-
ness of the new explanations.
Despite an explosion of studies on the
causesof civil conflict, there are few system-
atic tests of competing propositions that
utilize objective criteria in quasi-
experimentalways. Naturally,a complex of
factorsareinvolved in the generationof con-
flict, but it is still rarethat studies systemati-
cally gauge the relativeweight of competing
propositions. This study will gauge the
importance of proxies that capture some
aspect of theoretical linkages in an inte-
gratedmodel. The resultsmay then speak to
contrasting propositions and the larger
debate as to whether conflict is a function of
selflessopposition to tyranny(the searchfor
justice), or whethertyrannyderivesfrom the
vanities of a few men (the searchfor private
gain), a problem that has occupied social
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 Ijuly2002
research since at least the genesis of the
science of politics.1
The study of the causes of conflict is
fraughtwith many difficulties.One problem
facing systematicexamination of the causes
of violent conflict is identifying the appro-
priate model and variablesto hold constant
when exploring the impact of variablesof
interest. All too often, researchis pursued
based on the dependent variable, which is
that conflict alreadyexiststo arousethe inter-
est of research,leading to misleading con-
clusions about causes because the lack of
variancein case-studybased researchdesign
leads to overdeterminationof some variables
overothers (Collier& Mahoney,1996; King,
Keohane& Verba,1994). Moreover,scholars
are likely also to confuse what they want to
explain (underlying causes of violent con-
flict) by conflating contests within the
political arena,which may createa dominant
discourse, with acts of violence. The
violence, however, might in fact be quite
independent of the contests that drive the
dominant discourse(Varshney,2001).
The discourse dominating zones of con-
flict is heavilylacedwith storiesof grievance,
and objective factors are likely to be well
masked, particularlyto academicsand jour-
nalists. In these situations, one can find just
about any narrativeof grievanceto provide
the basis of the causal story. The focus on
difference,which is a naturalfunction of the
'enemy-image', is an especial feature of
political contests and violence. In such situ-
ations, culturaldifferencesin particularmay
come to be overemphasizedin games of 'us
versusthem', even though the participantsin
disputesrarelyspeakwith one voice. The dis-
course of grievance is often unrelated to
objective truth, which makes the discourse
1 Politicalscientistsand sociologistsdebatewhetherrebel-
lion is motivatedby relativedeprivation,or whetherby self-
serving,rationalaction (see Weede, 1998 for a review),a
debatethat relatesintimatelyto the greedversusgrievance
juxtaposition.

highly dependent on the natureand form of
the violence itself. It is a dauntingtaskindeed
for the researcherto enter this perplexing
environment and come away with a clear
picture of who the 'good' and 'bad' guys are
(one man's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter).It is difficult, indeed, to identify the
objectivefacts that may underlie all (or even
most) violent conflict so as to understandits
causessystematically.2
In many instancesof violent conflict, the
natureof the violence itself defines the com-
plaint, which means that the group organ-
ized enough to fight first determines the
cause and the subsequentdiscourseof griev-
ance. Thus, an organizationaladvantagefor
carrying out violence determines the dis-
course of grievance,not objective causes. In
such a way, Marxist narratives,ethnic griev-
ance, etc., gain ascendancy,based on who is
able effectively to organize violence.
However, the reasonsdriving capabilitiesto
organizeviolence and objectivefactorsgener-
ating individual and group grievance are
totally different things, even if they some-
times go together. If mafias are well-
organized for perpetratingviolence, as was
the case clearly in many of the post-Soviet
instances argued by many (Kaldor, 1999;
Mueller,2000), does this representlegitimate
grievances?As Varshney(1997: 2) points out
in referenceto India, the study of contem-
porary communal violence has become so
tangled in discursive contestations and
political manipulation that facts and
representationscannot be separated.
2 This is not to
suggestthatonly large-N,harddata(econo-
metric)researchis able to uncoverthe right relationships,
but that thereshould be a senseof variance,whateverthe
method used. Hard data, however, allows objective
measurementby standardizedcriteria,which is one valu-
ablewayof evaluatingcompetingclaims.Muchresearchon
environmentalscarcityand conflict, for example,selects
caseson the dependentvariable,using processtracingfor
identifyingthe causal links. See Gleditsch (1998) for a
critique of methodology employed by this genre of
research.
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Indra de Soysa PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 397
New Models of Conflict
Accordingto Collier & Hoeffler (1998), civil
war can be modeled as 'loot-seeking' wars
(large-scalebanditry), or as 'justice-seeking'
wars (rebelswith a cause). The first is based
on the notion that individuals join rebel
movements depending on the expected
utility of their actions,which is a function of
opportunities forgone by engaging in
violence and the availability of lootable
income, or the payoff. The higher the per
capita wealth and human capital, the less
likely individualswill engage in riskybehav-
ior, but this is dependent on the size of the
payoff,which they proxyas the availabilityof
lootable income, proxied by the share of
primarycommodities in total exports.
The second model is of justice-seeking
wars, where groups form on the basis of
ousting a grievance-causing government
(political system) and ending injustice. Such
movements, however,face enormous collec-
tive action problemssince justice is a public
good. Individualscan freeride by not bearing
the costs of war. Moreover,justice-seeking
rebellionshave to be largein orderto replace
the state, whereas loot-seekers may remain
small.Therefore,justice-seekingon the basis
of difference, or discrimination, within
highly fractionalizedsocieties is likely to face
bigger collective action problems since the
likelihood of garneringa largeenough coali-
tion is smaller.They proxy the level of griev-
ance and the likelihood of overcoming
collective action problems with social vari-
ables, such as ethno-linguistic and religious
fractionalizationand the degree of political
repression,and economic variables,such as
per capitaeconomic growth and income and
land inequality.
The results support the propositions in
many interesting ways. Collier & Hoeffler
(1998) find that both greed and grievance
predictconflict significantly.However,greed,
proxied by the availability of natural
398 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
resources(measuredas the share of primary
commodity exports in total exports) is sub-
stantivelya farstronger(five times) predictor
of conflict than the proxiesof grievance.The
proxies for ethno-religious fractionalization
exhibit a curvilinearshape, suggesting that
high ethno-linguistic and religious fraction-
alizationincreasesthe organizationalcosts of
fighting and thereby induces a peace effect
greaterthan the grievanceeffects generated
by moderate fractionalization.The purely
grievance-measuring variables such as
income and land inequality are not signifi-
cantly relatedto conflict. Likewise,political
repressioncan drivedown conflict becauseit
affects the opportunity costs of participants,
but moderate democracy tends to increase
the incidence of conflict, while further
increases induce peace. The net effect of
repression, however, is larger than that of
grievance-reducing democracy, suggesting
again that greed,ratherthan grievance,is the
more potent driverof conflict becausegriev-
ance should be highest at the highest point
of repression, but so are the opportunity
costs of rebellion. In other words, costs of
organizingto fight determinethe outbreakof
violence and not the supplyof justice.To put
it succinctly, there are fewer martyrs than
opportunists!
The Collier-Hoeffler model provides
many insights, but the conclusions are based
on the resultsobtained largelyby the single
indicator measuring 'lootable income'. The
use of primarygoods exportsin total exports
for modeling the motivationfor greed-driven
conflict raisessome questions.Although it is
a reasonablygood proxy for the purposes
outlined by Collier & Hoeffler- i.e. lootable
income for measuringthe size of the payoff
for engaging in violence - the assumption
that this measuredirectlycapturesthe degree
to which naturalresourcesarescarceor abun-
dant is problematic. Moreover, since they
reporta curvilinearrelationshipbetween the
ratio of primaryexportsto total exports,it is
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 Ijuly2002
unclearas to how conflict becomes less likely
at very high levels of available lootable
income. They explainthis resultas increased
state capacityas a result of superabundance,
which allows greater taxable income with
which to deal with opposition. The crucial
Collier-Hoeffler variable, the ratio of
primary exports to total exports, may be
questioned on at least four other grounds.
First,the finding that the ratioof primary
exports to total iexportsis stronglyrelatedto
conflict can very well be interpretedto mean
that poor countries,which are dependenton
primarygoods exports,arefacingMalthusian
crises and are unable thereforeto meet the
demands of society, leading to subsistence
crises,which is in fact the argumentput forth
by the proponents of 'eco-violence' (dis-
cussed in detail below).
Second, the ratio of primarycommodity
exportsto total exportsis not just a function
of resourceavailability,but it variesalso with
the denominator- total exports. Very poor
countries have a high proportion of their
exports devoted to primary goods because
they have fewer industrial goods to trade.
The model, however, does not capture the
macro-environment that determines total
trade, which indicates the strength of
governance variables. For example, a poor
country with a poor environmentof govern-
ance could simultaneously have a low
volume of exports based largely on extrac-
tion, without the ratio indicatingthe 'size'of
availableresources.In other words, since the
denominator determines the ratio, social
factors affecting investment and export
activity can affect the ratio. Adding growth
of GDP in the model may mitigate some of
the problem, but not all of it since the
denominatorof the primarycommodities to
total exportsis not GDP directly.
Third, not only might underlying
tensions affect the ratio, they may also affect
the mix of goods being traded.For example,
manufacturing is likely to shrink farthest
 Indra de Soysa PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 399

when tensions mount, or when governanceis
unfavorable for productive investment,
because investment in manufacturing
requires a stable environment. Rising
tensions and shrinking manufacturingmay
drive a governmentto extractprimarygoods
more intensively.In this way, social tensions
can change the mix of primary to manu-
facturedgoods in total exports. If the mix of
goods being traded changes simultaneously
with declines in manufacturing,the ratio of
the overall primary goods to total exports
ratio increases.
Fourth, since the exportation of oil can
dominate the export sector,and since a large
proportion of oil-producing countries
happen to be Islamic states, some might
question whether it is really Islam's mili-
tarism that is driving the result ratherthan
microeconomic behavior based on lootable
income. In otherwords, the Collier-Hoeffler
resultson primaryresourcesmight be reflect-
ing civilizational factors associated with
Islam,which dominate the primaryresource-
rich areas of South Central Asia, North
Africa, and the Middle East, areas that are
rife with problemsthought to emanatefrom
religious fundamentalism (Huntington,
1997). Figure 1 demonstrates how the
Collier-Hoeffler results might in fact be
claimed by three competing propositionson
the causes of civil war.
Below, I examine in detail each of the
competing propositions. This study utilizes
alternativespecificationand data to explore
the relationship between the Collier-
Hoefflerfindingsand alternativepropositions,
particularlyby applying better measuresof
natural resourceavailabilityand ethnic and
religiousdata,and by exploringthe possibility
that institutional factors that point to the
qualityof governanceand civil society matter
in the maintenanceof social peace.
Governance
One major drawback in the Collier-
Hoeffler model is that it lacks an insti-
tutional component, even though the analy-
sis is at state level. Institutional factors

Figure 1. Natural Resource Dependence and Competing Explanations of Civil War

This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
400 journal ofPEACE RESEARCH
fashion the opportunity costs of people and
help to solve collectiveaction problemsat the
level of the group, or society at large. Purely
'cold turkey'rationalitydoes not drivepeople
to be opportunistic in a frictionless social
world. While per capita wealth and the
growth rate capture some aspects of state
capacity and governance, the model is
perhaps under-specified with regard to
modeling collectiveaction for peace.At least
one robust result from the Collier-Hoeffler
analysis provides some cause for pursuing
governanceas an importantfactor.They find
a strong association between the size of the
population and conflict. Largerpopulations
have more conflict. However, larger coun-
tries are also found to be less open to trade
and contain smaller governments, which
suggest on the face of it that furtherinvesti-
gation of institutional factors is warranted
because trade is related to the macro-
environment that fashions predatoryversus
productivebehavior,at the societal and state
levels and the public and the privatespheres
of life (Hall & Jones, 1996, 1999).3
I propose that the Collier-Hoeffler result
on the size of the population is perhapscap-
turing the effects of institutional (govern-
ance) variables,since the size of the country
is inverselyrelatedto the level of openness to
trade (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1996; Wei,
2000). Tradeis an importantdeterminantof
the macro-environmentthat determinesthe
degreeto which governmentsencouragepro-
ductive activity rather than 'diversionary
activity' (Hall & Jones, 1996). Rodrik
(1996) argues that more open economies
tend to havelargergovernmentsbecausethey
are more likely to build institutions that
provide social insurancefor minimizing the
risksof being tied to a global tradingsystem.
3 Someeconomistshave
arguedthathomoeconomicus is not
givenonly to 'trucking,bartering,andexchanging,but also
to lying,stealing,and cheating',see Garfinkel& Skaperdas
(2000). Forsimilarargumentsabout predatorystatesby a
politicalscientist,see Levi (1988).
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 ljuly 2002
Apparently, more open economies have a
largershareof governmentto GDP, which is
supposed to serve a risk-reducingfunction.
Others find strong evidence to suggest that
more open economies have less corruption
(Wei, 2000). Alesina& Wacziarg(1997) and
Alesina & Spolaore (1997) challenge
Rodriks assertionthat open economies have
larger governments because of risk factors,
and they argue that the association works
through the inverserelationshipbetween the
size of the population and openness. Large
countriesspend less on governmentbecause
there are diminishing returns to paying for
the supplyof public goods. These researchers
also arguethat largecountriescontain greater
ethnic fractionalization,which also servesto
reduce the size of government.These argu-
ments arealso powerfulreasonsfor exploring
the connection betweenthe size of the popu-
lation and conflict, which is possibly linked
to the question of institutions, governance,
and the macro-environment determining
productionversuspredation.
A comprehensivestudy on conflict con-
ducted by the StateFailureTaskForcereports
that trade to GDP is significantlynegatively
related to violent conflict and state failure
(Esty et al., 1999). This resultwas one of the
most robust from two phases of the task
force'sinvestigation.It reportsthat 'countries
in Sub SaharanAfrica that were above the
median on trade openness were on average
only about one-half as likely to fail as coun-
tries below the median' (Esty et al., 1999).
Unfortunately, there is little theory that
allows us to interpretsuch a finding.4 It is
hypothesizedhere that higher levels of trade
areassociatedwith betterinstitutions,so that
governancemay reduce underlyingaggrava-
tions that may resultin conflictand constrain
4 ImmanuelKant arguedthat trade promotedpeace by
acting as a constrainton rulers who might otherwise
embark on war 'as if for sport'. Some contemporary
scholarsfind robustevidencefora 'Kantianpeace'between
states(Russett& Oneal, 2000).
 Indra de Soysa
opportunisticbehavior.The more important
trade is to the welfare of people, the more
likely that mechanismsof social peace (social
capital) endogenously develop because con-
flict and predatorybehavior are highly dis-
ruptive,driving down productiveactivity.In
other words, social capital through associ-
ational life may mitigate collective action
problemsof creatingand maintainingpeace-
ful relations, whether between communal
groups or within them (Putnam, 1993;
Varshney, 1997; Woolcock & Narayan,
2000).
The level of tradeis a good proxy for cap-
turing the degree of economic specialization
that requires a high degree of contracting,
binding state and society in an organic
relationship(Hall & Ikenberry,1989). The
literature on social capital sees 'bonding'
social capital to be a strong factor at low
levels of specializationand 'bridging'social
capitalto increasewith increasingspecializa-
tion. Alexis de Tocqueville,one of the fathers
of the concept of social capital,attributesthe
successof democracyin earlyAmericato the
thickness of associational life there. In his
celebrated book, Democracy in America,
Tocquevilleis explicitthat tradingties, which
give rise to mutually beneficialexchange,are
what create the civic associationthat results
in social harmony (see Heffner, 1956: 202).
People overcomebarriersto collective action
becauseof individualincentivesto cooperate
and group disincentives against destructive
behavior.
If civic association (social capital) is a
demand effect on peace, there is probablya
supply effect of conflict emanating from
closed economic settings. Closed economies
may increase the payoff to illegal activity,
such as smuggling, which institutionalizes
organizedeconomic activity in the shadows,
which ultimately provides to some groups
the organizationaladvantagesof perpetrat-
ing violence against a state or rival groups.
In other words, activities in the shadow
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 401
economy provide the organizational basis
for violence because those groups organized
as 'mafias'within the shadow economy are
well placed for exploiting underlying griev-
ances in the larger society (even spawning
them with strategic acts of violence).
Importantly,they may harbororganizational
advantages vis-a-vis a weak state. Such
groups are also often based on kinship ties,
so that the perpetrationof violence by one
group or the other leads to the weakeningof
social capital, hardening communal dis-
courses of grievance in the process. Some
(Kaldor, 1999; Mueller, 2000) have shown
how mafia-likeorganizationwas behind the
extreme violence in the former Yugoslavia,
and similargroups arebehind movements in
many of the former Soviet states, particu-
larly in the resource-wealthyCaspian Sea
region and other parts of Central Asia.
While some see this as a result of the
privatization of the state, it is much more
reasonable to see these groups as elite
organizations that flourished during the
closed economy period of the USSR (and
Yugoslavia),when the payoff to smuggling
(shadow economy) activity was enormous.
These groups are now stepping in to fill the
vacuum left by the collapseof political auth-
ority. Under these circumstances, it is also
highly likely that these groups, whether
along communal, class,or regionallines, will
already harbor highly antagonistic feelings
towards state authorities and institutions
that are not alreadyco-opted.
To sum up, trade may be important for
reducing conflict by raising the capacity of
government, reducing opportunity costs for
acting peacefully because of alternative
income-earning opportunities, and increas-
ing social capital, which acts as a deterrent
against groups forming on the basis of
violence for profit. It is surely closed
economies and borders that increase the
payoff to smuggling and other organized
criminality,which provide lootable income
402 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
and form the basis of organizationaladvan-
tagesto groupsvis-a-visthe state and the rest
of society. While further theorizing is
required for testing specific links between
trade and peace, this study gauges the insti-
tutional (governance) environment by
including the trade-to-GDP ratio as a sup-
plement to the greed-grievancemodels dis-
cussed above. This is consistent with the
economics literature, which uses trade-to-
GDP as a proxyfor gaugingthe qualityof the
macro-environmentof governance (Hall &
Jones, 1999).
Culture Clashes?
Popular accounts and much of the social
sciencesemphasizeethnic and religiousiden-
tities as a causal factor in the incidence of
violent conflict, although the exact links are
sketchy.In general,these theoriesidentifythe
grievancesof groups as a primaryreasonfor
violence - common identity makes mobiliz-
ation easier (Diamond & Plattner, 1994;
Gurr & Harff, 1994). Difference, whether
for socio-biological reasons (primordialism)
or as a convenientresourceexploitedby elites
(instrumentalism),is supposed to generate
grievances and conflict. Difference is sup-
posed to foster mutual fears and in-
group/out-group dynamics that make
mutual recrimination likely. The study of
ethnicity and nationalism,accordingto one
pre-eminentscholaron the subject,however,
is where 'theoreticaloverclaimingis in evi-
dence' and where competing positions have
not 'produced a great deal of cumulative
knowledge' (Horowitz, 1998). Despite a
multitude of explanations, which are seg-
mented along the primordialist-instrumen-
talist faultline, there are few solidly specified
models suggestingclearlyhow ethnic enmity
is the realcauseof violence and not, as is very
often the case, its by-product (Fearon &
Laitin, 2000).
While ethnic conflict is supposedlyon the
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 I/july2002
wane (Gurr, 1993), the primordialistvision
has gained much support with the publi-
cation of Samuel Huntington's (1997)
popular thesis on the 'clashof civilizations',
which suggests that cultural differenceswill
be the central factor in conflict in the post-
Cold Warworld.While Huntington'sthesisis
most relevant to internationalrelations, he
suggeststhat civilizationalties - those marked
by mass religions,such as Islam,Christianity,
Hinduism, Confucianism,etc. - will replace
the Cold War configurationsthat provided
the salient identities around class.According
to Huntington (1997: 20), 'culture and
culturalidentities,which at the broadestlevel
are civilizational identities, are shaping
patternsof cohesion, disintegrationand con-
flict in the post-Cold War world'. His thesis
is concernedto a largeextent with the inter-
civilizationalclashbetweenthe 'Westand the
rest', where the incompatible ethoses of a
ChristianWest and an IslamicNear Eastwill
mark the faultlinesof future conflict. As he
writes, 'the major civilizations in human
history have been closely identifiedwith the
world's great religions;and the people who
share ethnicity and language but differ in
religionmay slaughtereach other' (Hunting-
ton, 1997). In fact, he takes great pains to
show how Islamcan be highly antagonisticto
other religions,arguingthat an 'overwhelm-
ing majorityof faultlineconflicts have taken
place along the boundary looping across
Eurasia and Africa that separatesMuslims
from non-Muslims'. As he writes, 'Islam's
bordersare bloody, but so are its innards'.
At least one recent study finds little evi-
dence for the 'clash'between states divided
along Huntington's civilizational categories
(Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000). Islamic and
non-Islamic countries are no more prone to
conflict than others, but standardrealistand
liberal variables have more explanatory
power than culturalones. They reportsome
support for intra-Islamicconflicts, however.
This result is probably driven by territorial
 Indra de Soysa PARADISE IS A BAZAAR?
and political factors compounded by the
abundanceof a highly prized resourcerather
than by Islam's propensity for militarism.
However, it is worth pursuing the question
of oil wealth and Islamic militarism since
many of the oil-rich countries happen to be
largely Islamic. Thus, it is salient to test
Islam's independent effect on conflict in
models holding resourcewealth, ethnic frac-
tionalization,and democracyconstant. If oil
and peace don't mix, is it that Islam and
peace don't mix because of oil? This study
will also test the interactiveeffectsof Islamic
populations with Christian and non-
Christian populations to test specifically
Huntington's assertionsthat Islam is overly
militaristic and historically antagonistic to
Christianity. Moreover, it is important to
find out if moderate ethno-religious frac-
tionalization'spositive effect on conflict, as
reported by Collier & Hoeffler (1998), is
being driven by homogenizing religions,
such as Islam.
In terms of ethnicity and conflict,
Horowitz (1998) attempts a few steps
towardsa synthesis,which may be summar-
ized as follows:identitiesarenot hardgivens,
but they aremalleable.However,even in soft
form, attachmentmust exist to be exploited
for the rationalbenefit of elites. Passionand
interest work conditionally,where ethnicity
at least promotes'gemeinschaft',or as Daniel
Bell's (1975: 169) oft-quoted line suggests,
ethnicity mattersbecauseit 'can combine an
interest with an effective tie'. According to
Horowitz (1998), democracy can be highly
destabilizing when ethnicity is a ready
resource to be politicized for rational
political purposes, and ethnicity becomes a
'strategicsite' in contests (Bell, 1975). It is
argued also that institutional arrangements
can lessen the chance of violence breaking
out, since 'ethnic peace' is achieved by
varioussocieties in many disparatecountries
at different times. Electoral arrangements
and institutional arrangements, such as
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
403
consociationalism, apparently defuse
propensities towards violence, but as
Horowitz (1985) has pointed out, leadersof
large majorities face the risk of being out-
flanked by those who will play the ethnic
card,which createsthe logic of polarization.
While most of these explanationsoutline
the contoursof the contestsby describingthe
differences of the conflicting parties, the
links to violence are yet to be clearlyspeci-
fied. Moreover, there is confusion over the
type of violence, since ethnicity is often
associated with the riot. Riots, however,
occur for reasons other than ethnicity, and
even though minorities are often targeted,
rarelydo ethnic groups'speakwith one voice'
(Gorenburg, 2000; Mueller, 2000). Many
are able to explain communal polarization,
but the links to violence are not made
explicit.As some have suggested,the existing
literaturehas 'failed to distinguish between
ethnic violenceand ethnic conflict'(Varshney,
2001). If elites cause polarizationby ethni-
cizing interests, are they not the ones who
stand to lose the most from protracted
violence?Does the provisionof justice for the
entire group compensate elite loss from the
conflict? Moreover, is group identity along
ethnic lines a sufficient cause for mobiliz-
ation? The participants in many long and
bloody conflicts, such as la violencia in
Colombia, were not ethnically distinct, but
were mobilized by elites to violence. If
minority ethnic groups organizeto fight for
justice, why are they so rarelyunified?What
explainsthe successand monopoly power for
supplyingjustice of some groupsoverothers?
Moreover, how are islands of ethnic peace
possible in protractedand bloody ethnic war
zones?What conditions, at the nationallevel,
can predict peace, given that ethnicity is a
convenient vehicle for mobilization and
manipulation?At the heartof these questions
lies the problemof understandingwhetheror
not greed, or objective grievance, causes
conflict.
404 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
EnvironmentalScarcity
Since armed conflict takes place overwhelm-
ingly within poor states, it is thought that
environmentalpressureand povertyareparts
of a process that has trappedpoor countries
in a vicious cycle. The extreme pessimistic
view of environmentalpressureand conflict
is reflected in neo-Malthusian arguments
about 'the population explosion' (Ehrlich&
Ehrlich, 1990) and the 'coming anarchy'
(Kaplan, 1994). The recent outbreaks of
genocidal violence in places such as
Yugoslaviaand Rwanda and the continual
violence in many parts of Africa and Asia,
relayedlive on global television, have given
much impetus to the idea that the world is
flying apart because of social pressures
wrought by an environmentally decaying
planet. It is no exaggerationto suggest that
environmentalconcernsarea matterof 'high
politics' and that the discourse on develop-
ment and peace is dominated by ecological
concerns.
More sophisticatedanalysesof population
pressure,scarcity of resources,and conflict
offer some nuanced explanationsof how the
environment is related to conflict (Homer-
Dixon, 1999). The clearest articulation of
how environmentalfactors affect conflict is
found in the connection between the inca-
pacitatingeffects of resourcescarcityand the
capabilityof poor societiesto adaptto socio-
economic pressures.5While the causalpath-
ways from scarcity to conflict interact in
complex ways, the arguments stress the
importanceof 'resourcescarcity'as being the
primaryunderlyingcause determiningother
proximate causes of conflict. Some 'eco-
violence'proponentsgo so faras to arguethat
renewable resource scarcity is the causal
5 These assertionsare made despitetheoreticalarguments
and empirical evidence from economics and political
science showing resourcewealth to be problematicon
manyfronts- socially,politically,and economically(Auty,
2000; Lal & Mynt, 1996; Ross, 2001; Sachs& Warner,
1995; Woolcock,Pritchett& Isham,2001).
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 /july 2002
mechanism of conflict (Schwartz,Deligian-
nis & Homer-Dixon, 2000). Homer-Dixon
and associates argue that environmental
transformationaltersthe sociopoliticalfabric
of society, disrupting productive relation-
ships, which ultimately affects established
constraintson social conflict.
Conflict is generated by the scarcity of
naturalresourcesin two primaryways. First,
resource scarcity drives elites to 'capture'
resources,marginalizingpowerlessgroups in
the process.6 According to Homer-Dixon
(1999), such a processis at work in the recent
violence in Haiti, Mexico (Chiapas),
Rwanda, South Africa, and the Philippines.
Anotherway in which scarcitycausesconflict
is indirectlythroughits debilitatingeffect on
economic and social innovation - what
Homer-Dixon (1999: 5, 7) terms the 'in-
genuity gap'. Poor countries stay poor and
sufferarmedconflictbecauseresourcescarcity
acts to prevent socio-economic innovation.
The link betweenenvironmentalpressureand
conflict is mediated in part by the ability of
societies to achieve such collective goods as
economic growth and innovation, thereby
adaptingto changingconditionsgeneratedby
resource scarcity.7To deal with scarcity, a
society needs ingenuity- but the very scarci-
ties demanding social ingenuity act as con-
straints on innovation. According to
Homer-Dixon (1999), endogenous growth
theory, which stresses the importance of
endogenous technical change for sustained
economic growth (a proxy for economic
capabilityand innovation), fails to take into
account resourcescarcityas a restrainton a
society'sabilityto innovate.As he claims,over
time, an 'ingenuity gap' develops because
6 The belief that
objectivescarcitydriveselite greed and
therebyleadsto resourcecaptureis quiteproblematic,since
it assumesthat eliteswill be lesslikelyto do so undercon-
ditionsof abundance- i.e. the voracityof greedis depen-
dent on scarcity.
7 This view stands in opposition to induced innovation
theories,suchasthe Boserupiantheoryon populationpres-
suresand agriculturalproductivity(Boserup,1965).
 Indra de Soysa
society is unable to deal with environmental
scarcity, leading ultimately to conflict
(Homer-Dixon, 1999).
The Collier-Hoeffler model of loot-
seeking proxied by primary commodity
exports would at first glance contradict the
'eco-violence'arguments.As the authorscon-
clude, a country with a 'large' amount of
resourceswould likely suffer more conflict
than one that does not. As discussedabove,
however, resourcedependence is not abun-
dance, and the Collier-Hoefflerfindingsmay
very well be paradedas support for the eco-
violence arguments.Proponentsof both sides
of the debate have assumed that resource
dependence signifies objective abundanceor
scarcity.This study correctsthis problem by
using a measure of the available stock of
naturalcapitalto test objectivelythe effectsof
natural resourcescarcityon conflict. It will
also gauge the scarcity/abundanceproposi-
tions together with the civilizational argu-
ments linking the Islamic Middle East to
conflict through culturalexplanations.
Method, Variables, and Data
I use a standardsocial science technique to
gauge the relativesignificanceof the variables
representing the competing theoretical
positions. Maximum-likelihood probit
analysisgauges the likelihood that a positive
outcome (conflict) will obtain for a given
value of an independentvariable.The trans-
formed probit scores into the z metric allow
us to identify the directionand magnitudeof
change in the probability of Y occurring
given a unit increase in X, the marginal
effects of each of the variablesat their mean
values (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Stata,
1999). For comparability,I follow the basic
Collier-Hoeffler model with some variation
discussedin detail below.
I measureconflict at a relativelylowerlevel
than the thresholdof 1000 battledeathsused
by the Correlates of War (COW) data. I
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 405
employ data that use a lower thresholdof 25
battle-related deaths (Wallensteen &
Sollenberg,2000). This lower thresholdcap-
tures a level of conflict that covers societal
conflictsthat fallwell short of large-scalecivil
war, reflecting better the nature of 'eco-
violence' and/or criminalizedviolence as dis-
cussed in the literature.8Moreover,the high
thresholdof deathsmakescivilviolencemuch
rarer than actually observed around the
world. It might be that the Collier-
Hoeffler results on resource abundance
capture a dimension of what predicts the
severity of war and not necessarilyits out-
break.In otherwords,largewarsrequirelarge
finances. Wallensteen & Sollenberg (1999:
605) define a conflict as 'a battle between
incompatible interests over government
and/or territorywhere armed force is being
used, and where at least one of the parties
involvedrepresentsthe nationalgovernment'.
I test the post-Cold War era (1989-99)
because of the recent date of the natural
capital estimates.The post-Cold War era is
also free of superpowersupport for internal
wars, although not all the wars in the period
were free of external influence. The basic
model is Pr(WAR1989_1999) =f(E, D, P,R, S),
where E denotes economic variables (per
capita income 1989, trade openness 1989,
and the average growth rate 1985-89), D
denotes demographic variables (population
size and density in 1989), P denotes political
variables(democracyand its squaredterm in
1989), R denotes resources(renewableand
sub-soil assetsand their squaredterms), and
S denotes social variables proxied by
ethno-linguistic fractionalization (and its
squaredterm) and the percentageof Muslims
8 Whatkindof conflicts
ecologicalfactorsprovokeandhow
exactlyto measurethem is not alwaysclearlyspecified,but
Homer-Dixon (1999: 133) writes that ecologicalfactors
'weakenlocal and national institutions,which decreases
centralcontrol over ethnic rivalriesand increasesoppor-
tunities for insurgentsand elites challengingstate auth-
ority'. This statement suggests that the conflicts that
ecologicalfactorsprovokeinvolvethe state.
406 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
and Christiansin the total population.9The
data on the religious composition of states
are from La Porta et al. (1998). I also enter
interactiveterms of the resourceand demo-
graphic variablesand the social variablesto
test for conditional effects, specifically the
nexus between demographic pressure and
natural resource scarcity. All independent
variablesare measuredin the period before
the outbreakof conflict. For the purpose of
reducingany simultaneityeffects,I also enter
a discretevariabletaking the value 1 if a civil
warwas either going on in 1989 (continuing
from before) or if there had been any
previouscivil war reachingthe 1,000 battle-
death threshold, and 0 if not. The previous
wars are taken from the list supplied by the
Correlatesof War data.
The models contain the following control
variables.Per capita wealth is found to be
significantlynegativelyassociatedwith con-
flict (Collier& Hoeffler,1998; Henderson&
Singer,2000). Higher incomes give govern-
ments a largerbase of taxationwith which to
pacify or crush opposition, and higher
incomessimultaneouslyraisethe opportunity
costs of potential rebelsbecausethey mean a
greaterloss in termsof earningsin the regular
economy.This variableis measuredas GDP
per capita expressed in purchasing power
parity terms (PPP) and logged to reduce
skewness.The growth of income in the pre-
ceding five yearsis also a significantpredictor
of peace (Collier,1998). A highergrowthrate
possibly signifies the extent of opportunities
available for advancement. Growth is
9 Ethno-linguisticfractionalizationis the averagevalue of
five differentindices of ethno-linguisticfractionalization.
The 5 indicesare (1) index of ethno-linguisticfractional-
izationin 1960, which measuresthe probabilitythat two
randomlyselected people will not belong to the same
ethno-linguisticgroup;(2) probabilitythat two randomly
selectedpeople speak the same language;(3) probability
that two randomlyselectedpeople do not speakthe same
language;(4) percentageof populationnot speakingthe
official language;and (5) percentageof population not
speakingthe most widelyspokenlanguage.See La Portaet
al. (1998) for sources.
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 Ijuly2002
measuredas the annualaveragebetween 1985
and 1989 (the five yearsprecedingthe period
under study). The previousfive-yeargrowth
performance should capture the negative
growth effects among those states already
sufferinglarge-scaleconflict. I include trade
openness (total trade/GDP), measuredas the
annual averagebetween 1985 and 1989, to
capture quality of governance (macro-
environment) and possible social capital
effects on peace. The trade-to-GDP ratio is
logged to reduce skewness. I include popu-
lation density to model 'demand-induced
scarcity',which is measuredas the numberof
people per square kilometer (Hauge &
Ellingsen, 1998). Having density in the
model is also valuablegiven that my measure
of naturalresourcesis in per capitaterms, so
that high values are not simply capturedby
large countries with few people - in other
words, population size is bounded in space.
All these data are obtained from the World
Development IndicatorsCD-ROM (World
Bank, 2000).
I utilize the PolityIII data as a measureof
democracy(Jaggers& Gurr, 1995). The data
gauge democracyand autocracyalong a 10-
point scale. The degree of political democ-
racy is obtained as democracy score minus
the autocracyscore plus 11 so that the score
for regime type extends from 1 (most auto-
cratic) to 21 (most democratic).A squared
term of the democracy score is added to
model the quadraticshapeof the relationship
between democracy and civil peace. It has
been argued that conflict is likelier among
moderate democraciesbecause they are less
likely to be harshlyrepressive,therebylower-
ing opportunity costs for organizingopposi-
tion to the stateor for organizingviolence for
other purposes.The empirical evidence for
this propositionis quite strong- a high level
of autocracyand perfectdemocracyare both
conducive to peace (Collier & Hoeffler,
1998; Hegre et al., 2001).
I utilize data on the total per capitastock
 Indra de Soysa PARADISE IS A BAZAAR?
of natural capital as the crucial natural
resourcevariable(World Bank, 1997). This
variablemeasuresthe availabilityof natural
resourcescomposed of the absolute value of
the stock of cropland(agriculturalresources),
timber resources, other forest resources,
pasture, protected areas, and sub-soil assets
(mineral wealth). The World Bank (1997:
30) defines the stock of naturalcapitalas the
'entire environmental patrimony of a
country'.These valuesrepresentthe inherent
surplus value in the extractionand harvest-
ing of a resource because they take into
account the difference in the market price
and the costs of extracting, processing and
marketing these resources (the Ricardian
Rent). In general, these natural capital esti-
mates tell us in standardizedvalues the net
worth of the stock of naturalresourcesof any
given country in per capita terms. I use the
total stock with a separateterm for the esti-
mates of sub-soil assets,or mineralwealth, in
order to gauge the differing impacts of
renewable and non-renewable resources. I
enter a linearand squaredterm of both vari-
ables to model the quadratic shape of
resourcewealths impact on conflict, follow-
ing the Collier-Hoeffier method.
The non-renewable component is made
up of all mineralassets.I enter the quadratic
terms of both resourcevariables.I assign $5
to all cases that score zero on the sub-soil
assets even though there is some ambiguity
with 0 values, since the estimate depends on
whether a country is actually exploiting the
resource.Artificiallyassigningvaluesis some-
what problematic because of the nature of
the 'greed'arguments,since some countries
may not exploit certain resourcesand inci-
dentally not have conflict, which does not
mean that lootable wealth does not exist.
Conversely,a zero value may signify resource
scarcityin a particularcountry,which may or
may not contain conflict (Switzerlandhas 0
mineral wealth according to this data). The
ambiguity associated with 10 zero values,
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
407
however, is outweighed by the benefits of
gaining 10 data points and accounting as
stringently as possible for arguments of
scarcityrepresentedby the zero values. The
sample size is restrictedto 77 cases with the
natural capital estimates in the model and
expands to 139 cases without these data in
the model but with a proxy for resource
wealth capturedby a discretevariabletaking
the value 1 if an economy is dominated(50%
and above) by revenuesfrom oil exportation
and 0 if not. The dummy for oil dependence
is coded by Easterly& Sewadeh(2001). The
sample size varies owing to availability of
data.
Results and Condusions
First, I discuss the results gauging environ-
mental and demographicfactors in predict-
ing conflict (TableI). In column 1, I replicate
a model approximating the basic
Collier-Hoeffler model.
The results are highly supportive of the
basic Collier-Hoeffler findings despite the
alteredspecificationand alternativedata. Per
capita wealth is significantly negatively
associated with conflict. The size of the
population and population density are posi-
tively associatedwith conflict. The grievance
effects of a lack of democracy (justice) are
overshadowedby the opportunity costs of
conflict, since the democracyterms exhibit a
curvilinearshape. The two terms are jointly
highly significant. Ethno-linguisticfraction-
alization exhibits the curvilinear shape
reportedby others but fails statisticalsignifi-
cance (joint significance is p = .39). The
relativeavailabilityof total naturalresources
is unrelatedto conflict, while the availability
of mineral wealth predicts conflict signifi-
cantly, exhibiting a linear relationship.The
resultsshow no significanteffect of previous
wars, but this resultis possibly driven by the
sample of countries, since many countries,
such as Angola and Afghanistan,which have
408 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume39 / number 4 /july 2002

Table I. Probit Estimates of Change in Probability of Conflict (25 Battle-Death Threshold), 1989-99

variables
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Ln income/pc 1989 -.24** -.15 -.21 -.17 -.15

(-2.2) (-1.2) (-1.6) (-1.2) (-1.1)
Ln population1988 .09* -.05 -.08 -.09 -.02
(1.7) (-.68) (-.93) (-1.0) (-.87)
Ln pop. density 1988 .13* .17** .20** .19** .15*
(1.9) (2.3) (2.3) (2.1) (1.9)
Ethno-linguisticfraction. 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3*
(1.3) (1.5) (1.3) (1.4) (1.8)
Ethno-linguistic fraction -1.3 -1.4 -.98 -1.1 -1.3
squared (-1.1) (-1.2) (-.83) (-.91) (-1.6)
Democracy1988 .15** .13** .18*** .18*** .19***
(2.6) (2.3) (2.9) (2.8) (2.9)
Democracysquared -.01** -.01** -.01** -.01** -.01***
(-2.4) (2.2) (-2.5) (2.6) (-2.7)
Previouswardummy .13 .11 .16 .16 .16
1945-88 (.94) (.85) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1)
GNP growth/pc -.07** -.03 -.003 -.01 -.01
1985-89 (-2.5) (-1.2) (-.11) (-.23) (-.31)
Ln total natural resources 1.23 1.9 -.131 -2.1 1.8
1990 (.87) (1.2) (-.88) (-1.2) (1.0)
Ln total natural resources -.08 -.12 2.3 -.13 -.12
squared (.95) (-1.3) (1.4) (-1.3) (-1.1)
Ln mineral resources 1990 -.26* -.27* -.24 -.22 -2.0
(-1.7) (-1.8) (1.4) (-1.2) (-1.1)
Ln mineral resources squared .03** .03** .03 .03 .02
(2.1) (2.4) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4)
Ln trade/GDP 1985-89 -.38** -.47** -.48** -.56***
(-2.1) (-2.3) (-2.3) (-2.7)
Oil exporter dummy .76*** .76*** .83***
(3.8) (3.4) (3.5)
Ln ruralpopulationdensity .04 -1.2**
1988 (.44) (-2.0)
Ln rural pop. density x .02**
total natural resources squared (2.1)
Waldx2 44.6 53.0 51.0 50.1 44.9
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Log likelihood -32.4 -30.3 -27.2 -27.0 -56.3
Pseudo R2 .37 .40 .46 .46 .49
Observed p .40 .40 .40 .41 .41
Predictedp .32 .30 .30 .31 .23
N 77 77 77 76 76
*p < .10, **p< .05, and ***p< .01 (two-tailedtests).Huber-Whitecorrectedstandarderrorscomputedin all tests.The
tablereportschangein probabilityand z scoresin brackets.

This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Indra de Soysa
been undergoingviolent conflict, are not in
the sample becauseof the lack of data in the
restrictedsample.
In column 2, the trade/GDP variable
(openness) enters the model. Trade is nega-
tively associatedwith conflict and statistically
highly significant as expected. Population
size becomes statistically insignificant. As
hypothesized, the conflict effect of larger
countriesseems to be workingthroughtrade,
a result which suggests that policy and
governance play a more significant role in
inducing peace than does demography.The
other results largely remain the same,
although the ethnicity variables gain some
statisticalstrengthjointly (p = .11). Interest-
ingly, however, economic growths negative
effects on conflict seem to be working
through openness to trade, suggesting
important indirect effects of trade on peace
working through growth. Statisticalsignifi-
cance notwithstanding, an increase of one
standarddeviation above the mean value of
the logged values of the trade-to-GDP ratio
decreasesthe likelihood of conflict by -20%,
comparedwith the observed risk of conflict
of 40%. A standarddeviation increasein the
logged value of squared term of per capita
mineral wealth increasesthe risk of conflict
by roughly 78%, almost double the average
risk of conflict. The evidence supports the
position that mineralwealth abundancefuels
'greed-motivated'conflict, net of the macro-
environment proxied by these models in
terms of the trade-to-GDP ratio. My results
demonstrate, however, that primary com-
modity dependencemay not simply mean all
typesof resources,but mineralwealth is what
seems to be worth fighting over, since this
provides the super payoffs and is easily cap-
tured and defended.
In column 3, I entera dummy variablefor
oil exporters. As seen there, petroleum
exporters are highly susceptible to violent
instability.There is a 76% chance, in this
sample of countries,for an oil exporterto be
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 409
involved in a conflict as opposed to non-oil
exporters- just short of double the average
risk.The highly significanteffect of all min-
eralshas almostlost all statisticalsignificance.
In order to gain some relative sense of the
substantiveimpactsof the statisticallysignifi-
cant variablesthus far,I compute the relative
risksassociatedwith these variablesby raising
each by their mean plus a standarddeviation,
the median, and maximum values, holding
constant the other variablesat their mean
values. Figure 2 represents the relative
impacts on a scale moving up (positive
effect)/down (negativeeffect) from a baseline
of zero.
The effects of population density are
somewhat dwarfedby the effects of mineral
wealth, full democracy,and trade to GDP.
While increasing mineral wealth to its
maximum value producesthe largestchange
in the probabilityof conflict, becoming a full
democracy brings a substantial peace divi-
dend. Importantlyalso, tradeto GDP nearly
matches the impact of full democracy, no
matter which value is used in the computa-
tion. The greaterthe trade-to-GDPratio, the
greater the chance of peace, a result that
suggestsa powerfulpacifyingeffect from the
quality of the macro-environment deter-
mined by aspects of governance.Moreover,
densitys effect is net of othervariables,which
means that it is densely populated countries
that areless democraticand less open to trade
that are likely to sufferconflict. Haitians and
Rwandans are likely to face conflict when
they sufferbad governanceand authoritarian
repression,regardlessof the availablelevel of
'lootable income' or 'demand-induced
scarcity'.
Clearly,the statisticallysignificanteffectof
population density needs explanation. One
explanationis the threshold effect, whereby
densely populated countries capture the
'smallerwars'reflectedby the thresholdof 25
battle-relateddeaths utilized by this study.
According to the Collier-Hoeffler findings,
410 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
Figure2. SubstantiveEffectsof the RelativeRiskof Civil War
5 *St
4
3
2
-1
-2
-3
(1) Inpopulation
Variablr. densiry(2) democracy (3) Inmineral
squared;
which are based on the 1,000 battle-death
criteria,density was unrelatedto conflict. To
test specifically,however,whetherpopulation
density'seffect on conflict is capturing the
lack of renewableresources(the eco-violence
proposition), I enter a linear term of rural
population density (column 4). This term is
statistically insignificant. The correlation
between the two density variables is .44,
thereforethe insignificanteffect is unlikelyto
be driven merely by collinearity effects. In
column 5, I go further to test specifically
whether ruralpopulation density'seffects on
conflict are conditioned by the scarcity of
renewableresourcesby enteringan interactive
term. As seen there, densely populated rural
societies with access to greater per capita
renewableresourcewealth tend to have more
conflict, a result that is highly significant
statistically (p < .03). There is insufficient
theory to explain this result, except that
greed-relatedprocesses,such as elite control
of land working together with a bad policy
environment (closed-economy policy
environment), drive this result. Real-world
examples of conflict where policy-driven
scarcityis presentmight be countriessuch as
Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Nepal, where
Malthusian crises are likely to be politically
caused rather than attributable to 'mother
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 /july 2002
.
devlan
? . .
. .? ?
*0 Medi
Maximum;
walth squared;
(4) n tradeto
nature',at least in termsof scarcitymeasured
objectively.
The results of columns 4 and 5 taken
together cast serious doubt on theories of
conflict that see Malthusiancrisesas a driver
of civil violence.The resultsobtainedhere on
resourcewealth and conflict are not surpris-
ing considering that enough evidence has
been generated in recent years that shows
naturalresourcewealth to be problematicfor
society on many fronts, especiallyas it tends
to give rise to bad economic and social
policies (Auty,2000; Ross, 2001; Woolcock,
Pritchett & Isham, 2001). There is ample
evidence, however, for theories explaining
conflict as resulting from greed-driven
factors associated with the abundance of
mineral resources, especially oil. Trade to
GDP, proxying the effectivenessof govern-
ance, social capital, and the degree to which
scarcity is substituted with trade, shows a
strong negative effect on conflict, a result
that is also substantively significant and
robust to specification.These resultssupport
at least one recent study that has carefully
examined trade as a mediating factor on
resource scarcity within small island states
(Matthew & Gaulin, 2001). As they find,
areas suffering acute scarcities compensate
with trade,which is good news given massive
 Indra de Soysa
declines in transportation costs and the
global shift towardsfree trade.
The reported results mirror the findings
of the Collier-Hoeffler studies in general,
except that ethno-linguisticfractionalization
is not as strongas their findings.As discussed
above, they constructtheirvariableas a com-
posite of ethno-linguistic and religious frac-
tionalization. I test the religious variables
separatelyfor theoretical reasons discussed
above, to test whether civilizational factors
matter.TableII reportsthe results.As seen in
column 1, adding the religious variablesto
the model elicits stronger statistical signifi-
cance from the combination of variables
measuringethno-linguisticfractionalization.
The combination of democracy and its
squaredterm becomes statisticallyinsignifi-
cant. Islam is positively related to conflict
and highly significantstatistically,but so are
largelyCatholic countries.Holding the other
variablesat their mean values, increasingthe
shareof the Islamicpopulation by the mean
value plus a standarddeviation raisesthe risk
of conflict by 30%. The same exercisewith
the share of Catholics raisesthe risk of con-
flict by 26%. Interestingly,the interactive
term of Islamic and Christian populations
predicts peace, a result that is statistically
highly significant(column 2). Increasingthe
shareof both populations in one country by
a standarddeviation reducesthe risk of con-
flict by 17.5%. The results on religion are
interesting because they are independent of
the level of wealth and democracy.Moreover,
since the model holds constant ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and the inter-
active term of Islamic and Christian
populations, the positive effect of conflict in
Islamic and Catholic countries signifies that
homogeneity is problematic and points to
institutional factors rather than to 'natural
battle lines' between Islam and Christianity.
These results disconfirm simple proposi-
tions about Islamic and Christian enmity
leading to conflict. Apparently,it is not just
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 411
the 'innards of Islam' that are violent, as
Huntington has suggested, but also those of
Catholicism. Surprisingly, analysts have
looked east of the USA to single out the
Islamic world and have not looked south-
ward towards Catholic Latin America and
Africa. Some of the bloodiest conflicts in
Africa are raging in largely Catholic coun-
tries, such as Burundi, Rwanda,and Angola.
These resultstaken togethermay be suggest-
ing that conflict is likelier in societies where
church and state are driving competing
authorities and possibly emasculating
political institutions that mediate between
state and society. Moreover, institutional
factorsthat give the Catholic churchand the
mosque an organizational advantage for
mobilizing people possibly allow greater
degreesof conflict throughcommunal polar-
ization than through hatred of any defined
'other'.These resultssuggest anotherway in
which greater pluralism makes countries
safer- greaterpluralismpossiblyemasculates
opportunities for mobilization, as Collier
and Hoeffler'sfindings have also suggested.
The curvilinearshape of the results on eth-
nicity also suggest that ethnicity is likely to
lead to conflict becausemoderatefractional-
ization offers greater opportunities for
instrumentalizing ethnicity, not because
differenceresultsin 'cultureclashes'.
In column 3, the democracyvariablesare
droppedso as to maximizethe samplesize to
138 countries.As seen there, tradecontinues
to exhibit a negative effect on conflict.
Increasing trade by the mean value plus a
standarddeviationreducesthe riskof conflict
by 140%, which is substantialgiven that the
averagerisk of conflict for the sample of 138
countries is only 35%, roughly four times
less. In column 4, when trade is dropped
from the model, ethnicity, population
density, and oil-exporting countries become
statisticallyinsignificant. Size of the popu-
lation is now significantlypositively related
to conflict, suggesting once again that the
412 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 39 / number 4 /july 2002

TableII. ProbitEstimatesof Changein Probabilityof Conflict(25 Battle-DeathThreshold)1989-99

variables
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4)

Ln income/pc 1989 -.14 -.17* -.14** -.21 **

(-1.6) (-1.9) (-2.3) (-3.8)
Ln population 1988 -.060 -.048 -.003 .07**
(-1.4) (-1.0) (-.01) (2.5)
Ln pop. density 1988 .11*** .14*** .06** .04
(2.8) (3.3) (2.0) (1.3)
Ethno-linguistic fraction 1.7** 2.0*** 1.1** .65
(2.3) (2.7) (2.0) (1.2)
Ethno-linguistic fraction -1.7* -1.8** -1.1* -.77
squared (-2.0) (2.2) (-1.8) (-1.1)
Democracy 1988 .080 .057
(1.6) (1.2)
Democracy squared -.003 -.002
(-1.6) (-1.2)
Previous war dummy .20* .25** .20** .21**
(1.8) (2.1) (2.0) (2.2)
Ln trade/GDP 1985-89 -.37*** -.38*** -.29**
(-2.7) (-2.8) (2.4)
Oil exporter dummy .40 .49** .41* .39
(1.6) (2.4) (1.9) (1.5)
% Muslim .004** .005**
(2.2) (2.4)
% Christian .003 .006
(.65) (1.2)
% Catholic .003* .004*
(1.7) (-1.8)
% Christian X % Muslim -.001**
(2.2)
Wald X2 49.8 58.9 46.2 35.4
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Log likelihood -53.6 -49.3 -61.5 -66.5
Pseudo R2 .32 .38 .31 .27
Observed p .41 .41 .35 .35
Predicted p .35 .34 .27 .29
N 118 118 138 140

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailedtests).Huber-Whitecorrectedstandarderrorscomputedin all tests.The
tablereportschangein probabilityandz scoresin brackets.

effects of population size work through Comparing the grievance effects of a

governancefactors associatedwith a closed
economy and the macro-environment
proxied by trade. In general,the resultsalso
suggest that preventingwar can reduce the
risk of subsequent war, as indicated by the
positive and statisticallysignificant effect of
the dummy variablefor previouswar.10
large-scalewar in the history of a country
with the result on trade is illustrative -
holding the other variables at their mean
values, if a country erases its collective
10I addedregionaldummiesin all of the models,but at no
time did the significantvariables,particularly
the trade-to-
GDP ratio,change.

This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Indra de Soysa
memory of previous conflict, the gain for
building peace is less than the effect of trade
at its mean value. Increasing trade by the
mean value plus a standarddeviation will of
course give trade a 7-to-I advantage.Since
the wounds of history take time to heal, pur-
suing good governance and ensuring a
macro-environment favorable to mutually
profitable activity among people seems a
reasonableway to prevent further conflict.
This finding calls into question the so-called
'peacekeeping'tactic of keeping communi-
ties apartindefinitely,as the currentpolicy in
Kosovo does, if in fact institutionaldevelop-
ment is not pursued. Perhapsgreater,more
overt efforts should be made to build econ-
omic bridges between the communities by
improving governance, allowing access to
credits,improvinginfrastructure,and aiding
businesses, particularlyones with ties that
cross-cut communally.These are surely the
links that were missing in a largelystate-led,
bureaucraticcommand economy that drove
profitable activity underground, criminaliz-
ing and militarizingit, only for it to surface
laterwith devastatingresults.
In summary,the results suggest strongly
that 'greed' effects, measured by the avail-
ability of natural resources, particularly
mineral wealth, are a potent predictor of
conflict. Creed-relatedconflicts seem to be
more prevalent in highly homogenous
religious settings, particularlywithin largely
Islamic and Catholic countries. If there is a
clash of civilizations, it is much more likely
that it is political ratherthan cultural.There
is little support for need-basedargumentsas
expounded by those who see Malthusian
crisesarisingfrom resourcescarcity.Densely
populated countries that are less open to
trade suffer conflict, but the results suggest
policy-made rather than natural factors
stemming from the struggle to 'survive'.
Some of these resultsspeak directly to inter-
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 413
national policy that seeks to break up
multi-ethnic states on the rather loose
understanding that 'ancient hatred' drives
so-called 'ethnic conflict', a result of which
is to separatefighting parties,which unwit-
tingly creates more densely packed hom-
ogenous countries, which accordingto these
results at least tend to suffer more conflict.
Perhapspolicymakersshould evaluate such
simplistic prescriptions and promote
instead sounder institutional arrangements
for bringing about elite accommodation
and toleration, pushing good governance
that allows economic activity to be profit-
able. Policymakers should also re-evaluate
the fear of 'Islamicelections' where Western
powers fail to recognize fundamentalist
groups, which may only provoke more
violence in the long run, but think of more
creative ways in which to support demo-
cratic consolidation - lessons from Iran are
possibly salient here.
One strong policy implication from the
results is that it is possible for countries to
reduce their risk of conflict substantiallyby
instituting more liberal policies on trade,
promoting manufacturing over resource
extraction, and adopting policies that will
spur the growth of income. International
policy can have a direct bearing on many of
these aspects since the rich countries can
provide market access, capital, and transfer
technology. These policies should work
simultaneously to increase the opportunity
costs of war at the individual level, increase
social controls against the outbreak of
costly violence, and increasestate capacities
to deal with social instabilities emanating
from self-servingindividual behavior,which
are usually well-masked by ephemeral
discourses of grievance. Trade may in-
fluence interdependencieswithin society so
that collective action problemsmay be over-
come.
414 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
Appendix:SummaryStatisticsfor
RestrictedSample
Variable Mean Std.dev.Median Max
Ln pop. density 3.8 1.4 3.9
democracysqd 235 188 256
Ln mineralssqd 34.6 25.9 29.8
Ln tradeto GDP 3.9 0.51 4.0
List of countries
Algeria, Angola, Argentina*, Australia*,
Austria*, Bahamas, Bangladesh*,Barbados,
Belgium*, Belize, Benin*, Bhutan, Bolivia*,
Botswana*,Brazil*,Bulgaria,Burkina Faso,
Burundi*, Cameroon*, Canada*, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile*, China*, Colombia*, Comoros,
Congo DemocraticRepublic,Congo Repub-
lic*, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire*, Cyprus,
Denmark*, Dominica, Dominican Repub-
lic*, Ecuador*, Egypt Arab Republic*, El
Salvador,EquatorialGuinea, Fiji, Finland*,
France*, Gabon, The Gambia, Germany*,
Ghana*, Greece*, Grenada, Guatemala*,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti*,
Honduras*,Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland,
India*, Indonesia*, Ireland*, Israel, Italy*,
Jamaica*,Japan*,Jordan*,Kenya*,Kiribati,
KoreaRepublic*,Laos,Lesotho,Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia*,Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania*,Mauritius,Mexico*,Mongolia,
Morocco*, Mozambique*, Myanmar,
Namibia*, Nepal*, Netherlands*, New
Zealand*, Nicaragua*, Niger*, Nigeria*,
Norway*, Pakistan*, Panama, Papua New
Guinea*, Paraguay, Peru*, Philippines*,
Poland, Portugal*, Puerto Rico, Romania,
Rwanda*, Saudi Arabia*, Senegal*, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone*, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Africa*, Spain*, Sri
Lanka*, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suri-
name, Swaziland, Sweden*, Switzerland*,
SyrianArab Republic,Tanzania*,Thailand*,
Togo*, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago*,
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number4 /july 2002
Tunisia*, Turkey*, Uganda*, United Arab
Emirates,United Kingdom*,United States*,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela*, Vietnam*,
Zambia*,Zimbabwe*(N= 138)
* Countries in restricted
6.7 sample (N = 77)
441
123.8 References
4.9
Aldrich,John H. & ForrestD. Nelson, 1984.
Linear Probability,Logit, and Probit Models.
Quantitative Applications in the Social
Sciences. London: Sage.
Alesina, Alberto & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. 'On
the Numberand Size of Nations',Quarterly
Journal of Economics 112 (November):
1027-1056.
Alesina, Alberto & Romain Wacziarg, 1997.
Openness, Country Size and Government,
Working Paper 6024. Cambridge, MA:
NationalBureauof EconomicResearch.
Auty,RichardM., 2000. 'HowNaturalResources
AffectEconomicDevelopment',Development
PolicyReview18 (Spring):347-364.
Bell,Daniel,1975.'EthnicityandSocialChange',
in NathanGlazer& DanielP.Moynihan,eds,
Ethnicity:Theoryand Experience.Cambridge,
MA:HarvardUniversityPress(141-174).
Boserup, Ester, 1965. The Conditionsof Agri-
cultural Growth: The Economicsof Agrarian
ChangeUnderPopulationPressure.New York:
Aldine.
Cameron,DavidR., 1978.'TheExpansion
of the
Public Economy', American Political Science
Review72(4): 1243-1261.
Collier,David& JamesMahoney,1996.'Insights
and Pitfalls:Selection Bias in Qualitative
Research',WorldPolitics
49 (October):56-91.
Collier, Paul, 1998. The Political Economy of
Ethnicity.Paperpresentedat theAnnualBank
Conference on Development Economics.
Washington, DC: WorldBank.
Collier,Paul,2000. 'DoingWellout of War',in
MatsBerdal& DavidMalone,eds, Greede&
Grievance:EconomicAgendas in Civil War.
Boulder,CO: LynneRienner(91-111).
Collier,Paul & Anke Hoeffler,1998. 'On the
EconomicCausesof CivilWar',OxfordEcon-
omic Papers50(4): 563-573.
de Soysa, Indra, 2000. 'The ResourceCurse:Are
 Indra de Soysa
Civil WarsDriven by Rapacityor Paucity?',in
Mats Berdal & David Malone, eds, Greed6&
Grievance:EconomicAgendas in Civil War.
Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner (113-135).
Diamond, Larry& Marc F. Plattner,eds, 1994.
Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict,and Democracy.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Easterly, William & Mirvat Sewadeh, 2001.
'Global Development Network Growth Data-
base' (http://www.worldbank.org/research/
growth/GDNdata.htm) (as of October 2001).
Ehrlich, Paul & Anne H. Ehrlich, 1990. The
Population Explosion. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Esty, Daniel et al., 1999. 'EnvironmentalTask
Force Report: Phase II Findings', Environ-
mental Changeand SecurityProjectReport5
(Summer):49-79.
Fearon, James D. & David D. Laitin, 2000.
'Violence and the Social Construction of
Ethnic Identity', International Organization
54(4): 845-877.
Garfinkel,Michelle & StergiosSkaperdas,2000.
'Contract or War:On the Consequences of a
BroaderView of Self Interest in Economics',
TheAmericanEconomist44(1): 5-16.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter,1998. 'ArmedConflict and
the Environment:A Critiqueof the Literature',
Journalof PeaceResearch35(3): 381-400.
Gorenburg,Dmitry, 2000. 'Not with One Voice:
An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in
Nationalist Sentiment', World Politics 53
(October): 115-142.
Gurr,Ted R., 1993. Minoritiesat Risk:A Global
View of EthnopoliticalConflict.Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Gurr,Ted R. & BarbaraHarff, 1994. EthnicCon-
flict in WorldPolitics.Boulder,CO: Westview.
Hall, John A. & John G. Ikenberry,1989. The
State. Minneapolis, MN: University of Min-
nesota Press.
Hall, Robert E. & Charles I. Jones, 1996. 'The
Productivity of Nations', NBER Working
Paper no. 5812. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureauof Economic Research.
Hall, Robert E. & Charles I. Jones, 1999. 'Why
Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output Per WorkerThan Others?',Quarterly
Journalof Economics114(1): 83-116.
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PARADISE IS A BAZAAR? 415
Hauge, Wenche & Tanja Ellingsen, 1998.
'BeyondEnvironmentalScarcity:CausalPath-
ways to Conflict', Journal of Peace Research
35(3): 299-317.
Heffner, Richard D., ed., 1956. Alexis de
Tocqueville:Democracyin America.New York:
Mentor [originallypublished in 1835].
Hegre, Havard;Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates &
Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2001. 'Towards a
Democratic Civil Peace?Democracy,Political
Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992', Ameri-
can PoliticalScienceReview95(1): 33-48.
Henderson, Errol A. & David J. Singer, 2000.
'Civil War in the Post-Colonial World,
1946-92', Journal of Peace Research37(3):
275-299.
Homer-Dixon, Thomas E, 1999. Environment,
Scarcityand Violence.Princeton,NJ: Princeton
UniversityPress.
Horowitz, Donald L., 1985. Ethnic Groupsin
Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Horowitz, Donald L., 1998. 'Structureand Strat-
egy in Ethnic Conflict: A Few Steps Towards
Synthesis', paper presented at the Annual
Bank Conference on Development Econ-
omics. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Huntington, Samuel P., 1997. The Clash of
Civilizationsand the Remakingof WorldOrder.
New York:Touchstone.
Jaggers,Keith& Ted RobertGurr,1995. 'Tracking
Democracy'sThird Wave with the Polity III
Data, JournalofPeaceResearch 32(4): 469-482.
Kaldor,Mary, 1999. New and Old Wars:Organ-
ized Violencein a GlobalEra. London: Black-
well.
Kaplan, Robert, 1994. 'The Coming Anarchy',
AtlanticMonthly273(2): 44-76.
King, Gary; Robert Keohane & Sidney Verba,
1994. DesigningSocialInquiry:ScientificInfer-
encefrom QualitativeResearch.Princeton, NJ:
Princeton UniversityPress.
La Porta, Rafael; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Schleifer& RobertVishny, 1998. The
Qualityof Government,Working Paper6727.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Econ-
omic Research.
Lal, Deepak & Hla Mynt, 1996. The Political
Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth.
Oxford: Clarendon.
416 journal of PEACE RESEARCH
Levi, Margaret, 1988. Of Rule and Revenue.
London: Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Matthew,RichardA. & Ted Gaulin, 2001. 'Con-
flict or Cooperation?The Social and Political
Impacts of ResourceScarcityon Small Island
States', Global EnvironmentalPolitics 1(2):
48-70.
Mueller, John, 2000. 'The Banality of Ethnic
War',InternationalSecurity25(1): 42-70.
Putnam, Robert, 1993. Making DemocracyWork:
Civic Traditionsin Modern Italy. Princeton,
NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Renner, Michael, 1996. Fighting for Survival:
EnvironmentalDecline,Social Conflict,and the
New Age of Insecurity.New York: W. W.
Norton.
Rodrik, Dani, 1996. 'Why Do More Open
Countries Have Bigger Governments?'.Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Ross, Michael L., 2001. 'Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?', World Politics 53 (April):
325-361.
Russett, Bruce & John Oneal, 2000. Triangulat-
ing Peace: Democracy,Interdependence,and
InternationalOrganizations.Norton Series in
World Politics. London:W. W. Norton.
Russett, Bruce; John R. Oneal & Michaelene
Cox, 2000. 'Clash of Civilizations, or
Realism and LiberalismDeja Vu? Some Evi-
dence', Journal of Peace Research 37(5):
583-608.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Andrew Warner, 1995.
Natural ResourceAbundance and Economic
Growth, Working Paper 5318. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureauof Economic Research.
Schwartz, Daniel M.; Tom Deligiannis &
Thomas E Homer-Dixon, 2000. 'Commen-
tary:Debating Environment,Population,and
Conflict', EnvironmentalChangeand Security
ProjectReport(6): 77-94.
Stata, 1999. Stata Manual Release 6. College
Station, TX: Stata.
Varshney, Ashutosh, 1997. 'Postmodernism,
Civic Engagement, and Ethnic Conflict: A
Passageto India', ComparativePolitics30(1):
1-20.
Varshney,Ashutosh, 2001. 'Ethnic Conflict and
This content downloaded from 130.225.157.199 on Sun, 30 Mar 2014 14:35:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
volume39 / number 4 / july 2002
Civil Society: India and Beyond', World
Politics53 (April):362-398.
Wallensteen, Peter & Margareta Sollenberg,
1999. 'ArmedConflict, 1989-1998', Journal
of PeaceResearch36(5): 593-606.
Wallensteen, Peter & Margareta Sollenberg,
2000. 'ArmedConflict, 1989-1999', Journal
of PeaceResearch37(5): 635-649.
Weede, Erich, 1998. 'AreRebellion and Transfer
of Power Determined by Rational Choice or
RelativeDeprivation?',GuruNanakJournalof
19(2):1-33.
Sociology
Wei, Shang-Jin, 2000. 'Natural Openness and
Good Government', Working Paper 7765.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Econ-
omic Research.
Woolcock, Michael & Deepa Narayan, 2000.
'SocialCapital:Implicationsfor Development
Theory, Research, and Policy', World Bank
ResearchObserver15(2): 225-249.
Woolcock, Michael; Lant Pritchett & Jonathan
Isham,2001. 'The Social Foundationsof Poor
Economic Growth in Resource-Rich Coun-
tries', in Richard M. Auty, ed., Natural
Resourcesand Economic Growth. New York:
Oxford UniversityPress(76-92).
World Bank, 1997. Expanding the Measure of
Wealth:Indicatorsof EnvironmentallySustain-
able Development.Washington, DC: World
Bank.
World Bank, 2000. 'World Development Indi-
cators CD-ROM'. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
INDRA DE SOYSA, b. 1964. PhD in
Political Science (University of Alabama,
1998); Senior Researcher,InternationalPeace
ResearchInstitute, Oslo (1998-2000); Senior
Research Fellow, Department of Political &
Cultural Change, Center for Development
Research (ZEF), University of Bonn,
Germany (2000- ). Published articles in
Journal of Conflict Resolutionand American
SociologicalReview; currently completing a
book on the economic and political effects of
tradeand foreign direct investment.