LAW TRADITION VS CIVIL LAW TRADITION
GENERAL PROVISIONS
The common law tradition emerged in England during the Middle
Ages and was applied within British colonies across continents.
The civil law tradition developed in continental Europe at the same
time and was applied in the colonies of European imperial powers
such as Spain and Portugal. Civil law was also adopted in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries by countries formerly
possessing distinctive legal traditions, such as Russia and Japan
that sought to reform their legal systems in order to gain economic
and political power comparable to that of Western European
nation-states.
To an American familiar with the terminology and process of our
legal system, which is based on English common law, civil law
systems can be unfamiliar and confusing. Even though England
had many profound cultural ties to the rest of Europe in the Middle
Ages, its legal tradition developed differently from that of the
continent for a number of historical reasons, and one of the most
fundamental ways in which they diverged was in the
establishment of judicial decisions as the basis of common law
and legislative decisions as the basis of civil law. Before looking
at the history, let’s examine briefly what this means.
Common law is generally uncodified. This means that there is
no comprehensive compilation of legal rules and statutes. While
common law does rely on some scattered statutes, which are
legislative decisions, it is largely based on precedent, meaning
the judicial decisions that have already been made in similar
cases. These precedents are maintained over time through the
records of the courts as well as historically documented in
collections of case law known as yearbooks and reports. The
precedents to be applied in the decision of each new case are
determined by the presiding judge. As a result, judges have an
enormous role in shaping American and British law. Common law
functions as an adversarial system, a contest between two
opposing parties before a judge who moderates. A jury of ordinary
people without legal training decides on the facts of the case. The
judge then determines the appropriate sentence based on the
jury’s verdict.
Civil Law, in contrast, is codified. Countries with civil law
systems have comprehensive, continuously updated legal codes
that specify all matters capable of being brought before a court,
the applicable procedure, and the appropriate punishment for
each offense. Such codes distinguish between different
categories of law: substantive law establishes which acts are
subject to criminal or civil prosecution, procedural law establishes
how to determine whether a particular action constitutes a
criminal act, and penal law establishes the appropriate penalty. In
a civil law system, the judge’s role is to establish the facts of the
case and to apply the provisions of the applicable code. Though
the judge often brings the formal charges, investigates the matter,
and decides on the case, he or she works within a framework
established by a comprehensive, codified set of laws. The judge’s
decision is consequently less crucial in shaping civil law than the
decisions of legislators and legal scholars who draft and interpret
the codes.
A.
1. NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
G.R. No. L-47362 December 19, 1940
JUAN F. VILLARROEL, recurrente-apelante,
vs.
BERNARDINO ESTRADA, recurrido-apelado.
On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, the mother of the defendant
Juan F. Villarroel, obtained from the Mariano Estrada and
Severina spouses a loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years
(Exhibit A). Alejandra passed away, leaving the defendant as the
sole heir. The spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died,
leaving the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada as the sole heir. On
August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibit B)
declaring the applicant P1, 000 in duty, with an interest of 12
percent per year. This action is about the collection of this amount.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna, in which this action was
filed, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed
of P1, 000 with his legal interests of 12 percent a year from August
9, 1930 to its full payment. Appeal of this sentence.
It will be noted that the parties in the present case are,
respectively, the sole heirs of the original creditors and the debtor.
This action is exercised by virtue of the obligation that the
defendant, as the only son of the original debtor, contracted in
favor of the plaintiff, the only heir of the original creditors. It is
admitted that the amount of P1, 000 to which this obligation is
contracted is the same debt of the defendant's mother to the
parents of the plaintiff.
Although the action to recover the original debt has already
prescribed when the claim was filed in this case, the question that
arises in this appeal is mainly the question of whether,
notwithstanding such a prescription, the action is
appropriate. However, the present action is not based on the
original obligation contracted by the defendant's mother, which
has already been prescribed, but on the one contracted by the
defendant on August 9, 1930 (Exhibit B) upon assuming
compliance with that obligation, already prescribed. Being the
defendant the only heir of the original debtor, with the right to
succeed her in her inheritance, that debt legally brought by her
mother, although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now,
however, for the moral obligation, which is considered enough to
create and make effective and enforceable its obligation
voluntarily contracted on August 9, 1930 in Exhibit B.
The rule that a new promise to pay a prescreened debt must be
made by the same obligated person or by another legally
authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case in which it is
not required compliance with the obligation of the obligor
originally, but which you des voluntarily wanted to assume this
obligation.
The sentence appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the
appellant. This is how it is ordered.
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., Are satisfied.
G.R. No. 46274 November 2, 1939
A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant.
Marcial P. Lichauco and Manuel M. Mejia for appellant.
Wolfson, Barrion and Baradi and Ignacio Ycaza for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendant John C. Robb appeals to this Court from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive
part of which reads:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant, who is ordered to pay to the former the sum of
P2,000, with interest at the legal rate from March 11, 1938, until
paid, plus costs.
The facts established at the trial without discussion are the
following:
In September, 1935, the board of directors of the Philippine
Greyhound Club, Inc., told the herein defendant-appellant John
C. Robb, to make a business trip to Shanghai to study the
operation of a dog racing course. In Shanghai, the defendant-
appellant stayed at the American Club where be became
acquainted with the plaintiff-appellee, A. O. Fisher, through their
mutual friends. In the course of a conversation, the defendant-
appellant came to know that the plaintiff-appellee was the
manager of a dog racing course. Upon knowing the purpose of
the defendant-appellant's trip, the plaintiff-appellee showed great
interest and invited him to his establishment and for several days
gave him information about the business. It seems that the plaintiff
became interested in the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and
asked the defendant if he could have a part therein as a
stockholder. As the defendant-appellant answered in the
affirmative, the plaintiff-appellee thereupon filled a subscription
blank and, through his bank in Shanghai, sent to the Philippine
Greyhound Club, Inc., in Manila telegraphic transfer for P3,000 in
payment of the first installment of his subscription. Later on the
defendant-appellant returned to Manila from Shanghai.
Some months thereafter, when the board of directors of the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., issued a call for the payment of
the second installment of the subscriptions, the defendant-
appellant sent a radiogram to the plaintiff-appellee did so and sent
P2,000 directly to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in payment
of the said installment. Due to the manipulations of those who
controlled the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., during the
absence of the defendant-appellant undertook the organization of
a company called The Philippine Racing Club, which now
manages the race track of the Santa Ana park. The defendant
immediately endeavored to save the investment of those who had
subscribed to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., by having the
Philippine Racing Club acquire the remaining assets of the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. The defendant-appellant wrote a
letter to the plaintiff-appellee in Shanghai explaining in detail the
critical condition of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and
outlining his plans to save the properties and assets of the
plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible to the
stockholders who had paid their second installment (Exh. C). In
answer to said letter, the plaintiff-appellee wrote the defendant-
appellant requiring him to return the entire amount paid by him to
the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., (exhibit E). Upon receiving
this letter, the defendant-appellant answered the plaintiff-appellee
for any loss which he might have suffered in connection with the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the same way that he could
not expect anyone to reimburse him for his own losses which were
much more than those of the plaintiff-appellee (Exh. B).
The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or
not the trial court erred in holding that there was sufficient
consideration to justify the promise made by the defendant-
appellant in his letters Exhibits B and C.
In the fifth paragraph of the letter Exhibit B, dated March 16, 1936,
addressed by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-appellee, the
former said: "I feel a moral responsibility for these second
payments, which were made in order to carry out my plan (not the
first payments, as you have it in your letter), and Mr. Hilscher and
I will see to it that stockholders who made second payments
receive these amounts back as soon as possible, out of our own
personal funds. "As it is, I have had to take my loss along with
everyone else here, and so far as I can see that is what all of us
must do. The corporation is finally flat, so it is out of the question
to receive back any of your investment from that source; the only
salvage will be the second payment that you made, and that will
come from Hilscher and me personally, as I say, not because of
any obligation, but simply because we have taken it on ourselves
to do that. (And I wish I could find someone who would undertake
to repay a part of my own losses in the enterprise!)" And in the
seventh paragraph of the letter Exhibit C, dated February 21,
1936, addressed by the same defendant-appellant to the same
plaintiff-appellee the former said the following:
However, Mr. Fischer and I feel a personal responsibility to those
few stockholders who made their second payments, including
yourself, and it is our intention to personally repay the amounts of
the second payments made by those few.
. . . And, finally, paragraph 8 of the same letter Exhibit C states:
"We are to receive a certain share of the new Philippine Racing
Club for our services as promoters of that organization, and as
soon as this is received by us, we will be in a position to
compensate you and the few others who made the second
payments. That, as T have said, will come from us personally, in
an effort to make things easier for those who were sportsmen
enough to try to save the Greyhound organization by making
second payments.
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
A contract exists from the moment one or more persons consent
to be bound with respect to another or others to deliver something
or to render some services.
And article 1261 of the same Civil Code provides the following:
ART. 1261. There is no contract unless the following requisites
exists:
1. The consent of the contracting parties;
2. A definite object which is the subject-matter of the contract;
3. A consideration for the obligation established.
In the present case, while the defendant-appellant told the
plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible for the second
payments which had been made to carry out his plan, and that
Mr. Hilscher and he would do everything possible so that the
stockholders who had made second payments may receive the
amount paid by them from their personal funds because they
voluntarily assumed the responsibility to make such payment as
soon as they receive from the Philippine racing Club certain
shares for their services as promoters of said organization, it does
not appear that the plaintiff-appellee had consented to said form
of reimbursement of the P2,000 which he had directly paid to the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in satisfaction of the second
installment.
The first essential requisite, therefore, required by the cited article
1261 of the Civil Code for the existence of a contract, does not
exists.
As to the third essential requisite, namely, "A consideration for the
obligation established," article 1274 of the same Code provides:
In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of the parties is
the delivery or performance or the promise of delivery or
performance of a thing or service by the other party; in
remuneratory contracts the consideration is the service or benefit
for which the remuneration is given, and in contracts of pure
beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the benefactors.
And article 1275 of the same Code provides:
ART. 1275. Contracts without consideration or with an illicit
consideration produce no effect whatsoever. A consideration is
illicit when it is contrary to law or morality.
Manresa, in volume 8, 4rth edition, pages 618-619 of his
Commentaries on the Civil Code, has this to say:
Considering the concept of the consideration as the explanation
and motive of the contract, it is related to the latter's object and
even more to its motives with which it is often confused. It is
differentiated from them, however, in that the former is the
essential reason for the contract, while the latter are the particular
reasons of a contracting party which do not affect the other party
and which do not preclude the existence of a different
consideration. To clarify by an example: A thing purchased
constitutes the consideration for the purchaser and not the
motives which have influenced his mind, like its usefulness, its
perfection, its relation to another, the use thereof which he may
have in mind, etc., a very important distinction, which precludes
the annulment of the contract by the sole influence of the motives,
unless the efficacy of the former had been subordinated to
compliance with the latter as conditions.
The jurisprudence shows some cases wherein this important
distinction is established. The consideration of contracts, states
the decision of February 24, 1904, is distinct from the motive
which may prompt the parties in executing them. The
inaccuracies committed in expressing its accidental or secondary
details do not imply lack of consideration or false consideration,
wherefore, they do not affect the essence and validity of the
contract. In a loan the consideration in its essence is, for the
borrower the acquisition of the amount, and for the lender the
power to demand its return, whether the money be for the former
or for another person and whether it be invested as stated or
otherwise.
The same distinction between the consideration and the motive is
found in the decisions of November 23, 1920 and March 5, 1924.
The contract sought to be judicially enforced by the plaintiff-
appellee against the defendant-appellant is onerous in character,
because it supposes the deprivation of the latter of an amount of
money which impairs his property, which is a burden, and for it to
be legally valid it is necessary that it should have a consideration
consisting in the lending or or promise of a thing or service by
such party. The defendant-appellant is required to give a thing,
namely, the payment of the sum of P2,000, but the plaintiff-
appellee has not given or promised anything or service to the
former which may compel him to make such payment. The
promise which said defendant-appellant has made to the plaintiff-
appellee to return to him P2,000 which he had paid to the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., as second installment of the
payment of the amount of the shares for which he has subscribed,
was prompted by a feeling of pity which said defendant-appellant
had for the plaintiff-appellee as a result of the loss which the latter
had suffered because of the failure of the enterprise. The
obligation which the said defendant-appellant had contracted with
the plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, purely moral and, as such, is
not demandable in law but only in conscience, over which human
judges have no jurisdiction.1awphi1.net
perfect or imperfect, and without the receipt of actual pecuniary or
material benefit by the promisor prior to the subsequent promise;
(2) cases in which the moral obligation arose from a legal liability
already performed or still enforceable; (3) cases in which the
moral obligation arose out of, or was connected with, a previous
request or promise creating originally an enforceable legal
liability, which, however, at the time of the subsequent express
promise had become discharged or barred by operation of a
positive rule of law, so that at that time there was no enforceable
legal liability; (4) cases in which the moral obligation arose from,
or was connected with, a previous request or promise which,
however, never created any enforceable legal liability, because of
a rule of law which rendered the original agreement void, or at
least unenforceable; and (5) cases in which the moral obligation
arose out of, or was connected with, the receipt of actual material
or pecuniary benefit by the promisor, without, however, any
previous request or promise on his part, express or implied, and
therefore, of course, without any original legal liability, perfect or
imperfect.
SEC. 97. Moral obligation unconnected with legal liability or legal
benefit. — Although, as subsequently shown was formerly some
doubt as to the point, it is now well established that a mere moral
obligation or conscience duty arising wholly from ethical motives
or a mere conscientious duty unconnected with any legal
obligation, perfect or imperfect, or with the receipt of benefit by
the promisor of a material or pecuniary nature will not furnish a
consideration for an executory promise. . . . .
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and
so hold, that the promise made by an organizer of a dog racing
course to a stockholder to return to him certain amounts paid by
the latter in satisfaction of his subscription upon the belief of said
organizer that he was morally responsible because of the failure
of the enterprise, is not the consideration rquired by article 1261
of the Civil Code as an essential element for the legal existence
of an onerous contract which would bind the promisor to comply
with his promise.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the costs to
the plaintiff.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran,
JJ., concur.

As to whether a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration, read

in volume 12 of the American Jurisprudence, pages 589-590,
paragraphs 96, 67, the following:

SEC. 96. Moral obligation. — Although there is authority in

support of the board proposition that a moral obligation is
sufficient consideration, such proposition is usually denied. . . . .

The case presenting the question whether a moral obligation will

sustain an express executory promise may be divided into five
classes: (1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from
ethical considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations,
QUASI DELICTS
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity
as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of
section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules
of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now
final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant
Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants
on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the
arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is
hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses
Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c)
OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO
2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-
appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed
fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father,
was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which
was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or
fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not
only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil
action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in
the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such
cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more
likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that
the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation
of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said
Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer
uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear
that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts)
and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article
2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability
in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act,
which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards.
"The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include
any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be
developed in any society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion
de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38,
Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a
civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the
same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in
Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176

is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason

behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any
act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which
cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.

Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial

court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and
RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the
Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing
his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against
respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be
summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a
three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur
Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned
and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned
by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As
a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for
Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed
against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage
to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by
hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit
and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's
Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage
to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-
owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya,
swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit
his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that
before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he
was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by
the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident
was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck
driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to
turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the
intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while
he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the
truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep,
which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was
coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused
Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case
No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50
and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50
as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense
charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his
bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision
between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the
former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not
a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel
and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the
damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving
their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol
were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum
allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to
whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint
is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails
to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by
petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge
dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons
stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September
30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that
dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former.
Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an
independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for
the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which
took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation
of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the
same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the
order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge
suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more
decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition
before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which
we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September
12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner
Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent
Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred
by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and
SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was
made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the
trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only;
and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against
truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-
owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the
damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar
to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a
Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties,
Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are
present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity
of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil
Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case
truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to
petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-
owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had
put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza)
being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal
Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases,
the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising
from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict
under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As
held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in.
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still
more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable
to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-
petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is
based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint
to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur
Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar
suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his
car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either
by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's
employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the
same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of
the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage
amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and
moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly,
therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of,
namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a
Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or
omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the
negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of
Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing
Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were
alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-
delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-
owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent
civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action,
invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided
for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida
7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is
a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation
and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ...
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated
in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the
proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio
Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different
from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under
the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made
in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it
being substantive in character and is not within the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive
but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the
Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that
petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file
an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different
picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability
co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for enforcement
of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages
based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal
under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the
offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the
conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on
culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and
intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said
Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the
criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there
was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed
impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the
basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal
case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial,
accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped
and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo
Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was
the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven
by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo
Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by
Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the

facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable
for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly,
inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been
extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court 10 which provides:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases

not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-

driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that
Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil
Code quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted

on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence ...

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon

reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is

concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated
January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different
grounds.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970

dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent
Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his
successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the
merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February
23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803
against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.