Sec. 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Administrative
chanrobles virtual
Code of 1987."
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of
the text, or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall
require a different meaning:
 (1) "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority is made effective
in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions
or other forms of local government.chanrobles virtual law
library
 (2) "National Government" refers to the entire machinery of the
central government, as distinguished from the different forms of
local governments.chanrobles virtual law library
 (3) "Local Government" refers to the political subdivisions
established by or in accordance with the
Constitution.chanrobles virtual law library
 (4) "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various
units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein.chanrobles virtual law library
 (5) "National agency" refers to a unit of the National
Government.chanrobles virtual law library
 (6) "Local agency" refers to a local government or a distinct unit
therein.chanrobles virtual law library
 (7) "Department" refers to an executive department created by
law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any
instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank
of a department, regardless of its name or
designation.chanrobles virtual law library
 (8) "Bureau" refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any
department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any
principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or
assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless of actual name or
designation, as in the case of department-wide regional
offices.chanrobles virtual law library
 (9) "Office" refers, within the framework of governmental
organization, to any major functional unit of a department or
bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any
position held or occupied by individual persons, whose
functions are defined by law or regulation.
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 (10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework
vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.chanrobles virtual law library
 (11) "Regulatory agency" refers to any agency expressly vested
with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters
affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons, the
principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body,
such as a commission, board or council.chanrobles virtual law
library
 (12) "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges and the monetary authority of the State.chanrobles
virtual law library
 (13) "Government-owned or controlled corporation" refers to
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of
its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or
controlled corporations may be further categorized by the
Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and
the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and
discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.chanrobles
virtual law library
 (14) "Officer" as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee",
refers to a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or
manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of the government. When used
with reference to a person having authority to do a particular
act or perform a particular function in the exercise of
governmental power, "officer" includes any government
employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or
exercise that function.chanrobles virtual law library
1
  (15) "Employee", when used with reference to a person in the
public service, includes any person in the service of the
government or any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities.chanrobles virtual law l
Republic vs Migrino
GR 89483
August 30, 1990
Facts:
Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which
indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private
respondent Ret. Lt.Tecson was required by the Board to submit his
explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence. Private
respondent was unable to produce his supporting evidence because they
were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The
Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution,
recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation
of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.
The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private
respondent moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (1) that the
PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him
under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar
as it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of
actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired from the
AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board
opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied
by the PCGG. Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidence.
Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
with the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of
PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner replied to the opposition.
The court judge denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The respondent judge
granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private respondent
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the private
respondent’s case falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this
petition.
Issues:
WON PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent
Ruling:
No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, creating the Board
and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the contention
that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the
term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who
enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in
E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth
is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
#43 AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT (COA), [G.R. No. 116422, November 4, 1996] By: June Ylanan
Facts: Petitioners Avelina Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former
employees of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government
service. They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act
No. 660. In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660,
petitioners also claimed SSS “financial assistance” benefits granted under
SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971. Their applications were however
denied because of respondent COA’s 1989 ruling disallowing all claims for
financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56 for the reason that the
scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS constituted additional
retirement benefits, and the scheme partook of the nature of a
supplementary pension/retirement plan proscribed by RA 4968 (The Teves
Retirement Law), the law amending CA 186(the GSIS Charter).
Issue: WON COA abused its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners’
claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56? No.
Ruling: It is clear from the clauses and provisions of Resolution 56 that its
financial assistance plan constitutes a supplemental retirement/pension
benefits plan and Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 in no
uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other
than the GSIS -- for government officers and employees. Though it may be
disputed that Res 56 was promulgated for laudable purposes, it simply
cannot be tolerated for such reason alone as the said Resolution clearly
contravenes the provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no
effect. SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan,
particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the
guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them
nugatory. It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an
administrative order, the former must prevail.[15] A rule or regulation must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
2
order for such rule or regulation to be valid.[16] The rule-making power of a
public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not
use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to
what fields are subject toregulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
#45 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. INTERPORT
RESOURCES CORPORATION, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 By: June
Ylanan D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: On 6 August 1994, the
Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with
Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The SEC averred that it received reports that
IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and
that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares
utilizing this material insider information.
Consequently, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated
the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, when it failed to make timely
disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that
some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving
IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
Securities Act. The respondents in turn filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals which promulgated a Decision in favor of the IRC. It determined that
there was no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure,
insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which
the IRC allegedly violated. The CA likewise noted that it found no statutory
authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no
civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the
respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal
protection. Issue: WON the SEC has no statutory authority to initiate and file
any suit against IRC and its directors with respect to Section 30 (INSIDER'S
DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN TRADING) and Section 36
(DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) of the
Revised Securities Act. The SEC has authority. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of implementing rules to
make them binding and effective. Ruling: The Court of Appeals ruled that
absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had
against the respondents without violating their right to due process andequal
protection. This is untenable. In the absence of any constitutional or statutory
infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled
that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a
specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the
same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes. The mere absence of
implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a
reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. The policy of
the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined
to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules
and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing
general regulations for various and varying details of management. To rule
that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of
Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the
implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating
to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to
fully know. It is well established that administrative authorities have the power
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to
effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into
effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and
regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or
deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute
contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no
impediment to its implementation.
#46 KILUSANG MAYO UNO et. al. vs. THE DIRECTOR- GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, G.R. No.
167798, April 19, 2006 By: June Ylanan Facts: This case involves two
consolidated petitions seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420
(EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420 requiring all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize
their identification systems to ensure the attainment of the following
objectives: a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden xxx b.
3
To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the
government and those availing of government services; xxx d. To enhance
the integrity and reliability of governmentissued ID cards; and e. To facilitate
access to and delivery of quality and effective government service. Issues:
WON EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President. No.
Ruling: There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all
courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under
the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive
department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card
issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and
convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power.
Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative
power. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
"President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional power of
control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of
their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and
ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public. The President’s constitutional power of control is
se-lfexecuting and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course,
the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of
government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent
constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or
to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national
ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that
is compulsory for all branches of government. The Constitution also
mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There
are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform
ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing
EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420 is well within the
constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not
usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of
Executive power – the President’s constitutional power of control over the
Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Legislative
power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO
420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely
implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as
insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and userfriendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing
laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of
legislation. What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card
system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing
appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is
compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent
constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether
they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system
requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is
routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to
privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special
appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities
covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not
compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all
citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording
of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact,
the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data
collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
#47 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, G.R.
No. 180046, April 2, 2009 By: June Ylanan D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.:
Facts: This case is a result of the leakage in the June 2006 Nursing Board
Examination which prompted then President GMA to issue EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all
review centers and similar entitiesin the Philippines. In response thereto,
then CHED Chairman Carlito Puno approved the IRR of the said EO 566.
Then CHED chairman further advanced that “ While it may be true that
regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED under
Republic Act 7722, however, by virtue of EO 566 issued by the president, the
CHED now is the agency that is mandated to regulate the establishment and
operation of all review centers. Thus this case. Issue: Whether or not EO 566
is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHED’s jurisdiction. Yes. Whether or not the RIRR is an invalid
exercise of the Executive’srule-making power. Yes.
Ruling: The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the
authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested
with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and
to alter and repeal them,” and this power was vested in the Congress of the
4
Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the President.
It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. The president also exercises administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy. In this case however, EO 566 is
not supported by any enabling law. Regulations are not supposed to be a
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of
power to make laws. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power,
the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasilegislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power
through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only
exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA
7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither
institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting
programs. Hence, Executive Order No. 566 and its IRR was declared VOID
for being unconstitutional.
Smart Communications, Inc. et. al. vs. National Telecommunications
Commission
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE
CORPORATION (PILTEL) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003
FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the
billing of telecommunications services and on measures in minimizing, if not
eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit. Isla
Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
(PilTel) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum
circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum circulars. Such
jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines.
Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed
a joint motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention.
This was granted by the trial court.
The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs.
NTC filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The defendant's MD is denied for lack of
merit. NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial court. The CA,
upon NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari and prohibition, reversed
the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to
exhaust administrative remedies?
RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are
the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It
is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be
valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well
as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former
must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
5
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases
involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling
is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide
a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies
where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued
by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
ANNIE SAND, LYDIA VALDES, LUZ SABAS, JOSEFINA A. MENDOZA and
ROSARIO A. ORDIZ, in their capacity as Chairman and Members of the
Board of Examiners for Nurses, petitioners, vs. ABADSANTOS
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
No. L-30918. July 18, 1974.
Facts:
In an action for declaratory relief filed on September 18,1968 by respondent
AbadSantos School of Nursing against petitioners chairman and members
of the Board of Examiners for Nurses seeking a declaration that “Article VIII,
Rule 69, section 5 of the rules and regulations [of petitioner board] adopted
on July 27, 1967 (is) void, illegal and ineffective and without force of law and
that [respondent school] is not required to comply with the terms and
provisions thereof’respondent court after hearing rendered its decision of
June 24, 1969 holding that while petitioner board has “the full authority under
section 9, Republic Act No. 877, as amended to promulgate said rules and
regulations,” particularly the cited regulation providing for periodic inspection
of nursing schools, the board “may apply only the same to newschools or
colleges established or opened afterthe promulgation of said rules and
regulations” and “conversely” may not be given “retroactive effect” and
“cannot be enforced on schools and colleges already duly accredited by the
Bureau of Private Schools” prior to the promulgation by the board of the 1967
rules and regulations.
Respondent court thus rendered judgment declaring that “paragraph 5,
Rule 69, Art. VIII of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
respondents members of the Board of Examiners for Nurses is void, illegal
and of no effect against herein petitioner and its graduates.”
Hence, the present petition seeking a reversal of respondent court’s
judgment and for a declaration of validity of the disputed rule.
Nursing law; Administrative law; Board of Examiners for Nurses has visitorial
powers.—Respondent’s contention is untenable in law in that the argument
that “to contend that the Board of Examiners for Nurses has the same
visitorialpower over already existing schools of nursing as that conferred by
law on the Bureau of Private Education might result in the highly anomalous
situation that said Board and the Bureau of Private Education might have
different and conflicting findings on the conditions and standards of these
schools, and a resultant power struggle between these two agencies of the
governments, to the prejudice of the schools concerned and their students
and graduates,” manifestly addresses itself to the wisdom of the provisions of
the Act granting similar visitorial powers to the petitioner board as a
6
specialized board composed of highly competent technical persons, viz,
“registered nurses of recognized standing in the Philippines” whom the
Congress deemed could be relied upon to maintain high standards for
nursing education and the nursing profession.
Same; Same; Constitutional law; Judicial review; Courts may not pass
upon wisdom of statute.—It is well settled that it is beyond the domain of the
courts to inquire into the wisdom of the Act vesting the petitioner board with
similar powers to that likewise entrusted to the Bureau of Private Education.
Same; Same; Nursing Board’s visitorial powers may be exercised over
schools existing at the time of the promulgation of its regulations.—
Respondent court’s view that petitioner board’s power of periodic inspection
would apply only to new nursing schools opened after the promulgation of
the rule and not to existing schools already accredited by the Bureau of
Private Schools would lead to the absurd result whereby petitioner board
would be utterly helpless with reference to existing schools (which would
constitute a special class) and powerless to require them to maintain the
minimum standards under pain of disqualifying their deficient graduates from
the nurses’ examinations.
Same; Same; Constitutional law; Police power; Board of Nursing’s rule
providing for periodic inspection of nursing schools and barring from
admission to the nurses’ examination graduates of schools found to be sub-
standard during the period the deficiency existed is valid exercise of police
power.—It cannot be gainsaid that the cited regulation is one of the many
forms of a proper exercise of police power by the State which is called upon
to see to it and assure in the interest of public health and welfare that
colleges and schools of nursing are properly conducted and maintained in
accordance with the standards fixed; that they do not become sub-standard
or fall below the standards; and that only qualified graduates are allowed to
take the State examination and thereafter licensed to practice the noble
profession of nursing.
Same; Same; It is presumed that the Board of Nursing will discharge its
task reasonably and that new substantive requirements would be applied
prospectively.—In this regard, the presumption is that petitioner board would
discharge its task justly and reasonably in accordance with established
norms. Where it would impose new substantive requirements in the curricula
or the facilities to upgrade the standards beyond the minimum requirements,
such requirements would be prospectively imposed in the same manner cited
by respondent court that this Court in requiring a four-year’s bachelor’s
degree (in lieu of the previous 2-year pre-law course) for admission to the
study of law applied the new requirement prospectively and allowed those
already admitted to the study of law (from 1st to 4th year with a 2-year pre-
law course) to continue with their studies and upon graduation to take the bar
examination. But where the board finds in the course of its periodic
inspection that a nursing school does not meet the standing minimum
requirements and standards, then it is the board’s duty, as provided in the
rule, to require the deficient school to make the required improvements as
would enable it to meet the minimum standards which must be carried out
within one year and meanwhile to bar the would-be graduates of such
deficient school from the nurses’ examination until its deficiency and that of
its would-be graduates shall have been removed.
Pork barrel case: Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa case digest
October 9, 2017
Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 &
209251, November 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English
origin, refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of
Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this
provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an
item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee
elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of
the people, also became involved in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial
law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations
Act (“GAA”) called “Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”).
SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators.
The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or “hard
projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which would fall
under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of
democracy, the pork barrel was revived through the “Mindanao
Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development
Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released
directly to implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required
list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any
7
 kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to
“soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds
was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities
identified by individual legislators. This was also the first time when the
Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that
the Department of Budget and Management was required to submit reports
to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional
pork barrel aside from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd
School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the
Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned and
the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three
separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa
Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program
Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with
members of Congress for the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”)
appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with the
representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal
services and other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation
of non-governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects
was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to
specific amounts for individual legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express
statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed identify
programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds
and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8
of Presidential Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand
Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that
huge sums of money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the
form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the
PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary
basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the
allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a
three-year audit investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the
PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the
Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal
standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
8
 SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f)
local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system.
 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
laws allowing for their utilization are currently existing and operational and
thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the
abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter.
The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul the
legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from
deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of
the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a
situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public
interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s
constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the
preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such
that the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and
citizens of the Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs.
Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring
post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and the PDAF
Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not
only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas
of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies considering that the authority to identify projects is an
aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be
exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to
appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of
Budget and Management[2] does not also bar judgment on the present
case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and hence no
controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the
Legislative Departments has been violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund
release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
9
 that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to
the executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the ―
regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers
principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members
to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is
only recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification
of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can
be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been
violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is
lodged in Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation
because each of them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would
go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be
further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it
would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is
because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of
item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as
Congress is incapable of checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in
the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who
are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government, because it
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-
enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF
per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must
be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not
self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the
state shall prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a
self-executing provision.
10
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on
local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are
national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for
local development.
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on
the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have
been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(“LDCs”) which are already legally mandated to―assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development,
and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid
appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”, it is
enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart
a determinable amount: a Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues,
and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because
it set apart a determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the
aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development
projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes
undue delegation of legislation powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section
8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative powers because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
11