SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
Succession; Probate of Wills; Conflict of Laws; Proof that wills executed abroad conform
with the formalities prescribed by laws in the foreign jurisdiction or by Philippine laws is
imperative.—The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens,
will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the
Civil Code of the Philippines: “Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which
he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.” Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside the Philippines.—The evidence necessary for the reprobate
or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has
his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5)
the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries
on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]).
Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.—The
necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
(Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the probate of wills, the courts should relax the rules on
evidence, as the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible
before a purported will is probated or denied probate.—Petitioner must have perceived this
omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and
substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While
the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on
evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before
a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81
SCRA 393 [1978]).
Same; Same; Same; The separate wills of the spouses may be probated jointly.—There
is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be
probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched
in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be
separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and
simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be “liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” A literal application of the Rules should be
avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
[1984]).
Same; Same; Same; Joint Wills; What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint
wills, not the joint probate of separate wills containing essentially the same provisions and
pertaining to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature.—What the law
expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators’ reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain
essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal
in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a
number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187
SCRA 743 [1990]).
Same; Same; Same; With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as
if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time and
accordingly must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice to the known heirs, legatees and devisees, and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner.—The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
“cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance”
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented
for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Parties; A judge whose order is being assailed is merely a
nominal or formal party.—This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on
a very glaring fact—petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus,
even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge
whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor
General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722, G.R. No. 76714
June 2, 1994
1

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the
Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided
by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans
lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn,
18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his
wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order
of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my
estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance
with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of
her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order
of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my
estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance
with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped
by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and
substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with
the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills
were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and
petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary
to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special
administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in
San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge
Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special
administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following
day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life
Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of
the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan
and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation,
stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had
delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life
insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered
to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit,
and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia
Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs).
He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients
were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple
fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for
deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the
"Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and
therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene";
(2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American
citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York
laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art.
816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the
husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither
2

distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution"
under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on
July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the
appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the
"brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had
been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the
sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due
process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not
notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and
concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4)
that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized
his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is
qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the
Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence,
they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the
appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or
accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence
they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that
she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the
decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule
77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines
and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the
executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary
proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his
brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed
$215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly
assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the
Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide
equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and
place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure
to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for
his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24,
1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on
April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to
be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that
they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue
of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule
76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be
complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified;
(2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit
an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender
the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular
administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the
American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the
estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the
suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the
estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs
opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received
$215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid
agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the
two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the
submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special
administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana
reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption
is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each
and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
3

On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York
governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner
for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country
within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second
portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the
Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said
order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last
will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all
orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February
21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It
considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final
settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner
filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength
of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country
within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August
19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a
motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and
therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named
substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging
that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits .
. . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan
spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the
said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August
19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that
the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that
proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who
inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a
decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that
the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of
wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the
foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an
order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not
a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45
days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent
Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb
its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate
proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for
reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining
in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present
evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of
wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two
wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode
of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York
"where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in
separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July
18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate
proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as
they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against
"the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp.
405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration,
citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that
the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner
4

stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs
and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two
or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a
single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the
hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the
allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be
probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and
Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is
the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that
his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly
authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore
stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were
recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-
3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills
(Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the
Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters
testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan
that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing
Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were
held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly
executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted
to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property
(Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness
and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of the
decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their
court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29,
1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country,
or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
5

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429;
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the
first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit
the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent
Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts
should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos
v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses
should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills
is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should
be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and
simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in
the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987];
Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two
wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability
are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has
held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v.
Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact —
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus,
even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge
whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor
General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules
of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the
first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled
to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of
the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
6

G.R. No. 18600 March 9, 1922
B. E. JOHANNES, husband of Carmen Theodora Johannes, deceased, as a
administrator; CARLOS D'ALMEIDA and IDA JOHANNES, with her husband, J. E.
JOHANNES, relators, vs. Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY, as judge of First
Instance of Manila, ALFREDO D'ALMEIDA, brother of Carmen Johannes, as
administrator, and PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, as late guardian for a certain
cash deposit of Carmen Johannes, respondent.
1.CONFLICT OF LAWS; ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES; PRINCIPAL
ADMINISTRATION AND ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION, COMPARED.—One J, a
married woman, died intestate in Singapore, Straits Settlements. Her husband was named
the administrator of her property by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. Her
brother was appointed by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila administrator of
the Manila estate. Held: That the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila did not act in
excess of jurisdiction in naming the brother of the deceased as the ancillary administrator
of the estate.
2.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his
domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which
is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.—A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond
the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a
foreign state has no authority in the United States.
4.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in
a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 642, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, CONSTRUED.— It is
almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator is
to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else.
This preference has particular force under Spanish law precedents.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Code of Civil Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom administration can be granted,
leaves this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be found that the surviving
spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domiciliary
representative, if he applies therefor, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of
express statutory requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other person.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 783, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, CONSTRUED.—Pursuant
to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance
appointing an administrator of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final
determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and
is appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy [1907], 8 Phil., 594.) Johannes vs. Harvey,
43 Phil. 175, No. 18600 March 9, 1922
The relevant facts disclosed by this petition for certiorari and the return thereto may be
stated as follows:
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in Singapore,
Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there remained the
husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred
D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the brother
Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was in
Manila. The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking that letters of administration be
granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the lawful
husband of the deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband of the deceased.
At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband was named the administrator of the property
of the deceased wife, which was locally situate within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the Straits Settlements. (Under the British law [22 & 23 Charles II c 10, 29 Charles II c
3, and James II c 17], it would seem that the husband is entitled to the whole of the estate
of his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next of kin.) On October 1, 1921,
the brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila
estate of the deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This sum it appears, was on deposit in
the Manila banks under and by virtue of guardianship proceedings for the late Carmen
Theodora Johannes, which were finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the
Philippine Trust Company, on January 16, 1922.
The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable George R. Harvey, as judge
of First Instance of the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing
Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in the Philippines, and
that an administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary. Accordingly, relators pray the court
to annul the appointment of Alfred D'Almeida and to issue an order directing the Judge of
First Instance to have placed to the credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate
of Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late Carmen D'Almeida Johannes,
now on deposit and subject to the order of the court, with P5,000 as damages. The
respondents, Judge Harvey, and the administrator Alfred D'Almeida, in compliance with
the order to show cause why the writ should not issue, contend that the respondent judge
7

has not in any manner acted in excess of the jurisdiction duly conferred upon and exercised
by him in the manner provided by law, and that an order appointing an administrator is a
final and appealable order.
Certain general observations may possibly serve to clarify the situation.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Undoubtedly, if the husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court would give
consideration to this petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for local
purposes. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary representative,
if he applies therefor, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory
requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other person. (24 C. J., 1114.)

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person
dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because
a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of
the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has
no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in
the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed
among his heirs. (23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.; Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882],
108 U. S., 256; Perez vs. Aguerria [1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 443; Vaughn vs. Barret
[1833], 5 Vt., 333.)
There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of the
estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties
thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc
Suy [1907], 8 Phil., 594.)
As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has not acted in excess of its
jurisdiction, and as there in an appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the writ prayed for
cannot be granted. Costs against the relators. So ordered.

The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late Carmen
Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine
Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration,
conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay the claims
of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to the domiciliary
jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin. Such administration appears to be
required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of section 596 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which permit of the settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings,
have not been met. The decision of this court in Baldemor vs. Malangyaon ([1916]), 34
Phil., 368), on which relators rely, is then not in point because predicated directly on the
provisions of the section last cited.

It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator
is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone
else. This preference has particular force under Spanish law precedents. (4
Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 1085.) However, the Code of Civil
Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion of the court
to determine, for it may be found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the
responsibility. Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be considered in determining the
propriety of the appointment, and in this connection, it is to be noted that the husband of
the deceased, the administrator of the principal administration, resides in Singapore.
8

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents
Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution of attorneys where
the Motion to Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of will was filed, trial judge acted properly in
hearing evidence ex parte on probate of will in question.—We find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support
petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means
and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after
the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein
he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed.
Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P.
Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco
Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that
the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since
the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate
of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of will is resolved, probate court should meet
the issue.—The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478).
Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the intrinsic and
extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national and resident of
Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give his entire estate to a complete
stranger.—Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
x x x x the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania
law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA
358).
Motions; Due Process; There was no denial of due process as what the court repeatedly
set for hearing was the Petition for Relief, not the Motion to Vacate Order of Jan. 10,
1979.—As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the
records will bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates
until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the
order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to
believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence
when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested “for the future setting of the case for hearing x x x” did
not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied
in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Succession; Jurisdiction; Probate of Will of American citizen who left an estate in the
Philippines was properly filed in the City of Manila where estate is located.—Therefore,
the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion
at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United
States of America and not a “usual resident of Cavite” as alleged by the petitioner.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court
in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522, No.
L-54919 May 30, 1984
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed
the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte
presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C.
Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of
9

the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate
of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in
the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her
death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with
her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry
of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the
administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his
appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in
question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even
if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply
inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he
"has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be
truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of
evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with
a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124,
(Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and
Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according
to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn
in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit
C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United States of
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos
was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration
were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the
laws of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
(Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate
in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and
Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of
said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in
favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order
allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the
same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss
Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds
of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the
withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made
several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set
Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this
motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at
8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of
the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for
the future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set
aside previously filed.
10

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case
was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to
vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present
evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which,
incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on
its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13,
1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes
Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only
remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to
Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver
of rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos,
thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate
of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in
a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to
the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the
distribution of the estate-the law especially providing that repudiation of an
inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order
for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by
a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the
forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence
was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing
was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over
the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of
the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was
adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured
through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The
records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed
a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his
voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted
by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of
filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly
in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule,
the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which
was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
11

and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article
16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which
is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to
a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would
be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein
we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records
wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until
June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order
of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe
otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when
his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process.
The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean
that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu
of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and
not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of
merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by
the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc.
vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
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 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. L-3677 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of BASIL GORDON BUTLER; MERCEDES
LEON, petitioner-appellant, and ADA LOGGEY GHEZZI, administratrix-appellant, vs.
MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO., thru Philippine Branch, oppositor-
appellee.
1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; EXTENT OF POWER OF
ADMINISTRATION.-
The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets
of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an
administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state
or country.
2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ANNUITIES; PROCEEDS NO LONGER
FORM PART OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE; FUNDS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF
PROBATE COURT.-
The entire amount invested in a contract of annuity by virtue of which the beneficiary
receives a periodical sum during her lifetime, no longer forms part of a decedent's estate
and is beyond the control of a probate court. It has passed completely into the hands of
the company from which the annuity was purchased in accordance with contract duly
authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as a simple
consideration for the company's assumed obligation, the proceeds of the sale can not be
withdrawn without the consent of the company, except where upon the death of the
annuitant, the residuary legatee claims the remainder, if there be any. Neither the
domiciliary or ancillary executor of the decedent's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant
has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amount and except upon the conditions
agreed upon in the contract of annuity.
This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila which denied a motion of the
administratrix in the matter of the testate estate of Basil Gordon Butler (Special
Proceedings No. 6218). The motion prayed for the citation of the Manager of the Manila
Branch of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear and under
a complete accounting of certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and
claimed to belong to the estate. His Honor, Judge Rafael Amparo of the court below, held
that these funds "came into the possession of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., Inc.,
regularly and in due course and, therefore, sees no justifiable ground to require said
company to render an accounting thereon."
The essential facts are that Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died
in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in the
Surrogate's Court of New York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The
estate having been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947.
The will contained this residuary clause:
After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I
devise, give and bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which
I may die possessed to Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit:
the personal effects to be delivered to her for her use and profit; the moneys,
securities and other valuable property, not personal effects, to be held in trust for
her benefit by my executors, at their absolute discretion, to be administered for her
permanent benefit in whatever way they may consider most advantageous in the
circumstances existing. Since the said Mercedes de Leon is not of sound
judgment, and discretion in the handling of money, it is not my wish that she be
given any sums of money other than for her current needs, except as my executors
in their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount available for this
bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their
discretion may do so. And I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the
action of my executors upon their discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone
whatsoever.
For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross was
appointed trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948. Once
appointed, and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an
annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada,
paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a
monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime, with the proviso that in
the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the capital sum shall be paid in one sum to
James Madison Ross or his successor as trustee. And beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes
de Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance
Company's Manila Office.
With the object, so it would seem, of getting hold at once of the entire amount invested in
the annuity, Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler's will for probate
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey
Ghezzi as administratrix with the will annexed early in 1949. (James Madison Ross and
Ewald E. Selph had expressly declined appointment as executors "on the ground that the
probate proceedings of the above estate were terminated by the Surrogate's Court of the
County of New York, New York City, U. S. A., and that there are no properties of the estate
left to be administered.") After having qualified, the administratrix filed the motion which
Judge Amparo has denied; and as the party most if not solely interested in that motion,
Mercedes de Leon has joined Ghezzi in this appeal.
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The administration of Butler's estate granted in New York was the principal or domiciliary
administration (Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 175), while the administration taken out in
the Philippines is ancillary. However, the distinction serves only to distinguish one
administration from the other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. (34
C.J.S. 1232,1233).
The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the assets
herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only
to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that
an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another
state or country. (Keenan vs. Toury, 132 A.L.R. 1362; Nash vs. Benari, 3 A.L.R. 61;
Michigan Trust Co. vs. Chaffee, 149 A.L.R. 1078).This principle is specifically embodied
in section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in
the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law
in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada
under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party
whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which
holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to
the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing
or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES
In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the
administratrix's motion is defined in section 7 of Rule 88, which provides.
Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account.—The court, on
complaint of an executor or administrator, with any part the estate of the deceased
to appear before it, and may require such person to render a full account, on oath,
of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such
estate as came to his possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and
for his proceedings thereon; and if the person so cited refuses to appear to render
such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful
order of the court.
The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants the latter
to account for, nor did the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust for the
administratrix. In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of
the motion and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject of the motion,
we incline to believe, is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in
complete disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her
welfare, and of the annuity contract which the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction
with the trustee.
All in all, from every standpoint, including that of the annuitant's financial well-being, the
motion and the appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised.
The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants.

Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of
butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the
hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. Whether
considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation,
which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant,
the proceeds of the sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except,
upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there
be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the
annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the
conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.

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